Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XXXII:

Civilian Supply Is a Major CA Problem to the End

While the problem of civilian supply has already been touched upon throughout the volume, the present chapter deals with the more general history of the subject, especially in the latter phase of occupation when acute shortages began to be felt.

Although the delivery of supplies during the first six months ran behind estimated requirements, the lag at first made no great difference because of the limited area, capture of enemy stocks, and the fact that so far as concerned France civil affairs needs had been overestimated. However, when Belgium and a part of the Netherlands were liberated in September and October, CA officials began to feel the pinch. The great need for civil supplies arose at precisely the same time that the precisely combat forces began to experience a shortage in supply. In other words, the critical civil supply problem that developed during the winter of 1944-45 was really only a part of the larger problem arising from the unexpectedly rapid advances of the Allied Armies in August and September, the failure to open the port of Antwerp until 26 November (although the city of Antwerp had been entered on 5 September), and, finally, the Ardennes counteroffensive that came in the middle of December.

Just when Allied shipping and supply authorities were struggling to resolve the difficulties in the military supply program, French authorities were asking to be allowed to import raw materials and productive facilities for rehabilitation efforts. SHAEF recognized France's need for such a program but all that could be done for the time being was to plan for a gradual transition from a military to an Allied civilian supply program. The French preferred to take responsibility for their own rehabilitation program, and in 1945 a limited amount of shipping was made available for this purpose, as also for the national program developed by Belgium. At the same time the military supply program continued.

With German surrender there immediately arose the question of how long the military supply program should continue. Some liberated countries, at least, were apprehensive about the consequences of termination. But it was never contemplated that the Army should concern itself with civilian supply indefinitely; indeed, early planning had resulted not only in Anglo-American agreement on a policy of terminating combined supply operations but also in arrangements for ensuing transfer of U.S. Army responsibility to U.S. civilian agencies. The CCAC in November 1944 had agreed that the date for terminating military responsibility for any particular country should be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander. It was also agreed that the CCAC would advise the Combined Liberated Areas Committee of any military


decision affecting the date of termination of military responsibility in time to permit the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to (a) make known any policy consideration that might govern the continuation of such supplies; (b) ascertain whether or not a stable government had been established which could assume' the responsibility for civilian supplies; and (c) determine the extent to which supplies and shipping would be available to indigenous governments after termination of military responsibility. The President on 21 May 1945, shortly after German surrender, indicated his desire for early transfer of civilian supply responsibility to civilian agencies in a letter to the Secretary of War directing the Army to relinquish responsibility "as soon as the military situation permits." The actual process of disentanglement ran into some difficulties. France was eager to take over its own program and thought the military were moving too slowly in getting out. Belgium and Holland, on the other hand, were reluctant to see the Army relinquish its responsibilities and felt it was moving with undue haste. They evidently feared that the civilian agencies would be less successful in obtaining supplies than the military authorities. While the military programs were continued longer than at first contemplated, the War Department was unwilling to defer the close of its general program beyond August. Civilian relief then passed to the national governments involved and to the appropriate civilian agencies of the U.S. Government; still later UNRRA began to furnish supplies to those United Nations without sufficient foreign exchange resources. Thus President Roosevelt's initial plan to entrust civilian relief to the civilian agencies finally achieved, however belatedly, its fulfillment.



[The General Board USFET, Study 33: Procedures Followed by Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Restoration, Reorganization and Supervision of Indigenous Civil Administration, OCMH files]

156. . . . The responsibility for the procurement and handling of Civil Affairs supplies was delegated to the various Supply Services, and was to be handled in the normal supply channel. Supplies in Northern France were cared for, insofar as possible, in the same manner as other military stocks, with the Quartermaster Section responsible for the receipt, storage and issue of food. Difficulty was encountered from the first by poor marking of the supplies, which resulted in confusion on the beaches, since Civil Affairs supplies were included and issued with strictly military stocks. In many cases supplies were left on the beaches and spoilage of food resulted. Supplies were carried inland by transportation furnished by the Allied armies and turned over to the indigenous authorities at the places they were to be used. Later, an attempt was made to turn over the supplies to the French at the beaches, but the French authorities lacked the transport to keep the beaches and ports cleared. 1  ♦ ♦ ♦


[AAR, G-5, Third Army, ch. 3, sec. V]

♦ ♦ ♦ By the temporary attachment, while in coastal areas, of a United States Navy Officer with Civil Affairs training for port liaison, and of Specialist officers from Company 1, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, it was possible to handle requests from Corps and Detachments for special assistance promptly and adequately;

Difficulties arose, of course. The pace of the advance placed a strain upon all communications. Direct telephone contact with Detachments was rare. The wide distance separating Army G-5 and G-5, VIII Corps, had to be overcome by the sheer physical stamina of couriers. Restrictions on travel by staff members, for reasons of necessity, made contact with the operating Detachments a problem of first magnitude.

Just prior to the time that the Army began operations, requisitions were prepared calling forward relief supplies from Advance Section Communications Zone to supply dumps of the Army Quartermaster and Medical depots. These items consisted of food, soap, emergency feeding kits, sanitary and medical supplies. The Third U.S. Army Medical depot carried one Allied Relief Board Basic Medical Unit, and had two more "ARB" Units that were brought up to a depot further forward. Due to rapid movement, however, the Quartermaster Class II and IV forward depot was not established in time to stock Civil Affairs supplies as planned.

A Civil Affairs Operational Supply Detachment was organized 6 August consisting of two officers and two enlisted men from Company 1, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, which was given charge of the Civil Affairs supplies stocked at the Quartermaster Class 1 depot No. 10 near Rennes . . . for the use of the Detachment in Brittany. These supplies were called forward to the Rennes depot on the Quartermaster daily Telegram.

Emergency food and soap supplies were issued in the Army Service Area, Avranches, Granville, and Gavray. They were transported to Detachments from Advance Section Communications Zone supply dumps by captured enemy trucks driven by drivers from the G-5 Pool. Normally it was the responsibility of Advance Section Communications Zone to forward supplies to army depots, but due to the extreme shortage of army trucks it was necessary to use Civil Affairs transportation that had been obtained by salvaging damaged enemy vehicles.

Requisitions were approved and minimum requirements of gasoline, diesel oil and greases were furnished through Detachments for use of civilian officials, doctors and veterinarians to enable them to resume essential duties. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ AAR, G-5, Third Army, ch. 3, sec. V]

♦ ♦ ♦ At a conference on 21 July between French National authorities and officers of Communications Zone, 21 Army Group British and Twelfth U.S. Army Group, it was agreed, and confirmed later by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, that delivery of imported relief supplies would be made to departmental directorates of the Ravitaillement General. It was further agreed that delivery of relief supplies would be made to mayors or local officials by Detachments in the combat zone only, and then only under pressure of temporary necessity. No cash payment would be demanded by the Allied authorities delivering the commodities. Arrangements were made for future payment at a higher level.

Following the agreement the Regional Directors, L'Intendants des Aflaires Economiques of the Regions of Brittany and Angers, were called on for estimates of their minimum requirements of imported relief supplies. Both Regions reported a surplus of food stocks with the exception of sugar and salt. Their only requests were for immediate supplies of coal, gasoline, and fuel oil to care for immediate harvesting needs. Coal was not available but requisitions were approved for Civil Affairs gasoline and diesel oil in sufficient quantities to get the harvesting of crops under way in both Regions. The requisitions for diesel oil were furnished fully in the Region of Angers, and partially so in the Brittany area. Gasoline was not supplied from the dumps on account of the extreme shortage, but small supplies of captured enemy gasoline, diesel oil and coal were released for civilian use. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Copy of Ltr, Grasett, ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, to Koenig, CG, Fr Mil Forces in Great Britain 8 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 3006, Sup & Econ Branch]

2. It is desired to indicate in this letter the policy of Supreme Headquarters governing the issue and subsequent operation of such motor vehicles


and trailers as may be released to the French Authorities for use in relief work connected with the French civil population.

3. It is proposed that such vehicles and trailers will be delivered to the French Authorities in accordance with present arrangements for the delivery of property against physical receipt, subject to later settlement and to the following conditions:
a. That the vehicles will be used during the period in which SCAEF has relief responsibilities in Northwest Europe, exclusively for the collection and distribution of food and other essential supplies for the benefit of the civilian population, and that under no circumstances will such vehicles be used for military purposes without prior approval of SCAEF or under his authority,
b. That SCAEF will not undertake to provide any supplies or equipment in connection with the transfer of vehicles, or the activation of formations to operate the vehicles, other than the limited amount of spare parts and repair tools which are now available and which will accompany the vehicles. Uniforms for military drivers will be furnished to the extent that such are available for this purpose.
c. Operation and maintenance of vehicles so turned over is to be a responsibility of appropriate French Authorities. It further being understood that should the need arise for additional parts and supplies not available locally, such requirements will be submitted and processed through military formations as spot demands for supplemental relief supplies in accordance with the procedure currently in use, or as such procedure may be later amended by directive of this Headquarters.
d. That appropriate French authorities agree to so organize the use of these vehicles as to insure that they will be available at all times to assist French civil administrative authorities in the collection and distribution of supplies/stores for relief of French civil populations with particular emphasis on the collection and distribution of foodstuffs and medical supplies. It is agreed that the French officials in charge of the movement of this transportation will coordinate with representatives of the Supreme Commander in the field in order to insure use in a manner which will best further military operations currently in progress. It is further agreed that should the military situation demand such action, SCAEF or his authorized representative may, on completion of mutually satisfactory arrangements with appropriate French authorities, repossess all or any part of the vehicles turned over, it being understood that no French personnel is to accompany vehicles  if repossessed by Allied Forces unless arrangements concluded, specifically, so state.
e. It is likewise understood that French authorities will mark the vehicles with a distinctive marking to be agreed upon by French authorities and representatives of SCAEF consummating the sale and delivery of the vehicles. It is the opinion of this Headquarters that this marking should be as follows and should be placed on each door of the trucks and on each side of the trailers:
"Authorized by A.E.F. for movement of civilian supplies"
f. It is further understood that the above does not bind the Supreme Commander to the delivery of any certain number of vehicles and that decision as to the time and place of the release of such vehicles as may be made available will rest with subordinate commanders to whom such vehicles have been allocated by this Headquarters. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AAR, G-5, Third Army, ch. 9, sec. V, Gen Bd files, dr. 634]

♦ ♦ ♦ Due to the rapid movement and the consequent priority on transportation required for the tactical forces, it was not possible to bring forward to the Army depots imported relief supplies held in Communications Zone dumps. As a result relief supplies sold to French Authorities in areas of need, during the first three weeks of September, were obtained solely from captured enemy supplies released by Army G-4 and Quartermaster to Civil Affairs for this purpose. Transactions were made by Civil Affairs Detachments on the spot with French authorities, who arranged for equitable distribution through civilian agencies with civilian transportation.

The release of these supplies by Army G-4 and Quartermaster for Civil Affairs use was co-ordinated by the Relief Supply subsection. On C September the branch issued an Operational Supply Instruction entitled "Disposition of Captured Enemy Materials." This instruction outlined a uniform procedure to be followed by Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments in arranging the sale of captured enemy materials and for obtaining signed issue receipts from French authorities for future settlement between the national authorities concerned. ♦ ♦ ♦

Transportation of local surplus supplies from areas of plenty to areas of need was accomplished by agreement between Civil Affairs Detachments and French authorities. At the end of the month trucks from the Civil Affairs Trans-


portation Pool moved 370 tons of civilian-owned flour from Verdun to Nancy where a critical shortage existed. In another area where a shortage of bread existed, a Civil Affairs Detachment arranged with bakers in surrounding communities to bake extra quantities to help the needy areas.

Civil Affairs Detachments at Displaced Persons Centers, with transportation furnished by the Civil Affairs Transportation Pool, built up stocks of local food resources in their respective areas for feeding their charges. Supplementing these local resources were the relief supplies furnished from the Civil Affairs Supply Depot. ♦ ♦ ♦

At Cinq-Mars enormous quantities of enemy supplies, including foodstuffs, cognac and wines, and clothing were found in caves that covered an area of approximately thirty-five kilometers. Civil Affairs Detachment D3D2 was assigned to provide adequate guard and take a complete inventory of all stores. During the stay of this Detachment 5,780 tons of food supplies were issued to combat forces of the Army, and 5,632 tons were issued to units of the French Army. On 21 September [19441 Cinq-Mars reverted to the Loire Base Section of the Communications Zone, and the Detachment was relieved. It was estimated that there were sufficient foodstuffs alone stored in these caves to feed a United States Army Division for a full year.  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Cable. SHAEF (Fwd) to Subordinate Commands, 19 Aug 44, as Quoted in USFET Gen Bd Study 33]

♦ ♦ ♦ Reports being received on the standards of living and the reserves of food available in the areas uncovered in France indicate that there are no shortages and that the standard of diet is higher than in the U.K. In view of this, imported food supplies will now only be issued where it is patently clear that there is genuine want. It must be impressed on all Civil Affairs officers that the extreme shortages of transport facilities and the necessity for conserving supplies for later requirements demand that such action be taken promptly. It should also be impressed strongly upon the French that it is their responsibility to accumulate all supplies possible, and that unless they commence this immediately, there will be, in the near future, areas of want for which no supplies can be made available. 2


[Copy of Ltr, Scowden, Chief, Sup & Econ Branch, G-5 SHAEF, to Under Secy of State for War, 16 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 30o6, Sup & Econ Branch]

1. The greatest difficulty to be overcome in the distribution of relief supplies at the present moment is lack of adequate road transport.

2. The lack of transport has the effect of increasing the requirements of imported supplies as collection and distribution of indigenous production is rendered difficult or impossible.

3. The present necessity for diverting air lift from serving the needs of combat troops to carrying supplies into Paris is caused by this factor.

4. It is expected that the same difficulties of supply now experienced will be met in all densely populated areas but in a worse form.

5. Army Groups have already requested that all transport that is available or can be made available should be provided for them immediately.

9. It is therefore requested that inquiries be made through the appropriate Ministries to ascertain how many lorries can be made available now, or in the immediate future, for Civil Affairs use. It is not suggested that any high proportion should be new vehicles. Any vehicles which are capable of efficient load carrying will be acceptable.


[Ltr, Scowden, to M. Armond Meggic, President, Centre d'Expansion Francaise, 24 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 2342-1, Sup & Icon Branch]

We are keenly aware of the difficult living conditions endured by the people of France (luring the German occupation and of the many privations that had to be endured by persons of all ages, including small children. Since liberation, we have worked in unity with the French Government to improve the level of living of the French people generally. In this, I ant glad to say, we have made considerable progress. There is still much to be done before normal living conditions, with the unrationed abundance that the term implies, can be possible in France, but it is encouraging that so much progress has already been made.

You are familiar, of course, with the measures that have been and are being taken to improve the lot of the French population. First, liberation


has meant that the food products of France now belong to the French for their own use. The hundreds of thousands of tons of cereals, livestock products, and other foods taken annually by the Germans from France and her colonies is now a thing of the past. The Allied Armies, on the other hand, bring their own food with them; it is only in the case of perishable surpluses such as fruits and vegetables that purchases of French products are made by the Allied Armies, and this is done only upon offer or approval by the French Government.

Furthermore, the Supreme Allied Commander has taken measures to supplement in every way possible the indigenous food resources of France. Beginning with the early days of the invasion, food and the lorries necessary to transport it were brought to France by the Allied Armies in order to furnish emergency relief to the French towns and cities where food supplies had become critically low under German occupation. Lorries of imported food rolled into Paris from the beaches of Normandy on the day following our entry into the city.

Concurrently with food imports, measures are being taken in close collaboration with the French Government to bring about a better distribution of food resources already available in France. One of the major factors in this is the improvement of transportation facilities to move food products from surplus to deficit areas. You are familiar, I am sure, with the depreciated state to which French transportation equipment had been reduced by reason of lack of tires, fuel, and lubricants, to say nothing about the requisitioning of better vehicles by the enemy. We are now making raw materials available to the French Government for the fabrication of tires, and imports of tires, fuel, and lubricants are being made. A large number of Allied trucks are being used to transport civilian goods in France. Likewise, we have been able to bring in fuel and other facilities for French farmers to harvest crops for consumption by French civilians. Power services are being rapidly restored for the operation of flour mills, sugar-beet factories, and other food-processing plants.

Some time will be required, of course, before all of these facilities can be fully restored, but here too, as in other fields, progress is being made. I should like to stress, also, that the great advances being made must be credited in large part to the willingness and ability of the French themselves to solve their problems, provided that they can obtain certain essential items not available in their own country. We are doing our utmost to furnish these essential items.

As a result of the efforts of the French themselves and of the help that we have been able to give them, material improvements have been made. The French Government has increased the food ration scales very materially compared with those that prevailed at the time of liberation. It is hoped that further increases will be possible as additional improvements are made in internal transportation. Increases in the food-ration scales at official prices in turn will permit the wage earner and the person dependent upon a modest income to live without necessity of recourse to the black market. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Cable, SMC-OUT 39, Eisenhower to CCS, 1 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 2821-3, Welfare Agencies, ARC]

1. Due to limited availabilities of clothing against plan "A" procurement plan, it is deemed necessary by this Headquarters that American Red Cross [ARC] clothing be used as source of supply to fullest extent possible. This will alleviate the relief situation in liberated areas and reduce our military requirements accordingly.

2. In order to meet the estimated relief needs of France during the military period the American Red Cross has agreed to make available a total of 2,000 tons, which we are directing be called forward. This amount is in addition to the Red Cross clothing already shipped for southern France (2,000,000 garments).


[Samuel I. Rosenman, Report to the President on Civilian Supplies for the Liberated Areas of Northwest Europe (Prepared Pursuant to Ltr of President Roosevelt of 20 Jan 45), AG files, A-51-243]

♦ ♦ ♦ Civil Affairs imports from D Day to the end of the year 1944 in Northern France were 21% of advance estimates of requirements and in Southern France 75% of advance estimates of requirements.

In Northern France the small percentage imported compared with the advance estimate is in part explained by the fact that the 1944 crop became available about the time of liberation and that local food supplies were depended upon to meet immediate needs. . . .

The total civil affairs food imports from D Day to February 28 were 239,937 tons. An additional 119,000 tons were scheduled to be received in March and April.

The SHAEF estimate of requirements are 70,305 tons a month for April and May. These


are predicated upon the amount of food which SHAEF estimates will be required to bring the average caloric level to 2,000 per person in order to prevent disease and unrest. ♦ ♦ ♦


[G-4, Theater Service Forces, European 'Theater [TSFET(R)], 1 Oct 45, Report on Responsibilities and Activities of G-4 in Civil Affairs Supply, app. 4 to Gen lid Rpt 33]

13. Recommendations

It is recommended that before a similar operation is undertaken again, study be given to the following points:

a. Either the establishment of a separate or parallel civil affairs Supply Service, such as the quartermaster service, which could permit:
(1) More accurate accounting
(2) Complete regulation of stocks
(3) Handling by specialists of special items such as farm machinery
(4) The formation of an organization prepared to meet sudden emergencies
(5) Determination of priorities at the general staff level.

Or placing the responsibility squarely on the services, which would involve:
(1) Using the same standard of accountability for civil affairs as for other items
(2) Determination of requirements as much in advance for civil affairs items as for other items
(3) Prescribing a basis for issue which the services could apply as objectively as they apply standards for other issues
(4) Determination of priority at the Supply Service level
(5) Less flexibility to meet emergency demands.

b. G-5 Responsibilities. Assignment of duties to G-4 and G-5 is dependent upon determination of a, above. If, however, as in the present operation, planning, coordination and control is retained at the general staff level, with only limited supply responsibility placed on the Supply Services, the division of responsibility between G-4 and G-5 must be carefully considered and clearly defined. If the entire responsibility in civil affairs supply were placed on G-4, the likelihood of a lower priority for civil affairs supplies, the necessity for attaching to G-4 specialists capable of analysing local or indigenous resources, determining supply requirements, and controlling the issue of these supplies, must be considered. Such assignment might either duplicate in part or remove from G-5 the control essential to fulfilling the G-5 mission of studying the conditions among the civilian population which might lead to disease and unrest and coordinating action to prevent such condition.

If the responsibility for civil affairs supply were placed on G-5, this might mean competition between two general staff sections for shipping, use of ports, depots and transportation, determination of priorities on the chief of staff level; the supply Services receiving supply instructions from two general staff sections; and determination of requirements for civil affairs supplies on a different basis from that of other supplies.

Should the civil affairs supply responsibility be divided between G-4 and G-5, careful consideration must be given to the most satisfactory assignment of the four major divisions of the supply operation-determination of the over-all requirements including indigenous and imported; procurement, movement, storage of- imported requirements; basis of issue; and accounting. It must be remembered that G-5, in fulfilling its responsibility, is in a position, through planning, coordination, and supervision of the production and movement of indigenous supplies, to reduce requirements for imported supplies. Should specialized personnel be required by G-4 or G-5 for this operation, such personnel should be assigned rather than attached or used as liaison officers.

c. Packing and Marking. That civil affairs items are subjected to the same field conditions as other Army supplies, and that similar packing and marking standards be applied.

d. Priority. Establishment of some tangible basis for determining priority to be accorded civil affairs. A-When not needed, they are normally given the lowest priority with the result that when an urgent need arises not even the highest priority will assure delivery when needed.

e. Standardization of Items. Limiting items of civil affairs issue to those furnished by the Army for its other requirements. This would involve the use of only one pipeline and directing items to civilian needs in quantity and type, according to the urgency of the situation. Types of supplies not imported by the Army for other needs, except clothing, are usually not essential until later in the occupation, when they could be imported through civilian channels. In this way, a reserve smaller than the total of separate civil affairs and


Army reserves, would enable a larger and speedier fulfillment of an emergency requirement. Also the number of different items estimated at more than twenty thousand, many of which are peculiar to civil affairs, could be materially reduced.



[Copy of Ltr, Brig Gen Thomas J. Davis, AG, SHAEF, to CG, ComZ ETOUSA, 18 Nov 44 SHAEF files, G-5, ETOUSA, Comdg Gen, Opns & Policy]

1. It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that the present stocks of Civil Affairs supplies at present on the Continent in the United States Zone are such that present commitments cannot be met.

2. It is understood that the principal reason for this is that no imports of any material nature of Civil Affairs supplies have been made since last August. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. It is requested that an immediate report he rendered to this headquarters setting forth:
a. How far present commitments are being met.
b. Whether future commitments through January will be met.
c. The reason for the non-importation of Civil Affairs supplies as programmed.

4. As a result of this non-importation, there is, in the United Kingdom, a large quantity of Civil Affairs supplies allocated to you but still awaiting shipment.

5. It is requested that this headquarters be informed immediately of the proposed program whereby these supplies will be shipped to the Continent.

6. There is an urgent requirement for supplies available in the U.K. for the Western Area Holland. Although, in view of the critical position in the U.S. Zone, it is not desired to remove any of the supplies at present allocated, it is quite apparent that, if any of these supplies cannot be utilized in the U.S. Zone in the immediate future or shipping cannot be provided, they must be reallocated for use in Western Holland.

7. Any supplies, therefore, at present in the U.K. which cannot be shipped by you to the Continent before 31 December, will be transferred for immediate use in Western Holland. Arrangements will be made to have them replaced by allocation of supplies from the U.S.


[1st Indorsement, Hq ComZ, ETOUSA, to SCAEF, 2 Dec 44, same file]

1. Recently this headquarters has received allocations of supplies which are required by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force letter No. US/50, to be received on the Continent from the UK by 31 January 1945. Paragraph 7, basic communication, seems to conflict with this requirement.

2. With reference to paragraph 1, 2, and 3a, basic communication, present needs in many instances can not be met owing to depleted stocks, resulting from no lift from the UK since early September until 24 November.

3. Reference paragraph 3b, basic communication, the present plan of lift from the UK consists of 17,000 tons for November; 16,000 tons for December, and 16,000 tons for January. This will leave an unshipped balance of allocated supplies in the UK of 36,856 tons, exclusive of 44,729 gross long tons of POL. It is apparent, therefore, that without total allocated supplies on the continent, commitments . . . can be met only to the extent of supplies received.

4. Transfer of supplies for immediate use in Holland and replacement by allocation of supplies from U.S. would result in further inability of Communications Zone to meet obligations. The present allocation of ship tonnage to Civil Al-airs from U.S. until 31 January 1945 Twill not permit lifting the presently allocated supplies from the U.S. Consequently, the proposed requirement of lifting additional supplies from U.S. by 31 January 1945 would be impossible.


[Copy of Ltr, Grasett, ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, to DCofS, SHAEF, 7 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 702, ETOUSA, ComZ, Opns & Policy]

♦ ♦ ♦ The situation cannot be described as satisfactory, and in the American area we are only meeting our daily problems by hand-to mouth methods. In the 21 Army Group area the situation is a little happier, and can be described as being reasonably satisfactory-in fact, the re-


serves of Civil Affairs stores available are equal to the reserves of other classes of military stores. The reason for the situation in the American area being as it is, is largely due to factors well known to you, and the difficulty of the provision of military supplies for the Forward area, which has been evident during the last few months. Up to date Civil Affairs stores have had of necessity to take a back seat in relation to military stores, and we have not pressed Corn Zone to improve the situation until recently, because we could not maintain that the immediate need was urgent.

Captured German stores have gone a long way to meet emergencies and Com Zone have met spot demands for urgent relief of the civil population in such areas as the Maastricht salient and to the miners in Belgium. As a result of the lack of extreme urgency for Civil Affairs stores, it is probable that G-4 Com Zone has overlooked the problems of the future, but I think all Branches of Com Zone are now aware that the moment has come when Civil Affairs stores can no longer be relegated to a low priority. During-, the last fortnight Com Zone have been active in examining the problem; two officers have been sent out to America from Corn Zone to accelerate the loading of the ships with Civil Affairs stores.

As you are aware the shipping programme was cut during the autumn and the first cut was made on Civil Affairs stores. Furthermore, there are many liberty ships lying about the British Isle-; and off the beaches and French ports, the contents of which are not known for certainty. There has also been partial unloading of ships for urgently required stores such as ammunition. It many well be that on board these ships there are considerable quantities of Civil Affairs stores which it is hoped will be unloaded and available before very long. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Copy of Ltr. Col C. R. Landon, AG, 12th AGp to SHAEF, 13 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 702, Internal Affairs]

1. It is recommended that Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, carefully review the shortage of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies existing on the Continent and also review the present procedures being followed in allocating credits for, and moving Civil Affairs /Military Government supplies to, Army areas. It is believed that positive action is required to expedite the flow of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies to the Continent and to the Army areas.

The above recommendations are based on consideration of the following:
a. Shortage of supplies on the Continent.
(1) According to information obtained orally from the G-5 Supply Branch of Communications Zone,
(a) No Civil Affairs/Military Government supplies arrived on the Continent in September and October 1944.
(b) There is a backlog of over 170,000 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies in the U.S. and U.K.
(c) Stocks of two specific items concerning which inquiry was made were reported to be as follows on 15 November 1944:

Milk 12 tons
Blankets 117,000 each

(2) Oil three separate requests recently submitted by this Headquarters to Headquarters, Communications Zone for allocation of credits to the Armies for:
(a) Clothing (b) Trucks (c) Footwear and blankets from stocks of Civil Affairs / Military Government relief supplies, the reply has been that stocks were not adequate to permit suballocation for support of the Armies.
b. Present Civil Affairs/Military Government supply procedure has not and is not delivering adequate relief supplies to Army areas.
(1) During the months of August, September and October the three Armies in Twelfth Army Group issued 5.000 tons of relief food in France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Only 1.000 tons of this were imported supplies. 4.000 or 800 were captured stocks. Thus the Communications Zone furnished 20 , of the required supplies to Armies.
(2) On 10 September 1944 a directive was received from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to build up a reserve of 3,000 tons of relief supplies in forward areas for displaced persons. In accordance with this directive, instructions were immediately issued to Armies to create stockpiles. The Armies submitted requisitions to Communications Zone, within their prescribed tonnages and credit allocations, for the purpose of building these stockpiles. In the majority of instances. these requisitions were not honored by Communications Zone. On the 22d of November 1944, Ninth U.S. Army had no stockpile, Third U.S. Army had only 84 tons and while First U.S. Army had 3,242 tons of


supplies, all except 346 tons were captured German stocks.

(3) During October and November, Third U.S. Army submitted requisitions within prescribed tonnages for movement forward of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies for refugees and displaced persons, totaling 2,862 tons. Ninth U.S. Army submitted daily telegrams for 1,949 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies within prescribed tonnage allocations to alleviate near starvation in Limburg Province, Holland. None of these supplies started to move forward until the long delay and acute need caused the Commanding Generals of Third and Ninth Armies to place telephone calls and send telegrams to the Commanding General, Communications Zone. When brought to the personal attention of the Commanding General, Communications Zone, special trains were arranged to transport some of these supplies to the Armies.

(4) Under present tactical plans it is estimated that Twelfth Army Group will require 23,000 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies during the first month of "ECLIPSE" conditions for Allied displaced persons alone. It is believed that Communications Zone should have a minimum amount of 40,000 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies earmarked and ready for Twelfth Army Group use and not subject to diversion to civilian use in the Communications Zone.

c. The Communications Zone proposes to review the requisitions submitted by Armies and Communications Zone Base Sections and determine the amounts which will be applied against the total requisitions submitted.
(1) This procedure is objectionable as the Communications Zone should not be the agency to decide priorities of supply as between Base Sections and the Armies of this Command.
(2) If supplies are so short that available supplies must be pro-rated, or decisions made as to which demands will be met and which will not, it is believed that the decisions as between Communications Zone Sections and Armies of the Army Group should be made by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.


[Rosenman, Rpt to the President on Civ Sup's for the Liberated Areas of Northwest Europe]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Ardennes offensive in December 1944 cut through most of the best agricultural sections of Belgium and Luxembourg. The offensive [was ] shortly after the time of harvest and the enemy in retreat carried with him large quantities of food stuffs and livestock. Luxembourg which had been in a reasonably satisfactory position on food became a deficiency area.

As a result of the losses sustained in the Ardennes offensive, the inability of SHAEF to import the expected amount, and the early depletion of reserves, the population of Belgium is now seriously underfed. The national diet is low, probably not over 1850 to 1900 calories. There is a general consensus that the caloric intake falls short of 2,000 which is considered a minimum level. The greatest deficiency is in meat, fats, and oils-those products which are in greatest world shortage. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Copy of Ltr, Gen Davis, AG, SHAEF, to CG, ComZ, 17 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 702, ETOUSA, ComZ, Opns & Policy]

2. The difficulties experienced to date in meeting the civil affairs supply requirements of the Twelfth Army Group are fully appreciated by this headquarters. Your statement is noted that, with the improvement in port capacity and internal transportation, supplies will be moved to forward areas in increasing quantities and that plans for January contemplate building up depots to the extent that credits may be allocated to armies based on their estimates of requirements.

3. Due to the limited quantity of relief supplies that has been delivered to the forward areas because of difficulties outlined in your report, cumulative requirements, particularly those of displaced persons, and refugees, have become critical and relief supplies to alleviate this situation cannot longer be withheld except for overriding operational necessity as determined by the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, or this headquarters. In future allocations of Civil Affairs supplies made by this headquarters to you, separate suballocations will be designated for operational areas of the Twelfth Army Group. Should the Communication Zone, for any reason, be unable to call forward the quantities designated for the Group or to deliver to the armies relief supplies as requisitioned, Headquarters, Army Group, will be promptly advised of this fact, so that it may reconsider its overall tonnage schedule or if shipping (calling forward to the continent) is involved, it may make appropriate representations to this headquarters. This will insure a command decision in each case and it is hoped will overcome the objection raised


by the Army Group that ". . . the Communications Zone should not be the agency to decide priorities of supply as between Base Sections and the Armies of this Command." It is noted that you have suggested substantially the same procedure in the last paragraph of your report.

4. In the opinion of this headquarters based upon the data available, additional Civil Affairs trucks should be made available to the First, Third, and Ninth U.S. Armies. It is requested that consideration be given to the transfer of sufficient vehicles to these Armies so that each will have not less than 200 3-ton trucks or an equivalent in truck tonnage. It is considered that the 3-ton trucks are more suitable for the Armies but if sufficient of this type of vehicle are not available presently, the 15-cwt with trailer might be substituted until the 3-ton trucks are available. It is considered that priority in 3-ton trucks should be given to the Armies. It is requested that you advise this headquarters of the action taken on this suggestion or any alternate suggestion you may have for meeting the Civil Affairs transport needs of the Armies.


[Copy of Ltr, Kronacker, Minister of Sup, Belgian Embassy to McCloy, 6 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

I have just received the following information from my office in Brussels dated February 3d: "Deliveries on Civil Affairs Military Program have been 40,000 tons up to now, more than 50 per cent of which is wheat and flour. No fats have been brought in at all, and only 1,000 tons of meat, and 5,000 tons of fish."

May I remind you that figures for the military program for January and February which were communicated by SHAEF to the Belgian Government amounted to 126,500 tons. These figures included 11,000 tons of oils and fats, and over 20,000 tons of meat. They were arrived at by military authorities to reach a target of 2,000 calories considered as a minimum requirement to avoid disease and unrest. With imports remaining at such a low level we still are around 1500 calories. . . .

May I, therefore, again draw your kind attention to the fact that from a strictly military point of view and in the interest of the common war effort something should be done to increase the imports under the Civil Affairs Military Program, as well as under the so-called Civil National Program. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, SHAEF to WI), CM-IN 12558, 13 Feb 45, CCAC files, 440 (10-7-43), sec. 4]

3. Beyond the small quantity contained in the layette sets heretofore allocated, no nipples are available in Belgium. The Belgian authorities have requested military import of nipples. They regard the provision as too essential and urgent to wait on civil import program. This headquarters approves the request for same to the extent of 25,000 nipples per month for three months calculated on the basis of 3 nipples per infant for 8,333 births estimated to occur monthly in Belgium. A normal rate would be 6 nipples per infant. Request reduced to 3 to take breast feeding into account. Conditions of undernourishment have reduced breast feeding greatly below normal. Continuing unsanitary feeding by make shift substitutes is regarded as likely to produce disease prejudicial to military operations.

In view of the urgency we have submitted a spot demand on the War Office for the first month, 25,000 nipples.

4. It is requested you approve and allocate the source and procurement responsibility for 50,000 for succeeding two months.

5. The Belgians have been requested to consider meeting requirements thereafter by local manufacture from raw materials for production of industrial rubber previously allocated. Such manufacture could not produce nipples in time for the three months requested here.


[Copy of Memo, SW Stimson to the President, 28 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

General Eisenhower informed us in his message (SCAF 210) that a serious situation exists in the 21st Army Group (Montgomery Command) area by reason of retarded deliveries of civil supplies and urgently requested that 100,000 tons of food be available immediately from the UK stock for the 21st Army Group.

In an exchange of messages between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower, it developed that a total of 109,000 tons of supplies were required. Provision has already been made for approximately half of this. The problem of meeting the remaining 69,000 tons is now being considered in London. If the 69,000 tons are taken from the stockpile now being held in


England against Dutch requirements, which is the probable course, it will be necessary to secure replacements from the UK stockpile in order to protect Eisenhower against anticipated Dutch needs. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, McCloy to Kronacker, 12 Mar 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

I should like to clarify the situation which we discussed the other day concerning the deficiency of food stuffs for importation into the 21st Army Group area. The total deficiency amounts to about 109,000 tons. This includes 40,000 tons which has been scheduled for delivery by the 21st Army Group in March but which could not be loaded in the United States in time for the March arrival. In addition to this 40,000 tons, the theater had notified the Combined Chiefs of a requirement of 69,000 tons which is additional to the original program.

The total of 109,000 tons referred to above, will be delivered by imports of 51,000 tons in March and 58,000 tons in April. The large part of the 109,000 tons will be met from food stocks now in the UK including 30,000 tons of wheat, which are now in transit to the UK and which will be diverted for March arrival in the 21st Army Group area.



[Msg, SHAEF Main to WD, SCAF-122, CM-IN 2922, 3 Nov 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. I]

1. French government pressing strongly that for political, social and economic reasons France urgently requires raw materials and productive civil supplies. This type of relief for the French economy is not, however, considered a military responsibility under existing directives.

2. In view of French presentation of urgent needs of France for French procured civilian supplies, SHAEF is making a careful survey of probable port and transportation capacity for French civilian imports and presents the following forecast, subject to certain conditions in connection with Antwerp.

A. 5,000 tons daily between Mediterranean ports of Marseilles, Sette and Fort Vendres, commencing 1st December but with provisions that civil imports through Marseilles shall involve no clearance by rail.
B. 5,000 tons daily between Seine ports of Havre and Rouen commencing 15th January, but to be cleared only by inland water transport.
C. A possible capacity of 4,000 tons daily in coasters through Pas de Calais ports commencing 15th January.
D. Possibility of the entire capacity of Bordeaux which may be opened by February.

3. Foregoing tonnage is in addition to Military Civil Affairs program of direct relief items which will not exceed port capacity of 3,000 tons per day in northern ports.

4. Inasmuch as a Zone of the Interior has been turned over to the French authorities, SHAEF favors the establishment in the near future of a French civilian import program (as distinct from a military civil affairs program) under which the French can import whatever supplies procured by themselves they wish. Execution of such a program will be dependent upon possible shipping allocations to France, the port capacity SHAEF can make available, and existence of adequate port clearance facilities.

5. Present proposal is that military program of direct relief items will continue concurrently with such program, but that military program will gradually diminish in scope until there is complete termination of military responsibility. Consideration will be given to fixing a date on which the gradual termination of responsibility can be made complete. For the present it is intended that military responsibility will be limited to the direct relief items of food, soap, medical, fuel and clothing in amounts considered a matter of military necessity and intended primarily for forward areas, and French government will be responsible for all other imports, French government responsibility to begin as soon as shipping and port capacity can be definitely committed to French civilian authorities.

6. Available port and clearance capacity can be determined by SHAEF. Procedure whereby France can secure ship tonnage allocation should


be established as a matter of urgency. Considered here that shipping program should be presented to proper authorities by French with some form of certificate of SCAEF with respect to port and inland clearance facilities.

It is further considered that tonnage allocations should be made direct to French government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg. SHAEF Main to WD, SCAF-122, 3 Nov 44, CCAC files. 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1 ]

7. In order to carry out the foregoing plan [preceding document], a special four-party committee has been established in Paris to assist and guide the transition from the military to the civilian period. This committee, which will function in co-operation with SHAEF Mission to France, will consist of SHAEF, French, American and British economic advisors.

8. Intention is that French will discuss their programs of civilian requirements with the four party committee prior to formal presentation in Washington and London. After approval by competent authorities, French would themselves procure (or intensify procurement program already in course), thus creating a bank from which supplies could be ordered forward in conformity with considered joint estimates of port and inland movement capacities.

9. Initial program being presented by the French: will cover civilian importations through June 1945. This program will be an objective assessment o French needs in the light of probable port capacities and port clearance.

The program will be divided between military civil affairs requirements and French procured civilian import needs in accordance with paragraph 5 above. Military Civil Affairs requirements will be considered by SHAEF Mission subject to approval of SHAEF. Committee will insure that there is no duplication between the two sets of requirements.

10. Monnet expects to have draft program ready next week. After necessary consultation with' committee, he will proceed to Washington via London to discuss all relevant matters with appropriate authorities. . . .

Monnet fully understands that items under combined Board jurisdiction will be subject to allocations of quantities and supply source, but intention is that for all other items French should exercise buyer's choice subject only to shipping limitations. Understood that goods in short supply and those involving lend-lease will require full justification, but for all others it will be for the French to determine what they want to import within limits of civilian port capacity and shipping. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCAC to SHAEF Main, et al., LLM-327, CM-OUT G 68891 , 27 Nov 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. I]

1. Proposals in SCAF I22 are under active consideration here. Until decision is reached, however, French cannot be given separate shipping program and there is no method of enabling them to ship supplies such as raw materials, already procured or to be procured by them, otherwise than in military shipping program. Indications are that it will not at present be possible to increase your overall shipping allocations from the United States to provide tonnage for shipping space for such supplies will depend on priorities you assign to such cargoes.

2. Pending decision on SCAF 122, therefore, you may wish to consider whether, as a matter of necessity in the light of the existing situation, you desire to include in your shipping program for France items outside Plan A; for example, raw materials procured by the French. You may consider provision of such items essential in discharge of your mission. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, SHAEF Main to WD, MEL 358 CM-IN 8598, 9 Dec 44. CCAC Files, 400, Fr (3-14-14), sec. I]

1. It is noted that pending decision on SCAF 122 there will he only one shipping program for this Theater. The only tonnage which SHAEF can make available for civil supplies Out of present military shipping program is that required for relief supplies essential to the military Operation,

4. Although SHAEF has no primary responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of France, nevertheless it is recognized that the minimum economic needs of France have not and will not be met by the present civil affairs relief program and that serious economic and political difficulties may result if these needs are longer


delayed. It is therefore urged that serious consideration be given to making tonnage available for supplies of U.S. and UK origin to the extent possible, such tonnage to be included in the single theater shipping program, provided the necessary additional tonnage is added to that program....
Monnet is now en route to Washington to discuss these and other matters. ♦ ♦ ♦


BELGIANS DEVELOP A CIVILIAN IMPORT PROGRAM [Ltr, Gen Walter Bedell Smith to The Secretaries, CCAC and CCS, 31 Dec 44, CCAC files, 400, Belgium (6-2-44) ]

♦ ♦ ♦ Along lines similar to the development of the French civilian import program, a program has been developed by the Belgian Government under the auspices of the Four-Party Committee in Brussels.

The initial program prepared by the Belgian Government covers the period January-March 1945. It has received the unanimous approval of the Four-Party Committee, which considers that conditions in Belgium support the allocations of shipping tonnage sufficient to import the 250,000 tons of supplies in the program. ♦ ♦ ♦

The responsibility of this Headquarters is limited to an import program of relief supplies. This Headquarters has no responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Belgium, as represented by the Belgian civilian import program. Therefore, this Headquarters has not commented on the necessity for import of the items and quantities contained thereon. Any such comment will be provided by the U.S. and British economic advisers in Brussels through State Department and Foreign Office channels. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCAC to SHAEF Main, et al., LEM-403, CMOUT 89099, 9 Jan 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44) sec. I ]

1. Final decision on shipping policy questions presented in SCAF 122 must await conclusions to be reached in high level study of world shipping situation now in progress in Washington. 3  As interim measure to meet urgent French representations up to six ships have been made available for French supplies after clearance with United States Chiefs of Staff and British Joint

Staff Mission in addition to your allocations for January loading in the United States. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Incl A to CCS-746/8, Shipping Agreement, 31 Jan 45, CCAC files, 560 (9-30-44) sec. I ]

The following represents the agreed views of the respective United States and United Kingdom authorities concerning the shipment of supplies to liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945

1. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has signified his willingness to allocate to the French Provisional Government and to the Belgian Government certain port facilities and inland clearance for national government import programs separate from and additional to military programs.

2. A four-party committee consisting of representatives of the French Provisional Government, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force has reviewed and recommended an import program put forward by the French Provisional Government. It is expected that the import program of the Belgian Government will be recommended through a similar procedure in the near future. ♦ ♦ ♦

6. Subject to military necessity, ships are to be allocated against these programs for January, February and March loading from North America as follows:

  January Total MWT WSA [War Shipping Administration] February Total MWT WSA March Total MWT WSA
France 6 10 10
Belgium 1 2 2

8. Pending the final decision the allocations referred to in paragraph 6 are not to be reduced except in the face of military necessity and not without prior discussion with Mr. Harry Hopkins. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, SHAEF to WD, et al., MEL-465, CM-IN 25675, 26 Jan. 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

2. . . . the French authorities now state that they are proceeding with procurement under their


own civilian program and are relying so far as military action is concerned only on the transfer to them of the items and quantities set forth in the military target program.

3. French authorities therefore take the position that they are not interested in any military requirements program for France subsequent to I March. In view of the uncertain shipping situation, however, we have determined that it was necessary to submit a military French requirements program after February to protect our position in the event the French civilian program does not develop properly or cannot be sufficiently implemented. Military programs will continue to be submitted for France until our responsibility is terminated. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, WD to Somervell at Yalta, 29 Jan 45, Hearth-6I, CM-OUT 28743, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

Meeting held by McCloy, 28th January, to discuss French shipping attended by Monnet, Hilldring, Wylie and representatives of State, FEA and WSA....

Monnet insisted that Army Civilian Program under Plan A be dropped in March and that French assume full responsibility for all civilian imports under a single national program. He complained of confusion in procurement in U.S. and in distribution in France if these imports were not all included in one program. He asserted that the French government could not get information on scheduled Army imports for Civil Affairs and that information on arrivals was not adequate for their needs....

Wylie referred to the opposition of SHAEF, as expressed in MEL 465, pointing out that the theater commander had the responsibility for preventing disease and unrest to the extent necessary to avoid interference with military operations, and that the Commander alone could determine priorities between purely military supplies and civil relief for the prevention of disease and unrest in such shipping as was available to fill his requirements. Therefore some military program of Civil Affairs goods appeared essential so long as there was any question concerning the ability of the French import program to provide supplies sufficient for this purpose.

Monnet strongly objected to any consideration of a continuing Civil Affairs program under the military, asserting that if ships were available to meet the needs of the Theater Commander for supplies to avoid disease and unrest, such shipping was therefore in existence and should be made available for the French National Program. It appearing no further results could be obtained by extending the conference, Monnet and party then withdrew.

State Department and FEA representatives supported Monnet to the extent that they felt that procurement and internal distribution would be improved if the single National Program were approved. From a political point of view, State Department representatives felt it was desirable for the French to control their own civilian program since by so doing criticism would be diverted from the U.S. .. .

Hilldring stated that obviously the French would probably receive more supplies if the Army retained responsibility although it was desirable to place this responsibility with the French as soon as they were able to assume it if availability of shipping was no longer an obstacle. Wylie stated that the Law-Hopkins agreement now protected the military from demands for ships for the French National Import Program through March but that if the entire program including that portion for preventing disease and unrest was transferred from the Army it would subject all agencies to increased pressures for shipping for this program to an extent which might interfere with world-wide military requirements.

There was no agreement that all Army Civil Affairs Program for France could be discontinued. It was definitely agreed that action to relieve SHAEF of responsibility for a portion of the Civil Affairs Program should be taken only by CCS; also that ARGONAUT/Yalta/ would consider the question of the shipping program and that therefore final decision with regard to ships for Army Civil Affairs versus French National Import Program would be decided there. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Somervell, at Yalta, to Secretary Patterson, CiucKcr-24, CM-IN 30109, 31 Jan 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

Transportation system in France involving as it does complex interrelationships between railways, port facilities and highway transport, is such that further complications introduced by the independent handling of shipping and movement of supplies inland by the French might well produce disastrous consequences to logistical ar-


rangements of our Army and delay the date of the termination of the war.

Already the French have without consultation with the Americans begun to prepare for placing additional tonnage in Le Havre which is now cluttered with Army supplies and where greatest difficulty is being encountered in the operation of the railroads inland from the port.

It has recently been necessary because of failure of the French to operate railways properly for American Troops to take over and actually run trains on part of this system.

Under arrangements approved by the JCS today, priorities on shipping have been set up as follows for the consideration of CCS and Chiefs of State:

A. Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.
B. Priorities will be as follows:
1. Military requirements (including civilian relief) vital to the conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. ♦ ♦ ♦
2. Civil programs desirable but not essential to the warmaking capacity of the United Nations....
3. Military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or direct operation in the agreed strategic concept.
4. Civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort. ♦ ♦ ♦

It will be noted that the really vital part of the French supplies, namely civilian relief, would receive a higher priority under such arrangements than in the plan proposed by Monnet. Opinion here strongly in favor of the continuance of the War Department present policy in respect to these supplies and their shipment to Europe.


[Msg, Patterson, to Somervell, Hearth-90, CM-OUT -29943, 31 Jan 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

1. The French are pressing for a single National Import Program. ♦ ♦ ♦
2. Interested agencies of the War Department met with me yesterday to discuss this matter. The general views developed are as follows:

(a) With regard to Plan A, Civil Affairs Program, this must be retained in all operational areas. As for the remainder of France, there may be political reasons for turning Civil Affairs Program over to the French, but we do not favor doing this until such time as the theater commander is assured that the French are able to handle it and that sufficient port capacity and inland clearance can be made available without interference with military needs. ♦ ♦ ♦
(c) With respect to the French national import program brought over by Monnet, our concern centers on the impact this program may have on our military program with respect to shipping, raw materials and production.

4. We concur in the priorities stated in your Cricket No. 24. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Copy of Ltr. Kronacker, Minister of Sup, Belgian Embassy to MCCloy, 5 Feb 45, CCAC files, 400. Belgium (6-2-44)]

During conversations which took place between the Prime Minister Mr. Pierlot, Major General Erskine and his staff and myself, we indicated that in our opinion it would be necessary to continue the so-called Civil Affairs Military Program through the period from March 30th to the first July. Our main reason therefor was that the country being a military zone, the Army had better possibilities than ourselves for procurement, shipping, and port clearances.


[Msg, SHAEF, Fwd. to WD, SCAF-221. CM-IN 6191, 6 Mar 45, CCAC 400  Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

1. The French Provisional Government has made a formal request through the Four Party Committee that military responsibility for the importation of relief supplies, excepting coal and petroleum products, be terminated with March shipments and that from i April the French Government assume full responsibility for the procurement and shipment of civilian supplies for France. Military responsibility would continue, however, for imports of coal and petroleum products, for the supply of relief


items for operational areas, and for the military production program.

2. Within the limits of port capacity and clearance specified in SCAF 122, the French authorities have developed a program of civilian imports for which procurement and shipping will be arranged by themselves.

3. This headquarters considers it desirable that the French undertake full responsibility for their civilian imports at the earliest possible date. This would relieve us of a great responsibility. However, it is essential, regardless of where the responsibility lies, that relief supplies flow into France in at least the minimum quantities necessary to insure against unrest and civil disturbances in our rear areas. Consequently the specific date of termination of military responsibility for relief supplies is necessarily conditioned on reasonable assurance that the French can:

A. Procure supplies in quantities sufficient to meet at least the relief requirements specified in the military civil affairs program for months subsequent to April, assuming that April C.A. military requirements are met by March shipments.
B. Obtain shipping required to import at least the quantity of relief supplies needed to safeguard against disease and unrest as estimated in the military civil affairs program.

4. It is recommended by this headquarters that subject to the provisions in paragraph 3 that the military responsibility for G-5 program for France be terminated with April loadings.


[Msg, CCS to SHAEF, Fwd, FACS-169, CM-OUT 61883, 31 Mar 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2

1. In accordance with SCAF 221, and upon completion of April loadings, you are relieved of responsibility for provision and distribution of relief supplies for France, except as to POL and coal. 4  You should make appropriate arrangements with the French to assure smooth transition from military to civilian responsibility.

2. However, you may and should, with respect to operational areas 5  . . . import such supplies needed for relief as you consider necessary to accomplish your military mission.

3. It is believed that the steps which will be taken by the Provisional French Government and the U.S. and U.K. civilian agencies and shipping authorities will provide a reasonable assurance that the French can meet the conditions specified in Paragraph 3 of SCAF 221.

4. It is assumed that termination of military responsibility will make it necessary for the French to obtain shipping. Shipping which you would have used to carry G-5 supplies for France would presumably be made available to the French for this purpose. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, SHAEF to WD, CM-IN 22793, 13 Mac 45, CCAC files, 400, Belgium (6-2-44)]

2. Now that military operations have ceased in NW Europe it is considered that military responsibility for the provision of civilian supplies exclusive of POL and Coal should be terminated at the earliest date possible.

3. It is further considered that such action may well be acceptable to the national governments concerned.

4. It is therefore the desire of this headquarters to terminate responsibility with July deliveries. This headquarters will issue instructions as soon as possible indicating what supplies may be delivered in July, but in view of the existing shortages of supply the quantities apart from grain will be less than the present allocations. Irrespective of any outstanding allocations, programmed supplies not actually delivered by July 31st will not be carried over for delivery in subsequent months, but will be treated as being cancelled from the military program. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Truman to SW, 21 May 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 15]

On 10 November 1943, President Roosevelt directed the Army to undertake the initial burden of shipping and distributing relief supplies for liberated areas in Europe pending the completion by civil agencies of plans to carry out the necessary long-range plans of relief. The fact that our vast military operations in Europe have been carried on without disease and unrest in liberated areas testified to the Army's successful discharge of the obligations so imposed.

Once liberation of a country has been accomplished, however, I feel that the best interests of


the United States and of the liberated country itself require termination of this military responsibility as soon as the military situation permits. No responsibility for civilian supplies in any liberated country in Europe should continue to rest upon the Army except as may be dictated by actual necessities of the military situation.

On the other hand, no liberated country should be prejudiced by termination of this responsibility. The date and conditions of termination in each case should be subject, of course, to recommendation of the military commander in the field. In order that transition from military to civilian responsibility may be smooth, final decision by the Army to end its responsibility should be made only after consultation with the Government of the liberated country concerned and also with our own State Department and Foreign Economic Administration.

In addition, I think the general policy, upon such termination, should be to continue to assist the national governments involved and the appropriate civilian agencies of our government and UNRRA to the extent that the military situation permits. . . .

To the extent that implementation of this policy requires agreement of the British military authorities, will you please cause negotiations to be initiated through appropriate military channels to obtain such agreement.


[Paraphrase of Msg, SHAEF to WD, MET-817, CM-IN 29153, 31 May 45, CCAC files, 400, Belgium (6-2-44)]

1. The governments of both Holland and Belgium have stated that they are concerned over SHAEF's suggestion that responsibility for CA supply program (excluding coal and POL) in these two countries be terminated with the month of July shipments.

2. It is the opinion of the Government of Belgium that it is essential that the military continue to be responsible, through the month of August, at least for providing grain. The authorities in the Netherlands do not believe that their purchasing agencies can take over responsibility at once, since they are not sufficiently well organized. The governments of both countries would like to be assured of sufficient shipping to make up for the number of tons which the military is now bringing in. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, McCloy to Clayton, Chairman Liberated Areas Committee, Dept of State, 2 Jun 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 151

♦ ♦ ♦ The War Department contemplates the following program to implement this letter the President's letter of 21 May, above]:

1. As to Holland, Norway, Belgium and Denmark
a. No funds will be included in War Department budget estimates for fiscal year 1946 for the provision of civilian supplies in these areas.
b. War Department will terminate the provision of civilian supplies to these areas with August 1945 loadings. Supplies already in pipeline resulting from the use of funds appropriated in fiscal year 1945 will be adequate to meet requirements through August loadings.

2. As to France
a. War Department will terminate the provision of coal with August loadings. ♦ ♦ ♦


[MsĄ CCAC to SCAEF, GOV-382, CM-OUT 19132, 19 Jun 45, CCAC tiles, 400 (6-9-44), sec. I]

2. Considered that July loadings is too early to provide adequate notice to the Belgium Government and to assure smooth transition to civilian responsibility but that continuation of military responsibility beyond August loadings is not justified.

3. You are relieved of responsibility for provision and distribution of relief supplies for Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Denmark on completion of August 1945 loadings except as to POL and coal. Decision on which awaits your recommendation.6 ...

You should make appropriate arrangements with the national governments concerned to assure a smooth transition from military to civilian responsibility. ♦ ♦ ♦


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