Endnotes for Chapter IV

1 The alteration in the President's views had not become far-reaching by this time. See Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 3 Jun 43, in sec. 3, below.

2 The British had proposed that their Resident Minister, Harold Macmillan, be attached to Eisenhower's headquarters to be in a position to advise him on the political issues which would arise during operations in Sicily. Detailed plans for Military Government control during initial phase in Sicily will be found in Chapter VII.

3 See Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), Chapter II.

4 As regards French North Africa, the War Department's planning role was secondary to that of civilian agencies. The proposal of Mr. Rostow is striking because of its suggestion that the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee, in which the War Department was but one of a number of interested agencies, was less appropriate than a tightly knit planning relationship between the State and War Departments. When planning began for new areas something like this was, in fact, to eventuate.

5 The proposal of the civilian agencies for systematic joint planning was thus not adopted by the War Department, except for the two agencies noted above.

6 One difficulty in the State Department planning was apparently the multiplicity of levels and desks concerned. Not until the creation of the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) in late 1944 was a mechanism found which would bring about quick interdepartmental decisions. This committee was composed only of representatives on the higher levels.

7 One of the three plans, generally known as RANKIN I, II, III, for return to the Continent in event of deterioration of the German position. See Pogue, The Supreme Command, Chapter V.

8 These directives were in response to Governor Lehman's request for more definitive instruction.

9 Statement of Policy for Relief and Rehabilitation in Future Liberated Areas. Copies were also sent to State, Treasury, Navy, Agriculture, War Food Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, War Production Board, and the Bureau of the Budget.

10 Governor Lehman, it will be remembered, had early in April agreed that the War Department would assume responsibility for the first ninety days (see above, Chapter III, Section 4). This paragraph, in particular, was responsible for the concern in the War Department which led to Secretary Stimson's letter to Governor Lehman on 2 June.

11 Governor Lehman promptly expressed agreement with Secretary Stimson's observations.

12 The Director of the Bureau of the Budget had been working on such a plan ever since, in the French North African operation, it became evident that civilian agency operations were sadly in need of co-ordination. For memoranda of the Bureau of the Budget and others giving the background of the plan, see above, Chapter II.

13 In his letter to Secretary Hull of 3 June, the President described the plan as ". . . similar to what I had in mind when we discussed the problems arising from the invasion of North Africa. . . . The job in Washington will demand a large part of the time and energy of the Assistant Secretary you name to co-ordinate these activities . . ." CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1). To carry out the plan, the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (OFEC) was created. Though the State Department also had had leadership in North Africa, no machinery had been provided for co-ordinating the different civilian agencies in Washington or, except for the North African Economic Board, in the theater.

14 A proposed committee for combining the civilian economic agencies of the United States and Great Britain.

15 This position was also satisfactory to General Eisenhower, who had cabled that civilian agencies might soon send their personnel into Sicily. The issue insofar as it pertained to Sicily is fully treated below, in Chapter VIII.

16 In the ensuing paragraph of the memorandum General Hilldring instructs Hammond to try further to win British acceptance of the concept of civilian economic control laid down in the President's letter of 3 June. However, nothing came of these efforts. The Area Director Plan was never formally abandoned; it simply withered away owing not only to British opposition but also to the continuation of difficult conditions for the operation of civilian agencies.

17 While the charter of FEA incorporated the same mission as that of OFEC (sec. 3, above), abolished by the same Executive Order, the new organization was in one respect quite different. Whereas OFEC was merely to co-ordinate a number of independent agencies, FEA consolidated them within its own framework. The agencies brought together in FEA were the BEW, OFRRO, OLLA, and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) so far as concerned its foreign procurement activities. OFEC is generally supposed to have failed because independent civilian agencies were unwilling to sacrifice sufficiently their freedom of action. FEA would not have this difficulty. However, it was to be impeded by other difficulties, chief of which seems to have been the lack of adequate preparations for entering upon civilian economic activities under difficult conditions.

18 OFRRO obtained its funds from the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. There were varying points of view among civilian agencies as to the proper placement of relief functions, and it was uncertain at the time whether OFRRO would continue in its desired role. This was perhaps one of the reasons why the War Department did not count too greatly on OFRRO's procurement of civilian supplies or wish to extend it aid.

19 OFRRO was, in effect, requesting the War Department to help it out of its troubles. In return it was offering little or nothing since the concession of paragraph 4the right of the War Department to requisition OFRRO supplies during the military period-was one which the Army already took for granted.

20 One can easily see other and more fundamental reasons than those cited in this letter for declining Governor Lehman's proposal. The Army had tremendous difficulties even in fulfilling its supply responsibilities for the military period. There was a risk that these would be greatly increased if it also underwrote the program of a civilian agency whose charter was doubtful, whose standing with Congress was unknown, and whose competence for its task was as yet untried. An additional source of apprehension was the fact that a joint program with OFRRO might carry over and entangle the War Department in the postwar period, contrary to all its inclinations.

21 Without underestimating the difficulties faced by OFRRO, one may still find it difficult to accept the view that the War Department's rejection of Governor Lehman's proposal made OFRRO's fulfillment of its task impossible. Later UNRRA experience showed that a civilian agency can best obtain relief and rehabilitation supplies when war is over. (See George Woodbridge, compiler, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).

22 According to the History of the Civilian Supply Branch, I, p. 90, prepared by International Division, ASF, it was General Hilldring's letter of 7 July to Governor Lehman which led the civilian agencies to request an extension of the period of military responsibility to six months.

23 Governor Lehman, however, was asking the War Department not merely to abstain from opposition but for active support. This the War Department felt it inappropriate to give, except when OFRRO's requests were for items of military necessity. General Clay indicated this to Governor Lehman at a conference of 21 July when the latter again aired his procurement difficulties. General Clay stated that "the Army would not oppose, nor actively support OFRRO's requests for allocations of foodstuffs over and above the Army basic ration." ID files, Civ Sup, DS-80. At the same conference General Clay expressed his opposition to OFRRO's program of agricultural machinery since any advance stockpiling could only be at the expense of essential military equipment. The situation points up the difficulties of a civilian agency in procuring relief supplies independently in the face of military priorities.

24 The upward revision was brought about by two developments. The first was the request of the civilian agencies in July that the military authorities extend their responsibility from 90 (plus 45 days of the "pack-ration" or assault period) to six months. The second was the approval by the Combined Chiefs of a combined supply program for all of liberated Europe. See below, Chapter V, Section 4.

25 For months before UNRRA came into existence, its organizational and personnel problems were under consideration in OFRRO. Policies were drafted and approval secured. Also, the section of the UNRRA Handbook on international organization was prepared for the First Session of the UNRRA Council. When the new organization was set up, OFRRO personnel became the American component. Woodbridge, UNRRA, vol. I.

26 The explanation given in the documents quoted above is the only one that has been found. Participants interviewed could add no information about the background of the President's to November letter. Notwithstanding the reference to McCloy's presence at the 7 November meeting with Stettinius and Crowley, no evidence has turned up that the War Department appealed to the President for additional responsibility. The President had taken almost two years to come to the view attributed to him by McCloy in the 14 January meeting with Acheson. The 10 November letter was not a repudiation of the idea that civilians should, in principle, undertake these tasks but rested upon a recognition that civilians had not yet made themselves ready and were not likely to do so for a considerable time.

27 It is noteworthy that General Hilldring was discussing not merely Germany, but areas that would be liberated such as France, where an indigenous government would presumably be allowed to assume administrative responsibility as soon as possible.

28 General Wright and Major Palmer represented the International Aid Division of the War Department; Major McLean was the ASF working member of CAD.

29 This understanding as to the dependence of UNRRA operations upon invitation by the military was later confirmed by formal agreement with the international organization.

30 That the plan could be prepared with such speed after the President's directive was due to the efforts already put into revising the Army Supply Program on an assumption of broad responsibility (see above, Sections 5 and 6).

31 "Scorched" and "unscorched" conditions refer respectively to the assumption of great damage or of relatively little damage by the enemy. See also p. 682, below, and Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 194345, Chapters XXI and XXII.

32 This marks the first time the War Department was willing to join formally with the civilian agencies in a supply program. It had previously felt unable to accept OFRRO's overtures to this effect, evidently because, as already noted, of the fear that joint effort would entangle the Army unduly in the programs of the civilian agencies.

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