Endnotes for Chapter III
1 Fourteen sessions were held. Although the conversations are often considered to have ended on 27 March 1941 (see statement in opening paragraph of ABC-1), a fourteenth meeting was held on 29 March, at which time approval was given to ABC-1. (Min, mtg U. S.-Br Stf Confs, 29 Mar 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 14th mtg, W PD 4402-89. ABC -1 (American-British Conversations), Report of United States-British Staff Conversations, 27 March 1941, U.S. ser 011512-12R, Item 11, Exec 4 (hereafter cited as ABC-1 Report) is also reproduced in Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 15, pp. 1485-1542. Unless otherwise indicated, all documents cited in this chapter which are identified by either a B.U.S. or U. S. (Navy) serial number are filed in Item 11, Exec. 4.
2 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 26 Dec 40, sub: Army Reps for Stf Confs with Gt Brit, WPD 4402. This memorandum, written by General Gerow, was approved by the Chief of Staff on 28 December 1940, and Maj. Gen. William Braden, Deputy Chief of Staff, got in touch with the Secretary of War the same day. (2) Orders designating the Army members were issued on 30 December 1940. Ltr, TAG to Gen Embick, 30 Dec 40, same sub, AG 334.8 Confs (12-26-40). Later, at the suggestion of Admiral  that an Army secretary be appointed-the Navy had appointed Commander Lewis R. McDowell, and the British, Lt. Col. A. T. Cornwall-Jones, as secretaries-General Embick added Colonel Scobey as secretary of the Army section. (Min, 2d mtg U. S. Navy and Army Members, 29 Jan 41, U. S. ser 09212-2. )
3 Admiral Turner, Captains Cooke and Kirk, Capt. DeWitt C. Ramsey, USN, Lt. Col. Omar T. Pfeiffer, USMC, and Commander McDowell were members of the Navy section. (Ltr, CNO to Admiral , 24 Jan 41, sub: Appt of Navy Com to Conduct Stf Confs with Br, U. S. ser 09212.)
4 (1) Memo, Orme Wilson, Ln Off State Dept for Dir Central Div, Navy Dept, 16 Jan 41, sub: Br Aide-Memoire, Jan 15, 1941, WPD 4402-1. (2) On the outward voyage on the British battleship, King George V, Admiral Ghormley and General Lee presented a list of questions, to which the British furnished written answers on 31 January. Note by U. K. Delegation, Br-Amer Tech Convs, 31 Jan 41 B.U.S. (J) (41) 6.
5 (1) Min, plenary mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 29 Jan 41, B.U.S. (41) (J) 1st mtg, WPD 4402-89, Part 1 a. (2) Cf. min cited n. 2. Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand advisers were available for consultation with members of the British delegation but did not participate in the conversations.
6 Statement by U. K. Delegation, U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 29 Jan 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 1.
7 Agenda for U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 27 Jan 41, U.S. ser 011512-2.
8 General Lee sent this report to the War Department on 7 January 1941, a month after he had been instructed to secure information and report to the War Department. (Msg, Lee to Miles, 7 Jan 41, No. 647, WPD 4402-1.) Admiral Ghormley had also failed to get advance information, and had so reported to Admiral Stark.
9 Statement cited n. 6.
10 Ibid. Significantly the British representatives proposed, as an example of the principle that the partner having predominant forces in an area should exercise command over the Allied forces in the area, that "a United States Admiral should have command over British and Dominion naval forces in the Pacific and Far East." General Gerow wrote a marginal comment on this passage: "Watch out."
11 ABC-1 Report.
12 Min, 6th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 10 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 6th mtg.
13 The message is quoted in full in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 23-25. See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 141, 174, and Hull, Memoirs, p. 831.
14 The message of the Former Naval Person (Churchill) to President Roosevelt, 4 October 1940, is quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 497-98. Churchill asked the President whether he might not send an American naval squadron to pay a friendly visit to Singapore. He suggested that the visit might provide a suitable occasion for discussions by American, British, and- Dutch staff officers concerning technical problems of naval operations in East Indies and Philippine waters.
15 (1) Min, Standing Ln Com, 5 Oct 40, Item 58, OCS Binder 1. (2) Memo, CofS for SW, 7 Oct 40, sub: Mtg of Ln Com Saturday Oct 6, 1940, filed with min of Standing Ln Com, Item 58, OCS Binder 1. (3) Cf. Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 118.
16 At the same time that the British were presenting their appreciation on the Far East to the United States staff committee, Lord Halifax communicated the substance of this paper to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. (See min, conf in OCofS. 18 Feb 41.)
17 (1) Min, conf in OCofS, 18 Feb 41, WDCSA CofS Confs, I. (2) Declaration by U. S. Stf Com, U. S.-Br Stf Convs, 19 Feb 41, U. S. ser 011512-7.
18 The Far East-Appreciation by U. K. Delegation, Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 11 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 13.
19 Memo, Gens Embick, Gerow, and Miles, and Col McNarney for CofS, 12 Feb 41, sub: Dispatch of  U.S. Forces to Singapore, WPD 4402-3.
20 Min, Jt mtg of A&N See, U. S. Stf Com, 13 Feb 41, U. S. ser 09212-11.
21 (1) Min, Jt mtg of A&N See, U. S.-Br Conf, 19 Feb 41, U.S. ser 09212-15. (2) For the offensive strategy of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, as proposed by the Navy, see par 33, Statement by U.S. Stf Com, "The U. S. Military Position in the Far East," 19 Feb 41, U. S. ser 011512-8.
22 The Far East-Appreciation, cited n. 18. 
23 Ibid.
24 Statement by U. S. Stf Com, "The U.S. Military Position in the Far East," Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 19 Feb 41, par 26, U. S. ser 011512-8.
25 Ibid., pars 37-39. Nothing was said of the defenselessness of Singapore against land attack, though there is good reason to believe that the Navy was well informed on this score.
26 Note by U.K. Delegation, 3 Feb 41, Provision and Employment of U.S. Air Forces, B.U.S. (J) (41) 8.
27 The Air Corps 54-group program called for a total delivery by 1 April 1942 of 21,470 tactical and training planes. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, Plans and Early Operations-January 1939 to August 1942, I, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 129, (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF 1).
28 (1) Draft, Provision and Employment of U.S. Air Forces, n.d., no sig, Item 11, Exec 4. (2) See Colonel McNarney's discussion on air allocations and deployment on the occasion of General Arnold's pending trip to England. Memo, McNarney for Arnold, 7 Apr 41, sub: Stf Convs, WPD 4402-7.
29 The work of an Air subcommittee, ABC-2 was submitted two days after the ABC-1 Report was completed. (ABC-2, ltr, Gen Embick, Admiral Ghormley, and Admiral Beliers, to CofS, CNO, and (Br) CsofS, 29 Mar 41, sub: Air Collab. This document is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 15, pp.1543-50.) The members of the Air subcommittee were Air Vice Marshal J. C. Lesson, RAF, Captain Ramsey, USN, and Colonel McNarney, USA.
30 Min, 9th mtg U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 17 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 9th mtg. 
31 Memo cited n. 28 (2) .
32 (1) Ibid. (2) ABC-1 Report.
33 Statement by U.K. Delegation, 29 Jan 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 2.
34 (1) Min, 7th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 14 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 7th mtg. (2) For the definition of the agreed areas of British and American strategic responsibility, see Annex 2, ABC-1.
35 Min, 8th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 15 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 8th mtg.
36 (1) The organization of the U.S. Military mission in London as envisaged at that time did not provide separate Air representation. General Arnold wanted an Army Air officer to be assigned to each board and committee so that American organization would correspond to the British organization. Arnold expressed this view to Ambassador John G. Winant during his visit to London in April 1941. See Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, Harpers & Brothers, 1949), p. 217. (2) For the influence of the British pattern on American organization, see Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 102-03.
37 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 7 Apr 41, sub: U.S. Mil Miss in London, WPD 4402-5. The Army staff for the nucleus mission was to consist of sixteen officers including the head of the mission and, upon the entry of the United States into the war, was to be increased to forty officers. (2) Memo, G-2 for CofS, 7 Apr 41, same sub, WPD 4402-5.
38 (1) Ltr, Marshall to Chancy, Sp Army Obsr, London, 24 Apr 41, sub: Ltr of Instns, WPD 4402-5. (2) Notes on conf in OCS, 11 :00 O'clock, 28 Apr 41, WDCSA, CofS Confs, Vol II. General Lee, the military attaché in London, acted in the dual capacity of military attaché and special Army observer until General Chaney's arrival.
39 Ltr, Stark, CNO, to Ghormley, SPENAVO in London, 5 Apr 41, sub: Ltr of Instns, WPD 4402-11.
40 Msg, Chancy to TAG, 23 May 41, AG 210.684 (5-23-41) MC.
41 Memo, Capt A. W. Clarke, Secy to Br Mil Miss in Washington, no addressee, 18 May 41, sub: Appts to the Br Mil Miss in Washington, WPD 4402-10. The British mission itself was to consist of about thirty-one officers, although a number of other British officers were coming to Washington at this time to be assigned to Admiralty Missions in North America, and to the administration of the British Air Training Plan which was being implemented in the United States. The joint secretaries selected for the mission were Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN, and Mr. W. L. Gorell-Barnes of the Foreign Office.
42 See above, p. 8.
43 Incl A to rpt, JPC [Gen McNarney and Admiral Turner] to JB, 30 Apr 41, sub: Jt Bsc War Plan RAINBOW 5 and Rpt of U. S.-Br Stf Convs, Mar 27, 1941, JB 325, ser 642-5.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. The "Malay Barrier," as used in RAINBOW 5, was defined as including the "Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathers Island, Australia."
47 The Navy had stated that it would not transport reinforcements from the United States to the Philippines after Mobilization Day (M Day). Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Jan 41, sub: Measures to be Taken in Event of Sudden and Simultaneous Action by Germany and Japan Against the U.S., WPD 4175-18.
48 (1) Sec VII, Incl A to rpt cited n. 43. (2) Par 2, memo, Admiral Stark, CNO, for CofS, 22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions, RAINBOW 5 Development File, G-3 Regd Does.
49 Draft memo, WPD [Col Bundy] for CofS [May 41 ], sub cited n. 48 (2) . This memorandum was drafted not earlier than 22 May 1941, as it contains a reference to a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations of that date.
50 See VIII, Incl A to rpt, cited n. 43.
51 Min, JB mtg, 14 May 41.
52 The Secretary of the Navy approved joint Board 325, serial 642-5 (RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1) on 28 May 1941. Memo, Col Scobey, SJB, for CofS, 2 Jun 41, sub: Approval of JB Sers by SN, JB 325, ser 642-5. The Secretary of War gave his approval on 2 June 1941. (1) Ltr, JB to SW, 28 May 41, sub: Approval of War Plans. (2) Ltr, Stimson and Knox to President, 2 Jun 41. Both in JB 325, ser 642-5. The second letter forwarded RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1 to the White House.
53 Memo, Col Scobey for CofS, 9 Jun 41, sub: JB 325, ser 642-5-Jt A&N Bsc War Plan-RAINBOW 5 and Rpt of U. S.-Br Stf Convs-ABC-1, JB 325, ser 642-5. On 5 July 1941 Under Secretary Welles informed President Roosevelt that Lord Halifax wished the President to know that the British Government had in fact approved the ABC-1 Report. (Ltr, Welles to President, 5 Jul 41, and atchd Itr, Lord Halifax to Welles, 4 Jul 41, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 74.)
54 Min, conf in OSW, 10 Jun 41, WDCSA, SW Confs (War Council), Vol I. The Army planners quickly drew up detailed plans to send to Army commanders. The War Department Operations Plan RAINBOW 5 (WPD WDOP-R5) and the War Department Concentration Plan RAINBOW 5 (WPD WDCP-R5-41) were approved by the Chief of Staff on 19 August 1941 and issued to the Army commanders shortly thereafter. (See copies of plans in G-3 Regd Does.) RAINBOW 2 and 3-providing for American concentration in the Pacific in the event of war-were canceled at the Joint Board meeting of 6 August 1941. RAINBOW 1 and 4-the hemisphere defense plans-were not formally canceled until May 1942. RAINBOW 4 supplanted RAINBOW 1 in the spring of 1940 and, although its assumptions were actually superseded by events, it continued to serve for some purposes of hemisphere defense planning until 7 December 1941. Such long-range planning as the Army did in 1941 for future military operations was done under the assumptions of RAINBOW 5.
55 (1) See ltr, Gen Chaney, Off of Sp Army Obsr, London, for CofS, 8 Sep 41, sub: Air Def of Nav and Air Bases in U. K., WPD 4497-7. (2) A list of other reports submitted by General Chaney is in memo, WPD for TAG, 27 Oct 41, sub: Preparation for Plans for Task Forces, Bases and Def Comds as Provided in WD Opns Plan, RAINBOW 5, 1941, WPD 4497-7.
56 For examples, see: (1) memo cited n. 55 (2), and (2) notes on conf in Gen Gerow's off, 29 Oct 41, memo for red, L. C. J. [Lt Col Lawrence C. Jaynes], 29 Oct 41, sub: Augmentation of Pers and Functions of Chaney Miss, Tab D, Item 4, Exec 4.
57 (1) Ltr, Gen Chaney to CofS, 20 Sep 41, sub: Comd Arangements, U.S. Army Forces in Gt Brit, OPD 320.2 Ireland, 14. (2) Memo, W PD for SW, 3 Oct 41, sub: U. S. Trs for British Isles, WPD 4497-5. The proposed forces, exclusive of  Iceland, were listed as follows:
Bomber Force        36,000 
Northern Ireland        30, 000 
Scotland        13,500 
Token (England) Force          7,300 
Base Force        20,000
(3) Gen Gerow's Diary, 16 Jul, 12 Aug 41 entries, Item 1, Exec 10. The number of Army troops contemplated in WPD planning for Iceland fluctuated throughout the summer of 1941 between five and thirty thousand.
58 Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, for instance, believed that the idea of a token force was a mistake but, since it had been agreed upon, its strength should be held to a minimum. He maintained that, outside of the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. military effort should be, as much as possible, offensive. (Memo, Gen McNair, CofS GHQ, for ACofS WPD, 8 Nov 41, sub: U.S. Token Force ABC-1, WPD 4497-8.) Early in 1942 the token force for England was scratched. For a detailed account of the divergent views within the American staff, in late 1941 and early 1942, on the especially troublesome problem of the control and command of U.S. Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp- 579-87.
59 For over-all strength figures, see: (1) Strength of the Army Report, Machine Rcds Branch, AGO, STM-30; and (2) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943 to the Secretary of War, p. 2. The Regular Army divisions were: the 1st-9th Infantry Divisions, 24th Hawaiian Infantry Division, and the Philippine division; 1st-4th Armored Divisions; and the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions. The National Guard divisions were: the 26th-38th, 40th, 41st, and 43d-45th Infantry Divisions.
60 See Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the Army Service Forces (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 10, 12.
61 For a War Department review of the state of preparedness of the Army in the early fall of 1941, see: (1) memo, WPD for CofS, 22 Sep 41, sub: Overseas Possessions, Task Forces, and Leased Bases, WPD 4564-1, and (2) memo, WPD for CofS, 7 Oct 41, sub: Ground Forces, with corrected copy of incl, memo, CofS for President, 14 Oct 41, sub: Est of Ground Forces Req, etc., WPD 4594. (A copy with various rough drafts is filed in Env 8, Exec 4.)
62 In addition to reinforcing the U.S. overseas garrisons-Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines-the War Department in 1941 had to provide troops to garrison the leased British bases in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana. Troops were also deployed, under separate agreements, to Newfoundland and Bermuda. From June through November, other Army movements overseas were to Greenland, Iceland, and Surinam (Dutch Guiana). An account of the overseas deployment for hemisphere defense in 1941 will appear in Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
63 Ltr, Stark to CofS, 22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions, RAINBOW 5 Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.
64 Memo, WPD for CofS [May 1941], sub cited n. 63, RAINBOW 5 Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.
65 (1) Ltr, JPC [Gen Gerow and Admiral Turner] to JB, 28 May 41, sub: Submission of Jt Bsc Plan for Capture and Occupation of Overseas Positions, JB 325, ser 694. (2) For the diplomatic action taken by the United States, see Hull, Memoirs, p. 940.
66 Min, JB mtg, 24 May 41.
67 Ltr cited n. 65. The plan bore the Army short title, GRAY, and the Navy short title, WPD 47. For fuller information, especially on the War Department position, see WPD 4422.
68 See JPC rpt, 11 Jun 41, JB 325, ser 696. See also (1) John G. Winant, Letter from Governor Square (Boston, Houghton Miffing Company, 1947), pp. 203-04, and (2) Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 67.
69 Gerow Diary, 4 Jun 41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10.
70 Ibid., 19 Jun 41 entry.
71 Memo, H. R. S. [Admiral Stark, CNO] for Dir of War Plans [Navy], 1 Jul 41, no sub. Copy in Gerow Diary, atchd to 1 Jul 41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10.
72 See (1) Jt A&N Directive for Reinforcement of Defenses of Iceland (Short Title-INDIGO-1) [10 Jul 411, JB 325, ser 697-1; (2) memo, WPD for TAG (through Gen Arnold), 15 Jul 41, sub: GHQ Carry Out INDIGO-1, WPD 4493-41.
73 On 8 August the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolutions 92 and 93, extending the period of service. The House accepted them with amendments on 12 August, by the close vote of 203 to 202. The House amendments were accepted by the Senate and the measures sent to the White House for signature on 14 August. (For a discussion of the problem and legislative action during 1941, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. VII)
74 A detailed account of the occupation of Iceland by Army forces is contained in Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
75 (1) Gerow Diary, 29 Aug 41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10. (2) Memo, Gen Marshall for President, 6 Sep 41, sub: Orgn of first Army Contingent for Iceland, WPD 4493-125.
76 See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 291-92.
77 Notes on conf in OCofS, 16 Apr 41, WDCSA, CofS Conf, Vol II.
78 Ibid.
79 Memo [WPD] for CofS, 16 Apr 41, sub: Strategic Considerations Peace or War Status, WPD 4402-9. This document was initialed by Colonel Anderson, acting head of WPD in the absence of General Gerow, who was then on sick leave.
80 Notes on conf cited n. 77. Colonels McNarney, L. S. Gerow, Anderson, and Bundy were WPD representatives.
81 Notes on conf cited n. 77.
82 (1) Memo, G-2 for CofS, 19 ,dun 41, sub: Est of the Russo-German Sit, IB 85, filed in G-2/370.2 USSR (6-23-41). (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 303-04. (3) Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 393.
83 The American delegates to the military staff talks were Admirals Stark, King, and Turner, Generals Marshall and Arnold, Comdr. Forrest P. Sherman, and Colonel Bundy.
84 "General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff," 31 Jul 41, Item 10, Exec 4. Colonel Bundy noted that this review was read paragraph by paragraph by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound to the assembled British-American staff on board the H. M. S. Prince of Wales on 11 August 1941.
85 For the Prime Minister's theory advanced during the conference, see memo for Admiral Stark, no sig, n.d., sub: Notes of Speech by Prime Minister on USS Augusta, 9 Aug 41, Item 10, Exec 4.
86 For the staff discussions at the Atlantic Conference, see: (1) memo, Comdr Sherman for CNO, 18 Aug 41, sub: Notes on Stf Confs, 11-12 Aug 41, and (2) memo, Col Bundy for CofS, 20 Aug 41, sub: Notes of Stf Confs, Aug 11-12, 1941 on board Prince of Wales, both in Item 10, Exec 4; and (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 358.
87 WPD draft memo [W PD for CofS, Sep 41], sub: Gen Strategy-Review by Br CofS, WPD 4402-64. The memorandum was not delivered but was used informally in drawing up the joint Board letter.
88 For the JB reply, see: (1) ltr, JPC [Col Robert W. Crawford and Admiral Turner] to JB, 25 Sep 41, sub cited n. 87, JB 325, ser 729; (2) memo, Maj. Charles K. Gailey, Jr., Exec OPD, for CofS GHQ, 14 Oct 41, sub: JB 325 (ser 729)-Gen Strategy Review by Br CsofS, WPD 4402-64; and (3) memo, Col Scobey, SJB, for JPC (Army Sec), 3 Jan 42, sub: JB 325 (ser 729)-Gen Strategy, JB 325, ser 729. (JB 325, serial 729 was superseded by the paper entitled: Tentative U. S. Views on Subject of British Memorandum, Dec. 18. ) For other pertinent references to material in War Department files about the Atlantic Conference and its aftermath, see note for red, Lt Col Clayton L. Bissell, 31 Oct 41, sub cited n. 87; WPD 4402-64; WPD 4402-62; and Item 10, Exec 4.
89 (1) For a very brief account of the China aid program, see below, pp. 63-64. (2) For a full account, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952 ), Ch. I.
90 For a detailed treatment of the War Department's part in the lend-lease program, including administration, policies, and missions, see Richard M. Leighton, and Robert W. Coakley, The Logistics of Global Warfare, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
91 Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Mil Miss in Iran, WPD 4596. Actually SPOBS became a lend-lease mission only in a very limited sense. U. S. civil representatives in the United Kingdom were given important responsibilities for lend-lease, and heavy reliance was also placed on regular British-American channels in Washington.
92 For the setting up of the Magruder mission, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I.
93 For pertinent papers on the establishment of the Maxwell Mission, see: (1) WPD 4511-9, (2) WPD 4559-3, (3) Item 6, Exec 4, and (4) WPD 4402-72.
94 The American (Harriman) mission to Moscow included Admiral William H. Standley, Generals Burns and Chancy, Col. Philip R. Faymonville, and Colonel Bundy. For references in War Department files to the Harriman mission, see especially: (1) Item 2, Exec 10; and (2) WPD 4557-4, -6, -12, and -46.
95 (1) For the protocol, see agreement, n.d., title: Confidential Protocol of Conf of Reps of  U.S.A., U.S. S. R., and Gt Brit . . ., copy filed in separate folder annex, title: Russia (Moscow Confs), with WPD 4557. (2) For the formal decision to transfer supplies to the USSR under the Lend-Lease Act, see ltr, President to Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 7 Nov 41, WPD 4557-25. (3) For a detailed discussion of the Moscow conferences and aftermath, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 384-97. For the texts of the Russian-aid protocols, see U.S. Department of State, WARTIME INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Soviet Supply Protocols, Publication 2759, European Series 22 (Washington, Government Printing Office, n.d.).
96 For the Greeley mission, see for example: (1) WPD 4557-10 and -17, and (2) OPD 210.648 Iran, 38.
97 For references to the Iranian mission, see especially: (1) W PD 4549-3, and (2) W PD 4596-3.
98 A detailed treatment of the Wheeler, Greeley, and Maxwell missions is found in T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952) .
99 (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XI, treats the rearmament program and problem of foreign aid, and discusses in considerable detail the whole story of the development of the Victory Program in the War Department. (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. IV, contains an account of the role of WPD in Victory Program planning.
100 Ltr, President to SW, 9 Jul 41, Photostat copy filed in WPD 4494-1.
101 Memo, Gen Gerow for John J. McCloy, ASW, 5 Aug 41, no sub, Tab G, Item 7, Exec 4.
102 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Sep 41, sub: Resume of Confs, etc., WPD 4494-12. (2) Cf. memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Dec 41, sub: A&N Est of U.S. Over-all Pdn Reqmts, WPD 4494-21.
103 The results of the studies furnished him were incorporated in: (1) "Estimate Army Requirements . . .," September 1941 ; (2) "Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies (September 1941)"; and (3) a supplementary report, "War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941."
104 The detailed study of Army air needs, for the initial Victory Program estimates, had been prepared by the newly established Air War Plans Division in a paper known as AWPD/1. This document, based on ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5, contained the blueprint for AAF expansion. It called for 2,164,916 men and some 60,000 combat planes. (For a detailed discussion of AWPD/1, see Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 131-32, 146-47, 149-50, 594, 599-600.)
105 JB 355, ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title: JB Est of U.S. Over-all Pdn Rqmts, App II, Part II and Part III, JB 355, ser 707, in WPD 4494-13. Appendix II contains the Army estimate, Parts I and II being W PD's study-including Army Air Forces summary statistics-and Part III being a detailed study by the Army Air Forces War Plans Division. For a brief of the Army Air Forces study, including references to B-29's, see Appendix II, Part III, Section I. Appendix I contains the Navy requirements. As a result of the unrecognized differences between the Army and Navy, the Secretaries of War and Navy, on 25 September, forwarded to the White House, along with a single joint Board report on strategy to defeat the enemy, separate estimates of ultimate requirements-Army ground, Army air, and Navy. ((1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Ultimate Rqmts of Army, Ground, and Air Forces. (2) Ltr, S W and SN for President, 25 Sep 41. Both in WPD 4494-13.)
106 Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies (September 1941)," App II, Part I, JB 355, ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title cited n. 105. As summarized in the joint Board report, submitted to the White House along with the separate Army and Navy estimates on 25 September 1941, national objectives as related to military policy were: (1) "preservation of . . . the integrity . . . of the Western Hemisphere"; (2) "prevention of the disruption of the British Empire"; (3) "prevention of further extension of Japanese territorial dominion"; (4) "eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty." The first three items in effect supplemented the Army statement. The fourth, seemingly a long-range political objective that might have had significant implications for U.S. strategic planning in World War II, was presented without elaboration as to meaning or manner of achievement. (See JB rpt atchd to Victory Program Est, JB 355, ser 707, copy filed with WPD 4494-13.)
107 This "short of war" program was a summary of recommendations which were to be made in greater length in the "War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941." In this estimate, the "short of war" steps involved military and naval protection of the Western Hemisphere and American shipping; establishment of military bases in Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland, Bermuda, the Antilles, British Guiana, the United Kingdom, Alaska, and on U. S. islands in the Pacific; and finally the release of "merchant shipping, planes, foodstuffs, munitions to Russia, China, Great Britain and other powers opposing the Axis." ("War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941," Vol I, especially pp. 1-3, WPD 4510.)
108 (1) "Brief of Strategic Concept . . .... App 11, Part I. (2) Chart, "Ultimate Requirements Ground Forces," App II, Part II, Sec I. Both in JB 355, ser 707.
109 Chart cited n. 108 (2) . For fuller discussion on ways of defeating Germany, see App II, Part II, Sec II, "Estimate Army Requirements, Supporting Study," JB 355, ser 707.
110 It is remarkable in the light of subsequent events in World War II, that the Army planners should have settled on 1 July 1943 as the target date for the all-out effort against Germany. It is equally remarkable that their calculation of an 8,800,000-man Army came so close to the figure ultimately reached-8,300,000 (though with great variations in types and composition of units from those originally envisaged).
111 Memo, Gen Gerow for SW, 13 Nov 41, sub: Strategic Est, Vol I (Copy 11), Item 9, Exec 4.

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