Endnotes for Chapter I
1 Ltr, JPC [Col Walter Krueger and Capt John M. Mealier] to JB, 23 .Ape 35, sub: Rev of Jt A&N Bsc War Plan-ORANGE, JB 325, ser 546. The study of operations against Japan had taken precedence over other studies from the early 1920's. (See JB 325, sees 210, 237, and 270.) The first approved plan was joint .Army and Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, 16 July 1924, joint Board 325, serial 228. 'this plan was approved by the joint Board and the Secretary of the Navy in August 1924 and by the Secretary of War in early September 1924. !Sec Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East," Military Review, XXIX (December, 1949 ) , 22-39. )
2 App .4 to memo, Gen Embick, 2 Dec 35, sub: Mil Aspects of Sit that Would Result from Retention by U. S. of a Mil (incl naval) Commitment in P. I, JB 305, ser 573. One of General Embick's qualifications as head of the war plans staff was his known opinion on this question. He had only recently finished a tour of duty in the Philippines as commander of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays. While there, he had taken it upon himself to recommend the same policy, somewhat prematurely, for though his immediate superior, the commanding general of the Philippine Department, had indorsed his recommendation, the War Department had been unwilling to force the issue. ( (1) See memo, Gen Embick for Maj. Gen Ewing E. Booth, C.G. Phil Dept, 19 Apr 33, sub: Mil Policy of U.S. in P. I. with 1st Ind, Hq Phil Dept, 25 Apr 33. ( 2 ) For the .Army planners' comments, see memo, WPD, 12 Jun 33, same sub. Both in WPD 3251-15. (3) For timid joint Army-Navy action on the same problem in the next year, see WPD 3251-17 and -18, and JB 325, ser 533.)
3 Records of these disputes are to be found under JB 305 see 573; and JB 325, sees 617 and 618. General Craig was Chief of Staff from 1935 to 1939.
4 Jt .4&N Bsc War Plan-ORn1GF, 21 Feb 38, JB 325, ser 618, .4G 223, AG Classified Files. This plan was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 26 February and by the Secretary of War on 28 February. .Army and Navy forces in the Philippines would be "augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally." If war should not break out for several years, the Army garrison might have some support from the Philippine Army.  U.  S. Army plans had already been revised in accordance with the assumption that the Philippine Army, in the process of organization, would be the only source of reinforcements in the early stages of war with Japan. (See Army Strategical Plan ORANGE, 1936 Rev, AG 235, AG Classified Files.)
5 See the President's statement on hemisphere defense :n a radio address on 26 October 1918. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman, 1838 Volume: The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism (New York. 'The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 563.
6 See reports of public opinion polls made by the American Institute of Public Opinion, Fortune, and the Office of Public Opinion Research on the question of U. S. neutrality, in Hadley Cantril, ed., Public Opinion, 1935- 1946 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951) pp. 966 ff. For a history of American foreign policy from 1937 to 1940, see William L. Langer and S. Everett (mason, The Challenge to Isolation (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952).
7 Ltr, Actg SJB [Comdr Robert S. Chew] to JPC, 12 Nov 38, sub: Study of Jt Action in Event of Violation of Monroe Doctrine by Fascist Powers, JB 325, sec 634.
8 JPC study [Col Frank S. Clark and Capt Russell S. Crenshaw, USN], 21 Apr 39, JB 325, ser 634.

9 Ltr, SJB [Comdr John B. W. Waller] to JB, 11 May 39, sub: Jt A&N Bsc War Plans-RAINBOW 1, 2, 3, and 4, JB 325, ser 642. The letter contained the planners' proposals which the joint Board approved.

10 Ltr cited n. 9.
11 Ltr, JPC [Capt Crenshaw and Col Clark] to JB, 23 Jun 39, sub: Alternative Sits set up in Directive for Jt Rainbow Plans, JB 325, ser 642. For Navy studies and staff talks with the British, see Hist Monograph on U., S.-Br Nave Cooperation 1940--45, prepared by Capt Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, of the Hist Sec JCS, (hereafter cited as Kittredge Monograph), Vol I, Sec I, Part B, Ch 2; and Vol I, See I, Part D Ch 4.
12 See Ref (b), ltr, JPC [Col Clark and Capt Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN] to JB, 9 Apr 40, sub: Jt .A& Bsc War Plans-RAINBOW, JB 325, sets 642 and 642-1.
13 The revised directive, as quoted in the text, is from Incl A to JPC rpt, 27 Jul 39, sub: Jt A&N Bsc War Plan-RAINBOW 1, JB 325, ser 642-1.
14 The staffs had quickly finished outlining primary defensive plans within the terms of reference of RAINBOW 1. Jt .A&N Bsc War Plan-RAINBOW 1, JB 325, see 642-I. For a discussion of RAINBOW 1, see Stetson Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES .ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
15 Ltr cited n. 12.
16 Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and his director of plans, Rear Adm. Robert Ghormley, had already discussed this course of action with British naval officers during staff talks held in Washington in May 1939. Admiral Leahy agreed in principle to the proposed division of strategic responsibility with the Royal Navy in wartime, but refused to consider basing the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific on Singapore rather than Pearl Harbor. (Sec Kittredge Monograph, Vol I, See I, Part D, Ch 4.)
17 (1) Navy draft study, 5 Aug :39, on sit Rainbow 2. (2) Army second draft (Oct 39) of Rainbow 2. Both in Army files of the JPC, Development File for Rainbow 2, JB 325, ser 642-2.
18 This quotation IS from the Navy draft study cited in n. 17. A fairly complete version appears in the fourth Army draft ;fall of 1939). The assumptions in the fourth Army draft were rewritten and expanded by the Navy (21 November 1939), and stood thereafter little changed in the Navy correction of 11 April 1940 and the Army drafts of 11 May 19-10 (fifth Army draft) and 20 May 1940 sixth Army draft).
19 See various Army drafts in .Army files of the JPC, Development File for RAINBOW 2, JB 325 see 642-2. Along this route, the planners noted, the United States could send large patrol planes into the Southwest Pacific. They also noted that Simpson Harbor at Rabaul might well be made the base of operations against the mandated islands.
20 Army sixth draft Rainbow 2, 20 May 40, in .Army files of the JPC, Development File for Rainbow 2, JB 325, see 642-2.
21 In the .Army files of the JPC, this recommendation for staff conversations first appears as a matter of urgency in the Navy's final revision (18 April 1940) to the .Army's fourth draft plan Rainbow 2, although all Army drafts contemplated staff conversations in which specific agreements would be reached as to the aid which the United States might expect from the British, French, and Dutch as a prerequisite to the assumption by the United States of the responsibility for "sustaining the interests of the Democratic Powers in the Pacific." .Among the conditions stated by the planners, was the stipulation that Britain reinforce the Far Eastern naval forces by a minimum of one division of capital ships and insure the availability of Singapore to the U. S. Fleet. (Army files of the JPC cited n. 20.)

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