Chapter XIV:
Strategic Strands in the War Against Japan: August-November 1943
Aside from uneasiness over the immediate aims of the European allies in
the Mediterranean, Army planners had another compelling reason in the fall
of 1943 for clinching European strategy once and for all. In their eyes,
OVERLORD was more than a lever to secure the invasion of the European
continent via the Channel. It was also a means of regulating deployment
to the Pacific. The general understanding had been that the early
Anglo-American decision to beat Germany first had relegated the war
against Japan to a limited and secondary effort until the European foe
was beaten. However, the war in the Pacific would not and could not
stand still. In the months following Pearl Harbor the idea of
BOLERO-ROUNDUP had, as we have seen, been adopted and pressed by the
Army planners as a means of controlling run-away deployment in the
Pacific. TORCH had thrown this hope, along with their others, into
limbo. At Casablanca in January 1943, the Americans had served notice
that the continued diversionary trend to the Mediterranean would be
matched by expanded action in the Pacific. During the remainder of 1943,
the relaxation in favor of commitments for the Pacific, which had begun
concomitantly with the TORCH decision, had been continued for
maintaining the initiative against Japan seized at Guadalcanal.
Encouraging as prospects were in the war against Japan by the fall
of 1943, the expanding operations in the Pacific complicated rather than
simplified problems for the planners responsible for strategic
deployment of the Army. The operations threatened to absorb too much too
fast. How to keep that war progressing without drawing off too much of
the manpower and resources needed to defeat Germany was more than ever a
disturbing question. How to achieve a proper balance and timing in the
deployment of forces among the major theaters was becoming not less but
more difficult as the war progressed. The need to replace piecemeal
allocations of American resources for defensive and opportunistic
purposes in the Pacific by systematic deployment in accord with some
agreed over-all plan for the decisive defeat of Japan appeared greater
than ever.
[307]
As did enterprising commanders elsewhere, those in the Pacific
persistently called for more generous allocations. The peculiar needs of
campaigns in remote, disease-ridden, water-bound areas at the end of long
lines of communications created demands that seemed insatiable. Operations
threatened to become larger and larger. Like Topsy, Army forces and
resources in the Pacific "just growed" and, what is more, kept growing.
Nor did the Army planners want to postpone the defeat of Japan any longer
than necessary to defeat the European foe. In fact, one of the basic
arguments in the Army brief for accelerating the European conflict was
inability to defend any longer before the American people the postponement
of an all-out effort in the Pacific except on the ground that the Allies
were preparing to crush Germany at the earliest possible date.
More than OVERLORD therefore lay in the balance. The way out of the
dilemma seemed to the Army planners to be threefold: nail down the
European strategy; keep up unremitting pressure on Japan but so far as
possible within the limits of available Army resources and manpower
already deployed; and develop over-all planning against Japan -planning
that, without impinging on the strength and means needed to defeat
Germany, would capitalize on every possible short cut in order to hasten
the defeat of Japan after the collapse of Germany. Along these lines the
planners were searching in the fall of 1943 for answers to the problem of
the mounting costs of the "secondary war."
The Quest for Short Cuts
At the close of the QUADRANT Conference the Allies were in possession of
the strategic initiative against Japan but still without an approved basic
plan for its defeat. Strategic planning for the war against Japan had by
no means reached the decisive stage arrived at in blueprinting the war
against Germany. Although progress had been steady if unspectacular since
the Battle of Midway in 1942, a quick look at the existing front lines in
New Guinea, the Solomons, and Burma was enough to show that the far-flung
Japanese perimeter of defensive positions had as yet scarcely been
penetrated. The strategic "inner zone" lay safe and intact. Capitalizing
on Anglo-American-Soviet preoccupation with the European struggle and on
the weakness of China, Japan was in fact seeking to strengthen its
economic and military position behind, the outer barrier.
Combined British-American planning had been begun in the spring of
1943 for the "how," "when," and "where" of piercing these defense rings
and defeating Japan. By QUADRANT it had largely bogged down in the face of
the many political and military imponderables involved. At QUADRANT the
CCS attempted to revitalize the planning by supplying an answer to one of
the basic unknowns-the problem of timing. The resolution, championed by
the Americans at the conference, to hinge the plan against Japan on a
twelve-month period after the defeat of Germany introduced a new
controlling factor to guide the planners. It gave promise of relating
planning against Japan to planning against Germany. To save time
[308]
henceforth became a dominant aim of military planning for the: defeat of
Japan. Especially appealing to Washington Army planners was the
possibility of thus reducing the costs of the conflict.
Introduction of the twelve-month concept into the Japanese war made
swifter and deeper entry into the enemy's interior lines a "must."
Fortunately two elements then in the process of expansion or development
bade fair to provide the plans with teeth, fast carrier forces and the
very long range bomber, the B-29. The Combined planners at QUADRANT, in
assigning the United States responsibility for evolving an over-all plan,
instructed the U.S. planners to assume that the Germans would definitely
be out of action by October 1944, that maximum employment of Allied
airpower against Japan would be effected after that collapse, and that the
U.S. and the British Fleets would both be used to the hilt.1
Upon the surrender of the Italian Fleet, the British would dispatch a
large and powerful naval force to the Bay of Bengal via the Pacific. It
was the ardent desire of the Prime Minister that this British force be
available for several months of fighting in the Pacific before proceeding
to the Indian Ocean, possibly to bolster morale in Australia and New
Zealand. The U.S. Navy reaction to the proposal was quite unenthusiastic.
King argued that a dearth of facilities, serious logistical problems, and
a lack of suitable objectives upon which the British force could be used
during the limited period of its assignment in the Pacific made such a
move of doubtful value. The Army reception of Churchill's suggestion was
considerably more favorable, since the Army maintained that the U.S.
public would be encouraged to learn of the intensification of pressure
upon the Japanese. The Army, on the other hand, was less kindly disposed
toward the efforts of another ally-France-to help fight the, war in the
Pacific. The War Department disapproved French suggestions that French
combat units be organized and equipped to engage in battle in the western
Pacific in late 1944. It argued against imposing any added burdens upon
U.S. production and the tight shipping situation that such a commitment
would entail.2
Despite the indecision over the future role of the Allies in the war
against Japan, Army planners proceeded to investigate the possibilities of
defeating Japan by October 1945-within twelve months after the fall of
Germany. Assuming that the USSR and Japan would still be at peace, they
rejected approaches from the Philippines and the Kurils and an assault
directly on Honshu as time consuming or impracticable. Nor, in their
opinion, did a land approach via China promise to meet the target date.
The need to reconquer Burma, to overcome the tremendous logistical
difficulties, to negotiate endlessly with the Chinese, and to fight large
Japanese
[309]
ground armies made a major land campaign in China unacceptable. The
best possibility for finishing the war in 1945, they concluded, lay in the
invasion of Hokkaido, in early 1945, via Hawaii and the Aleutians. To
accomplish this, they warned, the scale of operations in the Central and
Southwest Pacific and in the Southeast Asia Command must continue at the
same pace existing at the time of the fall of Germany until the Hokkaido
offensive could be launched. Redeployment and training plans must be set
in motion immediately; shipping requirements would have to be thoroughly
studied. Hokkaido had been selected since it was a well-placed, lightly
defended island that would provide a suitable base for the later invasion
of Honshu. By striking deep into the enemy heartland tactical surprise
could be won. Current planning, the planners pointed out, was dominated by
the step-by-step advance from the west, southwest, and east, so perforce
operations during 1943-44 would have to follow these lines of approach.
Release of large forces after Germany's defeat in late 1944 would make a
direct attack on Japan possible in 1945.3
In the meantime the Air Forces plan, presented at QUADRANT, to use B-29's
against Japan was found by the Combined planners to be too optimistic
insofar as time and logistical factors were concerned. Attacks on the
scale visualized as necessary to complete the bombing offensive against
Japan by October 1945 could not be mounted in time.4 Investigation of B-29 potentialities did bring to light the need for
correlating general planning and Air planning and resulted in the
production by the U.S. Joint planners of a more modest plan that called
for the operation of the huge bombers from bases at Calcutta and Cheng-tu.
Other possible sites were considered. For the first time, stress was
placed upon the seizure of the Marianas -currently treated in Pacific
planning as a relatively subordinate and distant operation-and the
establishment of heavy bomber bases there at the earliest possible date.5
These earnest efforts on the part of the U.S. planners to tailor
objectives and operations to comply with the terminal date of October 1945
met with a temporary setback at the hands of the combined planning teams
who had been meeting in London and Washington and working on an over-all
plan. The combined planning teams had come by October 1943 to the gloomy
conclusion that there was "no prospect of defeating Japan by October
1945." They believed that the invasion of Japan would have to be provided
for in any comprehensive plan and reaffirmed the future importance of
China as a potential base of operations. The main factor limiting the
speed at which the Allies could de-
[310]
ploy their vast air forces after Germany's downfall would be naval and
amphibious strength, since it would take the United States several months
and the British nine months to reorient their forces. To speed this
redeployment, an early decision must be made on the British forces and
bases to be used. To help shorten the war, the Combined planners also
thought that the USSR must be induced to enter it as soon as possible.
They found that the outlook for successful invasion of Hokkaido in the
summer of 1945 was rather dim and thought that an advance upon Formosa in
the spring of 1945 held more promise. If this hope proved futile, an
alternative operation might be launched against northern Sumatra in late
1944 or early 1945. Japan itself might be reached in 1946.6
Reaction of the U.S. Joint planners to this combined effort was both
diverse and adverse. The Air Forces planner urged that more emphasis be
placed upon the potential role of strategic airpower. The Navy member
complained that the destruction of the Japanese Fleet as "a primary
objective and prerequisite to victory" had not been accorded its proper
place.7 The Operations Division, in briefing the Army member, cautioned
against pouring large amounts of men and materiel into China, since it
would be out of phase with the twelve-month concept. Though it was
important to maintain China in the war, forward air bases constructed for
the B-29's in China could not be defended against Japanese attack, nor
could Chinese troops be
readied for offensive warfare before 1947. It would therefore not be
reasonable to waste time and energy on such long-term projects.
Furthermore, the Operations Division believed that as a result of steadily
increasing attrition of Japanese air and naval power, the bombing of
Japan would become less and less necessary.8 The Army planners, in
preparing for the SEXTANT Conference in early November, further
commented:
Despite the agreement that the United Nations should direct their
principal offensive efforts against Germany and contain the Japanese by a
series of relatively minor thrusts, it is becoming increasingly apparent
that operations against Japan are approaching major proportions. Plans for
the defeat of Japan are not yet firm. However, the degree of success
enjoyed thus far is indicative of the need of a short term plan for
operations against Japan (upon Germany's defeat) with primary emphasis on
an approach from the Pacific rather than from the Asiatic mainland.
They concluded: U.S. Pacific planning undoubtedly will continue to
follow the three avenues of approach to Japan [SWPA, Central Pacific, and
North Pacific] with decision at a later date as to the area where the
major effort will be undertaken.9
The joint planners felt that too much weight had been placed upon the
value of help from the British Fleet and counseled the JCS to make the
ultimate objective of the 1945 Hokkaido attack the invasion of Honshu not
later than the spring of 1946. In the meantime,
[311]
they advocated an advance along the New Guinea-Netherlands East Indies-Philippines axis, to proceed concurrently with the Central Pacific
offensive. If any conflict in timing should occur, they stated, "due
weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central
Pacific promise a more rapid advance toward Japan, our ultimate objective;
the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the Japanese
homeland; and of greatest importance, are more likely to precipitate a
decisive engagement with the Japanese fleet."10 They believed it would be
better to reassess strategy after the completion of the Gilberts-Marshalls
campaign.11
The Combined and joint planners' ideas on the Japanese war were given a
distinctly cool reception when they reached the top strategic counselors
of the JCS in early November. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee found
that planning of the war against Japan continued to be imbued with
"conservatism" because of the tendency to overestimate Japan and to
underestimate British-American capabilities. The JSSC did not accept
Hokkaido as the primary target for 1945 and maintained that the key to
Japanese defeat lay in "all-out operations through the Central Pacific
with supporting operations on the northern and southern flanks."12 By
mid-November American. planners were still unable to resolve their
disagreement over the future, long-term pattern of operations against Japan and could not
present the JCS, preparing to depart for the next conference, with an
acceptable solution.
The Progress of Pacific
Operations
Failure in the months following QUADRANT to define long-term policies and
strategy for the Pacific war meant that in the meantime pressures already
developed against the Japanese perimeter would continue to be applied and
that new pressures would be evolved in the usual opportunistic manner.
With the Allies pushing forward in New Guinea toward the Huon Peninsula
area and advancing in the central Solomons to the islands of New Georgia
and Vella Lavella, the course for the immediate future in the South and
Southwest Pacific through New Guinea and toward the Bismarck Archipelago
was not difficult to fathom. With the initiation of the Central Pacific
campaign against the Gilbert Islands and the launching of Burma operations
during the latter part of the year, two additional points of pressure
would be applied against the Japanese.
The important task for the Army planners would be to sustain and
foster the old drives while making provision for growth and expansion of
new lines of offense. Balancing demands against resources, hitherto
decided mainly upon a Europe versus Pacific basis, now was to be further
complicated by the need for intra-Pacific allocations and priorities
between the South-Southwest and the Central Pacific.
Indications of this competition for
[312]
available resources were made clear when Nimitz requested on 20 August
that a firm date be set for launching operations in the Marshalls. With
the drive on the Gilberts scheduled for 20 November, Nimitz felt that 1
January 1944 would be a reasonable target date for the Kwajalein, Maloelap,
and Wotje Atolls in the Marshalls. Capture of the Marshalls would prepare
the way for the next step, control of the Carolines, and would support
SWPA and Indian Ocean operations. To carry out his plan, Nimitz visualized
use of one Army division and two and a half AAF bomber groups. The attacks
would be mounted from Oahu and the South Pacific and would use staging
points in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands.13
The Army planners were concerned over possible shipping complications for
the Bismarck campaign that might result from setting an early January date
for the Marshalls. Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff supported the Navy
contention that Nimitz should have a firm date on which he could count.
The Army-Navy understanding was that Nimitz should take into consideration
the continuance of the CARTWHEEL thrusts against New Ireland, the
Admiralties, and New Guinea in February 1944. In early September the 7th
Division, which had been used in the recently completed Aleutians
campaign, was designated as the Army division for the Marshalls operation.
Later developments forced Nimitz to recommend postponement of the
Marshalls target date to 31 January. In accepting his advice, the JCS on 2
November stipulated that the operations should begin not later than 31 January. General Marshall took
this occasion to point out the desirability of the high command in
Washington using the Foch system of pressing all subordinate commanders
constantly in order to keep the enemy continually in retreat and to
forestall delays or lags in operations.14 The unwillingness of Marshall to
accept postponements and his eagerness to advance target dates were
typical of this period of search for short cuts and faster results.
Readjustments, however, were constantly being made by the Army and Navy as
preparations for the Gilberts and Nauru neared completion. In September
the Navy discovered that a shortage of attack transports and cargo ships
might make the seizure of Nauru both difficult and costly since heavy
losses had been anticipated and logistical hazards would be quite severe
because of the atoll's isolated position. The Army accepted the
substitution of Makin Atoll for Nauru as an objective, but warned that the
U.S. Fleet might sustain more damage from Japanese land-based air in
trying to assault Makin.15
Aware, too, of the increased stature of the Pacific Ocean Areas in the
over-all planning picture, the Army during the summer of 1943 attempted to
bring about readjustments in the organization
[313]
and command of the region. It sought to establish POA as a theater of
operations with Nimitz as theater commander. The Navy would not accept the
suggestion as it was reluctant to place Nimitz snore directly under the
JCS.16 It was especially unwilling to divorce him from direct command of
the Pacific Fleet, for which he was then responsible to the Navy. The Navy
was far more amenable to a concurrent and closely related Army suggestion
to form a joint planning staff under Nimitz. This proposal would give the
Army increased representation at POA headquarters and, in the Army view,
would insure the more economical and efficient use of Army forces assigned
to Nimitz. When, on 6 September, the Navy agreed to a joint planning staff
in POA, the Army regarded the concession as an opening wedge in the Army's
campaign to make Nimitz theater commander of POA.17
Meanwhile, in SWPA the growing importance of the Central Pacific: was
making MacArthur uneasy. Believing firmly in the New Guinea approach to
the Philippines and convinced of the need to recapture the Philippines
before any final assault upon Japan, MacArthur teas alarmed at the
increasing attention given the mandated islands route. His concern lest
SWPA operations be shunted aside or halted with the completion of
CARTWHEEL, was reported to the War Department both by Somervell of ASF and
by Col. William L. Ritchie of OPD during their visits in the theater in
September and October. MacArthur feared that the failure at QUADRANT to
spell out any SWPA advance beyond New Guinea might cause the Australians
to slow down, since they would assume that future operations would be
basically naval. Acting upon Ritchie's recommendation that the SWPA
commander be reassured, the JCS informed MacArthur in early October that
unremitting pressure must be applied against Japan from every side and
that lie should perfect his plans for the seizure of Mindanao. They urged
him to try to bolster the Australian war effort and to prepare for the
Philippines operations, working on the assumptions that the main effort
would be made from SWPA and that a gradual build-up would take place in
SWPA generally at the present rate. Final decision would rest upon
developments, but the JCS warned him that rapid expansion of naval surface
forces might make the Central Pacific the logical route to utilize.18
MacArthur's quick response to tile JCS instruction was to submit RENO
III,
a revised, five-part outline plan for SWPA operations. According to RENO
III, Rabaul would initially be bypassed
[314]
but later seized and used as a base. Timing for the successive steps
leading to the attack on Mindanao had been accelerated to permit a
February 1945 target date. The desirability of operations against the
Carolines was recognized. Phase I, the neutralization of Rabaul, would
start about 1 February 1944 and would involve the capture of Hansa Bay in
New Guinea, Kavieng on New Ireland, and the Admiralties. This phase would
employ the services of seven infantry divisions and two parachute
regiments in the assault, along with fifty-nine air groups. Ten divisions
would be required for garrison duty. Phases II and III would complete
major operations in the New Guinea area. The Humboldt Bay-Arafura Sea
sector would be taken in June and the Vogelkop would come under attack in
August, to be followed by Geelvink Bay operations in October. Requirements
by October would be six divisions and one parachute regiment for assault,
thirteen divisions for garrison duty, and over seventy-seven groups for air
operations. Phases IV and V, operations against Halmahera Island and
Manado on northeastern Celebes and, finally, against Mindanao itself in
December 1944 and February 1945 respectively, were not covered by any
current directive so resources were not estimated.19
To present his ideas on the strategic situation to the JCS before the
approaching SEXTANT Conference, MacArthur sent his chief of staff, General
Sutherland, to Washington in early November. The earnest behests of
Sutherland in support of the New Guinea-Philippines approach accentuated
the MacArthur thesis that only in SWPA could ground, sea, and air forces
be employed as a team and large strategic bombardment forces be utilized.
The already existing air facilities on Mindanao and the opportunity to cut
off Japanese resources in the Netherlands East Indies and open up a port
on the China coast were also cited as advantages of the Philippines
advance. After considering RENO III and listening to Sutherland, the joint
planners came to the conclusion in November that regardless of the merits
of the plan, it called for more resources than would be available.20
The same consideration-the need to limit resources in Pacific operations
until after the defeat of Germany-also influenced the AAF. It was
reflected in the AAF's refusal of the many requests of Harmon and Kenney
for additional long-range fighter planes during the fall of 1943. While
fully aware of the good use to which any increases would be put, Arnold
queried Handy in mid-October on a Harmon plea for more P38's and P-51's for
the South Pacific Area-"More important there than to protect H.B. [heavy
bombers] going into Germany or protection of Eisenhower's army?" Handy's
reply was emphatic: "My answer is-NO!''
21
[315]
Despite the War Department's unwillingness to supply either SWPA or SOPAC
forces with more resources, which necessarily would have had to be
diverted from Europe, progress of operations in those theaters was
definitely encouraging. In the Southwest Pacific an amphibious landing in
the Huon Gulf area of New Guinea, combined with an airdrop by U.S. troops
in the Markham Valley and a converging land advance by the Australians,
cut off a large force of Japanese in the Huon Gulf area in early
September. This was followed by the fall of Lae and Salamaua by 16
September and the capture of Finschhafen on 2 October. Twenty-five days
later South Pacific forces debarked on the Treasury Islands in the
Solomons group, and on 2 November invaded Bougainville at Empress Augusta
Bay. The, attack on western New Britain, scheduled for 20 November, would
be supplemented by an airborne operation against Cape Gloucester and would
come at the same time as the launching of the Gilberts assault.22 In the
meantime, Halsey and MacArthur had conferred and decided that South
Pacific forces would carry out an attack against Kavieng, using the 3d
Marine Division and the 40th and Americal Army Divisions, while SWPA would
conduct operations against Manus Island in the Admiralties. Rabaul would
initially be bypassed and fleet protection was assured MacArthur for his
advance along the New Guinea coast .23
The Washington planners, also active during the summer of 1943, had drawn
up outline plans for the seizure of the Marianas and Formosa for future
use and had also studied the role the North Pacific might play in the
over-all plan to defeat Japan.24 Ejection of the Japanese from the
Aleutians had posed the problem of the use of Alaska as a future base of
operations, and in August General DeWitt of the Western Defense Command
had proposed mounting an attack from the Aleutians against Paramushiro
Island in the Kurils. The Army and Navy offered little objection to this
plan on tactical grounds. The prime obstacle seemed to them to be the
familiar encumbrance of the Pacific-the lack of sufficient resources to
stage the offensive in 1944. The Pacific Fleet, as Admiral Nimitz pointed
out, would be fully occupied with operations in the Central and South
Pacific. Nevertheless, JCS decided in September that planning for a
possible operation in 1945 should be carried on and that a base should be
constructed on Adak. In the meantime, Marshall wanted to reduce the Alaska
garrison to a maximum of 100,000, and possibly eventually to 80,000, as
rapidly as shipping would allow. The Air Forces, on the other hand, went
ahead with their plan to build three B-29 bases in the Aleutians by the
spring of 1944- Since geographically, strategically, and logistically
Alaska was almost a
[316]
separate entity and not a true part of the Western Defense Command,
the War Department decided in October to establish the Alaskan Department
as a separate theater of operations under Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr.,
as of 1 November.25
By the end of 1943 it appeared that Alaska would assume a passive role
insofar as a ground action was concerned and become primarily an air and
naval theater. Whether or not eventual operations, other than air, against
the Kurils would be staged from the Aleutians would depend upon whether
the USSR entered the war against Japan, upon the status and progress of
other Pacific operations, and upon the availability of shipping.
Shipping, Deployment, and
Rotation
In an essentially water-bound theater such as the Pacific, the main
controlling factor in planning fox operations was availability of shipping
to move and supply the offensive forces. Limitations imposed upon the
Washington staff by
the priority given the European war had often necessitated refusals of
Pacific theater requests for additional shipping and had helped restrict
aggressive efforts in the Pacific simply to retaining the strategic
initiative. With the rapid expansion of the Pacific Fleet, the scale and
tempo of operations would increase. This augmentation implied greater
demands for troop and cargo shipping, still in a state of imbalance, with
troop shipping in shorter supply during late 1943.
MacArthur alone wanted to move 150,000 men and their equipment within his
own area during the latter part of 1943 in order to put them in position
for current and future operations. He requested in August that a total of
seventy-one Liberty ships and ten other freighters be provided to ensure
him the necessary mobility to take advantage of enemy weaknesses.26
His insistence that failure to meet his requirements might result in
operational setbacks led the War Department to consider several
alternatives. Since the withdrawal of shipping from the United Kingdom or
North Africa runs to meet his needs would have meant a monthly loss of
15,000 spaces in those areas, the War Shipping Administration was
prevailed upon by the War Department to assemble ships from other sources.
A number of Liberty ships were loaned for sixty days and a group of small
cargo ships was scraped together to take care of the remainder of
MacArthur's needs.27
[317]
The tight shipping situation in the Southwest Pacific led Marshall in
early September to request the joint planners to make a survey of the
effects of Central Pacific requirements upon other Pacific operations. He
was apprehensive about the demands of the Gilberts and Marshalls campaign
and pointed out that in no case was it ever possible to give a commander
all that he wanted. Admiral Cooke informed him that there would be plenty
of cargo shipping available but personnel carriers would not be abundant.
It was Marshall's opinion, however, that Central Pacific requirements had
not been studied closely enough and King agreed, noting that very often
assault shipping was requested unnecessarily.28g
By the time the JPS made their report in late September, troop-lift
prospects had improved. A troop conversion program that permitted
alteration of cargo vessels then under construction to personnel carriers
had been approved by the JCS on to September, and there would be a surplus
lift to the Pacific of 86,000 places by June 1944. However, as King had
warned the JCS, combat loaders and landing craft would continue to be the
bottleneck in all theaters.29 To provide the LST's and other landing craft
necessary to carry out the CARTWHEEL operations, the Army and Navy agreed
in October to permit interchange of these craft between SWPA and SOPAC.
The shortage in personnel
shipping had its effects upon SWPA operations. According to Ritchie, the
attack against western New Guinea and New Britain following the successful
seizure of Kaiapit and Finschhafen in eastern New Guinea could have been
launched earlier had troop shipping been available.30
The influence of shipping upon deployment in the Pacific presented a very
real problem to the Army planners. They visualized a force of 2,200,000
men, including 35 divisions and 120 air groups, located throughout the
area after the defeat of Germany.31 By the end of September 1943, thirteen
divisions and thirty-four air groups had been deployed to maintain the
strategic initiative. In the Central Pacific the 6th, 27th, 33d, and 40th
Infantry Divisions were assigned under Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.'s, Central Pacific command, with the 7th Division en route from the
Aleutians in the shipping that had been amassed for the Kiska operation.
The 25th, 37th, 43d and Americal Divisions were under the command of
Harmon in SOPAC, and in SWPA MacArthur had the 1st Cavalry and the 24th,
32d, and 41st Infantry Divisions.
Plans to move additional units into the Pacific were entirely dependent
upon the availability of shipping, and the demands of each theater
throughout the world had to be carefully weighed against all the others.
That the allocation of shipping was a difficult and thankless task is
indicated by the rejoin-
[318]
der made by Handy in late October to a complaint from Richardson:
The War Department is fully cognizant of the extremely critical
shipping situation, which is not confined to the Pacific. Based upon the
number of available bottoms and thorough consideration of operational
requirements, including an appreciation of forces now available in the
several Pacific areas, an allocation of shipping is made monthly to each
the Central, South and Southwest Pacific. This allocation is concurred in
by the Navy Department here and is in no sense a hit-and-miss guess which
fails to consider the needs of each area.32
In the following week, Handy was forced to turn down Harmon's bid for
another Army division for post-CARTWHEEL Operations. Handy informed Harmon
that he would have to manage with the divisions already in the theater.33
Nevertheless, even while a severe shortage of shipping existed, plans
were being laid in Washington to ready additional units for shipment and
training as soon as conditions eased. To receive divisions fresh from the
United States and provide them with amphibious and jungle training, the
Army in August had named Richardson Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces
in Central Pacific Area-in addition to his current assignment as commander
of the Hawaiian Department-and made him responsible for training new units
bound for all Pacific theaters. Designation of the Hawaiian Islands as a
training ground would serve the dual purpose of permitting green troops to
become experienced and acclimated while furnishing the islands with
defensive ground troops during the training period.34
As Marshall informed MacArthur early in November, the restrictions on
shipping, added to the critical manpower shortage in the United States,
made acute the need for strictest surveillance and restudy of requirements
with a view to converting units already in the Pacific to fill Pacific
requirements.35
The actual increase in the forces deployed against Japan might seem
somewhat surprising unless it is kept in mind that many of the 1943
requests for men and planes that the War Department refused to grant were
over and above approved allocations. By the end of September the Army had
58,278 men located in the Pacific (Central, South, and Southwest), 131,670
in Alaska, and 61,198 in the CBI, making a grand total of 771,146 troops
taking part in the war against Japan. The Army forces deployed against
Germany had considerably outstripped those against Japan by this time and
amounted to 1,032,296 (Mediterranean, European, and Middle East areas).
Thus the ratio between the primary and secondary wars was approximately 4
to 3.36
Despite the numerical Army superiority there were thirteen U.S. Army
divisions arrayed against Japan and thirteen against Germany. While the
number of air groups (seventy-five) in position for
[319]
European operations at the close of September was more than double
the number of groups (thirty-five) pitted against the Japanese, it should
be remembered that the bulk of the U.S. Fleet, Navy, and Marine air
forces, and Marine ground forces was stationed in the Pacific and thus
served to balance the Army preponderance in the European war.37
The steady increase in personnel scattered throughout the Pacific and CBI
brought the vexing problem of rotation to the fore. During the initial
stages of the war, the great majority of troops had been sent out fresh
from the United States and the numbers of combat-weary and sick troops
that had to be returned home had been small and of minor importance. As
the second year of the conflict drew to its close, more and more men began
to show the debilitating effects of malaria, filariasis, and the climate.
The enervating consequences of jungle warfare, coupled with the limited
recreational and rehabilitation facilities, resulted in a lowering of
morale. In the Pacific, disease and climate disabled far more men than did
battle casualties. To further complicate this rather dismal picture, the
lack of shipping to put any adequate rotation system into effect made the
problem even more severe.38
The War Department recognized that the question of rotation must be
faced before adverse public opinion and lowered troop morale forced a
decision, but the only solution seemed to lie in the
provision of additional troop lift for fresh replacements. The
availability of adequate shipping for rotation of troops stationed in
South America, Central Africa, the Middle East, and the ETO presented no
particular difficulty. In the CBI, the Pacific, Alaska, and North Africa
the prospects of alleviating the problem seemed poor in view of the lack
of transport, the large requirements for fillers that would result, and
the understandable disinclination of theater commanders to sacrifice any
portion of their troop build-up for rotation replacements. The need for
remedial action to set a rotation plan in motion, however, led Marshall in
November to accept a suggestion of the Operations Division that a
1-percent-per-month figure be adopted for the hardship areas, starting in
March 1944. Selection of individuals to be sent home was to be left to the
discretion of the theater commanders, but Marshall proposed that longevity
of service and severity of sickness be prime considerations and, since the
numbers that could be rotated were going to be small, that a lottery
system might be used to determine the fortunate men. He warned, however,
that no additional shipping could be made available.39
The sharp protest that this last statement drew from MacArthur was
premised on his belief that rotation would not be carried out unless the
troop build-up could continue. MacArthur's protest spurred the Washington
staff to explore the shipping situation more closely. If four or five
Liberty ships a
[320]
month could be converted into troop carriers, the Army staff believed that
a fleet of twenty-four could handle the rotation program. In December
Marshall was to secure JCS approval for conversion and was able to notify
the theater commanders that the 1-percent policy would go into effect on 1
March 1944.40 Despite the small beginnings, the War Department hoped that
as more shipping became available, a larger percentage of personnel could
be rotated. In the meantime at least a start would have been made to allay
public opinion and help military morale.
Build-up in Burma
The priority that QUADRANT gave to land operations in Burma, coupled
with the appointments of Mountbatten and Wingate to SEAC, provided a new
impetus to CBI affairs during the fall of 1943 Mountbatten, described by
Marshall as "a breath of fresh air," made a favorable impression on the
Generalissimo and Stilwell, and preparations were carried on apace to get
the offensive forces and supplies ready for the dry season attack. The
U.S. Chiefs of Staff for their part sought to provide Mountbatten with
capable assistants. Besides Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Commander, Maj.
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had been chief Army planner from June 1942
to early September 1943, was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff and General Wheeler, former Services of
Supply commander in the CBI, was made Principal Administrative Officer
(G-4). In addition, a U.S. long-range penetration group was to be
organized and sent out to India to take part in the 1944 campaign.41 If
new blood and new direction could overcome the old lethargy and
procrastination, a true offensive might be launched in Burma during the
coming winter.
Meanwhile, with top priority assigned to land operations, a series of
plans was being prepared in India and London for possible alternatives.
British interest seemed to lie mainly in whether the objective of their 4
Corps advance from India would be Yeu or Indaw-Katha in north central
Burma and where and when amphibious operations would be carried out.
Reports from the theater received in Washington during September indicated
that the British placed little trust in the Chinese war effort and
discounted any effective aid from the Yunnan Chinese forces. The Ledo
Chinese, in whom the British evidently had more faith, were assigned the
task of reaching and taking Myitkyina by spring. The reports also
maintained that the British in India lacked confidence in the value of
their Indian troops and were concerned over the ability of the Assam line
of communications to sustain any prolonged thrust. British uneasiness led
Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Ferris, who commanded Stilwell's rear echelon at
[321]
New Delhi, to comment that the British had a "quartermaster" approach to
operations, but the lack of enthusiasm may also be attributed in part to a
growing belief held in India that Burma should be bypassed. Reports from
London indicated that the outlook for other than limited operations
against Burma was poor and that amphibious landings, if conducted at all,
would be against the Andaman Islands since the British had apparently
written off the Akyab-Ramree assault.42 Clearly, to counteract this
pessimism, Mountbatten and his new aides had their work cut out for them.
Possible adverse effects of the emphasis on ground Operations upon the
airlift to China had been anticipated at QUADRANT, but evidently had not
been considered seriously by the U.S. staff. When Auchinleck, who was in
command until the arrival of Mountbatten, warned the Americans in
September that he was going to use the British engineer units then working
on the Assam airfields to improve the road network leading from Imphal,
consternation arose among the U.S. theater staff and in Washington. Their
concern was increased by a report that Auchinleck had expressed himself
willing to curtail or even completely cut off all tonnage to China if the
need should present itself. When Ferris advised Marshall that unless the
Assam line of communications could be developed to support both land and air operations, he would soon reach the end
of his reserve stocks in Assam and be unable to supply China, the JCS took
quick action. Pleading the 10,000-ton-a-month figure over the Hump as a
Presidential commitment, they informed their British colleagues on 24
September that they felt that withdrawal of the British engineers from the
airfields should be timed so that U.S. units could replace them.
Furthermore, they argued, all decisions affecting the tonnage allocations
for the airlift should be made by the CCS until SEAC was organized. The
JCS derived little comfort from the British Chiefs of Staff, who supported
Auchinleck's position completely. The British Chiefs pointed out that the
possible disadvantage to the Hump traffic had been accepted at QUADRANT
and that current decisions in the theater must be made by the commander on
the spot, though the decisions would always be reported to the CCS.43
In the midst of these exchanges, Arnold advised the President that either
commitments to China would have to be modified if curtailments upon
tonnage were to be imposed on the airlift or QUADRANT decisions would have
to be altered. However, on 10 October, the British Chiefs finally agreed
to Marshall's request that Stilwell and Auchinleck should be instructed to
confer and establish the minimum airlift tonnage figure to be
maintained.44 It followed
[322]
that it would be the responsibility of the United States to deliver this
total or risk the avalanche of protests certain to follow from the
Generalissimo and his adherents.
The War Department had only recently been subjected to intensified
pressure from the Chennault supporters to bolster his airpower in China.
Not only had Chiang and Soong increased their persistent demands for the
fulfillment of the TRIDENT promise; even the British military attaché in
China had been induced to use British channels in a vain effort to arouse
Churchill's interest and support in the Chennault program.45
Although there was some justification for the complaints of Chennault and
his supporters about the failure of the Army to provide his forces with
the two fighter squadrons and the two medium bombardment squadrons
promised to him at TRIDENT but still operating with the Tenth Air Force in
India, the squadrons had been withheld for logistical reasons in order to
protect Chennault's supply line rather than for any intent to cripple his
offensive plan. The Army considered it pointless to expand U.S. and
Chinese air forces operating from China until the forces could be
maintained on a full operational basis. To pacify Chinese dissatisfaction
with the status quo, Marshall prepared a Presidential response to
the Chinese complaints, which was sent to Mme. Chiang on 15 September. The
message explained that Chennault's missing fighters would be sent to China
as soon as additional protection for the Assam airfields arrived and that
the bombers would be transferred as rapidly as airlift tonnage could
support their operations. The slow development of the Hump airlift was
attributed to mechanical defects in the C-46's, floods, and weather rather
than to any human deficiencies.46
This explanation helped to win a month's respite from Chinese
importunities, but then Soong again approached the President, who by this
time was rather disgusted with the repeated record of failure in China. In
passing on the Chinese complaints to Marshall, Roosevelt commented, ". . .
the worst thing is that we are falling down on our promises every single
time. We have not fulfilled one of them yet."47 In an effort to retrieve a
dismal situation, Roosevelt on 15 October instructed Marshall to have
Somervell, then en route to the CBI, look into the whole business of the
airlift and "put a real punch behind it." The president's disappointment
also led him to urge Churchill to take a personal interest in the build-up
of facilities in Assam.48
[323]
Prospects of a brighter future for the airlift showed clearly through
Somervell's report several days later. Recognizing the past problems of
new planes, untried and inexperienced personnel, poor facilities, and
difficult flying conditions, he felt that the Army Transport Command in
the CBI was past the critical stage and that improvement would soon be
evident. As if to prove Somervell a shrewd prophet, Hump tonnage reached
8,632 tons in October and gave evidence of attaining a greater total in
November. This allowed Chennault's air forces to operate more frequently
and permitted the long-delayed reinforcements to be flown to China to join
the air offensive.49
Somervell also closely examined the line of communications in Assam
and made command and administrative changes in the Services of Supply
organization to bolster the capacity of the vital supply route. To aid the
Americans in increasing the load-carrying potential of the Bengal-Assam
Railroad-long regarded the worst transportation bottleneck in the
theater-the British co-operated in securing permission for U.S. railroad
troops to take over and operate the line. The outlook for improvement in
tonnage movements in Assam and over the Hump seemed thus more optimistic
for the critical period that lay ahead.50
Somervell's visit to the CBI in October coincided with the arrival of Mountbatten to set up his headquarters
for SEAL and a concerted effort to get rid of Stilwell. Mountbatten had
arranged for an immediate conference with Chiang and Stilwell at Chungking
and was disconcerted to discover at the outset that the Generalissimo had
apparently made up his mind to request Stilwell's recall. Somervell
attempted to heal the breach, receiving powerful support from Mme. Chiang
and her sister, Mme. Kung. In the course of the negotiations, Stilwell not
only was forgiven but emerged temporarily, at least, more firmly
entrenched in Chiang's favor than ever before and enjoying the puissant
aid of the Soong sisters. Ironically enough, as Stilwell has recorded, the
apparent instigator of the October removal proceedings, Dr. Soong, was
himself told by the Generalissimo to get sick and stay away from the
political scene.51
Once Stilwell's status had been settled, the Chungking conference went on
more smoothly. When Somervell assured the Generalissimo that land
operations in Burma would not interfere with Hump tonnage, Chiang
consented to Chinese participation, provided Stilwell commanded all
Chinese troops, the British had available a powerful fleet in the Bay of
Bengal, and an amphibious operation was conducted in that area. The
arrangements for boundaries between the
[324]
China theater and SEAC presented a somewhat delicate matter,
especially those in Thailand and Indochina, but a gentleman's agreement
was effected between Mountbatten and Chiang allowing for control of
conquered areas in those countries to remain temporarily with the
conqueror and for later delineation of boundaries when China's forces drew
near to SEAC. A Chinese suggestion that a Chinese-British-American
committee be established at Chungking to handle all political matters that
arose during the coming operations won American approval but had to be
passed on to the British Chiefs of Staff for consideration.52
The Chungking conference, for all its surface agreement on Burma
operations, did not produce a firm commitment from the Chinese to carry
out their role. The conditional concurrence given by Chiang still hinged
upon the fulfillment of the amphibious and naval parts of the plan. If the
British failed to make good their assurances, Chinese support might be
withdrawn.
Immediately after the conference, on
21 October, Mountbatten received his directive from the Prime Minister. As
its prime responsibilities, SEAC was to engage the enemy as closely and
continuously as possible, relieve pressure on the Pacific, and inflict
attrition upon the Japanese. SEAC's secondary mission, significantly
enough, would be to maintain and broaden contacts with China by ground and
air. The specific objective for amphibious operations for 1944 was left
undefined, but preparations were to be begun and British Fleet support was
assured.53
To the U.S. planners the chief fault of this directive was the implication
that the British Chiefs, rather than the CCS, would decide matters of
strategy. Since the JCS had indicated that operations in SEAC should be
more closely co-ordinated with those in the Pacific as the tempo of the
struggle increased, the planners considered that the direction of the war
against Japan, including decisions on SEAC strategy, should be centered in
Washington. As Handy pointed out to Marshall, the amphibious operations in
SEAL for 1944, that Churchill wanted, would not necessarily support the
north Burma drive and would relegate the land offensive desired by the
Americans to a subordinate position. The JCS therefore informed the
British that they did not accept the British contention that only matters
of ground strategy pertaining to SEAC should be considered by the CCS. The
JCS believed that the CCS should exercise a general jurisdictional control
over
[325]
strategy in SEAC, which would include timing and sequence of
operations .54
The poor showing of the Hump expansion project during the summer and the
indication that the British still did not consider the opening of a land
route to China of vital importance were offset somewhat by the determined
effort of the President to secure international recognition for China as a
major power. Through the efforts of Secretary Hull, Roosevelt in October
had induced the Russians and British to allow China to become a signatory
to the Four-Power Declaration of Moscow.55 The President also invited
Chiang to confer with him at the forthcoming conference in Cairo in late
November. But while the President was endeavoring in the fall of 1943 to
bolster Chinese morale and importance, Washington military planners were
cautiously re-examining the place of China in over-all planning for the
defeat of Japan. The Army staff had already decided in September that
equipping a second group of thirty Chinese divisions would be
impracticable in the near future since it would impose an additional and
perhaps unnecessary strain upon the American economy. If the war in Europe
should end soon, the required equipment could be made available from
surplus American stocks in that area. In October the planners concluded
that no guarantee could be given that even the first group could be
supplied before 1945. Investigating the need for Chinese combat divisions
in an
over-all plan against Japan, the Operations Division's Strategy Section
concluded that a revision of the U.S. military policy toward China was in
order. Comparing Pacific prospects with expected accomplishments in China,
the Strategy Section felt that any effort from China would come too late
to be of assistance. In line with this premise, it recommended that little
more be expended on China than was necessary to keep her in the war, that
the bomber offensive based in China be limited, that only thirty Chinese
divisions be trained, that Burma be bypassed, and that excess service
troops be withdrawn from the CBI and used in other theaters.56
This shift in evaluation brought the Army planners, on the eve of SEXTANT,
closer to the British point of view and reflected a trend toward a
transfer of emphasis from China to the swifter route via the Pacific to
Japan. The recognition of the difficulties of employing China as a base or
as a source of manpower foreshadowed the revision of U.S. policy that the
showdown at SEXTANT would produce.
New Techniques and Weapons in the
War Against Japan
GALAHAD
The search for a short-term, over-all plan and the effort to speed
specific op-
[326]
erations against Japan were two manifestations of the U.S. staff's desire
in the fall of 1943 to get on with the war. Both pointed up a third and
related interest -the increasing attention paid to the potentialities of
new techniques and weapons of warfare whose full significance for
hastening the end of the Japanese conflict was only beginning to be
realized but whose cumulative effect promised in time to alter the whole
strategic picture.
One likely possibility was suggested by General Wingate's earlier
experiment in jungle warfare with the long-range penetration group.
Despite the indeterminate character of Burma plans and the discouraging
patterns of indecisiveness and delay previously exhibited in the CBI,
General Marshall had agreed at QUADRANT to provide three units modeled
after the Wingate columns for the February operations in Burma. The Chief
of Staff had long been interested in the possibilities of well-trained,
mobile troops operating behind the enemy's lines in conjunction with the
main Allied advance. Since he was strongly in favor of limited U.S.
participation in the coming operations and possibly hoping to supply some
offensive punch to the attack, Marshall moved swiftly in early September
to assemble the 3,000 odd volunteers required for the new force. In view
of the need for thoroughly trained and rugged troops for the grueling
assignment, he asked MacArthur to provide 300 and Harmon to contribute 700
battle-tested volunteers to form the nucleus of the group. The remaining
2,000 men would be drawn from the Caribbean Defense Command and from the
continental United States. Allied plans envisaged one column of 1,000
troops operating in advance of each of the three prongs of the north Burma
offensive. News of the prospective dispatch of the long-range penetration
unit drew an enthusiastic comment from Stilwell-"Can we use them. And how!
"57
MacArthur experienced some difficulties in attaining his quota; Harmon, in
spite of the greater demand made upon him, assembled his share without too
much trouble. With the Chief of Staff actively sponsoring the project,
1,000 men were moved from the Caribbean to the United States by air in
three days and, by his direct intervention, the liner Lurline was
obtained from the Navy to transport all the volunteers to the CBI.58
To supply the long-range columns during the course of actual operations in
the field, Marshall and Arnold in September devised a special air task
force, popularly called the Air Commando Force, composed of transport,
glider, observation, liaison, and fighter aircraft -a self-sufficient,
multipurpose unit. The land force, known by the code name GALAHAD and
later to win fame as Merrill's Marauders, was set up to perform one
mission of three months' duration and then was to be taken out of the
lines for rest and hospitalization. Marshall vested over-all command in
Stilwell, but told Stilwell that, if Wingate were placed in charge of all
long-range groups, the
[327]
U.S. columns should be operated under Wingate. Although Marshall
shared some of Stilwell's misgivings over British command of American
combat forces in the CBI, he warned Stilwell that in that case, "We must
all eat some crow if we are to fight the same war together. The impact on
the Jap is the pay-off."59
The personal touch of the Chief of Staff in assembling the long-range
group was an unusual occurrence and indicated the deep interest he felt in
the project. The eventual fine showing of the GALAHAD troops must have
brought Marshall a sense of gratification and satisfaction.
TWILIGHT and MATTERHORN
Of quite a different character was the Air Forces' potential contribution
to the Pacific war via the B-29. While the GALAHAD force was a tactical
unit to be used in support of local land offensives, the B-29 was a
long-range strategic weapon that could penetrate the very heart of the
enemy's war machine. Although Marshall did not take the same personal
interest in the development of the B-29 that he did in the long-range
penetration group, he well understood the efficacy and importance of
long-range bombing and had relatively early become a staunch supporter of
the value of the Combined Bomber Offensive. It
is interesting to note that whereas he favored the use of long-range
bombing in Europe as a prelude to the eventual cross-Channel attack, and
had earlier resorted to the air argument in order to keep alive the idea
of the ground offensive, in the Pacific he employed the same argument in
reverse-that the land operations to open the road to China would provide
air bases whence Japan could be attacked.
Originally the B-29 had been intended for the air offensive in Europe,
but delays in production had postponed the date of quantity delivery to
the point where it would have become available too late to play a major
role in that theater. Besides, the effectiveness and range of the B-17 and
B-24 were deemed sufficient to complete the task of destruction in Europe.
The Air Forces, therefore, during the summer of 1943 had turned its
attention to the formation of a plan to use the B-29 against Japan and had
finished the plan in time to present it to the CCS at QUADRANT.60
The AAF plan visualized a force of between ten and twenty groups of B-29's
based in central China, possibly around Changsha. With their 1,500-mile
radius of action, the B-29's could carry out sustained bombing operations
against the Japanese industrial zone. To support the B-29 bases in China,
at first
2,000, and later 4,000, converted B-24
[328]
type aircraft would be based in India to serve as transports.
Calcutta would be used as the port of entry for supplying the project. The
AAF pointed out the need for adequate protection of the B-29 bases in
China once the operations got under way. Japanese reaction to this threat
against their homeland would in all probability be violent, but the AAF
assumed that Chinese ground forces and U.S. airpower could successfully
defend the B-29 bases. The objective of the AAF plan was to reduce the
Japanese war effort to impotency, neutralize the Japanese Air Force, and
reduce the Japanese Navy and merchant shipping to a degree that would
permit Allied occupation of Japan. The AAF estimated that if twenty-eight
groups of B-29's (784 planes) were available to carry out five missions a
month, they could, operating at 50-percent operational strength, do the
job in six months. Since such large numbers of B-29's would not be
available for some time, the AAF estimated that, if operations were begun
in October 1944 and increased as more B-29's were produced, the
destruction of Japanese resources necessary to permit occupation would be
attained by 31 August 1945. This timing would be in consonance with the
objective of defeating Japan within twelve months of the defeat of
Germany.61
While the implications of this new strategic weapon were being studied by
the Combined planners during the week following QUADRANT, the Army queried
Stilwell on the feasibility of carrying out the AAF plan. If the plan were
accepted, he was informed, ten groups of B-29's would be based in China in
the Changsha area by October 1944 and this number would gradually be increased
to twenty groups by May 1945. Two thousand B-24's, converted into
transports, would originally be based around Calcutta; eventually the
strength would be doubled.62 Theater reaction in the CBI to the Air
Forces' plan indicated approval in principle but rejection in detail,
mainly on the ground that the limited capacity of the port of Calcutta
would not allow logistical support of the project within the time
allotted. Instead, in September Stilwell and Stratemeyer offered an
alternate plan called TWILIGHT, which envisaged basing the B-29's in the
Calcutta area and then shuttling them forward to the Kweilin sector in
south central China to offload some of their excess gasoline and to load
bombs for the air assault on Japan. In this maneuver not only would the
Super-fortresses be nearly self-sufficient but maintenance and security
measures could also be carried out much more easily at Calcutta. By April
1945 Stilwell and Stratemeyer hoped, ten groups of B-29's would be ready
to start operations.63 The 200-odd-mile shift of the forward base area
from Changsha southwest to Kweilin would, of course, decrease the number
of industrial targets that the B-29's could reach in Japan.
Since the original AAF plan had been adjudged too optimistic in its time
estimate from a logistical standpoint, TWILIGHT was approved by the
Combined planners as the most feasible means of
[329]
using the B-29 until the larger resources, freed by the defeat of Germany,
became available. The Air Forces accepted the TWILIGHT plan, but went on
to urge that bases be constructed in the Marianas and on Paramushiro when
those islands were captured.64
Further consideration by the Washington Army planners led them to advocate
the substitution of Cheng-to in west central China for the Kweilin area,
since the ground and air defenses required at Cheng-to would be far less
extensive and the airfields there could be readied in 1944 rather than
1945.65 Despite these advantages, Cheng-to was well over 400 miles farther
from the target area in Japan than the original base at Changsha selected
by the AAF. The operation of the B-29's via Cheng-to became known as the
MATTERHORN plan and visualized 150 planes based on Calcutta by March 1944,
with another 150 available by the following September. Nine airfields
would have to be built at Calcutta and five would have to be ready by
March 1944 at Cheng-tu, in addition to two fighter fields. The President
followed his approval of MATTERHORN On 10 November with personal requests
to Chiang and Churchill for assistance in meeting these airfield target
dates, and the Army acted quickly to send additional aviation engineer
battalions and truck companies to the CBI.66
Once British and Chinese support for MATTERHORN had been won, the main
problem for the United States would be to provide sufficient construction
units to take care of all the vital projects afoot in the CBI. The many
production delays that had hitherto bedeviled the B-29 program and caused
Presidential annoyance were turned over to the joint Aircraft Committee
for investigation. The committee was instructed by the JCS to look into
the effects of granting the Production of B-29's a priority above that of
other aircraft and to make every effort to increase production.67
The possibilities that the B-29 might shorten the war and serve to
give Chinese morale a much-needed boost seem to have been the main reasons
for selecting China as the trial area for proving the new bomber. Despite
the logistical complications involved, China did present the nearest base
from which to strike at the Japanese homeland in the fall of 1943 and the
President was anxious to pump new hope and determination into the flagging
Chinese effort.68
In anticipation of the value of a mass surprise attack upon Japan, Arnold
in
[330]
early November restrained Chennault's air forces from carrying out
sporadic nuisance raids upon the mainland. Meanwhile, joint and combined
studies were made of the possibility of using the Marianas to strengthen
the weight of the blow against Japan, and it was estimated that twelve
groups could be staged there by May 1945 if the islands were captured by
July 1944. Several groups could also be located in the Aleutians and be
ready for action by the spring of 1944. An AAF suggestion that the new
bomber might be used from SWPA drew an enthusiastic plea from Kenney to
permit him to send them against Japanese oil holdings in the Netherlands
Indies, but since the prime objective of the B-29 was to be the home
islands of Japan and the supply of planes was limited, no commitment was
made.69
Carriers and Submarines
Along with his interest in the long-range penetration group and the B-29,
Marshall showed a keen appreciation of the rising importance of another
weapon that promised to shorten the duration of the war-the fast aircraft
carrier.70 The growth of the carrier forces since 1942 had been
phenomenal. In November 1942, only two of the seven carriers that the
United States had upon entering the war were active, and one of these, the
Ranger, was in the Atlantic. A year later, Nimitz was able to send the
Saratoga and the Enterprise, four carriers of
the new 27,000-ton Essex class, five light carriers of the 11,000-ton
Independence class, and eight escort carriers against the Gilbert
Islands.71
Organized into mobile striking forces, the carriers could be used to
attack Japanese naval forces, conduct hit-and-run operations against enemy
fortresses, and provide close tactical air support for amphibious
landings. Thus, the floating airfields could carry out the process of
neutralizing enemy strongpoints by repeated air assaults or help capture
positions believed essential to the Allied advance. Neutralizing and
bypassing Japanese bastions promised to bring about a faster conclusion of
the war. Besides the B-29 and the aircraft carrier, notable progress was
also made in developing improved types of landing craft. Such improved
vessels as the LVT (A) (1), LVT (A) (2), and LCT (7), which eventually
became better known as the LSM, were soon to make their appearance in the
Pacific.72
The promise of these newer instruments of warfare sometimes tended to
obscure the yeoman service an older weapon-the submarine-was performing
against the Japanese. U.S. sub-
[331]
marines received little publicity, since the very nature of their work
demanded tight security measures if they were to stand a chance of
returning safely to their home bases. As the U.S. submarine fleet in the
Pacific increased, its impact upon Japanese naval and merchant shipping
mounted. Operating for the most part individually during the first half of
the war, U.S. submarines in the Pacific theater had sunk 17 naval vessels
and 142 merchant ships plus 4 probables, totaling 666,561 tons by the end
of 1942. The pace quickened during the first six months of 1943 when 9
naval vessels and 125 merchant ships were sent to the bottom-Japan lost
575,416 tons. During mid-1943, the U.S. undersea raiders operated in small
wolf packs as well as singly, and the addition of new and improved
submarines made the last half of the year a most fruitful period. From
July through December, 12 Japanese naval vessels and 166 merchantmen were
destroyed for a total bag of 793,763 tons.73 This figure may -not seem
particularly large when compared with the German sinking of Allied
shipping in the Atlantic, but the Allies could replace their losses and by
1943 were able to increase their merchant fleets. Japan was not in a
similar position; its limited shipyard facilities made full replacement
impossible.74
With the AAF using low-altitude and radar bombing techniques against
Japanese shipping and Chennault employing fighter bombers to destroy
inland merchant shipping in China, further inroads were made upon the
enemy's dwindling merchant marine. The rising rate of Japanese losses
imposed restrictions upon her offensive capabilities and even made
maintenance and repairs difficult.75
The promise of the new weapons and effectiveness of the older
ones in late 1943 were encouraging to the staff planners in Washington. If
the B-29 could sustain Chinese morale and bomb the Japanese homeland, if
the aircraft carrier could cut down the time element in reaching the
Japanese inner zone, and if the submarine and Air Forces could inflict
additional attrition and reduce the Japanese ability to resist, the end of
the conflict could be hastened and the military could more easily justify
the secondary war-that against Japan-to the American people.
The fall of
1943 brought no final answer on the ultimate strategy to be employed
against Japan. All were agreed on the need to make haste and some
promising avenues for future exploitation appeared to be opening, but the
American planners had been unable to agree among themselves on a specific
over-all plan. The difficulties of developing a plan on the basis of a
definite time limit were becoming apparent. Despite the lack of agreement
upon long-range plans, the uncertainty over the future roles and intentions
of Great Britain, China, and the USSR in the war against Japan, and the
priority of the war against Germany, the war against Japan was, on the
whole, proceeding favorably. It gave promise of
[332]
rapid improvement in the near future as fresh points of pressure were
applied against the enemy. The heartening expansion of U.S. carrier and
submarine forces and the prospective addition of the long-range bombers
offered further hopes of an accelerated advance and a shortened war.
Though the search for short cuts still left many basic questions in
ultimate strategy unanswered, certain trends in Washington planning
opinion came to the fore in the process. It was still an open question
whether to rely on the invasion of the Japanese mainland to accomplish the
unconditional surrender of Japan. The attention of both the chiefs and
their planners was definitely focused on the need to obtain strategic
bases and positions from which to take advantage of the redeployment of
air, naval, and ground forces from the European theater and compel the
early unconditional surrender of Japan. By the end of 943 it was the
well-defined aim of the U.S. planners to schedule operations in the
Pacific so that bases would be available to accommodate the large numbers
of reinforcements expected there after Germany was defeated. The quest for
short cuts also crystallized Washington planning opinion in favor of
making the main effort against Japan from the Pacific. Between the two
axes of advance-from the Southwest Pacific and via the mandated
islands-Washington planners leaned to the Central Pacific as promising the
more rapid progress. Whether this emphasis on the Pacific would emerge
from Allied strategic councils as dominant and what the effects might be
on the roles of the United Kingdom, China, and the as-yet neutral USSR in
the war against Japan remained to be seen.
The gathering momentum of the Allied drive in the secondary war,
encouraging as it was, drove home to Army planners the need of finally and
firmly fixing European strategy with the Allies at the forthcoming
conference. The Army planners were still faced with the basic problem of
how to keep the Pacific war a secondary conflict-so far as Army forces and
resources were concerned-at least until Germany was beaten. In fact, the
encouraging progress of the secondary war made the problem more
complicated than ever. Despite the early basic Anglo-American decision to
beat Germany first, operations in the Pacific war were taking on major
proportions. The costs in Army means and strength had steadily mounted.
The limited war threatened to become unlimited. For the Army planners, the
hope of a final and firm decision on OVERLORD at the next conference
embodied their desires for a measure of stability in global planning-to
keep the Mediterranean effort limited while permitting the Pacific war to
progress but at the same time remain secondary. With this hope in the
forefront of the Army staff's thinking, the U.S. delegation prepared to
move to SEXTANT for the next step in defining global strategy.
[333]
Endnotes
Previous Chapter
Next Chapter
Return to the Table of Contents
