Endnotes for Chapter VII

1 The President and Prime Minister Churchill decided at the Casablanca Conference that Sicily should be invaded after the end of the Tunisian campaign; in January 1943 General Eisenhower received from the CCS a directive to this effect. The above document is the first to raise the problem of military government for the new operation.

2 The officers designated were Colonel Holmes and Col. Charles M. Spofford, former members of the Civil Affairs Section, AFHQ, which had handled the operation in French North Africa. On 11 February the War Department notified AFHQ that the President had approved in principle General Eisenhower's proposals. The message indicated the President's view that the joint military government should be headed by one British and one American officer, that it should be under General Eisenhower's control, and that the policy which it should apply toward Italians should be benevolent except that it should include the arrest of Fascist leaders. General Eisenhower was asked to submit an outline plan. (Msg, WD to General Eisenhower, 11 Feb 45, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3847.)

3 Headquarters of EOTA, known as the Political Branch, GHQ, was established at Cairo with General Mitchell as chief Political Officer and Advisor to the Commander in Chief.

4 Under the system developed by the British, administration in occupied areas was placed in the hands of a Deputy Chief Political Officer (DCPO) who also acted as adviser to the military governor-the commanding general in each instance. The staff was divided into three main sections-legal, finance, and police. When military operations ceased, the DCPO became military governor. In the field, the DCPO was assisted by political officers who went forward with the occupying forces. As soon as military operations permited, a political officer took over the office of the mayor of a designated area and acted as chief municipal officer. A police force independent of military police was established, staffed at the top by an army officer with police training and augmented by civilian inspectors while the remainder of the force was recruited from local personnel. The civil police force, usually disarmed, assumed responsibility for civilian functions. CAD files, 091.1, Tripolitania.

5 As a result of these plans, AFHQ submitted to the War Department in early March an Appreciation and Outline Plan for Military Government in Sicily. It was to go through considerable revision by the two governments (see below) before eventuating in the organization known as Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory. (A copy of General Spofford's detailed report on the British system in Tripolitania will be found in the file cited above).

6 In this respect the planners deviated from the pattern applied to Germany at the end of World War I; in occupied Germany there were different national zones, all co-ordinated but free to establish their own laws and systems as far as practicable. Nonzonal military government would entail reconciling British and American systems, between which an important difference obtained with respect to the higher chain of command. The British, while recognizing nominally the paramount authority of the theater commander, expected the chief political officer to be guided primarily by advice from political authorities in London as soon as the fighting had ended. The dependence of the British civil affairs officers upon political authorities was known to the War Department and led it to view the British orientation of certain elements of the AFHQ plan with apprehension (see below, Section 7).

7 Since General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander was the Commanding General of the expedition this meant, as Washington was to note, that a British officer was to be Military Governor. The proposal made by AFHQ in this connection was one called for by the International Law of belligerent occupation.

8 The chart accompanying this draft failed to place the recommended Political Section under the line of authority from the Commander in Chief. Though inadvertent, the omission became the subject of comment in Washington and resulted in modification by the War Department (see below, Section 3).

9 Although the report was not submitted to the War Department until 1945, it is based upon notes made currently by General Spofford while a member of the planning staff, Force 141, and, later, Chief Staff Officer, AMGOT.

10 Lord Rennell of Rodd was to become the first chief of AMGOT. He had held the senior civil affairs role in the British occupation of East Africa.

11 In the documents of the theater "A" and "B" after names are used to indicate American and British, respectively.

12 The War Department had sent AFHQ a cable stating that for security and other reasons it was advisable to exclude civilian agencies from the planning both at Washington and in the theater. See Chapter IV, Section 1.

13 There is nothing in the files to indicate whether or not this memorandum was actually sent. However, Haskell states that it was seen by the JCS, and, according to his belief, also by the President. Interv, Epstein with Haskell, 17 Apr 50.

14 This message began by informing the War Department of Eden's proposal to Macmillan, British Resident Minister, referred to above, which the latter showed to General Eisenhower. Macmillan was informed by Eisenhower that it was not appropriate for him to comment on issues which he felt should be decided between the two governments.

15 The copy of the memorandum in the files is undated but, in returning his revision to Leahy on 7 April, the President indicated that the memorandum was dated 10 March. He made no changes in the above-quoted paragraphs of the State Department draft.

16 The AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 March, which had by now reached the War Department.

17 Actually the two secretaries are describing the plan as already modified by the War Department. The AFHQ plan did not provide for a Deputy Chief of Staff nor did it enter into questions of nationality.

18 The AFHQ plan as modified by the War Department (see the following section).

19 Colonel Haskell objected to the absence in the plan of a sufficiently clear statement of the principle of tactical supremacy. His memorandum set forth a number of changes which he felt should be made in the AFHQ plan. As only a part of these, however, were accepted, they are not quoted.

20 For the posthostil1ties period the American manual of military government (1940 ed.) provided that tactical units be used as organs of military government and that the commanding general assume responsibility in the area occupied, the boundaries coinciding with existing political boundaries.

21 Elimination of the Political Section originally recommended by AFHQ had been called for in the War Department message of 7 April (above). The British Officer who was G-4 at AFHQ on 29 April penned an interesting note on a chart made by the War Office to depict the organizational plan favored by the Americans, i.e., inclusion of a deputy chief of staff (American), head of a military government section, in the chain of command: "The objection to this setup is that the expression of higher policy may receive a U.S. twist in transmission to the executive authority on the ground...." The remedy, he further indicated, was to have a direct chain of command from the British Military Governor and the British Deputy Military Governor to the C-in-C. Though General Eisenhower was American he would be too much pressed with other matters to give military government problems much attention. See Memo, Brig. R. G. Lewis to the CAO, AFHQ, 29 Apr 43, AFHQ, CAO files, Reel 309A.

22 In a note which the War Department had seen, Macmillan, British Resident Minister, had indicated his expectation that if a political section to advise the Allied C-in-C was adopted, he would be permitted to extend the range of the matters on which he would himself advise Eisenhower. Macmillan note, Political Questions at AFHQ Arising Out of Operation HUSKY, CAD files, HUSKY file (prior to 1 Jun 43).

23 The Americans wished to strengthen General Eisenhower's control over civil affairs and keep the civil affairs section free from the political complications which seemed to characterize the British system, Interv, Weinberg With Mai Gen John E. Hull, former DACofS, OPD, 28 Feb 50.

24 Although the U.S. Field Manual of 1943 states that military government personnel should as far as possible deal with the inhabitants through indigenous personnel, here the President was favoring direct control. On the other hand, Lord Rennell's memorandum (below) outlines a theory of indirect control which was a departure from the British colonial practice (see above). The dispute was not resolved during the planning period but indirect control quickly became Allied policy in operations-a fact which supported Lord Rennell's arguments.

25 A difficulty not foreseen by the War Department was the frequency with which, as matters developed, the theater was compelled to wait a considerable time before receiving new instructions from Washington.

26 The American draft had been prepared by representatives of the State, Treasury, and War Departments. Its basic principles were taken chiefly from the State Department's March memorandum on a plan for military government in Sicily (Note 15 and sec. 2, above). The draft has not been reproduced inasmuch as, except for some changes brought about by discussions with the British, it is identical with the final CCS directive given below.

27 The supplement suggested was to the paragraphs concerning defascistization. After some debate the British proposal, including a distinction between beneficial and nonbeneficial Fascist organizations, was accepted in the form represented by paragraph 6a of the final directive.

28 The American draft had stated simply that no political activity was to be countenanced prior to the issuance of a further directive. The British modification was accepted.

29 General Hilldring disagreed with the British on this issue, pointing out that the American draft included the safeguard phrase "consistent with military necessity." Memo, Hilldring for BJSM, 11 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43.) In this case the British deferred to the American view, see final directive, par. 8, below.

30 Because of the length of time consumed in Anglo American discussions on unsettled points, the directive was sent to AFHQ in installments to avoid unnecessary delay. The bulk of it went forward on 31 May; on 10 June paragraph 6a was dispatched; finally on 28 June, after paragraphs 2 and 5 had been agreed upon by the two governments, the complete directive as given above was sent to Eisenhower. The CCS directive is of basic importance for Allied policy not only in Sicily but also in mainland Italy, to which it was later extended.

31 The plan was incorporated into a manual entitled AMGOT Plan, Proclamation, and Instructions. The September 1943 edition has been used in this volume.

32 These proclamations formed the basic legislative structure under which occupied territory was to be governed. Spofford Rpt.

33 The original plan had used the title Deputy Military Governor. At the suggestion of Lord Rennell this was changed to Chief Civil Affairs Officer to accord with a recent change in British terminology. Other changes were also made at his suggestion. Msg, AFHQ/CAD, 11 Apr 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 6633.

34 The abbreviation "AMG" was adopted in October 1943. See below, Chapter X, note 1.

35 General Administrative Instructions (GAI), sixteen in all, were a part of the AMGOT Plan published on 1 May 1943. These instructions, copies of which were issued to field personnel, deal with general policy and attitude toward civilians and the immediate duties of civil affairs officers upon entering occupied areas.

36 The controversial sentence was, in the end, never introduced into the printed manual. General Administrative Instructions No. 2, to which the CAO's were referred for their attitude toward the Italian people, merely restated paragraph 4 of the CCS directive and elaborated on policies to be pursued in eliminating Fascism.

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