Endnotes for Chapter XXI

1 The movement was one which continued the extremist policies of Communism after the Moscow-dominated Communist Party abandoned them for the duration. This abandonment began with, and was dictated by, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, which immediately ordered its followers everywhere to give the defeat of Germany priority over the fight for international communism.

2 A considerable portion of the Chief Commissioner's lengthy memorandum has been omitted. Although the memorandum was sent to many influential quarters, including the White House, none of its specific recommendations was adopted. Evidently they seemed to call for a degree of aid to Italy that would overstrain Allied resources. It is clear, however, that the memorandum helped focus attention on the problem of adapting the Allied Italian relationship to Allied postwar interests.

3 About the same time McNarney, in Washington on a visit, was discussing the Admiral's memorandum with the War Department.

4 SACMED of course was referring primarily to Venezia Giulia.

5 General Morgan, who succeeded Field Marshal Alexander as SACMED on 23 October 1945, was referring to the restoration of northern Italy to the Italian Government, a move which the CCS had authorized recently (see below, Section 6).

6 However, on 24 September CCAC notified SACMED that civilian supply for Udine and Venezia Giulia would remain a military responsibility. See below, Section 8.

7 On 5 September SACMED received a message from the Chief Commissioner of AC stating that he had still not received any information regarding the administrative procedures and the availabilities in the civilian agency supply program after the August loadings of the military. He considered the situation most serious. AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 2554.

8 The UNRRA program did not actually get under way until February. Amounting to $50,000,000, it included, in its supply phase, food for expectant women and for children, and medical and sanitary supplies.

9 The UNRRA program did not actually get under way until February. Amounting to $50,000,000, it included, in its supply phase, food for expectant women and for children, and medical and sanitary supplies.

10 The "Institutional Question," which the Government had committed itself to keep closed until after hostilities had ended and the Italian people as a whole could express their will. In July 1944 the Cabinet had expressed itself in a manner which seemed at first glance to violate the commitment.

11 The commitment of successive Italian governments to a truce on the institutional question envisaged continuation of the truce until the Italian people should be able to speak their will freely. AC considered that this meant the restoration by the government of the electoral process and free suffrage, which, as will be seen, were soon to be established with the government's preparations for the first local elections.

12 The left-wing parties believed that the large Catholic population might swing a referendum toward retention of the monarchy. But there is no reason to believe that the Allied Commission, in favoring a referendum, was influenced by anything but concern for what seemed the most democratic procedure. As matters turned out, the referendum had a different result from the one the leftwing parties feared (see below).

13 The omitted portion of Brigadier Lush's memorandum indicates that he is here referring to the failure of the two democratic Allies to provide educational measures in behalf of a positive program. He states that officers in the field had already proved the best ambassadors but lacked direction which should have emanated from the two governments. To this end he recommended the retention of Allied Commission officers during and immediately after the elections.

14 In November 1945 the Italian Government enacted the amendments carrying out the Local Government Sub Commission's recommendations. The task of preparing the lists was a heavy one and was complicated by several legal and administrative factors which arose both from the abolition of the Fascist system and such extension of Italian suffrage as the granting of votes to women.

15 The Council of Ministers had always taken the position with AC that its decree law of July 1944 did not preclude a referendum on the institutional question. In view of the wording of the decree and the strong preference of the left-wing parties for a constituent assembly, the argument might well have seemed an equivocation. As matters developed, the opposition of more conservative parties to the constituent assembly proved very powerful. In the end the more radical parties yielded, and the draft decree for the referendum described above was duly adopted.

16 Elections for a constituent assembly to implement the decision of the referendum were held simultaneously with the referendum itself. Local elections had already been held in March and April 1946.

17 The Soviet supported Yugoslavia in its demand for all of Venezia Giulia, and itself wished large reparations from Italy. Although the members of the conference arranged to meet at Moscow three months later to reconsider the issues, the Allies at this point realized that preparation of a peace treaty would take a long time because of the conflict of aims between themselves and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

18 According to the agreement at the Moscow Conference, 8 November 1943, (see Chapter X, Section 3) the Advisory Council for Italy would assume executive control in Italy at the expiration of AFHQ's military regime. It was therefore essential to retain AFHQ and the position of SACMED in order to restrict the Advisory Council, of which both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were members, to its current advisory function. When the Combined Chiefs reviewed the situation in 1946 they decided that because of the continuing troubles and dangers over Venezia Giulia, AFHQ should be further retained. See CCS Msg to AFHQ, 11 Jun 46 (FAN 671), CCAC files, 334, AFHQ (5-25-45).

19 Citation in Political Review by the Chief, Cmsr, AC, before 48th Mtg of the Advisory Council, 18 Jan 46, p. 5. Since the agreement was not even considered by Italy be cause of engrossment with the issues of the peace treaty, further text has not been included.

20 The CCS did not object and the transfer took place on 10 May.

21 The naval authorities objected to the proposed transfer, but since the reasons cited were not technical naval objections AFHQ overruled them. However, because of the belief that Northern Italy would soon be returned, and the advisability of making the transfer simultaneous with that of the north, the communes were not given back until December, when the north was restored.

22 De Gasperi succeeded Parri, whose government collapsed during the last week in November 1945. ACC files, 10000/136/120.

23 Nenni was released almost immediately on his promise not to violate regulations again. AFHQ appears to have been much disturbed by the incident.

24 ACC and G-5 had prepared this type of commitment in the feeling that the New Policy should be recognized in its terms.

25 Admiral Stone's letter was pursuant to a directive sent by the CCS. The terms in which the controls were lifted are as interesting for the exceptions as for the rule. The continuation of the war against Japan made it necessary to take precautions against any transactions prejudicial to Allied economic warfare, and accordingly the Italian Government was required not only to keep the two governments informed but also to adopt measures which would ensure against such injury.

26 In ensuing paragraphs the letter states that the controls will again be imposed if the steps in (a) and (b) are not taken within a reasonable time. It also sets forth further technical exceptions.

27 Category "A" covered exports required for the Allied war effort.

28 The government's program for rehabilitation supplies, financed by the United States.

29 A new government, with De Gasperi as Prime Minister, had just taken office on 9 December. It represented the Italian conservative parties less than those of the Committee of National Liberation, which were more disposed toward economic relations with the Soviet bloc and less amenable to continuation of remaining Allied controls. SACMED was probably cognizant of the new Prime Minister's political difficulties at the beginning of his administration.

30 Admiral Stone is referring to the draft of a proposed directive for the civilianization of the AC which was sent by General Hilldring to General Lemnitzer for comment.

31 The Service Subcommissions were concerned with the Italian armed forces.

32 Among the arguments used by this cable against undue curtailment of AC was the fact that within its structure there existed the headquarters of AMG (still occupied in Venezia Giulia), which to be effective needed to maintain the closest contact with all Government ministries.

33 AC recognized the feasibility of giving up its policy direction of AMG in Venezia Giulia but considered it necessary to retain a larger degree of advisory and control responsibility in other matters than the CCS thought necessary.

34 The effect of this provision was that AMG Venezia Giulia was henceforth to report directly to AFHQ.

35 The treaty was signed by the U.S. representative at Paris on 10 February 1947. For provisions concerning Trieste and cession of major parts of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia, see Chapter XX, Section 7. In addition Italy ceded several islands to Yugoslavia, the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, and certain small border areas to France. It incurred the obligation of $100,000,000 in reparations to the Soviet Union as well as smaller sums to other countries. Great Britain assumed temporary administration of Italian East Africa pending final disposition.

36 Article 73 provided that all armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers would be withdrawn from Italy as soon as possible and in any case not later than 90 days after the treaty went into effect.

37 Article III provided that when U.S. relief supplies were sold for local currency, the proceeds would be used for relief and work relief purposes within Italy, including local currency expenses of the United States incident to the furnishing of relief.

38 In Article I of the treaty Italy waived its own claims, and that of Italian nationals, against the Government of the United States and Americans arising directly out of  the war. The claims renounced by the United States included the payment for relief supplies sent both during the period of military responsibility and afterward under the FEA program. The second waiver, that of expenditures of U.S. armed forces in Italy, had been foreshadowed by President Roosevelt incident to the enunciation of the New Policy toward Italy (see Chapter XVII, Section 3).

39 R-day was the day for disbandment of AFHQ, coincident with the coming into effect of the peace treaty.

40 The solution recommended in the final paragraph quoted was adopted. On 3o April 1947 SACMED signed with IGCR a displaced persons transfer agreement which went into effect on 15 June 1947.

Search CMH Online
Return to CMH Online
Last updated 18 February 2004