[8-5.1A AA.G]
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems During the Korea Conflict
[Note: This manuscript was prepared by the Military History Section of Headquarters, United States Army Forces and Eighth Army at the end of the Korean War. It was subsequently deposited at the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH; now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use by historians preparing the official history of the Army. It is typical of the kinds of detailed studies routinely carried out by the experienced combat historians during the Korean War. The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-5.1A AA.G, which should be cited in footnotes, along with the title. It is reproduced here with only those limited modifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling, punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original. Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have been inserted as italicized text in square brackets. This item originally carried a SECRET security classification, but is now unclassified; all references to that past classification have been omitted.]
MONOGRAPHS
2. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems During the Korean Conflict
Background
OCMH assigned to the Military History Section, GHQ FEC by letter dated 3 Aug 51, responsibility for preparation, of a draft monograph on "Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems and Their Solutions," for Volume III, Part 2, of the official History of the Korean Conflict. The letter implemented instructions contained in DA letter AGAO-CS 314.7 (3 Aug 51) HIS, 9 Aug 51, sub: "Far East Command Historical Activities." G2, GHQ FEC began preparation of the monograph in accordance with a verbal agreement between Brig Gen R. F. Ennis, G-2, and Col Allison R. Hartman, Chief, MHS, in Nov 51. Research and work continued by G2 Hq FEC and G2 AFFE (Adv) until suspended by Col Myrick, Deputy G2 AFFE (Adv) in Jun 53 on account of personnel shortages. Per verbal agreement between Col Myrick and Col Preston J. C. Murphy, Chief, MHS, Hq AFFE, on 3 Sep 53 and DF dated 5 Sep 53, G2 was to incorporate in the monograph materials to discharge the requirement placed on CG AFFE by DA letter AGAO-CS 314.7 (20 Aug 53) HIS, 27 Aug 53, sub: "Historical Program, USAFFE," to cover exploitation of captured enemy personnel and documents. After collection of pertinent information, G2 AFFE resumed work on the monograph in Apr 54. The draft monograph was completed in Jan 55. Upon review, the Chief, Military History Section, determined that the monograph was not a historical study. It has been held pending a decision of the Chief or Military History Officer as to disposition.
Review Comments
MH has two clean drafts of the monograph. Consisting of 55 pages of text, without footnotes or documentation, it is a paper or study of various intelligence and counterintelligence problems encountered in the Far East during the period of the Korean conflict. It is a general study of the problems encountered, five chapters devoted to collection problems, intelligence production, communications, intelligence problems, and counterintelligence on both the Eighth Army—communications zone level and theater level. A final chapter contains conclusions and recommendations. Problems are discussed but few historical examples are cited. Rather than a historical study, it is an essay in intelligence problems with no references to supporting documents or source materials.
Recommendation
That in accordance with the request of Lt Col Rockis, OCMH, the draft monograph be forwarded to OCMH as a working paper only for whatever value it may be to writers of that office.
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
PROBLEMS DURING THE KOREAN CONFLICT
| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|---|---|
| PREFACE | i |
| I ARMY COLLECTION PROBLEMS | 1 |
| Linguists | 1 |
| Order of Battle | 2 |
| Photo Interpreters | 3 |
| Personnel Replacements for MIS Battalion | 3 |
| Ground Liaison Team Personnel | 4 |
| Assignment of EEI and Establishment of Priorities | 5 |
| Captured and Recovered Personnel and Refugees | 6 |
| Captured and Confiscated Documents | 8 |
| Enemy Material | 10 |
| Photo Reconnaissance | 13 |
| Terrain Intelligence and Mapping | 15 |
| II ARMY-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION | 16 |
| Order of Battle | 16 |
| Personalities | 16 |
| Evaluation of Covert Intelligence Reports | 17 |
| III ARMY-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS | 19 |
| Communications | 19 |
| Reports and Distribution | 19 |
| IV COMMUNICATIONS ZONE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS | 21 |
| Military Intelligence Specialist Personnel | 21 |
| Collection Problems | 22 |
| Intelligence Production | 23 |
| Co-ordination and Liaison | 24 |
| V THEATER-LEVEL COLLECTION PROBLEMS | 26 |
| Military Intelligence and Specialist Personnel | 26 |
| POW Interrogations | 31 |
| Captured and Confiscated Documents | 38 |
| VI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE | 41 |
| Clearances | 41 |
| Personnel Procurement and Rotation for CIC Detachments in Korea | 43 |
| Captured American Personnel | 45 |
| Korean Terrain Helpful to Enemy Agents | 46 |
| Threat of Sabotage During Hostilities in Korea | 47 |
| North Korean and Other Espionage Agents in Japan | 48 |
| VII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 52 |
This Monograph on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence problems during the Korean operation is a compilation of the difficulties and problems arising incident to that conflict. These problems are considered only in their relationship to the active area of hostilities and the development of intelligence information of immediate concern to the Commander in the field. That discussion relating to the field of personnel, procedural systems, and collection problems is brought out in detail because it is felt that these matters have a direct influence on the lessons learned and will offer a solution to similar problems in similar situations.
No attempt has been made in this document to cover the myriad facets pertaining to the production of strategic intelligence nor of the relationship of the theater Army Intelligence effort with that of the other services. However, the reader should remember that these difficulties arose while this section was G2 GHQ Far East Command and were applicable in part or in whole to those other services.
Conclusions and recommendations are contained in the last chapter of this document. Individual studies peculiar to a given situation may be found in existing accession lists or intelligence libraries of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
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page created 10 January 2002