Endnotes for Chapter XI

1 The functions of the Controller of Property, set forth in AMG Proclamation 6, embraced both the protection of Allied property and the custodianship of enemy property.

2 For later extension of this model of local government to the mainland, both in military government and Italian Government territory, see below, Section 6.

3 AMGOT had from the outset been inclined toward reviving representative economic bodies, but at first it had been only practical to do so on a communal or provincial basis.

4 ACC in its original form was the brain child of MGS in Algiers, which was headed by an American. The British in Italy tended to believe from the outset that the organization was too large, especially in view of the poor conditions of transport and communication under which the organization would for some time have to operate. They also considered, as the above document shows, that there was danger of ACC being so overactive in supervising the Italian Government that Italians would feel themselves smothered. (See the comments of Sir Harold Macmillan as quoted by C. R. S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), p. 114.) When Mr. Macmillan, to whom Colonel Maxwell addressed the above-quoted letter, became Acting President of ACC in November 1944 he put into effect a curtailment of the commission's supervisory functions.

5 The Government had representatives in military government territory who were concerned with national matters. Purely local officials in MG territory were of course appointed by AMG.

6 At that time the government was expected to go to Sorrento but at the end of March it moved to Salerno instead. Conditions here turned out to be better than at Brindisi but Salerno, too, was overcrowded. Naples was precluded because it was under Military Government.

7 Plans were made by ACC for revision of the tax system when political circumstances should give the Government more courage for drastic changes.

8 See Chapter XIII for the details of the financial issue. This section has not been designed to set forth the specific measures or proposals of ACC but merely to give the general pattern of its relationship with the government and the difficult conditions which for some time hampered its efforts. Its activities in relation to specific issues are taken up in other chapters, under various functional headings.

9 It must be borne in mind that many of the best Italian civil servants were still in German-occupied Italy.

10 The subcommissions listed are merely those of the economic and administrative sections-the two sections concerned directly with with civil administrative functions of the government.

11 For the details of the political discussion and its outcome, see Chapter XV.

12 The prefects, as matters developed, did not have to take the oath because the agreement with the government provided that appointments of prefects made by AMG would be confirmed.

13 On 19 December, General Holmes, Chief of MGS, cabled to General Hilldring acknowledging that AFHQ had gone on the presumption that sovereignty in the areas to be transferred could be restored to the Italian Government, subject to necessary Allied rights. This had seemed the implication of the Moscow Declaration on Italy. It was still the belief of AFHQ that the proposed agreements between AFHQ and the Badoglio government would safeguard Allied rights sufficiently. AFHQ feared that the proposal of CCAC-that AFHQ merely give the Italian Government the right to administer the territory under the supervision of ACC-would be ununacceptable to Badoglio and damaging to his political prestige. During the interchange of ideas between AFHQ and CCS, McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, arrived at AFHQ. He was apparently convinced by theater authorities that their views on the political and legal aspects of the issue had merit. On his return to Washington McCloy presented reasons for reconsidering the original position. The combined chiefs did reconsider, but even with modification its proposals continued to embody safeguards which AFHQ, as appears in the following document, considered politically impracticable.

14 The CCS in this message required, among other things, that the Italian Government recognize the territory as continuing legally to be "occupied," and that the Allied CINC might cancel any act of the Italian authorities or resume government if required by military or other exigencies.

15 Document "D," not included here, was a letter to the head of the Italian Government setting forth certain measures previously established by Allied proclamation (e.g., prohibiting syndicate payments) which the Italian Government was to continue through the issuance of decrees or proclamations.

16 This statement of the role of ACC in restored areas differs sharply from that held initially, which contemplated something closer to substantial help than to mere high level advice. On 28 September 1943 General Holmes wrote that "although nominally we shall turn over provinces as they are cleared . . . we shall probably have to give a substantial amount of direct assistance for some time to come." CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (1). However, in September transfer was expected to take place almost immediately, when the government was "a dilapidated and creaking machine." By February local government in the restored areas, as also the Badoglio administration, had had six months of Allied tutelage. As the ensuing documents seem to show, Italian officials were still not ready or disposed to "stand on their own legs" and the transition to ACC's purely advisory role was not without difficulty.

17 While initially left undefined, the range of higher officials receiving prior ACC approval came by practice to extend down to "prefects of 1st class." In June (see below, Chapter XVII, Section I) this range was so defined. There was nothing. in the Armistice calling for Allied prior approval of Italian appointments; the right was established by the above interchange.

18 The Administrative Instruction (Schedule A) attached to the order is merely a restatement, with minor changes, of the outline of pre-Fascist provincial and municipal organs which was given in Section 2, above, in Sicily Region Administrative Instructions No. 4.

19 A memorandum of ACC Headquarters for the Advisory Council, 26 August 1944, stated that the decrees of the Italian Government were made operative in AMG territory "almost invariably." It noted also that ACC's policy was that, except in certain cases where policy was dictated by military necessity, the Italian Government planned and drafted decrees while ACC acted merely as adviser.

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Last updated 18 February 2004