Endnotes for Chapter IX
1 For treatment of armistice and surrender terms see Albert N. Garland and Howard M. Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, a volume in preparation for the series United States Army in World War II.
2 The names given after each numbered region are Italian compartments. The personnel estimates were accepted by CCS on 31 August, but on 30 September MGS (see below, Section 7) found it necessary to ask for more enlisted troops in view of conditions found in Italy. Also, the designation of the regions was revised a number of times in the course of operations.
3 General Eisenhower replied on 29 July that he had been quite aware that his authority was limited to military matters and that he had been concerned only with obtaining authorization to act within such limits.
4 The message, approved by CCS substantially as submitted, is cited below under date of 28 July.
5 Among the conditions proposed by Eisenhower was "immediate acknowledgement of the overriding authority of the Allied Commander in Chief to establish military government." This accorded with the previous recognition at AFHQ that both this type of control and armistice control would be necessary.
6 This message is a summary of the lengthy and detailed plan set forth by MGS on 21 August (preceding document). The scheme finally adopted was, in a number of respects, different (see below, Chapter X).
7 This, a short document, was sent to General Eisenhower 30 July.
8 It should be noted that AMGOT-Sicily personnel were to be used for AMG and not for the proposed control commission. Many in the theater favored the latter course, but it had various disadvantages chief of which was sacrifice of the experience which AMGOT personnel had already obtained in military government.
9 General [Guiseppe] Castellano, who met secretly the AFHQ Chief of Staff and other Allied authorities at Lisbon on 18 August. See Garland and Smyth, Sicily, and the Surrender of Italy, Chapter IV.
10 Again there was dissatisfaction in one quarter of the War Department over giving the military governorship to a British general. Colonel Connor of OPD queried whether it was "desirable to create the public impression of British control of military government . . . in view of the fact that practically all civilian supplies sent into Italy will come from the United States." CAD, however, pointed out that the designation was consistent with the present chain of command and that any other would create complications. Memo, Col Hammond, CAD, for Handy, DCofS, OPD, 21 Aug 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security, sec. 1.
11 Message from AFHQ of 28 August asking permission, in view of the urgent need of Italian military assistance, to obtain Italian signature of the shorter military terms first and to present the further conditions only after this matter had been settled. OPD Msg files, CM-IN 21909.
12 document with political, economic, and financial as well as military conditions.
13 On this date an armistice (short terms) was granted the Italian Government by the British and American Governments. On the same (late, 3 September, the Eighth Army invaded the mainland. It was over a month later before Eisenhower could present to Badoglio the long terms containing political and economic conditions. (See below, Section 5.) ACC files, 10000/136/91.
14 Here Rennell discusses the meeting with the King and Badoglio and the decision not to establish MG in the area where they were exercising jurisdiction. This is covered in a document appearing on p. 229, below.
15 General Mason-MacFarlane, a British officer, had been Governor of Gibraltar. He was destined to become the first Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, of which this mission was, in a sense, the precursor.
16 In a message of 23 July to the CCS General Eisenhower had proposed that "in the event of the entire operation being conducted by French forces ... the civil administration of the island should be confided to the French National Committee of Liberation on condition that we enjoy similar rights and privileges to those prevailing in North Africa." He added, however, that it would be made clear that this must in no way be construed as establishing a precedent for metropolitan France. In June 1944 French troops also occupied Elba. CAD Msg files, CM-IN 16998.
17 Here again, as in the arrangements with Darlan for French North Africa, the theater commander was in effect, contrary to all the theory, making policy. For, once the argument of military necessity is invoked by a military commander in whom a government has trust, it is difficult to insist upon political policies contrary to his recommendations.
18 As of 29 September, and until modified (see below), the agreement was known as the Instrument of Italian Surrender.
19 This article required withdrawal by the Italian armed forces from areas indicated by the United Nations.
20 These proposals were approved, and on 9 November a revised protocol was signed. The revisions also included the addition of the Soviet Union as a party agreeing to the conditions of armistice with Italy. ACC files, 10000/109/144).
21 See below, Chapter XI, Section 4, for the first restoration of territory.
22 The King, expressing fear of German reprisals, had, as noted earlier, refused to declare war immediately.
23 This intemperately captious letter is of note less for the details of its allegations than as an illustration of the attitude which AMGOT at times encountered in Italian local officials. Group Captain Benson (see the following document) pointed out that because Foggia was geographically a part of the territory governed by Badoglio, it was more difficult for the prefect to accept the fact that Foggia had not been turned over to the Italian government like the other provinces of Apulia.
24 The commission formed by the United States and Great Britain with the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference, pending formation of the Advisory Council for Italy.
25 This expectation so far as it concerned early implementation, was not shared by the theater. The plan formulated by General Holmes on 4 October (see above, sec. 6) for military government over a large rear zone had already been put into effect.
26 The recommendation to send only a small number was accepted by AFHQ.
Last updated 18 February 2004