Endnotes for Chapter XVI

1 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), II, 1565-66.

2 As wall be remembered Marshal Badoglio at this time thought neither a declaration of war by Italy nor a broad-ening of his government would be possible until Rome was reached Apparently the Chief Commissioner had in mind the divergencies among Anglo-American political attitudes and the possibility that they would result in conflicting . pressures.

3 The Directive called for the immediate assumption of control by the CG of Fifth Army but for Rome later to pass under the control of Hq, AAI (Allied Armies in Italy), at which time an Area Commander, Rome, would assume immediate responsibility under AAI.

4 All of AMG's elaborate planning had been done in connection with that of the Rome Area Command, within the framework of which Fifth Army AMG was to function. Under the Chief of Staff of the Rome Area Command and his four Chief Assistants-G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4-the needs of the AMG divisions were arranged.

5 Captain Stone succeeded General Mason-MacFarlane on 24 June 1944, when the latter resigned because of illness.

6 On 8 September, in a report to the Advisory Council for Italy, Poletti observed that one of the chief impediments to epuration in the past--the difficulty of obtaining replacements-was now being overcome. In Rome many more people than before had indicated a willingness to assume public responsibility. ACC files, 10000/136/228. See below, Section g, for development of the new epuration program.

7 On 6 June 1944, Badoglio submitted the resignation of his government to the Crown Prince. The resignation was accepted but Badoglio was directed to proceed with the formation of a government to include political leaders then in Rome. Realizing that he would meet with strong opposition, Badaglio recommended that Bonomi be invited to set up the government. The Crown Prince acted on this advice and Bonomi accepted. However, the Badoglio government continued to function until the new government was approved by the Allied Governments (see following documents). Bonomi's cabinet was sworn in on 22 June 1944. ACC files, 10000/132/477 and ACC files, 10000/136/116.

8 In the discussion preceding the adoption of the resolution several members expressed the view that the Allied governments had the right to approve any change in the Italian government, and that it was the function of the council to advise the governments as to the desirability of approval. After the council acted, the Chief Commissioner communicated the terms to the President of the Council of Ministers and added the following additional safeguard: "I take the opportunity of reaffirming that under the regime of the Armistice, the Italian Government is bound to carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations. It is therefore essential that the prior agreement of myself as President of the Control Commission should be obtained and that the Governments concerned should be consulted through the machinery established for this purpose, before any important decisions of policy are put into effect." ACC files, 10000/136/116. The conditions imposed by the Advisory Council were accepted in writing by the new government. Five of the Cabinet members were holdovers from the old government. The Bonomi government reflected an equal representation of the new political parties and introduced new political talents from Rome.

9 Since the government wanted to come to Rome, and ACC wanted it to come, the hitch was evidently due to the military leaders.

10 As planned, the government moved to Rome on the date set, ACC moved its headquarters on 15 July, and AMG continued in control until 15 August.

11 On August 22 Brigadier Lush announced at the Conference of Regional Commissioners that the Allied officers administering the Southern Regions (numbering originally about 300) had been reduced from 175 to 100. On 28 August the Southern Regions of Calabria, Apulia, Campania, Foggia, Campobasso, and Lucania were amalgamated for ACC administration into one Region, and were placed under one Regional Commissioner and five provincial teams, concerned primarily with supplies and transportation. ACC files, 10000/132/6.

12 In February the government announced its intention of appointing by decree the Istituto Nazionale per it Commercio Estero to receive, handle, and account for all imported supplies other than those handled by the Federazione dei Consorzi Agrari. ACC Exec Memo No. 2, ACC files, 10000/109/2110.

13 The defascistization of the state administration was the only phase of the program in which the Allied authorities felt obliged to take a systematic interest (see below). This type of defascistization, covered by a decree of December 1943 (revised in May 1944) and other types (such as confiscation of wealth obtained through Fascist influence) were brought together in one program by a new decree, DLL-,59. Major features of the decree are cited below.

14 Several other defascistization decrees were found to be necessary. Moreover, in October it became clear that epuration would take longer than had been expected. On 1 November, therefore, the Government directed that it be concentrated on the higher grades of officials and power was given to the President of the Council of Ministers to retire all holdover officials who, though not hardened Fascists, had become hardened by the ways of Fascism. Brig Upjohn, Rpt in Min of 33c1 Mtg to Advisory Council for Italy, 6 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228.

15 Pellegrini was Director General of the telecommunications system in Sicily and Southern Italy [referred to as SET in documents], a position he had retained be cause of his great technical knowledge and ability and because of the importance of this system to the war effort. At the end of July a suspension action was taken against him by the Naples Defascism Commission, set up by Region III in accordance with the policy of instituting in AMG territory (Naples was still under MG) the epuration procedures of the government. Mal. Gen. L. B. Nicholls (British), Chief Signal Officer of AFHQ, together with other Allied communications officers, immediately pointed out the bad effect which the loss of Pellegrini's services would have upon the communications system. He stated that Pellegrini, like all other Italians, had been forced to work for the Germans but that he had rendered outstanding services to the Allies and could not be spared. The matter was called to the attention of the U.S. Political Adviser who argued : "The vast bulk of the economic and commercial talent in Italy was, of course . . . inextricably bound up with Fascism. Our military authorities undoubtedly have exploited many former Fascist individuals who have given loyal cooperation to the Allies during the crucial months of the Italian campaign. Are they to be compensated by internment?" Ltr, Murphy to ACofS, G-2, AFHQ, Jul 44, AFHQ files, G-5 Reel 275-B.

16 In accordance with the above-mentioned instruction of 8 August, the Acting Chief Commissioner of ACC requested Prime Minister Bonomi on 5 September to inform his ministers that "technicians or experts employed by the Allied Forces in positions of high responsibility will not be suspended, dismissed or arrested except after consultation with and the approval of Headquarters Allied Control Commission." ACC files, 10000/136/327

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