Last updated 18 February 2004
Endnotes for Chapter XXII
1 See p. 120, n. 2, above.
1 For discussion of this subject, see Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 539-40.
2 Text of this Agreement will be found in file cited above.
3 Text of this Agreement will be found in CCAC files, 014 (12-22-43), sec. 1.
4 CAD took the view that there was no necessity for formal agreement with Luxembourg but that General Eisenhower should be authorized to deal directly with that government, using the Belgian agreement as a basis for planning. The British took an opposite view and suggested that either the Belgian agreement be extended to cover Luxembourg or that a separate agreement be concluded along similar lines. The matter was referred to the State Department which recommended the British plan. As a result, the message of 21 February was sent to Eisenhower.
5 This Agreement will be found in CAD file cited above.
6 For details on use of resistance forces and recognition of French Committee of National Liberation, see Pogue, Supreme Command, VIII, 140-57
7 In April 1944, Lt. Gen. Grasett, G-5 SHAEF, announced that in the first phase of operations 21 Army Group, through its civil affairs staff, would he responsible for all civil affairs activities in France. On activation of a U.S. Army Group, SHAEF G-5 would assume direct responsibility for co-ordinating civil affairs operations in the field, SHAEF G-5 Ping files, 16.01.
8 Still seeking a formal agreement with the French, SHAEF was encouraged on 9 April when Secretary of State Hull declared that it was "of the utmost importance that civil authority in France be exercised by Frenchmen, should be swiftly established, and should operate in accordance with advance planning as fully as military operations will permit." Although the United States could not recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the government of France, Mr. Hull added, the President was disposed "to see the French Committee for National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in Chief." The Prime Minister, assuming that this declaration changed previous United States policy, promptly approved it. Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 146.
9 CCS 565 series deals with arrangements for goods and services to be provided in France. Text will be found in file cited above.
10 An interim directive was issued 14 May 1944. See Chapter VI, Section 4.
11 Mr. Churchill felt it would be unwise to invite de Gaulle to London under conditions that he would undoubtedly regard as insulting. Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 149
12 See Note 9, above.
13 The Americans, in other words, believed that it was necessary to make clear to the FCNL that working collaboration was not tantamount to political recognition. The British, apprehensive of offending de Gaulle, thought it best at least to evade the question.
|
|
|
|
Last updated 18 February 2004 |