Endnotes for Chapter II
1 The Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ in London was not formally activated until 15 September 1942. But as early as 21 August, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower cabled the War Department that it was necessary to organize on his staff a Civil Administrative Section in addition to his already existent Political Section, and asked for a civil administrator and key "military and civilian" assistants. Robert D. Murphy, former Counselor of the American Embassy at Vichy, was selected to head the Civil Affairs Section and a number of officers who had just graduated from Charlottesville were sent as military assistants. Civilian assistants were provided later by the State Department (see below, Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 24 Nov 42, sec. 3). Mr. Murphy's selection was due in great measure to his firsthand acquaintance with conditions in French North Africa. There, in the summer, he had gathered information showing the disposition of certain French groups, notably that of Brig. Gen. Charles E. Mast, to co-operate with the Americans in case they invaded this territory.
2 The civil affairs plan which appears in President Roosevelt's directive to Mr. Murphy (following document) was no doubt one which the latter had largely suggested (see George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: 1957) (hereafter cited as Howe, Northwest Africa), Chapter IV).
3 Although revised to make it more in accord with General Eisenhower's views on military authority, the directive, even in its revised form (see the following document) reflected the conception that, so far as concerned purely political civil affairs planning, Murphy was to have a great deal of latitude.
4 Murphy was thus not to assume charge of the Civil Affairs Section until after the occupation began. This was due to the secret mission to French North Africa on which he departed immediately after his appointment. H. Freeman Matthews, of the State Department, served as acting chief of the section throughout the planning period. Howe, Northwest Africa, ch. III.
5 AFHQ General Orders form the main part of the plan ,prepared by the Civil Affairs Section.
6 It had been decided that, because of the bitter feeling against Great Britain which the attack on Dakar had aroused among the French, the administration should be entirely in the hands of Americans.
7 The planners did not consider the declaration of military government desirable but were obliged to plan for it as a possibility.
8 With the emergence of the possibility of using General Giraud's help the thought of declaring military government, never a preferred plan, receded still more. It had recently become known to Washington and AFHQ that Darlan would not be disinterested in co-operating if a sufficiently promising American invasion was launched. However, despite General Eisenhower's consideration of this alternative, it was not approved in Washington. The narrative of the complicated negotiations with Giraud and other French leaders is to be found in Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, and in Howe, Northwest Africa, Chapters II and III.
9 After the landings, 30,000 tons a month were requested as a bare minimum. See Section 6, below.
10 The Allies landed in French North Africa on 8 November. They soon learned that Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, Commander in Chief of the French Forces, happened to be in Algiers visiting his ill son. Conferences with him began after the Americans took Algiers and discovered that the local French leaders would follow only Darlan, not Gen. Henri Giraud. This message was sent after Darlan had been won over to co-operation with the United States. On 13 November the French leaders in North Africa agreed to form a new government with Darlan as civil head and Giraud as head of the armed forces.
11 On the same day General Eisenhower had dispatched to Washington a copy of the proposed agreement with Admiral Darlan. Although consummation of the agreement called for the greatest haste, General Eisenhower felt that, 'in view of the deviation of the agreement from both of the alternative armistice drafts given him before the landings, CCS approval was required.
12 As finally consummated the agreement recognized the role of Great Britain in the area by adding to its references to the CG, U.S. Army, the phrase "and its supporting Allies."
13 The CCS, who had jurisdiction over civil affairs as over all other phases of combined military operations, were in effect delegating CA responsibility to civilian agencies, with the reservation that they should be kept informed on policy matters. See CCS Secretariat Memorandum of 27 November 1942, below.
14 In accordance with this letter the Secretary of State, on 21 November, established in the State Department the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO), with Governor Herbert H. Lehman as its director, and on 24 November the Office of Foreign Territories, which immediately assumed "the responsibility for implementing the economic and social program" for North Africa in Washington.
15 The President's earliest step in assigning responsibiilty to civilian agencies was his letter of 13 November to the Lend-Lease Administrator authorizing him to render-lend lease aid to French North Africa as vital to the defense of the United States. The letter implied that the Lend-Lease Administration was not merely to finance such aid but to procure supplies as an operating agency. About the same time the President declared that "No one will go hungry . . . in any territory occupied by the United Nations." Dept of State Bull, Nov 42.
16 It is doubtful that, in acquiescing so readily in the degree of control given to civilian agencies, War Department authorities were appreciative of the great civilian supply problem which French North Africa was to present. Interv, Harold Epstein, OCMH, with Donald H. McLean, former ASF working member of CAD, 17 Apr 50.
17 The Committee of Combined Boards was being set up pursuant to the CCS recommendation of 12 November (above).
18 The subject under discussion was the Army's purchase and shipment in November of barter goods and other civilian supplies requested by Eisenhower for French North Africa. The War Department had assumed responsibility pending the crystallization of civilian agency plans and procedures.
19 International Division and International Aid Division were used interchangeably.
20 A concise account of all agencies set up by the State Department for handling civilian supply will be found in Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (hereafter cited as Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45).
21 The function of this committee was to advise the Office of Foreign Territories on matters of policy.
22 This appointment gave Murphy direct access to the President and the State Department on matters of policy.
23 The charter of the North African Economic Board was revised on 8 January. Among the changes made was the division of the board into a Civil Department and a Military Department, the latter dealing solely with military economic matters. On 23 January 1943 AFHQ, in informing the War Department of organizational and personnel developments of the Board, stated that "responsibility has been placed in the civilian side but pending arrival of adequate civilian personnel military men will be detailed temporarily to civil department." OPD Msg files, CM-IN 10177. Civilian agencies soon filled the leading positions of the board's various divisions. To be sure, NAEB did provide for representation of the military component, both in its chairmanship and in its Military Department, and its general functions embraced the co-ordination of military and civilian interests.
24 Macmillan, a member of the British Cabinet, was at the end of December 1942 appointed British Resident Minister at AFHQ to keep His Majesty's Government informed on political matters and to supervise the British civilians who were coming to assume positions in NAEB. The Political and Economic Council was formed in order to provide a formal means for co-operation with Macmillan, who, not being a member of General Eisenhower's staff, required some medium for official collaboration.
25 Established in February 1943, it was an operating committee of the Committee of Combined Boards, and did its more routine work.
26 Nevertheless, on 18 December 1942, Eisenhower was notified that Murphy had been appointed the personal representative of the President with the rank of Minister (see above). It has been observed, however, that one of Murphy's great contributions was that he represented the political point of view while attempting to fit completely into the military framework, Interv, Epstein, OCMH, with Brig Gen Charles M. Spofford, one-time member of the Jt Exec Vice Chairmanship, NAEB, 17 Apr 50.
27 In December 1942 McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, had become the War Department representative on the Committee of the Combined Boards and also on the State Department's Interdepartmental Advisory Committee. Subsequently, the War Department obtained representation on the Combined Committee for North and West Africa (CCNA) and substantially all the other interdepartmental committees. AFS, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, 1, 22, 26.
Also in December there was established in the War Department an informal committee for North African Civilian Supply, consisting of representatives of the International Division, SOS; Operations Division, GS; Operations Division, SOS; Transportation Corps, SOS; and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. The committee acted under the chairmanship of the Director, International Division, which provided the secretariat. Matters relating to civilian supply for North Africa were referred to the International Division for action so that proper distribution of the problems might be made within the War Department, and correlation maintained between the action of the War Department and the action of the other agencies in Washington.
28 Colonel Rooth headed the group of CA officers who had been trained at Charlottesville. His proposal was not acted upon.
29 The agreement whereby French West Africa proposed to join Admiral Darlan's commissariat in forming a French Imperial Federation.
30 On 3 December AFHQ had sent to Washington the text of an agreement with Governor General [Francois Pierre] Boisson giving the United States all the military advantages which it sought in French West Africa. There were no civil affairs provisions in the agreement. See Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 270-71.
31 On 5 December the British Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the British Joint Staff Mission giving the assurance that the Government of the United Kingdom would not permit action or propaganda from British West African territories directed against the authority of Boisson. Eisenhower was asked to inform Boisson to that effect. OPD files, Exec 5, Item 4.
32 It is noteworthy that even in a purely political matter-and one in which the President felt the deepest concern-it seemed impossible to proceed without first obtaining the theater commander's views. The paramountcy of military necessity appears to have been recognized no less in Washington than in the theater. This was to be the case with most subsequent political issues as well.
33 A statement was drafted for Admiral Darlan but it was made public in entirety only outside of French North Africa. It was feared that the liberal tenets advanced would not have happy repercussions locally.
34 On 13 December Eisenhower replied at length to this message. While admitting that the political situation was "most confused and very difficult," he did not feel that the reports in general were accurate and stated that on the whole he was "gratified with the progress being made toward a sound civil administration." OPD Msg Files, CM-IN 6093
35 Giraud was, shortly afterward, chosen by the Imperial Council as High Commissioner. He remained in that office until, on 3 June 1943, De Gaulle and Giraud became co-presidents of a French Committee of National Liberation. In August 1943 the United States and Great Britain recognized this body as de facto governing body in North Africa and other areas where its authority was accepted.
36 For recognition of FCNL, see Chapter XXIV.
37 Shortly after this message, Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., of the Office of ACofS for Materiel, reported a recent conversation with General Eisenhower as follows: "General Eisenhower places great stress on the necessity of doing everything possible to import the maximum of supplies for civilian economy. The underlying reason for this is the long unprotected communication line-approximately 1,500 miles, Casablanca to Tunisia-the security of which in large measure is dependent on local military forces and civilian population." ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 30-31.
38 The shortage of shipping was always to be far more serious than the shortage of supplies.
39 These items could, of course, be justified on the ground that the farmers' wives would sell wheat to obtain them.
40 Assistant Secretary of War McCIoy had made a trip to French North Africa and had sent an urgent cable on the personnel shortages.
41 For criticisms of OLLA supply operations, see below. Also see Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 3943-45.
42 On the whole, the 30,000-ton-a-month program set by General Eisenhower was successfully met. The difficulty lay in the fact that both the French and some of the Washington civilian agencies believed a larger program desirable.
43 The first OFRRO field mission left for North Africa the middle of January 1943.
44 It is clear that the civilian agencies did not consider themselves able to cope with this phase for the present. Whether or not they felt that the Army should always handle relief initially is less clear. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 9 February [above], Governor Lehman had stated that OFRRO men could have gone in with the Army over the North African beaches if his office had been in existence then.
45 For organization of Civil Affairs Division see Chapter III.
46 The War Department had, previously, handled procurement of civilian supply only in emergencies, and generally by borrowing from existent Army supplies.
47 In other words, although the direction was to be military, the actual operation in Tunisia was to be joint military-civilian. In this respect it was only the nucleus of the full military control which was to come in later operations.
48 This is an excerpt from a lengthy report, evidently written by an individual close to McCloy, who had just returned from a visit to North Africa. It was circulated among leading War Department authorities concerned with civil affairs and received much attention because of its realistic description and analysis of the entire setup for civil affairs in the theater. The writer, though concerned over the lack of co-ordination, did not himself criticize the principle of civilian control.
49 Colonel Holmes happened to be in Washington at the time, having brought over the AFHQ plan for military government in Sicily.
50 This is an extract from a very rough draft, commenting on General Somervell's memorandum for McCloy of 3 April, above.
51 Although NAEB was left in the control of civilian agencies, it retained its status within the military framework much longer than was originally intended. In accordance with the plan of eventual "civilianization" of Allied economic activities in French North Africa, the decision was made, after the completion of the Tunisian campaign, that NAEB should be superseded by a wholly civilian organization in November 1943. But it proved very difficult to find civilian replacements for certain key military personnel, and the conversion of NAEB was, consequently, long delayed. Finally, on I June 1944, it was replaced by the North African Joint Economic Mission, a civilian agency, which was placed directly under the two Allied governments. Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater, MS, OCMH files, pp. 59ff.
52 For an account of the continuing problem of industrial rehabilitation supplies for devastated areas, see Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45.
53 See above, page 55, for the abortive plan of coordinating propaganda and civil affairs under Mayor LaGuardia as a member of General Eisenhower's staff.
54 This memorandum was largely prompted by the issue whether the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, as its director desired, should be given an executive order vesting it with power of co-ordinating civilian agencies in the sphere of civilian relief and rehabilitation abroad. Although OFRRO had been in existence for several months, its powers had not as yet been authoritatively defined.
55 Some of the most critical remarks about the working of the civilian agency setup came from civilian agencies themselves, particularly the State Department and OFRRO. It should be noted that much stronger criticism was directed against the Washington agencies than against NAEB in the theater, which, despite the transiency of its personnel, appears to many to have done a rather good job. Interv, Epstein, 18 Apr 50, with Spofford who was connected with the North African operation in a military status.
56 The reference here is to the President's establishment of the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordination. See below, Chapter IV, Section 3.
Last updated 18 February 2004