Endnotes for Chapter XVI
1 See Ch. XIV, above.
2 (1) Min, 129th mtg JCS, 24 Nov 43. (2) Min, 2d plenary mtg, SEXTANT, 24
Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Book. (3) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 686. (4) Romanus and Sunderland,
Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. II, which contains
a detailed account of the plans and maneuvers concerning CBI matters during
the conference.
3 Min, 1st plenary mtg, SEXTANT, 29 Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Book.
4 (1) CCS 405, 22 Nov 43, title: Role of China in Defeat of Japan. (2)
Min, 28th mtg JCS, 23 Nov 43 (3) Min, 128th mtg GCS, 23 Nov 43.
5 (1) Min, 129th mtg CCS, 24 Nov 43. (2) See also, min, 130th mtg JCS, 25
Nov 43, for reiteration by Marshall of the same argument.
6 Stilwell Papers, p. 255.
7 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 328.
8 Min, 130th mtg JCS, 25 Nov 43. The President's oral promise to arm and
equip ninety divisions sometime in the future was, after the end of the war,
to lead to considerable discussion between the Americans and the Chinese in
regard to its validity in the postwar period. See Feis, China Tangle, pp. 368ff.
9 Min, 130th mtg JCS, 25 Nov 43.
10 Min, 131st mtg JCS, 26 Nov 43.
11 On the 27th, after the President and Prime Minister had already left for
Tehran, Stilwell informed Admiral Mountbatten that the Generalissimo, before
departing Cairo that morning, had reversed himself again and rejected all
his earlier agreements. Evidently the reversal of the 27th did not become
known to the President at Tehran; in any event, on 30 November Chiang again
changed his mind and again agreed to join in CHAMPION. The details of what
Chiang agreed to are confusing, but it should be remembered that the
Chinese, for security reasons, had still been told nothing of the details of
BUCCANEER, simply that a major amphibious operation would take place in the
Bay of Bengal area. See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems,
pp, 62ff.
12 Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
13 Min, 2d plenary mtg, SEXTANT, 24 Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Book.
14 The comparative statistics on overseas deployment that the President read
out were those he had requested of General Marshall aboard the Iowa. See PP.
339-40, above, and App. A, below.
Despite the silence of the official record of the conference on British
reaction at this point, it appears from other evidence that it was very much
in the minds of Churchill and his ministers in the fall of 1943 that British
manpower was at a critical state and would continue to go downhill in
proportion to American manpower, particularly if the war with Germany
continued after the end of 1944. On 1 November he had circulated a Minute to
his advisers, in which he stated: "Our manpower is now fully mobilized for
the war effort. We cannot add to the total; on the contrary, it is already
dwindling." Quoted in Ehrman, Grand Strategy V 44.
(The Prime Minister's revealing "Memorandum on Man-power, 1st November,
1943" is reproduced in App. X, pp. 569-71, of that volume).
15 CCS 409, 25 Nov 43, title: "OVERLORD" and the ;Mediterranean. GCS
.409 is a note by the British Chiefs of Staff. Their specific proposals were
to: unify command in the Mediterranean; pasta the Italian campaign until the
Pisa-Rimini line was reached; nourish the guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia.
Greece, and Albania; bring Turkey into the war in 1943; open the
Dardanelles; and undermine resistance in the Balkan states.
16 Min 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
17 Min 129th mtg JCS, 24 Nov 43.
For a detailed analysis of the British position at Cairo-Tehran, see Ehrman,
Grand Strategy V, Ch. IV. On the basis of his examination of the British
records for this official account, Ehrman contends that the Americans were
overly suspicious of British views on OVERLORD and the Mediterranean. He
denies that Churchill in 1943 wanted a "Balkan campaign involving
substantial British and American forces" (p. 112). For his interpretation of Churchill's somewhat
contradictory statements on the Balkans in late 1943, see pp. 112-13 and App. VI, PP. 554-56.
18 JCS 6m, 26 Nov 43, title: "OVERLORD" and the Mediterranean. JCS 611 is a
JPS study of CCS 409.
19 JCS 606/1, 23 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With USSR. This paper is a
report by the JSSC.
20 (1) CCS 407 (rev), 26 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With the USSR. CCS 407
is a memo by the CCS. (2) Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
21 Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
22 Msg, Roosevelt to justice James P. Byrnes, 1 Nov 43, Item 14,
Exec, 5.
23 Army staff preparations at Cairo for the meetings with the Russians
largely took the form of preparing data for General Handy's use. (1) Memo,
T. T. H. for Roberts, 24 Nov 43, no sub, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5. (2)
Memo, Ferenbaugh for Handy, 26 Nov 43, sub: A List of Questions the
Russians May Ask and Related Data, Envelope 3, Item 15, Exec 5. This envelope
contains data taken by General Handy to Tehran.
24 Min, 129th mtg CCS, 24 Nov 43.
25 JCS 606, 22 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With the USSR. In this paper,
Marshall submitted to the JCS a message Deane had sent him from Moscow No.
57, CM-IN 7730 (13 Nov 43).
26 Min, 130th mug JCS, 25 Nov 43.
27 Min, 130th mtg JCS, 25 Nov 43.
28 (1) CCS 407 rev), 26 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With the USSR.
(2)
Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
29 Memos and notes of political discussions attended by the Big Three
and/or their political advisers are scheduled to be published, in a volume
on the conferences at. Cairo and Tehran, in the Department of State's
foreign relations series.
30 Min, mtg President and JCS, EUREKA, 28 Nov 43. SEXTANT Conf Book. The
meeting was held at 1130.
31 Min, 132d mtg JCS, 28 Nov 43, at 1000, EUREKA Conf. Postwar writers who
have dwelt on the complete absence of political motivation or
sophistication on the part of the U.S. staff compared with the British in
World War II have uniformly overlooked the contemporary British view of
American strategic policy for the war in Asia.
32 Min, mtg President and JCS, EUREKA, 28 Nov 43 SEXTANT Conf Book.
33 Min, 1st plenary mtg USA, Great Britain, and the USSR, EUREKA, 28
Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Book. The meeting was held at 1600 in the Soviet
Legation, Tehran. The following discussion is based on minutes of the
meeting.
34 Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 44-45.
35 Min, military mtg between the USA, Great Britain, and the
USSR, EUREKA, 29 Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Book. The meeting was held at 1030 in the Soviet
Legation, Tehran. The Americans were represented by Admiral Leahy and
General Marshall, the British by General Sir Alan Brooke and air Marshal
Sir Charles Portal, and the Soviet Union by Marshal Voroshilov.
36 Min, military mtg between USA, Great Britain, and the USSR, EUREKA,
29 Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Book.
37 Min, 2d plenary session, USA, Great Britain, and the USSR, EUREKA, 29
Nov
43, SEXTANT Conf Book. The meeting was held at 1900 in the Soviet Legation,
Tehran.
38 For interpretations of the President's role at Tehran, see:
(1) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, PP- 780, 789 (2) mane, Strange Alliance,
pp. 41-43; and (3) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 204ff.
39 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 946.
40 (1) Ltr, Barker, Deputy COSSAC, to Handy, 17 Nov 43. The letter reached
Handy at SEXTANT. (2) Ltr, Handy to Barker, 2 Dec 43. Both in Folder
Item 15, Exec 5. The information was relayed by General Handy to "the proper
people."
41 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 91. See also Morgan,
Overture to
Overlord, passim.
42 Min, 132d mtg CCS, 30 Nov 43. The meeting was held at 0930 in the British
Legation, Tehran.
43 Colonel Bessell has recalled how the outline plan, drawn up in the
midsummer of 1943 by the JWPC, came to be available at the Tehran
conference. He stated, "Just before General Somervell left Cairo for the
Teheran Conference, he asked me whether we had an outline plan for an
invasion of Southern France. I dug up our old JWPC study and furnished him a
copy. He brought it to Teheran." Col William W. Bessell, Comments on
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, 6 Sep 56, MS, OCMH
files.
44 Recalling the hectic days at Tehran, General Handy has commented:
"When we left Cairo for Tehran, it was generally agreed . . . that we
would have to be guided by the Russian desires, particularly as to
Mediterranean operations. The U.S. planners felt rather glum and the British
were correspondingly elated, because they felt Stalin would want a
supporting operation nearer his own front which of course pointed to the
eastern Med. The British were rather taken aback, to say the least, when
Stalin came out so definitely supporting our views and in fact using many of
the arguments we had repeated over and over again. "When Gen. Marshall
returned from a meeting with the Br Cs of S-he told me that now the Southern
France operation had been accepted. The British said it couldn't be done,
resources would not be available, etc. Gen Marshall said they were to meet
again the next morning (it was then evening) and asked me to get him some
notes for the meeting. "Somervell, Cooke, O'Donnell [Col. Emmett O'Donnell] and I got together that
night after dinner and drew up an outline plan for the operation-Somervell
handling the shipping support and supply factor, Cooke the landing craft and
naval support, O'Donnell the air, and I the divisions and other combat
troops. We did have a very sketchy study made some time before, but all of
us had given a lot of thought to this operation. The outline plan we drew up
was reproduced by some early hour in the morning, possibly about 3 A.M. Our
Cs of S took it to the meeting the next morning with copies far the British.
It was good enough to win the argument. In fact it represented pretty well
how the operation itself was actually carried out several months later and
with a lot of detailed study and planning. The British always believed our
planners had produced the plan in Cairo, they didn't think it was possible
to `pull it out of the air' overnight. I have always believed that this
action was what finally 'buttoned up' this question and made it a decisive
win for us." Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, Comments on MS, Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, 28 Sep 56, OCMH files.
45 (1) JPS 249, 9 Aug 43, title: Plan for Invasion of Southern France.
(2)
Study, 29 Nov 43, title: Operation Against Southern France, ABC 384 Europe
(5 Aug 43), 9-A. (3) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 123-25.
46 (1) Paper, 29 Nov 43, title: Proposals Presented by the U.S.
Delegation at Moscow, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. (2)
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 784-85. (3) For the story of the
proposals, the subsequent negotiations, and outcome see Deane, Strange
Alliance, especially Chs. VII and XIII.
47 For the political discussions and decisions at Tehran, see:
(1) Churchill,
Closing the Ring, pp. 359-62, 373-74, 381-82, 389-407; (2) Leahy, I Was
There, pp. 205-06, 209-12; (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 777,
782-83 785-87 790, 792-98; (4) Department of State, Publication 2423, The
Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany
and Japan, pp. 5-6, containing a copy of the Declaration of Iran.
48 Notes on dinner held in the British Legation, Tehran, 30 Nov 43,
Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
49 For Sherwood's
observation, see Roosevelt and Napkins, p. 799
50 Ltr, Handy to Barker, 2
Dec 43, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5.
51 Department of State, Publication 380, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation:
1939-1945, p, 202
52 CPS 131/1, 9 Dec 43, title: Amphibious Operations Against the South
of France.
53 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 408-09.
54 (1) Msg, Harriman to Marshall, 2 Nov 43, CM-IN 1946. (2) Min,
1st plenary
mtg, EUREKA, 28 Nov 43 SEXTANT Conf Book. (3) Leahy, I Was There, p. 208.
(4) Cf. Ch. XIII.
55 (1) Min, 3d plenary mtg, SEXTANT, 4 Dec 43, SEXTANT Conf Book. (2)
Churchill, Closing the Ring-, pp. 378, 409.
56 Min, 3d plenary mtg, SEXTANT, 1 Dec 4.3. SEXTANT Conf Book.
57 Ibid.
58 Min, 135th mtg JCS, 5 Dec 43. See also CCS 423/2, 5 Dec 43, title: Draft
Agreement by CCS.
59 Min, 135th mtg GCS, 5 Dec 43.
60 Min, 4th plenary mtg, SEXTANT, 5 Dec 43, SEXTANT Conf Book.
61 King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 525. King dates the meeting
the morning of 6 December, but surrounding circumstances indicate that this
meeting, and the one that followed later in the afternoon, both took place
on 5 December.
62 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp, 411-12.
63 (1) Msg, President to Generalissimo, 5 Dec 43, Item 70, Exec
10.
(2)
Min, 137th mtg CCS, 6 Dec 43- (3) King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p.
525. (4) Leahy, I Was There, p. 213. (5) Churchill, Closing the
Ring, p. 412. (6) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.
801. (7) Romanus and
Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. II, King and Leahy both state in their accounts that the President informed them
of his decision to cancel BUCCANEER late in the afternoon of the 6th, but
the President's official log of the conference indicates that he met with
the JCS at 5 P.M. on the 5th. The President's log is scheduled to be
published, in a volume on the conferences at Cairo and Tehran, in the
Department of State's foreign relations series. Churchill relates that he
was notified on the 5th after the President, "in consultation with his
advisers," reached his decision that afternoon. Churchill, Closing the Ring,
pp. 411-12. The message to Chiang was sent late on the night of the 5th.
64 CCS 427/1, 6 Dec 43, title: Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia
Alternative to "BUCCANEER." The President's message to Chiang and
Mountbatten's over-pessimistic report were to occasion embarrassment later in
the month, when Mountbatten discovered that he could mount a sizable
amphibious operation even after the bulk of his resources were withdrawn. By that
time, Chiang had already accepted the President's offer to defer north Burma
operations until the fall. See Ch. XIX, below.
65 Compilation of Background Material for SEXTANT, prepared by S&P Gp OPD
[about 10 Nov 43], Tab 2, ABC 337 (18 Oct 43) 5.
66 CCS 300/2, 18 Nov 43, title: Estimate of Enemy Situation,
1944-Pacific-Far East. The "Inner Zone" consisted of Japan proper, Korea,
Manchuria, North China, Formosa, and Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin).
67 CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, title: Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
68 (1) CCS 319/2 (rev), 27 Aug 43, title: Progress Rpt to President and
Prime Minister. (2) CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to President and
Prime Minister. (3) CCS 380/1, 3 Nov 43, title: Basic Policies for the Next
U.S.-Br Staff Conf. (4) Min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43. (5) Compilation of
Background Material for SEXTANT, prepared by S&P Gp OPD [about 10 Nov 43],
Tab 4, .ABC 337 (18 Oct 43), 5. (6) CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, title: Over-all Plan
for the Defeat of Japan.
69 CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, title: Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Memo, Handy for Marshall, 3 Dec 43, no sub, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5
73 See Ch. IX, above.
74 (1) JCS 446, 6 Aug 43, title: Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far
East. (2) Min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43. (S) CCS 397 (rev), 3 Dec 43, title: Specific Operations
for the Defeat of Japan,
1944.
75 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 415.
76 For the following summary of SEXTANT decisions, see
especially: (1) GCS 426/1, 6 Dec 43, title: Rpt to President and Prime
Minister; and (2) msg,
Handy to Hull, 7 Dec 43, CM-IN 4483.
77 (1) Ltr, Marshall to President, 29 Nov 43, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library. (2) JCS 577/3, 2 Dec 43, title: Rankin, Case "C." JCS
577/3 is a report by the JPS at SEXTANT. (3) Min, ,134th mtg JCS, 4 Dec 43.
(4) CCS 320/4, 4 Dec 43, title: Operation "RANKIN." This is a JCS memo. (5)
Min, 134th mtg GCS, 4 Dec 43. Back in Washington, conferences were taking place between the army and the
State Department on the postwar occupation and administration of Europe.
See: (1) msg, Betts to Strong and Marshall, 28 Nov 43, CM-IN 17337 (2) msg,
Maj Gen John H. Hilldring for McCloy, 30 Nov 43, CM-OUT 11830; and (3) memo,
Col G. A. Lincoln, no addressee, 23 Nov 43, sub: Conf with Secy of State,
Folder 3, Item y, Exec 5.
78 For the study at SEXTANT of an operation against southern France, see
especially: (1) JPS 359/D, 1 Dec 43, title: Dir, Study of an Amphibious
Landing on the Southern Coast of France; (2) CPS 131/D, 1 Dec 43, title:
Amphibious Operation against the South of France; (3) CPS 131/1, 3 Dec 43,
same title;(4) CPS 131/2/D, 3 Dec 43, title: Dir, Amphibious Operation
Against the South of France; (5) min, 135th mtg JCS, 5 Dec 43; and (6) min,
136th mtg CCS, 9 Dec 43.
79 (1) CCS 424, 5 Dec 43, title: Amphibious Operations Against the South
of France. (2) Msg, SEXTANT to Eisenhower, USFOR London for Br COS,
repeated to AGWAR, 6 Dec 43, FAN 283, CM-IN 3958. (3) CCS 426/1, 6 Dec 43,
title: Rpt to President and Prime Minister.
80 For the negotiations with the Turks in December, see: (1) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 799-800; (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp.
415-17, 422, 430-31 See also, memo, Billo, Chief SS for Chief S&P Gp OPD,
24 Dec 43, sub: Notes on Radiogram COS (W) 996 from Br COS to Allied Force Hq, Tab 204, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 196-213 (7 Jan 43).
81 (1) CCS 408, 25 Nov 43, title: Cmd of Br and U.S. Forces Operating
Against Germany. Memo by the JCS, submitted to the British at Cairo. (2)
CCS 408/1, 26 Nov 43, title: Coma of Br and U.S. Forces Operating Against
Germany. British staff reply to the U.S. paper. (3) Msg, Marshall to
Stimson, 2 Dec 43, SW files, War Plans, 54. (4) Churchill, Closing the Ring,
pp. 335-40.
82 (1) CCS 387/3 5 Dec 43, title: Dir for Unification of Comd in the
Mediterranean. (a) Min, 138th mtg CCS, 7 Dec 43.
83 (1) CCS 400/2, 4 Dec 43, title: Control of Strategic Air Forces in NW
Europe and in the Mediterranean. (2) Min, 138th mtg CCS, 7 Dec 43.
84 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 802-03For the President's
decision, see also: (1) Churchill, Closing the Ring, PP. 418-19; (2) Stinson and
Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 441-43; and (3) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe,
pp. 206-09.
85 Quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 803.
86 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 443.
87 Newsweek, January 2, 1956, p. 15.
88 The original note in Marshall's hand and signed by the
President was forwarded a few days later by Marshall to Eisenhower as a
memento. It is reproduced in Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 208. See
also: (1) msg, President to Marshal Stalin, 6 Dec 43, Item 70, Exec 10; and
(2) ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Dec 43, Case 56, Book 14, Exec 9.
89 See, for example: (1) memo, Lt Col Edward B. Gallant for Gen Handy, 3 Dec
43, sub: Statistical Chart-Landing Ships and Craft, Tab ETO, Condensed
Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6; and (2) memo, Tansey for Handy, 4 Dec
43, no sub, Paper 5, Folder 4, Item 15, Exec 5.
90 Msg, Somervell to Styer, 3 Dec 43, CM-IN 1176.
91 CGS 428 (rev), 15 Dec 43, title: Relation of Available Resources to Agreed
Operations. The added craft for OVERLORD were twenty-six LST's, twenty-four
LCI (L)'s, and sixty-four LCT's above the Quebec allocations; and for ANVIL
were forty-one LST's, thirty-one LCT's, 3 XAP's, and six LSI (L)'s. See
also, Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45 .
92 For instructions, see msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 1 Dec 43, CM-IN 563.
93 (1) Msg, COMINCH to COMINCH Hq, 30 Nov 43, No. 3190, CM-IN 287
(1 Dec 43). (2) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 127.
94 Msg, Handy to Hull, 5 Dec 43, CM-IN 3290.
95 (1) Msg, Handy to Hull sgd Royce, 6 Dec 43, CM-IN 3972. (2) BIGOT msg,
Handy for Smith, 29 Dec 43, CM-OUT 10819.
96 (1) Msg, Hull to Handy (orginator OPD), 4 Dec 43, CM-OUT 1732.
(2) Pers
ltr, Hull to Handy, 17 Dec 43, Item 14, Exec 5.
97 For a reflection on the problem of the political implications of this
shift, especially in connection with postwar Asia, see Appendix B, below.
98 Quoted by Stimson in Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p.
443.
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