Endnotes for Chapter V

1 Interv, Weinberg With Gen Hilldring, Dec 50.

1a CCS 190 (see above, Chapter III, Section 3) initiated the entire discussion over the formation of a combined civil affairs committee. It proposed that such a committee be created by extending to all occupied areas the jurisdiction of the Committee of Combined Boards (Chapter II, Section 3) a combined civilian agency established in 1942 to handle the supply and economic problems of French North Africa. This proposal was rejected by the U.S. Joint Chiefs on 31 March (JCS 250) (Chapter III, Section 3) because of the difficulties which, they felt, were inherent in civilian control during the initial period of military operations.

2 A committee, including British civilian economic agencies, which had been set up by the War Office in June 1942, largely for the purpose of estimating the requirements of civilian supply in liberated areas during the military period. The committee was most commonly referred to as AT(E). See also Chapter XXVII, section I.

3 A British committee which had the function of reconciling military and civilian supply policies and of providing for the transition from the military period of supply responsibility to the civilian.

4 The British were thus proposing two combined civil affairs committees-one in London, the other in Washington.

5 In other words, a repetition of the North African pattern with its aggregation of civilian agencies.

6 The British Chiefs of Staff wished the AT(E) Committee to have the primary responsibility for operations based upon the United Kingdom, that is, for northwest Europe. This became clear to Americans only after the Washington committee had begun to function.

7 The War Department from the beginning had been reluctant to become involved with the decisions of the London committee. It had felt that it could not become bound by decisions into the making of which it could not enter on any basis equal to that of the British with their elaborate on-the-spot organization.

8 As the other provisos were not assented to they are not quoted. They concern principally the functions and authority which the British desired to see accepted with respect to the AT(E) Committee.

9 General Hilldring had actually had little difficulty in securing their concurrence. They had apparently been concerned lest the British proposal for a combined committee of civilian agencies be accepted. This would have meant an entanglement with British agencies which threatened too great a loss of freedom of action. See Chapter IV, Section 2, note by Governor Lehman, 5 May 1943, protesting the proposal of CCS 190 on the ground that it infringed upon the mission assigned to him.

10 The proposed CCAC, as a subcommittee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, did not conflict with the civilian Area Director Plan which the President was espousing at this time for operations within the theater. See pp. 100-101, above.

11 This paragraph, after considerable debate, had been accepted by both the British Joint Staff Mission and CAD. But opposition to the draft arose in the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. McNarney objected to the fact that the words "after the capture" enabled the United Kingdom to impose its policies upon an American commander before the exigencies of military occupation had ended.

12 This paragraph reflected American insistence upon the principle of military control pending determination by military commanders that relinquishment of control to civilian agencies was safe. However, the paragraph also met the British position insofar as it made possible such relinquishment before the end of military occupation.

13 This paragraph was a compromise between CCS 190/4, favored by the British and CCS 190/5, which substituted the words "upon the relinquishment of military government" for the phrase "after the capture" in the former. At the CCS meeting of 25 June, Dill proposed that CCS accept the new draft tentatively pending London's opportunity to express its views upon the revision. This was done and the new committee, which became known as the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, was ready to function. Under these conditions, the Charter was approved by the President on 9 July and by the Secretary of State, 10 July 1943.

14 The above-quoted paragraph 6 proved acceptable to the British Government and was incorporated in the Charter. But before this happened, another paragraph had given rise to divergent interpretations, on an issue so serious as to prevent CCAC from functioning for some time (see below, Section 2).

15 The paper referred to was the British-Norwegian Agreement, CCS 274, which Devers recommended on Io June for favorable consideration as suitable for Norway and as a guide for future similar arrangements for civil administration and jurisdiction in liberated territories. The War Department took the view that ". . . inasmuch as the TRIDENT decisions directed combined planning for occupation of Norway, it is essential that a combined agreement be made. . . ." CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1); ABC files, 014, Norway (4 Jul 43), sec..

16 The British here base their claim in behalf of AT(E)'s jurisdiction upon a legal ground-the charter of CCAC. However, the paragraph referred to concerning the status of the London committee was, like so many provisions of international agreements, inherently vague-perhaps intentionally so. While both sides were to use legal arguments in the long debate which followed, the really impelling motivations were of course nonlegal. Each country felt that it could best safeguard its interests if issues most directly touching them were decided by a combined committee located in its own capital. Each country, thus, felt that political as well as legal justice was on its side. The case of the Americans is, unfortunately, more fully stated in the documents which follow than that of the British. The feeling of the British that the AT(E) Committee should have had primary jurisdiction over civil affairs planning for Europe is expressed in strong though good-tempered fashion by Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Morgan, former Chief of Staff, COSSAC, in his Overture to Overlord (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 234 ff. He points out that the British had been engaged in this liberation and conquest business already for some years, and had been at great pains to set up an elaborate civil affairs organization. It seemed difficult to make sense out of duplicating the British efforts by giving the Washington committee primary jurisdiction over the very area which the British had been studying and preparing for so long.

17 In the preceding portion of the memorandum General Hilldring had expressed the view that COSSAC headquarters was the proper and expedient instrumentality for combined civil affairs planning in the United Kingdom. COSSAC, he pointed out, had been designated by CCS as the agency for this purpose.

18 The British felt that, as regards civilian supply, the United States should assume primary planning and procurement responsibility for Italy while they themselves should assume it for the European Theater. The distinction suggested itself because operations in northwest Europe would be based on the United Kingdom and also because the British were carrying the main burden of negotiations with the governments in exile. One difficulty for the Americans in accepting the British view was that, while the British wished to reserve to themselves the main planning for the European Theater, they by no means proposed to relieve the United States of furnishing a large part of the supplies. Plans eventually agreed upon for northwest Europe supply requirements will be found in Chapter XXIII, of this volume.

19 A copy of this message was given to the Chief of the Civilian Supply Branch, ASF, by the British Joint Staff Mission, with the request that the War Department aid in executing its proposals. The Mission stated that this was but one of numerous similar matters which would be arising in increasing number.

20 The Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee, established in September 1941 under Sir Frederick Leith Ross.

21 Mocatta arrived from England the middle of June and held a series of conferences with War Department supply authorities beginning 19 June. In addition to requesting a definite commitment of U.S. wheat shipments, he sought full acceptance by the War Department of the London AT(E) Committee's supply estimates for Europe. (ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 102.) The War Department representatives informally took the negative position outlined by Wright in the memorandum for Clay which follows.

22 It was British practice to submit military as well as civilian requirements formally to the Combined Boards, a civilian agency.

23 A postscript on a copy of the memorandum stated that General Clay had agreed with its proposals. Wright informed the British Joint Staff Mission on 24 July that questions of the type, amount, and time of supplies for Europe should be agreed upon in Washington on the basis of the U.S. theater commander's recommendations together with those of the British.

24 It will be noted that the U.S. membership did not include any civilians while the British included one civilian representative. The British were led to include civilian representation because of the interlinking of civilian agencies with their supply procedure for the military period. McCloy stated at the second meeting of CCAC that American civilians would attend those meetings to which they were specially invited. The supply subcommittee came to be known as CCAC/S.

25 This document embodies CCS decisions reached at the First Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in August 1943 and became the future guide for combined civilian supply planning. For further details see Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45, Chapters XXI and XXII.

26 Estimates of European supply requirements arrived at by working parties of the AT(E) Shipping and Supply Subcommittee.

27 General Clay put the matter in the following way: "When the War Department goes before the allocating authorities of the U.S. Government with the Army Supply Program, the Department feels entirely justified in using the high Army priority for obtaining the minimum essential civilian supply requirements . . . that are included in the Army Supply Program. The War Department, on the other hand, does not feel that it would be justified in applying to the allocating authorities for advance stockpiling on a large scale of additional civilian supplies not absolutely necessary for military operations." These, Clay proceeded to explain, were requested, if deemed advisable, by civilian agencies such as OFRRO. Min, 3d Mtg CCAC, 29 Jul 43, CCAC files, 334 (7-15-43), sec. I.

28 The disagreement over the content of the basic ration was not settled until the eleventh meeting of the Supply Subcommittee, 16 November 1943. The ration as finally agreed departed from original U.S. view by the inclusion of limited amounts of sugar, fat, and coffee, the last for morale purposes. The proportions of these items included were not as great as the U.K. members thought advisable, but their proposals were referred to civilian agencies for consideration as supplements to the military ration.

29 Among the factors which influenced the American members was the old reluctance to concede a role to civilian agencies in advance planning for military occupation. CCAC 34, dated 19 October 1943, memorandum of the U.S. members of CCAC/S, stated: "Reasons of security make it inadvisable to delegate to nonmilitary agencies the responsibility for schedules of requirements based on operational plans (CCAC files, 334 Combined Boards, 10-19-43). It further stated that the need for direct and speedy action is best served by centralizing supply responsibility in one combined military agency. On the other hand, the British had to take into account the fact that any determination of supply responsibility by a combined military agency might affect injuriously their own civilian economy, much more heavily taxed than that of the United States. As their civilian agencies responsible for the requirements of their economy were represented on the Combined Boards, they wished that requests for the requirements of occupied areas "be considered by those who have the responsibility for handling the problem presented by each individual raw material and foodstuff as a whole, and by them fitted into world supply and demand picture of which they alone have full knowledge." Memo, Rickards, British Army Staff, Washington, for Wright, Dir, ID, 11 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334, Combined Bds (10-19-43). This difficult issue was not settled until 23 November, as indicated in the following document.

30 Simply stated, the compromise was that the British supply representatives were permitted to refer matters of supply responsibility to the Combined Boards as they wished to do; the Supply Subcommittee was not obligated to do so as a body.

31 Areas outside the combat zone and line of communications.

32 The British in February 1944 agreed to the U.S. position on hiatus areas when they accepted the so-called "Plan A" for combined supply operations in Europe. See below, Chapter XXIII, Section 5; see also Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45, Chapters XXI and XXII.

33 The establishment of the European Advisory Commission was agreed upon at the Moscow Conference. The Ambassador to Great Britain was the American representative on this body which was to meet in London. General Wickersham, formerly Commandant of the School of Military Government, was appointed military adviser to the U.S. representative and in that capacity was to represent the War Department and act as a liaison officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By its terms of reference, the Commission was to "study and make joint recommendations to the three governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three governments may consider appropriate to refer to it." The vagueness of this formulation raised the possibility of the EAC's considering questions of civil affairs arising in the presurrender period. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs in opposition to this (see below) were incorporated in instructions from the Secretary of State to the U.S. representative on the Commission.

34 That is, elevation of AT(E) to the status of senior combined civil affairs committee for Europe.

35 The British members of CCAC had for several months abstained from discussing matters which their government considered within the proper jurisdiction of the London committee. On 7 December, the American delegates in AT(E) were forbidden active participation pending determination as to whether jurisdiction over planning for ETO would fall on CCAC in Washington or the London Committee.

36 In an OPD Memo for record, 19 January, it was pointed out that the Director of CAD had originally been opposed to a London subcommittee. The reason for CAD's later acquiescence is indicated by the same OPD Memo. A statement made by Colonel Marcus, Executive of CAD, to OPD is cited as follows: "He stated that the British have refused to take affirmative action in CCAC meetings which has resulted in complete frustration with nothing having been accomplished for months. He said that the London idea was the only remedy and if not accepted, the CCAC would cease to exist. . . ." G-3 files, ABC, 014 (11-27-42), sec. 2.

37 When the CCS accepted the British proposal for a London subcommittee, the British resumed full co-operation in CCAC.

38 The issue is now that of co-ordination of combined military agencies and combined civilian agencies in supply planning for the post military period. This deadlock, like all that had gone before, was finally broken. ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 263.

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