Endnotes for Chapter IX

1 The designation WPD was changed to OPD during the period of the development of the BOLERO plan. In this chapter the names are used interchangeably, generally as they appear in the documents being described.

2 For ABC-l and RAINBOW 5, see Ch. IV. For ARCADIA Conference, see Ch. V.

3 General Arnold and his staff were likewise dismayed by the piecemeal commitment of American forces as it affected the distribution of American Air strength. See memo, R. A. Lovett, ASW for Air, no addressee, 9 Mar 42, sub: Strategy of Scarcity, OPD 381, 4.
General Marshall and Secretary Stimson were also fully aware, of course, of the need for a common strategic goal, as they indicated by promptly becoming the staunchest advocates of the BOLERO outline plan which OPD evolved. In fact as time went on, OPD officers proved to be more inclined to deviate from the original BOLERO strategy, in view of later logistic and politico-military developments, than General Marshall and Secretary Stimson. See the latter's favorable presentation of the BOLERO plan in his On Active Service in Peace and War. On later thought some of the officers closely associated with drafting the initial plan were not so sure that it represented the wisest strategic course that could have been charted. Rather, as this chapter attempts to show, they strongly felt the need of some central strategy, and the BOLERO plan was their solution at the time. This chapter does not discuss the BOLERO plan as part of the developing pattern of strategy, but simply as a significant case history in staff planning.

4 Notations by Gen Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit file. At the bottom of this notation is an added sentence, dated 7 May 1942: "The above plan, which finally won official approval in Apr, is called BOLERO."

5 Ibid., 24 Jan 42.

6 Ibid., 19 Feb 42.

7 Ibid., 22 Feb 42.

8 JPS Directive 1 to JUSSC, 28 Jan 42, forwarded to JUSSC, 30 Jan 42, JPS 2. The first JUSSC meeting convened two days later, 30 January. See JUSSC Meetings, JCS rcds.

9 President Roosevelt spoke of the obsolescence of ARCADIA plans in his Message 115 to the Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, copy filed with CCS 56/1 in ABC 311.5 (1-30-42).

10 Min 4th meeting CCS, 10 Feb 42. This CCS order resulted from consideration of a British paper on deploying air forces in the Far East, CCS 34, which the CCS forwarded to the CPS, 10 February 1942.

11 (1) Min 13th meeting CPS, 11 Feb 42. (2) JPS directive to JUSSC, 11 Feb. 42, JPS 2/1.

12 The issue was considered on the JCS level as JCS 23, 14 March 1942, title: Strategic Deployment of Land, Sea, and Air Forces of the U. S. JCS 23 which comprised all the previous studies, was submitted by the JPS to the JCS 14 March 1942. JCS 23 and all associated papers are filed in ABC 370 (1-28-42). In this chapter the citations of the complicated set of JCS 23 papers are as precisely descriptive of the individual studies in JCS 23 as possible, and the standard reference to JCS papers (number, date, and title) is not always employed.

13 (1) JUSSC study (majority and minority reports) submitted to JPS, 18 Feb 42, JPS 2/2 and JPS 2/2 (A). (2) JUSSC study reconciling the two reports, submitted to JPS 6 Mar 42, JPS 2/5. (3) Min 4th meeting JUSSC, 3 Feb 42, JCS rcds.

14 (1) JCS 23, 14 Mar 42, title: Strategic Deployment of Land, Sea, and Air Forces of the U. S. For the quoted phrase, see JPS conclusions added at the end of the JUSSC study (JPS 2/5). (2) Cf. min 6th meeting JUSSC, 5 Feb 42, JCS rcds.

15 For evidence of the WPD point of view, see WPD notes on JCS 23, prepared for 6th meeting JCS, 16 Mar 42, filed with JCS 23 in ABC 370 (1-28-42). See also n. 23.

16 All the foregoing is from memo, WPD for CofS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions and Their Application to Southwest Pacific, Envelope 35, Exec 4. General Eisenhower's initials appear in the action officer corner on this copy of the memorandum, indicating that he himself drafted at least the final version of the paper.

17 JUSSC study, title: Review of Strategic Situation in Japanese Theater of War, submitted to JPS 6 Mar 42, and JUSSC study on strategic deployment also submitted to JPS 6 Mar 42, JPS 2/5 and JPS 2/6. JPS 2/5 superseded the JUSSC majority and minority reports, 18 Feb 42, JPS 2/2 and JPS 2/2 (A).

18 WPD notes by Colonel Handy, on an early draft of JPS 2/5, filed with JPS 2/5 in ABC 370 (1-28-42). There is no indication of authorship, but the phrasing of the text suggests that the notes are intended as a guide from the Army planner to the Army section of the JUSSC. Much later (1947) General Handy was unable to say positively that he was the author of these notes, but thought that in all probability he had written them.

19 JUSSC study, 6 Mar 42, JPS 2/6.

20 This Pacific estimate included Alaska and Panama, plus the Caribbean Air Force.

21 For all the foregoing, JUSSC study, 6 Mar 42, JPS 2/6. Annexes A through H present detailed statistics and description of operation planned. The outline plan is presented in Annex C.

22 JUSSC study, prepared by direction of the JPS to revise estimates on troop deployment in the light of commitments made subsequent to the 6 March study, JPS 2/6, atchd as App. II of the JPS paper submitted to the JCS 14 Mar 42, JCS 23.

23 All the foregoing concerning WPD's position is from WPD notes prepared for the Army planner's use at the 4th meeting JPS, 11 Mar 42, filed with JPS 2/6 in ABC 370 (1-28-42). There is no indication of the author.
For a clear indication that WPD at this very time did not take the 1942 possibility very seriously, see notations by Gen D. D. Eisenhower, 10 Mar 42, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit file:
Gradually some of the people with whom I have to deal are coming to agree with me that there are just three "musts" for the Allies this year—hold open the line to England and support her as necessary; keep Russia in the war as an active participant; hold the India-Middle East buttress between Japs and Germans. All this assumes the safety from major attack of North America, Hawaii, and the Caribbean area.
For WPD's approval. of the whole deployment study after the JUSSC had revised estimates on American forces in its study submitted to JCS, 14 Mar 42, as App. II of JCS 23, see WPD notes on JCS 23, prepared for the Chief of Staff's use at the 6th meeting JCS, 16 Mar 42, filed with JCS 23 in ABC 370 (1-28-42).

24 (1) Min 4th meeting JPS, 11 Mar 42. (2) Min 5th meeting JPS, 14 Mar 42. At this second meeting of the JPS it was directed that a paper (JCS 23) be submitted to the JCS. (3) See n. 12 above.

25 (1) JPS conclusions to JUSSC study on strategic deployment, JCS 23, basic paper, 14 Mar 42. (2) Cf. WPD notes on JCS 23, prepared for the Chief of Staff's use at the 6th meeting JCS, 16 Mar 42, filed with JCS 23 in ABC 370 (1-28-42). General Eisenhower had initialed a draft of the paragraph in JCS 23 defending the point of view. See this draft and attached note indicating that the Army Air Forces members of the Joint Planners were by this time willing to go along with the WPD position, abandoning what was evidently an Army Air Forces argument in the JUSSC minority report of 18 February 1942, JPS 2/2 (A), filed with JCS 23 in ABC 370 (1-28-42).

26 JPS conclusions to basic paper submitted to the JCS 14 Mar 42, JCS 23.

27 Min 6th meeting JCS, 16 Mar 42. The members of the JCS recorded a general understanding that current commitments included one division in excess of JUSSC recommendations.

28 (1) British War Cabinet-Joint Planning Staff study, 9 Dec 41, title: Opns on Continent in Final Phase, copy filed before CPS 26/D, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1. (2) Ltr, Field Marshal Dill to Gen Marshall, 16 Mar 42, copy filed before CPS 26/D, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1. Field Marshal Dill simply turned this copy of the British study over to General Marshall personally "apropos of the offensive about which we spoke today." (3) Ltr, Gen Marshall to Field Marshal Dill, n.d., copy filed before CPS 26/D, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1. This British study of 9 December was marked as the second revised draft. The CPS used a later, almost identical draft, dated 28 December 1941 and bearing the name of ROUNDUP, for their studies. See CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42. A copy of the 28 December study is in JCS rcds, CCS 381 (3-23-42), 1.

29 (1) Min 7th meeting JCS, 23 Mar 42. (2) Min 13th meeting CCS, 24 Mar 42. (3) CPS 26/D, 25 Mar 42, title: Directive/Offensive Opns in Europe.

30 Min 12th meeting CPS, 26 Mar 42. The CPS work coincided with but was largely negated by the final approval of the plan drafted in OPD. WPD was renamed OPD on 23 March 1942.

31 Memo, OPD for CofS, 25 Mar 42, sub: Critical Points in Development of Coordinated Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of War, OPD 381 BOLERO, 6.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 The immediate use to which OPD's 25 March memorandum was put was for what Secretary Stimson called a "very fine presentation" of the issue at the White House 25 March 1942, attended by Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, General Arnold, Secretary Knox, Admiral King, and Harry Hopkins. For references to the meeting, see: (1) Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 416-17; (2) min of 7th meeting JCS, 23 Mar 42; (3) memo, Col J. R. Deane, OCS for Gen Arnold and Gen Eisenhower, n.d., Tab "Misc," Book 4, Exec 8.

35 Interv, Lt Col Connor with author, 11 May 48, OPD Hist Unit Interv file.

36 (1) For responsibilities of Colonels Hull and Connor, see interv, Lt Gen Hull with author, 3 Jul 47, OPD Hist Unit Interv file. (2) For extra-OPD staff work, see papers in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

37 (1) 1700 Report, 1 Apr 42, Current Gp files, AG Rcds Br. This is the only documentary record of OPD's submission of the BOLERO plan to the Chief of Staff. (2) Interv, Lt Gen Hull with author, 3 Jul 47, OPD Hist Unit Interv file.

38 Three weeks previously the President had told the Prime Minister that he was "becoming more and more interested in the establishment of this new front this summer, certainly for air and raids." See msg 115, President for Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, with memo, SW for CofS, 24 Mar 42, in ABC 371 (3-5-42). For Presidential approval, see: (1) Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 418-19 (Secretary Stimson says the plan was approved on 1 April); (2) cf. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 519-21.

39 (1) For reference to General Marshall's position as negotiator "in the name of the President," see memo, ACofS for SW, 12 Apr 42, sub: Review of Our Situation, OPD 381, 6. The memorandum was drafted by General Eisenhower. (2) For composition of delegation, see paper, n.d., title: Opn MODICUM, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42),5. In addition to Mr. Hopkins, General Marshall, and Colonel Wedemeyer, the party included Col. H. A. Craig, Air Forces planner, and a physician for Mr. Hopkins. Colonel Hull of OPD was not a member of the original MODICUM party although he was in England at the same time and took an active part in discussions of BOLERO with the British. The MODICUM party traveled under code names, General Marshall as Mr. Mell and Colonel Wedemeyer as Mr. White.

40 The Marshall Memorandum or BOLERO plan is extant in a number of distinct versions, all similar in substance but varying considerably in language and order of presentation of points. Many copies are undated and the titles were changed on several occasions. Presumably for security, no formal file entry for the plan was ever made in either the regular OPD decimal file system or the files of the Office of the Chief of Staff. Even the President did not keep a copy. The plan itself was covered with a memorandum arguing the strategic propriety of the plan, and for that reason the British adopted the phrase Marshall Memorandum for the whole plan, then unnamed. The BOLERO/ROUNDUP/SLEDGEHAMMER terminology came into use a few weeks later. For lengthy documentary references to the various versions of this plan, see OPD Hist Unit Study P.

41 Even after formal reference to the landing craft issue had been put in OPD's BOLERO plan and the plan approved, General Eisenhower noted: "This morning I attended a committee meeting on 'Landing Craft' at which were discussed questions on which I begged the answers last February. Who is responsible for bldg. landing crafts? What types are they bldg? Are they suitable for cross channel work? Will the number of each type be sufficient? etc? How . . . can we win this war unless we can crack some heads?" Notations by Gen D. D. Eisenhower, 6 May 42, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit file.

42 Min of meeting, U. S. Representatives-British CsofS, London, 14 Apr 42, Tab E, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

43 Min of meeting, U. S. Representatives-British CsofS, London, 9 Apr 42, Tab D, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

44 Min of meeting, U. S.-British Planning Stfs, London, 11 Apr 42, Tab N, ABC 381 BOLERO (316-42), 5.

45 Min of meeting, U. S.-British Planning Stfs, London, 13 Apr 42, Tab Q, ABC 381 BOLERO (316-42), 5.

46 Min of meeting, U. S.-British Planning Stfs, London, 12 Apr 42, Tab 0, ABC 381 BOLERO (316-42), 5.

47 Min of meeting, U. S.-British Planning Stfs, London, 11 Apr 42, Tab N, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

48 Min of meeting, U. S. Representatives-British CsofS, London, 14 Apr 42, Tab E, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

49 (1) Msg, Gen Marshall for SW, 15 Apr 42, CM-IN 3939. (2) Min of meeting, U. S. Representatives-British War Cabinet Def Com, 14 Apr 42, WDCSA 381 (SS), 1. (3) Min of meeting, U. S. Representatives-British CsofS, London, 14 Apr 42, Tab E, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (4) British CsofS paper, title: Comments on Gen Marshall's Memo, COS (42) 97 (O), 13 Apr 42, Tab F, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (5) The Prime Minister had personally advised General Marshall of his acceptance of the plan 12 April 1942. Msg, Gen Marshall for Maj Gen McNarney, 12 Apr 42, CM-IN 3210.

50 Msg 70, Prime Minister for President, 17 Apr 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4, Book 1.

51 British CsofS paper, title: Comments on Gen Marshall's Memo . . ., Tab F, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. The British qualification concerning the Middle East and India was premised on the belief that temporary diversion of British-American resources was necessary to stem the Japanese advance toward India and through the Indian Ocean and to prevent the Axis Powers from establishing a consolidated position from which even a concentrated attack against Germany would not dislodge them.

52 (1) Min of meeting, U. S. Representatives-British CsofS, London, 14 Apr 42, Tab E, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (2) British CsofS paper, title: Comments on Gen Marshall's Memo . . ., Tab F, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

53 Min of meeting, U. S. Representatives-British War Cabinet Def Com, 14 Apr 42, WDCSA (SS) 381, 1.

54 Msg, Gen Marshall for Maj Gen McNarney, 13 Apr 42, CM-IN 3457.

55 Notations by Gen D. D. Eisenhower, 20 Apr 42, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit file.

56 (1) Msg, Gen Marshall for Maj Gen McNarney, 12 Apr 42, CM-IN 3210. (2) Memo, OPD for WDCMC, 13 Apr 42, sub: Landing Craft, Item 5, Exec 1. (3) Memo, SOS (Brig Gen W. D. Styer) for Maj Gen Eisenhower, 12 Apr 42, Item 5, Exec 1.

The Navy estimated that one third of the required number of landing craft would be available by September 1942, the remainder by April 1943.

57 (1) Msg, Lt Gen Arnold for Gen Marshall, 12 Apr 42, CM-OUT 2141. (2) Msg, Lt Gen Arnold for Gen Marshall, 14 Apr 42, CM-OUT 2433.

58 Memo, Maj Gen Eisenhower for Brig Gen Handy, 14 Apr 42, sub: BOLERO Planning, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

59 Memo for rcd, Maj Gen Eisenhower, 20 Apr 42, sub: Conf with Gen Marshall/Orgn for BOLERO Planning, Item 4, Exec 1.

60 (1) For General Handy's suggestion, see min 13th meeting JPS, 22 Apr 42. (2) Forces directive, CPS 26/2/D, 28 Apr 42, title: Directive for Preparation of War Plan-BOLERO.

61 (1) Memo, OPD for U. S. Secy CCS, 27 Apr 42, sub: U. S. Army Membership of BOLERO Combined Com, OPD 381 BOLERO, 8. (2) Min 1st meeting BOLERO Combined Com, 29 Apr 42, with CPS 26/2/D, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.

62 CPS 26/2/D, 28 Apr 42.

63 (1) CPS 26/2/D, 28 Apr 42. (2) Min 17th meeting CCS, 28 Apr 42. (3) Memo, Secy JCS for ACofS OPD, 6 May 42, sub: BOLERO Combined Com in London, with CCS 69, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.

64 Min 1st meeting BOLERO Combined Com, 29 Apr 42, with CPS 26/2/D, ABC 381 BOLERO (316-42), 1. Although the original directive from the CCS (CPS 26/2/D) called for the preparation of a war plan, the committee confined its work to preparing troop movement and shipping schedules. No war plan BOLERO was ever prepared except the OPD BOLERO/ROUNDUP plan (Marshall Memorandum).

65 For Colonel Hull's description of the functioning of his new section, see pers ltr, Col Hull to Brig Gen C. T. Bolte (HQ USAFBI), 19 May 42, Tab 57, Book 2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

66 Chart on Future Opns and European Theater Secs appended to memo, Col Hull, no addressee, 17 May 42, OPD 321.19, 42.

67 Notations by Gen D. D. Eisenhower, 21 May 42, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit file.

68 (1) Maj Gen Eisenhower, Notes to Take to Great Britain, 22 May 42, Book 5, Exec 8. (2) Maj Gen Eisenhower's rpt, title: Account of "BOLERO Trip," 23-30 May 42, filed with CCS 72 in S&P rcds, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.

69 The director of these exercises was the British Army commander in the Southeast, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, who impressed General Eisenhower at this time as a "decisive type . . . extremely energetic and professionally able." Maj Gen Eisenhower's rpt, same title, filed with CCS 72 in S&P rcds, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.

70 Notations by Gen D. D. Eisenhower, 4 Jun 42, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit file.

71 Ibid., 11 Jun 42.

Return to the Table of Contents

Search CMH Online
Last updated 19 October 2004