[8-3.1 AA Vol. 6]
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL HISTORY OF THE ETO
PART VI
NEPTUNE: TRAINING, MOUNTING, THE ARTIFICIAL PORTS
Historical Division
United States Army Forces, European Theater
Lt. Clifford L. Jones
March 1946
[Note: This manuscript was prepared at the end of World War II by Lieutenant Clifford L. Jones, one of the Army historians assigned to the Historical Division of the European Theater of Operations (ETO). It was subsequently transferred to the Office of the Chief of Military History (now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use in the writing of the multi-volume official history of the US Army in World War II. It is typical of the kinds of superb background studies prepared by participant-historians during that conflict. The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-3.1 AA v.6, which should be cited in footnotes, along with the title. It is reproduced here with only those limited modifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling, punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original. Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have been inserted as italicized text in square brackets. The manuscript originally consisted of two separate volumes; they are now bound together as a single volume but retain their original handwritten volume pagination. The graphics were originally pasted on sheets in the page sequence; some have since been lost.]
Table of Contents
Page
Volume I |
||
FOREWORD | i | |
I | BACKGROUND OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS | 1 |
The Beginnings of Invasions | ||
Training in the United States | ||
Early Developments in the United Kingdom | ||
Arrival of American Units in the United Kingdom | ||
II | AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN | 12 |
Planning for TORCH | ||
Operation TORCH | ||
Lessons from TORCH | ||
Training in North Africa | ||
Preparations for HUSKY | ||
Operation HUSKY | ||
Lessons from HUSKY | ||
Operation AVALANCHE | ||
Operation SHINGLE | ||
Summary | ||
III | EARLY TRAINING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM | 53 |
Contact with other Theaters | ||
Training Policy in the United Kingdom | ||
The American School Center | ||
The Joint Q Planning School | ||
The 29th Division in the United Kingdom | ||
Miscellaneous Training | ||
Development of Doctrine Through Exercises | ||
IV | PLANNING FOR OVERLORD AND NEPTUNE | 95 |
The Evolution of the Plan | ||
Planning by Engineers | ||
Plan NEPTUNE—General | ||
Plan NEPTUNE—Mounting | ||
Plan NEPTUNE—The Assault | ||
Plan NEPTUNE—Beach Operations | ||
Basic Agreements | ||
V | COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES | 144 |
Selection of Assault Units | ||
The Assault Units | ||
Composition of Shore Units | ||
VI | THE ASSAULT TRAINING CENTER | 164 |
The Background of the Center | ||
Activation of the Center | ||
Center Doctrine | ||
Settling [sic] up the Center | ||
Organization of Assault Troops | ||
Courses at the Center | ||
Development of Doctrine | ||
Center Chronology | ||
VII | EXERCISES | 211 |
Exercise DUCK I | ||
Exercises DUCK II, DUCK III | ||
Exercise FOX | ||
Other Assault Exercises | ||
Miscellaneous Exercises | ||
Exercise TIGER | ||
TIGER—The E-Boat Attack | ||
Exercise FABIUS | ||
VIII | MOUNTING | 275 |
The Base Sections | ||
Development of Marshalling Facilities | ||
Marshalling facilities in Southern Base Section | ||
Marshalling facilities in Western Base Section | ||
Control of Movement | ||
Equipping the Invasion Force | ||
Waterproofing | ||
Marshalling in Southern Base Section | ||
Marshalling in Western Base Section | ||
Composition of the Assault Convoys | ||
Briefing and Embarkation | ||
Volume II |
||
IX | D DAY, OMAHA | 1 |
Introduction | ||
Omaha Beach | ||
The Voyage of the Assault Convoy | ||
The Preliminary Bombardment | ||
H Hour—The Gap Assault Teams | ||
First Engineer Landings | ||
Mid-morning | ||
Mid-day | ||
Late Afternoon | ||
D Day Night | ||
X | D DAY, UTAH | 34 |
Introduction | ||
Utah Beach | ||
The Voyage of the Assault Convoy | ||
Paratroop Landings and Preliminary Bombardment | ||
H Hour—The Gap Assault Teams | ||
First Engineer Landings | ||
Development of Utah Beach on D Day | ||
XI | OMAHA BEACH DEVELOPMENT TO THE STORM | 63 |
The Tactical Situation | ||
Marking the Beaches | ||
Development of the Beach | ||
D plus 6—Opening the Inland Dumps | ||
Later Improvements | ||
XII | UTAH BEACH DEVELOPMENT TO THE STORM | 86 |
The Tactical Situation | ||
Marking the Beaches | ||
Development of the Beach | ||
Unloading Operations | ||
Dump Activities | ||
Personnel and Vehicles | ||
Beach Development | ||
XIII | THE STORM PERIOD | 110 |
Planning the Harbor | ||
Construction of the Harbor | ||
The Storm | ||
Damage caused by the Storm | ||
The Change in Plan, Arromanches | ||
Aftermath of the Storm | ||
XIV | THE BEACHES AFTER THE STORM | 135 |
Settling down to Normal | ||
August Operations | ||
Fall Operations | ||
Movement of Personnel | ||
Movement of Supplies |
GRAPHIC
Figure 1 | RATTLE Conference appreciation of beach capacities of Western France, July 1942. |
2 | COSSAC final plan of November 1943, designating beaches, ports, future plans for lines of communications, etc, and including the changes of February 1944. |
3 | The OVERLORD plan, including the naval plan, the SBS divisions, ports of debarkation etc. |
4 | Plan for the GOOSEBERRIES and MULBERRIES at OMAHA and UTAH. |
5 | Assault Training Center map, with insert of map of England, showing location of training areas and schools mentioned in Chapter III. |
6 | Schematic organization of an assault regiment, battalion, company, team, and their attachments etc. |
7 | The Mounting Plan for southern England, showing SBS and WBS, the ports, division of responsibility for mounting the assault forces, follow-up and buildup. |
8 | OMAHA Beach, showing planned exits, dump areas, transit areas. |
9 | UTAH Beach, showing the same plans as in Figure 8. |
10 | UTAH Beach as it actually developed. |
11 | Command and communications channels at the beaches, showing relationship of Navy and Army commands. |
[Volume II]
APPENDICES
A | Tonnages of cargo unloaded at the beaches, 6 June to 19 Nov 44. |
B | Personnel crossing the beaches from 6 June to 14 Nov 44. |
C | Movement of vehicles across beaches, 6 June to 12 Nov 44. |
D | Casualties handled at the beaches, 6 June to 4 Sep 44. |
E | Prisoner evacuation via the beaches, 6 June to 4 Sep 44. |
F | Breakdown of tons discharged by dukw, ferry-craft, barge, direct to truck, 31 Aug to 20 Nov 44. |
[Volume II]
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 193 |
i
On 6 June 1945 [sic] American and British troops invaded the continent of Europe over open beaches in one of the most revolutionary operations of World War II. Invasion was the climax of many months of planning, training, enthusiasm, disappointment, and continual trial and error. Neither doctrine nor tradition pointed the way. When it became evident that there could be no victory without invasion, there were no up-to-date field manuals, no approved training techniques, no specialized troops, no training centers, and no equipment. The landing and supplying of a great military force on a hostile shore over open beaches was an operation which began from scratch.
Consequently the history of the invasion of France and the subsequent beach operations which permitted Allied troops to burst from their bridgehead and advance east is long and complicated. It began in Spring 1940, on the sands of Dunkirk, and ended in the early winter of 1944 when the last few tons of cargo were brought across the beaches during a lull in a Channel storm. Its roots were complex and widespread, winding through London and Washington, and through countless army and navy bases, training camps and experimental stations in the
ii
United States, the United Kingdom, and North Africa.
This study, therefore, can be no more than a part of the complete history of the invasion, which eventually must be compiled from source materials now in many parts of the world, and from the files and records of the armies, navies and air forces of the two nations. What follows is a record of the training of American troops in Great Britain for the landing operation, the preliminary assault landings in the Mediterranean, the mounting of American troops for the Normandy landings, the beach assault, and the establishing and operating of the two American beaches in France—OMAHA and UTAH.
The first part of the study includes a brief sketch of the background of amphibious doctrine and the effect of early operations in the Mediterranean area on planning for the invasion of France. This section is far from complete, since much of the pertinent source material is not available in the European Theater. It should be taken as an indication of the effect that the Mediterranean operations had upon planning and training for the Normandy operation. The main body of the study is divided into two parts. The first concerns planning and training in the United Kingdom for the beach operation, the schools and training centers set up, the procurement of invasion equipment, and the final mounting and loading for the operation. The second covers the landings, the setting up of the two beach ports, and their operation to early
iii
winter 1944, when they were forced to close.
In general, the compiling of the first part of the study suffered from the unevenness of source material. As an example, a rather exhaustive search of records available on the continent in the Fall of 1945 failed to disclose much trustworthy material dealing with the activities of the all-important Southern Base Section in England. Important records of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade were lost in transit from Africa to the United Kingdom. There was more material concerning the Assault Training Center than could be used, but very little concerning important phases of some of the exercises. These gaps are indicated in the bibliography which is appended.
For the most part, material dealing with the second, or post D Day, part of the study was entirely adequate, but time was lacking to do as much work as had originally been planned on this phase. This probably is not too disadvantageous, since the future researcher should have far less trouble in compiling information regarding post D Day beach operation than he will have in covering the planning and training period. Chapters IX, X< XI, XII, and XIII may be used as a general survey of the post-D Day period, and the researcher may then proceed to a more involved study of those bases which interest him.
iv
This study, particularly the second half, is based, no only on the study of the sources, but also on experience. The writer, Lt. Clifford L. Jones, was a member of an historical team which joined the headquarters of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade on Utah Beach. The study which follows was written at Paris and St. Germain, France, between late June 1945 and January 1946.
Considerable historical material was not available in Europe during the latter period. Important records of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade had been sent to the War Department in Washington some time before the study began. Most of this material, however, had been seen by the writer in 1944 and is incorporated in Operation Report Neptune of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, and in Notes on Utah Beach and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade in the files of the Historical Section, ETOUSA.
It must be remembered that an amphibious landing is fundamentally a supply project rather than a tactical maneuver. For a few hours, while the assault troops are fighting on the beaches, tactics and logistics meet, but once the infantry begins to slash its way inland, the beach area ceases to be a battlefield and becomes a highly specialized port and depot whose main purpose is to insure a steady flow of supplies and reinforcements to the front. It is in this flow of supplies and reinforcements which provides the theme of this study.
v
Tactics are discussed only as they affect logistics, or as they are affected by logistics. This is the story of how the United States Army landed its forces on two open beaches, and then turned those beaches into one of the greatest military supply installations in history.