UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-60002
First Printed 1966-CMH Pub 20-3-1 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR Stetson Conn, General Editor Advisory Committee
Office of the Chief of Military History Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History
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. . . to Those Who Served
Foreword This is the second of five volumes to be published in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. When completed, these volumes will present a comprehensive account of U.S. Army activities in what was once euphemistically termed a police action. Truce Tent and Fighting Front covers the last two years in the Korean War and treats the seemingly interminable armistice negotiations and the violent but sporadic fighting at the front. The scene therefore frequently shifts from the dialectic, propaganda, and frustrations at the conference table to the battles on key hills and at key outposts. The author presents a solid and meaningful reconstruction of the truce negotiations; he develops the issues debated and captures the color of the arguments and the arguers. The planning and events that guided or influenced the proceedings on the United Nations side are thoroughly explained. The volume abounds in object lessons and case studies that illustrate problems American officers may encounter in negotiating with Communists. Problems encountered by the U.N. high command in handling recalcitrant Communist prisoners of war within the spirit and letter of the Geneva Convention are explained with clarity and sympathy. Truce Tent and Fighting Front is offered to all thoughtful citizens-military and civilian-as a contribution to the literature of limited war.
vii The Author Walter G. Hermes received his M.A. from Boston University and his Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University. During World War II he served with the U.S. Army in radio intelligence and military government assignments. After the war he attended the University of Denver and the University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. Hermes joined the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1949. For many years he served as Department of the Army representative on the Department of Defense Liaison Committee with the Department of State on the Foreign Relations of the United States series insofar as they covered World War II and the international conferences of that period. Dr. Hermes is at present a member of the Current History Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History. He has assisted Dr. Maurice Matloff in the preparation of the volume Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, and has edited the volume by Maj. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War in the ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES.
viii Preface This volume is offered as a contribution to the politico-military history of the Korean War. Unlike nearly all of the previous wars waged by the United States, the conflict in Korea brought no military victory; in fact, during the last two years of the struggle neither side sought to settle the issue decisively on the battlefield. In this respect the Korean War had no modern American counterpart. It resembled most the War of 1812 when the nation had also carried on a desultory war while it attempted to negotiate a peace with the British. More important fighting, in both cases, went on at the peace table than on the field of combat. Although the action at the front from July 1951 to July 1953 was inconclusive, there was a definite interrelationship between the intensity of the fighting and the status of affairs at the truce meetings. Both the United Nations Command and its opponents tried with some success to induce more reasonable negotiating attitudes in their adversaries through the application of limited military pressure. Under the command system operating during the Korean War, the U.S. Army was given executive responsibility for carrying out U.S. military policy in Korea and for negotiating the truce agreement. Thus, the volume crosses service and departmental lines. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief, Far East Command, and his successor, General Mark W. Clark, commanded U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces as well as Republic of Korea units. As Commanders in Chief, United Nations Command, they also controlled ground, air, and naval forces contributed by some members of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war in Korea. Although the armistice negotiations were supposed to be strictly military in nature, political elements entered the discussions and the Army often had to participate in formulating and carrying out the policy adopted by the President and his advisors. Army officers, through Army channels, frequently handled not only military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea, but economic and political affairs as well. The Army story in Korea, therefore, is more than a service account; in essence, it is the American story of the struggle for peace during the war. For the focus of the volume, the activities of the theater commander were chosen as the most appropriate. From this intermediate point the author could shift to Washington for policy decisions that affected the war, ix or move easily to the truce tent or the fighting front in Korea to show how the policy was carried out. The theater commander served as a moderator between the world of policy and the world of action, leaving his imprint on both. The unavailability of reliable documentation of the Communist Chinese and North Korean plans, objectives, and casualties has forced the author to rely upon the U.S. intelligence estimates for information in these areas. While the information contained in these estimates cannot be regarded as firm or precise, it was the best available when the volume was written. Since the last two years of the war produced few large-scale ground operations, battlefront coverage has been selective. Major operations are, of course, described in some detail, but to attempt to cover the hundreds of hill actions, patrols, and raids would require an over-sized volume cluttered with monotonous detail. The emphasis, therefore, has been placed upon small-scale actions involving U.S. Army units that most typically portray the fighting of a given period. No attempt has been made to do more than summarize the combat operations of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines during the last two years of the war, as these services have published, or are in the process of publishing, their own detailed accounts. Similarly, the Republic of Korea and many of the other participants in the United Nations Command have published, or presumably will publish at some future time, accounts of their participation. The contributions made by the other U.S. services and by the other nations of the United Nations Command in Korea deserve full consideration and credit, but the author felt it was quite proper to devote the majority of his attention to U.S. Army units in the combat portions of the volume. The problem of dating the many radio messages exchanged between Washington and the Far East has been met by accepting the date on the document used. The time differences between the two areas meant that different dates were used in each place for the same message, but it was felt that any attempt to change all the dates to Washington time or to Tokyo time might lead to further confusion. In most cases the difference of a day meant little substantively and the messages can be identified and located by number as well as by date. In the course of researching and writing this volume the author has received help from many sources, both within and without the Office of the Chief of Military History, and gladly acknowledges his indebtedness. He owes special debts of gratitude to Col. Joseph Rockis, former Chief of the Histories Division, OCMH, and to Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief, Current History Branch, OCMH, for their steadfast confidence and support during the initial phases of the project. For their many helpful suggestions and wise counsel the author is also deeply grateful to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, Dr. John Miller, jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Mr. x Billy C. Mossman, General History Branch, and Dr. Robert W. Coakley, General History Branch, all of the Office of the Chief of Military History, as well as to Mr. James F. Schnabel, JCS Historical Division, Mr. Wilber W. Hoare, JCS Historical Division, and Dr. Jules Davids, Georgetown University. Without the cheerful and efficient documentary research assistance of Mrs. Lois Aldridge and Mrs. Hazel Ward of the World War II Division, National Archives and Records Service, the author's task would have been far more difficult. In the Office of the Chief of Military History the personnel of the General Reference Branch under Mr. Israel Wice and his successor, Mr. Charles F. Romanus, have provided services too numerous to mention. The volume was edited by Mr. David Jaffe, whose interest and professional skill were welcomed throughout the writing and revision of the manuscript. Mrs. Marion P. Grimes performed yeoman service as assistant editor and Mrs. Frances R. Burdette ably assisted in the preparation of the manuscript for the printer. The index was prepared by Mr. Nicholas J. Anthony. The author was fortunate in having the maps drawn under the direction of Mr. Billy C. Mossman, whose knowledge of the terrains and the records to be researched left little to be desired. The photographs were skillfully selected by Miss Ruth A. Phillips. It is perhaps needless to say that any substantive errors that remain in the manuscript are solely the responsibility of the author. In conclusion the author would be remiss if he failed to express his appreciation of the encouragement that he received throughout the writing of this volume from his wife, Esther Festa Hermes.
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