1 Task Force 343, comprising three U.S. infantry divisions, the 2d Armored Division, and the II Corps of the U.S. Seventh Army, was commanded by Mal. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. Task Force 545 comprised various elements of the British Eighth Army under General Sir Bernard Montgomery. The co-ordinating authority over the two task forces was the Fifteenth Army Group, known as Force 141, commanded by General Alexander. The island of Pantelleria had been invaded on 2 June by the British 1 Division in order to provide bases for the attack on Sicily. An independent AMGOT-Pantelleria was activated and placed under Brig. Gen. [Auby C.] Strickland, U.S. Air Corps, as Military Governor. The attitude of the inhabitants was friendly. The islands of Lampedusa and Linosa had been seized on 19 June by the U.S. Seventh Army and placed under an AMG which reported directly to AFHQ.

2 Italian organization for collecting (amassing) agricultural produce.

3 Even in areas where fighting was still going on, AMGOT Headquarters was permitted to give a considerable amount of actual direction to the officers in the field. Chanler, Chief Legal Officer (CLO), AMGOT, reported to Hilldring in a survey report of 27 December 1943 that "it would have been easier if they had been able to do this by issuing formal `technical directives' without having to struggle with the great communications difficulties of going through channels." CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (1)

4 Taxes from the syndicates, a component of the Fascist system of centralized economic control.

5 On 20 September all railway operations in Sicily were turned back to civilians, under the supervision of Allied military operating units. In September, also, AFHQ ordered that as of 15 October AMGOT would become responsible for rail operations in the American area. Previously AMGOT's principal service had been that of keeping the Sicilian organizations intact through advancing funds. Rpt of Transportation, Communications and Utilities (T.C.&U.) Div, Hq AMG, 6 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/154/317.

6 In reading the communications of CAO's to their military superiors it must always be borne in mind that, whatever their rank, these officers were apt to have the type of civilian background which develops independence of thought and tongue. Thus, while carrying out orders, they tended to tell their organizational superiors precisely what they thought, no matter how bold from the point of view of conventional Army practice. Headquarters had the good sense to realize that it was dealing with an unusual group of subordinates, and, as the following memorandum from the Chief Staff Officer illustrates, usually answered their honest complaints and criticisms patiently.

7 General Holmes had probably absorbed some of the climate of opinion in Washington during his visit there in March. The theater planners in general were unaware of what the President and the civilian agencies were planning at the time. With respect to Roosevelt's position, Stimson states: "Before the invasion of Sicily, Mr. Roosevelt made one more effort to insure the dominance of civilian agencies in civil administration but the experience gained in this operation and in the early stages of the Italian campaign appears to have convinced him that for good or ill the armed forces must have the administrative responsibility in all military theaters. Two actions in November 1943 showed . . . how far the President had moved. First, on November 10 [see above, Chapter IV, Section 7] he wrote a letter to Stimson declaring that the War Department must assume responsibility for civilian relief in liberated areas. . . . Second, from Cairo . . . he cabled . . . that all arrangements for civilian administration and dealings with the French . . . must initially be military. . . ." See Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), PP. 559-60

8 According to General Spofford, Preston Sturges, representative of OFEC as indicated above, was himself convinced, after studying conditions on the spot, that it was premature for civilian agencies to consider entering. (Interv with Harold Epstein, 17 Apr 50.) It has already been seen in Chapter IV that the civilian agencies in Washington, less well informed than Sturges, were of a different mind. In any case, the British put the quietus on entrance of civilian agencies as such. CCAC court only authorize the entry of individual civilians.