Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XXVI:

The Tie-up With De Gazelle Pays Off in Southern France

No strategic commitment of the war caused such bitter and prolonged wrangling at high levels as the operations in southern France. The British and Americans exchanged their angriest words on the relative merits of a landing in southern France as opposed to some alternative employment of Allied forces. The debate continues in memoirs and reminiscences. To the historian who reviews the unfolding of the contemporary record and what has been written later, a certain irony appears in the fact that while this was the most controversial it was also the most successful large-scale amphibious assault of the war. In all probability criticism should be leveled less at the planning and landing aspects of the operation and more at the tactical decisions made by the invading forces once ashore. 1 From the civil affairs point of view the operation was distinctive in the amount of responsibility placed on officials of the liberated territory. The preceding chapter has indicated that in the SHAEF area control of civil affairs was indirect. In southern France they became so indirect as to resemble Allied administration only faintly.

Southern France was not invaded until 15 August 1944, about ten days before SHAEF forces were liberating Paris. As mentioned in the chapter on planning, one of the difficulties met with during the planning phase was solved by the creation of the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment (Overhead) to direct civilian problems until responsibility passed to SHAEF. This regiment, whose commanding officer carried the title of Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Seventh Army, was set up according to the pattern common to the Mediterranean Theater. It included specific branches, regional teams, and detachments. The organizational pattern on D-day, together with certain changes in organization and supply procedure that took place early in the operation, appears in the opening documents. The first section of documents concerned with operations covers experiences and emergencies encountered in the first ten days. The advance progressed more rapidly and more smoothly than had been foreseen. Because of French help the planned civil affairs teams and detachments could be done away with rather soon. In their place liaison offices with from one to four officers were established at key geographical points where they served as clearinghouses for all civil affairs matters. The chief problem of CAHQ arose from the rapid liberation of large areas in which there was a food deficit. This necessitated speeding up the delivery of relief supplies.


The French were anxious to take over responsibility for civil administration in France and the Army was no less anxious to have them do so. On 12 September Civil Affairs Headquarters announced that "The policy of this Headquarters is solely to act as a liaison agency with the French Government, to learn its needs, and then to try to meet them within the bounds of military practicability. . . ." This statement is not to be taken to mean that Civil Affairs officers and men had little or nothing to do. Far from it. Later sections of the chapter deal with some of the continuing problems that were encountered after the initial impact of invasion. Practically all reports from the rapidly advancing units indicated that the most serious of these were shortages of transport, labor, and food. In this respect the south of France presented a sharp contrast to the situation in Normandy where there was a surplus of agricultural products. The south was largely dependent on imports from the north and west, and the destruction or confiscation of local transport facilities by the Germans had prevented both the preservation of food during the peak season and the shipment of surpluses to marketing areas. Various expedients were adopted to relieve the situation. The import of civilian supplies was speeded up, over five hundred trucks destined for the Middle East were diverted to France, and eventually southward moving military trains moved indigenous supplies down the Rhone valley. The American Army trucks were operated by two French "Groupes de Transport," which also made light repairs. Heavier maintenance was carried out in U.S. Army workshops.

The problem of dealing with the resistance in the south also presented a contrast to the situation in the north. In the north the Germans had instituted a military administration and the resistance was concerned primarily with getting rid of Germans. In the south the Germans had exercised control through the Vichy regime. Hence the resistance was directed principally against collaborators and took on many of the ugly aspects of civil war. Old scores were paid off and political axes ground. The Francs Tireurs Partisans Francais (FTPF), a Communist organization, along with the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (French Forces of the Interior) (FFI), arrested thousands of people and dealt out summary justice. In the department of Alpes-Maritimes, Communists were especially strong and in Marseille there was serious disorder. Allied civil affairs officers could do little but remonstrate with the French Military Mission. The French were ineffective also since they had neither arms nor transport. The situation improved somewhat after a French division was marched through Marseille. Eventually the Resistance forces were allowed either to join the army or return to their homes.

Dealing with the resistance was a problem primarily for the French but the extensive black market that rapidly sprang up was a U.S. Army problem. The black market was encountered in every theater of the war but it seems to have assumed unusual proportions in southern France. According to one source, an estimated 20 percent of the supplies landed at Marseille was stolen and sold by members of the armed forces and their followers; not only civil affairs supplies but also Army stocks were pilfered. At one point the theft of gasoline threatened to halt the Allied advance up the Rhone. The best efforts of military police and of the few public safety officers were inadequate to bring the situa-


tion under control for several weeks. When the Sixth Army Group assumed command on 15 September 1944, the Regimental Commander, Col. Henry Parkman, Jr., in addition to his other duties, became Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, of the Army Group. Thus the original plan calling for all civil affairs responsibilities to be vested in one officer became effective. SHAEF assumed responsibility for administration in southern France on 1 November and for supply on 20 November 1944. Control of shipping in the Mediterranean was still an Allied Force Headquarters responsibility.



[G-5, Sixth AGp, Hist Rpt, 19-31 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 504, 6th AGp Fld Rpts]

♦ ♦ ♦ The basic differences between the SHAEF plan and that which was worked out at Seventh Army were, in general, as follows: (a) the delegations of authority which AFHQ made to the CG, Seventh Army, were more extensive than those which SCAEF had made to Army Group Commanders in the OVERLORD operation; (b) the Seventh Army plan was based, from the first, upon an assumption of greater authority by the French civil authorities than had been contemplated by the SHAEF plan; (c) the civil affairs personnel was to be far less numerous in the ANVIL area than in the OVERLORD area. To a very considerable extent these differences were the result of the fact that the Seventh Army included among its units French Army "B," and that accordingly the same degree of political responsibility did not have to be assumed by the American commander in all operational areas. The fact that planning was being carried on in Algiers in the shadow of the Committee of National Liberation may also have tended to make the Seventh Army and AFHQ more aware of the inevitable drift towards full recognition of the Committee than was the case with planners in London. ♦ ♦ ♦

. .. It was planned to establish the Civil Affairs Headquarters at Marseille at the earliest possible moment and to have all civil affairs personnel, other than those assigned to tactical units, work out of that Headquarters, being sent to such administrative centers at Regional and Departmental capitals as needed. .. .


[History of Civil Affairs Operations for Southern France Under AFHQ, 15 Aug-1 Nov 44, p. 15, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt 5]

♦ ♦ ♦ As CAHQ for the Seventh Army, CAHQ occupied a unique position. While it operated under policies set down by G-5, Seventh Army, it reported directly to AFHQ and received orders directly from that source. Furthermore, it set up policies itself.

It derived authority for this from the Seventh Army's "Administrative Instruction No. 2" which outlined CAHQ's principal functions in this way:
"a. to maintain close liaison with the French authorities.
b. in liaison with the French authorities, to develop and formulate policies for the conduct of Civil Affairs throughout the whole of the liberated areas."

This duplication of the policy-making functions led to definite discord between CAHQ and the G-5 Section of the Army. Within two weeks after the landings Seventh Army staff officers were charging CAHQ with infringing upon their domain and CAHQ was countering with a charge that G-5 officers were transgressing in the operational field.

The dispute was resolved on the 15th of September when the Sixth Army group was activated and the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment passed under its control, becoming its Civil Affairs Headquarters. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr]

♦ ♦ ♦ By D-Day (15 August 1944) the authorized strength of the regiment had been increased to 196 officers and 398 enlisted men....

After intensive study of the ACC and the ECAD organizational charts, Colonel Parkman decided to establish five branches: Operations; Service and Supply; Law, Public Safety, Fine Arts; Economics and Finance; Welfare, Displaced Persons and Public Health. Almost immediately after D-Day, however, Public Health was constituted as a separate branch.

The organizational diagrams also provided for a Public Relations Adviser to the CCAO, a headquarters housekeeping staff, five regional teams of five officers each, one city detachment of eleven officers, three port detachments, one follow-up team and four specialists detachments. This provided posts for the greater part of the 196 officers. The remainder were attached as CAO's to tactical units or to the Civil Affairs Group of CBS (Continental Base Section), the unit designated to handle port and supply matters for the combat troops. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr]

♦ ♦ ♦ early assignments were almost completely re-shuffled by D plus 30, the date by which the last of the CAHQ officers had arrived in Southern France. Experiences of the CAO's .. . indicated to Colonel Parkman and his staff that there was little, if any, need for the various teams and detachments.

He, therefore, eliminated all the detachments and teams from the Tables of Organization. A few small groups, ranging from one to four officers, were sent into the field to handle liaison with the French at key points. All of the port work was placed under the Continental Base Section. The other officers remained at Headquarters.

This re-organization did not emerge until the middle of September but it was being discussed as early as D plus 3. Colonel Parkman also decided about that time that 196 officers and 398 enlisted men were far too many for the work at hand. Accordingly, he arranged with AFHQ for 50 of these officers and 75 men to be sent to Italy, rather than to France. Most of them, though, rejoined the regiment by October 1.


[AFHQ Interim CA Directive on Supply to CG, Seventh Army, 20 Aug 44, 1  CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1) sec. 5]

1. General. You will be responsible for the initial provision and distribution of such relief supplies to civilian populations throughout the area of your jurisdiction as are essential to the successful accomplishment of your military mission and as necessary to meet minimum essential civilian requirements.

The term "relief supplies" refers to those items of supply procured specifically for civilian use, whether by importation from without the theater or by local procurement within the theater. Some of these supplies may be identical in type to United States Army supplies and, in fact, procured from excess or used United States Army supplies. For that reason every care must be exercised to prevent mixing civilian supplies with Army stocks. Further and specifically there is no authority for the issuance of United States Army stocks of any type, including subsistence, for civilian use except in extreme emergency. Such supplies issued under that condition will be in minimum essential quantities and a detailed report of such issuance will be furnished this headquarters immediately.

2. Requisitions for Civil Affairs Supplies will be submitted by your headquarters to this headquarters. On approval by this headquarters, submission of these requisitions to CCAC and the necessary provision arrangements with authorities concerned will be responsibility of this headquarters.

3. Requisitioning Procedure. Requisitions will be at this headquarters ninety (90) days before delivery is desired in this theater. In the case, however, of requisitions for the period D plus 90 to D plus 180, a delay is authorized sufficient to make an on-the-ground estimate of supply requirements. Requisitions for the six months' period D plus 180 to D plus 360 will be in this headquarters by D plus 90. Emergency requisitions may be communicated by telegram but will be confirmed by standard requisitions. This


headquarters will advise you of action taken on all requisitions.

4. Shipping. The import of civil supplies will be dealt with in the same manner as the import of military maintenance supplies and will be related to the overall acceptance capacity of ports of discharge and ability of the administrative organization to store and distribute. All requisitions will therefore include a phased shipping schedule based on the acceptance capacities of French ports. This headquarters will be responsible for making the necessary shipping arrangements within the limits of available shipping and for advising you of all arrivals of civil supplies covered by your requisitions.

5. Scale of Issue. Subject to such restrictions as may from time to time be issued by this headquarters, you will provide CA supplies to civil populations on a scale of issue designed to bring local standards up to a minimum consistent with the standards of military necessity. For provision of foodstuffs a standard of 2,000 calories per day per head is established as the desired goal.

6. Distribution. You will make CA supplies available in local areas by effecting delivery thereof to authorized French authorities for distribution by them to civilian populations. At the earliest possible date consistent with military operations, arrangements will be completed by you for the turnover of CA supplies at points of initial entry to French authorities for distribution.

7. Payment. Supplies for local civilian use may be delivered to authorized representatives of FCNL against physical receipts only, subject to later settlement. Detailed instructions regarding payment for supplies will be provided you through technical channels.

8. Direct Issues to Consumers. In accordance with relief policies established by this headquarters you are authorized in emergencies to allow the direct issue by CA detachments of CA supplies to actual consumers. In order to permit future settlement between the countries concerned you will require that a certificate covering these issues be accomplished by the U.S./Br/Fr officer responsible for the distribution of such supplies.

9. Utilization of Local Resources. Prior to the issue of imported CA supplies you will require French authorities to make the maximum use of existing local resources including manufacturing and production facilities. You will accomplish this by ensuring that locally available supplies are procured and distributed by the French authorities before similar CA supplies made available to you by this headquarters are distributed. However, you are authorized to effect military procurement of supplies for CA purposes where necessary. Such purchases will be in accordance with specific directives to be issued by this headquarters.

10. Use of Civilian Labor. Ordinarily you will require French authorities receiving CA supplies to hire, pay and furnish civilian labor necessary for the handling of such CA supplies at the time and place of turnover from your CA representative. However, you are authorized to permit CA detachments to hire civilian labor when French authorities are unable to provide that required for this purpose.


[Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater, HS, MTO files]

♦ ♦ ♦ A question arose as to whether the general co-ordinating authority of SHAEF included the duty of reviewing the estimates approved by AFHQ. G-5 SHAEF interpreted a CCAC directive of 17 June 444 to mean that it was authorized to screen AFHQ supply estimates in detail. After discussion, however, with the AFHQ mission and G-5 representatives sent to London, G-5 SHAEF concluded that detailed examination of the AFHQ estimates would involve undue delay and was also not in conformity with AFHQ's status as an independent headquarters. SHAEF recommended to the CCAC that it be responsible only for co-ordination of the general basis of planning, that is, of such matters as insuring importation of the same categories of supplies and the maintenance of the same ration scale in both zones. The CCAC agreed that it should receive AFHQ's operational requirements directly and co-ordinate them with SHAEF's. Thus the estimates of relief needs for southern France were screened only by AFHQ.

The planners also evolved a supply requisitioning procedure which generally followed that already in use in Italy. Seventh Army and the French metropolitan authorities would together be responsible for the estimation of phased-long-term requirements. . . . AFHQ would edit and review these requisitions and submit them to the CCAC. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. II]

The assault waves of the Seventh Army were still surging up the mined beaches of the Riviera coast, in the onset of Operation DRAGOON, when the first Civil Affairs officer to set foot on Southern France, crashlanded in a glider ten miles inland. Immediately, he started work on civilian problems.

It was 0900 on D-Day, August 15, 1944, when 1st Lieutenant Joseph Welsh, CAO of the 1st Airborne Task Force, pulled himself out of the wreckage of a glider, one mile northeast of Le Muy, a small city in the Department of Var. Reporting personally to Major General Robert T. Frederick, Commander of the unit, at his nearby CP, he received orders to "look after the civilians." At once he began visiting farm houses in the vicinity to determine conditions there.

A few hours later, most of the Civil Affairs officers attached to the three American divisions which spearheaded the southern debarkment were also on land, hurrying from town to town checking on political, supply and other key questions, while trying to keep pace with the rapid advances of their organizations.

VI Corps Headquarters landed soon after. Its Civil Affairs staff, headed by Major Campbell Dickson, chose a waterfront villa at Ste.-Maxime for an office, moved in and started work on the rigorous task of establishing communications with the Divisional CAO's.

Members of the G-5 Section of the Seventh Army came ashore the next day. Led by Colonel Gerry, Assistant Chief of Staff for G-5, they proceeded under fire to the Army CP at Ste. Tropez. En route, Major Robert Bennett, finance specialist, helped capture a sniper.

The afternoon of D plus I was not old before the Civil Affairs machinery set up to handle the early combat phase problems was in full gear.

Top-ranking officers of the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment (Ovhd), which actually operated this machinery, had also established a CP by then and were co-ordinating the hurried, early reports.

First accounts from the field were unanimous in telling of the wild, sweeping enthusiasm with which the local French populace was greeting its American liberators, of the evidently high state of organization of the underground "Resistance" movement and its apparent co-operative attitude. They also detailed the surprisingly small amount of war damage, the dearth of refugees and the satisfactory status of public health. However, almost all reports reflected the imminence of what were to be the two big Civil Affairs problems: the lack of food and the lack of transport. Hunger could be seen in the distance.

Since the Commanding General, Seventh Army, felt that the French could be depended upon to govern themselves, the function of Civil Affairs in that stage of the operation was largely one of information gathering.

Two Civil Affairs officers from the 2678th Regiment were attached to each of the three American divisions, the 3rd, the 36th and the 45th, and one with the Airborne Task Force. Their job was to cover all of the important towns freed by their units and send back a report on the situation as they found it.

These CAO's worked closely with French liaison officers, members of the staff of General Henri Cochet, Chief of the Military Mission from the De Gaulle government to Major General (later Lieutenant General) Patch, Commanding General of the Seventh Army. One was to have been attached to each of the American units but initially only the 36th and the 45th Divisions were so supplied.

It was the responsibility of these liaison officers to resolve local political questions and to install in office the Maires and Préfets designated in advance by Algiers. Lack of a sufficient number of the liaison men was probably the first big organization difficulty encountered by CAHQ (Civil Affairs Headquarters).

When the ABTF (Airborne Task Force) captured Le Muy on August 15th, for example, Lieutenant Welsh did not have the services of a liaison officer. Entering the town with the combat troops, he stopped long enough only to capture 30 German prisoners, and then went to the Maire. He found there that no Maire had been selected to replace the incumbent official, a Vichyite by then in flight. Consequently, he had to take it upon himself to locate the former, pre Vichy Maire and, in the name of General Frederick, restore him to his old post. Later, a French liaison officer regularized the appointment.

Civil Affairs officers with the 3rd Division were also without the help of a liaison officer, but, fortunately, in the 13 towns they covered during the first three days of the operation, the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) were so well organized that, according to a CAHQ report


dated August 18th, "No problems of replacements of public officials arose which were not handled by the FFI."

Finally, by dint of constant pressure on the Cochet Mission, the full complement of four liaison officers was finally obtained. The work they did in saving the Allied Forces "the embarrassment of unresolved political problems" has since been described as both "imperative" and "invaluable." ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAO, 36th Div, Weekly Rpt, Undated, to Corps and Army SCAO's, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

1. Landed D-Day H 11:45 at Green Beach.♦ ♦ ♦

The division is moving so fast we cannot set up all towns falling into our hands. We are letting Corps catch the towns adjacent to our route....

Our operational setup is: I remain with the division CP and move with it to settle local divisional problems. Examples: looting in St. Raphael, murder in Trans, labor for division on military highway and bridges in Sisteron. The team of Lts. Justis and Broadhead pull up to the rear, setting up the town as they go along. They join me at division. At first this didn't work because of the French long operational reports that have to be made out by Lt. Justis. Since Lt. Justis visited Corps and Army for discussion of these problems the above setup is working smoothly....
... the political situation looks to be all right. However, it may break loose once things ease up (excitement of troops and liberation). Suggest Army Civil Affairs work through Department heads to check on developments and instructions to small towns in the interior. Due to the fact that this is vegetable season, food situation is fair. Health is normal. Children need attention. Most of them are underfed. Practically no flour. Please note our food situation reports on preliminary sheets. The Forces of the Interior are doing a wonderful job of German collaborator and political cleanup. Our work is easy due to the work they have done before we arrived. We cannot revisit a town passed so the later report is not forthcoming. . . .


[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to G-5, AFHQ, 18 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, I7.17 Hist Rpts]

1. The Civil Affairs officers with the Third Division have covered 13 towns. In each town the FFI 2  was well organized and although this Civil Affairs Division group is the only one without a French Civil Affairs Administrative Liaison officer, no problems of replacement of public officials have arisen which were not handled by the FFI. Therefore, no decisions of this kind have been made. The condition of these towns is good, the people healthy and enthusiastic and food in the near future is likely to be the big problem.

2. The Airborne Division with one CA officer took the town of Le Muy [see above ] ....

3. The two CA officers with the 95th Division are now ashore and are taking over the towns in the middle (45th Div) area which were previously being handled by VI Corps because of the absence of the 45th Division CA officers due to delay in their disembarkation. The condition in these towns seems satisfactory. There is a French Administrative Liaison officer with this Division.

4. The CA experience of the 36th Division officers has been highly instructive to date. They have been in St.-Raphael, Frejus, and Draguignan. In each town the FFI was completely organized and was prepared to take over the government, install a Maire and care for the civilian needs. A very competent French Administration Liaison officer (CA) is with our men and in each case he authorized the installation of the new Maire and got things started. The only difficulty along this line appears to he that this French officer has so many reports to make to the new Prefect of Draguignan (all ordered by Algiers who installed the Prefect) that he cannot keep up the amount of work thrown on the CAO's because the Division is moving so rapidly. Some instructions either increasing the number of French liaison officers or decreasing their paper work would be very desirable at division level. Perhaps the reports could wait until a later stage.

5. . . . These towns, under their new Maires and the FFI are well organized and it is believed that they will be efficiently run. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to G-5, AFHQ, 18 Aug 44]

6. We are working toward a plan whereby, as soon as Departmental capital is taken, the


French civilian problems will be put on a territorial basis except for those directly affecting military matters in the forward areas. CA VI Corps is thoroughly co-operative and helpful on this as well as all other problems. However, since the divisions are moving so fast and towns are being turned over to Corps either just after a divisional CAO has been in a short time, or before he has been in at all, it is necessary to secure a strong and active French Administrative Liaison officer-which we have not at present. The assignment of good active French liaison officers in the forward areas is most important and is a No. 1 problem with us. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to CG, Seventh Army, 21 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

♦ ♦ ♦ the Departmental administration of Var and the coastal towns, plus Frejus and Draguignan, were turned over to CAHQ, as far as Civil Affairs responsibilities were concerned. 3  This includes the area back of Draguignan, Longues, Le Luc and Collobrieres (not including the last three towns). CAHQ has officers in Draguignan, St.-Raphael, Ste.-Maxime and St.-Tropez. It is believed that these officers can shortly be made available, except that a CAO in St.-Tropez will be needed as long as Seventh Army is there.


[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to SACMED, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

6. Departmental Administration. A report from the CAO who has been in Draguignan to render assistance in the reorganization of Departmental administration indicates that the administration is now as firmly established as is possible in the circumstances . . . things are going ahead so smoothly that on 22 August the CAO leaves Draguignan. The two problems upon which the success of civil administration depends are communications and supply. . . . The possibility of making some communications facilities .. . available to the civil authorities is under consideration. In so far as civil supplies are concerned, the population has evidenced very general understanding of the priority of military interests and it is anticipated that the small communities so far liberated will be able to get along on local resources for the next month or so with minimum assistance from Allied sources. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAHQ, Rpt to CG, Seventh Army, 21 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

3. The chief problems encountered in the forward areas to date are:
a. Division CAO's have had to move so rapidly that they have gotten out of touch with Corps.
b. A strong French Administrative Liaison officer is needed at Corps and has not yet been produced.
c. Shortage of flour and other basic foodstuffs in all communes.
d. Vigorous action by FFI is re-establishing local government immediately after a town is evacuated by the Germans.
e. Numerous reports of looting of buildings and seizure of civilian vehicles by civilians and troops. The behavior along the coastal area and Frejus seems to have been the worst. The Commanding General, VI Corps, has made the prevention of looting a unit command responsibility. ♦ ♦ ♦

Experience to date indicates that CAO's in the forward areas can most profitably perform the following functions in this operation:
a. Information-collection and transmission to higher headquarters.
b. "First aid" assistance to civilians where it is requested and necessary to relieve the distress immediately following combat, and
c. Assuring certain measures necessary to the operation of the Divisions and Corps (including control of civilian traffic, provision of labor, enforcing the curfew and blackout, and the like). In this latter connection, it is to be observed that in many cases the Germans had removed the Gendarmerie from the smaller to the bigger towns so that they are short in the former. However, no difficulty exists as yet from this situation.


The French Administration of the Department of War is still getting under way at Draguignan. The only two problems upon which Allied assistance is requested are:
a. The importation of flour to assure adequate bread ration, and
b. Communication facilities between the office of the prefect and those of the Maires of the principal cities. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to SACMED, 23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

I. Civil Affairs Officers with French Units: Contact has been made and operating procedures worked out with the CAO attached to each French Infantry Division and the Acting SCAO with French Army B. . . . The CAO with the [French] 3d Division operates without the use of a French officer as an intermediary. However, he confines his inquiries largely to matters relating to civilian supplies and transport, all political, public safety and other specialists problems being handled locally with the Maires by the Securite Militaire attached to the division in whose section the CAO works. Information secured by the CAO indicates that the condition of the towns visited by him (north of Sollies Pont, south of La Roquehussanne and west of the line drawn between them) is substantially similar to that in the towns thus far uncovered in the American area. . . .

2. Civil Affairs Officers with U.S. Units: Owing to the speed of advance, it has been found necessary to split the four officers at VI Corps into teams to keep contact with and to follow up the men with the Divisions. . . . The CP's of the three Divisions are considerably further forward. Towns can only be visited once by the Divisions and only those manifesting some important problem by the Corps officers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

Colonel Lavilleon, Chief of Staff of the Military Delegate for Southern France, reports that considerable progress has been made in the organization of civil administration in liberated territories in the Department of Var. He states that immediately after the arrival of Allied and French troops, administration was based on the Commune. Acting under authority conferred upon him by the Military Delegate, he has either appointed mayors or confirmed appointments made by local Resistance committees. . . . Administration is now being placed on a Departmental basis. ♦ ♦ ♦

There has been little violence in liberated areas to date except for the reported shooting of six enemy agents of French nationality as Allied troops were landing. There have been a number of cases in which women had had their hair clipped by "young patriots." A considerable number of collaborationists have been incarcerated by Resistance groups. ♦ ♦ ♦

To date, the refugee and displaced persons problem has nowhere presented any substantial difficulties. In most of the small towns there are a number of French persons from other communities. They seem to have been absorbed into the towns and have been satisfactorily taken care of by friends and relatives. . . . In Brignoles, with a normal population of 5,000, there are 3,000 refugees from Toulon, recently evacuated. The officials of Brignoles are making satisfactory provision for their welfare. The municipal authorities have been instructed to take vigorous action to prevent the return of the Toulon residents to their homes until Toulon is ready to receive them. Similar advice will be given to all other towns near Toulon and Marseille in which refugees are found.

With the fall of Toulon expected in the near future, a considerable problem of refugees returning to the city is anticipated. A refugee specialist of Civil Affairs Headquarters is at present making a quick survey of a number of towns in the area between St.Tropez and Brignoles, in which towns there are reported to be many refugees from Toulon.

The rapid advance of operations had made impossible the screening of persons of uncertain status who have been detained by the Provost Marshal. Accordingly, all persons who are prima facie entitled to the status of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention are being held as prisoners of war and are being evacuated. ♦ ♦ ♦

In thirteen towns, including St.-Tropez, Cogelin, Collobrieres and Ramatuelle, the condition of the towns is good, the people healthy and enthusiastic.

The general impression is to the effect that most of the important collaborationists left with the retiring enemy forces. It has been called to the attention of the Chief of Staff to the Military


Delegate that unwarranted arrests might lead to social unrest. He stated that he has already started screening these arrests with a view to preventing injustice, but he cannot move too quickly owing to the passions of the moment. ♦ ♦ ♦

Individual communes have not more than one or two days' stocks of food left. The small stocks in the uncovered area come from two sources: (1) captured German dumps and (2) stocks de securite. The former are very limited in quantity but are being guarded by the Resistance and distributed by the mayors of the communes. The latter are stocks accumulated secretly by the Ravitaillement General. In Var, this cache is located at Draguignan and Ste.Maxime. ♦ ♦ ♦

It is hoped that presently available food in the country districts will enable the people to subsist until the food starts flowing in and that the emergency imports can be retained for the large cities. Permission has been secured from naval authorities for the resumption of fishing in restricted areas in the neighborhood of St.-Tropez. It is believed that this will be of substantial assistance to the civil population. ♦ ♦ ♦

Emergency medical supplies for St: Tropez have been provided by the Medical Section, Headquarters Seventh Army, and the situation is in hand....

A bombing at St.-Tropez . . . put a strain on the hospital and medical facilities. . . . Local medical facilities are poor but generally the situation appears to be in hand.

... Power and telephone lines were found to be nearly all intact. . . . Damage to central office equipment is virtually nil. . . . The questions of restoring water and electric services are related, for water supplies will be adequate when the electric pumping systems are restored to service. In a number of communities it has been possible to provide supplies of fuel oil sufficient to pump limited amounts of water. ♦ ♦ ♦

Two banks function in temporary quarters in St.-Tropez and also the Caisse d'épargne with staffs intact and tax collectors present. $29,000 worth of freshly-printed French currency was captured on a German. Le Muy is being held by the Finance Officer. The supplemental currency is circulating freely with the tradespeople and it does not appear necessary to post the currency notice. . . . The situation seems generally satisfactory. No advances have been required by the French authorities thus far and ample currency is reported available in the area uncovered to date.


[Summary of First Reports, 4  Submitted by 36th Div CA Officers, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts, 7th Army)

1. Les Arcs (1130, 20 Aug)-Capt. Broadhead.
a. Local officials in control; new officials designated by Fr. liaison officer. Population: 1939-3200; present, 3500. Slight bomb damage; no minefields or booby traps. Local citizen has removed unexploded bombs. Fire and civil defense services are organized.
b. Approx. 5 days food on hand. Flour needed.
c. Public health excellent; no epidemics.
d. Water system, satisfactory. Electricity partly operating. Resistance apparently has sufficient trucks.
e. No surplus labor.
f. Financial situation: 50,000 fr. No banks. Post office open.

3. Montferrat (0940, 21 Aug)-Capt. Broadhead.
a. Local authorities have situation in complete control. New officials designated by Fr. Liaison officer. Resistance actively organized under a local chief. Population: 1939, 220; present, 370. Attitude, jubilant. No damage, mines or booby-traps. Traffic clear. Small-town fire service, everybody volunteers.
b. No food other than garden products. Town representative has gone to see Prefect about food. Flour needed.
c. Public Health: most of the children have just had scarlet fever and need food badly. No doctors or serum. Recommend special consideration for food supplies.
d. Water OK; electricity OK; telephone cut. No transport.
e. No surplus labor.
f. No money in commune; obtained from Prefect as needed. No banks. Post office open.

7. Digne (1530, 21 Aug)-Capt. Broadhead.
a. Local authorities in complete control of situation. New prefect has not arrived although Vichy appointee has been replaced. New city officials designated. Resistance actively organized under a local chief. Population: 1939-7800; present, 10,900. No refugee problem. Attitude: jubilant and friendly. Slight bomb damage, no mine


fields or booby-traps. Fire and civil defense services are organized.
b. Sufficient food for several days, one week or slightly more. Need milk more than other food products.
c. Health and sanitation OK. Hospital 300 beds. Sufficient doctors.
d. Water and electricity OK; telephone cut. No trucks, no railroad or other means of transport; needs transport.
e. No labor surplus.
f. Sufficient funds for operation. Three banks. Post Office is open .
g. Recommend visitation by Army, CA personnel to work out problems on departmental level with new prefect and staff.

9. Sisteron (1430, 21 Aug)-Maj. [John P.] Powhida.
a. Everything under control. Resistance group small, well organized. Population about 200 (subnormal, due to bombing last week). Morale high. About 50 buildings destroyed; 200 persons killed. Touring hotel mined (unexploded bombs reported to Ordnance). Fire and civil defense well organized; given 5 gals of gasoline to enable them to go to a fire.
b. Food will last several days, after that, drastic.
c. No health and sanitation problems, but children underfed.
d. Communications and public services all destroyed. No local transport.
e. Labor situation good, being used by division to clear military highway and blown bridges.
f. Funds on Hand: 200,000 francs.


[Memo, Col Parkman, CO, 2678th CA Regt., to CG, Seventh Army Through G-5, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

An advanced detachment of the 2678th CA Regiment, consisting of the CO, two other officers and one enlisted man, arrived in Marseille at 2000 24 August 1944. Heavy fighting was going on in certain sections of the city and the detachment, in order to reach the Prefecture, had to proceed under small arms fire.

A brief reconnaissance of the military situation at that time showed that there was much artillery fire under way in the advanced elements of the French 3d DIA as they sought to smash remaining German resistance centered in the Port areas. ♦ ♦ ♦

... the detachment established contact with representatives of the CBS and made preliminary arrangements for setting up an office and for billeting....
The detachment then met with officials in charge of the city's food supplies. . . . Inasmuch as the total amount of available food is entirely contingent upon the amount of damage wrought in the Port areas, it was arranged for these officials to survey that area just as soon as the fighting now in progress there permits. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Resistance elements seem to be in control of the departmental and municipal governments and appear to be working well with M. Aubrac [Commissaire Regional de la Republique]. The former head of the municipal government has been ousted and replaced by M. Lionel. As far as can be seen the government is functioning with these officials "meeting first problems first."

... Both the gendarmerie and the police are said to be reliable and anti-Vichy. Some looting occurred during the early days of the FFI's fight against the Germans here, approximately three days ago, but this was held to an absolute minimum and reputedly presents no further problems. ♦ ♦ ♦

It is reported that the Germans have destroyed most, if not all, of the port facilities and have blocked the entrance to the ports by sinking ships across them.

Because of the high number of civilian casualties occurring during the FFI onslaught against the Germans here, the hospitals are reported crowded and there is said to be a "desperate shortage of medical supplies." ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. II]

♦ ♦ ♦ The experiences of these first ten days demonstrated something of high value to CAHQ. Its entire concept of Civil Affairs operations in Southern France was predicated on the thesis that the French would be able to handle their own affairs with only small assistance from Allied CAO's. As a result, it planned very little use of detachments in the field, and not too many officers at headquarters. Months later, Major Lewis H. Van Dusen, Operations Officer for CAHQ, commented:

"If the French had failed to take over their responsibilities, we would have been in the soup. As it was, they proved capable and we encountered no unsurmountable difficulties."


In summary, the first ten days after the H-Hour landings saw a mass of important information collected and interpreted. It saw the French take control of their affairs and their government with fine competence.

Serious difficulties were met and, in large part, solved. Plans had to be re-adjusted to coincide with the rapid military advances. Shortages in Civil Affairs personnel and liaison officers had to be overcome. Relationships between various CA staff and operational elements had to be resolved. Policies governing such key questions as the recruitment of labor and dates for the importation of civilian supplies had to be determined. All this was done, though, and in the main, satisfactorily.



[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

♦ ♦ ♦ The biggest job of all, of course, both during the early days and even later after the cessation of hostilities in the south, was at Marseille.

This city was destined to be a great port of entry for American supplies and troops. The Germans, however, had done "an unparalleled job of demolition" and left its docks, cranes, slips in ruins. The harbor was heavily mined and jammed with the wrecks of sunken ships. Reconstruction of the port was deemed an even bigger task than that of Naples, but upon its rapid rehabilitation and proper operation depended the supplies of the Sixth Army Group.

Army and Navy engineers commenced rehabilitation within hours after the liberation, and came at once to CAHQ for help in getting labor. Staff officers of CBS (Continental Base Section) also were asking aid in procuring workers. More than 12,000 laborers were demanded. CBS wanted hospitals for army wounded, warehouses, garages, and factories for supply functions. It was up to CAHQ to persuade the French to meet these requests quickly.

Civilian needs had also to be met.
Conferences were immediately instituted with the staff of the Commissaire Regional on the question of labor registration, on the necessity for an immediate re-organization of the governmental labor machinery then in tatters through the departure or arrest of erstwhile collaborators. Requisitioning procedures were discussed. Medical officers were sent out on surveys of nearby hospitals. Supply officers, newly arrived from Naples, held long sessions with the French Ravitaillement officials to determine regional needs and to evolve distributing methods. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opus for Southern Fr, pt. III]

Marseille-principal seaport and transportation hub of Southern France, with a population which included the dregs of six continents, the flotsam of many races-provided the first real test of CAHQ's effectiveness.

By a week from D-Day, G-3 reports indicated that Marseille with its 650,000 inhabitants, as well as those other two big coastal cities, Nice with a quarter of a million and Toulon which had a normal population of some 180,000, were likely soon to be liberated, much ahead of schedule.

The news caused a rapid adjustment of plans among the handful of officers, nine in all, then at CAHQ's Ste.-Maxime CP. 5  It meant that some of these CAO's would have to be ready to move to Marseille at a moment's notice. It meant that others would have to go east to Nice and Cannes. Headquarters itself would have to operate on a shoestring with almost nobody present there for days at a time. Lack of CA personnel during this early phase was proving a serious handicap.

Of even greater importance was the question of supplies. Allied food imports were not due to start arriving until D plus 40, a date set before the landings, when it was thought that the Allied advances would be much slower. Now, more than a million people would have to be fed.

At once, G-5, Seventh Army started cabling AFHQ, urging that the imports be speeded up to D plus 10. ♦ ♦ ♦


[2678th CA Regt., Rpt to G-5, AFHQ, 27 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts, 7th Army]

2. Urban Life. Increasing evidence of a return to normalcy was perceptible on all sides. Efforts were being made by householders to clean up sidewalk debris. Some shops had reopened. The hectic atmosphere of the past few days seemed to be subsiding. It was reported that a large number of people had gone on foot and by bicycle into the countryside to search for fresh vegetables. According to the newspapers, nearby farmers were generous in giving freely from their stocks.

Moves toward the resumption of normal business life were also apparent in press notices directing employees of the Electricity Company, of the Administration of Public Assistance, Postal Federation to return to work tomorrow morning.

Condensed milk was distributed today for children up to 18 months of age.
Concern over the low stocks of food was expressed in all newspapers but assurances were printed to the effect that every effort is being made to ease the situation. One newspaper, the Provencal, printed a big front page story stating that it had learned from authorized sources that an important stock of food has been built up in Algiers by the American Army for the population of Marseille. It stated that this is composed of flour, potatoes, dried vegetables and oil. The stock, it said, has already arrived in France and is now being unloaded in Frejus and St.-Tropez but that it will be at least two to three weeks before all difficulties regarding food have been surmounted.

3. Law and Order: Today's newspapers carried lists of collaborateurs arrested here. Truckloads of Vichyites who have been active in the street fighting against the FFI here were carried away yesterday to "imprisonment."

A State of Siege order by [Lt.] General [Aime de Goislard] de Monsabert, CO of the 3d DIA, directing disarmament of civilians was declared by him not to apply to members of the FFI.

Notice was given to all Jews in Marseille who have been "obliged" to use false identity cards to report to the Union of Jews to have their real identities re-established.

4. C.B.S. A conference was held with officials of the C.B.S. to discuss civilian problems affecting their operations....

7. Utilities. It was learned that there is an acute need of 50 gallons of gasoline per day in order to operate the auxiliary power plants of the telephone service in Marseille. P.T.T. officials declare that this amount of gasoline is vitally needed in order to permit a resumption of telephone service in full.

8. Medical Conditions. Since no civilian hospitals here have been as yet damaged, there seems to be adequate hospital facilities for civilian needs even including civilian battle casualties (it is estimated that 200 civilians have been killed and 500 wounded here). Since all of the Boo civilian doctors in Marseille were ordered to remain here, there is adequate medical care. The hospitals also have enough nurses at present.

Malaria is reported to be rare in Marseille although the anophelin mosquitoes are found throughout the city. Sand fly fever has begun to appear, though. This is the first year in which sand flies seem to be abundant here. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XI]

Famine, street demonstrations, and disorder not only among the FFI but among Allied troops as well-these spelled the chief Civil Affairs problems in the Nice-Cannes area. In Toulouse, constant attention had to be given to reported threats of a Communist uprising. Only in Montpellier were conditions calm.

The Nice-Cannes-Grasse section with its continual holiday atmosphere, its mixed population that included tens of thousands of Italians, and its concentration of Communistic sentiment, was a trouble-spot from the beginning. Once the playground of the World, it had become a war zone afflicted by tragic hunger and unrest.

The fighting along the Italian border, only a few miles from Nice, made few headlines but it continued 24 hours a day with a dull ferocity. The 1st Airborne Task Force was assigned there as a static force to hold the Germans off the Seventh Army's right flank. Its foxholes were only a short ride from the Nice bistros and rough, hardboiled paratroopers, tense and nervous from relentless days under fire, flocked to them for release. . . .


The conduct of these soldiers was often wild and unruly. Fights between them and civilians were frequent and complaints about them flooded the local Civil Affairs office. The CAO's there had to spend a great deal of time smoothing wounded civilian feelings.

... General Frederick, Commander of the 1st ABTF [Airborne Task Force], was . . . "very Civil Affairs conscious." He paid close attention to civilian developments and gave full support to his CA personnel. 6  ♦ ♦ ♦

By September 6th, the political situation in Nice had quieted down to such an extent that [1st] Lt. [Joseph] Welsh was able to report to CAHQ that "from the operational point of view there does not seem to be any cause for alarm. Order has definitely been established although there are a few isolated cases of looting and banditry on the part of groups of FFI." ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAO, Cannes, Rpt, 23 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Sec, Monograph, vol. II, an. M-3o, Jkt 6]

♦ ♦ ♦ As is generally the case between cities the world over, there exists quite naturally a rivalry between Cannes and Nice and during this past week it has made itself manifest in at least the three following situations:
(a) Nice ordered the discontinuance of the Cannes newspaper, the Cannes Riviera, which was under the control of the Liberation Committee....
(b) The Bureau Militaire Hq in Nice cut the Cannes Office by 50%, put 3 members off the staff because they were not in the military and, finally, reassigned Col. Petrequin to another area. The reason for this is that Cannes is now to be run as a peacetime office....
(c) The same situation exists in the Ravitaillement. Nice has made accusations (proven false) that Nice's trucks have been hi-jacked in Cannes, and Cannes claims that Nice takes stocks to Nice that should remain in Cannes. I am getting reports on all of these things and hope that in some small way we can reduce this sort of misunderstanding.


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XI]

♦ ♦ ♦ the tiny principality of Monaco with its one city, the world famous Monte Carlo, was in the throes of even worse conditions than Nice.

An independent nation under the control of France, it had to face within its few acres the usual FFI problems, the usual torrent of arrests and even more than the usual starvation.

A CAHQ report on conditions in Monte Carlo, distributed to the press on October 8th said: "This former playground is like a house of mourning, shuttered and hungry. Producing nothing itself and with railroad connections virtually suspended, it has been living on the community soup kitchens and the black market. The latter is under sharp fire, and penalties for those engaging in black market activities are severe, but it flourishes nevertheless. An idea of prices may be gained from the fact that a kilo of chicken is 1200 francs, a kilo of old mutton is Boo francs. Most things, no matter what the price offered, are unobtainable."

The Monagasques complained bitterly that the French were not sending them enough food. The French lacking food and transport both, of course, could do little to help them. However, through the efforts of CAO's at Nice, some supplies were sent there, and the situation did improve.

Dissatisfaction with the French and fear of the local FF1 on the part of the rulers of Monaco led to a novel Civil Affairs problem for General Frederick, one with real international significance.

Lieutenant Welsh has told of the incident. According to his account, Prince Louis, ruler of the little monarchy, and his Prime Minister, M. Robilot, were so afraid of the local FF1 that at a conference with General Frederick in Monte Carlo, the Prince offered to lead his people into the American Nation. He asked that Monaco be permitted to become a protectorate of the United States.

General Frederick, Lieutenant Welsh says, declined the offer with thanks. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XI]

♦ ♦ ♦ On the west side of the Rhone River, there lie vast stretches of Southern France which


were termed in CA planning the "hiatus area"....

CAHQ responsibility for this hiatus area took in all the six departments in the Montpellier Region . . . but only three of the Toulouse Region....

The first CA personnel reached Montpellier early in September when Major Allison Lucal went there to make a preliminary survey. .. . He found that refugees had swelled the normal 1,600,000 population to 2,000,000. Although four of the six departments produced wine almost exclusively there was sufficient food grown in the other two to ease the general situation had transport been available. . . . His reports over subsequent weeks concentrate largely on his efforts to ease the transport difficulties, of his attempts to get the nearby port of Séte swept of mines so that CA food ships could enter. They also tell of his actions in trying to ease the bridge situation over the Rh6ne River; there, as in Lyon, the Germans had practically paralyzed road and rail traffic by their demolitions. . . . By [October 28 ] the arrival of 83 imported Allied trucks had eased the food situation.

.. . Politics was the main concern of the CA officers stationed in Toulouse. For many weeks wild rumors flooded France and even reached England and America that Toulouse was a center of wide-spread Communism, that Soviets were being established in its factories, that it was unsafe for a conservative business man to walk the streets....

As early as September 3d, Major W. [Wilbur] W. Sacra was sent into Toulouse to make preliminary estimates of the conditions there. He noted the usual after-liberation characteristics of FFI and epuration problems. Food, however, did not represent a big problem. Toulouse was a surplus area. ♦ ♦ ♦


[SCAO, Toulouse Rgn, Rpt to CO, 2678th CA Regt., 21 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Jkt 6]

♦ ♦ ♦ The political situation, one gathers, is not any too good. . . . Roughly the situation is that the Communist element is very strong and independent. The FTP forces are certainly very active and aggressive around the city and apparently are acting somewhat independently of the general FFI forces and so far not volunteering for service elsewhere in the French Army....


[CA Liaison Officer, Sixth AGp, Rpt to CO, 2678th CA Regt., 1 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Jkt 6]

♦ ♦ ♦  An impression has apparently been created in parts of France that the city of Toulouse is a hotbed of unrest and violence. . . . I

wish to report my own conclusions that, considering the times, there is a high degree of order here and that there are no valid grounds for rumors of violent struggles. . . . I visited the office of the Regional Secrétaire General of Police, . and he stated that he too knew that various rumors had spread but that there was no basis for them and that it was quite obvious to anyone who wished to investigate that complete order existed in Toulouse. He furnished us with copies of the Police Record for Toulouse (city) for the month of October as evidence of the absence of disorder....

2. When we arrived in Toulouse seven weeks ago, we heard various stories from some quarters about the danger from radical elements. There was no unusual violence actually being committed but the fear was of what might happen, particularly since it was considered that the police force was inadequate and under-armed. There was some basis for uneasiness because of the fact that there were thousands of armed men walking the streets, many of them very young. Almost all of these, however, are now in the Army or disarmed and the streets present a different picture. There was also some fear expressed regarding the danger of an illegal assumption of power by the FTP [FTPF] (Francs Tireurs et Partisans Francais) ] element (considered Communist) within the FFI. This has not materialized and there do not appear to be any reasons for believing that it will.


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. IX]

♦ ♦ ♦ Headquarters did not want regional or other CAO's making statements to the press that might be in conflict with over-all policy. In line with its wishes to soft-pedal Civil Affairs work, it preferred to have little or no public attention given its officers.

Accordingly, a directive . . . prepared for Colonel Parkman's signature was circulated on September 10th. It said in part:

"In view of the complex nature of the duties of Civil Affairs officers in Southern France, it is felt imperative that a centralized control be maintained by Civil Affairs Headquarters over all information, statements or activities of Civil Affairs officers which affect Civil Affairs public relations.

"It is therefore directed that no Civil Affairs officer will issue any statement or information whatsoever to the press, radio, newsreels, etc. (domestic or external) without first clearing the


same with PRO [Public Relations Officers], CAHQ." ♦ ♦ ♦

[Memo, PRO, Seventh Army, 12 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 523, 7th Army Opn Rpts]

♦ ♦ ♦  Government: Within minutes after the liberation of their cities, departments and regions, the French have gone about the re-establishment of government and have proceeded efficiently towards the solution of pressing problems. Today, both regional and local governments seem generally to have popular support and to be doing a competent, effective, and democratic job.

Civilian Supply: The civilian supply situation is generally good and is improving, although there are critical shortages in milk, gasoline, oil, and transportation. Food is short in the coastal areas, but the arrival of civil affairs food supplies has eased the problem. It might be noted that whereas no food ship was originally scheduled to arrive until D plus 40, it was possible through the co-operation of all branches of the Army and Navy, to get a food ship here on D plus to. As a result, food actually reached Toulon before firing had ceased. In Nice, when our food arrived there, people got their first taste of bread in 12 days, and their first white bread in five years. Marseille, which had been suffering from an acute food shortage, now has been able to boost its bread ration from 150 to 200 grams a day.
To meet a critical dearth of milk for babies, the 7th Army released from its own stocks 100,000 cans of condensed milk and 3,450 pounds of dried milk.
Naturally, the lack of trucks and the great scarcity of gasoline have made difficult the distribution of such food as was available.

Public Utilities: Electricity is working in most places, even Nice and Toulon. Long distance telephone communication is still largely interrupted, but there is partial service in most cities. Repairs to improve these services are under way. Postal service has been re-established locally, and in some cases, on an inter-urban basis. Insofar as communication lines are concerned, the Army has curtailed its own use of them to immediate battle requirements.

Labor: The French government has reorganized its labor machinery, and is proceeding to the establishment of wage rates. It is working closely with the re-established trade unions on these matters. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

♦ ♦ ♦ Top CAHQ personnel met twice weekly with Regional Commissaire Aubrac and his staff. At these formal conferences, the Army's requests and complaints were voiced to the French, and the latter's brought forth as well. Matters which could not be solved at a lower echelon between the French departmental heads and CAHQ officers were thrashed out.

Minutes of the meeting of September 22nd records a typical session. There M. Aubrac urged that certain schools, requisitioned as billets by Army troops, be released for the education of children. Maj. Karl [ S. ] Cate, Head of Economics and Finance Branch, replied that he was "working on it" in conjunction with the real estate officers of CBS.

Then M. Aubrac asked when the port of Marseille: by then partially repaired but open only to certain military ships-could "be used for civilian supply shortages in order to save trucking so many supplies from Toulon."

Lt. Col. LeGros, supply expert, reported that this could not be done for at least a month because the port of Marseille was needed for military supplies. ♦ ♦ ♦

Major [Donald B.] Robinson brought up the question of FFI shooting American officers in error. M. Aubrac said that a number of these were German sympathizers dressed up in FFI garments. M. Aubrac was told that we did not believe such to be the case in most instances. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Chief, CAO, Sixth AGp to Rgnl Cmsr, Marseille, 28 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, I-list, 60, Jkt 5, app. D-9]

1. Herewith reply to your letter of 16 September 1944, with each of your inquiries listed in the order of its submission by you.

2. Derequisition of Lycée Thiers: This school will probably be vacated by 7 October 1944. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. Derequisition of Lycée Perier: This school is still required by the Military, being occupied by Port labor troops.

4. Derequisition of Raffineries St. Charles: The U.S. Quartermaster is still using these refineries.

5. In regard to paragraphs 3 and 4, the Real Estate Section, Continental Base Section, is continuing its search for alternative accommodation


for the present occupants of Lycée Perier and Raffineries St. Charles.

6. As soon as the Economics and Finance Branch of this Headquarters receives the list of schools which M. Massenet requires to be derequisitioned, the Branch will obtain particulars of numbers of personnel occupying these schools and will inform M. Massenet.

7. Supplies, Medical, and otherwise, needed by the Marseille hospitals: Reply to this inquiry has been sent to your office under date of 23 September 1944 by the Public Health Section of this Headquarters.

8. Faculte Mixte de Medicine Generale: So far, no supplies of deuterium and helium seem available for use of the anti-cancer substitute, but inquiries are being continued.

9. Letter from General Secretary for Police Affairs: Major Oscar R. Bowyer of the Economics and Finance Branch has interviewed the General Secretary for Police Affairs, and has asked him for a detailed list of materials needed for the proposed internment camp near Marseille. Upon receipt of this list, inquiries will be prosecuted as to availability of the materials.

10. Letter from the Consulate General of Greece: Recruitment of maritime personnel is dealt with by the appropriate French authorities, as are all our requests for manpower. It is suggested that the Greek consul convey the problem of placing Merchant Navy officers of his nationality to Mr. Peltier, Director of the Port of Marseille. The pertinent correspondence is therefore being returned to you. .. .

11. American newspapers: This Headquarters has communicated "Le Provencal's" offer of a printing press to the Public Relations Officer at Continental Base Section.

12. Russian National Anthem: A cablegram has been dispatched to Allied Force Headquarters requesting delivery of the musical score of the new Russian National Anthem. 7



[CA Circ 1, G-5, Seventh Army, 28 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5 ]

11. French Personnel. . . . It is expected that French officers will be attached to staffs at all levels, down to and including divisions, in both American and French forces. Such officers will be employed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officers of the Staffs to secure, from the civil authorities and the civil population, compliance with the wishes of the Commander. They will undertake negotiations on civil affairs matters with French officials. They will advise on relations with the civil administration and the population. Such officers, though subject to the authority of the Commander, may receive and, after consultation with the appropriate members of the Commander's staff, act upon such instructions of the French authorities as are inconsistent with the requirements of the Commander. ♦ ♦ ♦


[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

♦ ♦ ♦ In St.-Raphael, Frejus and Draguignan a competent French Administrative Liaison Officer has accompanied the CAO's and in each case has authorized the installation of the new Mayor. .. .

At Toulon, it was agreed that, while awaiting the arrival of French Administrative Liaison Officers (who have now been agreed upon between General Cochet and General de Lattre), the Commanding General should be requested to produce a qualified French officer from his own staff to deal with the French officials in Toulon....
.... 8  After these officials have been consulted, a


special team, consisting of available CAO's and specialists (probably a total of two or three) would proceed into the town to assist with the problems which presented themselves to the CAO of the Division. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, SCAO, VI Corps to Chief, CAHQ, 23 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, app. C-10]

1. During the planning for the present operation, there was considerable speculation about the participation of French Administrative Liaison officers with the civil affairs staffs attached to American tactical formations.

2. After 5 weeks in the field, it can be reported that the work of these French officers has been invaluable; the presence and co-participation of French Administrative Liaison Officers has been imperative to the type of civil affairs functions which American officers attached to tactical formations have been called upon to perform.

3. The French officers attached to divisions have entered towns with combat troops to appraise the political situation the day of liberation. The Corps liaison officer has followed up within a day or two, and has frequently accompanied new prefects into the department capitals. Consequently, American civil affairs officers could establish immediate liaison with properly designated civil officials without the embarrassment of unresolved political problems. The French officers have maintained close contact with local and departmental officials and Resistance leaders until the tactical formation moved forward; it has been very clear that their advice and liaison has been as valuable to civil officials as to American civil affairs officers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. X]

♦ ♦ ♦ Within a few weeks after the landings, liaison offices were established in six regional capitals, Lyon, Dijon, Clermont-Ferrand, Montpellier and Toulouse, in addition to CAHQ's organization in Marseille. 9  Offices were also set up in Grenoble and in the Nice-Cannes-Grasse areas.

They served as clearing houses for all local Civil Affairs problems. They kept in constant touch with, and submitted comprehensive reports weekly on, every phase-political, economic, public safety, legal and other activities in their areas.

As a rule, the liaison officers established their headquarters in centrally located hotels or office buildings, their living quarters nearby. They hired civilian interpreters and secretaries, civilian cooks and servants. They draw their rations from American Army units, if any were present in the locality, or trucked them in from CAHQ. For transportation, they usually were assigned one or two military vehicles. These they augmented by requisitioning or borrowing civilian cars. They received their instructions, mail and pay from CAHQ couriers who made the rounds of the liaison offices several times each week. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. X]

♦ ♦ ♦ Lyon liaison office . . . was charged with responsibility for the departments of Ain, Ardeche, Drome, Haute-Savoie, Isere, Loire, Rhone and Savoie. In the city of Lyon, it had the third largest metropolis in all of France, one with more than 600,000 inhabitants and with large silk and chemical industries.

Traffic control was the most serious problem faced by the Civil Affairs officers who entered the city a few hours after its liberation on September 3d. Normally a routine matter, in this instance it constituted a case of "life and death" urgency for the Seventh Army.
.. . Lyon straddles two rivers, the Rhone and the Saone, with the heart of the city located on a narrow strip of land no more than a mile wide between the two streams. The rivers are traversed by 23 bridges over which run the main roads from the South to the North. As such, they were, of course, of vital military importance. Furthermore, since they provided the only means of ingress and egress for food trucks and pedestrians, they were also of prime significance to the existence of the city.

The retreating Germans demolished 21 of these 23 bridges, including every one over the Rhone. The results were almost paralytic.
Seventh Army engineers came to the rescue and hooked up the destroyed sections of one bridge, providing a one-way crossing for vehicu-


lar traffic. Immediately civilian trucks, cars and pedestrians by the thousands started pouring across it. The jam became even worse when hundreds of peasants also crowded on the bridge, too, pushing cartloads of farm produce. So great was the congestion that Army convoys were stalled for hours. The average time to get from one side to the other was 2V2 hours; in some instances, it ran to six hours.

The situation on Seventh Army supplies grew critical. Lt. Col. M. Hay, Senior Regional Liaison Officer at Lyon, worked desperately in conjunction with the civilian police to arrange traffic control plans. Unfortunately, the police were none too efficient and there were no MP's available for duty. Things got so bad that Colonel Hay and an assistant had to go on the bridge and direct traffic themselves. Their problems were made more acute by irresponsible FFI members who insisted on driving the wrong way in the one way traffic lane and even went so far as to threaten the American officers with tommy guns to force their way through. ♦ ♦ ♦

Other problems encountered by the CAO's in Lyon encompassed some minor difficulties with the FFI, some disagreements between the French and the Army over requisitioning procedures, and some difficulties in the distribution of food surpluses. Although the Region of Lyon was a surplus food area, many of its departmental officials were reluctant to let food leave their districts. .

Civil Affairs work was greatly simplified in Lyon by the formation of a special Inter-Allied Mission as a liaison office for the regional government. Under the procedure established by M. Farges, Regional Commissioner at Lyon, the Civil Affairs laison officers channeled all their requests on governmental agencies through the Mission and left it to the Mission to follow up on them.

A typical day at the Lyon office, according to the War Diary kept by Maj. Cedric C. Payette, who succeeded Lt. Col. Hay as Regional Liaison Officer, included a meeting with several American newspaper correspondents and making arrangements for them to interview the local French officials.

It also comprised such things as:

1. A session with the Greek consul over 14 Italians who had escaped from Switzerland.

2. A call by an American woman who wanted a divorce from her French husband, then in jail as a collaborator.

3. A talk with a French manufacturer who was seeking war contracts.

4. Participation in a memorial ceremony for Allied dead.

5. A conference with the Regional Commissioner on rationing plans and price control.

The most delicate problem which Major Payette had to handle was the relationship between his office and the Commander and Staff of Area Command B, a subdivision of Delta Base Section. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Base Section personnel, according to Major Payette, themselves took over all dealings with the civilian authorities in Lyon. . . . They were preemptory in their attitude both toward the French and Civil Affairs, Major Payette feels, and he thinks that the Army's interests suffered resultingly. "I had to spend a great deal of time soothing feelings among the French," he said. [Annex L-6 to file, cited above, Section I.]

Even after CAHQ moved to Lyon, no success attended any effort to reassert Civil Affairs jurisdiction here. Friction continued. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hilt of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

♦ ♦ ♦ liaison officers were charged with day-to-day contacts with the civilian authorities in their regions. They were expected to determine regional supply needs and to observe the distribution of imported Allied supplies. Further, they represented local army units to the civilian officials, executed special assignments from CAHQ such as surveys of industries, studies of the press, etc.

Specialists from Headquarters toured the entire South, following up problems in their particular fields. Transportation experts, for example, worked on plans for setting up pools of . . . army trucks which were loaned to local French civilian administration for aiding in the distribution of food. Coal experts checked on mining problems. Utilities men dealt with PTT (Post, Telephone, Telegraph) and the Signal Corps arranged for the return of telephone circuits to civilian use. Public Works officers surveyed road and bridge conditions and co-operated with Army Engineers in arranging for the French departments of Ponts and Chaussees . . . to rebuild certain bridges and repair important roads. ♦ ♦ ♦



[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

♦ ♦ ♦ The real force behind all administration at the moment is the Resistance movement. The Comite Departmental de la Liberation in Var is under the leadership of "M. Mouche," whose real name is not revealed. There are eight sub-committees in the principal towns of Var. That part of the department which extends from the Maures Mountains to the sea coast is under a sub-departmental committee at the head of which are two coleaders: M. Marc Rainaut for military matters and M. Girard for political and administrative matters. The latter is Acting Mayor of St.-Tropez. M. Rainaut was recently decorated with the Silver Star by the Commanding General of the Seventh Army in recognition of the part he played protecting paratroopers who landed in and near the town. ♦ ♦ ♦


[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44]

♦ ♦ ♦ Bands of young members of the FFI have been roaming the countryside and some have taken threatening attitudes towards civilians. The activity of these bands is less pronounced than it was immediately after the landings. Also there has been some indication of disagreement between members of the FFI due, it is thought, to the fact that the "regulars" have considered that some of the recent "converts" were not entitled to membership. Many are said to be wearing armbands who are not authorized to wear them. The danger of possible civilian disorders has been brought officially to the attention of Colonel Lavilleon and it has been considered proper to suggest that members of the FFI, who have no military purpose to perform, should be disarmed. Colonel Lavilleon has taken the position that any precipitous action in requiring the FFI to disarm would be unfortunate, but he recognizes that the situation requires attention and proposes a program as follows:

(1) Instructions to chiefs to disarm all below the age of 18 and above the age of 45

(2) Immediate enrollment of all authorized members, numbering of their armbands to prevent misrepresentation, and disarming those not entitled to serve as members of the FFI.

(3) Control of arms at local headquarters and authorization for the use thereof only on authorized missions.

(4) Organization of commando groups of the younger members who desire active military service and incorporation of such groups in French Army B.

(5) Of those remaining, to transfer volunteers to regular territorial Army units as soon as the military administration in Southern France can be reconstituted.

(6) Those not wishing to serve in the regular French Army to return to civilian life.
The Commanding General of the Seventh Army feels that the matter requires clear-cut action and he is desirous that General Cochet proceed to Southern France for the purpose of taking responsibility for the implementation of policy outlined by Colonel Lavilleon. Efforts are being made to arrange passage for General Cochet to Southern France for the purpose mentioned. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Maj Russell Kennedy, CMP, Hist, Public Safety Operations, Southern France, 11  SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, J-2]

♦ ♦ ♦ When Marseille fell, the FFI there numbered about 1,600. Within two weeks this number had grown to 4,500, as all the hoodlums and grudgeholders flocked to the colors after the fighting was over. In another month the figure had dropped to about 3,000 as the original mem-


bers, mostly reputable citizens, returned to their normal pursuits, leaving the undesirable elements as the great bulk of the organization. It was at this time that, having reported that the FFI in the Marseille Region consisted largely of criminals and undisciplined young hoodlums and that effort was being made to secure the liquidation of the outfit, I received a letter from Lt. Col. Mark Howe informing me that I had lost my perspective and did not understand the troubles of France. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VIII]

♦ ♦ ♦ The difference in viewpoint between Lt. Col. Howe and Major Kennedy was representative of the wide cleavage in attitude among CA personnel. Officers who served at CAHQ report that two extremes could be seen there, the one holding that "everything the French did or didn't do was perfect and that the American Army should remain completely aloof from French affairs," and the other feeling that "nothing the French did was right and that an AMGOT should be established."

Inasmuch as the policy-making officers, it is said, leaned more to the former view than the latter, CAHQ in general tended to follow a hands-off policy.

Some mild protests were made to the French when the FFI set up its own street patrols to ferret out alleged collaborators. Trigger-happy boys, some as young as fourteen, were quick to shoot at anyone who disregarded their orders to "Halt and identify yourself." ♦ ♦ ♦

The situation grew more acute as several members of the Allied forces were shot by the FFI by error. . . . on September 22nd he [the CAHQ Public Safety Officer] was able to report that he had taken steps to prevent further incidents and that he was "optimistic that none will occur as the FFI leaders are most anxious to prevent such incidents." ♦ ♦ ♦

Unfortunately, however, the civilian police, whose arms and vehicles had been taken either by the Germans or the FFI, were in no position to enforce these edicts [issued by the French Secretary General for the Police]. And the difficulties with the FFI continued. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist, Public Safety Opns, Southern Fr]

♦ ♦ ♦ Prior to the abolition of the FFI in the Marseille Region, there were numerous instances of American personnel being shot at by FFI members and five reported cases on which the shots took effect. One captain was wounded slightly in arm and head, one lieutenant critically wounded in the abdomen, and one was shot through the head and killed. The latter two occurred when FFI men, without warning, opened fire on the outskirts of Toulon on a car in which they were riding. . . . Investigation by the CID resulted in the apprehension of the two men responsible who admitted the shooting but claimed that the occupants of the car had fired on them first. The French authorities made a collateral investigation and reported that the Americans were unarmed and that the culprits had made this allegation merely to reduce their own culpability. Despite this, when the two men were turned over by CID to the Sub-Prefect at Toulon for incarceration and trial, the latter promptly released them. . . . now, nearly three months after the shooting, the men not only have not been tried or spent a night in jail but, so far as I have been able to determine, no steps have been taken looking toward their prosecution. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VIII]

♦ ♦ ♦ A re-appraisal of the facts of this incident . . . indicates that CAHQ did not take very positive steps towards obtaining punishment for the killers of one of its own men. There were, unquestionably, mitigating circumstances in that the American soldiers were driving after dark in an unmarked civilian car without lights. On the other hand, the various investigations substantiated the fact that the two FFI members, both men with criminal records, opened fire without any warning at all. And the further fact remains, as Major Kennedy pointed out, the perpetrators did remain unpunished in any way.

Although certain CAHQ officers were unperturbed about the state of public safety, it is also true that in off the record conversations, officials of the Regional Government at Marseille admitted their concern. Eventually a French division "happened" to move through the city and to make a parade up its main streets. Shortly afterwards, a regiment of Zouaves was moved in to aid the police in patrolling the streets.

By government action, the FFI finally was eliminated as an organization and its members given the alternative of joining the Forces Républicaines de Securite (FRS), enlisting in the army, or reverting entirely to civilian life.

The FRS quickly developed a good state of organization and discipline and, as recounted by Major Kennedy, "did excellent work in prevent-


ing the transport of stolen military property in civilian vehicles."

Months later, though, shooting could still be heard on most nights in Marseille. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq, Seventh Army, Rpt, 3 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI]

In the ten days that have passed since the liberation of Marseille, the local Communist leaders have continued their policy of working with other political groups in the city and with the departmental and regional officials....

. . . Officers of the Securite Militaire declare that the Communists are creating no problems, and members of Aubrac's staff confirm that there are no difficulties-at least "for the present." This qualification, however, indicates a fairly general undercurrent of nervousness that the Party may change its line without prior notice. ♦ ♦ ♦

Finally, it is of some importance that the Communists-whose shock troops, the FTP, are particularly important in the local FFI formations are apparently offering no resistance to the announced measures for regularizing the status of the FFI.... ♦ ♦ ♦



[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VI]

♦ ♦ ♦ American soldiers were guilty of contributing heavily to the black market. The practice started innocently enough when the assault troops began trading cigarettes for wine, but it grew to enormous proportions thereafter as the Base Section and Port soldiers discovered that they could get astronomical prices for the PX rations and Army supplies. Cigarettes sold at 100 francs a package; C ration cans for 25 to 50 francs; gasoline at 60 francs a liter.

Inroads into the army stocks became critical and the effect on the French economy serious. ♦ ♦ ♦

Many arrests . . . were made and much government property recovered through the use of road blocks, increased number of guards at the ports and depots, constant surveillance of known outlets and through tips supplied by undercover operatives. . . . But these were only a drop in the bucket.

The thefts and black market sales continued and spread. Soon the trade took on the proportions of big business. The light sentences given by the French courts to civilian offenders-despite CAHQ protests-did little to deter them.

The road blocks did do fairly good work in stopping the transport of stolen army property in civilian vehicles but they reached only a small proportion of the traffic. Since the majority of the goods moved in military vehicles, these road blocks-usually manned just by French police and security forces-were completely unable to control it. Joint patrols of French and military police were needed for this purpose but because of the local dearth of MP's, were impossible to arrange. ♦ ♦ ♦ [See extract from History of Public Safety Operations by Major Kennedy, in concluding section of this chapter.]


[CAO, Nice to CCAO, Seventh Army, Rpt, 20 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt VI, M-I9]

2. In an effort to suppress the black market now existing in Nice in Army food supplies, a memorandum has been issued to the units within the 1st ABTF and read to the troops . . . and is used as a warrant to confiscate any and all Army rations, gasoline, and other material found on the persons or property of civilians.

3. The Prefect has taken complementary action to prevent the purchase of food and other supplies from militaries....


[Econ and Finance Branch Report to CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, J-7]

♦ ♦ ♦ a. During the first few weeks after the liberation of Toulon it is probable that several jeep loads of army rations and clothing were sold in Toulon. These sales were made in the period prior to the putting into operation of effective preventative measures by the Provost Marshal.
b. The Provost Marshal of Toulon is sincerely interested in preventing black market operations by service men and is making a real effort to prevent such operations.
c. The black market operations by service men in Toulon have declined to a point of minor significance.


[CAPO, Toulon, Report to SCAO, G-5, Delta Base, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, app. J-47]

1. (2) The campaign against black market in U.S. Government supplies and property is now organized and proceeding satisfactorily. The local police have assigned four plainclothesmen to this work and their efforts are being coordinated and directed with the Provost Marshal by this office as per instructions received from your office through Captain Kolgore. The campaign has not been in operation long enough to determine the size of the existing black market. However, it has been ascertained that the more or less haphazard black market activities mentioned in previous reports has stopped. The black market at present is underground and may be well organized, dealing principally in tobacco and selling to retail stores or individual civilian retailers who in turn sell to the general public. The campaign was organized 2 October and began to function the following day....


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VI]

♦ ♦ ♦ It was difficult to persuade the French civilians not to patronize the black market. For four years, these men and women had been trained to use it as the usual concomitant of their daily existence. They regarded it as a normal, unmoral perhaps, but never immoral affair. The highest French officials patronized it themselves and it was not an extraordinary event for CAO's to be invited to dinner by a ranking public servant and to dine off obviously black market meat or stolen American canned goods.

Some inroads on the practice were made by the French, acting under constant CA pressure. Sharp police and court action were taken against black market profiteers. Blazing newspaper publicity was given to their methods and to the menace they offered to France's economic health. As a whole, though, the black market continued to thrive. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAO, Alpes-Maritime, Rpt, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-r2]

♦ ♦ ♦ it has been reported to me that our combined efforts against the black market are now beginning to be felt. As previously reported, 1,500,000 francs have been collected and several individuals are under arrest. One baker who sold bread at go francs per loaf is up for 500,000 francs, imprisonment or deportation. The situation is, I think, looking better.



[ASF, ID, Hist of Civil Sup, vol. I, pp. 237-38]

♦ ♦ ♦ These requirements were based on a 1500 calorie scale of provisions for 65% of a population of 7,600,000 and amounted to 48,900 tons of foodstuff, 1200 tons of soap and 23,200 tons of coal. They were approved without modification by the Supply Subcommittee at its 10th meeting, 17 March 1944, as falling within Plan "A" estimates for France. For purposes of operational convenience it was decided that the U.S. would furnish the initial civilian supply shipments for Southern France since only in this way could the supplies be combat-loaded on the


initial assault convoys then being loaded in the U.S....

2. Co-ordination of SCAEF/SACMED Requests:

By LAC 406, 19 May 1944, requirements for the ANVIL [DRAGOON] areas were resubmitted on collapse (RANKIN) assumptions. Through subsequent exchange of cables it was agreed that 45 days on collapse assumptions were equivalent to 90 days operational Requirements and allocations were made on this basis within the over-all supply plan. At the same time SACMED was informed in CAL 502 that action on his second 45-day collapse requirements (second 90-day operational) must await SCAEF comment in order to avoid combined SHAEF/AFHQ re quests in excess of approved quantities for France and that in future co-ordination of SHAEF/ AFHQ requirements for France would be essential. . . . 12


[Gen Bd Study 33: Procedures Followed by CA and MG in Restoration, Reorganization and Supervision of Indigenous Civil Admin]

157. . . . Techniques of operation in Southern France contrasted with those used in Northern France. Instead of the supplies coming under the jurisdiction of G-4 Section it was a separate and distinct Civil Affairs operation. Ships arrived solidly loaded with Civil Affairs supplies and a section of the docks at Marseille was designated for the unloading of these supplies. All Civil Affairs supplies were turned over to the French at the port, on official receipts, for the French to distribute. .. . The vehicles brought in for transportation of Civil Affairs supplies were issued to the French to take care of necessary transportation and to supplement the indigenous transport. This procedure placed the responsibility of allocation, transportation, and distribution solely on the indigenous authorities and relieved the Allied armies of transportation, storage and accounting for supplies except at dockside. It must be noted, however, that the supplies brought in at the southern ports were for one country and all of the supplies could be immediately turned over, while in Northern France supplies, all originally for the French, were later destined for France, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and displaced persons in Germany. In that case the turnover of supplies at dockside would have been more difficult. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Komer, CA and MG in MTO]

♦ ♦ ♦ The handling of civilian supply in army areas was the responsibility of the Quartermaster, Seventh Army. This was a departure from the system used in Italy where civilian food supplies, although standard quartermaster items, had been distributed by AMG and ACC. The handling of identical items by two distinct agencies resulted in losses . . . of both military and civilian supplies and also entailed duplication of personnel and records. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. IV]

♦ ♦ ♦ Once the supplies were delivered [to French authorities], responsibility for their distribution in France became a responsibility of the French. CAHQ did reserve the right, though, to advise on allocations, and even in case of emergency to overrule their wishes.

Only once was it necessary to question a French decision in this respect. It followed upon the action of Regional Commissaire Aubrac in "freezing" within the Region of Marseille all imported Allied foodstuffs, some of which had been destined by representatives of the National Ministry of Agriculture for other southern regions as well.

Major Archibald Alexander, Chief of the Service and Supply Branch, in a conference with M. Aubrac, told him forcefully that he had not the right to issue such an order. M. Aubrac asserted that he had. Alexander insisted to the contrary, taking the position that the disposition of Civil Affairs supplies was and had to be, under the control of the Delegate of the National Minister of Agriculture.

Necessity for drastic steps by CAHQ was averted, though, when the Paris Government upheld Alexander's position and directed Aubrac to countermand his order. Accordingly the food was distributed generally, not exclusively to Marseille. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hilt of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. IV]

♦ ♦ ♦ During the planning stage, G-5 Section Seventh Army and CAHQ submitted requisitions to AFHQ. They requested sufficient civilian supplies to last 180 days under combat conditions or 90 days under conditions following


a complete cessation of hostilities. Eventually, it was decided that these supplies were to be used over 120 days.

AFHQ screened these requisitions, then submitted them to the CCS who allocated 180,000 tons from sources in the U.S.A., the U.K., and the Middle East for use over this four-month period. AFHQ then ordered the supplies forwarded, as needed, to Africa and Italy, but left it to CAHQ to decide what actually should be shipped into France on the agreed ten-day phasing schedule.

After the August 15th landings, CAHQ was to notify AFHQ four months in advance concerning over-all-supply requirements, and go days in advance of "What it wanted to arrive, and where, and when."

It was also CAHQ's responsibility to arrange for port acceptance of so-called Civil Affairs ships on which these supplies were transported; to see to it that they were unloaded and their contents accounted for before they were turned over to the proper representatives of the French Government.

The Service and Supply Branch of CAHQ handled all phases of the import program except for accounting procedures which were done by experts of the Economics and Finance Branch and the unloading and turnover which were supervised by the CA Port Detachment.

This Port Detachment created an enviable record. Originally its personnel was to have constituted the Civil Affairs Section of the Continental Base Section. . . . However, the presence of CAHQ in the same city as CBS led to the handling of most of its Civil Affairs problems by headquarters itself.

As a result, CBS CA personnel . . . were directed to concern themselves exclusively with unloading Civil Affairs ships and the delivery of their contents to the French. ♦ ♦ ♦

To help the French develop information on which to base their allocations, as well as to assemble the necessary data on which to formulate the requisitions to AFHQ, the Services of Supply Branch sent officers throughout Southern France to make a survey of potential harvest returns. They interviewed all Ravitaillement and Agricultural officials and brought back a detailed study of future food requirements. ♦ ♦ ♦

With hundreds of French trucks immobilized for lack of gasoline CAHQ arranged for deliveries of POL to the French Government from Army, captured enemy and imported stocks....

Long sessions with the Transportation Corps produced tonnage allowances on Army trains for civil affairs supplies heading from Toulon to Marseille and from Marseille to the North. In September, an allowance of 300 tons a day was granted to carry foods from the port at Toulon to Marseille. By the 15th of October, this figure had risen to a point where the Railway Priority Board had approved the movement of more than 50,000 tons of civilian supplies, comprising coal, machinery, milk, vegetables and meat....

Although the freight movement by rail played an enormous part in the relief of the starving coastal areas, as did also the rehabilitation of civilians' automotive transport, it is safe to say that the deciding factor was the importation of Allied military trucks for use by the French Government.... ♦ ♦ ♦

[Major Bennett, G-5, Seventh Army] wrote: Transport in France was a greater problem than supply. Imported supplies without transport brought in to move them cannot be effectively used quickly where needed....


[Civil Affairs Report on Liberated Areas, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civ Ad min]

♦ ♦ ♦  The Resistance in each town has one or two trucks. The Ravitaillement in most towns has from one to four additional trucks, depending on the town's size, and has the use of Resistance trucks in other instances. This capacity is adequate to care for the needs of the towns so far uncovered. The cities are expected to present a more difficult problem. A number of trucks have been hidden by the departmental Ponts et Chaussees, the wheels in one place, the engines in another, and the bodies in a third. They are now being reassembled. Assurance has been given that adequate trucking will be available to handle imported civil supplies. All trucks are gazogene powered and the authorities have been advised to keep them so in view of the general gasoline shortage. Supplies of charcoal are abundant in Var. The ingenuity and initiative shown by the French officials and FFI in regard to transport are characteristic. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Civil Affairs Report 2 to ACofS, G-5, Seventh Army, 6 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-10]

♦ ♦ ♦ At present there are approximately 40 civilian trucks (wood-burning) operating in the supply haul from St.-Tropez warehouse [to Nice]. Cannes and Antibes are dispatching their own trucks to Tropez. Although the cutting of the Var bridge has made it difficult for these


vehicles to get through, progress is satisfactory. All civilian traffic over the Var has been halted with the exception of supply trucks. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Civil Affairs Liaison Officer, Nice, Report to CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, vol. II, Jkt V, M-11 ]

♦ ♦ ♦ An absolute minimum 500 tons of food are feeded daily. We have enough gazogenes to haul 600 tons daily but these trucks are so slow and inefficient that it takes them two days or more to make a one day trip.... Therefore, . . . it is impossible to import .. . half of the absolute minimum....

We have 15 trucks which could haul 25 more tons daily if we had gasoline and oil....
The chief of the Ravitaillement has informed me that the people would absolutely be starving but for the importation of American flour....

To remedy this situation we need gasoline and oil and at least a few of the 526 [sic] army trucks loaned to the French government by the U.S. Army. If these trucks are forthcoming, please send them to Nice loaded not empty. Food is being held for Nice in other departments and with sufficient transportation we can pool this food in the ravitaillement. 13  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist, Road Transportation Branch, 15 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 6o, Jkt V, app. E-r4]

During the month of April of this year a Group was formed which was named the Transportation Committee and had as its aim the formulation of plans for the rehabilitation and handling of all transportation in the area of Southern France then assigned to the particular operation. Plans were formulated based on the total amount of supplies to be imported and a request placed for the allocation of 900 1 1/2-ton trucks for the use of Civil Affairs. At that time it was the intention to bring these trucks in on a sale basis, deliver them to the various former commercial trucking concerns in the area with the proviso that they give first priority to the hauling of food. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C.... disagreed with our original request and substituted in lieu thereof 557 4-ton trucks which were then in the Mid-East....

Included with these 557 vehicles was a complete one year supply of spare parts involving some 8 or 9 hundred tons. . . . Several weeks passed and we continued planning with General Cochet's representatives in North Africa along the lines of turning these vehicles over to existing commercial firms. We were suddenly confronted one day by the fact that G-4 of the Task Force had ordered that since these vehicles were consigned to the Commanding General of the Seventh Army for use of Civil Affairs they were in fact a part of the Army equipment, and although they were designated for use in Civil Affairs in Southern France, we would not be permitted to make any arrangements for the sale of these trucks to French commercial firms prior to the receipt of specific instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. . . . Further, that the Civil Affairs transport group would be fully responsible for the maintenance, operation and accounting for these vehicles and spare parts. . . . Realizing that we should never be able to obtain sufficient American or British personnel to adequately control and operate these vehicles, a plan was devised by the Transportation Section to request from the French cadres of officers and enlisted men to form two Groupes des Transports, the equivalent of an American truck battalion-I say the equivalent but it was much larger than a truck battalion.

General Cochet approved of this plan and took immediate steps to have necessary officers assigned by the Ministry of War. It was then proposed by the undersigned officer that a school be established and conducted by the transportation committee for the purpose of instructing these assigned French officers in the administration and maintenance of vehicles in accordance with existing Army Ordnance regulations. The school was formed and conducted in Algiers during the first week in August. It was attended by six officers and 12 enlisted men. . . . After the finish of the schools . . . final instructions and authority were given to the groupe commanders to begin requisitioning of garages, hiring of drivers and completion of their garages immediately upon their entry into the country. After arriving in Marseille we made immediate contact with the group commanders whom we found were already here and carrying out their instructions and plans. . . . The first trucks to arrive were brought over from Italy where they had been erroneously shipped . . . and were turned over


to our groups after being serviced on 13 October 44. . . . We were informed at 8 o'clock on the morning of 15 October 44 that two ships from the Mid-East were in Marseille Harbor containing . . . a total of 220 of our vehicles. Having assigned to us at that time only three qualified American maintenance officers and eight mechanics it can be easily imagined the amount of work that this small group of men were expected to accomplish. . . . After three different attempts and numerous arguments with the Army we finally obtained suitable parking space and garage facilities. . . . While we were in the middle of servicing the first 220 vehicles we received word from Toulon that the balance of our trucks, which would bring us up to a total of 556, were being off-loaded at Toulon. This again threw the operation into complete confusion . . . since neither the space nor facilities were adequate for the additional vehicles....

Some of the problems encountered at Toulon were the lack in that city of trained civilian mechanics and of adequate civilian tools. The mechanic problem was solved with German POW's and the tools were badgered, scrounged and begged from the Ordnance. . . . The plan of distribution devised in North Africa was seen to be completely impracticable since in that plan the supply committee had decided on the establishment of various depots and sub-depots throughout the territory and the trucks could be more efficiently used by working directly from these depots and sub-depots. With the arrival of the supplies and their immediate turnover to the French it was seen that the main problem then involved would be-first, port clearance and secondly the distribution of the supplies from the main warehouses at Toulon and Marseille to the various regions. The second problem would be the gathering in from the various areas the indigenous supplies, vegetables, etc. It was therefore decided to distribute the groups as follows: Two companies consisting of 88 trucks each in Marseille; one company of 88 trucks in Toulon. These three companies comprise the Groupe de Transport 521 in Marseille. The other Groupe de Transport, or 522 Groupe, was to have its headquarters in Lyon. Its companies would be established with two companies remaining in Lyon and the northern region and one company to be established in Montpellier. . . . This plan was put into operation and companies established. Since that time a great many changes have been made. . . . The operation as a whole was almost impossible to control. Sufficiently trained American maintenance officers and mechanics were impossible to obtain. ♦ ♦ ♦

.. . Our organization, while still being inadequately staffed, is nevertheless accomplishing work and in such amounts that it is being noticeably appreciated by French officials throughout the southern zone. A compliment by a senior officer not long ago . . . stated in a few words a great deal of praise. He said, "everywhere you travel now in southern France you see in operation our Civil Affairs trucks." ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. V]

Largest of the CAHQ sections, the Services and Supply Branch, also was charged with handling such functions as labor, communications, public works, utilities and solid fuels. Labor was probably the most ticklish.

Several successive crises occurred in this field. Controversial questions involving U.S. Army jurisdiction, wage policies, recruiting methods, union recognition, etc., had to be solved.

. .. The army urgently required skilled stevedores for the docks, mechanics for ordnance shops, common laborers for railheads and depots as well as scores of other classifications. It needed thousands upon thousands of men but, unfortunately, the local labor market was both limited and of poor quality. There could be no denying the truth of the French statement that the cream of Marseille workers were prisoners of war, had been drafted for forced labor by the Germans, or had joined the FFI. The remaining number was small and markedly inefficient.

In addition, at the moment of liberation, there was no working governmental machinery for recruiting such workers as remained nor was there any over-all policy governing the U.S. Army's labor relationships. The situation was both difficult and vexatious. ♦ ♦ ♦

The French were startled to find that the plan laboriously agreed on earlier [in Algiers] was apparently to be discarded or, at least, delayed. However, they were persuaded to begin the recruitment of workers while CAHQ requested AFHQ to get a ruling on the matter from SHAEF.

The recruitment commenced under French control but with CAHQ assistance. It went slowly, due in large part to public confusion over wage rates, working hours, etc. Day by day, though, slowly it mounted until on September 17th, end of the first payroll period, the Army had been supplied with 7,000 civilian workers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. II]

♦ ♦ ♦ On August 19, CAHQ told AFHQ that, "Owing to the speed of the advance, the Army requires several thousand laborers to unload quickly supplies in ships in the harbor off the beaches near St.-Tropez. Since the towns are small and since food is scarce there has been considerable difficulty in securing this labor .. . Major Bennett is touring the area, appealing to the FFI leaders for aid, and organizing a program for the registration of labor."  14

Bennett and other CAO's actually drove from town to town along the coast and for 30 miles inland, appealing to local officials to get Frenchmen to volunteer for Army labor.

This was a difficult task in that the low wages offered and the hard type of labor expected did not attract many workers. So difficult was the task, in fact, that heated debates raged at CAHQ and G-5, Seventh Army, over whether or not to urge the Cochet Mission to institute labor conscription. This was urged by some as military necessity and opposed by others as undemocratic. The opposition carried the day and no such recommendation was made. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CA Rpt on Liberated Areas, 18-23 Aug 44]

♦ ♦ ♦ At the present time, it appears that voluntary workers will not reach the required number; accordingly, beach labor is being requisitioned by the French authorities. Such workers are being classified as dock workers. As such, it is planned to pay them 10 francs per hour, plus two francs for the family allowance. Rations are not available in sufficient quantities to serve the noon meal to workers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. V]

♦ ♦ ♦ there was considerable confusion over CBS' actual labor requirements. Upon arrival in Marseille, the Base Section's Branch chiefs deliberately overestimated their labor needs as a guarantee against possible future shortages.

The first estimate of CBS labor requirements was given to CAHQ on 27 August, while Marseille was still a battleground ....15  This estimate was exorbitant and later changed repeatedly, thereby making the task of CAHQ's labor officers far more complicated than it should have been. CAHQ's labor specialists have since observed that careful evaluation of future labor requirements, made jointly by CBS and CAHQ in advance of the landings, would have avoided many subsequent difficulties.

CBS insisted that it wanted all these workers and that it wanted them in a hurry. CAHQ, therefore, undertook to find them and set about stimulating a reorganization of the French labor machinery. Its efforts along these lines finally succeeded when representatives of the National Ministry of Labor arrived to take charge themselves.

Initially CAHQ claimed complete jurisdiction over the recruitment of all workers-as well as over the setting of all army labor policies-however, the staff readily acceded to the demand of CBS that its Base Purchasing Agent be made the sole army hiring agency because it knew full well that it lacked sufficient personnel to man the employment offices. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. V]

♦ ♦ ♦ Delays in the preparation of the payrolls, plus misunderstandings of the rates followed by the Army (the French had changed the wage levels just at this time) contributed to worker unrest and resulted in several spontaneous stoppages. These, combined with the notorious laziness of Marseille workers, their reluctance to work on Sundays and often on Mondays, too, their refusal to work in the rain (due in part to a lack of raincoats and boots), their demands for two-hour lunch periods, infuriated CBS officers who had to get ships unloaded and supplies moving.

They resolved to expedite the arrival in Southern France of trained units with personnel comprised of Italian prisoners of war, 28,700 in all. This decision was alarming to CAHQ because


of the intense anti-Italian feeling among the populace. ♦ ♦ ♦
... Despite the early fears, no serious troubles involving them occurred. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, RRO [Regional Relief Officer] Marseille, to ACofS, G-5, Sixth AGp, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, app. F-7]

.... trained service units, comprising 28,700 Italian prisoners of war, are expected here by D plus 60....
It is planned that some 14,000 will be employed in Marseille and the others at Dijon.

The decision to proceed with early plans to bring in the Italians was apparently taken with great reluctance and over the objections of CBS G-2, CIC, and the CBS Civil Affairs police officer that the presence of the Italians would be likely to provoke rioting.

Reasons cited for the decision to bring them in are general dissatisfaction with CBS' present civilian employees and conviction that it would be impossible to find 14,000 additional workers here. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Army's plans in this regard were outlined to M. Aubrac at yesterday's regular conference. The first announcement came as a great shock to M. Massinet [Massenet] and others on Aubrac's staff but M. Massinet agreed that it would be quite impossible to find 14,000 more civilian workers here. He also declared that he could well understand the Army's feeling that its present civilian employees are anything but satisfactory.

M. Aubrac concurred and said finally that the French Government would not object to bringing in Italian POW's under the following conditions:

1. That present civilian employees are not discharged.

2. That the Italians are treated strictly as POW's, kept under heavy guard (also for their protection), wear uniforms marked POW, and are not fed better than French civilians.

3. That they work in the port or at Army installations and not be used as truck drivers working separately around the city.

He said that if the Army needs truck drivers, he will make a great effort to find 500-1000 of them. ♦ ♦ ♦

Late last night, Aubrac's position was reported to Colonel Wickersham in the absence of Colonel [Roye P.] Gerfen. Wickersham felt that the three conditions (with the exception of the question of rations) were acceptable to CBS. In the matter of truck drivers, lie said that the Italians would be employed only in convoys under heavy MP escort.


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. V]

♦ ♦ ♦ In evolving a labor policy satisfactory, both to the French and to the U.S. Army, the biggest problem CAHQ had to meet was the question of who was to pay these workers-the American Army or the French Government. Involved in this question was the ticklish subject of payment of various French social and wage taxes, family allowances, etc.

Conversations between French labor officials and CAHQ labor officers in Algiers had produced a draft of a plan by which the French agreed to pay the U.S. Army's civilian employees, charging the funds so dispensed to reverse lend lease. The plan would have permitted the Army, under certain circumstances, to pay its workers directly at wage levels fixed by the various regional commissioners. In this latter instance, however, it was to deduct from each employee's wage the social security tax, and the government wage tax, but to add a "vacation indemnity." A copy of its payroll was to be given the French who would pay these workers, their family allowances, and workmen's compensation.

Unfortunately, the draft of this plan had not been finished by the time the first CAHQ officers left Africa for France.

On their arrival in Marseille, they knew little about the plan except what was told them by a French labor official who had participated in the Algiers talks. Their reaction was that they lacked authority under the governing SHAEF policies to commit the Army to such a drastic change of policy. ♦ ♦ ♦

Meanwhile, the proposed labor policy was discussed at length with CBS. Its officers, in the main, were strongly opposed to it and preferred to continue the traditional methods of the Army meeting its own payrolls, without any of the deductions and additions called for under traditional French social legislation. However, they eventually were persuaded to follow CAHQ policy provided that it was in accordance with SHAEF wishes.


When the first payday arrived, no decision had yet come from SHAEF. Accordingly, it was determined with French consent, that the Army would pay the workers directly. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Servs and Sup Branch, Report, Sixth U.S. AGp, 23 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, app. F-5]

1. Wage payments by the Army for the first payroll period ending 17 September 1944 are now being made and in a few smaller installations have been completed. Revised wage rates have been released by the French Labor Office and in some categories show an increase. Especially is this the case with common labor where the hourly rate moves up from 12.5 francs to 16 francs....

3. There is some indication that a shortage of skilled labor exists. However, the payment of increased wage rates, feeding and payment of social benefits, if and when directed, may bring sufficient skilled workers to the fore. Surely a well defined labor policy consistent with French law together with more realistic wage scales will improve labor relations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, ACofS, G-5, Sixth AGp, to Chief, Servs and Sup Branch, CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 27 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, F-8]

1. On 13 September 1944, cable FWD 14723 from SHAEF to AFHQ stated that "where Seventh Army is certain that French regional or local organizations are in position to pay civilian employees and accept burden of administering social security payments, Seventh Army may agree to French assuming such payments and obligations."

3. Having examined the question of the capacity of the French national, regional, and local authorities in the Region of Marseille to make payment of the wages of civilians employed by the armed forces and to fulfill the burden of administering social security payments on account of such employees, it has been determined at this headquarters that those authorities are in a position to make all such payments. The employing arms and services are, accordingly, free to permit the French national, regional, and local authorities in the Region of Marseille to assume such payments and obligations. 16


[Provisional Directive for Civ Labor, CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 3 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 6o, Jkt V, F-10]

1. The following provisional directive is published under the authority of cable FWD 14723 from SHAEF to AFHQ, dated 13 September 1944, for the preparation of French payrolls for civilian employees in Southern France.

2. The Civil Affairs Section will make every effort to assist the military forces to procure whatever labor they require, to make available labor for essential civilian needs; to prevent work stoppages in civilian operations; to assist the local authorities in alleviating unemployment; to maintain the system of Social Security and Workmen's Compensation Benefits and Contributions; to re-establish labor exchanges or employment offices and other governmental agencies required to accomplish the above.
a. The above will be accomplished to the fullest extent possible by reliance upon the French authorities and the efforts of Civil Affairs officers will be confined to liaison relationship.

3. Method of Procuring Civilian Labor.
a. Necessary civilian labor will be furnished by the French Office of Labor and Manpower. In communities where such offices are not established, labor will be procured through the Mayor.
b. By direct hiring, emergent cases only, when labor is not available under a above.
c. The use of private contractors will be adopted only in circumstances permitting no other efficient manner of accomplishing the work; however, such contractors working for components of the Army will be bound by all labor and social security laws and regulations and all undertakings with such contractors will contain a provision insuring compliance with these laws and regulations.

4. Wage Rates.
a. Wage rates in every instance will be those legal French rates existing in the Regions and Departments according to zone and skill classifications. Wage rates will be secured from the French Regional Labor Office. Changes in wage rates will be made by French authorities only.

5. Payment of Wages.
a. Wages usually will be paid by the French Office of Labor and Manpower.
b. However, in the case of direct hiring, wages will he paid by the using Arm or Service.
c. In both instances the using Army and Service will submit payrolls for each payroll period to the French Office of Labor and Man-


power on forms to be supplied by the French authorities.
d. The deduction for worker's wage tax and social security contributions and the payment of vacation indemnity will be made by the employing service only in cases of direct hiring.
e. In every instance the French authorities will be responsible for the payment of social security and workmen's compensation benefits and family allowances.

6. Workmen's Compensation.
a. All accidents or compensable occupational diseases arising out of or in the course of employment shall be reported immediately to the French Office of Labor and Manpower on forms provided by French authorities.

7. Conditions of Employment.
a. Normal work week is 48 hours; six days of 8 hours each, exclusive of meal time or time of travel to and from the job. Work week begins on Monday and ends on Sunday.
Overtime will be paid for all time worked over 48 hours in any work week.
c. Overtime
rates will be paid as follows:
(1) Day Work
10% increase on basic day rate for work performed over 48 hours between hours 0500 and 2200.
(2) Night Work
25% increase on basic day rate for work performed over 48 hours between hours of 2200 and 0500.
(3) Sundays and holidays for night workers will be considered as beginning on the night of such Sunday or holiday and ending the following morning.

8. Termination of employment.
a. All workers shall receive one week's notice except as follows:
b. Fortnightly (14 days) workers employed for at least six weeks shall receive two weeks' notice.
c. Monthly workers employed for at least six weeks shall receive two weeks' notice and if employed for three months or longer they shall receive one month's notice.

9. Meals and rations will not be provided to workers unless directed by the Commanding General in areas as he may deem necessary. When meals and rations are provided the cost of them will be deducted from the worker's wages at prices approved by the French authorities.

10. Instructions for the preparation of French payrolls will be published by this headquarters as may be required.


[CAHQ to SACMED, Rpt, 26 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

♦ ♦ ♦ SCAO Continental Base Section arrived on August 25 with four other officers (Allied) and two French officers from the staff of General Cochet. The SCAO immediately took charge of unloading the Liberty Ship, William Pender, which had just arrived with 5,000 tons of civilian food supplies. The unloading is proceeding satisfactorily at St: Tropez and SCAO CBS proposes to establish himself and his men there until the arrival of additional staff on D plus 15, at which time he will move to Marseille. Four CAO's and some vehicles arrived from Oran today. One CAO is being sent to join the Airborne Division in the Nice-Cannes area. He [SCAO] proposed that another will be assigned to wind up the labor recruitment program for the beaches and the remaining two will move on to Marseille and Toulon. . . . SCAO Army B has also arrived and has taken his place at G-5, Army B. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Adv Ech, 2678th CA Regt., 25 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

♦ ♦ ♦ as of 20 August, there was enough flour to last until September 1 on the basis of the present ration of 150 grams per person per day. 17  ♦ ♦ ♦
There were also 20,000 kilograms of special flour for children.
There were 150,000 cans of condensed milk, said to be a 10 days' supply for children up to 18 months....
There were 150 tons of frozen beef. Sixty-six tons will be consumed tomorrow in a go-gram per capita distribution, the first distribution of meat here in at least two months.
There is only enough olive oil on hand to permit a distribution of 100 grams per person (possibly 300 grams)....


There are no dried vegetables and virtually no wine.

This situation of low food levels may possibly be eased through the requisition of certain supplies belonging to the Swiss government, provided that they have not been destroyed. ♦ ♦ ♦

During the morning, a report came through to the Supply authorities that 15,000 people in the Endeume section of Marseille were isolated and facing famine. Accordingly, a fervent request was sent to the commander of French troops requesting him to send food-supplied by the city-to this section in a tank column. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAO, 1st ABTF, Report to ACofS, G-5, Seventh Army, 6 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-10]

Food is probably scarcer in the Nice area and in the Department of Alpes-Maritimes than in any other region of France. To date, since the invasion in the South, 70 tons of flour have been received in Nice and Cannes, which has been the basis of a distribution of 175 grams in Nice last week, and 125 grams so far this week, of bread per person. Last Saturday, 3 September, 200 grams of "pates" were distributed but so far in September no other foodstuffs have been available. Since the 1st of August only 75 grams of meat have been given out. Now in the process of distribution are 250 grams per person of "confiture" (against FE ration card) and go grams of meat. Preparations are being made for the distribution of milk to children for the first ration period of September. Cards are now being given out for the month of September.18  ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ A number of U.S. citizens are presenting themselves to the CAO requesting food. In Nice there are a number of American women, married to Frenchmen, who chose to remain in the country during the German occupation. They now request the Army to furnish them with extra rations. Our policy has been to explain that, on the part of the Army, no official differentiation can be made between these people and the French citizens who draw rations in the same manner through the civil supply channels, and that the Army has no supplies to place at the disposition of American citizens.


[CA Liaison Officer, Nice, Report to CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 6o, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-11]

The food situation for this department is catastrophic. There are 425,000 people who are living on starvation rations and without an increase in diet we can expect severe reactions from the entire population against the American Government. It is a well-established fact that the people ate better under the Nazi occupation, though the black market was running rampant, but we are now employing all facilities to halt the black market and they no longer can rely on this source of food. 19  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Liaison Officer, Alpes-Maritimes Dept, Rpt, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-12]

On 1 Oct 44, we took our Weapons Carrier to the Ration Dump at Ste.-Maxime and returned with 514 cans of emergency stocks to be used in connection with evacuees from the front. Last Sunday, 8 Oct 44, three more vehicles were added to the Weapons Carrier-a 2 1/2-ton truck borrowed from the MP Company and two gazogene camions belonging to the Ravitaillement General. We also took 8 men along to load the trucks. We returned with the following items, all taken from salvage: Milk-4448


cans; Corned beef-1462 cans (3 kgs each); Meat and Vegetable Stew-4500 cans; Vegetables (large size)-115 cans; Miscellaneous (sausage, jams, etc.)-150 cans.

The plan of distribution briefly will be this: the Ravitaillement General . . . and the Directeur des Services Sanitaires . . . will jointly control distribution to the hospitals, the children and the needy. The exact plan was worked out in my office and is now being prepared by these gentlemen for the approval of the Mayor. I personally have confidence that this food will get to those who need it most. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Sr Rgnl Liaison Officer, Alpes-Maritimes, to Chief, Econ & Finance Branch, Sixth AGp, 19 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-13]

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your letter requesting further information concerning some food recently gotten from army salvage. I shall answer the questions in their order:
a. Who had title to the food issued?
The U.S. Army Quartermaster Ration Dump.
b. Was issue made out of Army stocks or stocks that had previously been turned over to IMPEX?
Issue was made at my request from salvage stocks, which means canned goods not in cases due to breakage of cases, dented or otherwise not suitable for distribution to the Army. It had not previously been turned over to IMPEX.

2. Who operates the salvage dump?
It is not a salvage dump. It was the Ste.-Maxime QM ration dump and all ration dumps acquire some salvage which they stock in an open field and it becomes a problem. Therefore they are willing if the cause is just to let me have some of it for the use mentioned in report.

3. Any other information of value to determine whether Allied authority must account for the civilian supplies mentioned in your report?
I believe I have given all the facts. However, I simply went to the dumps with 4 trucks, loaded them, returned to Cannes and turned stock over to the Ravitaillement. The next morning the chiefs of the Ravitaillement and Health Depts., together with the French Liaison Officer and myself agreed that this small amount of foodstuff should be given by direct issue to the hospitals, the children and the needy. The Ravitaillement delivers an order from Dr. Advier, the chief of the Health and Welfare Dept. I received a receipt for the whole stock and I also received original copies of the orders for distribution. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Parkman, ACofS, G-5, to CON, Sixth AGp, 29 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 17.18, Jkt 1]

Pursuant to oral orders from the CG on 25 Oct 44 and further instructions contained in Memorandum of the same date from G-4 Section .. . the undersigned left this Hq at 1200 hours 25 Oct and proceeded directly to Nice, arriving at 1630 hours. On arrival he reported at once by telephone to Major General Frederick and arrangements were made for morning conference on 27 Oct. The evening was spent in conference with M. Geguen, Directeur du Ravitaillement for the Department of Alpes-Maritimes (A-M) in company with the Civil Affairs Officer, I ABTF (Capt. Welch), and the Liaison Officer for Nice (Capt. Pritchard), and in personal reconnaissance and interviews with local citizens. In the morning of 27 Oct, conference was held with General Frederick, after which the undersigned conferred with the Departmental Prefect, M. Escande, and the Commissaire Regional de la Republique for the region of Marseille, M. Aubrac, who was in Nice for a short visit. After report to General Fredericks the undersigned took off for Marseille, arriving at 1400 hours 27 Oct. At Marseille conferences were held with the Supply and Transport officers of Civil Affairs Headquarters, with Brig. General [John P.] Ratay, Commanding the Delta Base Section, and with members of his staff, and a meeting was held with Commandant Soulmagnon, representative of the National Ministry of Ravitaillement for the Southern Zone of France. The undersigned departed from Marseille at 1030 hours 28 Oct., arriving at Vittel airport at 1600 hours, after calling at Lyon for conference with the Chief Supply Officer of Civil Affairs Headquarters.

2. General Frederick expresses his concern on two points, in particular:
(a) The feeding of the population of Monaco. Was a fair allocation being made to Monaco of imported food stocks and other produce available to the Department of A-M? Could a decision be made one way or another on the question of whether Monaco would come under the Department of A-M for the distribution of food supply or whether it could deal directly and


independently with the Regional authorities at Marseille?
(b) Possible unrest among the population of Nice due to uncertainty of food supplies. Could a long range program, for three or four months, be laid down which would enable the local authorities to get away from their present hand to mouth existence?

3. On the points raised in 2 (a) above, the undersigned satisfied himself by direct questioning of M. Aubrac, M. Escande, and M. Geguen, and by personal check of the figures that the allocation of imported food supplies to Monaco was done on a fair and equitable basis. . . . On the question of Monaco dealing directly with Marseille, the decision of M. Aubrac and M. Escande was definitely in the negative. This seems sound to the undersigned as the Monagasques number only about 2,000 as against 18,000 French, and it would be poor administration to allow so small a number the special privilege of direct dealing, when all other communities were administered by the Department.

4. On the point raised in 2 (b) above, there is no question that the Regional and Departmental authorities would be only too glad to make firm plans on a quarterly basis instead of monthly or weekly as is now the case. However, as they pointed out, it would be unsound to do so, and even more unwise to publish a long term program, in the light of all the uncertainties of transport, both by sea and by land. Failure to make good on a published program would even be more disastrous to public confidence than the present uncertainty. M. Geguen has endeavored and is endeavoring to keep the public fully informed on the facts by a series of radio talks, which seem to have a good effect and to have been well received....

5. General Frederick expressed himself as satisfied when the decisions referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 were reported to him.

6. Status of Food Supply in Nice Area.
a. From liberation to date. There has been a steady and substantial increase in the foodstuffs made available to the population of Nice. . . . [as best evidenced by the tables appended at Tab "D."] In addition, the undersigned was convinced by talks with men and women on the street that, in literal translation, "Everything goes better." The people in their conversation are always talking food, but one hears, or overhears, constant reference to the improvement since the days of the Germans, or "since the Americans arrived." A visit to the local market showed a quantity of vegetables and fruit for sale at reasonable prices, grapes, pears, figs, onions, potatoes, squash, and an apparent delicacy called "pissaladibre." There is, of course, a great lack of meat, sugar, and fats. The distribution of 300 gr. of olive oil in October was the first in several months.
b. For November. There is considerable concern expressed about food supply for November. However, the undersigned sees no reason why this concern should be any greater for November than it has been for previous months. In fact, it should be less. Twenty-two 2 1/2-ton trucks, allocated by the CCS for Civil Affairs, have been recently turned over to the Department to be used in bringing in supplies from outlying regions. M. Geguen informed the undersigned that the olive oil about to be harvested ought to total 1,000 tons. The newspapers of 27 Oct. carried the news that 200 tons of potatoes had arrived at St,.-Raphael, and . . . [a] letter from Civil Affairs Hq. .. . confirmed M. Geguen, indicates that the Paris Ministry has allocated 12,612 tons of potatoes to the Department of A-M. Imported supplies are behind schedule and there is no reserve, but ships now discharging flour and wheat assure continuance of the present ration of bread of 300 grams a day. There seems to be no cause for serious alarm.

7. Transportation of Food Supplies. The solution to the problems of Nice (as, in fact, of all areas in Southern France) lies in the provision of transportation, particularly rail. Stocks of potatoes are available to the Department in the Regions of Dijon, Clermont, Chalons-sur-Marne, etc. Cheese is available in quantity at Lons-le-Saunier. Chestnuts are ready for shipment in the Department of Lot. All these cases have been reported to Civil Affairs Headquarters and to French Regional authorities, and the method of obtaining rail transport, through their own channels for North to South movement, has been made clear to them. It is believed arrangements are now in train to provide the transportation needed to bring these supplies from the interior and north of France to San Raphael, whence they will move by truck to Nice.

8. Coal. As suggested by General [Clarence L.1 Adcock, Séte can be used as a shipping point for the coal which is badly needed at Nice to manufacture gas for cooking purposes. Latest information obtained by the undersigned is that minesweeping began 25 Oct. and the port should be ready by 8 Nov. The undersigned, by cable to SHAEF G-5, requested they support the demand made on the French Ministry of Communications by the Departmental authorities that the coaster Ville de Bastia now in the port of Séte be assigned to the run. This vessel can carry about


1,800 tons or a month's supply for the minimum requirements of Nice for cooking gas. Efforts are also being made to work out rail transportation by a devious route from the mines at St. Etienne, with transshipment by truck at two stages en route due to the destruction of bridges.

9. To summarize, the difficult situation at and about Nice is not to be minimized. The area is almost completely dependent on imports from outside and its means of communication and transport are badly cut off or damaged. However, the people are not starving even though they may not be plentifully fed and there is, in the writer's opinion, no basis for fearing any outbreak or serious unrest. Civil authorities are alert to the difficulties, are endeavoring to solve them, and are being actively assisted by Civil Affairs Headquarters, Sixth Army Group. . . .


[Hilt of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VII]

♦ ♦ ♦ utilities and public works experts . . . found the French officials quite competent to handle the reconstruction of war damaged facilities. As a result, they concentrated largely on surveys of the utility situation. ♦ ♦ ♦

CAHQ communications experts worked closely with the Army Signal officers in arranging for military use of civilian lines and later in developing policies for their restoration to the French. They also collaborated with G on plans for the resumption of mail services. ♦ ♦ ♦

The housing of troops and installation was a matter of primary importance and controversy to the Army and the French both. Requisitioning of space by the Army was often unwise and extravagant; complaints by the French often unfounded and selfish. The Economics and Finance Branch of CAHQ had the job of trying to mediate the opposing views. ♦ ♦ ♦

At one time it was proposed that a mediation board comprising representatives of the Base Section, the Regional Government and CAHQ be established to study these requisitioning complaints. The proposal, made by CAHQ, was never consummated as the French insisted that the Board be given arbitrary powers, a demand to which the Commanding General of the Base Section naturally refused to accede. ♦ ♦ ♦

More success attended efforts of the E&F [Economics and Finance] officers to have the French set price ceilings for such soldier needs as barbering, dry cleaning, laundry service and drinks. In general, the prices were adhered to by the civilians.

At the request of the French, CAHQ arranged with CBS to forbid soldiers from entering French restaurants and eating the depleted local food stocks. This move worked out well, as can be seen in an E&F memorandum, dated October 4: "Eighteen restaurants and cafes were checked in the downtown areas of Marseille during dinner and supper time. Only one soldier was seen in a cafe and he was not eating. No sailors were seen eating in restaurants."

Through the efforts of CAHQ, Army purchases of French foodstuffs were confined solely to those items-vegetables and fruits-in which a surplus existed. It was the responsibility of the E&F Branch to determine whether such surpluses existed. When the harvest season ended, these surpluses vanished and CAHQ saw to it that the Army returned to its usual diet of imported foods.

In pursuance of SHAEF and AFHQ policy, CAHQ also started a drive to curtail any purchases, except those of drinks, by American soldiers in French stores. ♦ ♦ ♦

. . . The CA representatives were empowered by SHAEF to discuss with the French [during the planning phase] solely the implementation of policies laid down by SHAEF. They evolved the arrangements for the use of Allied supplemental francs and stamps in France, plans for emergency credit arrangements of private enterprises, accounting and auditing procedures, financial reports and property control. ♦ ♦ ♦

Some difficulties did arise shortly after the liberation in connection with the use of Allied supplemental currency. . . . As a general rule, the Allied franc was readily accepted by the population. However, the CAHQ weekly summary of September 17 says: "It is apparent in many parts of Southern France that the population does not have an adequate understanding of the status of the supplemental franc. As a result, in some areas it circulates at a distinct premium and in others, it is not readily accepted-the latter only in the places where Allied troops have not entered. AFHQ has been requested to urge the French Government to issue a clear statement on this matter. . . .

Acting at AFHQ's request, the Paris Government issued instructions clarifying the status of the Allied franc, and their acceptance generally became an accepted fact. . . .

In addition to the financial and requisitioning problems, the E&F Branch made a number of surveys of French industries, their potentialities and their needs. In liaison with the Ministry of


Production, it started the wheels moving for the importation of necessary raw materials and machinery. ♦ ♦ ♦

The E&F Branch was charged with still another duty. It had to safeguard the property of United Nations nationals until American, British and other consuls arrived on the scene and could handle this work themselves.

Working with the Swiss consul, who had protected Allied interests in Southern France during the German occupation, E&F officers toured up and down the Riviera, checking on the condition of Allied homes and other property, making arrangements for their future safeguarding. On one occasion, several headquarters officers, as well as a number of regional officers were directed in a "priority order" to make an immediate quest for information on the property of the Duke of Windsor, scattered as it was from Toulouse to Grenoble to the Riviera. Consisting of houses, "furniture, objets d'art and souvenirs," it was found in good condition. On another occasion, they were asked to check on Lord Beaverbrook's villa on the Riviera. ♦ ♦ ♦

Extensive plans for handling streams of refugees had been drawn up in Algiers at conferences between members of the Cochet Mission and officers of the CAHQ Welfare and Displaced Persons Branch.

From the very first days after the landings, though, it was readily evident that no great difficulties would be encountered in that line....
Some misgivings were felt in connection with some 135,000 refugees from the bomb-and-shell battered city of Toulon who had been evacuated to the Departments of Drome, Isere and Ardeche before the debarkment....
These misgivings were largely unfounded. The French officials maintained competent control throughout the South. ♦ ♦ ♦

Since the French were geared to do such a good job, the Welfare activities at CAHQ were largely confined to surveys and spot-checks. ♦ ♦ ♦

By CAHQ definition, a displaced person was one of another nationality than French who did not reside normally in France. While there were not huge numbers of them in the Sixth Army Group zone, there were at least 20,000 Italians who had formerly been POW's of the Germans, 8,000 to 10,000 Poles, over 5,000 Belgians, several thousand Russians as well as smaller groups of Czechs and other nationalities....

On September 10, in the weekly CAHQ summary, there is a comment that "Displaced persons problems are not receiving adequate attention. ..." Not only were the French largely disinterested but so was CAHQ. Lt. Col. Aronson himself later said, "The French and we both ignored the displaced persons problem as militarily unimportant." ♦ ♦ ♦

CAHQ had the aid of liaison officers from the Belgian, Polish, Dutch and Czechoslovakian governments in dealing with displaced persons of those nationalities. These men were attached to CAHQ by SHAEF directive and acted under its orders....

As early as August 10, Lt. Col. Aronson foresaw a big Russian problem and cabled AFHQ asking for a Russian liaison officer. He repeated the request again from France after he had encountered hundreds and hundreds of Russian POW's of the Germans there. . . . Not until December, though, did a Russian liaison officer arrive.

The first big movement of people which the Branch had to handle came late in October when the Sixth Army Group took over responsibility for the Displaced Persons Center at Vittel. This was a former German internment camp with a population of some 2,000 persons, chiefly women and children of claimed British and American nationality. The Sixth Army Group decided that the inhabitants of the camp had to be moved farther to the rear. . . . Eventually it was decided to set the camp up at La Bourboule, Puyde-Dome. Some 700 persons were brought there by train and lodged in resort hotels after 1,200 others had been sent to their former homes in France or to other destinations of their own choice.

An ECAD detachment was brought in to run this camp, the only instance of the use of such a detachment. ♦ ♦ ♦

Their very first surveys of health conditions along the coast as they drove from hospital to hospital, from one municipal public health office to another, indicated that CAHQ's problems in this field would be slight. Health conditions everywhere were generally good. ♦ ♦ ♦

Only in medicine and hospital equipment were they short, and CAHQ was able to, help remedy the dearth by supplying emergency medical units at first and later by importing more than 100 tons of key medical stocks. These were turned over to the Ministry of Public Health for distribution. ♦ ♦ ♦

A summary of the work of the medical personnel at CAHQ indicated that their chief value was one of a preventative nature. By watching closely all incidence of communicable diseases, they were able to help safeguard the health of American troops and to stand ready to assist the French. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Komer, CA and MG in MTO]

♦ ♦ ♦ It had been planned that when Seventh Army advanced beyond Lyon, the limit of the AFHQ zone, SHAEF would assume control of all operations in France. The speed of the advance was such that as early as the end of August [the Army] was operating in the SHAEF zone, far beyond the limits of the zone of communications in southern France. Accordingly, on 15 September SHAEF assumed operational control in southern France and made Sixth Army Group operational, with all Allied tactical forces in southern France under its command.21  Since it was desirable to continue to supply these forces from the Mediterranean theater as long as that theater had excess reserves, AFHQ was to retain control of the administration and maintenance of the forces in southern France. It was also to be in control of civilian supply and civil affairs in general as long as it retained responsibility for the maintenance of these forces. Thus Sixth Army Group, while under tactical control of SHAEF, assumed responsibility to AFHQ in supply and civil affairs....

In the latter part of September discussions took place between G-5 AFHQ and G-5 SHAEF on the final transfer of civil affairs responsibility. As the national administration, re-established in Paris, had abolished the missions for the Northern and Southern Zones and proposed to screen centrally all supply requisitions from regional prefects, SHAEF planned to use its Mission to France to centralize in Paris all Allied relations with the French Government. The elimination of AFHQ as an intermediate headquarters would enable the Allies to manage civil affairs on a national basis and conserve manpower. Accordingly, it was agreed that AFHQ would transfer its remaining civil affairs responsibilities in southern France to SHAEF as soon as SHAEF was in a position to handle all administrative and supply matters.

On 25 October the French Committee of National Liberation was recognized by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as the Provisional Government of France. On the same day, General de Gaulle signed a decree establishing a French zone of the interior [Chapter XXV, Section 7]. This merely confirmed a previous status, for the Allies had not found it necessary to invoke in the forward zones the powers vested by the civil affairs agreements in the Supreme Allied Command. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

♦ ♦ ♦ practically all the personnel for the G-5 Section of the Sixth Army Group were drawn from CAHQ. Colonel Parkman became its ACofS (Assistant Chief of Staff) for G-5, Lt. Col. Mark Howe, Chief of the Law Branch, its DACofS (Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff) and various branch chiefs were given similar posts. Each of these officers continued to hold down their old assignments in CAHQ, too, with Colonel Parkman remaining CCAO and Commanding Officer of the regiment. 22

The move to the Sixth Army Group carried with it additional prestige for CAHQ but it also created serious administrative difficulties. Since Colonel Parkman and the majority of his immediate staff had to spend most of their time at Sixth Army Group Headquarters, then situated 216 miles away at Lyon, "on the spot" leadership and decisions were often missing at CAHQ. It was a current complaint there that the organization was floundering for "lack of a boss."

In October, Sixth Army Group moved even farther away, this time to Vittel. In an effort to bridge the distance between the Commander and his unit, CAHQ moved to Lyon, and an acting DCCAO (Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer), Major (later Lt. Col.) Karl S. Cate was appointed. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive, SHAEF to CG, ComZ, ETO, and CG, SHAEF Mission (Fr), 2 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, AG 014.1-1, Fr, folder 6]

1. Effective 0001A 1 November 1944, the Commanding General Communications Zone, ETO, is charged with responsibility for all Civil Affairs activities in the area designated in paragraph 2 hereof, and the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater, is relieved of such responsibility, except insofar as he has undertaken by Memoranda of Understanding of 24 September and 13 October 1944, and cable of 12 October 1944 (NAF 799) (the substance of which is set forth in Annexure A) to assume temporary responsibilities in connection with the import of civilian supplies into the designated area.

2. The area covered by this Directive (herein called the Designated Area), comprises the following named departments: Alpes-Maritimes, Var, Bouches-du-Rhone, Gard, Herault, Aude, Pyrenees-Orientales, Ariege, Haute-Garonne, Tarn, Aveyron, Lozere, Ardeche, Dr6me, Vaucluse, Basse-Alpes, Haute-Alpes, Savoie, Cantal, Haute-Savoie, Isere, Ain, Rhone, Loire, HauteLoire, Puy-de-Dome, Allier, Saone-et-Loire, Cote d'Or Doubs. 23


[SACMED, Report to CCS on Operations in Southern France, Aug 44, OCMH files]

♦ ♦ ♦ It was decided that on 1 November my general administrative responsibility, apart from supply, might be terminated. Accordingly, on that date General Eisenhower's Headquarters assumed certain administrative functions, chiefly those pertaining to personnel and at the same time took over the administration of French Civil Affairs, except for the provision of civil supply requirements. As to these, SHAEF would assume responsibility for over-all planning and, after consultation with H.Q. Communication Zone Advance (NATOUSA) advise AFHQ as to its desires for import and movement of civil supplies to Southern France ports. AFHQ was thereafter to act as agent for SHAEF in the procurement, calling forward, shipment and discharge of such supplies, and to determine priority of discharge as between civilian and military cargo. 24

Just prior to the transfer of administrative responsibility decision was also reached as to the transfer of supply responsibility as well. Effective 2o November ETOUSA was to take over the administration of supply from NATOUSA. Effective that date H. Q. Southern Line of Communications ETOUSA was to be activated under General Larkin [Maj. Gen. Thomas B.] as Commanding General, and authorized to communicate direct with NATOUSA on matters pertaining to personnel and shipment of supplies from Italy and North Africa to Southern France and movement of shipping in the Mediterranean. Responsibility for the movement of shipping in the Mediterranean was to remain with AFHQNATOUSA and Commander in Chief Mediterranean. Practically, this involved the transfer of a considerable part of SOS NATOU SA with its Chief, General Larkin, from NATOUSA to ETOUSA. Initially his new headquarters was to be located at Caserta and, pending its removal to France, an advance headquarters was to be established at Dijon.

These arrangements completed the transfer of general administrative and supply responsibilities to General Eisenhower and at 000IA hours on 20 November my last official connection with the operations in Southern France was dissolved.



[Ltr, CAHQ Opns Officer to ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 29 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, vol. II, Jkt V, N-2]

1. Below are listed the principal organizational and procedural problems met with by the 2678th CA Regiment to date during the DRAGOON Operation:
a. Speed of advance plus late date at which personnel of Civil Affairs Headquarters arrived caused a large number of Civil Affairs problems in the early stages when there were very few persons available from Civil Affairs Headquarters to handle them. This resulted in G-5, Seventh Army, departing from its staff functions and conducting operations. This move, while it may have been necessary under the circumstances, resulted in considerable and continuous confusion.
b. Absence of transport, petrol and spare parts; destruction of railroads and bridges-all made it necessary to use a number of ports along the coast. Such use required additional personnel to handle the unloading and turning supplies over to the French. At the same time, difficulty in removing mines and other obstructions delayed the use of the largest port for civilian supplies, thereby increasing the transport problem.
(1) In addition, there has been great difficulty in obtaining trucks for hauling civilian supplies. Confusion results when Army Headquarters accepts figures, say for trucks needed for civilian supplies in the Southern France operation, and then retains these trucks for its own use on the grounds of military necessity, thus negativing months of careful planning by CA Transport. Also, experience to date indicates that Civil Affairs Headquarters is not being informed adequately relative to the names of ships transporting CA trucks, the identity of the trucks concerned, nor the port of distribution. The result is that CA authorities must beat the bushes looking for vitally-needed vehicles which have actually been found in the unauthorized possession of other units.
c. There were problems connected with the interpretation of the agreement between the Allies and the French concerning the procurement of services and supplies directly through the French instead of indirectly. The French were slow in being able to assume this operation and the Army, to a less extent, in taking hold of it. Frequently, procurement and requisitioning by  the Army resulted in depriving the French of facilities which they so urgently needed.
d. The payment of labor by the French was slow, involving problems relating to social security, family allowances and uniform rates of pay. Owing to lack of communication, it was difficult to find out who had exclusive and final jurisdiction on any one matter! Consequently, Civil Affairs Headquarters sometimes would not know from whom to get an answer for the question.
e. French Liaison Officers arrived very late and the job they were to perform was almost solved before their arrival.
f. The problems in the forward areas were negligible. The big problem was the lack of communications between front and rear and questions of supplies and transport for the French. Questions of currency, public health, welfare, and displaced persons were negligible as they were handled by the French. Field personnel were late in getting in the field and when they did arrive they would not appear to be badly needed, except in towns where there were large groups of troops, such as Marseille, Grenoble, Dijon, Lyon, and Besancon.
g. The problem of conflict of jurisdiction between the local civilian authorities, FFI, and the Army made it extremely difficult to solve the problem of disarming the large number of FFI who were going about armed.
(1) An additional problem was the disposition of collaborationists. At first, all collaborationists were being brought before the Cours Martiales composed of FFI officers. The emphasis on the speed of this court has now given almost completely away to the system of justice and due process of law under the Cours de Justice. According to the Minister of Justice, all trials to have been conducted under the old system will be withheld awaiting the establishment of the Cours de Justice in the individual sectors concerned. All military offenses are to be tried under one of the permanent military courts.
h. And, finally, there was the problem of the conflict between the Base Section personnel as to unloading their ships and the Headquarters personnel interested in maintaining accurate accounts of the material handed over to the French. The former group thought the latter was unnecessary in operations, and the latter thought the former were not handling their job in a consistent manner. This conflict was considerable. And therefore it is recommended that in the


future every effort be made to foresee and thereby forestall similar conflicts in similar operations.


[Ltr, Parkman, CCAO, Seventh Army, to ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 17.18, 6th U.S. AGp, Jkt 1]

2. It is believed that the organization of one unit, such as the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment, to operate as the vehicle through which both army administration and civil affairs were handled was a most satisfactory expedient enabling the operation to be conducted with only approximately 135 officers, and in many ways saving time, trouble, and confusion.

3. It is believed that the operation of civil affairs through a headquarters attached to the army formation responsible for the whole area was sound because it enabled the CCAO to speak for the Commanding General and for Army Echelon which controlled the whole area and at the same time centralize civil affairs responsibilities in one head.

4. It is believed that the operation of the civil affairs headquarters out of which all civil affairs personnel not on detached service with any army unit worked was desirable in that it placed a pool of officers and men at the disposal of the CCAO, giving the greatest amount of flexibility and mobility to the organization.

5. It is believed that the principle, in a liaison operation of this kind, of placing officers only at the administrative centers where the highest local officials were established was a sound proposition. It was unnecessary except in an area occupied by a considerable number of troops to have personnel for local work and the liaison work to be adequately performed by attaching liaison officers to the officials at the top (Regional Commissioners).

6. Although there was some difficulty in connection with the accounting procedure adopted by the officers attached to the base section in connection with unloading of civilian supplies, this situation is not believed to have resulted from any inherent weakness in the organizational setup but rather from the failure to establish correct methods of handling the problem to which all agreed in advance. Civil affairs officers with base sections should receive their policies from CA Headquarters and should, in accordance with these policies, then devote themselves to solving the problems presented to them by their respective Commanding Generals.

7. For the first time, civil affairs was placed with several base sections in the same area. The Commanding General of each base section desired to have a civil affairs staff attached to him. This worked satisfactorily as long as the Civil Affairs Headquarters was available to set the civil affairs policy in accordance with the wishes of the Commanding General of the unit in charge of the whole area, but considerable difficulties are anticipated and may arise when no one commanding general controls the whole area, i.e., both the communications zone and the forward areas. It is to be hoped that in this and other cases some over-all civil affairs control on the spot as that now available from SHAEF in Paris would be established before any possibility of split jurisdiction in connection with the handling of civil affairs policy could arise. It is fundamental that in the entire area, irrespective of whether it be the Commanding General, hiatus area or forward area, one civil affairs policy be established and administered by one civil affairs headquarters attached to the commanding general having jurisdiction over the whole area, and this civil affairs headquarters should be on the spot even if the headquarters of the commanding general (such as AFHQ) should not be. Some of the difficulties were mentioned in the last letter, to which this is a supplement, and which should be corrected in a future operation as follows:
a. The lifts bringing in civil affairs personnel were too late.
b. Adequate information and planning was not done with the base section and forward area organization prior to D Day largely because of difficulties caused by separation between Africa and Italy.
c. Base section personnel must be selected from officers who know civil affairs and have considerable background and experience in it. In this operation some of the civil affairs officers with the base section had little civil affairs experience and were not properly trained in the over-all civil affairs policy to be used in the operation.
d. The G-5 of the Headquarters of the Commanding General controlling the area and the CCAO should be the same person so that that there is unified responsibility. If they are two persons, the G-5 should remain with the Commanding General in the forward areas and should permit the Civil Affairs Headquarters to operate without divided responsibility in the whole area.
e. The selection of personnel to be brought in early lifts should as far as possible include general civil affairs officers rather than specialists. In this operation the Army Special Staff sec-


tions insisted that certain specialists be brought in in the early stages. The services of these specialists were not needed (Public Health, Public Welfare, Communications) in the early days as much as were the services of general civil affairs officers.
f. In the liaison operation the need for medical personnel is small and few need be brought in.
g. The problems connected with administering civil affairs units can be reduced to a minimum and were reduced to a minimum by permitting the units to secure messing and billeting locally rather than having it provided from a central source. The system followed in Southern France was far more economical than the ECAD detachment system. However, if this is to be followed provisions should be made for reimbursement of the officers and men insofar as they are required to spend their own money for messing and billets.


[ACofS G-5, Report to CG, Seventh Army, 6 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.18, Hist Rpt, Jkt 1]

♦ ♦ ♦ I. Political. The political situation had elements of difficulty which could well have impeded the progress of the Seventh Army. Due to the efforts of the Cochet Mission (Delegue Militaire Francais pour les Operations du Sud), working in close co-operation with the FFI and other resistance groups, satisfactory and capable regional, departmental and local officials were installed in all important governmental positions. These appointed officials, with new thoughts and energies, when acquainted with the needs of the military, devoted themselves to the creation of an orderly and stable government, thus facilitating the military effort by the establishment of a stable rear area. In no small measure was the work of these officials made easier and support obtained from the people because of their recognition and acceptance by the Allies through Civil Affairs officers.

Conclusion. Political problems in any liberated country should be entirely resolved locally by the inhabitants themselves with Allied support of a central government to which local officials can look for authority and general administration. Such procedure ensures the support of the Allies by the population, allays any of their fears of a "quasi occupation," makes enemy political propaganda ludicrous and leaves the Army free to devote itself to the tactical phase exclusively. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. Liaison Officers. French liaison officers were attached to all echelons of civil affairs. Liaison in a liberated country is letting the other fellow do the work vis-à-vis the population. French liaison officers have taken great pride in guaranteeing proper civilian control in Army areas and civilian officials have co-operated with them to an extent impossible with American officers. But the presence of U.S. Army officers, concerned with Civil Affairs, has reassured local officials as to lack of selfish intentions of the Army operation and that instructions and requests of French liaison officers had U.S. Army support and approval.

Conclusion. Liaison officers of nationality of liberated country where operations are in progress should be attached to all echelons of Civil Affairs and almost exclusively used as a medium of contact with officials and population. U.S. Civil Affairs officers should, however, make their presence and support known as well.

3. Labor. Immediately upon arrival at the beaches, there was a demand by the Army for civilian labor on a scale not envisaged and beyond the capacity of villages located near the beaches to supply. Contact was made by Civil Affairs officers with Mayors of villages as much as 30 miles removed, registration of laborers effected, transportation to and from the beaches of the laborers done by employing units. ♦ ♦ ♦

Conclusion. Problem of civilian labor is best handled by Civil Affairs as it is essentially a civilian matter.

Using services should make a careful survey of labor requirements in planning stage and advise Civil Affairs which then can make a study of probable availability of labor in area of operations based on population density. Wage scales and conditions of employment should be widely circulated within the Task Force, under the lowest security classification possible, to effect the required general distribution of information to units.

Wage scales should be strictly uniform and broken down into simple categories of unskilled, semiskilled, skilled and very skilled. Other occupations likely to be encountered in Army hiring, such as waiters, cooks, orderlies, should be listed in wage scales.

Deduction by Army of social insurance contributions by civilian employees working for Army, should be accepted by Army as a principle. Each labor instruction in Sicily, Italy and France provided against it. Eventually, however, it was done through one means or another on instructions from higher authority. Considerable record confusion, from a civilian standpoint, would be avoided if a flat percent, most closely approximat-


ing the total employee contribution, were made by Army on each total weekly payroll, i.e., if percentage 10%, pay employee 90% of wage and pay 10% of total weekly payroll into Social Insurance Fund. Necessary conversion tables could easily be prepared and administrative details are not insurmountable.

4. Public Health. Favorable weather and a rapid advance reduced public health problems largely to a question of prompt furnishing of emergency medical supply kits containing some 36 different items ranging from codeine, ether, morphine, sulfa drugs to suture catgut, rubber gloves and bandages. Civilian medical supplies were low and sometimes exhausted and the kits were most useful.♦ ♦ ♦

Conclusion. Adequate medical supplies should arrive by D plus 3 and Civil Affairs officers should land some with them on D Day or D plus i, if civilian population of any size is to be encountered at an early stage. Thereafter, Civil Affairs officers at Corps and Divisions should carry emergency kits along with them. Plasma should be included in emergency medical supply kits.

Chlorinators and H.T.H. should be in by D plus 10. Fabric glass for hospital repair should arrive early. Medical supply officers and sanitary engineers should land at an early date, certainly by D plus 2.

Reporting of communicable disease cases by civilian authorities, should be made through nearest Civil Affairs officer and forwarded through military channels to Chief, Public Health Branch, Civil Affairs. This method is necessary for prompt reporting when civilian communication channels are confused or broken.

Hospital assembly units to care for large civilian disasters should be phased to arrive at an early date.

Indigenous medical personnel, doctors, and nurses, are likely to be adequate. Supplies are the important thing.

5. Finance. The supplying of Army Finance Officers with adequate supplemental currency early enough to permit troop exchanges before debarkation is the principal task of finance. Thereafter, enough currency to care for payrolls and procurement for 90 days in advance should be brought in. ♦ ♦ ♦

Conclusion. Finance, public and private, presents no large problem for Civil Affairs in a liberated country.

6. Requisitioning (other than local procurement). Requisitioning in a liberated country, no matter how carefully planned and operated, is a source of constant friction with the civilian population.

Conclusions. In liberated countries full use of local officials should be made in service of requisitions on populace. In rear of actual combat areas, requisitions should be served and no property taken without such formality. Requisitioning of real estate and obtaining of billets should be under Engineer's guidance and control with the senior commander in any village/town in rear of combat, appointing an officer to act as Town Mayor during occupancy of that area to ensure that necessary formalities are observed and to eliminate "space competitions" among units.

7. Communications and Utilities. Civilian communications were damaged and thrown into confusion during the advance. The damage was not wholly due to bombing and shelling incidental to the advance, but was in substantial part due to planned enemy demolition. ♦ ♦ ♦

Conclusion. In Army area, Civil Affairs officers should leave restoration of communications and utilities to Army Engineers and local officials. . . .

8. Supply and Transport.

a. Maximum effort on the supply side of Civil Affairs should be directed at reconstituting the economic services of the indigenous government. Emphasis should be placed on making available to these services the supplies essential to the subsistence of the civil population which are unobtainable from local resources, and the facilities (especially truck transportation and telephone communications) necessary to enable these services equitably to allocate and efficiently to distribute these and indigenous supplies. It is a disservice to render too much assistance in that the civil supply services thereby tend to become dependent upon Army assistance and unable to operate when the Army leaves.
b. Phasing of imported civil supplies was correct, taking into account the limitations imposed upon the civil supply program by the limited unloading capacity for the whole operation. It was this factor which delayed the arrival of trucks until D plus 40. In future, if the military supply program and unloading capacity in the target area permit, trucks (with one year's spare parts) should be given as high a priority as the top priority foods. As it was, we had to depend on the depleted, worn-out, gazogenepowered supply of indigenous trucking for the first 40 days, not only to haul local production in a populous area completely lacking in normal rail transport but for port clearance of imported


supplies as well. No demands were made upon Army for loans of military transport, and military truck capacity was so overtaxed that no such demand could have been filled anyway without seriously handicapping the military effort. The need for importing civil trucks at an early stage would be even more marked if invasion were being planned of a country without the transport reserve of France.
c. The principal mistake in the civil supply program was placing dependence upon arrangements made by higher headquarters without actual physical check of these arrangements. The following instances illustrate this point:
(1) Arrangements were made and confirmation in writing received from AFHQ for the provision of two coasters loaded from Liberty ships arriving at Mostaganem on D-5, these. coasters to be held for call forward to the beaches if food shortages met with upon arrival made this necessary. Decision to call these forward was made and message despatched on D plus i calling these coasters forward. On D plus 2 AFHQ advised that the coasters were not ready and the Navy would not allow them to sail in convoy, anyway. Fortunately, time allowed to call forward the Liberties instead with the convoys leaving Oran on D plus 5 and D plus 10.
(2) A supplementary coaster program was arranged for Alpes-Maritimes and telegraphic assurance given by AFHQ on D plus 27 that a coaster of required tonnage would arrive at latest by D plus 35 and D plus 40. A coaster of half the required tonnage arrived on D plus 55. Emergency arrangements had to be made to transship supplies from Toulon by LST [Landing Ship (Tank) ] and truck, but the report of a food shortage demonstration by 2,000 people before the Prefecture at Nice at the end of September indicated that these were inadequate. Fortunately, the demonstration did not prejudice the military situation.
(3) Olive oil was known, in the planning stages, to be one of the serious shortage items in France. Requisitions were placed with AFHQ and confirmation received that the 17,000 tons of olive oil in North Africa would be phased in as requested on D plus 4o and every 10 days thereafter. Word was recently received from AFHQ via Sixth Army Group that the olive oil program has collapsed.

Conclusion. Indigenous resources in France were, except in large cities, adequate for minimum diet.

Transport in France was a greater problem than supply.

Imported supplies without transport brought in to move them cannot be effectively used quickly where needed. Some trucks, destined for civilian use, should arrive by D plus 15 with one year's spare parts and turned over to civilians for operation under Civil Affairs supervision during the initial 60/90 days.

Closer study should be made of possibility of use of empty supply trucks and trains to move indigenous supplies from surplus areas to deficiency areas through which such returning military transport might pass.

.Regional and local officials should solve their own supply problems with minimum assistance from Civil Affairs. Such independence ensures a much speedier return to normalcy and fuller use and exploitation of local resources, makes minimum demands upon military resources of supply and transport.

9. Displaced Persons and Refugees. Due to the rapidity of the advance, the problem assumed far less proportions for the Seventh Army than was envisaged. Refugees are a real problem in a static situation.

Through co-operation with the Provost Marshal and assistance from FFI and local gendarmerie, roads were kept free of persons moving from the combat zone to the rear and moving from village to village. The movement, in no case, assumed proportions of any size. ♦ ♦ ♦

Conclusions. During a rapid advance, refugee problem is not of sizable proportions. Local authorities in a liberated country can take care of such cases as do arise. ♦ ♦ ♦

10. Public Safety.
a. Circulation. While circulation is an aspect of public safety, it is worthy of special treatment as a vexatious problem particularly in Corps and Division areas.
In conjunction with CIC and Provost Marshal, a system of pass issuance which left Corps and Division free to take steps they considered necessary in their area, was erected, at the same time throwing the burden on civilian authorities and Securite Militaire to screen most passes issued. ♦ ♦ ♦
b. General Public Safety. Problems were relatively few. Gendarmerie, police, fire and air raid services were found reasonably intact in personnel and equipment. Small arms and uniforms were sometimes a problem with the gendarmerie. This problem was treated on a SHAEF level. ♦ ♦ ♦
Circulation pass issuance, if abused, can permit enemy access to Army area by enemy agents. CIC, PM and Civil Affairs


should work very closely together on any general rules of pass issuance. Particular care should be exercised in forward areas.

Public safety services in a liberated country are competent and should be left free to do their own work with full explanation given them of military requirements. Civil Affairs should assist PM and CIC in their contacts with such officials, making no arrangements themselves except with prior approval of PM or CIC. Routine matters, not affecting Army, are of course an exception to this rule. ♦ ♦ ♦

General Conclusions:

1. A minimum number of Civil Affairs officers should be used in liberated countries. Except for special problems, use of Civil Affairs Detachments in towns and villages, is not necessary nor, in our experience, welcomed by local officials.

2. Army and Corps should have a G-5 Section as part of the authorized T/O [Table of Organization], together with necessary T/E [Table of Equipment].

3. Higher Civil Affairs Hq or G-5 Sections should use command channels for all correspondence and reports, technical or otherwise to lower echelons.

4. Liaison officers of nationality of liberated country should be attached at all echelons and carry on all contacts with officials and population.

5. Corps G-5 should have two 2 1/2-ton trucks available for emergency use in transporting civilians and supplies.

6. Close co-ordination with other general and special staff sections at Army, Corps and Division levels is constantly needed for full utilization of the civil affairs services and to delineate spheres of responsibilities in the light of actual operational problems.

7. Reports required from Corps and Division Civil Affairs officers should be kept to an absolute minimum. (Successfully done in this operation.)

8. A Civil Affairs officer, apart from the G-5 Section of Army, is needed in any city, town or village where the Army Hq is located in order to deal with local problems affecting Army, but to be physically separate from Hq to eliminate civilians passing in and out at Hq.

9. A port detachment of Civil Affairs officers and men should be landed well in advance of receipt of any imported supplies to work out the innumerable attendant details of storage, accounting, transport, distribution, local needs and all that goes into a smooth-working supply organization. Initially, this was done by G-5, Army. Valuable contacts (civilian) and knowledge of local supply situation were thus acquired by G-5 which moved with Army, making it necessary for the port detachment to go through the same learning process. It is fruitless to say that such knowledge can be fully passed on to a successor. The details are too many, the personal contact and resulting confidence created cannot be transferred to another.

10. Military government and civil affairs in any country present the same basic common sense problems. While recognizing the need for detailed procedure in some fields, such as accounting, it is felt that too much written, little-used material was produced. Policies and procedures should be as broadly stated as is consistent with clear direction of responsibility. Experience and the facts of a particular situation will dictate the operational details.


[Kennedy, Hist of Public Safety Opns]

♦ ♦ ♦ As Chief of the Public Safety Branch, I wrote the Public Safety section of the Civil Affairs Manual for the operation, and same was approved and incorporated verbatim in said Manual. However, no steps were taken to implement the plan, and my requests for personnel, equipment and organic transport were ignored. ♦ ♦ ♦

It was my repeated recommendation that Public Safety officers come in on D plus 2 or D plus 3, as in the Sicilian and Italian operations, so that they could take things in hand before they got out of control, but this recommendation was not even considered. The Chief of the Public Health Branch, a Medical Officer, was brought in on D plus 2, but I was not permitted to come in until D plus 10. This delay in bringing in Public Safety officers permitted the FFI, FTP, Milice Patriotique and other extra-legal organizations to take control of the situation, disarm the police and steal their transport and equipment, and to generally take matters into their own hands. Had an adequate number of Public Safety officers been present, to work with, advise and lend moral support to the civilian public safety agencies, this situation would not have arisen; some lives, many unfortunate incidents and many thousands of dollars worth of military supplies would have been saved.

Landing at St.-Tropez on D plus 10, the CBS advance party immediately began unloading a ship of flour, sugar, etc. The French authorities were immediately contacted on the security angle, and promised to furnish adequate guards for ship-


holds, beach, trucks, route and warehouse. These promises were not kept, and the guard force at St.-Tropez was at no time half as large as it should have been; moreover the guards furnished were undisciplined and unreliable, would hide and sleep whenever possible, and frequently abandoned their posts. The French IMPEX officer in charge, Captain Silvere, when pressed on the subject of guards and laborers, stated, "After all, this is American property until I receipt for it, and we're merely helping you unload it."

Completing the St.-Tropez unloading, we moved to Toulon to prepare for the unloading of additional ships. A security plan was drawn up and presented to the French officer in charge, Lt. Col. Guzzy, who promised to put it into effect with 400 guards. He actually produced less than 200, and the security of the operation was at no time adequate. ♦ ♦ ♦

Captain Smith was placed in charge at Toulon, while I proceeded to Marseille and with [Col. William D.] Williams and Spencer attempted to bring some order out of the chaos. Several weeks of intensive effort finally brought the police, fire and civil defense agencies to a reasonable state of efficiency, as we succeeded in securing for them gasoline, arms, the return of some of their vehicles stolen by FFI members, etc. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Provost Marshal of D.B.S. [Delta Base Section] was highly co-operative, but he simply did not have the personnel. Naples had 1,100 MP's; Marseille, a city of comparable size, had 280! The French authorities in Marseille did everything requested, and did it reasonably well, to suppress the traffic in military property, but only military police arresting military personnel for selling or trading the supplies can really suppress such traffic. ♦ ♦ ♦

When C.A. Headquarters moved to Lyon ... it had become quite obvious that those individuals running civil affairs in Southern France were not favorably disposed toward Public Safety. The attitude seemed to be that Public Safety was a useless appendage of Civil Affairs, that it could not be abolished because required by directives, but that it should be restricted, hamstrung and ignored in every way possible. No vehicle was ever assigned by Headquarters to the Public Safety Branch or to any officer in it, despite repeated requests. The expenditure of confidential funds ceased when Lt. Col. Cate took over as CCAO, although four hundred dollars, expended over a period of about six weeks in Marseille, had brought in information which probably saved two hundred thousand dollars worth of military property from theft or resulted in its recovery. The weekly reports of the Branch were emasculated before being incorporated in the Civil Affairs Weekly Summary, favorable comments on conditions or organizations being left in, but unfavorable comments being omitted. As a result, one reading the Weekly Summary would receive a completely erroneous picture of public safety conditions in the area. Moreover, reports coming in from Public Safety officers in the field were not always sent to the Chief of Branch; a report on a serious disturbance among German prisoners employed on the ship unloading operation at Toulon was diverted, and never did reach the Public Safety Branch. Finally, the Public Safety Branch was abolished and its Chief declared surplus, along with several other Branch Chiefs.

The prime lesson to be learned from the Southern France operation so far as Public Safety is concerned-and it should have been learned from the Sicilian and Italian operations-is that whenever the Army goes into a new area, enemy or otherwise, disturbances among the civil population, and thefts of military supplies and equipment, will be in inverse ratio to the number and efficiency of Public Safety officers present in the initial stages. The Public Safety Branch's recommendation for this operation was for 45 officers, 6o enlisted men and 40 vehicles, preferably civilian type, equipped with radio. We received 4 officers, 3 enlisted men and no equipment of any kind. It was estimated by competent officers on the scene that as high as 20 percent of the cargo which came ashore in ducks at Marseille was diverted and sold by the drivers. An adequate complement of public safety personnel, on the scene early, could have so organized the civilian public safety agencies as to have prevented a large part of this, and would have saved many hundreds of thousands of dollars of losses. The tremendous and thriving Black Market in Marseille in American rations, cigarettes, gasoline and other supplies got its start through the lack of Public Safety officers-and continued to thrive because of the shortage of both Public Safety officers and military police.


[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XII]

November 1st 1944 was the day AFHQ control over the South of France terminated and Supreme Headquarters, AEF, took over. The first phase of Civil Affairs in Southern France was ended.

Looking back on their work of the initial eleven weeks from August 15, CAHQ officers feel that they accomplished much of military


value; much also of genuine political and humanitarian worth.

Some important things were perhaps left undone, they admit. On the whole, though, it is their belief that Civil Affairs made a real contribution both to the war effort and to the rehabilitation of liberated France.

On the credit side of the CAHQ ledger, they point to the effective manner in which, all through the Operation DRAGOON, CAO's prevented civilian problems from interfering with the drive of the combat troops.

On the same black side of the ledger, they note their efforts in helping to feed and clothe French civilians. Their imports of food and trucks were the key factor in averting stark famine. Their pressure on the local officials did much to increase governmental efficiency.

Summing up, they say that Civil Affairs assisted the Army materially in its relationships with the civilians; and it greatly helped the civilians to readjust themselves to meet the stern necessities and the stringent demands of warfare.

But there is a red side to the ledger, too, according to CAHQ -veterans; debits comprising more sins of omission than of commission.

They say: Lack of prior planning on labor needs made the recruitment of workers move more slowly than it might have. Lack of attention to the need for repatriating displaced persons, particularly Italians, left thousands of them in the area to constitute a possible security threat. Failure to take a strong position with the French may have permitted a degree of lawlessness to continue longer than it should have.

Looking back, himself, on this initial phase, Colonel Parkman, the CCAO, said that he was completely satisfied with the work of the organization and the policies of his group. The only change he would have made would have been to have phased in more Civil Affairs personnel earlier in the operation as well as to have insisted that more Civil Affairs trucks-those brought in for loan to the French-arrive earlier.

Unlike the landings in Normandy, where the troops encountered rich food-producing provinces at the start, the Army in the South found famine at the coastline and only moved into surplus areas hundreds of miles inland. We needed CAO's at once to handle the supply question and we needed trucks desperately for transporting supplies. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hist of CA Opns, DRAGOON, Pt. IX]

♦ ♦ ♦ At the conclusion of eleven weeks of AFHQ control in Southern France, the population knew something of the Allied contributions to their welfare, but not as much as they might have.

Their early enthusiastic liking for the American Army and the American soldier was beginning to wane. Criticisms and rumors were becoming endemic. Misconceptions of American ideas and policies were starting to cascade. Unfortunately, though, little now could be done to counteract this. Policy was against it.


[Ltr, Cochet, former Mil Delegate for Southern France, to Parkman, ACofS, G-5, Sixth AGp, 6 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Jkt VI, N-5]

As you have learned, sometime ago the Provisional Government of the Republic decided that the military delegations were no longer needed for the direction of French territory because the liberation of the land and the progressive reestablishment of communications have permitted the central power to resume its chain of command.

I therefore leave my command and want to tell you how I've appreciated your efforts and those of your officers in the period which followed the landing of the Allied Armies in France.

I pay my respects to all those who have worked under your orders for their desire to help France. In the name of my personnel and in the name of the people over whom I exercised my command, I thank you. ♦ ♦ ♦


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