Last updated 18 February 2004
Endnotes for Chapter XVIII
1 The Italian bands outside the Italian Army who fought against the Germans and Fascists were sometimes called Patriots and sometimes Partisans. In Central Italy, where, in the summer of 1944, they were first met in considerable numbers, they were most often known as Patriots.
2 Lt Monti was a Communist partisan and was frequently referred to as one of Group Capt. Benson's spearhead CAO's.
3 With approval of the Acting Chief Commissioner and the Patriots Branch, ACC, the Italian Government set up an Italian Committee under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Bonomi to function in close co-operation with the Allied Control Commission. This committee had no authority north of the rear Army boundaries, which was under absolute control of Headquarters, AAI. See also ACC Instructions on Administration of Patriots, sec. 2, below.
4 For Browning's objections, see remarks at Conference of Regional Commissioners, 22 August 1944, section 2 above.
5 No. I Special Force was the main component of Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (SOMTO). CMF had by this time replaced AAI. SOE is an abbreviation for a Special Operations Executive officer.
6 On the next day General Wilson, SACMED, had a conference with Signor Longhi [alias for Dr. Alfredo Pizzoni], President of the CLNAI. In reply to the latter's appeal for official recognition, General Wilson stated that ACC would shortly be suggesting to the Italian Government that the time was now ripe for recognition. MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, PC(44)-141, 23 Nov 44.
7 The delay was due to a Cabinet crisis of the Bonomi government.
8 The agreement was approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, and the Chief Commissioner, AC, was directed to inform the Italian Government and the CLNAI of such approval. ACC files, 10000/136/338.
9 In early March the Italian Government inquired whether it might send Signor Medici Tornaquinci, Under Secretary of the Ministry for Occupied Italy, to visit the CLNAI in order to prepare the ground for liberation. Upon the recommendation of Admiral Stone and the two Ambassadors, AFHQ approved. On 29 March, Tornaquinci signed an agreement with the CLNAI covering local administration by the CLNAI during the period between a German collapse and the establishment of AMG. However, Bonomi continued to be very uneasy. His attitude is reflected in the next document.
10 This recommendation was based partly on purely military grounds. A part of the report not quoted tells how the German forces early in the winter drove the partisans to the hills, where, after a few hard months of winter, their numbers and resources became so reduced that they were no longer capable of any military action but were operating in small and scattered bands.
11 This chapter considers only that part of the planning for northern Italy which concerns the partisans. Other features will be found in the following chapters under the relevant category.
12 In his message to the CCS of 15 February SACMED, requesting that the two governments provide a portion of the food and clothing required in care for the partisans, pointed out that it was essential that some inducement be made to the partisans to surrender their arms and return to their peacetime ways of life. He expressed the fear that otherwise they might become a considerable embarrassment to the Allied occupational forces. AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 5696.
13 Before anything could be done, the war was over.
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Last updated 18 February 2004 |