Endnotes for Chapter XIX

1 This assurance was confirmed by the CCS on 28 April 1945 in a message to AFHQ, FAN-536 (Chapter XX, Section 2).

2 In planning for Sicily and southern Italy no such provision had been made for the initial stage. The working class population was much larger and more powerful in the north, and the opening of the door to negotiated wage increases was a necessary safety valve.

3 Inflation had not reached the same heights in northern Italy as in the south.

4 Arrangements with and planning concerning the CLN's of northern Italy are treated in Chapter XVIII, above.

5 This section deals only with northwest Italy; for northeast Italy, see below, this chapter and Chapter XX.

6 This type of killing took place soon after the occupation of Rome. (See above, pp. 478, 534.) The hope had been that by placing more responsibility on the Italian Government, recurrence could be avoided.

7 The striking feature of the CLNAI pseudo government was that instead of denying the authority of AMG-in traditional revolutionary fashion-it simply ignored this authority as far as was convenient. The local CLN's also ignored their own central authority.

8 The order provoked from the northern Italy political leader Randolfo Pacciardi the bitter remark, "Thus ends the revolution of the North." AC Weekly Bull, 8 Jun 45.

9 The letter is quoted in President Truman's communication below.

10 See also Section 8 below for context of this message.

11 This recommendation was approved. While wage and price regulations were continued, the road blocks were abandoned on 28 May.

12 This discussion is notable less for any results than for its analysis of the economic situation and its needs. The CCS did not wish to sanction any measures contrary to the spirit of the New Policy, and thus was unwilling to approve even Allied advisory representation on the proposed Board. As an alternative, ACC turned to the plan set forth in the following document.

13 The Bolzano Conference sought to co-ordinate repatriation movements between the Mediterranean and European Theater.

14 Pursuant to the recommendation, SACMED on 19 June cabled the CCS that, in his opinion the transfer of some 55 reluctant Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union would almost certainly mean their death and asked for a ruling. The content of the CCS reply is indicated by the document which follows.

15 In Phase II, according to the plan for northern Italy (Sec 7, above), AC with its Regional staffs was to relieve the Army AMG's. This change was to become effective 15 May 1945.

16 AC did not actually take charge until 4 August. The territory remained under military government but as administered by AC regional teams rather than Army AMG.

17 On 6 September a second cable from SACMED on the issue of restoration indicated that he now felt that Bolzano could be returned to Italian Government jurisdiction at the same time as the other Northern territories. He again made exception of Venezia Giulia, and also of Udine because of its tactical relationship to that area. The CCS did not communicate its approval of the proposed transfer. It soon appeared that the reason was the change in the State Department's attitude with regard to Bolzano. Secretary of State Byrnes had become concerned lest return of that province to Italian administration might prejudice settlement of the matter at the peace conference. By the same token, return of Northern Italy without Bolzano would create agitation in Italy. SACMED, together with the Chief Commissioner, AC, was embarrassed by the long delay of CCS in approving return of North Italy to the Italian Government. On 19 October, as the following document indicates, he pressed CCS for an answer, and finally, in December, approval was given (see Chapter XXI, Section 6).

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Last updated 18 February 2004