Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XVI:

Rome Is a Turning Point

From the outset the prospective liberation of Rome seemed of great importance, and the longer the delay the greater did this importance seem. One reason was that difficulties of conducting civil affairs short of the capital became more and more evident, but perhaps another reason was that to offset the sense of frustration there developed a tendency to envisage the prospective event as a favorable turning point. Even if not militarily decisive, capture of the first European capital would give the Allied armies greater prestige. The Allies and the Italians agreed on this, but in other respects their interpretations of the happy turning point differed in emphasis. The Allies looked forward to being able to reduce their administrative burden by bringing the Italian Government to the city where the ministries, civil servants, and archives would enable it to exercise broader responsibilities. The Italians, on the other hand, liked to think that this change would enable them to raise their political status from very subordinate to more nearly equal partnership. These differing concepts bore the seeds of possible conflict because if the Italians were to become more self-assertive the Allies would face problems largely offsetting any lessening of the administrative burden.

The documentation herein illustrates mainly broad political and administrative issues which developed largely out of the difference in the two points of view. The earlier documents, however, center on the occupation of the capital which, after an offensive launched on 11 May 1944, was reached by advance troop elements on 4 June. The very first finding could well have seemed an augury that henceforth the Italians would play a larger role. When, on 5 June, General Hume, SCAO Fifth Army, arrived in Rome he found in charge a well-organized underground, led by General Roberto Bencivengo, who relinquished to him authority over a city which Italians themselves had evidently taken measures to save from the great German damage feared by the Allies. At first there was a great glow over liberation but General Hume's group soon observed the existence of serious problems-in food, prices, and housing-and also that the citizens of Rome could be unjustly critical of the time taken to bring them under control. On 15 June the city became AMG Rome Region, responsible directly to Headquarters ACC, an arrangement that lasted until i August when Rome Region was absorbed into Region IV.

In the sphere of political developments even the first issue encountered-a few days before, in fact, the city was entered foreshadowed that Allied-Italian relations would present more difficulties than before. The King, it will be remembered, had agreed to step aside as soon as Rome was reached. Plans for his retirement, which had been carefully worked out by the Badoglio government and approved by ACC, called for the immediate transfer of


all power to Crown Prince Humbert as Lieutenant General of the Realm as soon as he was notified that Rome was in Allied hands. At the same time Badoglio would resign and would be asked by the Crown Prince to form a new government to include leaders of the Rome CLN. In spite of these arrangements the King was reluctant to give up his powers as soon as promised and a few days before the liberation contended that he should personally enter the eternal city. Fearing hostile demonstrations, Allied authorities prevailed upon the King to adhere to his original promise and the instrument transferring the Royal powers to the Crown Prince was signed on 5 June.

Also, the original plan to have Badoglio form a new government could not be carried out. Some of the political leaders simply would not serve under the Marshal but agreed unanimously to serve under the 73-year-old Ivanoe Bonomi, President of the Rome CLN and in the pre-Fascist period a Prime Minister. The new cabinet consisted of some holdovers from the previous regime but despite urging by both Bonomi and General Mason-MacFarlane, ACC Chief Commissioner, Badoglio himself refused to serve. In the negotiations over the formation of the new government Allied views were represented by General Mason-MacFarlane. His message of 9 June to AFHQ, herein reproduced, does not touch on the question whether this role had been fully authorized. According to another source, he betook himself to Rome and without specific prior approval of either the British or American governments, or the Advisory Council, proceeded to advise on the formation of the cabinet. For different reasons neither government was pleased with the results of his handiwork. The Americans objected to the fact that General Mason-MacFarlane had informed the Italians that the appointment of Court Sforza as Foreign Secretary would not meet with Allied approval. The Department of State sent a protest to London and General Wilson, SACMED, was informed that the appointment of Sforza would be entirely agreeable to the United States. The British were unhappy about the whole setup and Mr. Churchill protested to the President that Badoglio had been replaced by a "group of aged and hungry politicians." The United States was inclined to accept the fait accompli on the ground that the Italians should be encouraged to work out their own political solutions in accordance with the spirit of the Moscow declaration. The two governments agreed that the views of the Advisory Council for Italy should be Obtained. 1  Reflecting the greater strength of spirit among Italians resulting from the liberation of their capital, Bonomi expressed surprise that he and his cabinet would have to wait upon any such approval. The Advisory Council gave its approval to the new government provided it would accept all the obligations of the previous government with respect to the Allies and would defer the institutional question until Italy could freely decide it. In the light of these developments Mr. Churchill withdrew his objections and the Italian ministers took their oath of office on 18 June. A few days later General Mason-MacFarlane was succeeded by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Ellery W. Stone as Acting Chief Commissioner.

Only a few days after the new government was installed, it issued a decree which seemed to reopen the constitutional question contrary to the solemn commitment taken by its members upon their inauguration. Decree Law No. 151 of 22 June pro vided for the calling of a Constitutent Assembly after the liberation of national territory to decide "the new constitution of the state." This piece of legislation was


harmless insofar as it deferred the decision till after liberation, but it could well cause anxiety insofar as it seemed to settle in advance that a constitutent assembly would make the decision. Captain Stone and his advisers felt that a referendum would be more likely to secure a true expression of feeling. If an assembly were held, they feared that the parties of the extreme left would have the opportunity to introduce propaganda and pressures calculated to overthrow the monarchy. Bonomi assured Captain Stone that the decree law did not rule out the possibility of a referendum and the matter was in fact eventually settled by a direct popular vote.

For military and administrative reasons that ACC could not understand, since it had seemed vital for a government to be set up in Rome as soon as possible, it was nearly a month and a half after liberation before AFHQ allowed the government to move to the capital. Little time, however, was wasted before territorial restoration was effected. Territory was transferred to the government in three separate installments from July to October; provisions reserving certain rights to the Allied military forces were identical with those of the first transfer. With ACC's encouragement the government took on greater economic responsibilities-especially in the administration of civilian supply and foreign trade, and in statistical and other research relating to rehabilitation import need sand without any encouragement it completed and systematized defascistization legislation so as actually to permit Italians to get started in their own long-stalled program of epuration. ACC at first welcomed this initiative without misgiving indeed it even proceeded to gear its own epuration machinery in AMG territory to Italian legislation and to the use of Italian agencies. However, whereas previously ACC had been embarrassed by the inadequacy of epuration measures, it now was embarrassed on occasion by the daring or consequences of such measures. Just when the head of ACC Civil Affairs Section was admonishing the RCAO's not to spare any high-level Fascist as indispensable, AFHQ was proceeding on the ground of indispensability to effect the release of the Italian Director General of the telecommunications system in Sicily and southern Italy, an undoubted Fascist who was being tried by an Italian Defascism Commission. Moreover, the patience of ACC was severely taxed by the ineptitude of the government in not providing adequate police safeguards, at the trials of certain notorious Fascists, against either mob violence or the escape of the prisoner. Patience was also strained when difficulty in reorganizing the Cabinet to satisfy demands of left-wing elements entailed unconscionable delay in government action on pressing matters.

ACC looked upon these and other instances of the government's shortcomings as growing pains in Italian progress toward greater stature. But it was difficult to feel that the first months after liberation of Rome had brought anything like the expected relief in the Allies' administrative burden. The first restoration of territory did no more than make possible the reduction of ACC officers from 175 to 100; Bonomi himself urged only very gradual reduction of Allied personnel in Sicily until the political situation had clarified. But in addition to making possible reductions in AC personnel, the government's greater personnel resources enabled it to place Italian officials and Carabinieri at the disposal of AMG in its advance in Central Italy. All this amounted up, but the War Department had hoped that the liberation of Rome would bring a far greater easement through wholesale transfer of responsibilities to civilians. Just as it failed in its efforts to persuade FEA to take over financial responsibility for civilian supply in


southern Italy, so it even failed to bring about preparations for having civilian agencies enter the operation in Italy. Indeed, AFHQ and ACC both felt that the only way to reduce the personnel commitment under present and prospective conditions of military operations was through greater infiltration of civilian specialists into agencies within the military frame work-and here the difficulty was that few qualified civilians could be spared from war work at home. No switch from a heavy to a relatively light burden was reached at Rome-or, for that matter, beyond. Perhaps in view of all previous experience in civil affairs it should never have been expected.



[Memo, Murphy, U.S. Minister, AFHQ, 27 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, The Capitulation of Italy, p. 611]

♦ ♦ ♦ It was obvious, throughout our conversation with the Marshal that in his own mind, and apparently in the minds of his associates, and this is confirmed by General [Mason-] MacFarlane, almost everything hinges on the return of the administration to Rome. 1


[Ltr, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 28 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1]

♦ ♦ ♦ We cannot expect very much in the way of effective administration from the Italians until the government is re-established in Rome and perhaps not too much even then.♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, Cmsr, ACC, for Gen Wilson, SAC, MTO, 8 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

5 . . . .the fusion of political talent in Rome with the existing Government will have to be carried out as expeditiously and as smoothly as possible. Reber and Caccia (members of the Political Section, ACC) will be entering Rome at the earliest possible moment and will, I hope, be able to keep in the closest touch with political developments in the city. It is essential that other individuals and organizations do not interfere during this very important period. In the light of past experience I wish to urge very strongly that a directive be issued informing all concerned that they must scrupulously refrain from endeavoring to influence the cabinet changes and the political developments during the period until we have become firmly established in the capital. 2


[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy to Secy of State, 29 May 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 5. CM-IN 23643]

The Political Committee held a meeting in Caserta this morning which was attended by Macmillan and myself as a result of an invitation from General Wilson. Staff sources informed me before the meeting that the possibility existed that in the space of 48 hours Rome might be entered by Allied troops....

All ordinances and proclamations having to do with the city of Rome will, of course, be signed by liberated Italy's Military Governor, General Alexander. Acting under the supervision and direction of General Alexander, during the period when the Fifth Army is responsible for the Rome area, Hume (an American Brigadier General) has been named Commanding Officer for Rome of the AMG, and in the Rome area the


garrison forces will be under the command of [Harry H.] Johnson, an American Major General, will include Carabinieri, of Italian nationality, which are available to [Mason-] MacFarlane and ACC, for transfer to Rome immediately to maintain law and order. As quickly as possible Hume's ACC personnel will take over from Johnson's troops. The relinquishment to the Italians to as great an extent as possible of responsibility with respect to the administration of Rome is planned by the ACC according to statement made by [Mason-] MacFarlane. ♦ ♦ ♦

According to Johnson the basis of Allied Machinery for the administration of Rome was planned to be Rome's administrative subdivisions which numbered 10 with the focus centering on the main policy office. I upheld the view of General Devers that the taking of Rome was of importance from a political rather than a military (mainly transportation) standpoint and consequently that the turning over of the city to Italian organizations acting under the control of the ACC should be accomplished as quickly as conditions will permit. ♦ ♦ ♦

It was agreed to respect the Vatican's rights as a neutral state and also understood at the meeting that the Allies would not disturb enemy nationals taking refuge in the Vatican. In connection with the Vatican's press and radio it was also agreed that customary rules of military censorship would be put into effect similar to those now applied by German Military authorities. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive, Hq AAI to Fifth and Eighth Armies and IV Corps, 3 Jun 44]

1. The political issue involved in the occupation of Rome outweighs the military importance of the city. This is a principle which must govern all the actions of the Allied Forces in regard to the city.

2. Rome is the first great capital city to be occupied by the Allied Forces. Their behavior in it and the efficiency of their civil and military administration will attract attention from all quarters of the world.

3. It may well be the wish of the Allied Governments that the Italian Government, with the Allied Control Commission, should be set up in Rome with a minimum of delay. In this case provision of facilities necessary to achieve this and to enable the Italian Government to function quickly and smoothly will be a prime responsibility of the Allied Forces. ♦ ♦ ♦

14. The number of troops in Rome is at all times to be kept to a minimum. It is not the intention that Advanced Base installations should be established within the city. In general, installations in Rome will be limited to hospitals, transit camps, leave hostels on a strictly limited scale, and similar institutions for the welfare of the troops. 3  ♦ ♦ ♦



[Hume Rpt, 22 Jun 44]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, accompanied by his chief of staff, Major General [Alfred] M. Gruenther, Brigadier General George Beucler, Chief of the French Mission with the Fifth Army and Colonel Britten of the British Increment, Fifth Army, Major General Harry H. Johnson, Commander of the troops in the Rome Area and Brigadier General Edgar Erskine Hume, Chief of Allied Military Government Section (S.C.A.O.), Fifth Army, entered Rome in several jeeps at approximately 8 a.m. on Monday, 5 Jun 1944. The Germans had been driven out of the city at approximately 10 p.m. of the previous night, some of our units having maintained contact with the enemy at intervals for the previous twenty-four hours.

2. General Clark's party, as prearranged, proceeded directly to the Campidoglio (City Administrative Offices) where they were met by General Roberto Bencivenga of the Italian Army, who had been designated by Marshal Badoglio, with the approval of Lieutenant General Noel Mason MacFarlane, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, to have civil and military control of Rome during the interval between the departure of the enemy and the arrival of Allied troops. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Finance Subcom, ACC, 10000/143/453]

1. When the vanguard of the Finance SubCommission arrived in Rome, it found that the heads of nearly all governmental financial institutions had gone North. General Bencivenga, leader of all the Rome underground forces, had made


elaborate preparations to preserve all records and to prepare dossiers on the activities of leading Fascists in each institution. This was achieved through the secret appointment of committees for each institution composed of representatives of the six parties. They had been given full instructions as to their duties during the inter regnum period between the German loss of control and the full establishment of Allied control. The same procedure has been followed in other areas subsequently liberated from the Nazis. When the Allied Military Authorities assumed control of the city, the internal committees continued to function. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg, Roosevelt to Badoglio, 7 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/461]

I wish to thank you for your message dated 6 June. That the first capital of Europe to emerge from the dark shadow of tyranny should be Rome, with all its universal significance, is found by the American people of good augury to the cause of world freedom and progress for which they are fighting. . . . Just as the entire civilized world regards Rome and the other historic cities of Italy as their inheritance, so, I am certain, the people of Italy have never been more deeply aware than now that the cause of the civilized world is their cause too and calls for the dedication of all their powers of heart and mind.


[Hume Rpt, Jun 44]

IV. Headquarters

On arrival in Rome in accordance with plans previously made, the Allied Military Government and the Rome Area Command established offices jointly in the Campidoglio. 4  This historical building has been traditionally the seat of the government of the city of Rome from time immemorial and it was felt that in the early stages of occupation it was important for us to begin our administration and governmental duties at such a place. ♦ ♦ ♦

V. Finances

... Anticipating a shortage of cash, we brought with us 600,000,000 lire from Banca d'Italia, Naples This money, together with 240,000,000 Allied Military Government Lire belonging to AFA (Allied Financial Agency) were brought in four trucks which reached Rome with the first elements of AMG. The money was deposited in the Banca d'Italia before noon on the day of arrival. Our anticipation was verified by investigation which proved that all the banks were short of cash and that the Banca d'Italia was down to practically none. The Germans and their Fascist allies had made away with nearly all the available money in the banks. There were a few notable examples of hidden cash, two of the banks having concealed 75,000,000 lire each and one 40,000,000 lire....

The officials of the Banca d'Italia were interviewed on the first day and a meeting of all the banks of the city was called for the next. At the meeting, the financial policies of AMG were explained and each bank was requested to make prompt reports of its condition. These reports have been received and analyzed. On the basis of our study or the figures, the Fiance Division decided that the banks could be re-opened promptly. General Order No. 2 was posted on Sunday 11 June, making effective on Monday, 12 June, the re-opening of the banks and of the banking services of the Post Offices (the postal savings and current accounts, and the issuance of postal savings bonds). . . . To be able to reopen the banks so quickly after our occupation is a record for Allied Military Government, irrespective of the size of the city concerned. ♦ ♦ ♦

VI. Public Safety

The entire personnel of our Public Safety Division was attached, sometime prior to leaving Caserta and Naples, to the S-Force, a special body created to enter Rome as soon as practicable to preserve records, archives and papers in public buildings, which might have been damaged or destroyed by enemy action. Thus our police officers, to whom 2800 Carabinieri and 400 Guardie di Finanza were attached, were available for immediate duty. ♦ ♦ ♦

The conduct of the population of Rome with but a few exceptions, has been excellent since our arrival. Great enthusiasm was displayed.... In only a few instances was there anything like sniping, after the city quieted down within the first twenty-four hours. There have so far been a few cases of looting reported in and in almost all of them the culprits have been captured.

. .. One of the first and chief difficulties was the matter of disarming the "partisans".... It is not known to what extent these persons rendered useful services prior to our arrival but it


was considered that it would be a potential menace from now on to permit men in civilian clothing having only an armband by way of identification on to go about armed....

On the other hand, it was realized that these men have a certain claim upon us and we did not wish to be accused, as we were in Naples in several instances, of not protecting those who had been our friends. At the same time that the order was issued to disarm these men, the matter was carefully explained to members of the National Committee of Liberation and they were requested to inform their several organizations as to why this was necessary. ♦ ♦ ♦

Thus far about 2200 Carabinieri have come forward in response to our notice and are offering themselves for duty. They are being vetted under the direction of the Chief of Police since it is obviously unwise to take them into our service without careful examination of each individual case. ♦ ♦ ♦

VII. Food Supply

♦ ♦ ♦ Thus far food for approximately 2 days has been transported from Anzio to Rome and held as a reserve. It was not necessary to use this immediately on arrival since it was found that food for approximately two days had been already distributed by the Germans, so that our supplies were not immediately necessary. This was a great aid to us in view of the circumstances above outlined. ♦ ♦ ♦

We are distributing 100 grams of bread per day and so far this has delighted the people because, though not greater in amount than that furnished before, the white flour is a source of both wonder and delight since none has been available in Rome during the whole period of the war.

Our Economics and Supply Division has found the Alimentazione organization efficient and we are continuing to make our distributions through this agency.

VIII. Water Supply

At the time of the arrival of the Allied troops in Rome it was reported that while there was a reduction in the available water there was no actual famine. The water pressure however was so reduced by breaks in the Acqua Marcia Aqueduct that water was not available in the pipelines in the higher parts of the city, although available in the lower parts.... The engineers of AMG, in co-operation with those of the Rome Area Command, immediately undertook the work of repairing damage to the aqueduct and at the same time providing for shunting water from the smaller mains into those normally supplied by the large aqueduct. In this way, a rationed amount of water was made available in all parts of the city, except those highest.

... To prevent actual shortage of water for drinking and cooking purposes we have followed the practice that had been found successful in Naples-namely the setting up of power distillation units, the water derived from which being transported by water carts to water points in various parts of the city. ♦ ♦ ♦

IX. Electricity

Since the electric power for Rome was largely hydroelectric and since the plants are still in possession of the enemy, it is not surprising that only a limited supply of current was available at the time of our arrival. Since there will be a delay before the hydroelectric lines from the south, which have been brought forward as the Allied forces advanced, can be able to deliver power in Rome, our engineers immediately gave their attention to operating at greater than previous extent the stand-by steam aid Diesel for the power plants in the city.

Excellent co-operation was had from the Allied Railway Service which immediately made available to us one-thousand tons of coal or % of the total supply. Other fuel supplies have been located. ♦ ♦ ♦

Power for trains is being made available....
Trams (street cars) are ready to be placed in operation but so far only a few lines are in use because of shortage of electricity.

XI. Welfare

The officer in charge of Welfare is being ably assisted by personnel, men and women, of the British and American Red Cross Societies....

Previous to entering Rome, contact was established with Vatican authorities asking their cooperation in co-ordinating and protecting the various organizations which had been operating soup kitchens in Rome. This they did very efficiently with the result that over 225 church-controlled and 44 E.C.A. kitchens (Ente Comunale d'Assistenza) have continued to feed over 300,000 individuals. Supplies of food were hidden from the Germans by all of these organizations at great risk to many of the various administrators.

Arrangements have been made to continue this work in co-operation with the Vatican authorities, who offer us the use of their extensive facilities, including if necessary, motor vehicles for the transportation of food. The presence of numerous refugees who came into this city shortly be-


fore our occupation . . . has grown greatly. The number of people receiving food from the kitchens has increased to almost 400,000. These people, who are of all ages, receive one meal per day. ♦ ♦ ♦

XXVIII. Removal of Fascist Officials

A conference was held on the day of our arrival with Signor Ivanoe Bonomi, former Prime Minister of Italy and Chairman of the National Committee of Liberation. He was asked to give us the names of persons in office whom he felt should be removed on account of past Fascist history. At the same time we asked him for suggestions as to office bearers for the future. He was told that his suggesting that Rome be governed by a Giunta was considered favorably. We announced that a Sindaco rather than a Governatore would be appointed. The later title was one invented by the Fascists....

XXIX. Relations with the Holy See
(Vatican City)

Within one hour of the time we set up government in Rome we made contacts with the American and British diplomatic representatives to the Holy See....
A group of Vatican authorities headed by Prince [Carlo] Pacelli, nephew of the Pope, called at our office on the first day of our occupation and in a conference many details as to future relations were arranged. We offered to place military guards about the frontiers of Vatican City and the offer was accepted and hope was expressed that we could use Italian police rather than Allied soldiers. We explained that this would be done, but that a few British and American police in addition would be available to maintain order. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

♦ ♦ ♦ They work because they must earn their bread but to the mass of the people the war has passed them over. Particularly noticeable is the spirit in Rome, a city untouched by war and whose citizens appear to have more zeal in safeguarding their own local interests, be they physical or political, than in any progressive measures towards the rehabilitation and reconstruction of their country as a whole. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

102. . . . Admittedly, the food ration is a bare minimum. . . . Through undernourishment the people are restless and this is one of the reasons for the political situation being more tense.

103. As a measure of the supply problem of so large a city, 7,986 tons of imported foodstuffs were distributed during the month. 93 tons went to soup kitchens and 99 tons to hospitals. These figures indicate a distribution of rationed foods of 164 grams per person per day, 160 grams of which was flour. This is 40 grams less than the amount decided upon and failure to supply the full scale was due to limitations of transportation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq ACC, Monthly Report for August 1944, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

36. It was becoming evident during the month that the food situation was serious and that the shortage was not due to teething troubles which would cure themselves. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Econ Sec, AC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44]

♦ ♦ ♦ A....

1. Feeding Rome is the most difficult food problem in Italy. This is due to the inland location of Rome and to the fact that Rome under peacetime conditions draws all sorts of foodstuffs from relatively distant areas, whereas other cities in Italy depend on distant outside sources for, at most, only a few foodstuffs. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. The already difficult situation is further impaired by the dependency on a few railroads. . .. The Rome-Naples railroad when opened again by the Army was largely devoted to the carrying of military supplies. The Rome Ancona railroad which tapped the important surplus food producing center of the Marche had been so thoroughly destroyed by the retreating Germans and our bombings that the Army decided not to attempt to put it back into operation.


1. Immediately accompanying the first Allied troops entering Rome were the AMG trucks of food. Although the Nazis had removed all but a small portion of the city's supplies, the amount of flour brought in made it possible to maintain the too gram ration without a break. Then on 21 June 1944 the bread ration was increased to 150 grams and on 25 June to 200 grams, making necessary the shipment into Rome of 300 tons of flour a day. Beginning on 18 June 1944, other imported foodstuffs began to be available to the Rome public. By the end of June, a total of 7,000 tons of food had been brought into the city and had moved into consumption channels. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. Due to the absence of organized messes in the first few weeks, many troops on leave ate in the restaurants which cornered the black market


supply of food. With the low official ration, the disappearance of the black market, for the average Roman, made the food supply of the average Roman family very difficult. After a few weeks, approved restaurants supplied by the Army were opened and eased the demand in the black

3. During July the situation continued to improve. 8,000 tons of imported foods alone were supplied to the people....

The total number of calories provided by this ration came to around 660 per day.

4. During July the most notable improvement took place in the provision of fresh produce for the markets. From an average of less than 300 tons per day at the end of June, the figure was increased by 50 percent to around 450 tons per day at the end of July.

5. In August energetic measures were taken to establish the lines of supply from the provinces of the south. Transport continued to be the bottleneck. An extra distribution of 550 grams of pasta was made in the last two weeks of the month.

6. . . . For September, the goal was set of 50,000 metric tons which would provide 2 1/2 pounds of food per day for each ration card holder, of which there were 1 1/2 million in the city.

7. In order to reach this goal, it is necessary to transport fish from as far away as Pantelleria, potatoes and other vegetables from around Naples, wine from Puglia (Heel of Italy). The usual districts which provide food to Rome from the north and northeast still were not available during most of September. The destruction of the Rome-Ancona Railroad has made largely inaccessible to Rome the rich food-producing districts of the northeast coast and has cast a heavy burden on the other food producing areas. ♦ ♦ ♦


[1st Lt Harold B. Lipsius, Chief, Rome Black Market Contl Div, ACC, Rpt for Nov 44, ACC files, 10400/ 153/79]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Sindaco of Rome has been notified by this Division of the open trading in rationed articles upon the streets of Rome....

... One of the important reasons . . . is the attitude on the part of the populace and the authorities that trade in the Black Market is not criminal. The Prefect does not prosecute violators even after denunciations are instituted. The carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza are powerless unless they are instructed by the Prefect and the Sindaco to enforce the ration and price laws to their very letter. This division will continue its investigations into these conditions and will continue to present its findings to the Italian authorities for their action. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Capt Stone, USNR, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, 5  Address to the Advisory Council for Italy, 1 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/231]

♦ ♦ ♦ The housing situation is ... difficult. The population of Rome was already several hundred thousand above the normal figure before the arrival of the Allies. Now it is considered vitally necessary in the interests of the Allied war effort that a restricted number of Allied headquarters should be in Rome, at least on a temporary basis. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Stone, Address to the Advisory Council for Italy, 11 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/231]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Council no doubt follows the Roman press and will have noticed the recurrent complaints of the difficulties of daily life. Indeed we have probably all had personal experiences over the difficulties of water and light. Before these the Italians put food. As to that, I should like to say here and now that stories of starvation are grossly exaggerated....

There is a shortage, I admit. The bread ration is only 200 grams a day and that is not a great deal, but it is also not starvation and even to give this ration we have had to stretch the existing means of transportation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Poletti, Rgnl Cmsr Rgn 4, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/132/6]

5. First, concerning Rome City and the area forming the ex-governatorato di Roma. The basic policy of our AMG administration was to do the job in the most rapid manner, inasmuch as we agreed that Rome should be turned over to the Italian Government at the earliest possible moment.... What has AMG accomplished?

6. The new structure of local government was instituted. It has been functioning with initiative and steadfast adherence to democratic principles. The Mayor has performed valiantly.

7. New able, anti-Fascist heads of governmental agencies and services were appointed and


with our assistance established into their jobs. We insisted on new faces in the public business.

8. An epuration commission was organized in co-operation with the National Committee of Liberation. This hard hitting epuration commission did a good job. AMG officers have likewise executed a vigorous epuration. Thousands of leading Fascists were turned out of office; hundreds arrested and interned. Epuration in Rome is now in the hands of the Italian Government. Without a thorough and rugged clearance of leading Fascists from positions of public trust and influence, a new Italy of liberty can never arise. 6

9. The people of Rome suffered greatly during the period of German occupation. Nor was it because they received a mere Too grams of bread. Men, women, and children were afraid to leave their homes. The Gestapo was constantly on the scent of thousands of good citizens and to hide these citizens thousands more had to risk their lives. The City was in a state of dread. The Allies have given Rome freedom from fear.

10. In this Eternal City newspapers of all political shades, magazines and periodicals are being published and read. No censorship other than military exists. There has never even been an intimation that newspapers should be reluctant to criticize Allied Military Government. Quite the contrary, the Regional Commissioner, in his weekly radio broadcasts, has urged the Italians to present constructive criticism. The Romans, stifled by 22 years of Fascism, have resumed their ancient liberty of expression. In fact, the satirical paper the Canta Chiaro had a wonderful cartoon the other day. It showed a bachelor at the table ready for dinner. Entering is a mast attractive maid. The man asks, "What do we have for dinner tonight?" The maid, who is carrying a cute portable radio, on a lovely silver tray, answers, "Poletti on the radio." The Allies have given Rome freedom of the press, freedom of speech.

11. One of the most thrilling and satisfying experiences of the Regional Commissioner in Rome has been his work with the Chief Rabbi of Rome. The Rabbi was harbored by a Catholic anti-Fascist from the bloody clutches of the SS. Both the Rabbi and his Catholic protector were invited to our office. The Chief Rabbi was told that he could resume religious services at the synagogue. The Regional Commissioner and other AMG officers attended the first service. The Allies have given Rome freedom of religion.

12. Months before Rome was liberated, its people had heard the promises of the Allies to feed and clothe them. Therefore, Rome, like every other city which we have administered, had high hopes-too high to be met in the face of the primary exigencies of military operations in Italy and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. AMG is sensitive to the needs, but it cannot ask the Army to stop the battles near Florence or postpone the landings at Anzio or Toulon. The Romans, like the people of other cities, require time to absorb the simple fact that the war continues and that sacrifices for an Allied victory must continue. Rome now appreciates the fact. Romans have been orderly and co-operative. Law and order have been fully respected. The Romans are anxious to make a contribution to the victory of the United Nations.

13. Rome has not had the food that other liberated cities have had. There have been shortages of olive oil, pasta, salt, sugar, eggs, potatoes, other vegetables and fresh fruit, and, of course, meat has not existed.

14. AMG in this Region has worked closely with Italian officials. The Food Administration was reorganized and revitalized by Italians. Food has been controlled at every entrance into the City so as to divert it from the black market into the City's general market where it can be sold at official prices. The Italian police, including those of our special black market squad, have been vigilant. Civilian trucks which had been hidden from the Germans have been brought out and organized into three large pools. Rome, of course, survives on the use of civilian trucks. Rome has no rich country nearby and these trucks have had to travel long distances.

15. The cooking of food in Rome has been difficult. Electricity coming from Terni and Tivoli, thoroughly mined by the Germans, is scarce. The gas plant has not been functioning because of the inability to transport coal to Rome. In close co-operation with the Italians we have organized a charcoal market and succeeded in making a first distribution of charcoal at non black market prices.

16. The groundwork has been laid under AMG. The benefits will accrue in ever-increasing amounts. In the coming weeks Rome should get more food. Up to the present, the Allies have not given Rome freedom from want.

17. AMG in Rome and the Vatican have worked very closely. AMG has been greatly aided in many problems by the Vatican. Not only has


the Vatican been of tremendous assistance in the handling of refugees and refugee camps, transport, hospitals and other institutions, but also the Vatican has borne the heavy burden of operating scores of soup kitchens which serve 300,000 hot meals each day. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Transl of Aide-mémoire Sent by King Victor Emmanuel to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Comsr, ACC, 26 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

His Majesty, The King, as he has repeatedly affirmed, and officially declared to General [Mason-]MacFarlane on the 21st February last, intends to re-enter Rome, Capital of the Kingdom, and there entrust to S.A.R. The Prince of Piedmont, the Lieutenant-Generalcy of the Kingdom.

The return of the King to the Capital is held a condition necessary and essential for the Monarchy, for the Crown and for the prestige of the House of Savoy.

Any contract entered into away from the Capital would leave with many, if not the major portion of Italians, the impression of an act not voluntary but imposed by a Southern minority and tolerated by the Allies. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 27 May 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 21151 ]

There have been made preliminary plans for the King's retirement and for announcement of Crown Prince as Lieutenant of the Realm upon arrival at Rome. Badoglio on receiving official information will notify King who at once will transfer to the Prince his powers. Formal resignation of his government will then be tendered by Badoglio to Crown Prince, who will invite him to form a new government. Together with Crown Prince and leaders of the six parties, Badoglio will go to Rome as soon as practicable to make contact with party leaders and principal politicians there for the purpose of making changes in government to bring about adequate representation of Rome's political resources. A visit by the King to Rome in early stages of occupation will not be permitted.


[Aide-mémoire of Verbal Communication Made to the King's Representative by Col Monfort, DCCAO, 15th AGp, 31 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

In reply to the requests made by The King, the Supreme Allied Commander has instructed me to communicate the following:

(a) It will not be possible for The King to return to Rome in the meantime. H.M. is expected to carry out his undertaking to transfer his powers to the Crown Prince as soon as H.M. is informed officially that Allied troops have reached Rome. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane for AFHQ, 3 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

2. It is the King's wish to fly to Littorio aerodrome and to proceed to the Villa Savoya which is extremely close to the aerodrome and which would not involve entering Rome itself. There he would sign the transfer document and would then return at once to Ravello.

3. Yesterday evening I had a further talk with Badoglio on the subject.

4. Badoglio said that if the King were permitted to carry out his proposal he would have to take the Crown Prince with him and that the Crown Prince would definitely have to show himself in Rome. Badoglio considered that this would be most unwise as it was most probable that there would be hostile demonstrations and this would clearly prejudice the prospects of his own Government and successful fusion With the political parties in Rome. . . . Badoglio asked whether the King might be allowed to go to Rome as suggested and make the transfer after the formation of the new Government. I replied that this was quite impossible as the King had contracted to make the transfer as soon as Allied troops reached Rome and any delay would have inevitable unfortunate repercussions not only in the Allied countries but in Italy.

5. Badoglio remained emphatic on the point that it was essential that he and the party leaders in liberated Italy should visit Rome at the earliest possible moment to effect contact and fusion with the Rome political parties. He was most hopeful of being able to reform his Government in the course of a visit of one day. . . .

6. Since last talk with him he had, however, changed his mind on one point. He now considers that the Crown Prince should not be allowed to visit Rome until a day or two after the fused Government was formed. He was very insistent


on this point and is clearly anxious at the type of reception the Crown Prince will get unless he enters Rome under the umbrella of a Government including Rome representation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to ACC Hq, 5 Jun 44, ACC file.. 10000/136/116]

♦ ♦ ♦ This afternoon the King once more made his plea to Badoglio and to me. It was explained to him by me that unfortunately it was impossible for the next few days to give him transportation to Rome and that we could not consider his delaying for so long a time the signature of the act of transfer.

The King replied that he accepted this as inevitable but that before he signed the act of transfer he desired Badoglio as President of the Council of Ministers to let him have a letter stating that it was impossible to meet his wishes and that a transfer document would have to be signed at once. Badoglio, in consultation with myself, wrote to the King a letter on such lines, stating that it was clear to him after consulting with me that it was impossible for the King in the meantime to proceed to Rome and that it was necessary to sign a transfer document immediately.

A document of transfer, which I had previously read to Charles and Kirk [U.K. and U.S. Political Advisers] and which I had also had my legal advisers approve, was then signed by the King.


[Order of Victor Emmanuel III, 5 June 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

♦ ♦ ♦ Our beloved son, Umberto di Savoia, Prince of Piemonte, is appointed our Lieutenant General. With the support of the responsible Ministers, he will discharge in our name all the affairs of administration and will exercise all the Royal prerogatives without exception, signing the Royal Decrees, which will be countersigned and approved in the usual manner. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jun 44]

2. In view of the fact that the Rome Committee of National Liberation contained the recognized leaders of all the Parties except the Communist Party, it had long been clear that a political crisis was inevitable when Rome came into Allied hands. In the first place, whatever government was in power in the South of Italy would, inevitably, have to resign and, in the second place, it was to be feared that, despite any commitments made by the Parties in the South, the Rome leaders would reopen the institutional question. . . .


[Paraphrase of Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 9 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

1. . . . During the first conversations in Rome it became clear that Badoglio would have met with a strong and very active and vocal opposition and could not form an all party government. These conditions would have seriously handicapped the tranquility and administration of the country. 7

2. All parties, on the other hand, had a common readiness to serve under Bonomi on the conditions required by me as regards the obligations taken by the previous governments towards the Allies and also in respect to the institutional question.

3. Bonomi has given me his assurance that the Government will include the most representative political leaders in Rome and the remainder of liberated Italy.

4. Both Bonomi and I did our best to persuade Badoglio to accept a post in the Cabinet. However, the Marshal was altogether unyielding in his determination to retire from the scene.

5. Bonomi has never had connections with Fascism and enjoys much prestige, particularly in Rome, because of his activities during the German occupation. Remaining in hiding, he succeeded in keeping the Rome Committee of National Liberation alive and united.

6. I think and hope that I have persuaded Bonomi to take the post of Foreign Minister. Sforza has done his best to obtain it.

8. Bonomi has a good background and experience and is well preserved. He is easy to get along with. Like that of a number of his colleagues his political past dates back to the pre-Fascist period. Although as regards Fascism all


of them have a clean slate they are a very elderly team and many of them at the end of a day's work show distinct strain. . . . I should say that although Bonomi seems to have considerable experience, a clear brain and a good manner when not fatigued, he scarcely seems to have the energy and the personality desirable in the head of a very mixed and rather difficult team.... Most of the criticism of Bonomi that has come to us from different quarters has been limited to doubt as to his having enough determination.


[Transl of Ltr, Bonomi to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, Cmsr, ACC, 13 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

In regard to the urgent communication made to me yesterday and to Marshal Badoglio and by which the outgoing Ministry must remain in charge until the approval of the United Nations for the constitution of the new Cabinet, I must make some friendly observations to you inspired by the warm desire to maintain the closest cordiality between the people who fight together against the common enemy: Hitlerian Germany. ♦ ♦ ♦

I have given proof to you recently not only to accept completely the two conditions [below] indicated by you for the formation of a new Government, but also to keep very much in mind your advice and your suggestions inspired to maintain the best relations between the United Nations and the democratic Italy which now resumes its long interrupted activity. But I would not know, in the face of public opinion of my Country, how to justify an initiative in regard to a purely democratic Government and expression of forces which have fought against German oppression, initiative which finds no precedents in the practice followed during the formation of prior Cabinets. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Chief Cmsr, AC for Italy, to CCS, 18 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Advisory Council for Italy have examined the events leading up to the formation of the proposed new government by Signor Bonomi, and they consider that in all the circumstances this government should prove satisfactory in furthering the main purpose of the the Allied Powers which is the final defeat of Germany.

They must however insist that:

(1) The new government express their readiness in writing to accept all obligations toward the Allies entered into by the former Italian Governments since the conclusion of the Armistice signed on September 3, 1943, and that every member of the Government should be personally acquainted with the terms of all such obligations including the terms of the Armistice signed on September 29, 1943.

(2) The new government undertakes not to reopen the institutional question until such time as Italy has been liberated and the Italian people can freely express their views. 8


[Memo, Capt Stone, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, to Gen Wilson, SACMED, 3 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

I. In the communiqué of the 23rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 22nd June, the following passage occurred:

"The President of the Council proposed and the Council approved a draft decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent Assembly, the oath for the members of the Government and the right of the Government to issue laws.

"This measure establishes, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a Constituent Assembly to decide the new Constitution of the State."

2. In order to elucidate exactly what this part


of the communiqué meant, I made enquiries from the Italian Government and received the following explanation from the President of the Council and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were emphatic that it did not mean that the Cabinet had approved any particular scheme whereby the country should choose between a monarchial or a republican form of government. It might appear from the wording of the communiqué that the scheme in mind was that this question should be decided by a Constituent Assembly. This was not the case. . . . All that the Government had so far decided was that it was expedient in their first communiqué to reaffirm publicly their intention to ensure that the Italian people should in due course be free to choose their form of government and that a Constituent Assembly would be elected.

3. In taking note of this explanation, I made it plain that the subject was one of considerable interest to the Allied Governments. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had on a number of occasions affirmed their intention that the Italian people should be free to choose in this matter at the proper moment. The Italian Government should therefore presume that the Allied Governments would wish for full details of any scheme under consideration before it becomes law....

4. At this stage I would only make one comment. It is clear to me and my advisers that the best chance of a fair decision of the issue between monarchy and republic would be a referendum or plebiscite-preferably under Allied supervision. . . . The reason is simple. In countries such as Italy, with limited experience in recent years of democratic government, and under the circumstances presently existing here, it is unrealistic to expect that no attempt will be made by domestic or external interests to secure the result desired by them. It will be clearly far more difficult to manipulate a referendum throughout the whole country than to lobby and cajole the members of a Constituent Assembly. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for AFHQ, 11 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/132/324]

♦ ♦ ♦ As regards the move of the Italian Government, I had hitherto envisaged that it would not be possible to start moving it to Rome for at least a month or six weeks after Rome fell into our hands. It was naturally to be anticipated that we would find a very disorganized capital.

This has not been the case and with public utilities and communications of all kinds functioning adequately and with ample accommodation available there are now no material reasons why the Government should not be installed in Rome at once.

The only local difficulty in this connection lies in the fact that Rome must be kept under Military Government for, at any rate, a long enough period to enable me to decide that an administration which is of necessity, and must of necessity, be dislocated and purged is capable of functioning efficiently.

I have asked Sig. Bonomi and Sig. de Nicola whether, should the situation arise, the Italian Government would find it awkward or, from their point of view, undesirable to function in Rome while the city was still under Military Government. They were most emphatic that they would have no objection whatever.

2. As regards efficiency of administration with all its resultant advantages; and as regards the prestige of the new Government and of the Lieutenancy, there is everything to be said for installing the Government and the Lieutenant in Rome at as early a date as possible.

All the Ministries are available in Rome and could be occupied at very short notice. More important still, large numbers of civil servants are available and ready to step into their appointments. They will naturally be subject to normal epuration but it seems clear that the bulk of those with bad Fascist backgrounds have fled the city.

Conditions in Salerno are extremely difficult. There are no proper Government offices, there is a desperate shortage of living accommodation, and there is an extremely limited staff of civil servants....


[Stone, Address to the Advisory Council for Italy, 1 Jul 44]

♦ ♦ ♦ The main preoccupation of the Italian Government is, of course, the question when it


will be allowed to move to Rome. Until then it will not settle down to work. As a political Government it must inevitably rely, to a great extent, upon the permanent Civil Service in the Italian Ministries. The bulk of this Service is in Rome and the Germans have not succeeded in dispersing this administrative machine. There is not room in Salerno to house it. Indeed there is not even room in Salerno for the Under-Secretaries of State to go there. I warned the Supreme Allied Commander of this when I saw him last week on the 21st June. 9  Since then I have been to Rome to see the situation for myself, and returned more then ever convinced that the move was essential in the Allied war interest. As you gentlemen know, the Allied Control Commission is not staffed with sufficient personnel to carry out such things as the repair of roads, the re-establishment of hydro-electric stations, etc. We must rely upon Italian organizations which we control and supervise in accordance with the needs of the Allied Command. The mainspring of these Italian administrative organizations is in the Ministries in Rome and it is in the Allied interest to get these working again as quickly as possible. So that the Ministries should not be entirely idle I have authorized that the Under-Secretary of each Ministry may get his administrative machine ready for work in Rome. But of course until the Government can move, these Ministries cannot be allowed to undertake anything beyond their own internal organization.

There is also the political aspect. It does not help the Allied war effort in Italy if the Government publicly loses prestige. Many Italians are now asking why the Government does not go to the Capital and are concluding that it is because they do not enjoy the confidence of the Allied authorities. Consequently we risk that the effectiveness of the Italian Government will diminish if it is not soon allowed to go to Rome. On my return from the Capital I once more laid these considerations before the Supreme Allied Commanders and urgently pressed for authority to transfer the Italian Government at the earliest possible date. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 9 Jul 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 1512]

Agreement now reached that military convenience permits move of Italian Government to Rome coming week. Except for Service Ministries planned to complete move by 15 July when Government will officially function from Rome. Necessary staff ACC and Advisory Council will likewise move.
It is expected AMG will continue to administer Rome at least until 15 August. 10


[ACC Press Release, 20 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

1. The Allied Control Commission announces the transfer to the Italian Government today, July 20, 1944, of all territories comprised in the provinces of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento, Avellino and Naples, with the exception of the Commune of Naples....

4. The Allied Control Commission is charged with the responsibility for ensuring the effective use of Italian resources in the common war and of representing Allied interests to the Italian national and local governments. For this reason and in the interest of the common victory which is the indispensable condition of freedom, it has been decided, in agreement with the Italian Government, that the Commune of Naples, owing to its exceptional importance as a port for Allied supplies, shall remain for the present a military zone under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in Chief. The United Nations also reserve the right to hold Allied military courts in territory handed over to the Italian Government for the trial of offenses against Allied forces and property. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Lush, Exec Cmsr, ACC, Min of Remarks at Conf at Rgn III Hq, 4 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/166]

Brigadier Lush opened the meeting and told the assembly that he called this meeting in order to discuss the possibility of consolidating Regions 2 and 7 with Region 3. The Executive Commissioner pointed out that it is felt by the Acting Chief Commissioner, that large parts of the Southern parts of Italy should be turned over to the Italians entirely and it should be decided in meeting if this would be possible and practicable. He said that the decision will not cause any inconvenience. It is planned to have a Regional headquarters in Naples and not more than 6 Provincial Teams. It will he necessary to retain Allied Officers in areas where there are


Allied troops. Another reason for retaining ACC Officers in these areas is an administrative one. The third one is a political one. This step would be an intermediate one, and later on the entire southern part of Italy would be turned over to the Italians. The Brigadier stressed the fact that these teams would have to be mobile and would look after areas wherever needed. Where Allied Forces are stationed there should be an officer of ACC. This would mean that large areas will not be covered by ACC officers at all and in these parts it will be up to the Italian local governments to make decisions alone. Sooner or later, the Brigadier pointed out, it must be up to the Italians to stand on their own feet. The longer we remain resident and the longer we remain in a position of personal control and supervision, the more difficult will it be to go away. Another point is the drastic reduction in personnel, which has to be made in order to supply the north with experienced officers. The main factor however is to give the Italians a chance to see what they can do in areas. 11


[Min, ACC Conf at Rgn III Hq, 4 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/166]

♦ ♦ ♦ Colonel Upjohn [Director, Legal Subcommission] pointed out that it is better to make a start at some time, now, and give the Italians a fair chance of a start. Mr. Caccia, Political Section (B) [British] stressed the same facts. We should build this new government up. The present Italian Government is a very weak one. It is a coalition government, having six parties competing with each other. The Allied policy will be to back them up, if they fall down. From the political point of view, we are interested in how far they are able to go. We certainly will help them administratively, too. Mr. [Anthony] Antolini, Ec. [Eton] Director, ACC, pointed out that we have built up an "Industrial Production Program." This will reflect on industry and public works. The main work is carried with the Italian Ministry of Industry, which shows the will and intelligence to co-operate. Mr. Antolini revealed that we have some stocks of materials, which will be distributed. New factories will start production very soon. He also stated that a program in the agricultural side is set up by the end of the month. This pertains to Public Works as well. The consolidation of the economic side will be handled from Reg. [Region] Headquarters. We have some 50 Italian engineers and we will find out what they can do. Let us find what the Italians can do and give them a start. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Announcement by Gen Alexander, CinC, AAI, 17 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

The Allied Control Commission has announced today the return to the Italian Government of the provinces of Rome, Frosinone, Littoria.

The movement which was begun on February 11th of this year with the return of Lucania, Calabria, Sicily and the provinces of Salerno and Potenza, continued on July 10th with the return of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento, Avellino and Naples province with the exception of the port of Naples, has now restored to the Italian people a region comprising nearly half of the Area and population of the Kingdom.

And now in addition, the capital of the realm, Rome, has been restored and the Italian Government is already installed in the capital of United Italy.

That this has been made possible is due in the first place to the continuous advance of the Allied forces, who have steadily driven northwards through territory which presents considerable military difficulties and against a determined enemy.

It has been made possible secondly by the conduct of the Italian people and of their Government. It is a tribute to the Italians' desire for peace and for order that tranquility has been so readily established and that a Government representing all the political parties has been created and is functioning and in so short a time. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Lt Col C. Carroll, Director, Property Contl Subcom, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

4. Prior to the occupation of Rome it had been the policy to assume actual and formal custody of properties. With the occupation of Rome this teas changed to control only, and formal taking of


custody was abandoned. It is believed that there was little difference in legal effect between the two methods, but the paper work was greatly reduced.

5. Since about mid-August we have been following a policy of taking only so much control as will prevent removal, destruction or waste, combined with a right to inspect, to advise, and to remove Fascist or obviously incompetent managers or sequestrators.

6. Two factors prompted these changes:
(a) insufficient personnel to permit of close control and management, and
(b) a desire to make certain the continuing and complete responsibility of the Italian Government.


[Eton Sec, Hq ACC, Rpt for Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

♦ ♦ ♦ Steps were taken whereby the Italian Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, established the office of Direttore Generale dell 'Alimentazione, which assumed direct charge of co-ordinating and controlling all phases of the supply of essential foodstuffs. The Direttore Generale appointed Federazione dei Consorzi Agrari as the distributing agent throughout Italy. Through this action an organization was established for handling imported foodstuffs. The plan went into operation on 1 September for the large Southern Region, and will be extended to forward areas on 1 October. The detailed work of keeping warehouses' records, making sales and effecting collections has been transferred to Italian hands, leaving AC to perform only the quantitative accounting for imports received. 12  


[Memo, Labor Sub-Com, AC, for the Public Relations Branch, 25 May 45, ACC files, 10000/146/33]

♦ ♦ ♦ The assumption of direct control by the Italian Government of territory which was transferred from Allied Military Government, and the greater freedom of decision and action permitted to the Italian Government, affected the scope of the Labor Sub-Commission, and from October 1944 the Italian Government, industry and labor assumed greater freedom of action in the regulation of wages in industry in Italian administered territory.


[Capt Ralph F. Germann, Agriculture Subcom, AC, Summary of the History of the Agriculture Sub-Commission, 5 Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

♦ ♦ ♦  It was not until the Sub-Commission entered Rome that it was possible to turn over much responsibility to the Italian Government regarding the activities which were being carried on by the Sub-Commission. . . . As time passed, new personnel was secured for key positions and more responsibility was given to the Italians. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Note, Chief I&C Sec, Political Comm., AFHQ, for SACMED's Political Comm., 23 Aug 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, PC (44) 96]

1. Under the Fascist regime, the Italian broadcasting system was run as a monopoly by EIAR [Ente Italiano Audizioni Radio], which has been described as a private stock company operating under state supervision. As the Allied forces progressed in Sicily and Italy, the complete control of Italian broadcasting stations was taken over by PWB. Under the terms of an agreement reached on 13 May 1944 between PWB, ACC and the Italian Government, administrative and technical matters in connection with broadcasting from Italian stations was placed under the direction of EIAR with PWB retaining full control over programme management.

2. PWB proposes to turn back to the Italian authorities as soon as possible the operational responsibility and control of Italian radio. As a first step it is proposed that entertainment programmes be turned over to the Italians, PWB retaining for the time being an over-all control of radio news.

3. It is clearly the correct policy for PWB to divest itself progressively of the control of Italian radio. But some misgivings are felt at the fact that a progressive turn-over of the operation and control of Italian radio to the only existing Italian radio organization, EIAR, may have the effect, unless steps are taken to reform it, of reinstating a Fascist corporation with monopolistic powers under the direction of the Italian state. This result would be at open variance with the expressed aims of the Allied Governments, which call for freedom of speech and freedom of all channels of news dissemination.

4. It therefore seems necessary that steps should be taken now to ensure that the charter of EIAR be revised by the Italian Government in accordance with democratic principles. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, to Hilldring, 7 Sep 44, CAD files, 380, Reconstruction (4-30-44) (1)]

♦ ♦ ♦ III. b. 356 Industry Census: There is ... being compiled by the Italian Government, through the Institute Statistico, and the Economic Section of the ACC a statistical review covering the social, agricultural and industrial position of Italy today. This study will cover 356 industries. A survey was made in 1938 of all Italian industry, divided under this number of headings. The returns submitted at that time numbering some 50,000 are being microfilmed, and will be cross-referenced with the present-day census which is being assembled on one general form based on those used before. This study will provide relatively complete information of the present situation of Italy, together with that of 1938, and could serve as a basis for the preparation of whatever plans for rehabilitation may be desired. The work is scheduled for completion sometime during the latter part of October.

c. Industry Advisory Board and Committees: In order to stimulate and aid the Italian Government in the work of rehabilitation, the ACC has proposed to it the creation of an Industry Advisory Board to be composed of representatives of several ministries together with advisory committees for individual industries and groups of industries. The functions of this organization will he to plan and organize production programs for finished goods, ascertaining the requirements for raw materials, fuel, power, transportation and other necessities, and endeavoring to obtain or produce these supplies so far as possible within the country. Several of these committees have already been organized and have begun to function.

e. Ministry of Foreign Trade: After authorization from AFHQ the ACC is about to propose to the Italian Government the creation of a Ministry of Foreign Trade (discussed earlier under the names of Ministry of Supply and Ministry of Commerce). This ministry would have the functions, at first under the ACC and later independently, of planning import and export programs, receiving and screening import requests from the ministries, issuing import licenses, receiving and accounting for imported goods, and generally stimulating and developing exports. It is anticipated that this ministry will play an important role in deciding what raw materials Italy is to import with its limited foreign resources, and in furthering exports so that the maximum foreign resources be obtained. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Capt Stone, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, for Hq AAI, 12 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

I. The Italian Government have recently been pressing for an early restoration to their control of the Provinces of Teramo, L'Aquila, Pescara and Chieti on the grounds that, among other things, the Province of Chieti was liberated over 9 months ago, and that in Teramo and Aquila the activities of the patriots have given ample proof of anti-German and anti-Fascist sympathies. These headquarters are in full agreement that from the administrative point of view, these Provinces could be handed back at any moment.

2. In order to conform to the new boundary of AFHQ, and thereby to simplify certain aspects of administration and legislation, it is considered that the Provinces of Viterbo and Rieti might also be handed back to the Italian Government at the same time. The damage suffered in these Provinces was not so great as in the areas where the Armies halted for a period. Public works are now well in hand, the Italian provincial administration is working and except for a small portion of Viterbo, the whole area is south of the Rear Army Security Control Line.

3. An additional advantage in this proposal is that it would enable the Allied Control Commission to withdraw at once a small number of officers badly needed in the North. [Provinces named herein handed over 16 Oct 1944] ♦ ♦ ♦



[Political Sec, ACC Hq, Rpt for Jul 44, pt. IV, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

2. It has been a month of considerable accomplishment for the Government. For one thing

the various defascistisation decrees have been collated. Special courts have been set up to try Fascist crimes and these courts are empowered to give the death sentence, although, perhaps with some irony, at the same time Italy went back to her old position of "moral supremacy" by abolition of capital punishment which the


Fascists had brought into the old code. Sforza was named High Commissioner for Fascist sanctions (July 28th). These sanctions can be resumed under the following headings: cancellation of Fascist political sentences, punishment of Fascist crimes, defascistisation of state administration and confiscation of wealth acquired through Fascist connections. 13  Epuration of the various governmental branches is being handled through a committee formed by the department itself plus a member appointed by Sforza's commission. Sforza has been given subordinate High Commissioners to assist him, one for each of the "sanctions" indicated above. The machinery swung into gear somewhat late in the month but there are indications that it will now move rapidly and remorselessly. Some earnest of serious intentions may be seen in the dismissal of del Vecchio and [Giuseppe] Bastianini from government service, naming a new head of the Bank of Italy (Introna) to take the place of [Dr. Vincenzo] Azzolini, discharge of [Francesco] Jacomini, once Lieutenant of Albania, and in such measures as revocation of pension to veteran "volunteers" of the Spanish war.
[Official Transl of DLL-159, Sanctions Against Fascism, pt. II, Purging of the Administration, 29 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/147/113]

11. Officials and employees of the following bodies shall be subject to epuration proceedings:
(1) civil and military State administrations, even if autonomous;
(2) local authorities and other public bodies and institutions;
(3) special concerns operating under public authorities or bodies and private concerns recognized by the State as controlling public utility undertakings or concerns having nation wide interests.

12. The following shall be dismissed from service:
(1) any person, particularly if when holding high office, who has by participating actively in the political life of fascism or by showing himself as a consistent apologist of fascism, shown that he is unworthy of serving the State;
(2) any person who has obtained an appointment or promotion through favoritism of the party or of fascist officials of high rank.

13. Any employee who has been guilty of fascist bias, incompetence or corrupt practices such as have been introduced by fascism into public administration, shall be likewise dismissed. ♦ ♦ ♦

14. Any person who has held the position of "squadrista" or "Sanzepolcrista" or "ante-marchia," "Marcia su Roma," "Sciarpa Littoria" or who has been an officer in the Fascist Militia if he had been guilty of Fascist partisanship or improper conduct shall be dismissed from his office or employment, but if not so guilty he may be awarded less severe punishment.

15. Any person who has received undue promotion or any preference in any competitive examinations because of his fascist position in lieu of dismissal will be reduced in rank or be returned to his former position.

16. Any person who has after 8 September 43 distinguished himself in the struggle against the Germans may be excused from dismissal or other disciplinary measure.

17. Any employee who, after 8 September 43, moved to North Italy with or had pledged allegiance to or has in any way collaborated with the (Republican) Fascist Government shall be dismissed.

Punishment of lesser degree may be awarded to such as show that he or his relatives were exposed to serious threats or danger.

Any person who by his acts has effectively aided the patriots or has undermined the work of the Germans or of the (Republican) Fascist Government which they were apparently serving, may be excused from punishment.

In every case an account shall be made of the allowances that were due under the original terms of employment and of any excess payment which may actually have been received. Any special allowance or sum granted or paid on account of any transfer to the North will be disallowed.

18. The Commission of first instance to hear epuration proceedings will be a Commission to be established in every Ministry or autonomous authority or body. When personnel of different classes of functions is employed in a Ministry more than one Commission may be established in that Ministry.

Such Commissions will be appointed by the competent Minister and will be composed of a judicial or administrative magistrate either serving or retired, who will preside over them, and of the Chief of personnel or of an official of the Administration, and of a third member nominated by the High Commissioner for the Sanctions against Fascism.


A Commission to be appointed by a Prefect composed of a judicial official, either serving or retired, an official of the Prefecture, and a member to be nominated by the High Commissioner, will be instituted for Communes, Provinces, Public Welfare Institutions and bodies under the control of the local authorities. 14


[Ltr Capt Stone to Bonomi, 14 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/327]

I have to acknowledge your letter of the 26 June relating to your request for the implementation of your defascistization decrees in newly liberated territories as soon as possible.

I asked Colonel Upjohn (Acting Head of the Administrative Section in the absence of Lord Stansgate) to discuss this matter with you, which he did last Saturday morning. I should like to affirm once again the points pressed by Colonel Upjohn to you, namely that:

(i) ACC is only too anxious to use, even in territory not yet restored to your administration, Italian Government decrees and agencies.
(ii) The matter is vitally urgent and we rely on the Government to complete its plans at the earliest possible moment.

Colonel Upjohn also saw H. E. Count Sforza on Tuesday when the following conclusions were reached subject to your approval:

(i) H. E. Count Sforza undertook, after discussion with you, to supply in a very few days the names of 3 or 4 fair and just but firm antifascists who may be expected to be found in each of the principal localities as we move North, and who would be secretly consulted by my officers for advice as to the immediate suspension from office of the important fascists in the locality. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Notes On Mtg, Between Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec. ACC, and Count Sforza, High Cmsr for Epuration, 30 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/105/819]

♦ ♦ ♦ [Count Sforza stated:] . . . He wished to make quickly striking examples of the worst cases and let matters die down. He did not think it of importance to pursue the small man and he proposed to tell Scoccimabo [Mauro Scoccitnaro] to instruct the Ministerial Commissions to act on these lines.

Col Upjohn impressed upon H.E. [His Excellency] the importance of these Commissions getting to work very quickly with which view H.E. said he was in entire agreement. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Col Norman E. Fiske, Deputy Exec Cmsr, ACC, for Rgnl Cmsrs, 4 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/147/113]

2. The decree [DLL 159 on Government epuration ] has already been extended to Military Government Territory which is under Regional control. . . .

8. The responsibility for supervising the progress of defascising by the Provincial Commissions devolves upon the Regional Commissioner. . . .

9. The usual distinction between military and Italian Government territory will apply; namely, that in the former the responsible officer can direct the prefect to set up a commission and ensure that it functions; in the latter he can only advise and press. In the latter case if no satisfactory response is obtained, the matter will be reported so that Hq ACC (which has received the Italian Government's undertaking that defascising will be dealt with expeditiously) can through that Government bring pressure to bear on the defaulting party.

10. It is important that as much progress as possible should be made in areas soon to be restored to the Italian Government. If it is possible to get provincial commissions formed and functioning before the Italian Government takes over much time will be saved.

11. Nothing in this decree affects the right of a CA officer in Military Government territory to remove any Italian officials from their employment whether for fascism, incompetence, corruption or for any other reason. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ACC Notes on Mtg of Sub-Corns at ACC Hq, 6 Aug 44. ACC files, 10000/105/775]

♦ ♦ ♦ Col. Upjohn explained some of the principal features of Part II of the decree and


that we are not at present taking a sharp interest in the other parts. The object to be achieved is the removal of notorious and ardent fascists from the heads of all departments and national concerns and for the removal of all those who are notorious and conspicuous locally from their positions. It was not intended to dismiss large numbers of the unimportant because they had been fascists. To do so might disorganize administration; it might create an unemployment problem; it would create a score of persons with a grievance. Most would require to be maintained.

♦ ♦ ♦ Col. Upjohn impressed on the Subcommissions the importance of getting their Commissions at work quickly, they must press for names, excuses should not be accepted. It was not proposed to screen the persons appointed; we must trust the Italians not to appoint fascists. To screen would cause a great deal of delay but if anything was known or found out against any appointee it should be reported....

The cases of all persons either removed or not re-employed would have to be brought before the Commission. Those exonerated might be re-employed. It was being arranged that we should be notified of cases against such persons so that any evidence we had might be presented and our views made known.

Attention was called to the circular letter on the decree. It would be for Regions to keep Sub-Commissions informed of conspicuous fascists who were not dealt with and see that dismissals were in fact carried out. Regions will supply Sub-Commissions with such reports and returns as may be essential to show progress but paper should be kept down as much as possible.

No person is indispensable, we are pledged to remove notorious fascists and they will be removed. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Unsigned Brief of CA Sec, ACC, on the Case of Ugo Pellegrini, 15  28 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/105/772]

1. Both Churchill and Roosevelt have announced publicly that Fascists will be removed from office.

2. The CC [Chief Commissioner] has stated that in execution of this policy fascists will not be retained in office on the excuse of exceptional knowledge, experience or ability.

3. The CC in his directive of 24 May followed this policy. He pointed out that officials in northern Italy have been serving the Republic Fascist Government and ordered that all would be dismissed automatically (para 3). He permitted only two exceptions (para 5) (a) if the official was not a fascist or (b) if absolutely necessary for the furtherance of the war effort, temporary retention might be permitted.

4. It is not suggested that Pelegrine's [sic] retention should be temporary; it is asked that the finding that he is a fascist should be over-ruled.

5. There is considerable feeling in Naples as to our failure to bring about the removal of Fascists though we have been in occupation for 9 months.

6. This is the first list prepared by the Naples Defascism Commission set up by Region III; it attracts therefore special attention and is a test of our intentions.

7. In view of the fact that its personnel is Italian, a reversal of its decision will have more far-reaching effects than if a decision of a RC is over-ruled.

8. It is known that Pelegrine [sic] is a fascist. If the decision is reversed the bona fides of our instructions will at once be open to attack. It will be said that our justice is not administered without fear or favor. There will be suggestions made of corruption and favoritism and wire pulling. The people's confidence that we mean to purge fascism will be completely shaken.

9. The RC states that the matter is a test case, that there is a great local interest, that he genuinely fears that there will be grave political unrest if the decision is reversed and that there is a real possibility of serious industrial trouble also, even strikes.

10. The decision is proper, the body who honestly gave the decision is entitled to be supported.


Failure to support such bodies is likely to lead to their future failure to do their duty. A large number of similar commissions are now in process of being set up under the new decree. It would be most disastrous if they felt that they could not rely upon support and that persons they condemn shall be free and retained in responsible positions which enable them to bestow or withhold favour.

11. Not only would it be improper and a breach of faith to reverse this decision. From the point of view of future administration it is also inexpedient so to do and a reversal is likely to have most far-reaching and damaging effects politically and industrially.

12. I cannot too highly emphasize the importance of not interfering with the decision in this case. I regard this as a matter of the very gravest importance.


[Ltr, Capt Stone, Chief Cmsr, ACC, 21 Aug 44, to Hq AAI, ACC files, 10000/105/772]

♦ ♦ ♦ a. Count Pellegrini was suspended from his office as Manager of SET at Naples by the AMG Epuration Committee at the end of July with the leave of Allied Force Headquarters.
b. On 9 August 1944 he was arrested and it was apparently understood by Allied Force Headquarters that such arrest was in connection with the Epuration proceedings and his immediate release was directed....
c. A report was called for by this headquarters as to the circumstances of his arrest and a copy thereof was supplied to Allied Force Head quarters on 10 August 1944. This report disclosed the fact that the arrest was not connected with the Epuration proceedings but was in connection with a criminal charge of giving help to the enemy.
d. Allied Force Headquarters considered this report but telephoned a confirmation of the order for release and again confirmed the order in their signal F 81582.
e. Count Pellegrini was released on 11 August and this was confirmed in my letter A/CC 250, dated 13 August 1944

3. As this matter has been dealt with direct between Allied Forces Headquarters and this headquarters, it is thought proper that you should be informed of the foregoing facts.


[Note, Secy of the Political Comm., 28 Aug 44, MTO, HS files, PC (44), 92]

1. In accordance with conclusion 5 of PC (44) 10th meeting, the Allied Control Commission were instructed on 8th August to inform the Italian Government that Italians employed in higher grades in technical professions and in public utilities should not, in the process of epuration, be removed without the prior consent of the Allied authorities. The instruction to the Allied Control Commission went on to suggest, in paragraph 3, that the procedure to implement this directive should be in line with the following principles:

(a) The officials and employees who are of primary interest to the military are those in the services of communications, transportation and electric utilities.
(b) A distinction may be made between (i) persons whose services are unique and whose suspension should, therefore, be permanently deferred so long as any military interest remains, and (ii) persons in less important positions for whom replacements could be found upon adequate notice of their proposed suspension.
(c) The procedure should provide for notification to the technical arm or services of the Allied Forces interested in the services of the individuals concerned at the level appropriate to the case. The most practical channel of notification would seem to be through the appropriate Subcommission of the Allied Control Commission.
(d) The procedure should be designed to prevent any public announcement of proposed suspension or other action against the individuals concerned until the Allied authorities have acted. 16


[Memo, Capt Stone to CinC, AAI, 6 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/329]

2. The Air Force Sub-Commission, acting in accordance with the recent provisions concerning the elimination of Fascist elements from the Italian Air Force, had issued instructions through the Italian Air Ministry for the return of Lt. Col. Luigi Rusco and Capt. Pietro Saulini from Sardinia to the Mainland to await their trial.

3. The Brigadier General Commanding the Allied Garrison of Sardinia objects to the re-


moval of these officers on the score that they are indispensable, having occupied key positions as Italian Commanders at the Air Bases of Decimomannu and Alghero respectively for several months. It was also stated that they had rendered excellent services to the Allied war effort and have been co-operative in every way. The views of this Commanding General have apparently received your support....

4. I wish to point out that the defascization of the Italian Air Force is a matter of considerable political importance, and we are being pressed from all sides for it to be carried out with the utmost despatch. Moreover I cannot agree that any officers are entirely indispensable or irreplaceable. These two officers, having had records of Fascist activities, would be naturally only too willing to accept shelter from the Allies, and would endeavor to ingratiate themselves by working hard in their aid.

5. On recommendation of the Air Forces SubCommission, I have, therefore, to request that these officers may be relieved at once and sent back to the Mainland. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Notes of a Mtg Between Brig Upjohn, Vice President, C Sec, AC, and His Excellency Scoccimaro, Italian High Cmsr for Epuration, 3 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/105/819]

Brig. Upjohn drew attention to the Chief Commissioner's letter to the Prime Minister, of 5 Sep 44, the Director of Public Works letter to the Minister of Public Works of the 14 Nov and his own letter to H. E. of the 14 Nov and pointed out that in spite of direct requests Ing. Tizzano, the Director General of the Ministry, had been dismissed. He asked for an explanation.

H.E. [Scoccimaro ] said that action had been taken by the Epuration Sub-Commission without consultation with the H.C. [High Commissioner] and that he would give instructions that no order for dismissal should be made.

Brig. Upjohn said that Ing. Tizzano's services were essential for the war effort and it should be ensured that he should take his place the following day. His return would of course be without prejudice to any action that the Government might like to take against Ing. Tizzano when his services were no longer indispensable. ♦ ♦ ♦

Brig. Upjohn referred to the Pellegrini case and inquired when the epuration proceedings would in fact begin; the Allied Commission considered this case of importance. Pellegrini was a man whose services would be useful to the Allies and the Allied Commission was anxious to know whether or not his services would be available.

H.E. said that he was at a loss to explain the various delays, excuses and obstacles with which he had met and was meeting. . . . He [ Brig. Upjohn] was giving instructions that the case was to be proceeded with without delay. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Upjohn, Rpt in Min of 33d Mtg, Advisory Council for Italy, 6 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228]

♦ ♦ ♦ The responsibility of the Italian Government is not only to remove fascists from positions of important administrative posts in connection with the Government or public companies of national importance but there also remains the question of the removal of fascists from controlling positions in trade and commerce, which problem has not yet been adequately dealt with. It is particularly important that firms which are engaged in substantial international trade should be defascised as, apart from this being in accordance with Allied policy, they may become centres of infection in other countries or may act as centres of fascist propaganda or for collection of information. It is also important that firms having large financial interests should be defascised in order to prevent substantial funds from being made available for fascist purposes. None of the decrees published so far efficiently deals with the important private concern. While it is probable that a majority of important fascists will be caught by some of the provisions of the many decrees already passed, this Commission has at the present moment under consideration a draft decree which endeavours to stop such bolt holes as still exist. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Upjohn, Rpt in Min of 33rd Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 6 Apr 45]

♦ ♦ ♦ The problem which faces Italy is very different from the problem which faces France. France was occupied for a matter of 4 years, during which movement was restricted and therefore persons could not move far from their hometowns. The only persons to be dealt with were collaborators and local memory and local feeling is sufficient to produce the evidence. Cases are therefore mostly relatively simple and can be dealt with quickly but in Italy fascism has existed for over 20 years, unjust and discriminatory laws 20 years old, not only have to be repealed, but their effects have to be undone, property unjustly


confiscated over a period of years has to be restored. Political trials of those who opposed fascism during the past 20 years have to be scrutinized and injustices corrected. The fascist administrative machinery has not only to be broken but a new administrative machinery has to be dissolved and fascist ideology has to be eliminated. In order to obtain convictions for fascist crimes it is necessary to delve into the past and enquiries are sometimes necessarily very lengthy. . . . Epuration also may depend upon the investigation of a course of conduct extending over several years.

In order to see whether assistance in dealing with these vast problems could he derived from a study of the methods employed in France, a French-speaking officer of this Commission who was not only employed on epuration but is also a lawyer, was sent to France in December. .. . In the main his conclusions were that insofar as epuration was concerned, that the Italian method was sound. It is a long term policy to proceed with justice and moderation and to leave as little desire as possible for revenge. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lt Col S. H. White, CA Sec, AC, for Vice President, CA Sec, 27 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/869]

♦ ♦ ♦ If the accepted policy is to remove only the ardent fascist in a position of authority and to regard the average civil servant as of necessity a fascist (as in many trades a skilled worker even though a conservative is of necessity a member of a trade union then the proportion of persons dismissed, 4%, is consistent with a reasonable purge.

I think it may therefore be claimed that a fairly good job has in fact been made of epuration. It has at times been slow but that is not surprising if one considers the fact that the machine had to be created, the dearth of experienced administrators, after 20 years of fascism, the fact that legislation has been piecemeal-ad hoc to the various situations as they arose-(with more time and greater experience, more comprehensive and more satisfactory legislation might have been devised). Lastly, there has been the political necessity of satisfying six contending parties all jealous of each other coupled with three changes of Government and the resulting delays and negotiations. ♦ ♦ ♦

Epuration may have been slow but that is partially because it has been careful; the spirit in which it has been carried out has been excellent; on the whole it has been effective and the operation has not left a feeling of resentment. There is no reason to fear that it will not be concluded in the same manner or to fear that AC will not be able to congratulate itself upon a difficult job-well done.



[Capt Stone, Chief Cmsr, ACC, Min of Remarks at Conf of Regl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/132/6]

♦ ♦ ♦ The first phase of our work was what may be called the construction period. In October at Moscow our objective was laid down for us by the Allied Governments in a declaration on Italy....

In April the Italian Prime Minister was able to transform his Government into a political government to include representatives of all the six parties who formed part of the Committees of Liberation in South Italy. This was a great step forward to achieve the goal that had been set for us in the Moscow Declaration. But it has always been realized that a further change would be necessary when Rome had been liberated and when many of the national political leaders of the parties might become available. Expectations were not belied and in June, soon after the Allied entry into Rome, a new government was formed under Signor Bonomi combining the leaders of the parties in Rome and the leaders from the South in a single national administration.

I need not remind you that this Italian Government was approved by the Allied Governments and we in ACC/AMG have the duty of doing all that we can to support it in carrying out the hard tasks that lie before it. This, to my mind, is the dominant aspect of this second phase into which we have now entered....

But the task of the Italian Government is a hard one. War has passed over all the territories under their administration and in this war the Germans have gone out of their way to destroy Italy. It is our job to help the Italian Government to overcome these difficulties....


[Capt Stone, Rpt in Min of 21St Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 22 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/228] 17

... after a short and violent fight, the mob succeeded in taking [Donato] Carretta away from the Carabinieri. ♦ ♦ ♦

Carretta was then lifted, dragged to the centre of Polite Umberto, the bridge facing the main entrance of the Palace of Justice, and then dragged to the river bank and thrown into the water. But he was not dead. The contact with the cold water probably revived him and he made feeble attempts to swim. At this sight, the more excited members of the crowd went down to the river bank, got hold of a boat and reached the floating body. With the oars they hit him again and again until he died. The body, tied to the boat, was then dragged down the river, as far as Regina Coeli, the Jail he directed under the German occupation, which is a little way down the river. There they dragged him from the water, threw him against the door of the Jail and tied his body to the grating of a first floor window.

The incident could have been avoided had the Italian authorities made adequate public safety preparations for the conduct of the Caruso trial. Allied troops were not called out because our policy is not to do so in territory under the Government's control unless Allied lives or property are endangered or there is interference with the war effort. But because certain prisoners at the jail are security prisoners arrested by the Allies, Allied Military Police were sent to the jail. Carretta's body was cut down and the crowd dispersed without violence.

I conferred with General [Thoburn K.] Brown of the Rome Allied Area Command. We agreed that there was no need to call out Allied troops. Later, I conferred with the Prime Minister and Sforza and reviewed with them the arrangements for resuming the trial.18

2. As you have no doubt heard, the trial took place without incident on Wednesday and Thursday and ended in a verdict of guilty and sentence of death for Caruso and a verdict of guilty and a sentence of 30 years imprisonment for his former secretary Occhetto. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Jt Statement to the Press by Roosevelt and Churchill, 2b Sep 44, Dept of State Bull (1 Oct 44), P. 338]

♦ ♦ ♦  The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.19  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo for Files, Commodore Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, 13 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/109/171]

♦ ♦ ♦ As to withdrawal of AC personnel from AC Regions, the Prime Minister reiterated the view which he expressed in September that he desired AC not to withdraw further from Sicily for the time being and until the political situation in Sicily had clarified.

As to the Mainland, he suggested that it might be satisfactory, as a start, to withdraw AC personnel in the area south of Salerno. He advised that the Undersecretary would propose a date when this might become effective at our subsequent meeting. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, CofS, AC, for Chief Cmsr, AC, 7 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

The resignation of Bonomi's Government on 26 November and the failure to establish an Italian Government up to date, is creating delay, inconvenience, and worse, to the work of the Allied Commission and, therefore, to the Allied war effort. In the absence of a Government none of the Ministries is prepared to discuss policy or make decisions or carry out anything but the usual routine of business. In the middle of a war with the pressing problems that have to be solved in this country, the cynical disregard of appar-


ently all parties for the necessity of making their political aspirations subservient to the war effort which has led to the failure to form a Government, can only increase the difficulties of the Italians themselves, decrease their dignity and prestige amongst the Allied Nations and do irreparable damage. I do most earnestly recommend that the strongest recommendations be made to the Lieutenant of the Realm and to Bonomi himself that the Italians should show themselves capable of governing themselves and that a Government should be formed without any further delay. 20


[Memo, Harlan Cleveland, Exec Dir, Econ Sec, AC, for Econ Subcom, 31 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/154/965]

1. From a number of complaints received from Regional Commissioners, it is fairly evident that the Italian Government is not always in a position to provide for the civil administration when territory is transferred to its jurisdiction.

2. An essential pre-requisite before territory is transferred, should be that the Italian Government has made flexible arrangements to provide for the operation of essential services and the continuance of civil administration.

3. Although this question is primarily for the Civil Affairs Section, it raises the point whether it would not be worthwhile to draw up a list of minimum essential conditions which need to be made by the Government, on the Economic side, with respect to any area of presently AMG territory before it is taken over by the Italian Government.


[Admiral Stone, Report to Advisory Council for Italy, i6 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228]

♦ ♦ ♦  I. . . . The outstanding event of the past fortnight in Italy was the escape of General Roatta from the custody of the Carabinieri and his subsequent disappearance. As you are aware, General Roatta was in process of being tried with . . . others for crimes against the Italian state. . . .

2. On the night of 4th March, Roatta, who had been transferred on the order of the court from the Regina Coeli Prison to the Virgilio Military Hospital, owing to alleged heart trouble, succeeded in making his escape. The whole press showed great indignation over the affair and stressed the seriousness of the event both from the international point of view and on account of the evidence of hidden Fascist influence which it brought to light. The Communist Party issued a statement accusing Army Police and Carabinieri of complicity in organizing the escape and generally charging the authorities responsible for epuration with frustrating the demands of the people for the punishment of Fascist criminals. They also demanded the immediate dismissal of the Heads of the Carabinieri and the Police, the suppression of the body suspected of having organized the escape, by which they presumably meant the General Staff, and the establishment of a commission of three ministers to investigate the political responsibility for the incident and to propose to the Government other radical measures for epuration of bodies alleged to be protecting ex-Fascists.

3. The Government had already issued a statement emphasizing the great impression made by Roatta's escape on public opinion and promising that all those responsible would be punished. They also announced a million lire reward for his capture and stated that the Head of the Carabinieri would be removed. On the afternoon of 6th March a public demonstration was held at the Colosseum in which all the Left-wing parties participated. After speeches by various leaders a part of the crowd moved on to the Quirinal where an attempt was made to enter the Palace. During this demonstration a hand-grenade was thrown killing one Italian civilian and wounding two Allied soldiers and an Italian Police official. Shots were fired by the Carabinieri. The crowd then carried the body of the dead man to the President of the Council's office at the Viminale where Signor Bonomi received a deputation which demanded the Government's resignation. The delegation consisted of representatives of the Socialist, Communist and Action Parties, the Unione delle Donne Italiane, a Partisan, two wounded ex-servicemen and General [Arnaldo] Azzi, himself a storm centre not so long ago. Signor Bonomi replied that he could not desert his post and that as head of a coalition of parties he would shoulder responsibility for the Council of Ministers....

4. The papers of the 7th March were full of speculation on the Government's possible course of action and indeed on its chances of survival. Following a lengthy meeting of the Council of Ministers, however, a communiqué was issued


which relieved all fears of a Governmental crisis. In this communiqué the President of the Council deplored the irresponsibility of certain press organs which had led to the necessity of supervising the activities of provocative and subversive groups. It stated that after a full discussion in which individual parties composing the Government made their position clear, the Council of Ministers recognized that there was no reason to dissolve the coalition. The Council expressed the hope that it might be possible to re-establish collaboration within the Government of all parties composing the Committee of National Liberation. . . . This bait to the Socialist and Action Parties that they would be welcome if they wished to return to the Government was subsequently firmly rejected by "Avanti." The Council then proceeded to nominate General [ Brunetto ] Brunetti to command the Carabinieri in the place of General [Taddeo] Orlando, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, to arrange for the re-invigoration of the police, to provide for the immediate internment of "socially dangerous elements of the old regime" in accordance with Article 8 of the law for Sanctions against Fascism. It announced the preparation of a list of persons of anti-Fascist beliefs and political impartiality suitable for political life in the provinces and for speeding the purification of public life. Finally it announced the transfer of the Intelligence Staff, the former S.I.M., from the Italian General Staff to the General Staff of the Army, in accordance with arrangements proposed by the Allied Command. A commission of four ministers was appointed to re-organize the Purge of Fascist activity and to establish juridical rules for proceeding against Fascists in North Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Admiral Stone to Bonomi, 26 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/109/582]

♦ ♦ ♦ I find that for operational reasons it would be undesirable to restore to your jurisdiction the complete compartimenti of either Umbria or Marche. The compartimento of Toscana is not yet wholly liberated. Furthermore, I think it would be unsound to transfer merely those provinces which are immediately contiguous to Italian Government territory as they are economically and administratively bound up with the compartimenti I have mentioned above; also, at the present time, large numbers of Allied troops are in these provinces and the problems which inevitably arise in such circumstances are, I believe you will agree, more easily solved, to the greater satisfaction of both the Allied Forces and the inhabitants, by the Allied Military Government.

Accordingly, I believe the better plan will be to postpone any further restoration of territory until the liberation of further areas in the North makes possible the restoration to you of one or more complete compartimenti and I propose to advise the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly. 21


[Ltr, Charles, Br Ambassador to Italy, to Stone, Chief Cmsr AC, 19 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

2. Clearly the effect of the [proposed] decree as it stands on the economic and industrial structure of Italy would be radical and might raise a political question whether a non-elected, interim Cabinet would not be acting essentially ultra vires in passing it. Yet, I feel that, however carefully any advice offered by the Allied Commission may be confined to these aspects . . . , it is highly likely that any attempt at dissuasion would be misrepresented on the Left. The Commission might be placed in the light of attempting to protect Fascist big business from the people's justice.

3.... Under Article 17, it would be sufficient for 20% of the shares to be found to belong globally to persons of the proscribed categories to have the whole Company brought under the control of the New Ente dominated by a single Minister who, it is safe to presume, will be a Communist. He might well order the nationalization of the Company; ...


4. I am of course unable to say how real the danger is. I have no exhaustive list even of British investments in Italian industry. But I do not think we can doubt the existence of a risk.... I feel that the Allied Commission have a responsibility to put in a formal reminder to the Government of this international interest in Article 17. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Stone to Bonomi, 27 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

In the course of the conversation which we had . .. on the 23rd of this month, you stated that H. E. Pesenti had agreed to withdraw from his draft decree any reference to corporations (Societa Anonime).

Such proposed legislation, both in its effect upon present military production and also-looking at the matter from a longer point of view upon foreign investment, is of extreme importance to Allied interests, and I should therefore be most grateful to receive from Your Excellency, in writing, confirmation of this withdrawal.


[Ltr, Stone to Bonomi, 21 May 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

I have been informed that certain amendments have been suggested to the proposed decree providing for the confiscation of illicitly acquired wealth, which re-introduce the principle of confiscation of the property of private companies in certain circumstances.

This is a matter in which the Allied Governments are vitally concerned and I must ask you, my dear Prime Minister, to let this Commission see a draft of the proposed decree in its final form before it is passed by the Council of Ministers, or if already passed before its publication in the Gazette.
[Ltr, Bonomi to Stone and Text of Proposed Statement, 14 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

♦ ♦ ♦ Minister Pesenti, who has kept in touch with the Commission through a delegate, informs me that a statement of the Italian Government on the matter would be enough to dispel the expressed apprehensions, and suggests the text enclosed. ♦ ♦ ♦

Text: .. .

In proceedings for forfeiture involving the interests of citizens or companies of the United Nations, the Italian Government will examine carefully any observations which the United Nations may make.


[ Ltr, Stone to Bonomi, 18 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

I The Allied Commission has no objection to the decree becoming law in its present state.




♦ ♦ ♦ In forward areas the month has taught many lessons: the necessity of close co-operation between AMG's with the Armies and the Regions following up behind; the vital necessity for planning well ahead with respect to supplies and transport; the necessity of having organized transport companies both with the Armies and forward Regions; the fact that the refugee problem decreases with the speed of advance; the value of training and planning in view of the inevitable breakdown in communications; the increasing necessity for a pool of Italian Government officials which can be called upon at short notice; the need for continuity with regard to legislation in the forward areas and those turned over to the Italian Government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Local Govt Subcom, Rpt for Jul, 10 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/109/617]

b. . . . experience has shown that AMG with 5th and 8th Armies have at times found no administrative officials in newly liberated provinces. To cater for these circumstances, arrangements were made in collaboration with the Italian Government for the provision of a small team containing the minimum number of officials (including a Prefect) which would be necessary to restart the administration. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Capt Stone, Rpt in Min of 21st Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 22 Sep 44]

3. . . . Groups of Carabinieri have been attached to the Fifth and Eighth Armies. They move into


the newly occupied territory with advancing Allied troops and constitute the first symbol of returning Italian administration. The Carabinieri have been enthusiastically welcomed by the liberated Italian population and their work in the early stages has been of the greatest assistance in establishing military government.
Steps have been and are being taken to improve the morale of the police forces generally, and discussions are being held with commanding officers.


[Memo, Local Govt Subcom, AC, on Pietro Nenni's statement in London Press, 18 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/141/422]

8. With the advance of the Allied Armies north, it became apparent that many provinces would be liberated all at once, instead of one at a time, and that consequently it was necessary to provide a pool of prefects from which officials might be drawn for provinces as they were liberated. We pointed out to the Italian Government that a shortage of trained personnel made it imperative that non-career officials be appointed, possessing the necessary integrity and competency, in lieu of career officials. This idea was accepted grudgingly by the Government, but whole-heartedly when it was agreed by us that the title of the non-career man would be "Prefetto Reggente" instead of "Prefetto del Regno." ♦ ♦ ♦


[Col Duval S. Adams, Dir, Transportation Subcom, ACC, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

7. In forward areas of the Armies, the Military Railway Service rapidly rebuilds the necessary rail lines. However, with the rapid moves of our armed forces in recent months, distances to railheads have necessarily been greater with also priority of movement for Army supply. This with the increased area occupied and additional harvest requirements, has increased the demands for truck transport. With the general shortage of trucks and the heavy military demands, our requisitions put forward months ago for some 2,000 War Department vehicles have not been filled. Further, the 1,000 War Department vehicles allocated to us in February for early delivery have been slow in reaching us. [The] last of them are only now arriving.

8. Requisitioning locally of Italian trucks always has the effect of causing their disappearance, therefore we developed early a plan for the reactivation of motor haulage companies and placing the hauling on a commercial basis under a standard tariff of rates. This policy is showing increased success and a much greater number of civilian trucks are now coming into service; there are now some 3,000 Italian civil vehicles engaged in hauling civil supplies.

9. The Italian Government is co-operating and the standard tariff of rates worked out with them, has now been published as a decree and effective in all territory under the Italian Government. The same tariff is being supplied to Regions for application in new territory as they take it over.

10. In addition, the Ministry of Communications of the Italian Government has just completed the draft of a new decree, the effect of which will be the establishment in the various provinces of central pools into which will be grouped all haulage companies with their vehicles; these will operate under the uniform tariff and under control, so that movement of priority goods, such as food supplies, will be moved first. Once this agency, called E.N.A.C. [Ente Nazionale Auto-Trasporti Cose], is working efficiently, we can then hand over to it the various truck pools now operated by ACC officers.


[Ltr, Lt Col G. Marshall, Rgnl Public Health and Welfare [PH&W] Officer, Rgn V, to Subordinate Officer, 23 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/164/197]

At the Conference of Prefects held on the 20th August 44 at Headquarters Region V, the R.P.H.O. [Regional Public Health Officer] spoke to the meeting on the problem of refugees and of plans for their disposal.

The forward Provinces of Region V will be called upon to each absorb 2,500-3,000 refugees on a temporary basis within the Communes, in order to facilitate the rapid rehabilitation when war has passed. This procedure has become necessary owing to the impossibility of sending any more south at the present time.

The main point which it was intended to impress on the Prefects was that the responsibility to make all arrangements within their own Province rests with them and not with AMG. ♦ ♦ ♦

The scheme as outlined was for a Central Camp to be set up in a large building in or near the Capital of each Province and on the main line of Communication, capable of handling 300-400.

Administration of the camp would be the responsibility of the Prefects, through a committee composed of Medico Provinciale, Italian Red


Cross, and other leading personages. It would be the duty of this committee to provide cooking utensils, blankets, and rations, the latter obtainable from the Consorzio Agrario. All refugees leaving the main camp will be given sufficient rations to enable them to live until they obtain their ration card in the Commune and the Sindaci will make all arrangements for their reception and dispersal on arrival. ♦ ♦ ♦


[PH&W Div, AMG Fifth Army, Report on Florence City, 9 Sep 44, app. A., ACC files, 10000/164/197]

♦ ♦ ♦ The sanitation of the city was in a terrible state when Florence was taken over. No work had been done during the twenty days of fighting. Corpses had accumulated and there was no water to flush the sewers which had been damaged in places. The amount of refuse per diem, exclusive of human excreta is 100 tons. Provincial contractors had removed the refuse but these contractors were non-existent. As the bridges were down and no transport existed about 26 tons of refuse had accumulated and this was increasing at the rate of 100 tons per diem. The military authorities promised transport and lent two lorries for one day. No horses or carts were available and even if they had been allowed across the military bridges it was considered inadvisable to take them from the countryside and so interfere with the collection of the harvest. However, under the energetic administration of Major Richardson, the AMG Engineer, the conditions have greatly improved. The Ufficio Sanitario managed to make seven lorries which would go out of scrap and damaged vehicles. Two sites for refuse tins were picked in areas where land reclamation projects could be carried out, labour was obtained for street cleaning, notices published re enforcement of laws and committing nuisance, and the situation is now in hand. 183 tons of refuse are being moved daily and in a short time most of the nuisances will be removed. Sewers have been repaired and a certain amount of water is available. The recent heavy rains were a great help in cleaning out sewers and drains. A site was made to bury corpses in the Botanical gardens as they were not allowed to be taken across the bridges to the cemetery. The gruesome job of removing these bodies was complicated by the absence of wood and coffins. What coffins that there were had to be used two or three times to carry the bodies. All bodies have now been buried. Shortage of disinfectants is still a problem. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ACC Hq, Rpt for Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

AMG Fifth Army 23

1. At the beginning of September AMG Fifth Army had ten Provincial Commissioners and their teams in operation on the Arno, with a wide front to cover, and about twenty new communes were opened up. Siena Province was turned over to Regional administration on 5 Sept and the commune and city of Livorno was handed over to the P.C. shortly afterwards, the AMG Army team being withdrawn for duty further North.

2. Among new communes occupied later in the month was Pistoia, entered by AMG on 15 Sept and found to be considerably damaged. Later the communes of Firenzuola and S. Godenzo were occupied. Both towns have been completely destroyed.

3. Towns along the Arno Valley between Pisa and Florence had largely been evacuated during the last weeks of August, but many inhabitants have since returned to their homes. There are many minefields in the area, much of the harvest has been lost and considerable unemployment exists.

4. The food situation is generally serious: local resources are poorer than was expected and a large proportion of the wheat harvested has been spoilt by war and weather and is unfit for consumption. But food in small quantities is reaching the bulk of the population.

5. There has been much political activity during the month, especially in Florence. The patriot problem is synonymous with politics: they are the bone of contention between the various political parties. Attempts made to recruit patriots


for the regular Italian Army have not been very successful: patriots wish to join the Army in organized bodies rather than as individuals.

6. Carabinieri for the Northern Regions are arriving satisfactorily.

7. AFHQ is making arrangements with the Transportation Sub-Commission for the formation of Truck Companies to haul civilian supplies.

8. Pisa was under intermittent shell fire until 28 Sept. Inhabitants of the city, estimated at about 15,000 persons, were all North of the river and in view of the water shortage all entry into the town was temporarily stopped by a ring of police posts. Later the supply improved and many people returned to their homes. Patriots, who co-operated well, were duly disarmed and public order was good. The famous leaning tower suffered a few unnoticeable chips.

9. Conditions in Florence improved noticeably when the Germans had withdrawn from the Northern suburbs. The sanitation of the city, which was in a terrible state when the Allies entered, is now in hand. Law and order are good and all hospitals are functioning normally. Schools are to reopen on 2 October. A committee formed of prominent persons deals exclusively with Anglo-American nationals. Two hundred homeless Southern Italians are being evacuated daily. The food supply to the city is still unsatisfactory.

10. Political unrest in the city centres around the conflict between the Prefect and the Committee of National Liberation: AMG support is being given to the former. The city has attracted many visitors, including the Lieutenant of the Realm, Togliatti and the Prime Minister, and a host of unauthorized persons. [The document continues with a summary of similar experiences of AMG, Eighth Army.]


[Memo, Sr SO, AMG Fifth Army, for All Concerned, 29 Sep 44, ACC files, 10700/154/2]

1. With the industrial area of Italy with its big, largely populated cities soon to come under our control, it must be appreciated that the strictest economic control must be exercised at every stage in order to utilize the limited food supplies now available to the best possible use.

2. SCAO's, CAO's, Corps Supply Officers, Provincial Commissioners, Regional and Provincial Supply Officers responsible to AMG Fifth Army are therefore responsible that imported supplies (especially flour) are requisitioned and distributed with the closest and strictest economy. In this, you will be guided by the following principles:

a. Grain
No effort must be spared to stimulate the threshing and amassing of grain. Particular attention will be paid to the promulgation of grain and flour prices by Regional and Provincial Supply Officers; the prompt payment of farmers for wheat amassed, and the prompt ordering of POL [Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants] supplies. In the latter, the AMG Fifth Army Supply Division will continue the distribution of POL as quickly as availability makes possible.

b. Flour
All mills must be put to work with the minimum of delay. Where power is lacking, tractors or motors must be utilized and POL for this purpose will be given first priority.

c. Bread
Every CAO must endeavour to make his commune self-supporting. In addition, the Corps of Provincial Supply Officer must take advantage of the exportable surplus of flour from a surplus commune, using it in a deficient commune. In accordance with previous instructions issued by this Headquarters, the basic bread ration remains unchanged at 200 grams except that in communes using imported flour it is set at 100 grams increasing to 200 grams when local grain is used. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Frank E. Toscani, Sr SO, AMG Fifth Army, for ExecO, AMG Fifth Arm,, 26 Mar 45, ACC files, 10700/ 154/1]

♦ ♦ ♦ Experience has shown that in the initial stages of the landing at Salerno/Paestum, civilian food supplies were not properly phased and did not arrive on time. Since then, we have organized a system of supplies which has worked with marked success to the extent that communes were supplied within 48 hours after liberation during the offensive of the 5th Army of May-September 1944. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Food Subcom AC, Final Rpt, Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

2. . . . The disastrous consequences of the nonexistence of extra Italian stockpiles prior to entry [of the Allied Armies] had been fully apparent in the early days of the occupation when a hand to mouth existence had to be followed. To avoid repetition of this, stockpiles of essential foods were built up at strategic points for civilian feeding as fresh areas were ready to be occupied. As a result, throughout the remainder of the advance up the Italian peninsula, food was normal-


ly taken into communes within a few hours after the departure of the retreating enemy. The scales for the immediate post-occupation period were more generous than those allowed for areas which had been settled for a long period, as it was realized that there would be distress and a definite need for building up of morale and the physical strength of the civilian population. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lt. Col Ralph L. Rolph, Provincial Cmsr, Florence Province, for AMG Fifth Army, 10 Nov 44, ACC files, 10700/143/19]

At 11:30 to-day, 10th November 1944, a crowd estimated at between 100-150 women congregated outside the Prefettura bearing signs with inscriptions of the following character:

"Milk for our children"
"Away with the Fascist Prefect"
"Long live the Allies"
"We want Epuration"

They asked to be allowed to send a deputation to the Provincial Commissioner. In the absence of the P.C. at A.M.G. 5 Army, they were received by Major A. J. Shove, the Executive Officer.

They said they wanted to represent to the Allied Government the feelings of the women of Florence.

They thought that the bad distribution of food, coal, and wood in the City was due to the continued existence in the administration of Fascist elements who had been encouraged by the appointment of a Prefect who had for so long worked under the Fascist regime. They accused him of having sent thousands of persons to concentration camps and said that they had no confidence in an administration honeycombed with Fascists and with Paterno at the head.

They said that the Carabinieri were making no serious attempts to deal with black market offences and said that at road-blocks they were deprived of food they had purchased in the country although they had passes to go into the country to get food.

The Provincial Commissioner arrived before the deputation left and explained that the Allied Military Government were making every effort to improve the present situation and that the food situation was quite a different matter from the political issues raised. The deputation said they would put up with privation with joy if the Fascist Prefect were not at the head of the administration.

The Provincial Commissioner said that the situation was steadily improving and he hoped a number of additional lorries would be available to bring charcoal into the City shortly, and this would help alleviate their present shortages. He said that demonstrations of this sort harmed their cause rather than helped it as the facts were fully known and appreciated.

The deputation admitted that the principal ground for the demonstration was not the food situation but the question of the removal of the Prefect.

In my view the deputation was not spontaneous. 24  It was dispersed without incidents.


[Ltr, Commodore Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC to Bonomi, 16 Nov 4.4, ACC files, 10000/136/327]

♦ ♦ ♦ When territory is first liberated, AMG officers carry out a somewhat rough and ready operation in accordance with the procedure laid down in Executive Memorandum No. 67 [ch. XIV, sec 2]. At this stage, where the territory had been recently fought over, you will appreciate that officers are extremely busy with the immediate and urgent problems of administration and restoration, and it is for this reason that the executive memorandum is deliberately made simple and easy to carry out. It is recognized that it provides only a rough guide, and there may be cases where urgent necessity demands the retention of ex-Fascists temporarily in office in order that pressing matters of administration may he executed.

Later on as conditions become more normal. DLL No. 159 dated 27 [translation dated 29 July 1944 is introduced, and thereafter epuration is carried out entirely by the Italian Government. As an example, I may state that this decree is at present in operation in nearly all Provinces at present under Military Government.

Certain difficulties are arising, however, owing to the inability of the Government effectively to carry out the provisions of DLL No. 159 in the more distant Provinces owing to lack of transport, the requirements of the Military authorities in restricting movement in forward areas, and so on.

To meet these circumstances it has been agreed between Count Sforza and Brigadier Upjohn that


it may be necessary to introduce a modified form of epuration under the Allied Military Government. The procedure will be for army Provincial Commissioners to appoint local Commissions of Italians who will then carry out epuration in accordance with the principles laid down in DLL No. 159. 25

Where the personnel is suspended from office under the terms of Executive Memorandum No. 67, or G.O. 35, such suspension is temporary pending formal proceedings by the Italian Government under DLL No. 159. It is true that persons suspended continue to receive their salary, but this is because Article 22 of DLL 159 so provides, and I feel that it would be unfair to attempt a different solution in Military Government territory.

As you will see from the terms of Executive Memorandum No. 67, suspensions are made on classification basis and therefore frequently without documentary investigation, but I have already arranged for copies of all scheda personale, where such are completed, to be handed over to the High Commissioner for Epuration at the proper time. A large number of such schede have already been sent to the High Commissioner, who will also be supplied with orders made under G.O. 35. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq AC, GO 35, 28 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/141/139]

1. Persons to Whom This Order Applies

Officials and employees of the following bodies shall be subject to proceedings under this Order:
a. Civil State administrations, even if autonomous
b. Local authorities and other public bodies and institutions
c. Special concerns operating under public authorities or bodies and private concerns recognized by the State as controlling public utility undertakings or concerns having nation wide interests.

2. Categories of Persons

The following persons shall be suspended from service:
a. Any person who has shown that he is unworthy of serving the State either by having participated actively in the political life of fascism or by having shown himself a consistent apologist of fascism and particularly if he has so acted when holding high office.
b. Any person who has obtained an appointment or promotion through favouritism of the party or of fascist officials of high rank.
c. Any person who has been guilty of fascist bias or corrupt practices.
d. Any person who has held the position of squadrista, or sansepolerista, or antemarcia, or marcia su Roma, or Sciarpa Littorio, or who has been an officer of the fascist militia.
e. Any person who after the 8th September 1943 moved to North Italy with or has pledged allegiance to or has in any way collaborated with the Republican fascist government. 26  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Bowman, Rgnl Cmsr, Emilia Rgn, Rpt for Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/132/11]

6. In both Fifth and Eighth Army areas officers of Emilia Region have been employed either as CAO's or in a specialist capacity under the command of the respective SCAO.

7. In the case of Eighth Army a special plan has been made for the administration of the area. Under this plan the executive administratation of the area will be placed under a Headquarters staffed by Emilia Region. This administrative Headquarters will be directly responsible to the SCAO.

8. The purpose of the plan is to provide the specialist staff not normally present with Army and to make an earlier start on measures of rehabilitation than would otherwise be possible. The scheme has been approved by Headquarters Allied Commission and will come into operation when the SCAO considers the position has become sufficiently static. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Gen Hume, SCAO, Fifth Army, for Hq AC, 3 Jan 45, ACC files, 10700/154/I]

1. During the past several months there has grown up a practice under which the provinces


of Tuscany have established what amounts to effective trade barriers against certain other provinces. While the reason is, of course, a wish to protect certain provinces from the loss of commodities, chiefly food, there has resulted a situation that is believed to be harmful to the public good.

3. As a principle it is believed that as little restriction and artificial control as possible should be placed on the economic life of Occupied Italy. It is a growing feeling that the black market itself would be less serious a problem if we reduced almost to the vanishing point the existing restrictions on trade.

4. It is proposed to issue instructions that there will be no interprovincial trade restrictions within the area of the Fifth Army but obviously this will not entirely solve the problem if there are trade restrictions in the territory of the several regions into which the Fifth Army will pass. Thus the problem does not merely concern the Eighth Region in which the Fifth Army is now located. It will be perhaps even more serious as we go north. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Min, 38th Mtg of CCAC, 27 Jul 44, CCAC files. CCAC 112]

♦ ♦ ♦ General Hilldring stated that he agreed with the British paper before the committee that there is no alternative to the continuance of the Allied Control Commission for the present. He pointed out, however, that CCAC policy was that the administration of civil affairs should be delegated to the appropriate civilian departments and agencies as soon as the military situation permits. ♦ ♦ ♦

Colonel Megaw [British member] asked if it were the U.S. view that the transfer of ACC to civilian control should take place while fighting was still going on in Italy. General Hilldring said yes. He indicated that it would of course not be possible to operate ACC and AMG control sections in Italy completely autonomously. The two organizations would have to work closely together. The military, he stated, must have certain absolute rights. 27


[Memo, OEA, Dept of State, for Hilldring, 31 Jul 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 2]

With reference to our meeting with Messrs Grady and Reber in your office 28 July, there is inclosed for dispatch to AFHQ a draft formula for a revision of allied control machinery in Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

With the liberation of Rome and the establishment of Italian government, ACC and Advisory Council for Italy in the Italian Capital the present is considered an appropriate time to re-examine the organization of allied control machinery in Italy and the relationship of the various allied bodies in that country....

It is recognized that the time has arisen for the "demilitarization" of the Control Commission. This should be accompanied by the gradual infiltration of allied civilian officers and employees into the organization and the general withdrawal of military personnel or their release from military duty.

In line with this policy it is recommended that the office of the Chief Commissioner of ACC be filled by a civilian. He would act as the Deputy of the C-in-C allied armies in Italy, who was Acting President of the ACC and Military Governor of Italy.

This recommendation does not involve any alterations of the line of authorities stemming from Supreme Allied Commander. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, ACC, for Chief Cmsr, ACC. 29 Jul 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, 387.4-1]

8. Suggestions have been made that the Allied Control Commission should divest itself of certain responsibilities and functions in specific areas of this territory which are no longer of military interest to the Allied Forces: that there should be a dividing line on one side of which civilian or other agencies should operate, leaving to the Allied Control Commission responsibility only in areas relatively close to the scene of operations.


9. From the point of view of distribution of military personnel these proposals are attractive but whatever the reasons may be outside this theater they would appear to be unsound from the point of view of the proper administration, related always to military necessity, of the population in this theater of war.

10. It is vitally necessary from the political point of view that the Italian Government should take the maximum responsibility in the government of the territory handed over to it. So long, however, as this is a theater of war and so long as the Italians have the status of cobelligerents, the Government can look to but one Allied authority for direction, control and advice. That authority should be the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, the agency created by the long terms of the Armistice for this purpose. . . . In order that the Chief Commissioner may be in a position to exercise direction and control and furnish advice he must have representatives, however thinly distributed, in all Darts of the territory. He cannot in the present state of instability in this country rely on information furnished by the Italians alone, nor can he carry out his responsibilities by exercising remote control and by making use of "trouble shooters". Moreover, . . . the presence of resident Allied Civil Affairs Officers . . . is necessary to facilitate the functions of the military authorities and to promote good relations between the civilian population and military forces without which the maximum resources of the country cannot properly be employed. There still exist in Sicily, Sardinia, and many places in Southern Italy, Allied installations and Allied forces.

11. Again, reports from the Southern areas show that the country has not reached a stage of stability which would justify complete abandonment of large areas without the presence of a few Allied officers. The standard of administration shown by heads of local government, the numbers and degree of efficiency of the Carabinieri and other police agencies, are not sufficient to insure that stability which is necessary, not only where Allied installations exist, but throughout the country, so long as this country is a theater of war. However much we may wish to compel the Italian local government to stand on their own feet and to take full responsibility, it must be remembered that the presence of one Allied officer in an advisory capacity may make all the difference between order and disorder and is probably worth many hundreds of Carabinieri or troops in the enforcement of law and the maintenance of stability. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo prepared by Maj H. C. Ellis, WO [War Office], and Maj Allen L. Keyes, WD, With the Co-operation of Dallas Dort, Dept of State, and B. A. Workman, Ministry of Supply, for G-5, AFHQ, Aug. 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 2, app. to CCAC 112-4] 28

1. The first question is whether the responsibilities of the ACC for supply of civil relief and economic matters should be detached from its other activities in order to be controlled directly by a combined civilian agency independent of the CCS. Prior to the cessation of hostilities in Italy such action would not seem desirable for the following reasons:

(a) The quantity of supplies required to be imported for civil relief is affected both by the rations fixed for the Italian people and by the amount of local Italian resources which are not used by the military. Maximum control over local resources (e.g. the amassment of the harvest) can be achieved only by the full co-operation of various parts of the ACC. Many of the subcommissions of the ACC do not come under the Economic Section and are not appropriate . . . for transfer to civilian personnel. Prices have to be controlled, decrees issued and enforced, black market operations suppressed and local labour fully utilized. These tasks entail directing the Italian Government on agricultural policy, on the drafting and issue of decrees, and on the employment of the Carabinieri and the enforcement of regulations. They further require, while the Italian Government remains as weak as it is at present, local supervision in the provinces through the regional organization of the ACC.
(b) The handling of imported supplies is dependent on shipping, port facilities, road and rail transport and warehousing accommodations. So long as hostilities continue these will, with unimportant exceptions, be controlled ultimately by AFHQ. If economic and supply responsibilities were to be transferred to a civilian agency with which AFHQ presumably would have no connection, difficulties might easily arise over the provision of transportation and warehousing facilities.
(c) The Allied Commander in Chief in enforcing the terms of the Armistice acts through the ACC, which is the body through which all


dealings with the Italian Government are conducted. For a body responsible not to him but to a combined civilian agency independent of the CCS to be dealing also with the Italian Government, during hostilities, might lead to dualism in policy and would invite confusion.
(d) While hostilities continue, all Italian activities both military and civilian must be fully mobilised and coordinated as a part of the Allied military effort. Any attempt to divide responsibilities might detract from such full mobilisation.
(e) ACC frequently derives advantage from military facilities available in the Theater. Thus various needs for stores of a technical character may well be met from military stocks in the Theater. . . . Furthermore, technical advice is available to ACC through the military services (e.g. Medical, Engineers, Signals). Although by special arrangement an independent combined civilian agency might obtain the advantages of these facilities, it seems probable that they would not get them regularly or of right as does a body which is part of the military organisation.

2. The second question is whether the responsibilities of the ACC for supply of civil relief and economic matters should be transferred to a combined civilian agency for any particular parts of Italy.

Prior to the cessation of hostilities in Italy such action would also seem undesirable. The evils of divided administration were clearly demonstrated during the few months when liberated Italy was under the control of independent AMG and ACC authorities. . . . Moreover, it is important politically that the same treatment should be given to all parts of Italy, or at least to all parts returned to the administration of the Italian Government. 29


[Memo, Gen John Clark, CAO, AFHQ, for CCS, 24 Aug 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

2. Problems connected with Italy's foreign trade, and the work of arranging export and import transactions, have been increasing steadily in recent months. Neither the Allied Control Commission nor AFHQ possesses the organization or personnel adequate to perform this work, nor is either staffed to give to the development of this aspect of Italy's economic life the attention which it needs. ♦ ♦ ♦

4. Machinery is also required by the ACC to handle the commercial details of exporting and importing, and a similar need is felt by AFHQ to assist it in conducting foreign trade transactions throughout the Mediterranean Theatre. AFHQ, G-5, is not a commercial organization and is not staffed to handle business details of foreign trade transactions. At present G-5 is using the UKCC in conducting trade between Italy and French North Africa and between Italy and the Mideast, but G-5 has no agreement with the UKCC other than an oral understanding. It is felt, with increased trade opportunities throughout the Mediterranean in prospect, that the time has come to formalize this situation and to bring in the USCC 30  as well as the UKCC. Such an organization would be of great assistance in handling the external work connected with the development of Italy's foreign trade. Together with the proposed Ministry of Commerce it could relieve the military personnel of AFHQ and the ACC of attending to many of the business details connected with the making of exports and imports. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ Col Spofford, ACofS G-5, AFHQ, Min of Remarks at a Mtg Held at AFHQ, 2 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/105/569]

a. Supreme Allied Commander was responsible in this Theater for, among other things, the rescue, administration, maintenance, repatriation, or settlement of refugees and displaced persons. There were already in the Theater a number of Agencies-some sponsored by the Allied Governments, others representing various interests. 31


The help given by these agencies in the solution of the problems was welcome. It was, however, obvious that the activities of all such agencies should be co-ordinated. It has been considered that there was need for an agency to act in an advisory capacity to AFHQ, and, particularly, to advise the Allied Commander on the contributions which could be made by civilian relief and welfare organizations in the solution of the problems. No such body now existed.... ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, CAO, AFHQ, for CCS, 11 Sep 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 3]

4. It has been observed that in the case of civilians already sent over from the United States, ... the instructions issued to them do not coincide with the principles laid down in TAM 261. The cases of Mr. Michael J. Grosetto and Mr. Charles R. Ryan, both of the Foreign Economic Administration, may be cited as examples. These gentlemen both arrived with letters from the FEA accompanied by "Instructions to FEA Employees serving in Foreign Countries." Copies of the letters and of the instructions are attached. It will seem that specific duties for these gentlemen are laid down and channels of communications are envisaged outside the normal channels under which ACC functions.

5. Other civilian employees have arrived from the United States bearing letters assigning them to specific duties with ACC which in many cases are not applicable to the duties which ACC require them to carry out. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Note, Col Spofford for SACMED's Political Comm., 12 Sep 44]

The following several changes in the direction of civilian control may be made during this present period [of active hostilities]:
(a) Military personnel in the Economic Section and in certain other parts of the Control Commission may be replaced by civilians.
(b) Civilians may be associated with the officers having to do with supply, particularly movements and transport, in G-5, AFHQ, so that the machinery and operative problems can become known to them.
(c) Civil supply requisitions for Sicily, Sardinia, Southern Italy, and possibly other parts of Italy could be so identified that decisions regarding them and financial responsibility for them in Washington and London might if desired be taken by civilian agencies. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Remarks of Hilldring in Telecon With Wickersham, U.S. Mil Adviser, EAC, 15 Sep 44, CAD Msg files, WD-TC 972] 32

♦ ♦ ♦ Instead of following the line that we would keep the military in this business the shortest possible time consistent with military considerations, the absence of civilians from the Allied Control Council in Italy has been the principal factor in keeping us in this business the longest possible time. It's hard to make the transition if you lack continuity, which you will get if you go in initially with a number of civilians. You mentioned the political side and the OWI side, I think there's one other section where it is vitally important to get civilians in early, and that's in the economic side, which will be our principal headache. There is another advantage to getting civilians into your economic set-up, and that is that we get on the ground, from our point of view, representatives of the agencies that are primarily responsible for the economic picture, and I think that deserves a great deal of consideration. We started in the other way in Italy. There were no civilians at all in the economic set-up, and everybody in the Italian picture will now agree that that was a very great mistake. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Hilldring for Lt Col [Paul H.] Davis, CAD, 16 Sep. 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

3. There has been considerable conversation and correspondence with regard to the demilitarization of ACC. This started last November when a civilian, Mr. Henry Grady, was placed in charge of the Economic Section of ACC, and the War Department has been hammering ever since to get the civilian agencies to send their people to the Commission. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Lush, to Chief Cmsr, AC, 19 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/68]

1. The principle with regard to infiltration of British civilian officials into the Allied Commission agreed upon in London was that as suitable vacancies occurred civilians should be sought to fill them: only if wholly adequate civilians could be found should they be selected. It was agreed that
(1) that the number of vacancies occurring would be few
(2) the possibility of finding civilians of sufficient ability and experience was remote
(3) quality and not quantity was the criterion. ♦ ♦ ♦

7. I found here that the warning given to me on all sides that the best civilians were either in uniform or in key jobs was true and I was unable to find a civilian capable of fulfilling the appointment. ♦ ♦ ♦


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