Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XIX:

Liberation of the North and Problems Not Settled by Victory

Planning for northern Italy, because it was a task of the greatest magnitude, began early-just about the time, October  1944, when 15th Army Group settled down to a winter of virtual stalemate at a line within fifteen miles of Bologna. About the same time, the Allies announced the new policy toward Italy, which gave heightened importance to long-term political objectives in that country and made it necessary to plan for the north in the light of these as well as other objectives. Integral parts of planning for the north, but parts where the problems were so distinctive as to warrant separate treatment here, centered about the relationship with partisan CLN's (ch. XVIII) and the question of Venezia Giulia (ch. XX). The thorny problem of the partisans, as has been seen, brought into focus the Allied aim of protecting the authority of the moderate and friendly Italian Government against any challenge which the Communist partisans might raise against it after liberation. The issue of Venezia Giulia, together with the question, herein treated, of other northeastern frontier areas such as Bolzano, highlights the extent to which planning for northern Italy also had to concern itself with the objective of maintaining AMG in areas of international dispute until the peace treaty could settle matters. But as the documents on planning indicate, in addition to these special and more political type of questions, there were quite difficult administrative and economic problems. As the main Allied offensive was to be in the northeast, northwest Italy would be a hiatus area in the sense that it would not have the usual number of military agencies. In consequence AFHQ would be required to help AMG in the first phase of operations; moreover, the plan was for AC with its regional teams to take over quickly from AMG in Phase II. Civilian supply also presented a serious problem in that if railroads and ports were severely damaged by scorching, initial distribution of civilian supply would have to be made in long hauls by trucks, unfortunately still in short supply. Further, there were long-term economic problems on the solution of which-since northern Italy had the great bulk of Italian industry-depended the whole question of whether Italy after complete liberation would be economically viable. The problems included repair and provisioning of industrial plants, protection of the north's distinctive price and wage structure by controls and an "economic barrier," and the enlistment of the aid both of management and labor in economic rehabilitation.

If military victory would leave most of ACC/AMG's problems still unsolved, certainly the character of the campaign would have a great effect for better or worse on their task. Just as the long delay in capturing Rome had disrupted all civil affairs


initial plans for the south, so a bitter contest in northern Italy, where the Germans would have time for extensive scorching, would make rehabilitation of civilian life very difficult indeed. Soon after the beginning of the Allied offensive on 9 April it became apparent that this time luck was on the side of the Allies. The British Eighth Army, which began the offensive, advanced rapidly along the Adriatic coast. Five days later the American Fifth Army launched its drive on the key enemy position at Bologna. Though putting up a strong defense initially the German lines cracked, and highly mobile columns pursued them across the Po valley. The Eighth Army drove northeast toward Trieste and Austria, American II Corps raced north ward toward the Brenner Pass, and American IV Corps fanned out over northwestern Italy. By 2 May the race was over and roughly twenty months after the first Allied landing on the Italian heel, the German armies in Italy surrendered. For the first time in history, Italy had been conquered by an invader moving from south to north.

The end of fighting had come with surprising suddenness. Problems of the most varied character remained, and perhaps the only generalization possible about the occupation is that it too was characterized for the most part by surprises. Devastation and economic disruption had been expected as in southern Italy, but the liberation of the north saw little destruction, except from Allied bombing, and no breakdown of industry. It had been feared that civilian supply would be very difficult, but because damage to transport facilities was relatively small there were few problems in feeding the population. The CLN's were found everywhere in effective control, and instead of having to build up local government from scratch AMG faced the novel problem of tactfully taking over the reins from an existing organization. All this created an initial hopefulness, but before long AMG found its optimism had been much greater than was warranted.

First, not only individual partisans but various CLN's began to give trouble. The former created a most pressing problem of public safety. In addition to the regular and well-disciplined partisan bands there were a large number of last-minute patriots who had seized abandoned German and neo-Fascist arms which they used to good effect against their enemies, public and private. A certain amount of vengeance was to be expected in any event but the vast area uncovered and the thin dispersion of AMG officers gave the terrorists a broader scope than might otherwise have been the case. As for the local CLN's, they never openly defied military government but they did tend simply to ignore its decrees and those of their own central authority. As the Allied armies consolidated their positions they tried to deal tactfully with CLN's but it soon became evident that firmness was also needed. The Fifth Army invalidated all CLN orders and decrees as of 29 May but allowed CLN's to continue functioning as "advisory bodies to Allied Military Government with respect to the problems affecting the government, economy and reconstruction of the region." With regard to disarmament, again there was no open defiance but oft-times only partial compliance.

The liberation of the north had been expected to give rise to delicate international situations in disputed frontier areas, but the most troublesome of these (aside from Venezia Giulia) was in an area where difficulty, though foreseen as a possibility, was least expected to be serious. This was the trouble which arose with French armed forces in a northwest frontier area considered undisputed Italian territory. A few facts by way of background help clarify the nature of the problem. The Aosta Valley had certain historic associa-


tions with France and included along the border some French-speaking people. Rumors of French plans to annex the area began to reach AFHQ and the Italian Government in Rome in the autumn and winter of  1944-45. When he was planning the spring offensive Field Marshal Alexander had to consider that his forces possessed but small superiority over the two German divisions in the area. In spite of misgivings on the part of both the American and British ambassadors, Field Marshal Alexander decided that the military advantages of French help outweighed possible political risks. In March therefore he arranged with SHAEF for French troops along the border to carry out "limited operations designed to contain two German divisions." Field Marshal Alexander had cause to regret his action. By the end of April the German withdrawal became a rout and the French penetrated much deeper into Italian territory than planned. On orders from SHAEF Lt. Gen. Paul Doyen halted his advance but refused to withdraw except on orders from his government.

In spite of the presence of French troops AFHQ ordered 15th Army Group to occupy the area and there resulted an intermingling of French and American troops with conflicting orders-a situation obviously inviting clashes. During May French civilians were infiltrated in the Val D'Aosta, propaganda for annexing a border strip to France was distributed, petitions for a plebiscite were circulated, and attempts were made to establish French military government. At the end of May General Doyen refused to allow AMG officers to post proclamations in the town of Imperia and on 4 June he stated that he had been ordered by his government to occupy Cuneo Province. Occupied with similar difficulties in Venezia Giulia, Field Marshal Alexander requested the CCS to authorize him to use force if necessary to establish military government in the disputed areas. The explanation for this extraordinary incident is probably to be found in General de Gaulle's conception of French honor. The American ambassador in Paris made strong representations, and President Truman ordered the cessation of all supply except rations for the French Army. The French thereupon agreed to withdraw their forces from Italian territory provided withdrawal should have merely the appearance of normal relief.

On the northeastern frontier of Italy there were areas where self-determination had some color of validity but here less difficulty was experienced by AMG than had been expected. The South Tyrolean provinces of Belluno, Trento, and Bolzano had been ceded by Austria to Italy as late as 1919, and when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia in World War II they annexed these provinces to the Reich. In planning for the liberation, AMG officers foresaw no special problems in Belluno and Trento since they contained only small Austrian minorities. Bolzano, on the other hand, had a German-speaking population of from 65 to 80 percent. Allied authorities assumed that Belluno and Trento would probably be restored to the Italian Government at an early date but that military government might be required in Bolzano until the signing of a peace treaty which would make provision for national minority rights. When the Allies liberated the South Tyrol early in May they found that the local CLN's were effectively in charge here as elsewhere and that the national minority problem was not serious except in the northern part of Bolzano. The Italian composition of the CLN's facilitated the Allied policy of restoring Italian administration in name and form even if not, in predominantly Austrian areas, the substance. In Bolzano a South-Tyrolese party seeking self-determination was allowed to function, and in other respects as


well AMG at first tread very cautiously where local institutions reflected minority nationality. In early June, however, Headquarters AC laid down the policy of making Italian the major language in all schools and of firmly discouraging any separatism. It was with considerable surprise, therefore, that the Chief Commissioner learned four months later that Secretary of State Byrnes had developed toward Bolzano's fate an uncertainty which Admiral Stone had assured the Italian Government did not exist.

While AMG was asserting its authority in areas of international tension, it was also engaged, together with ACC, in the great problem of economic rehabilitation that on second view appeared more serious than in the first moments of gratification over the slight extent of damage to industry. Even when intact, the industrial plants were of no immediate usefulness because coal and raw materials were lacking. Before embarking on a large program of imports the economists in AC felt that certain controls were desirable. Some manufacturers, compelled to pay idle workers, were being driven into bankruptcy; others were producing luxury items instead of essential goods; still others were producing for export items needed in Italy. Drawing on American experience, AC in April 1945 had proposed an Industrial Production Board, comparable to the U.S. War Production Board, to be composed of an equal number of Allied and Italian members. AFHQ objected to this plan on the ground that it would involve the Allies in the Italian economy for the indefinite future. Other expedients were suggested but AC was unable to obtain CCS approval for any plan involving Allied control. Finally an Italian plan of "self discipline and voluntary co-operation" was put into effect. Not only in this respect, but also in the early abandonment of the economic barrier as unworkable, occupation of the north showed how initial plans must often be changed in the light of experience or second thought.

For the most part, inadequacy of initial plans was due to developments which could not have been foreseen. Allied officers had foreseen that the liberation of the north would produce a refugee and displaced-person problem of unprecedented proportions. A reception-camp, care, and transport program had been carefully prepared, but it could not have been anticipated that the flow of expatriates home would begin before facilities were ready as soon as hostilities in Europe came to their sudden end. To expedite the flow of persons from Italy a Joint AFHQ-SHAEF Committee for Inter-Theater Repatriation Movement Coordination was established in July 1945. The goal of this committee was to have all Italians home by September, before snow in the Alpine passes would hamper movement. By the end of November nearly a million Italians had been repatriated.

The problem of evacuating non-Italians from Italy was even more difficult. Approximately 170,000 prisoners of war, chiefly German, were returned to their homes but as of 30 September about 75,000 displaced persons, mostly "stateless persons," remained. These stateless persons consisted of Yugoslav royalists who did not wish to return to Communist Yugoslavia, Polish patriots who did not desire to return to Communist Poland, persons from eastern Poland and the Baltic states under Soviet rule, and homeless Jews. Among the humanitarian decisions of military authorities was that of SACMED and the CCS in June 1945 to use no force in returning to Russia, or any of the territories incorporated by the Soviet Union, displaced persons who did not wish to return and did not claim Soviet citizenship. Because of the shortage of personnel and delay in negotiating certain agreements the transfer of


all displaced-person operations to UNRRA was delayed for a considerable time (see ch. XXI, Section 8).

Another of the many discrepancies between plan and implementation was the inability to effect an early transition from Army AMG control over northern Italy to control by AC with its regional teams. As the concluding section of documents indicates, AC was desirous of putting this plan into effect at the end of May and believed it would relieve Army AMG of a burden which it was in no wise prepared to cope with for any long period. However, the disarming of the partisans and the keeping of careful watch until French forces had withdrawn from the Aosta Valley were problems which seemed to i5th Army Group to require military handling, and as long as it was needed for such problems it wished to retain authority over military government. After the settlement of the dispute with the French in mid-June, AFHQ directed the Fifth Army to transfer its responsibility to AC, but once again, due to reports of unrest in certain provinces, there was a delay. By 4 August AC had assumed responsibility for all territory previously under Army AMG. Still more noteworthy was the degree to which international complications delayed return of northern Italy to the Italian Government. By July AMG had so far restored normal conditions that the Assistant Chief of Staff of G-5 AFHQ believed the area should be transferred, and SACMED on 6 September proposed the transfer to the CCS, excluding only Venezia Giulia and Udine Province-the latter because it gave access to Venezia. The CCS long delayed its approval because of the State Department's concern lest transfer of Bolzano prejudice its ultimate disposal-a concern which also affected return of all northern Italy since to withhold only Bolzano would create an issue with the Italian Government. Not unit- 8 December did the impatient Italian Government receive back an area which, except as concerned involvement of international complications, had been ready for its administration long before (see also ch. XXI, sec. 6).



[Ltr, Capt Stone, USNR, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, to Italian Undersecy of State for Foreign Affairs, 11 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

With reference to your letter of August 15th I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement. 1


[Min From Offices of U.S. Political Adviser and Br Resident Minister, 29 Jan 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, 503, Cofs]

♦ ♦ ♦ In connection with the occupation of Northern Italy, it would seem desirable to give consideration to the division of that part of the country into two areas: North-western Italy and North-eastern Italy. This is necessary because, in the case of the latter, other interests, particularly Yugoslav, are involved, whereas in the case


of the former we need only take Italian interest into consideration. ♦ ♦ ♦

In North-eastern Italy the situation is complicated by the fact that there are Yugoslav claims to territory hitherto recognized as Italian. For some time past the Yugoslav Partisans have been building up an organization in this area with the obvious intention of staking out a claim as soon as the moment is convenient. If, therefore, Allied Military Government is to function in these areas, it is essential that it should not come into conflict with these Partisan elements, which are particularly strong in the country as opposed to the towns. It follows that some degree of understanding must be established in advance with Marshal Tito. This should not prove impossible, if, as now seems likely, a united Yugoslav Government is established in the very near future. There is no suggestion that a formal agreement should be concluded with Tito on this subject, but it is submitted that Tito should be informed, well in advance, of our intentions.


[Memo, Commodore Stone, Acting Chief Cmsr, AC, for AFHQ, 29 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/I36/287]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. . . . I wish to bring to your notice certain . . . considerations in respect of the three Provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno.

2. All available evidence indicates that, since the capitulation of Italy, the control of these three provinces has been taken over by Germany. The phrase used by one of our informations is that these three Provinces have been "administratively annexed to the Reich."

3. Therefore, it appears likely that, on the entry of Allied troops, a situation of some anarchy may be found. The holders of office under the German regime may have fled taking with them all available records.

9. In the case of the Province of Bolzano there are special considerations. Over 80% of the population is German speaking. Most of them are passionately attached to Austrian tradition and their recent period of administrative incorporation in the Reich may well have revived aspirations of union with a new Austria. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ Paper, Appreciation of the Military and Civil Commitments in N.W. Italy, 29 Nov 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, Log p. 164]

5. This area [Compartimenti Liguria, Piedmont, and Lombardy] is one of dense population (approximately 12 million) the majority of which is concentrated in a few large urban centres. The population, containing certain Fascist elements and a fair number of armed partisans, whose attitude to the Italian Government is uncertain, is liable to be easily disaffected. The prompt introduction after German withdrawal of civil supply into N.W. Italy to the minimum scale necessary to prevent unrest and disease will, therefore, be a primary consideration if a major internal security commitment is to be avoided.

7. So far in Italy the introduction of civil supplies has followed the course of military operations and the movement of the supplies has been achieved largely by military motor transport, and by means of the facilities (ports and railways) already rehabilitated and controlled by the military. Further, the relatively slow rate at which Italy has been liberated has enabled communications to be developed more or less concurrently with the speed of the advance.

8. N.W. Italy, on the other hand, is likely to be a hiatus area which will be deliberately evacuated by the enemy over a relatively short period. The communications are likely to be subject to systematic destruction on a scale far greater than that hitherto encountered in Italy. The damage to communications in N.W. Italy may, however, be reduced in extent if the partisans pursue an anti-scorch policy and if bombing targets are so selected as to spare those communications.

9. The support of operations against the enemy only indirectly requires the development of communications in N.W. Italy. These communications are required to meet the civil commitment in the area. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ Paper, Appreciation of the Mil and Civil Commitments in N.W. Italy, 29 Nov 44]

24. The following main factors affect the determination of responsibility for the N.W. Italy commitment:
a. Hq AAI is charged with responsibility for operations in Italy and as such will be responsible for clearing N.W. Italy of the enemy and for the establishment of AMG.
b. N.W. Italy is likely to become a hiatus area not directly connected with AAI's main operations against the German forces remaining in N.E. Italy. In previous cases the solution of civil problems has been in large measure assisted by the existence of military agencies for military purposes in the area involved. In N.W. Italy mili-


tary agencies for purely military purposes will be less strongly represented and the direct military interest in the area smaller. This will throw a greater burden of responsibility on the civil organization.

c. Any military administrative resources required for civil purposes in N.W. Italy will largely have to be provided from resources now controlled by AAI.

25. It is concluded that AC should be made primarily responsible for the development of N.W. Italy and that they should work in close conjunction with AAI who will be responsible for the initial occupation and maintenance of law and order in the area. The development of N.W. Italy is only indirectly connected with the operational task of AAI, and for this reason AAI should be relieved of responsibility for this area by AFHQ as early as possible.


[Note, Macmillan, Actg President, AC, undated, presumably Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/68]

♦ ♦ ♦ When we reach the North we shall find large working class populations in Turin and Milan. It will test all our efforts to keep them alive. They will be the first large urban populations in our care situated inland and not upon the seaboard. To bring them food without railways or trucks will present a formidable problem to Allied Military Government. At present, slaves although they may be of German occupation, the factories are running and the people are largely employed. When they are "liberated" the power will probably be destroyed, the factories largely dismantled, the machine tools wrecked or taken to Germany, and the raw materials not available. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Col James E. Butterworth, Chief of Econ and Sup Div, G-5, AFHQ, for ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 19 Dec. 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, p. 381-34]

1. In studying the Log Plans appreciation for Northwest Italy, and in studying some of the problems that will result from the area becoming an hiatus area, together with the additional plans that will be required for the balance of Northern Italy, it has become apparent that we are faced with a task that is beyond the present means of the Allied Commission assisting the Italian Government to perform. Northern Italy beyond our present operational frontlines has a population of approximately 20 million, of which 14 million are in the industrial Northwest. The following remarks are confined to the Northwest area:
a. The withdrawal of enemy formations from the Northwest for whatever reason will make it necessary for the Italian Government to ensure the equitable distribution of food supplies to the population. To do this it will be necessary to supplement the local resources, most of which come from the Lower Po Valley, by imported wheat and other supplies. The port of Genoa will have to be reopened (Navy).
b. The rail line from Genoa to Alessandria and beyond will have to be repaired. We are faced with destroyed tunnels and bridges, making it at least four months before any rail can possibly be made available. This throws the burden on trucks.
c. The present truck situation of the Italian Government implemented by War Department vehicles operated by the A.C. is insufficient to care for our present liberated areas of Italy. Additional trucks (1700 capacity 1 1/2 tons each) have been notified as being approved. Their arrival cannot be anticipated prior to February and March. The required lift to service Northwest Italy is approximately that of 3000 3-ton trucks operating on two shifts daily. In addition to this it is anticipated that between 1500 and 2000 local trucks may be found to pick up local supplies and to aid in the distribution from established centers.
d. Coal. It is not anticipated that coal can be shipped prior to the availability of rail service.
e. Petroleum. Plans call for a short pipeline from the port inland, but all of the packaged stores and petrol and fuel oil from the end of the pipeline must be carried by trucks (the same trucks that are supposed to carry food).

2. The occupation of Northeast Italy will increase proportionately the problems enumerated above.

3. Northwest Italy is the manufacturing center of the nation. It is, not agricultural to a self supporting degree. If we acquire this territory before we have the means to distribute the local foodstuffs or to import and distribute supplementary foodstuffs it is almost certain that a chaotic condition will soon develop that may threaten the operational plans of the military. It will be impossible to avoid serious unrest if there is no employment and no food.

4. Recent intelligence reports both from G-2 and OSS sources indicate that the Germans are pursuing a systematic plan for immobilizing all of the industries of Northwest Italy. They have planned for the destruction of highway bridges, the complete removal of all trucks for at least 50


miles in the low country where no other destruction is possible; for the dynamiting of tunnels both for rail and highway traffic. They have arranged for the destruction of the vital hydroelectric plants, and in agreement with Italian industrialists who have requested that their buildings be not destroyed, they have agreed to immobilize these industries by removing vital parts of the machinery without which no operation can take place. At the same time while these plants are being used for German production, the raw materials available arc being kept to the minimum so that Allied liberation will find these plants with no raw materials on which to work. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Lt Gen Sir Brian II. Robertson, CAO, Remarks in Min of Mtg at Hq AC. 23 Dec 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, Log p. 164]

2. CAO stated that the policy suggested .. . 29 November had been revised. . . . It was now proposed to offer to Allied Commission certain definite military assistance which they could assume as a firm basis for their planning. ♦ ♦ ♦ [See Directive No. 1, below.]

3. It was emphasized that military personnel were not available to meet completely the above commitments and that the maximum use of civil resources would be required by the military.

5. Road Transport
The main problem was to move civil supplies to N.W. Italy in the initial stages of the occupation during the period prior to Genoa being developed. The CAO stated that he was prepared to move, under military arrangements, a certain daily tonnage of civil supplies from existing stockpiles to some point between Bologna and Piacenza, from which point on carriage would be an AC responsibility. . . .

It was agreed that drivers for these additional vehicles should be Italian military personnel. AFHQ would assist in their training, but the responsibility for their raising would rest with the Allied Commission. ♦ ♦ ♦


[15th AGp Admin Directive No. 1, 19 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/105/486]

3. Operations. As stated in Operation Instruction No. 3, Headquarters, 15th Army Group, the Occupation of Northwest Italy is to be conducted in two (2) phases:
a. Phase
I-Military occupation and the elimination of any remaining German or Fascist Italian formations, and the reestablishment of law and order among the civilian population, terminating in the establishment of Allied Military Government.
b. Phase
II-The assumption of responsibility for military administration and Allied Military Government by AFHQ.

4. Administrative Responsibilities-Phase 1
a. As set forth in letter, AFHQ, dated 25 January 1945, file AG 323/o6i GDS-O, Subject: "Occupation of NW Italy," AFHQ will be responsible for:

(1) Opening and operating the Port of Genoa

(2) Repair of the following railways:
The easiest route to Milan
(Priority of repair contingent upon state of demolition found to have been carried out by the enemy when the area has been entered.)

(3) Construction and operation of petrol pipelines and bulk storage facilities from Genoa to Alessandria

(4) Co-ordination of the repair of the main State Cable routes, operating through L/C Signals, Headquarters, 15th Army Group.

(5) Training of Italian drivers for vehicles under the control of Headquarters, Allied Commission for the delivery and distribution of civil supplies.

(6) Supply sufficient motor transport to IV Corps to lift civil supplies at and forward of railhead. Units concerned with the above tasks will be under IV Corps for local administration.
b. Fifth Army will be responsible for
the supply and administration of all troops operating under, or administered by, IV Corps.
c. IV Corps, assisted by Headquarters, No. 2 District, will be responsible for:
(1) The establishment of Allied Military government.
(2) The initiation of civil relief measures.
(3) The initiation of the following:
(a) Repair of the following roads:
(i) Genoa-Alessandria
(ii) Piacenza-Alessandria-Turin
(iii) Piacenza-Milan

(Subject to physical reconnaissance and military requirements, priority for repair will be in the order given above.)

(4) Traffic control on the main arteries of military supplies.


(5) Co-ordination of the rehabilitation of electric power and water systems at Genoa and such other places as may be notified.

(6) The initiation of the mobilization of civil resources. (to be co-ordinated with Headquarters, Allied Commission, through Headquarters, 15th Army Group.)

5. Administrative Responsibilities-Phase II
a. During this phase, responsibility for administration of Northwest Italy will pass from IV Corps to AFHQ. Headquarters, No. 2 District, will be the local AFHQ agency responsible for continued British military administration and Headquarters, Allied Commission for civil administration. MTOUSA will be responsible for the supply and administration of any U.S. forces remaining in Northwest Italy.
b. IV Corps, after co-ordinating with No. 2 District, will recommend to Headquarters, 15th Army Group when administrative responsibility for all, or any part of, Northwest Italy should pass from IV Corps to AFHQ.

10. Responsibility of Headquarters, Allied Commission.
a. AFHQ has defined the long-term responsibility of Allied Commission in Northwest Italy as follows:
(1) Generally insuring that as the first consideration unrest and disease are prevented, and as the second essential that industry is rehabilitated and opened.
(2) The provision of civilian manpower and materials to assist the military in the execution of the tasks detailed in paragraph 4, above.
(3) The economic development and rehabilitation of Northwest Italy, and the provision of civil resources for this purpose, within the limits of such policies as may be established by AFHQ. The following matters will have priority, subject to requirements under paragraph 10a(2), above, in the allocation of civil resources:
(a) Provision of drivers to operate vehicles for the movement of civil supplies.
(b) Mobilization of workshop facilities for the rehabilitation of Italian vehicles found in the area.
(c) Maintenance and repair of all Allied Commission vehicles used for the transportation of civil supplies.
(d) Mobilization of local engineer resources in labor and materials for reconstruction and repair of:
other than those set out in paragraph 4 c, above.
(e) Provision of dock labor for handling port discharge tonnages in excess of that which is a military responsibility.♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive, Labour Subcom, Hq AC, to All Concerned, 14 Apr, Issued 4 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/978]

2. . . . (a) Wages in private industry will be fixed at 3 April rates....

(b) Nevertheless, it will be lawful for employees and employers to negotiate for and agree upon proposed wage increases.2  Accordingly, Article 4 of General Order No. 41 provides that negotiations for wage increases will be permitted between employers and employees. Any agreement reached as the result of such negotiations will be submitted through the local Ufficio del Lavoro to AMG and will be valid only upon receipt of AMG approval in writing.

(c) It will be the policy not to approve increases as long as the price level remains substantially constant. Where, however, there has been a substantial increase in the cost-of-living, such agreements may be approved to the extent deemed appropriate under the circumstances, after regard has been paid to the recommendation of the Regional Italian Joint Advisory Committee in each case. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Bonomi, 16 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/202]

♦ ♦ ♦ It has been decided to appoint Joint Advisory Committees comprising representatives of the Italian Government, Italian industry and Italian workers to be attached to each Regional Commissioner in AMG territory for the purpose of advising on labour and industrial questions. The functions of the Regional Joint Advisory Committee are:

(1) To advise upon proposals for wage changes reaching the Regional Commissioners from negotiating bodies through Ufficio del Lavoro with the comments and recommendations of the latter.

(2) To consider and advise upon matters leading to industrial unrest and, where neces-


sary, to take a personal part in the negotiations upon such matters.

(3) Generally to advice on question that may be referred regarding to the establishment, staffing and operation of government offices dealing with labour , such as Ufficio del Lavoro.

(4) To identify at the earliest possible moment industrial establishment which should be safe-guarded for requisition or deterioration.

(5)Similary to identify industrial establishment which should be re-activated at the earliest possible moment in the general interest and to prevent unemployment. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg, G-5, AFHQ, to All Concerned, 22 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/154/333]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. It has been decided, because of wide divergences between wage and price scales in southern Italy and those reported from Northern Italy, to maintain the reportedly lower rates and prices in the north and, for an initial period, to separate the two economies.3  Economic boundary line will be as follows: northern boundaries of Lucca, Pistoia, Firenze and Ravenna provinces, and the western and northern boundaries of province of Apuania.

2. Price differentials will probably make smuggling and black market over the economic boundary line profitable for both military and civilian vehicles (Italian and Allied).

3. Police road blocks will be established as check posts on all roads crossing the boundary indicated in paragraph I, in order to examine for illegal cargo both southbound and northbound traffic. Military police (to search military vehicles) and Carabinieri or Guardia di Finanze (to search civilian vehicles) will staff the road blocks jointly....

4. Through AC/AMG channels you will be notified of the types of cargo which should be made the subject of search. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, AC Hq, for G-5 AFHQ, 26 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/273]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. (a) Food
Stockpiles are available ready for immediate movement into the North to provide an impact ration on the following scale:

Wheat/flour 100 grams of bread per capita per day
(except Liguria-200grams)
Sugar 125 grams per capita per month
Fats 200 "      "      "     "       "
Salt 100 "      "      "     "       "

Food stocks found locally in the North will be used to supplement this scale.

(b) Transport.
In the event of full occupation taking place over a period of two months, Allied Commission will be unable fully to meet its commitments in the movement of civil supplies which are planned to be imported. If the full occupation takes three months or longer, transportation available will probably be sufficient to meet minimum requirements. The situation would be completely changed if the Germans capitulate. In this case it is anticipated that port facilities and railways would be available for use after a short period.

(c) Distribution.
Distribution will be made down to provincial centres by military transport already allocated. Below these centres distribution will be made under Allied control through the media of the Consorzii Agrari and the existing Sepral (Sezione Provinciale Alimentazione) using indigenous transport.


[Directive, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, and CCAO, 15th AGp, to AMG Officers, 27 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/641]

♦ ♦ ♦ It is in the interest of the Allies that there should be a stable Government in Italy and the Allied policy is to strengthen the legitimate Italian Government in every way possible. The Italian Government in Rome may not have the entire confidence of the CLN's in the North and, at best, their influence there may be subject to fluctuation. . . . The Government has succeeded in exacting a certain measure of recognition from the CLN's in the North, but the possibility cannot be overlooked that they, or their component political parties, may not abide by this agreement if circumstances seem favorable for a political upheaval. 4



[Hq AC, Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

♦ ♦ ♦ I. 1. The Month of April falls into two clearly marked periods of AMG activity. During the first of these the calm and routine administration of the small area of Italy lying within the Army boundary was carried on, while at the same time preparations were diligently made for the commencement of military government in the large areas which it was expected the Army would occupy during the coming advance. Food was stockpiled at Florence, Viareggio and Forli. An advance food depot was established at Porretta Terme. The Provincial and Regional teams, particularly those in the nearest provinces and regions, were prepared for early movement. On 11 and 12 April the 92d Division took Massa-Carrara and the first of the new territories to be liberated was entered by AMG officers. Shortly after the middle of April the attack on Bologna began and that city fell on 21 April. Modena was entered on 23 April, Mantova on 26 April. On 28 April the city of Milan, which had previously been the scene of a Partisan uprising, was entered by IV Corps. By the end of the month the greater part of North Italy had been occupied and rumour of an impending surrender was already current. . . . Within a period of ten days, the zone of Allied Military Government under the Fifth Army had been expanded from a little more than three provinces, Firenze, Lucca and Pistoia, to thirty provinces covering a far greater expanse of territory, population, wealth and industry than had ever been subjected to Allied Military Government in Italy at any one time before.


[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

4. A new and important situation that confronted AMG during the month lay in the character and strength of the CLN's encountered in every province and almost every commune. While the position of the CLN's found in Tuscany last summer and fall had been strong, especially in Florence where they had actually governed the city for several days before any AMG officers were allowed to cross the Arno, the position of the CLN's in Northern Italy was much fortified by the encouragement they had been given by the Italian Government in Rome during the winter months, and also by the central direction which had been created in Milan. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Col H. T. Walker, CofS, G-5, IV Corps, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. a. The first of May found civil authority in much confusion. Partisans were in control of towns and cities which had been by-passed by the Allied forces. The local Committees of National Liberation were in full operation and had selected the various governmental officers. Decrees were being issued by the CLN without reference to AMG....
b. The CLN of north Italy and its correspondent committees of National Liberation in the regions and provinces had prepared plans long in advance of liberation as to officers, economics, finance, in fact, on all of the problems which would confront the governmental authorities in the area. Most of these were found to be sensible and the appointments well chosen. ♦ ♦ ♦


[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

4.... The CLN's had been recognized by Rome as the legal governments of Northern Italy during the period of German occupation and, while it was understood that they were to step aside when AMG came in, nevertheless their actions during the occupation acquired a certain validity which otherwise they would not have had. In practically all instances, for example, the CLN had actually designated Prefects. These men had taken possession of their offices by the time AMG officers arrived. AMG could remove them if they were considered unsatisfactory. But it may be doubted that it was legally necessary for AMG to "appoint" them, if it desired to continue to use their services, as they had already been appointed by bodies recognized by Rome as having the right to govern the regions; and this being the case it also became a rather futile gesture to consult the local CLN as to whether


someone on a list previously made up in Rome should not be appointed Prefect. The answer was obvious: What is the matter with the existing Prefect: i.e. the one recently appointed by the CLN and unless an answer could be found to that inquiry there was no use bringing the matter up.
.... Their nominees for office were generally retained by AMG....


[Hq AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

1. Operations in May were a continuation of the Allied Armies swift breakthrough of the German winter line during April, culminating in the surrender of the German Armies in Italy on 2 May and finally in the total surrender of Germany on 8 May.

2. Shortly after the first of May a new phase of AMG began; this was due to the establishment of military government in cities and communities which had not experienced the ravages of war and which saw a, victorious army sweep past hard on the heels of a flying enemy. Enormous areas had to be covered by AMG teams who, prepared to find chaotic conditions, found instead outstanding normality. Trains were running in every provincial capital in the North of Italy, electric light and water were functioning in most large cities and shops were well stocked. The Committees of National Liberation were conducting Provincial and Communal administration with efficiency, and AMG was therefore faced with the entirely novel problem of tactfully taking over the reins from an existing organization, in contrast to its experience further South where no such organization was functioning at the time of liberation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for AMG Officials, 1 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

3. The outstanding successes of the patriots in liberating their towns from Nazis and Fascists, the good administration, according to initial reports, set up by the CLN's, the execution of Mussolini and many of his accomplices, and the surrender, in some cases to the patriots, of a great bulk of the German forces, make a review of our policy necessary.

4. The greatest delegation possible should be made to the Italian authorities who will, in many cases, be members of the CLN's. At the same time every effort should be made to impress upon the people and the authorities that Allied Military Government is the temporary forerunner of the Italian Government, and that Allied Military Government is working in the closest co-operation with that Government at the Headquarters of this Commission.

7. The implementation of this policy will not be easy. The greatest tact, the greatest patience will be necessary. We should all remember that it is for the Italians to determine their own destiny, and that military government in circumstances prevailing now is necessary only for the protection of Allied troops and installations. A light rein with a firm hand should be the order of the day.

8. Above all, we must remember that it is our duty to administer rather than to intervene in the political future of Italy.


[Paraphrase of Msg, Hq AC to G-5, AFHQ, 8 May 45, G-5, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 5820]

North Italy preliminary reports indicate such an economic situation that Northern Italy industries might well be used for Allied war effort at once if coal were made available in sufficient quantities. Were there to be utilisation of industry it would greatly benefit Italian labour and would do much to help in the economic and political crisis which is ahead. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Capt Charles I. Dunn, CAO, Commune of Genova, Rpt, 24 May 45, ACC files, 11002/105/1]

1. On 2 May 1945 this officer took over the duties of C.A.O. Commune of Genova. He found the communal administration functioning in a remarkable manner, taking into consideration that all high communal officials had been in office not longer than ten days from the above date.

3. Public Works and Utilities. This officer found all public utilities operating with the exception of the gas plant which was undamaged but inoperative due to lack of coal. However, street barricades and rubble were wide spread throughout the city, a definite hazard to army traffic.

4. Public Health and Sanitation was excellent. Two of the largest hospitals, San Martino and Pammatone were badly damaged or destroyed,


causing congestion in the others. In addition, many German wounded were found in hospitals throughout the city but were quickly removed by the Military. Sanitary conditions within the commune were good.

5. Refugee Camps. Even at this early date refugees from outside the commune were arriving in Genova. The Sindaco set up a refugee camp run by E.C.A. [Ente Comunale d'Assistenza] at the school Duca degli Abruzzi caring for-approximately 300 persons. A soup kitchen was also operated in the above connection at Albergo dei Poveri Salita Carbonara 2.

6. Public Safety was in rather chaotic state. All the royal Carabinieri were removed from their posts and armed Partisans were patrolling the commune. The shooting of civilians was wide spread and public order at a low ebb. ♦ ♦ ♦

7. Finance. All banks and the stock exchange were closed. Financial transactions were at a stand still.

8. Public Relations were seemingly excellent, the Municipal authorities were friendly and anxious to assist in any way possible.♦ ♦ ♦


[Food Sub-Corn, AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/159/671]

2. A.C. stockpiles on Eastern and Western coasts were more than adequate to cope with the demands of the Northern provinces. Transport of food supplies from stockpiles and warehouses was the controlling factor in determining the amount of food that could be made available. After an initial difficult fortnight, shipment has improved considerably-by the end of the month, a total of over 19 thousand tons of food has been issued from warehouses on the east side, distributed over the whole of the Po Valley, and over 5 thousand tons from the warehouses on the west side to the Ligurian coast.

3. Investigations were continued during the month as to the stocks of indigenous foodstuffs throughout the North. The results, to date, have been encouraging; considerable stocks of grain, rice, sugar, and cheese have been declared and these will be incorporated in plans for the provisioning of the North.

4. Working organizations of food rationing, food control, and distribution, have been discovered in the North and every effort is being made to utilize these, so that the minimum interference in the food economy of North Italy will be made. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Food Sub-Corn, AC, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/159/671]

2. Considerable attention was given to the linking up the food organizations found to be existing in Northern Italy upon our entry there with the Italian Ministry of Food. Agreement was reached as a result of several conferences, and now there is a complete Italian food organization in Northern Italy which is linked up with that in Rome. ♦ ♦ ♦


[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

II. d. Transportation has been the limiting factor in the supplying of food and movement of personnel. Fifth Army Transportation Section took over control of all transportation and by the end of the month movement of supplies was built up to 2500 tons per day and [is] still increasing. Over 3,100 carabinieri and their equipment were transported from Florence to their provinces requiring as much as a six-day turnabout in some cases. Regional and Provincial teams were aided in their moves to their various capitals by this transportation. Refugees are being transported by backlog of trucks as far as possible.

In order to best utilize additional trucks, other than Allied Commission trucks, from Fifth Army and Peninsular Base Section a large warehouse was established in Modena on 26 May. This warehouse is stocked with the extra' Allied Commission trucks over and above those necessary for the minimum 450 tons per day commitment for Milan and Turin and by Army and Peninsular Base Section trucks on backhauls of Prisoners of War.♦ ♦ ♦


Diary, Lt Col S. H. White, 15th AGp Liaison Mission, May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

♦ ♦ ♦ Thursday, 10 May. At about 2230 evening 9 May I received message that persons were at Headquarters who wished to see me. I found there two peasants and a priest; they told me that some days ago a German vehicle had been shot up and they had obtained a chest of money; they asked that the Allies should take charge. I phoned 88 Div. who said the location was outside their area and suggested 10 Mtn. Div. to which I replied that I did not think the latter had any unit in the vicinity. I then rang 2 Corps who were sceptical of the story but said they


would attend to it. I asked when and was met rather evasively. I said I could myself arrange to get the money in.

I left next morning at 9 and arrived at Cloz about 10 to find whole village in church. Waited until ii conclusion of High Mass (Ascension day) and then went to the Priest's House who produced wooden crate for which I handed over order in name of GOC and receipt. Returned to Bolzano when I knocked up Bank Italia it being a holiday and requested them take in money located Lt. Paquette and returned to Bank of Italia [sic]. Money counted; 8 1/2 million lire in notes and 11 1/2 million lire in bankers orders, obtained receipts from Lt. Paquette....

Spoke General Hume and Colonel [Joseph R.] Burrill who approved suggestion of reward to village. (Letter to GOC 15 Army Group sent by Colonel Burrill.) ♦ ♦ ♦


[Finance Div, AMG Fifth Army, Final Rpt, Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

♦ ♦ ♦ In a dry report like this, all the romance will be squeezed out, and just the final results will be given, and we leave it to your imagination or if you wish to your postwar time to tell you of the thrilling chases over the mountain passes and into dark caves, and searching through safes, etc., etc., for the treasure of the Nazi and the Fascist! ♦ ♦ ♦

One of our latest caches was from several cases of German SS uniforms in a warehouse which were found to have large sums of Italian lire in the pockets-completely equipped. ♦ ♦ ♦

So the treasure hunt goes on over the Dolomites-the Brenner-the Bergamo and the Carnic Alps-up and down the lakes-in caves. The score rolls up and up and it is billions we talk of now-not millions-and platinum and gold and jewels and moneys of every country-not the paper money either-gold sovereigns-double eagles-napoleons-gold marks-and even barrels of silver which may go to make silver nitrate for the Medical Department or some other prosaic task. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, The Spec Cmsr for Social-Fascism (Signature Illegible), to U.S. Ambassador to Italy, 28 Oct 45, Transmitted by David McK. Key, U.S. Charge d'Affaires ad Interim, to Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, i6 Nov 45, ACC files, 10000/136/123]

♦ ♦ ♦ I have the honor of transmitting to you a circular that I have sent out to Fascists and sympathizers on occasion of October 28
[anniversary date of the Fascist march on Rome].

We intend to re-enter the political life of our country, ready to give loyal and sincere collaboration to our enemies of yesterday, for the good of today and of tomorrow of the Italian people.♦ ♦ ♦


[Circular addressed to the Italian Social-Fascist Party of Action reads in part as follows]

Comrades! Italians in good faith!
On April 25, 1945, at the Prefecture of Milan; the Duce in a long conversation with me told me what I am going to repeat here below:

"(2) Italy, having lost a war, will be subjected to the Victors for a very long period. It is not improbable that Hitler is right and that at a certain moment the Anglo-Americans will find it necessary to wage war against the USSR. In such a case, the Fascist must side with the Allies.

"If Germany had won this war, we must remember that a defeated England would have had a second place in Europe just the same and Italy the third place because at the bottom, Hitler had a higher esteem for the English than for the Italians. Instead, having lost a war, Germany will disappear from the role of important nations for an indefinite period and in such a case, Fascists must give their support to Great Britain until it overthrows Russia and takes over again the reins of Europe in her hands." ♦ ♦ ♦

These were the words of the Duce, pronounced a few hours before he was assassinated. Now you know how to comport yourselves. Remember: your immediate duty is that of fighting against that type of constitution which the despotic government of the so-called C.L.N. wants to impose upon you. ♦ ♦ ♦



[G-5, Fifth Army Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

3. The first great problem that confronted AMG in all the new territory was the Partisan situation. In every province there were found to be thousands of Partisans, armed to the teeth, many of them with excellent fighting records but many also who had picked up arms only as the Germans withdrew, all ready to tell the world (and many genuinely believing) that they themselves and their comrades had driven out the Germans and liberated their cities, substantially unassisted by the Allied Armies, and most of them toughened by months of rough living in the mountains and, it was feared, little disposed to convert their swords into ploughshares and return to the quiet walks of peace. Edward Burke said that one could not indict a nation and so one cannot indict the Partisans. They came from every walk of Italian life and included the noblest and most high-minded of Italian youth, men and women, as well as much of the material out of which our American city gangsters are made. It is this latter element that has given trouble.

From the first entry into Bologna the problem of Partisan murders raised its ugly head. It continued unabated. These murders take two forms, first the unorganized casual killing of a single individual, presumably, in most cases, by an individual or small group and presumably also in such cases largely for personal revenge, possibly revenge for some injustice committed by the individual under Fascist authority; and second, the more or less organized shooting of Fascists by Partisans at the direction of their leaders, possibly after some form of so-called trial, such as is alleged to have been given Mussolini and the others arrested with him. In some provinces one form of lawlessness predominates; in others, another. For example in Bologna the individual private murder has been the rule while in Verona the killings, as far as is known, were all of the pseudo-legal variety. ♦ ♦ ♦

AMG response to this situation during April was of two kinds. First great efforts were made to disarm the Partisans and with astonishing success during this period. Parades were held during April in Bologna and Modena and by the end of the month preparations for parades in Verona, Vicenza and other cities were well under way. At these parades the Partisans passed in review, fully armed and under their own leaders, before General officers of the Fifth Army, and at the conclusion of the parades surrendered their arms. Bands played, bugles trumpeted, drums beat and flags were unfurled in the soft April breezes. After the arms were surrendered speeches were made and Partisan Certificates were presented to the leaders. [See Chapter XVIII, Section 2.] At Bologna 3,500 Partisans surrendered their arms and at Modena more than 14,000. Dozens of truckloads of rifles, ammunition and all sorts of small arms were collected. The lot included a few light pieces and, at Modena, two tanks. However it was noted that the number of pistols and machine guns turned in was surprisingly small.

The other effort to bring the killings under control was through appeals to the sense of responsibility of the better elements in the community. Appeals were made privately and by public proclamation by AMG officers, by the CLN's, by the new Prefects and Mayors, by church officials and by Partisiani leaders themselves. That these appeals had some good effect cannot be doubted. Nevertheless the situation remained grave at the end of the month and, while Carabinieri had been ordered to do everything possible to prevent the commission of such crimes, ,no serious effort had been made up to the end of the month to punish any of the perpetrators thereof. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Braine, Dir, Labor Subcom, for Hq, AC, 21 May 45 (Written after a visit to the North, 6-19 May), ACC files, 10000/146/37]

10. A public pronouncement should immediately be made regarding
(a) The appointment of Works Management Councils....;
(b) The payment of Liberation Bonus to  workers....;
(c) The appointment of Commissioners and Vice-Commissioners in replacements of compromised or missing managements.

The first depends upon a so-called Decree of the Committee of National Liberation for Upper Italy, dated 17th April 1945, which abolished the Fascist "socialization" decree but applied, to establishments with capital of one million lire and


above which had been liable to socialization, provisions for managements councils containing 50 p.c. representation of workers.

The second rests upon an alleged agreement between representatives of industry and of workers in the CLN, and required payment of the bonus to industrial workers to be completed by 31st May. It was later extended to employees in commerce, to be paid by 31st August. Any number from four to six million workers would be affected and as the average payment would be in the neighborhood of 3,500 lire per worker, the inflationary effect and other results would be serious if the payments were made.

The third started as the nomination by local CLN's of interim managers to keep businesses going when the managers disappeared, but has been interpreted as the right to substitute nominees at the instigation of such Committees. The demand is made that a worker should be appointed if capable; otherwise, that a worker should be appointed Vice-Commissioner.

11. In fact, the three questions were not heard of in Bologna, Venzia, Padova, and were not much in evidence in Genoa. They are being developed most in the Milan area and also in Turin. Threats of personal violence are being made in the Milan area and also in Turin. In the Turin area some employers made the theatrical gesture of offering the keys of their establishments to the workers when they were asked for the bonus, which they said would mean the closing of their businesses.

I gathered the impression in Milan, Turin and Genoa that the workers' representatives in the various Camere del Lavoro were themselves fearful of the consequences of pursuing these issues, with the exception of the Communist secretary of the Camera at Milan.

12. . . . On the first two issues it is recommended that a decision should be taken to suspend action until the Italian Government has fully considered all the implications. On the third issue it is recommended that commissioners or receivers should be appointed by AMG or the Italian Government, in substitution where advisable, of those appointed by CLN, and that orders should be issued that there should be no arbitrary replacement of existing managements. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min, Mtg of SACMED's Econ Comm., 22 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

♦ ♦ ♦ Mr. Antolini [Vice President, Econ Sec.] reported that the CLNAI had established in Northern Italy a retribution bonus system to be supported by all industrial workers. Collections are being enforced by industrial unions and similar organizations.... General Spofford pointed out that CLNAI decrees in AMG territory are not legal or enforceable, and as a consequence this is a matter to be dealt with by AMG....


[An Italian's Rpt Sent by Bonomi to Chief Cmsr, AC, 28 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

The political and economic situation in North Italy is most ambiguous; while there is an Allied Military Government, the C.L.N.A.I. is carrying on because of the full powers given to it by the Rome Government, and has installed itself like a real civilian government, with commissions and commissioners acting as ministers.7

The decrees and regulations which they issue do not always correspond with those of the Allied Government or of the National Government.

While the military organization of the partisans was perfect, the civilian may not be prepared for the grave problems of the present items; this creates a state of confusion which might seriously harm the political and economic future of North Italy and of the whole nation as well.

Extremist elements follow systems which are not very different from the demagogic systems of the past regime; others aim at getting hold of the leading posts of command through a rash and personal work of epuration, considering the fact of belonging to this or that partisan formation to be an essential condition, and overlooking all other technical or experience requisites.

Worked up by the programs of leftist men or parties, the working masses feel disappointed for they find that the regulations against the leading classes are never drastic enough; faced with more and more numerous demagogic acts, the latter feel no less disappointed, and are preoccupied by the lack of organization and logical consequences in the regulations which are being issued; ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive, Poletti, Rgnl Cmsr, Lombardia Rgn, to Provincial Cmsrs, 22 May 45, ACC files, 11100/101/140]

On and after June 7, 1945, there are to be no armed partisans operating as partisans in your


province. In other words, from that day on no armed partisans are to be used even to guard their own CP's, warehouses, railroads or other installations. The groups of a thousand partisans for Milan City and 500 each for each province, which have been heretofore authorized on the condition that such partisans wore a serially numbered arm band and carried an identity card, are to be dissolved by June 7th. Until that date you are permitted to use these especially authorized partisans for the guarding of their CPS, warehouses, etc., but they are not to be permitted to roam the streets generally with arms. ♦ ♦ ♦


[G-5 Sec, Fifth Army, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/100/436]

2. . . . In those areas where the Army swept through and quickly demonstrated power, the Partisans responded at once to the order to disarm and return to civil life. The war had passed them and there was no real need for them to fight to protect their land. Partisans of Bologna, Modena, Mantova and Verona were examples of this favorable reaction.

In other sectors in which complete liberation was slower there was another and more difficult problem. The Partisans were loath to surrender their weapons until the surrendered German troops were disarmed and removed from such areas. Also there were Fascist groups organized for resistance and until they were tracked down the Partisans were disinclined to part with their arms. Milan, Turin, Trento, and Bolzano provinces were examples of this problem.

There was accordingly issued by the Commanding General, IV Corps, in collaboration with the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, an order that Partisans should be disarmed and their weapons turned in on or before the 7th of June. This order was in general well obeyed. By the end of May a steady stream of weapons mostly rifles-was coming in from the Partisans to the collection centers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, to G-5, AFHQ, i Jun 45, ACC files, I0000/136/120]

♦ ♦ ♦ The CLNAI on the whole has lived up to the agreements made prior to occupation and has cooperated insofar as possible under the pressure exerted by the various political parties within the Committee. ♦ ♦ ♦

There are now disturbing reports from the Provinces. There have been desires on the part of local CLN's to issue decrees of their own and a few have attempted this. To end this matter permission is being sought through channels for the publication of General Wilson's agreement with the CLNAI to establish the fact that Allied Military Government was to take over. In addition a letter has been written by the President of the CLNAI to all local CLN's again reiterating that they now become consultative rather than governing bodies. This has been given wide publicity. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Gen Hume, ACofS, G5, to All Concerned, undated, probably late May, ACC files, 11100/101/5]

After consultation with the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy and with its approval, and in accordance with the agreement made with the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre and the said Committee

It is ordered that with respect to all territory occupied by the Fifth Army:

1. All decrees and orders heretofore made by the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy, the Regional Committee of Liberation, Provincial and Communal Committees of Liberation, or any economic, financial, industrial, or other committees or agencies of the said Committees of Liberation, shall cease to have any legal effect as of 28 May 1945, unless specifically ratified by Allied Military Government.

2. All appointments to offices of whatever nature heretofore made by the said committees are not valid until legalized by Allied Military Government.

3. Any decrees, orders or appointments purporting to be made by said committees after the publication of this order shall be null and void.

4. Allied Military Government acting for and by authority of the Commanding General, Fifth Army is the only authority empowered to issue decrees and orders and to make appointments to a public or other office. This authority wherever practical is delegated to the duly constituted Italian Officials previously appointed by Allied Military Government such as the Prefect, Questore, and the Mayor of a city. All orders is sued by public officials affecting the civilian population will be issued only with the written approval of the appropriate officer of Allied Military Government.

5. The said Committees of Liberation and Committees and other agencies thereof will operate only as advisory bodies to Allied Military


Government with respect to the problems affecting the government, economy and reconstruction of the region. Allied Military Government has in the past and will continue to collaborate closely with the said committees of Liberation.

6. This order shall apply and be effective in all territory now occupied by the Fifth Army. 8


[Political Review of Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, at 38th Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 15 June 45, ACC files, 10000/136/229]

3.... On June 1st, Colonel Poletti, the Deputy Senior Civil Affairs Officer at Milan, published an order to the effect that the decrees and orders issued by the CLNAI were to be considered henceforth as having no legal validity. They would be replaced by decrees and orders of AMG. This statement no doubt had its effect on the discussions in Rome. On June 2d, the six parties met together and as a result of their deliberations were able to issue a declaration of complete agreement on this subject. Briefly, it was agreed that:

(1) the provincial and communal Committees of National Liberation should continue to carry out consultative functions alongside the prefects until such time as the normal organs of local administration should be reestablished after democratic elections;
(2) that the other committees of national liberation not covered by the preceding paragraph should return to their exclusively political character and
(3) the committees in factories and industries should be transformed into technical and trades union organizations according to the production needs or social requirements of the factory or plant in question. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo (unsigned) for Chief Cmsr, AC, Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/810]

1. . . . General Order No. 46 provides a system of epuration in private industry.

2. At the present time in the north, and particularly in Milan, large numbers of employees in private industry are being thrown out of employment on the alleged ground that they have been fascists. In many cases the real purpose is to enable some other employee to pay off an old score or to take over the position of the dismissed employee.

3. It is the considered view of the CLN, Lombardia Region, AMG, and CA Sec that the only way to check this is to provide a system of epuration for private industry under which all complaints of fascist activity against an employee are investigated by an impartial commission.

4. This order provides for this and establishes the necessary machinery. It is approved by the CLN, the Regional Commissioner, and the High Commissioner for Epuration in Rome.


[Memo, Brig John K. Dunlop, RC, Venezie Region, Hq AC, 23 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

3. I do not expect any difficult developments so long as A.M.G. remains in existence. Our close link throughout the Region and the independent position of Provincial Commissioners give, I think, sufficient guarantee. I do, however, anticipate that when A.M.G. ceases one or two things will happen. Either the Prefects will become the mere tools of the Provincial Cs.L.N., or else there will be considerable friction between them. This, as I see it, can only be avoided by some definite decision now on the part of the Italian Government as to the policy they propose to adopt with regard to Cs.L.N.

6. A very important question centers around the provision of finance. In the resistance days the various Cs.L.N. received financial grants from the C.L.N.A.I. With these grants they paid their staff and probably paid the members of the C.L.N. Now that the grants have ceased, the Cs.L.N. are beginning to find themselves in financial difficulties and the only way in which they can continue an administrative existence is by raising contributions from the public. In far too many cases these contributions resemble all too closely forced subscriptions. If it is the intention that Cs.L.N. exist in future in Italy then their composition and organization must be laid down and government funds be made available for their proper maintenance.

7. Otherwise I believe that there is real danger that they will degenerate into party bodies maintained by graft and they will lose a great measure of public sympathy and support. You have no doubt already heard the cynical public exposition of the meaning of their initials, "Come loro noi."


[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Rgnl Cmsr, Lombardia Rgn, 27 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/399]

1. I am sure that the P. C., Cremona, was activated by the best motives to ensure the subordination of the activities and authority of the CLN to good and just administration. I am equally sure that the procedure he adopted defeated his ends and laid himself, AMG, and Allied policy open to just criticism to the effect that AMG was about as dictatorial a regime as can be imagined.

2. The. CLN's sprang from the people, or a section of the people, who were prepared to fight the Germans and fascism. Whatever their subsequent defects-including usurpation of powers of government-they cannot and should not be put in their place by orders, issued in the form of an open letter, carrying such dictatorial instructions as are those contained in paras 5-8 of the letter. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Msg, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Maj Gen Willis D. Crittenberger, CG, IV Corps, 3 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/282]

SACMED has directed that Allied Military Government will be set up in all territory under his command, that is to say all Italy. If therefore French are found in occupation AMG will be set up in the usual manner. If French Military Government has been set up AMG will replace it.


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 13 May 45, AFHQ files, MC-OUT 4012]

1. A critical situation has arisen in N.W. Italy due to continued presence in that area of French troops. The events which have led up to this are as follows:

2. In March I appreciated that as Fifteenth Army Group had only a small superiority in divisions over the enemy the holding of the 2 German Divisions on the Franco-Italian border would very materially assist the offensive in April. I arranged therefore with SHAEF for French troops along the border to carry out limited operations designed to contain those German Divisions....

3. The operations of the French troops were most successful in attaining the desired end, but resulted in certain French units crossing the border into Italy. As soon as the military necessity for French operations along the border had passed, SHAEF was requested to order the withdrawal of all French troops into France. [Lt.] General [Paul] Doyen's reply to this order stated that he could not withdraw without previous agreement of his Government. He also stated that the arrival of troops of Fifteenth Army Group at Susa, i.e., behind his forward positions, was "a serious and unfriendly act." As a result of a request from me that the French General Staff be pressed to order withdrawal SHAEF replied on 7th May that General Doyen was being asked to coordinate withdrawal of his troops into France with arrival of my forces on the Italian border. SHAEF further stated they had stressed importance of enabling this Theater to establish frontier control on Italian side as already agreed between SHAEF and the French. SHAEF recommended as best means of insuring French withdrawal that my forces proceed to border control. Accordingly I instructed my troops to complete the occupation, including establishment of AMG, but emphasized that armed clashes with the French should be avoided. The attitude I have ordered them to adopt is that this action is as agreed between SHAEF, AFHQ and the French.

4. On 11th May CG Fifteenth Army Group reported to me that a Fifth Army Staff Officer had been in touch with General Doyen and that the latter acknowledges receipt of order to withdraw but is awaiting confirmation from the French Government before complying. Doyen proposed an interim solution that either we advance to line now occupied by French leading elements or that we advance to the frontier leaving French troops in situ. Doyen's Chief of Staff on 9th May proposed an Allied ceremony in Turin with French participation, this to erase stigma of French having to go to Turin in 1940 to sign capitulation. This will not be permitted.

5. Meanwhile the French since their entry into the country have adopted a truculent and pro-


vocative attitude towards the Italians and in consequence Italian Partisans have not surrendered their arms and I consider an immediate clash between French and Italians very likely....

7. Fifth Army has been ordered to continue to advance as rapidly as possible to the frontier, taking all practicable steps to encourage the French to withdraw but in any case to establish Allied frontier control. If hostilities are theatened by this action troops will stand fast and I shall decide the action to be taken.

8. While French troops on the ground are extremely cordial to our troops progress is not satisfactory because of French passive interference in the form of road blocks on key routes. Any attempt to rush matters would probably lead to unfortunate incidents.

9. It appears probable that the present French attitude in NW Italy has the support of the French Government. It thus appears most unlikely that SHAEF will be able to enforce French withdrawal without Government backing. Request therefore you take necessary action urgently to provide this.


[Msg, Gen Mark Clark, CG, 15th AGp, to Field Marshal Alexander, 19 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/ 282, MC -IN 14294]

♦ ♦ ♦ General Doyen, Commanding French Army of Alps, visited me here today. He explained that French troops were seriously disappointed when required to stop advance in Italy just as they were about to exploit victory. He stated that prestige and honour of French Army requires that French not be required to withdraw from Italy at this time. He said that he felt quite certain that no question of annexation of Italian Territory was involved. At one stage he suggested that instead of having French troops withdraw, he felt that American troops should give way to permit French to occupy larger area. I told him I was certain this would never be agreed to.

It is perfectly apparent to me that French troops will remain generally in their present positions in Italy for some time while the situation is being discussed on Governmental levels. Meanwhile, with two Commanders in the same area and troops thoroughly mixed, the set up is unsatisfactory. In spite of drastic orders issued by all Commanders concerned to prevent incidents, some are liable to take place, particularly in view of an inflammable Franco-Italian relationship. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander, to CCS, 5 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/282]

1. Following events have taken place:
A. On 29 May Deputy Regional Commissioner of Liguria was refused permission by French local commander to post Allied Proclamations in western Imperia establishing AMG and was advised that General Doyen, Commanding French Army of Alps, was unable to envisage a change in administration in western Imperia at this juncture as any such change would appear to Italians as retreat on the part of France.
B. On 30 May General Doyen sent a letter to General Crittenberger, Commanding IV Corps, referring to the action of the Deputy Regional Commissioner Piemonte in his attempts to establish military government in province of Cuneo. The letter outlines French justification for occupying northwest Italy. . . . 9
C. Following radio message was received by GG IV CORPS on night 2/3 from General Doyen:

I have sent to General Juin a copy of the letter I asked Major Rogers to deliver to you. I beg to let you know that I have just been notified of the full approval given by the Chief of the Provisional Govt of the French Republic. General de Gaulle has instructed me to make as clear as possible to the Allied Command that I have received the order to prevent the setting up of AMG in the territories occupied by our troops and administered by us by all necessary means without exception.

3. My comments are:
A. General Doyen's message in para IC above discloses a complete change in French policy in N.W. Italy. He now states that he has been ordered by de Gaulle to prevent me from setting up Allied Military Government in disputed areas by force if necessary.
B. Apart from wider considerations, our position in Italy and vis-à-vis Tito will be greatly prejudiced if we accept this ultimatum.

4. I recommend
A. That I be directed by you to complete the occupation of N.W. Italy and to establish Allied Military Government there, using force if necessary.
B. That I be authorized to publish to all troops under my command and to press a statement of the facts.


5. I consider that the French would be unlikely to oppose the establishment of Allied Military Government if strong U.S. and British forces, especially armored forces in which the French are lacking in this area,, are despatched in support, with orders to use force if necessary.


[Ltr, President Harry S Truman to De Gaulle, 6 Jun 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-B]

You have by this time no doubt seen the message from this Government which was communicated to your Foreign Minister yesterday. I wish to appeal to you directly in this matter and to notify you with what great concern and how seriously I view the action of the First French Army in the Province of Cuneo in northwest Italy.

This Army, under the command of General Eisenhower . . . ignored orders issued to it to withdraw to the frontier in keeping with the arrangements for the occupation and organization of Allied Military Government in Italy under Field Marshal Alexander, the Allied Commander in Italy. More recently the following events have taken place: On May 30 General Doyen, commanding the French Army in the Alps sent a letter to General Crittenberger, commanding the United States Fourth Corps in Northwest Italy, referring to an attempt to establish Allied Military Government in the Province of Cuneo. The letter ends with the following paragraph:

"France cannot consent that a modification against her will would be made in the existing state of affairs in the Alps Maritimes. This would be contrary to her honor and her security. I have been ordered by the provisional government of the French Republic to occupy and administer this territory. This mission being incompatible with the installation of an Allied Military agency in the same region, I find myself obliged to oppose it. Any insistence in this direction would assume a clearly unfriendly character, even a hostile character and could have grave consequences." ♦ ♦ ♦

This constitutes a very blunt statement of the intention of the French Government to maintain its forces contrary to the order of the Allied Supreme Commander and in direct contravention of the principles which I accept, and I know you will agree, as representing the best interests of all allied governments in preserving a hard won peace, namely the avoidance of military action to accomplish political ends. ♦ ♦ ♦

While this threat by the French Government is outstanding against American soldiers, I regret that I have no alternative but to issue instructions that no further issues of military equipment or munitions can be made to French troops. Rations will continue to be supplied.


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 9 Jun 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 3062]

General Juin arrived my headquarters this morning. Following reports interview.

1. Juin began by deploring misunderstanding which had arisen over French occupation of N.W. Italy and stated he had come to clear up this unfortunate matter. Except for one or two minor frontier adjustments, France had no territorial claims in this area. She was merely concerned in protecting local inhabitants on Italian side of frontier who were French by race, sentiment and language. Juin then asked whether the French Government already established might continue in this area and whether French troops might remain in occupation under my command. I replied that my instructions on this matter from the US and British Governments are clear and give me no power or discretion to agree to such arrangements.

2. Juin then stated that he saw no objection to early withdrawal of French troops now in Val D'Aosta and the Susa area, but that withdrawal from Tenda area was another matter. General de Gaulle had not given him authority to withdraw these troops and in any event a hasty withdrawal would be most hurting to French amour propre. When questioned he stated that a month might be adequate time for withdrawal. I replied that if withdrawal commenced at once and was completed by end of June it would be acceptable to me personally.

3. After considerable further discussion I suggested that Juin agree that he should return to France immediately to explain whole situation to de Gaulle and obtain decision. He accordingly left Naples by special aircraft at 13oo hours and a message was despatched to Paris requesting an immediate interview with de Gaulle on his arrival. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 10 Jun 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 3313]

1. French Mission at my Headquarters received message from General Juin this morning 10th June stating that General de Gaulle agrees to withdrawal of French troops west of 1939 Italo-Franco frontier.


2. General Juin's message further states that a French delegation comprising General Carpenter [Mal. Gen. Marcel Carpentier], General Lorbert (Chief of Staff to General Doyen) and a Staff Officer from General Juin's Headquarters are arriving at Naples this evening 10th June to settle details for a progressive withdrawal of French forces from Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 11 Jun 45, NAF1009]

1. . . . Following arrangements were agreed:
a. Relief of all French troops in N.W. Italy will be carried out progressively and will be completed by 10 July. Details will be settled by local Commanders.
b. In Val D'Aosta and Susa areas AMG will be established immediately. In Tenda area, where French military administration is now functioning, handover to AMG will be done progressively under local arrangements. There should be no difficulty or delay since AMG officers are already located generally throughout area.
c. Relief will be carried out by U.S. and British troops. For so long as Anglo-American troops are available in N.W. Italy, Italian troops will not be stationed on Franco-Italian Frontier.

2. It was agreed that no publicity would be given to these arrangements and that no communiqué would be issued by this or any military Headquarters concerned. Emphasis is to be laid on the operation being a normal military relief and use of the word "withdrawal" is to be avoided. An undertaking was given to the French representatives that the U.S. and British Governments would be requested to conform to the same policy and to avoid making any public statements. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Memo, G-5, AFHQ, for Hq AC, 8 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

5. The following considerations are set out as being pertinent in the case of planning in Bolzano:
a. It may be assumed that the province will not be detached from Italy notwithstanding the case which can be put forward on historical or ethnical grounds. Nor is the policy of forced emigration along the lines of the Italo-German agreement of 1939 likely to be pursued after the war. On the other hand, it may be assumed that provision for the protection of the German speaking inhabitants of the South Tyrol (as a minority within the Italian State) will be included in the final settlement with Italy.
b. Direct control by AMG methods will probably be continued until permanent provision for the minority protection envisaged under a. above is assured.
c. The AMG policy, in the light of the above, should not encourage separatists hopes or the creation of local government institutions which cannot be expected to survive the return to Italian rule. On the other hand, while reconstituting the Italian system of local government in name and form, AMG policy should encourage the substance of local self-government. As proposed by you, only indigenous officials should be employed  and emphasis on either the Italian or Austrian connection of candidates should be avoided.
d. The use of Italian troops and Carabinieri should be avoided but if a special police force cannot be recruited locally which is free of Nazi taint then they may be employed. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Dunlop, Rgnl Cmsr, Venezie Region, Rpt ACC files, 10000/105/248]

♦ ♦ ♦ As a result of the complete Allied victory effected by the 2nd of May, very little fighting took place within the Region of Venezia, and the Allied advance through the Region was rapid until the northern and eastern frontiers of Udine, Belluno and Bolzano were reached by . Allied troops.

The reception of the Allied troops by the population was enthusiastic, except perhaps in the northern part of Bolzano where the Tyrolese were inclined to be pro-German in their sympathies. Committees of National Liberation were found to be functioning everywhere and there was in Venice a strong Regional Committee which had already carried out much preliminary work. There were numerous bands of armed patriots throughout the Region, with the strongest best organized operating in Treviso, Belluno and Udine. Although there was probably some disappointment on the part of the local C.L.N.'s that


they were not left in a position of absolute power, surprisingly little difficulty was found in persuading them that the control of the country had to pass to AMG. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo on the Formation of the Party of the South Tyrolese People, Apparently Prepared by the Party Leader, Erich Amonn, 7 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. The spokesmen of the South Tyrolese people founded the "Party of the South Tyrolese People" on the 7th May at Bozen with the object of uniting in this party all of the South Tyrolese people with the exception of Fascist and Nazi elements.

2. The programme of this party is as follows:
(i) To defend the rights of the South Tyrolese people as regards their culture, language and economy on a basis of democratic principles after 25 years of Fascist and Nazi suppression.
(ii) To assist in maintaining peace and order in the country.
(iii) To authorise its representatives to lay before the Allied Governments in a legal manner the claim of the South Tyrolese people to the right of self-determination. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Maj D. R. B. Mynors, Report on Political Conditions in Bolzano to SCAO, Fifth Army, 10 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

2. In general it may be said that the population of Bolzano is largely Italian in sympathy but that the country districts definitely do not want to be incorporated in the Italian State. . . . The Committee of Liberation in Bolzano is an entirely Italian affair containing representatives of the usual parties but contains two persons to represent the Austrian interests; these two men are pledged not to raise the international question at the present time and say that personally they favour an independent republic of Bolzano.

3. In Bolzano the CLN have nominated Bruno de Angelis for Prefect who is stated by all who have business with him to be an outstandingly able and pleasant person. The administration has been reorganized and appears to be working as smoothly as is possible at the present time, in view of the number of German troops still walking about the city armed. In the Brunick area the population have proposed well known German collaborators for the office of Sindaco. CAO's. are in every case appointing Italians for the time being. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Statement Addressed to the CLNAI by the Bolzano CLN, Signed by Bruno de Angel is and Ferdinando Visco Gilardi, 13 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. Alto Adige: The fundamental premise for the study of the position is that the Brenner Frontier is not a matter for discussion by the Governments of the United Nations.

2. In Alto Adige the CLN of Bolzano has at the present time achieved the status of provisional government as a result of the military (Partisan) activities of the clandestine liberation movement.

3. The composition of the population which now consists of two South Tyrolese to every one Italian is a determining factor in the policy which the Bolzano CLN has adopted from the beginning and is now submitted for approval to the CLNAI.

4. It should be borne in mind that the South Tyrolese and Italian elements have not yet elaborated the organic form of an agreed democratic action. Both retain their respective positions as opposing nationalities only now obliged to work in common under the orders of the Allied authorities within the limits of the economic and administrative needs of the areas. After the centuries old rule of the Hapsburgs and the 20 years of Fascist oppression and Nazi reaction, the temper of the inhabitants is still too high to permit the consideration of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta decisions as the sole real basis of the Europe of tomorrow.

5. The Bolzano CLN proposes to lead the Alto Adige Region through the difficulties arising from the co-existence of these two nationalities in a territory embittered by the excesses and the sufferings of war towards a democratisation of both the Italian and South Tyrolese groups in a strictly European sense.

6. The Bolzano CLN is convinced that it is the strict duty of every truly democratic organisation of Government to approach and solve the problem of German minorities not on the basis of national compromises but by a juridical regime which will assure all European minorities absolute equality of rights and obligations under the control of formal international guarantees. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Amonn, Leader of the South Tyrolese Party, to AMG, Bozen, 19 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

The status of the South Tyrolese at present has been defined by Colonel [Francis M.] Wray in-


dicating that the South Tyrolese should form a party having equal prerogatives and duties for both sides and with no ascendency of one group over the other.

This principle is being continually disregarded by the Italians. . . . South Tyrolese officials are being removed without further ado from public and private offices and are being replaced by Italians without the least regard being given to their specific knowledge of the branch of business concerned.

This is the case in banks, provincial and communal offices, public and economic administrations and enterprises such as the Electricity Works of Bozen and Meran. The same situation obtains in the juridical authorities. Italians today are found holding offices of practically all the branches of public life. . . .

The promise of the right to use both languages in this province is not being kept in any branch of public life. People who speak our language in the street, in shops or in trams are continually being insulted by Italians. CLN people threaten businessmen with violence and arrest if bilingual-public notices are not immediately removed. ♦ ♦ ♦

For the same reason hundreds of Italians are poured into the province from the South, in an attempt to outnumber the local population. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg, G5, Fifth Army Hq, to Hq AC, 20 May' 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

Many problems are arising in re-Italianization of Bolzano and portions of Trento Provinces which call for decisions on highest level because of possible future international political repercussions. Would emphasize importance from outset of wise statesmanship in meeting such problems of which following examples are given:

1. During last few years German language was compulsorily taught in all schools. We understand Italian was compulsory previously. Reopening of schools is urgently desired but decision on language question is needed first.

2. What disposition should be made of German nationals who before 1939 were not resident in the area.

4. Bolzano Provincial Commissioner has been given tentative directive by this Headquarters to proceed on following scale of priorities:
a. Administrative efficiency.
b. Maximum conformity to normal Italian forms.
c. Reasonable protection for interests of minorities. ♦ ♦ ♦


[H. L. d'A. Hopkinson, Br Political Adviser, AC, Report on a Visit to Bolzano and Trento, 2 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/291]


1. The Province of Bolzano . . . contains about 310,000 inhabitants. . . . Of this figure it is estimated that about two-thirds are of German stock; the remainder are Italian. The country folk are mostly of German race and language. ... Bolzano city itself contains a large majority of Italians and the Italian flag is prominently displayed....

5. On the liberation of the territory, the first duty of Allied Military Government was to replace the existing Nazi gauleiter, majors and other functionaries by Italians and non-Nazi Germans. This was accomplished fairly rapidly in the case of the higher posts, but took some time in the lower grades. The Prefect, Colonel de Angelis, had been selected by the CLNAI Milan to approach the difficult problem of German and Italian relations in the Province in a wise and liberal manner. A German-speaking sub-Prefect was appointed, and on 24th May when I visited Bolzano the Prefect handed in to the Provincial Commissioner a list of appointees for subordinate posts in the Province. Over 50 percent of the appointees were German-speaking. The Provincial Commissioner and the Prefect sanctioned the appearance of a German newspaper "Dolomiten" alongside of the Italian paper run by the five Italian parties of the CLN. Authority was given for the re-opening of German language schools and it was laid down that signs should be posted in both German and Italian languages. In Bolzano city itself a large number of the streets were changed back to Italian names but I noticed that in most of smaller towns the German names were allowed to remain. The Prefect informed me that in his opinion this policy was the only means of preserving Bolzano Province for Italy.

7. According to reports received the majority of the German-speaking inhabitants desire the reunion of the Province with Austria, but part of them would be prepared to remain under some form of local autonomy in a democratic Italy. The Italians naturally wish to retain the Italian connection. Considering the dangers inherent in the situation there have been remarkably few clashes between Germans and Italians though there was some trouble with local Italian partisans


in the early stages who resented what they regarded as being the too favourable treatment accorded to the German forces. . . . Since that date two representatives of the South Tyrolese People's Party have been added to the Committee. I enclosed a copy of a memorandum addressed to the Provincial Commissioner by the Head of the party setting forth their views on the situation [above]. I believe the situation described therein, insofar as it concerns the measures said to have been taken by the local Italian authorities against the German-speaking members of the population, to have been to a great extent remedied by the action taken by the Prefect in consultation with the whole CLN referred to in paragraph 5 above. . . .


The position in Trento is entirely different. Except for ten German-speaking Communes which since 1936 have been administered as part of Bolzano province, the vast majority of the 400,000 inhabitants are Italian. The Provincial Commissioner, Major [Fred O.] Mavis, informed me that he had had no racial problems. The CLN, which consists of the usual five parties under a locally selected Prefect, is functioning satisfactorily and except for a tendency to continue to issue orders, which he is tactfully discouraging, they have cooperated very satisfactorily. Communism in both Trento and Bolzano Provinces appears to be weak.


[Msg, Hopkinson to Hq AC, 9 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/ 136/287]

Col. Fiske reports that there have been minor incidents between troops of Folgere Gruppo who were recently moved into Bolzano Province and German speaking population. Although it appears to be nothing serious at present I think it is a good instance of a case in which Allied Commission ought to have been consulted by Allied command before and on political aspects of movement of Italian troops. You may care to take up question of principle using above as example.


[Msg, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, to Fifth Army, 12 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/2287]

2. As interim policy, consider we should adopt following measures: Italian should be first language in all schools. German may be used if asked for by local authorities as an additional language. .. .

3. The indigenous inhabitants should be treated as Italian citizens and all question of separatism and change of nationality should be firmly suppressed...


[Memo on Recent Trip to Northern Italy, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Deputy Theater Comdr, MTOUSA, 9 Jul 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ papers]

b. Bolzano province, which has a population of some 65 to 80% Austrian origin, is outwardly quiet but essentially presents the same problem as Venezia Giulia [Ch. XX] minus the outside influence which complicates the latter. AMG administration is in good shape and has so far kept the situation well in hand. The officers on the ground, however, are convinced that the Austrian population will resist strongly a return to the pre-war conditions. The overwhelming majority undoubtedly prefer to be attached to Austria. If this is not possible some form of local autonomy with rights guaranteed to the Tyrolese minority is probably essential. AMG officers emphasized there, as they have in Trieste, the fact that the pressure will probably increase rather than decrease as time goes on and are strongly of the view that it is highly desirable to obtain a decision on the ultimate disposition of the area as soon as practicable. This will avoid a long period of political tension and will also stimulate economic recovery which will obviously not take place until it is known to which side the territory will be assigned. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, G-5, Fifth Army, for Provincial Cmsr of Bolzano Province, 18 July 45, ACC files, 10000/109/291]

1. In your weekly report dated 12 July 1945, paragraph I, you state that "until a decision is made as to the political geographic disposition of this province the South Tyroleans will agitate to separate from Italy. If a definite decision is made that the province is to remain Italian.

2. As far as our policy is concerned it should be considered a definite decision has been made that the province is to remain Italian. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to SACMED, I Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/323]

I have just learned . . . U.S. Government now considers that Bolzano Province should not be returned to the Italian Government at an early date together with the other northern provinces excluding Udine.

I am very much concerned at his reversal of policy and would point out the following: A. In an unclassified letter dated 20 August I was advised by the American Ambassador that the Department of State would not object to the return of Bolzano if the Allied Commission and AFHQ consider the retention there no longer necessary. The letter added that if it is decided to return Bolzano, the Italian Government should be informed that return would be without prejudice to final disposition . . . by Peace Treaty. B... on 20 August I reported to you that I had advised Parri of my recommendation with regard to both Bolzano and Udine. As instructed by SACMED ... 27 September ... I informed the Prime Minister that SACMED considered that Udine, for military reasons, would be retained under AMG but would be returned to Italian administration when such reasons no longer existed. [Ferrucio] Parri, therefore, understood that Bolzano would be returned but without prejudice to final disposition. 10

If U.S. Government now reverses position set forth in Ambassador's letter . . . I consider that political effect on Prime Minister, his Government, and the general public will be most unfortunate....


[Msg, AFHQ to Allied Com, 2 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/323]

Information just received that U.S. position will not be firmed until return Secretary of State to Washington. No action proposed on your message at this time. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Memo, Braine, Dir, Labour Subcom, AC, for Hq AC, 21 May 45, ACC files, 10000/146/37]

1. The following memorandum is based upon impression gathered during a rapid tour of North Italy with a mission from Economic Section of Headquarters, A.C., Italy, which left Rome on 6 May and returned on 19 May 1945. During this period visits were paid to Bologna, Padova, Venice, Milan, Turin and Genoa.

2. The main impressions are:
(i) The unexpectedly favorable state of industrial establishments, plant, power, trains, etc.
(ii) The optimism on the part of the Italians.
(iii) The hard fact that owing to the prospects of supply of coal there will inevitably be mass unemployment.
(iv) The necessity of providing alternative work schemes.
(v) The necessity equally of providing state relief in cash and in kind, including feeding in popular kitchens, on a scale superior to the present system.
(vi) The different character and temper of the Italians of the North from those of the South; and the general recognition on the part of Allied Officers in the North that detailed administration and control as in the South is not necessary and would be resented.
(vii) The fact that however efficient the Italian machinery of administration, there must be formulation of policy and direction from above to guide the machinery; and that the Committee of National Liberation is not in itself able to provide this, although it has assumed a position of authority which rivals or even challenges AMG control.
(viii) The necessity of arranging for the Italian Government to administer relief schemes, public assistance, feeding, etc., through the efficient machinery to which Allied officers pay tribute-instead of trying to build up from scratch an Allied administered system. This is without prejudice to any views expressed elsewhere as to the advisability of Allied control, in general or in detail, of Italian industry.

3. The most important step is perhaps to dispel the false optimism which pervades Italian circles. Having seen one miracle, viz., the preservation of


their plant, power and equipment from the deliberate destruction which ruined the center and south, they expect another, viz., the supply of coal and raw material on a scale which will enable them to resume full production. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Note, Gen. Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, Report on Current Status of Economic Barrier Between North and South Italy, 15 May 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

1. On 22 April, at the request of the Allied Commission, this Headquarters directed the Allied Military authorities in the North to establish police road blocks as a means of assisting in maintaining, for at least an interim period, an economic barrier between Northern and Southern Italy. The purpose was to maintain the reportedly lower prices and wages in Northern Italy.... On 26 April the 15th Army Group expressed the belief that the above wage policy was based on a false premise, and urged that normal discretionary powers be given to keep wages and prices as low as possible, having in mind operational necessities. . . .

2. As to prices, the Director of Labor (British) stated in a phone conversation from the North to his Headquarters that prices are rising rapidly in the North and controls are not effective.

3. As to wages, Fifth Army urges that authority be granted to add 50% of the cost-of-living bonus to the A.F. [Allied Force] basic wage scale in the North (but not the bread bonus), and states that the A.F. basic wage rates have caused dissension in Bologna. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of the Mtg of SACMED's Econ Subcomm., 22 May 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

♦ ♦ ♦ Admiral Stone recommended that the barrier be abolished on 28 May. He requested that the existing instructions respecting prices and wages in the North remain in effect.... 11

Mr. Antolini, recently returned from an inspection of North Italy, reported that in general supplies are more abundant and wages and prices are lower than in the South. The barrier has served its intended purpose, largely through its psychological effect, which was to prevent speculation and rapid inflation. Wages and prices will be raised as circumstances require, with established military controls acting as a retarding factor. It is anticipated that a certain inflation will take place in the North with a somewhat opposite deflationary effect in the South, as a consequence of the draining from the North of goods and services. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg From AFHQ to Liberated Areas Comm., 31 May 45, OPD Msg files, MC-OUT 10864]

1. Social and political conditions found in Northern Italy indicate that even if full program [of civilian supply] already submitted is supplied precarious unemployment will remain.

3. Principal limiting factor in development of Italian economy is coal. Therefore necessary that economic plans and requisitions be related to maximum availability. Accordingly request your reply as soon as possible to LAC 1148 asking information on availability.


[Min of SACMED's Political Conf, 31 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/258]

6. The Conference had before them a paper recommending the eventual establishment, under Italian Government Auspices, of a Production Advisory Board with Allied advisory representatives.12   ♦ ♦ ♦

Rear Admiral Stone . . . , said that the main problem was that of large scale unemployment in Northern Italy. The factories there were at present working, but their stocks of coal were very limited, and if proper control was not exercised, there was a likelihood of up to four or five million Italian workers becoming unemployed. While substantial Allied forces remained in Italy awaiting redeployment, it would not be possible to ignore the political unrest resulting from large scale unemployment. This might involve the maintenance of Allied forces in Italy for a longer period than would otherwise be necessary. He felt the problem could not be tackled piece-meal, and that an overall plan, coordinated with the import programme, was required. The control should also be directed so as to fuse the two economies of the North and South....


Lieutenant General Robertson agreed with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and added that it was not entirely possible for the Italians to organize their industry on a sound basis without help from the Allied military authorities, as the latter controlled the supplies of coal and certain other essential raw materials. Under the organization now proposed the military authorities would be in an advisory position only and could step out without difficulty as soon as the Italians were in a position to carry on unaided. He felt sure that without some organization, industries would lie fallow and severe unemployment would result. He had discussed the matter on a recent visit to London where, although the initial War Office reaction had been that the Allies should not become involved in what appeared to be a matter for the Italian Government, the proposals had finally been viewed with sympathy. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive of Hq AC to All Concerned, 9 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/154/347]

1. The Plan for the Control of the Manufacture and Sale of Industrial Products of Northern Italy attached hereto ... will be implemented at once.

2. This plan was developed by the industry of northern Italy to provide through cooperation and self-discipline a means for re-establishing an orderly economy subsequent to the impact of liberation. The Italian Government has approved the plan and will participate therein through its established AC/AMG contact for that part which pertains to territory still under Allied Military Government. The presence of members of the Italian Government on the North Italy Industrial Council and the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board assures the fact that the Government is always informed.

3. Since the plan affects primarily the industry of northern Italy, with the seat of control at Milan, the plan must be implemented under the full authority of Allied Military Government. The plan embraces the entire north with the exception of Venezia Giulia and must be administered uniformly without regard to regional boundaries with the exception above noted. Therefore, the plan will be administered by the Allied Commission through its forward office in Milan. Regional Commissioners will be called upon extensively for advice and cooperation, and for local administration.

5. The organization of the committees listed in the plan will be completed without delay. As the occasion may demand, committees covering additional fields of industrial endeavor may become necessary. The proposed organization and plan of operations of such new committees must be transmitted to the Allied Commission for approval and inclusion in this order by appropriate amendment.

6. Each committee listed in . . . the Plan will submit its organization, membership and list of officers, together with its detailed plan of operation through the North Italy Industrial Council to the Allied Commission for approval. The Council will examine all plans and cause their modification and revision to fit the limitations of such general factors as coal, power and transportation availabilities, etc.; will secure the Plan's approval by the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board if price fixing is involved; and will present the plans to the Allied Commission. The Allied Commission will screen the plans for conflicts with existing plans for all of Italy and for coordination with the import program and will suggest necessary modifications, before giving final approval.

7. Once the committee organization and plan of an industry group has been approved, this approved plan will form the basis upon which the industry will operate freely with its own management and without interference by AC/AMG except when absolutely necessary. Emphasis must be placed upon permitting Italian industry and commerce to proceed under its own management and to provide for the enforcement of its own self-imposed restrictions.

8. The president of the North Italy Industrial Council will be appointed by the Italian Government. Each Regional Commissioner will transmit promptly to the Milan office of A.C. his designation for member of the council as provided in . . . the basic plan. At the same time Regional Commissioners may transmit suggestions for the selection of the labor member of the Council.

9. In its operations the Council should be permitted full exercise of its powers . . . , with only the minimum necessary limitation thereof through the overall AMG control....

10. The President of the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board will be appointed by the Italian Government. Each Regional Commissioner will transmit promptly to the Milan office of A.C. a list of nominations of residents of his Region engaged in the fields of endeavor specified in . . . the basic Plan. From the lists of nominations the members of the Board will be selected to give the coverage by callings and by regions provided in the basic Plan. ♦ ♦ ♦


Plan for the Control of the Manufacture and Sale of Industrial Products of Northern Italy

The functions of these industrial committees will be as follows:
(1) T o survey the existing productive units within the industry and to formulate a plan for the utilization of plant capacity.
(2) To control the nature of the products to be produced and the level of production to be performed by the several plants within the industry.
(3) To recommend the closing of unproductive and uneconomical plants or parts of plants; and to recommend, where necessary, transfer of equipment between plants to effect sound economic production within the industry.
(4) To recommend the allocation of: Raw materials, obtained either by importation or from local resources, equipment, tools and operating supplies necessary to carry out a scheduled production.
(5) To supervise and control the flow of raw materials and semi-fabricated materials to and between plants within the industry.
(6) To ascertain the amounts of the finished products within the industry available for distribution and to recommend the distribution of same.
(7) To recommend which products of the industry, if any, should be subject to regulation and control in their manufacture and sale.
(8) To recommend to the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board, the raw materials, semi-fabricated goods and finished products upon which prices should be fixed and the prices therefor.
(9) To effect the observance and enforcement of the accepted plans throughout the industry.


[Labor Sub-Com, AC, Final Rpt, Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

♦ ♦ ♦ The fundamental problems in the labour field in the North were, therefore, reactivation of an undamaged industrial potential, reduction of surplus labour over and above the normal balanced labour force of each industry, and the fact that such surplus labour must have an alternative source of remuneration (i.e. alternative employment) or must have the means of sustenance guaranteed either by continued receipt of wage subsidy or by unemployment benefit. The difficulties were accentuated by the inadequacy of existing social insurance provisions under which unemployment benefit for an adult male was 7 lire a day; the price of an egg was 30 lire. Equally vital was the problem of relating wages to prices and, whilst avoiding rapid inflationary developments, permitting wage rates gradually to adjust themselves to the levels pertaining in the Centre and South of Italy.

Yet another major problem at this stage was that of Allied Force wage rates. The pressure of operational necessity had now subsided and it was no longer appropriate to have regard to incentive, remuneration for risk, or results regardless of cost. The guiding factor had now to be the realization that employment of civilians by the Allied Force would decline and eventually cease; there was a responsibility, therefore, to relate Allied Force wage rates closely to those paid by Italian industry, and to preserve a pattern that could eventually be absorbed into the Italian industrial economy without causing dislocation. ♦ ♦ ♦

... By Decrees of 10th January and 13th February, 1945, the Fascist Republican Government in power in Northern Italy had forbidden discharge of workers in industrial establishments, had required employers to "make up" the pay of under-employed workers to the normal 48 hours per week, and had authorized refund to employers of 75% of the make-up; this refund came from the Cassa Integrazione, a contributory Government Insurance Fund. On 31st May, 1945, Labour Sub-Commission advised that the liberation of the North would result in confusion, mass unemployment and hardship, unless the existing provisions for surplus workers were continued to bridge the gap until relief measures could be prepared. The Italian Government expressed willingness to continue to subsidize through the Cassa Integrazione, and workers' and employers' representatives reaffirmed in the Milan Agreement of 8th July, 1945, the ban on discharges except in specified cases.



[Plan of DPRSC for Northern Italy, 28 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2069]

1. Area Covered
As it is impossible to divide Northern Italy into two parts either for dealing with refugees during operations or later repatriating Italians from outside the Frontiers, this plan deals with Northern Italy as a whole and concerns the five Regions of Emilia, Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte and Venezia.

2. General plan
This general plan is divided into two phases. The first phase being the operational phase, when the most important task is the care of war refugees. The second phase is mainly repatriation. These two phases may have to function conjointly if North West Italy is liberated before North East Italy.

3. Phase I (Operational)
Refugee Centres handled as previously in 5th and 8th Armies' areas, and in the rear of these by the three existing Groups of Centres. Allied Nationals in large towns to be cared for by Forward Representatives of D.P.R.S.C. who will accompany A.M.G. spearheads, and in addition by mobile Forward Groups, who will deal with both Italian and Allied Nationals, as required. As far as possible centres selected for this phase will be those which will also be required in Phase II.

4. Phase II (Repatriation)
(a) Italian.
There are approximately one million Italians to be returned to Italy from outside the Northern Italian Frontiers. . . . It is impossible at present to forecast by which route most of the Italians now in Germany will arrive Viz:-By train through Switzerland, or from the North East.

They may consist of
(1) Former Italian Soldiers.
(2) Ex-Italian P.W.
(3) Italian workmen, including some women.

It has been agreed in view of the difficulties of distinguishing repatriates, that D.P.R.S.C. in conjunction with the High Commissioner for Italian Refugees, will establish an organization to deal initially with all repatriates arriving in Northern Italy. After the initial processing of repatriates, those who are found to be former Italian soldiers or Italian ex-P.W. will be handed over to be dealt with by the Military Organization concerned either in part of the same centre or another centre as is convenient.

(b) Non-Italian. It is estimated that at present there are some 30,000 non-Italian Displaced Persons in Northern Italy who will require to be returned to their own countries. . . . The centres as proposed will deal with these, and in addition there will be centres at Genoa and Trieste from which Allied Nationals can be repatriated. These may be part of centres outlined in this plan, or separate centres according to available accommodation. Two further Allied National Centres to be selected later on.

5. Organization
(a) Advanced Repatriation Headquarters consisting of advanced Representatives of H.Q. D.P.R.S.C. with such representatives of War Materials Disposal and Italian P.W. Sub-Commission and Land Forces Sub-Commission if required, as are considered necessary, and their opposite numbers in the Italian Government, will be set up either at Milan or in the vicinity of the Allied Military Organization concerned.
(b) Group Headquarters will be set up at each Allied Commission Region Headquarters, except Emilia. D.P.R.S.C. Centres in Emilia would be eventually controlled from the Group Headquarters in Liguria. It may be necessary to have a second Group Headquarters in Venezie Region.
(c) Each Group Headquarters will control several Collecting and Transit Centres, which in turn will control certain Frontier Repatriation Posts.

Collecting and Transit Centres-Capacity 5,000 persons.

Frontier Repatriation Posts-Capacity 1,000 persons.

The most suitable accommodation is ex-P.W. Camps, Barracks, Schools, Hotels, or other large buildings. Such places are essential for centres as no canvas is available. ♦ ♦ ♦


[DPRSC, AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/514]

1. (i) The rapidity of the advance of the Armies in Italy and the conclusion of hostilities in Europe has resulted in uncontrolled movement starting before the full complement of control camps and


assembly centres could be set up. The frontier through which a large movement of able bodied Italian Refugees has come is the Austrian-Italian frontier. The movement of these refugees has been aided by the use of backloading empty Army transport. Some 80,000 Italians have returned to their homes south of the line Modena-Bologna-Forli. Thousands have returned to their homes in North Italy. Apart from these returning Italians certain Poles and Jugoslavs, uncertain of the position of their respective countries, have moved into Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. (i) II D. P. Assembly Centres and 10 Control Camps are now completed and a large proportion of these have been sent to administer camps in Northern Italy. These units represent half of the total required....
(ii) Two factors affect the control of returning refugees. These are:
a. Co-ordination.
The question of coordination is extremely difficult due to the lack of communications between the various Headquarters and the distance of these Headquarters from Rome.
b. Transportation.
Rail transportation in Italy is at present not connected between the South and the North. This resulted in a "bottleneck" at Bologna and Forli....

4.... The majority of those so far arrived in Italy have been men and it is anticipated that sick persons, women and children will be those that can be expected to arrive in Italy at a later date. The problem of movement of these 3 last categories is one that is of grave concern to this Sub-Commission. The attitude of the C.L.N. in Northern Italy has been extremely helpful. These Committees have approached officers of the SubCommission with the request that they may be told what is most urgently needed by the Refugees and they will make the necessary contribution. This helpfulness has facilitated the movement, officially and unofficially, of these many thousands of returning Italians....


[Mynors, Opns Officer, AMG, Fifth Army, Report of Trip to Brenner and Dolomite Areas, 10 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

I. From Verona I proceeded up to the west side of Lake Garda to Torbole . . . thence to Rovereto . . . and north to Bolzano on Route 12. There were large numbers of refugees on the road walking home; all were fit young men and there were no carts or movement of a character to cause any disturbance to military traffic except at the Bailey Bridges and tunnels at the northwest corner of Lake Garda. The Provost Marshal of the 10 Mountain Division stated that in order to make the movement as orderly as possible he had issued instructions for all empty trucks proceeding south in the divisional area to stop at the collecting points at cross-roads on the main supply routes and carry refugees as far south as the trucks were going. In this area there is said to be no feeding problem as individuals manage to live on what they can pick up at wayside farms and at simple communal kitchens run by the CLN's in the communes.

5. [The Headquarters which I visited] .. . universally requested that Fifth Army lift the ban on the carriage of casual civilians in returning empty trucks; apart from humanitarian reasons such a dispensation would accelerate the movement of refugees down the Brenner route and would thus keep the roads clear of stragglers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Sr Frontier Refugee Officer for All Concerned, 9 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2051]

1. Circular n. 13 dated 20 March 1945 from Headquarters Fifth Army forbidding military vehicles from transporting civilians (except in certain specific instances) is still in full force and effect.

2. In order legally to utilize casual vehicles for transport of refugees the following system will be put into effect:
a. In any town served by an AMG or Provincial Officer "Refugee Pick-up Points" will be set up where AMG or Provincial Officer considers refugee situation warrants it.
b. These pick-up points must:
i. Be located on main travel routes.
ii. Be set up in vacant lot or other areas where trucks can park away from the traffic for loading.
iii. Be properly signed as "Refugee Pick-Up Point" with large sign. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of Mtg of the Transportation Subcomm. at the AFHQ-SHAEF Conf at Bolzano, 15 Jun 45, app. B,13  MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

1. The following are the main conclusions of the sub-committee meeting of Movements and


Transportation aspects of movements between SHAEF and AFHQ territory.


2. The following routes should be used for controlled movement:
a. Brenner Route.
b. Route through Switzerland.

In assessing acceptance it was also necessary to take into account the southward flow of Italians along routes from Austria and North East Italy.

Types of Movement and Acceptance:

3. (a) Southbound:
Allied Commission Italy can accept forthwith in Italy 5,000 per day by controlled movement plus up to 2,500 per day that may enter Italy by controlled movement. The SHAEF-AFHQ Joint Disposal Committee should review this figure at intervals in order to increase it when possible. Allied Commission Italy require additional personnel and about 6 GT Coys [Companies] (720 trucks) in order to maintain and later increase these numbers.
(b) Northbound:
(i) Germans:
SHAEF can accept forthwith German prisoners of war and surrendered personnel, but they should not be for the Russian Zone of Germany. All German personnel will move by Brenner route.
(ii) Other Nationalities:
French, Belgian and Dutch personnel should be repatriated via Switzerland or over the Franco-Italian border. Central Europeans should move by the Brenner route. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 14 Jun, as Paraphrased in Directive from AMG, Fifth Army, to AMG Officials in Northern Rgns, 25 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2051]

♦ ♦ ♦ In your area, Displaced Italian Nationals will receive the same treatment in care and assembly as United States Displaced Nationals. Repatriation will be effected as rapidly as maintenance requirements of occupational forces and arrangements with Italian Government permit. Priority of movement for repatriation should, however, be given to United Nations Displaced Persons and persons freed from concentration or internment camps and other places of detention.


[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/463]

9. h. The refugee centers were processing approximately 2000 refugees per day coming through from Germany and Austria in the early part of the month. At the close of the month a daily average of 5000 refugees were processed through the Brenner Pass into Italy. An additional 10000 refugees per day were processed from Switzerland through Como starting on 30 June 1945.

A new camp was established 13 Km northwest of Verona to handle the Brenner traffic. The rail lines were opened from Innsbruck to Verona and thence to the Po River. The new camp is established as a feeding and rest stop on this route. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Maj James R. Geddes, CO, Hq, AGp, DPRSC, AC, Rpt for July 1945, ACC files, 10000/164/1741]

1. General
.... The problem of feeding and sorting out at Pescantina has been one of the most disheartening tasks that this group has had to tackle. Although five weeks before it was due to be required, O.C. "A" Group pointed out to G-5, Fifth Army, that some sorting place at Verona was required, nothing definite was decided on till some seven days before it was due.

Continuing this indifference, no actual help arrived on the scene till 2 days before the place was due to be used. When the pioneer Coy [Company], which was to build the camp under the guidance of a R.E. officer 5th Army, did arrive, they turned out to be only a pipe-laying coy., and had neither tools nor interest, and in fact couldn't even dig a decent hole to the required specification. The struggle to make this camp was carried on by the camp staff despite the lethargic manner and indifferent attitude of those who were supposed to help under AFHQ cable .. . dated 1 May 45. ♦ ♦ ♦

4. Refugees
The Italian refugees passing through were, in the main, fairly strong, but a considerable number suffered from T.B., and were too sick to continue and had to be taken off at Bolzano to rest a few days before continuing.


I feel that some of these cases might be held up at the start and sent on the ambulance train....

5. Repatriation and Welfare
As most of the refugees are in transit, the only welfare work which can be accomplished is of a superficial nature. At 23 AMGEC however, where the refugees are more static . . . the workshops-shoemaking, dressmaking, printing and carpentering-are being efficiently operated under the capable direction of Miss P. Nethersole, BRCS.

Refugees cross the Brenner usually about midday or in the afternoon, the trains running at intervals of one or two hours and arrive in Bolzano during the night, where the refugees are fed and the sick taken to hospitals. . . . They arrive in Verona during the morning, where they detrain and are fed and sorted out for South, East or West....

At the station food halts, most of the welfare work is carried out by C.A.R. and the Pontifical Commission. When a train arrives, from every vantage point there swoops down on the train a horde of welfare workers who carry off their prizes, despite the efforts of the administration. . . .

The latest demand received from one priest was for a 3 tonner water wagon to deliver a kind of light refreshment to the thirsty. I decided, however, that the water wagon could be put to a better use, after I had sampled the concoction.

7. Conclusion
Despite 5th Army and the prevailing lassitude natural after 5 1/2 years of war, and in some cases the criminal indifference of those who have positions of importance, the flow of refugees continues unabated. At no point has "A" Group had to cry "Hold, enough."


[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 6 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. A very strong plea has been addressed to this commission on behalf of persons of Russian nationality who do not wish to be repatriated. A number of these people have been avoiding the Soviet Regime and their escape from Russia during the war has given them hope for the future. A number of others are what is known as "White Russians," that is to say, Russian citizens who escaped from Russia between 1917 and 1930.

2. Both these classes are at the present time being repatriated to Russia under the policy regarding the disposal of Soviet citizens as covered by HQ MTOUSA letter AG 383.7/414 A-O dated 9 March 1945 and AFHQ letter GR/3491/2/GI (Br) dated 15 March 1945

3. In both these letters the term "Soviet Citizen" is defined as including all who claim citizenship. No mention is made of persons who do not claim citizenship, although it may be that, in fact, they held it.

4. I recommend for your urgent consideration that the sole test in applying the directives mentioned in paragraph 2 above be whether a person claims Russian citizenship and that if he or she does not do so, he or she be treated as stateless. 14


[Memo, Findlay, Dir, DPRSC, AC, to Subordinate Officials, 20 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2051]

1. The following ruling is given for your own information and guidance and will not be communicated to any Russian Authority. Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Poles, whose homes are East of the 1939 line of Demarcation or East of the Curzon Line will not be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they claim Soviet citizenship.

2. No force may be used to return Soviet citizens unwilling to be repatriated. The Russian Mission is aware of this fact.


[Memo, Brig T. R. Henn, DACofS, G5, AFHQ, for Chief Admin Office, AFHQ, 11 Jun 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

3. The question of the stateless persons has for a long time been under consideration of our governments. I do not think any solution is in sight. As a practical matter, we shall have to decide on an interim policy, assuming that AFHQ must carry out the overall planning for at least six months ahead for these people. The factors are, I think, as follows:
a. We are not likely to be able to move them en bloc to found new stateless persons colonies. North Africa is generally unsuitable.
b. Shipping resources on the scale required are not within sight.


c. These people should not be removed further from their countries of origin than is strictly necessary; since a softening of heart, or a change of government, may lead to their partial reabsorption at no very distant date.

4. I therefore consider that the right policy is to plan for the reception of these people into permanent camps in anticipation of their remaining in this theater at least through next winter. These camps should be chosen and organized so that as many as possible of the inmates are set to some kind of productive work, and the maximum self-sufficiency achieved. They should remain under the general supervision of the Allied Commission until UNRRA is capable of taking them over. At the same time, every effort should be made to induce these people to accept repatriation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[DPRSC, AC, Rpt for Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/514]

6. At the end of the month a total of 95,438 persons were recorded by the Record Bureau covering 72 nationalities. A total of 858 enquiry messages were received and processed. . . The Records Bureau continues to handle many interesting and unique cases of bringing families or members of families together again after long periods without news of each other. An Italian woman, British by marriage, had been bombed out in England and had partially lost her memory due to shock. She wished to communicate with her mother and sisters in Rome, having completely forgotten their address except for the fact that they may have lived near a market. There were two other clues-a cousin was the proprietor of several ice cream shops in the city and an aunt once worked for Elizabeth Arden. Both mother and sister were traced and a message forwarded to the enquirer. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Hq AC to All Concerned, 10 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/164/1040]

a. Germany-To repatriate some 100,000 Italians. Nearly 1/2 million have already been repatriated from Germany and Austria. At present repatriates are arriving via Brenner at an average of over 6,000 a day at Pescantina (Verona), some 2,000 a day through Switzerland (Corno & Domodossola), some 1,000 a day ex-Austria and Yugoslavia.
b. France-Practically all Italian refugees repatriated. Some 40,000 PWs in Labour Companies still to be dealt with when demobilized.
c. Russian Zone-Some 23,000 Italians have already arrived in Germany and many of them have reached Italy. Some 15,000 have come through Austria. There is at present prospect of many more.
d. Yugoslavia-Some thousands of Italians have arrived via Trieste-many in poor shape and many have had to be hospitalized.
e. Southern Italians in Northern Italy-At least 1,000 per week are being moved South from Lombardia. It is hoped to increase this figure shortly.
f. Other nationals

(1) Northern, Western Europeans.-The bulk have been repatriated-only a few hundred remain in Camps.
(2) Greeks, Albanians, Mediterranean Nationals.-The numbers desiring repatriation are few-but Greeks are still in transit from Germany.
(3) Jews.-The total now in "Centres" number some 6,000-infiltration from Germany and Central Europe still continues but large scale movement, it is hoped, has been finally stopped.
(4) Dissident Poles, Mixed Slavs.-The bulk are now housed-the remainder will be housed shortly. The number of Poles who desire to go home is growing and is now about 1,400. Transportation to Poland is so far unsolved.



[Aide-mémoire of Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Lt Gen Robertson, CAO, AFHQ, 5 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

It is strongly recommended that, particularly in NW Italy, the change from Phase I to Phase II be effected as rapidly as possible. 15  It is impossible for the civil administration of N.W. and N.E. Italy to be continued in present circumstances by one AMG Headquarters at each Army. In N.E.


Italy this AMG Headquarters is already concerned with the advance into Austria. The Regional staffs are in position in all four Regions and it is essential for the proper functioning of civil administration that full delegation should be made by the Armies to the Regional Commissioners in order to make effective Allied Military Government by decentralisation.


[Ltr, Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec, AC, for Exec C1nsr, AC, 18 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/313]

1. This memorandum is based on the promise that the administration by the Allies of Northern Italy will be completed without any unmanageable disorders and that there will be a reasonable restoration of economic life without leaving outstanding any large problems of an economic character, such as widespread unemployment; in short, that Allied Military Government can be terminated in all the Northern areas, except Venezia Giulia, on 1 August or, at latest, 1 September 1945. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Aide-mémoire of
Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for 15th AGp Conf, 24 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/176]

1. Now that hostilities are over the problem in N.W. Italy becomes one of civil administration. It is a problem of great complexity both for the Allied Military Government and for the Italian Government which will follow. The AMG teams with 5 Army and IV Corps have handled the initial stages of military government with their customary efficiency. AMG has been set up and first aid to the civil population has been successful. But it has never been contemplated that these teams would be capable of administering after the initial occupation the very large area comprising 4 Regions with a population of 21 millions now under the military command of the Armies. Their staffs have been maintained at the lowest possible figure so as not to interfere with operational activity. I submit that the time has now come when the Regional staffs with their teams of administrative and technical experts representing all the Sub-Commissions, should take over the administration and come under the command of this HQ in order that the closest relation may be effected with the Italian Government who may be required to assume authority in a comparatively short space of time. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Lush, to Chief Cmsr, AC, 25 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/176]

1. I attended the conference at 15th Army Group concerning the occupation of NW Italy yesterday. The consensus of opinion was that until the partisans were disarmed and until the situation on the French frontier was liquidated, 5th Army military command must remain in NW Italy. So long as the Commanding General exercised that command he insisted, and it was agreed by the Chairman, that he must have full control including that of military government.16  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Public Safety Sub-Corn, AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/143/450]

The liberation of the North necessitated the transfer of about 19,000 Carabinieri from the South of Italy in order that the strength of 55,000 should be evenly allotted to Regions throughout the country. 5,650 were transferred as spearhead, followed by a second wave of 4,000. At this point the Italian Government protested strongly against any further withdrawals of Carabinieri from the South, and they were stopped. It was then decided to recuperate those Carabinieri found as Patriots and to employ them in the north as special police. These men wear an AMG armband and draw civil police rations as distinct from Italian Army rations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Public Safety Sub-Corn, AC, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/143/450]

a. No one can claim that the situation is, by any manner of means, satisfactory. On the other hand the period of wholesale and daily murder has passed and the over-all picture of the North showed a big improvement by the end of the month. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 1 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

♦ ♦ ♦ The flow of allotted foods into all provinces has been slow, due to the lack of adequate transport facilities and the long haul


from the Forli, AMG Food Dump. Flour has been given priority in all regions on first delivery, since bread is the most important item. Sugar, salt and milk will be delivered when an adequate stockpile of flour is delivered.

A Railhead has now been established at Cremona where the food is transported by truck from Forli and then placed on freight cars and delivered by rail from this point to the Regions of Lombardia and Piemonte. While the railroad could handle approximately 1,000 tons daily, thus far only about 450 tons daily have been hauled by the railroad due to the lack of transport from Forli to Cremona. However, additional truck transport is being secured by the Senior Supply Officer, AMG Fifth Army and this amount will soon be increased.


[Hq AC, Rpt for Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

Emilia Region
. The food situation is good but, although prices have dropped considerably, they are still too high for the poorer classes.
8. The number of killings and kidnappings have decreased.

Liguria Region
17. The supply of rationed food has been satisfactory but prices on the open market are extremely high.
19. Rehabilitation of the ports of Genoa, La Spezia, Imperia and Apuania is proceeding and about half of the port of Savona is in operation.
22. Communications on the whole are good and railway facilities are relieving the transportation problem to some extent....

Lombardia Region
24. The economic life of the North is gradually reshaping itself in all fields where supplies exist.... The lack of coal continues to hamper industry generally and in particular the steel industry.

Piemonte Region
35. 13,000 tons of coal arrived during the month and have been allotted.
36. Killings and crimes of violence have decreased but it is considered that large numbers of firearms are still held by unauthorized persons for criminal purposes.

Venezia Region
45. Industry is progressing slowly towards recovery but acute unemployment continues owing to lack of coal and raw materials. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Deputy Theater Comdr, MTOUSA, 9 Jul 45, on Trip to North Italy, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

♦ ♦ ♦ a. The consensus of opinion, in which I concur, is that as far as administrative factors are concerned AMG can turn the provinces in the north over to Italian administration at any time after i August without danger of administrative breakdown or serious loss of administrative efficiency....
b. The officers with whom I talked were fairly unanimous in feeling that from the end of this month a continuation of AMG administration will probably result in diminishing returns, both administrative and political. It is agreed by all but the Italian extremists that AMG did a necessary and effective job at the time of the occupation. The first few weeks were disorderly and the political tension was high. Nearly all factions accepted AMG as an impartial stakeholder until the internal political difficulties could be settled, at least to the extent of forming satisfactory governments at the provincial and communal level. This has been done in the great majority of the provinces. The administrative personnel is concededly of a higher order and more efficient than in the south. The only impediment has been the political one which has been pushed far enough into the background so as not to be a major factor in the local administration at the moment. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, I Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/136/323]

In accordance with general policy reaffirmed in FAN 536 [See Chapter XX, Section 21 it is proposed to hand back to Italian jurisdiction the following compartments on 30 September 45, or 21 days after receipt of orders for handover, whichever date is later: Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Venezia Tridentina (less Bolzano Province) and Venezia Propria (less Udine Province). 17


[Msg, SACMED to CCS, 19 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583, NAF-1080]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. The delay in reply to my recommendations contained in NAF 1069 and NAF 1071 is a matter of considerable concern to me. The Italian Government, which is aware that the proposed turnover date has passed, is greatly embarrassed; the Italian press is openly suspicious of Allied intentions....

2. The release schemes for both British and U.S. personnel are fast draining down the experienced personnel which are required if the territory is to remain under AMG. To retain them at this late date or to introduce inexperienced personnel will not restore the full efficiency of military government. ♦ ♦ ♦


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Last updated 18 February 2004