Chapter XVII:
AFTER TORCH
What to do after completing the conquest of North Africa was the
crucial question of Allied strategy at the end of 1942. Since operations
in North Africa were almost certain to continue for several months and
since it was uncertain how many months they would last, it was too early
for a final decision to be made. But the British and American
staffs, still much preoccupied with the progress of the first big
combined operation, began to feel out each other's positions on future
Allied strategy.
On 18 November the Prime Minister cabled the President that the
"paramount task" before the United States and the United
Kingdom was, first, to conquer North Africa and open the 'Mediterranean
to military traffic and, second, to use the bases on the African shore
"to strike at the underbelly of the Axis . . . in the shortest
time."
1 He spoke of the advantages of using either Sardinia or
Sicily as air bases to attack Italy and called for a "supreme
effort," to bring Turkey into the war in the spring. He concurred
in a proposal the President had sent him that the CCS should "make
a survey of the possibilities including forward movement directed
against Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece, and other Balkan areas and including the possibility of obtaining Turkish support for
an attack through the Black Sea against Germany's flank." 2 In
accord with these desires of the President and the Prime Minister, the CCS on 19 directed the combined planners to examine the situation in
the 'Mediterranean and recommend a policy for subsequent action in the
area.3
At a White House meeting on 10 December 1942, the President took up
with the JCS the question of the next move after the close of the
campaign in North Africa.4 General Marshall gave reasons for not
undertaking any new operations in the Mediterranean. The first thing to
be done, he observed, was to clear enemy forces from Tunisia in order to
hold the area without using large forces and to be prepared to safeguard
the lines of communication in the
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Strait of Gibraltar. He once again called attention to the logistic
difficulties of operations in the Mediterranean and repeated his
opposition to "dabbling" wastefully in that area. Before any
new operations were undertaken there, he wanted to make sure that they
would be worth the cost. Marshall wanted to settle the North African
campaign quickly in order to increase the rate of troop movements to the
United Kingdom-then about 8,500 men a month. He declared it to be
important to build up a balanced force to strengthen the defenses of the
British Isles and to take advantage of possible German disintegration on
the Continent. He specifically argued that it was important for the
United States and the United Kingdom to be ready in March or April 1943
to launch emergency operations against the Brest peninsula or Boulogne,
or both, if there were signs that the German air force was becoming
weaker or if German forces started to move through Spain.
The President was of the opinion that there then was no need for an
immediate decision on the next strategic move, and that a decision could
possibly be delayed until as late as 1 March 1943. Meanwhile, the United
States should continue to build up forces both in the United Kingdom and
in North Africa with the greatest possible speed. These two strong
striking forces would be prepared to execute whatever line of action
should be chosen. The President declared that even if British and
American forces did not succeed in driving the enemy out of Tunisia
immediately, they were helping the Soviet Union. He expressed the
belief, moreover, that operations through Turkey would be well worth
considering as a next possible strategic move, provided Turkey could be
persuaded to cooperate.5 But the President did not commit himself to any course of
action. So far as the War Department planners could tell, it was still
an open question whether he would commit the united States to further
operations in the Mediterranean. Planning for such eventualities had,
of course, to be continued.6
Role of Air Power
In the closing weeks of the year, while the Army planners were
studying possible future operations in the Mediterranean, they were
also examining plans for air bombardment in the European theater. The
Army Air Forces remained as eager as ever to concentrate air power
against Germany. General Arnold held that bombing was the only means
of maintaining pressure against Germany, and that an integrated air
offensive from the United Kingdom and North Africa would offset the
dispersion of Allied forces caused by the North African operation.
The main force would be based in
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the United Kingdom. Arnold declared that a minimum force of 2,22:1 U.
S. heavy and medium bombers based in the United Kingdom and utilizing
American "precision methods" would in six months have a great
enough effect to make a land offensive against Germany possible.7
Commenting on these views, the Army planners had pointed to the
limitations of weather upon a sustained "all-out" bomber
offensive, as well as to the reservations of tire British about any kind
of cross-Channel offensive before the complete collapse of Germany. If
the British would not agree to exploit a favorable situation created by
the proposed bombing operations, they observed, then the operations
would in large part be wasted.8
Recognizing that air power was a strategic weapon of great importance,
the Army planners cast about for a proper role for it in the changed
circumstances of the European war. They were favorably inclined to that
part of the recommendations of the AAF--with which General Eisenhower
was in accord-for developing United Kingdom, Forth African, and other Mediterranean
bases, as they became available, into a single area for
air operations.9 They recommended a more extensive air offensive throughout the European
theater from these bases and intensive Allied pressure regardless of the
specific line of land action eventually adopted in the theater. The Army
planners did not accept the more extreme claims being advanced by
exponents of victory through air power.10 They still saw a need for
a tactically oriented air offensive before and during a combined land
offensive across the Channel; they were not willing to rely solely on
"strategic bombing" to prepare the way for the defeat of
Germany.
Summary of Main Alternatives
Examination of the possible courses of action in 1943 and thereafter
led the Army planners to the conclusion that there were three main
alternatives- -victory through strategic bombing, cross-Channel
invasion, and continued pressure in the Mediterranean region.11
They rejected the first alternative-victory through strategic
bombing-believing that only the concerted use of air and land offensives
would produce the decisive defeat of Germany. The second alternative-the
cross-Channel operation involved a reversion to ROUNDUP as soon as the
enemy was expelled from North Africa. The Army planners had not given up
the idea that there must be a decisive campaign in northwestern Europe,
but they could not see how or when it could be launched. To resume plans
for ROUNDUP in 1943 would be to ignore the fact that a decisive,
large-scale cross-Channel operation would not be fea
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sible, as it matter of logistics, before mid1944. It would mean accepting the
sacrifice of trial] of tire psychological and
tangible
advantages promised by TORCH. It Would also be to disregard the fact that
large ground forces would be required to safeguard North Africa and the Middle Fast. In addition, the Army planners were very much
impressed by the heavy cost ill Casualties of the Allied raid on
Dieppe in August 1942.12 They thus accepted once more the indefinite
postponement of Roundup.
The third alternative continued pressure in the 'Mediterranean
region- was the line of least resistance. The strategic objectives for 1943 would be to open the
Mediterranean to Allied shipping, and to knock Italy out of the war. The proponents of this alternative
pointed out that the United States and the United Kingdom could not
decide, perhaps before mid-1943, when and where the decisive blow
against Germany would be struck. In the meantime, limited operations in
the 'Mediterranean would be of some help to the Soviet Union by making supply
routes shorter and safer and by giving Germany no respite.
Such operations could be carried out within the limited means at the
disposal of the United States and the United Kingdom in 1943 and could
be supplemented by the all-out air offensive against Germany. .
Rejecting the first alternative and convinced that the second must be
postponed, the Army planners in the closing weeks of 1942 turned with
considerable misgivings toward the third alternative for 1943.13
The study of the War Department planners had thus brought them by
the turn of the year to no conclusion oil which they could heartily
agree regarding the course to be followed, in the European Mediterranean
area after TORCH. But they were beginning to face tip to the need for
some new way of going about the defeat of Germany. Air bombardment
its it strategic weapon suggested it combination of possibilities
consistent with the view of strategy to which the American military chiefs
adhered. Although tire relations among the possible elements--
cross-Channel, air bombardment, and Mediterranean-were still
confusing to the War Department planners, they were beginning to think
in terms of possible permutations and combinations of operations. They
were still speaking-as a carry-over from earlier 1942 planning-largely in terms of this operation or that. But by the very circumstances of
their involvement in the Mediterranean, they were now being compelled
to consider the possibilities of this and that course. The transition
to the strategic initiative err the European theater, along with the
growth of the resources at their disposal, had brought them to a new
stage in strategic, planning.
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As long as plans for operations across the Atlantic in 1943 remained indeterminate, it
was impossible to resolve the uncertainties
and disagreements of the American planners over future operations in the
Pacific. But since a large-scale continuation of operations in the
Mediterranean was highly probable, the began to project a parallel
development
of operations in the Pacific. The Army planners continued to work on
the principle-which was never stated in so many words-that further
"diversions" to operations in the Mediterranean, as required
to maintain the momentum of the "diversionary " operations
initiated there in 1942, justified parallel "diversions" to
operations
in the Pacific, as required for the same reasons. This equation remained
the basis of War Department dealings not only with -admiral King and
General MacArthur but also with the British, since the effective check
on British proposals involving increased U. S. Army commitments in the
Mediterranean was always the prospect that the JCS would recommend correspondingly
more ambitious plans in the Pacific.
South and Southwest Pacific
In the late fall of 1942, American forces in the South Pacific were
still desperately fighting off a series of Japanese thrusts aimed at
dislodging them from their foothold in the southern Solomons. General
MacArthur had begun a campaign to relieve the Japanese threat to Port
Moresby, the advance Allied base on the southern coast of New Guinea.
During October and November, Australian troops drove the Japanese back
across the Owen Stanley Range, while American troops-transported to the
northeast coast primarily by air- joined in bottling up the Japanese in the Buna-Gona area. From the
middle of November 1942 until the middle of January 1943, the Allied
troops engaged in bitter fighting to eliminate the Japanese from their
strongly defended positions.14
In October 1942 the President had told General Marshall that he
believed the northeast coast of New Guinea should be secured as soon
as possible. Then operations could be undertaken against the New
Britain-few Ireland area and from there against Truk, the important
Japanese base in the Carolines. The President's view was entirely in
accord with that of the Army strategic: planners who had long been
maintaining that Rabaul was the key to the Japanese position in the
Southwest Pacific, and the best way to approach Rabaul was from New
Guinea.
Although the immediate objective was the elimination of the threat to
Port Moresby, the Papua Campaign was actually the first step in securing
the northeast coast of New Guinea. This move was essentially the limited
Task Two that General Marshall and his staff advisers had proposed
shortly after the launching of Task One, as part of the scheme of
operations against Rabaul.15
As soon as the Allied forces in the South and Southwest Pacific had
shown that they
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could withstand powerful Japanese Counterthrusts, Marshall urged
that definite plans be drawn tip for continuing the offensive. as
provided in the joint directive of 2 July 1942. On December 1 he sent to
-Admiral King for comment the draft of a new joint directive to proceed
with the next steps: "Seizure and occupation of the remainder of
the Solomon Islands, northeast coast of New Guinea, New Britain and New
Ireland." Subject to the approval of the JCS, General MacArthur
and Admiral Nimitz were to provide jointly the necessary task forces and
to maintain and protect the lines of communication. The target date for
beginning these campaigns was also to be determined jointly by MacArthur
and . MacArthur was to be charged with the strategic direction of the
forces involved. A naval officer was to be in direct command of all
naval and amphibious operations.16
Weeks of proposal and counterproposal followed, and as had happened
in June 1942, the expectation that the Navy would favorably consider the
Army recommendations was disappointed. The same issues of unity of
command, maintaining the flexibility of the Pacific Fleet, and the
risks involved in the employment of naval forces under the strategic
control of other than naval officers were carried over from the June
discussions. Briefly stated, the War Department called for "an
elbowing-forward movement" along the Solomons and New Guinea
axes.17 Except for the completion of Task One, all subsequent action would take place in the
Southwest Pacific Area. Therefore, strategic control should be vested in
General MacArthur. The argued that 'bask One could not be considered
completed until the Guadalcanal--Tulagi area had been made secure and
developed into an air and naval base. A step-by-step advance tip the
Solomons chain would be necessary, but doubts were expressed about the
possibilities offered by North Fast New Guinea as a base of operations.
Admiral Halsey's command in the South Pacific should not, in an case,
be disturbed. Unified command should be set tip over the whole Pacific
theater and General MacArthur be given strategic: direction of
operations in the Southwest Pacific under Admiral Nimitz.18 This
proposal was an entirely natural continuation of the line of reasoning
the Navy Department had taken on previous occasions and was accompanied
by the same justification as before- the very strong operational
argument that the Pacific Fleet should not be divided between two
commands. The war Department agreed that a single commander should
some day be appointed for the whole Pacific theater, but once again
pointed out that this « as a matter for higher authority and that a de-
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cision could be made only after prolonged consideration, because of
the "political, international and organizational implications."
The War Department also reminded the Navy that provision must be made
for shifting, air forces as well as naval forces in the Pacific: from
one sector to another. The action proposed by the Army, besides
solving the problem at hand, would be "a positive step toward
eventual unification of command of all forces in the Pacific."
19
By early January 1943, when the Chiefs of Staff left for the
Casablanca Conference, the Army and Navy had reached no agreement on
the details of the strategy and command arrangements for continuing
operations against Rabaul.20 Nor had the JCS as yet received
MacArthur's detailed plans for the employment of forces in those
operations.21 In anticipation of these meetings, the War Department planners had
themselves
drawn up for the Army representatives an outline strategic plan for an
Allied offensive to seize and occupy Rabaul. A condition of the War
Department plan was that Allied operations in the Solomons, New Guinea,
and the Bismarck Archipelago be placed under the operational control of
a single commander.22 The reason for this condition was to make sure
that the two jaws of the pincers would come together on Rabaul. Among
the advantages of the operation, the War Department planners observed,
were bringing the key Japanese naval base at Truk within range of Allied
bombers, extending the area of Allied air reconnaissance, and removing
the existing threat to the Hawaii-Australia supply route. This
operation, moreover, would continue the offensive against Rabaul already
opened. Seven U. S. Army and Marine divisions, five Australian and New
Zealand divisions, three Marine raider battalions, and one U. S.
parachute regiment-all told, about 187,000 combat troops-would be
required to execute the proposed plan. All these Allied forces were
allocated to the area but not all of them had been sent. There were,
moreover, deficiencies in certain kinds of shipping-especially small
ships for coastwise use-and some of the divisions within the area lacked
equipment and training for jungle and amphibious operations.
To make possible continued operations aimed at Rabaul-the War
Department had taken steps to send essential reinforcements to Mac
Arthur. As a partial compensation for the immediate involvement of
available trained amphibious troops and amphibious equipment in South
Pacific operations, the War Department had dispatched a parachute
regiment and additional transport planes to the Southwest Pacific. A
jungle-trained combat team, moreover, had been sent to that area. An
engineer amphibian brigade had been organized for shipment to
Australia along
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with a unit to assemble and repair landing craft. Such steps were in
line with the relaxation of War Department restrictions on Pacific
deployment following the combined agreement on TORCH. In addition, the
JCS had approved, at the end of November 1942, the diversion of the 25th
Division tentatively scheduled for Australia--to the South Pacific, on
the condition that the 1st Marine Division would be released to General
MacArthur.23 Contingents of the Marine unit began to arrive in the
Southwest
Pacific in December, the vanguard of a first-class division experienced
in landing operations.24
Limited Operations in the Aleutians
During October and November 1942 the threat of further Japanese
penetration in the Aleutian area remained of secondary importance so far
as the Army planners were concerned. Since all available means were
being used to bolster the precarious Allied position in the South and
Southwest Pacific and to execute TORCH, American strength could not be
spared for immediate operations in the Aleutians. For that reason, the
War Department had repeatedly refused to approve urgent recommendations
from General DeWitt of the Western Defense Command that he be allowed
to assemble forces to eject the Japanese from the Aleutian.
In the closing weeks of 1942 the Washington staffs reconsidered the
question of operations in the Aleutians. Late in November reports had
come in that the Japanese had landed a reconnaissance party on
Amchitka, an island just to the cast of Kiska. Admiral Nimitz at once
recommended to Admiral King that Amchitka be occupied as soon as
possible by an Army garrison. He pointed to the possibility that the
Japanese
might construct an airfield there-they had been unable to complete one
on either Kiska or Attu.25
In mid-December 1942 General Marshall and Admiral King reached an
agreement on a joint directive to Admiral Nimitz and General DeWitt
for the preparation of plans to occupy both Amchitka and Kiska. Amchitka
was to be occupied as soon as possible and an amphibious force was to
be trained for the Kiska operation. But Marshall thought that for
tactical and logistical reasons the operation should not be undertaken
in the war future, and at his request no target date was set.26
The War Department remained reluctant to commit additional forces to
Alaska until final agreement on the dates of the offensive operations
was reached. The
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Chief of Staff expressed dismay that so mane troops were being
committed to Alaska for an essentially defensive role:
The present strength in Alaska I am informed is about 85.000 men and approved commitments will raise this figure to over 98,000.
Considering the desperate fighting in which we are involved in tile Solomons.
New Guinea and Tunisia, and Stilwell's predicament in Burma, we cannot
afford this continual increase in Alaska.27
On 20 December the War Department specifically told DeWitt that the
forces for the occupation of Amchitka would have to be taken from those
currently available to him.28
While detailed operational plans for the Amchitka and Kiska
operations were being prepared in the theater, the War Department
strategic planners, in anticipation of the Casablanca discussions, drew
tip an outline plan for the occupation of Kiska.29 On the assumption
that the impending landings on Amchitka would be successful, the
proposed target date. for the undertaking against Kiska was set for
early May 1943. Based oil the estimates submitted by General Dewitt, a
total ground force-assault and reserve-of approximately 25,000 would be
required, including one infantry division, one infantry regiment, and
sundry other ground units trained in landing operations.
The purposes of the projected operation were to reduce the threat of
further Japanese aggression in the Aleutians and Alaska, remove a Japanese
observation post in the North Pacific, and deny the use of Kiska Harbor
to the Japanese.30 The planners were not at all sure that it would
be worth the expense in American lives, shipping, and equipment to
remove a position that was then costly to the Japanese because of
American air attacks. Even after tile Japanese were driven from Kiska,
furthermore, they would still have a listening post in the Aleutian
area on Attu, and to remove this Would take a further investment of
American forces and resources. The operation would not, the planner,
maintained, result in the reduction of the American air and ground
garrisons in Alaska. Oil the contrary, it would increase the Alaskan
garrison
by the number of forces required to occupy Kiska. Though acknowledging
the advantages of removing the Japanese threat in the northern Pacific,
the Army planners were still ware of the further scattering of American
strength.
At the same time that the planners were engaged in exploring the
problem of ejecting the Japanese from tile Aleutians, they were also
considering the possibilities of using the northern route of approach to
Japan.31 In September 1942 Admiral King had called for the study of
ways and means of supporting Soviet troops in the Far East and of
using Soviet bases to strike at Japan itself should war break out
between Japan and the USSR.32 A special subcom-
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mittee of the JPS reported at the end of November 1942, listing what
would have to be done to prepare against this contingency. This
included recapturing the western Aleutians-to ensure the safety of the
lines of communication-and obtaining Soviet co-operation in plans and
preparations for a campaign against Japan via the northern route.33 On
5 January 1943 the JCS approved these recommendations, with slight
modifications, for planning purposes.34
Consideration of the northern route, however, was to be temporarily
abandoned by the Army staff planners following the Soviet Government's
refusal early in January 1943 to allow a survey of facilities in
eastern Siberia.35 The cancellation of the survey project (BAZAAR)
seriously curtailed the planning that could be done for a campaign
against Japan by way of the northern route. But the unopposed landings
by an American task force on Amchitka, begun on 12 January 1943, just
before the opening of the Casablanca Conference, raised the question of
further operations in the Aleutians.36 The Army planners had
to allow for another active front, which was likely. to require a further dispersion of American forces in an indecisive area.
Plans for Burma Operations
The strategic location and manpower of China had continued to figure
throughout 1942 as essential-if somewhat abstract -factors in planning
the war against Japan. Lark Japanese ground forces were still in
China.37 To make more use of bases in China and of the huge reserves
of Chinese manpower would threaten Japanese positions on the Asiatic
mainland and allow air operations both against Japanese coastwise
traffic: and against the Japanese home islands. It might well force the
Japanese to divert strength from other areas, specifically from the
South and Southwest Pacific. To realize these possibilities, China's
troops would have to be armed and its bases equipped with supplies from
the United States and Great Britain on a much greater scale than in
1942, when only a trickle of supplies had reached China, carried by a
few transport planes from India over the Hump.
Throughout 1942 Allied leaders and strategists remained in general
agreement that they must keep China in the war, and appeared to agree
that the best way to do it wits to reopen land communications through
Burma. In the words of the. JCS, the course of action in the Far Fast in
1943 should be:
Conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the
supply route; to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying
her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available
to us, bases
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essential for eventual offensive operations against Japan
proper.38
Various proposals and plans--American. British, and Chinese--for an
offensive in Burma had been tinder consideration in Washington since the
summer of 1942.39 It had soon become apparent to the combined
planners that, for lack of necessary means, a major land offensive to
retake all of Burma could not be launched before late 1943, if then.40
The combined chiefs directed, in early November 1942, that planning
for this offensive continue. At the same time they decided to explore
the possibilities of a limited operation earlier in 1943.41 By early
December 1942 General Marshall had ready for the JCS the War Department's
proposal for a limited offensive operation to be launched by the
Generalissimo
and General Stilwell in March 1943.42 It was to follow a British
operation to seize Akyab, which was already under way, and a British thrust
toward the Chin win River that was to begin in February 1943. The War
Department proposed that a limited spring offensive, to be launched by
forces converging from India and China, be aimed at opening a land
supply route into China connecting Ledo with Myitkyina and Bhamo thence
to Wanting on the Burma Road. General Marshall stated to the JCS that he
considered the proposed Burma operation to be of the "utmost
importance." To reopen a land route from Burma to Supply the
interior of China would make possible the use of greater American air
power in China, since the required base facilities could be supplied
overland rather than by air. There was even a good possibility, in
Marshall's opinion, of using bases in China to carry out the
long-cherished project of bombing Japan proper. The bombing of Japan
would influence opinion in India and China and among the Soviet forces
on the -Siberian front and would "seriously complicate" the
Japanese position in the South and Southwest Pacific.
A condition of that operation, as 'Marshall went on to point out,
was that Tunisia and Tripoli were in Allied hands, and that no major
land offensive would be undertaken in the African-European theater
before
the summer of 1943. In order to know whether or not operations could be
undertaken against Burma in 1943, it would be necessary to know
whether there would be an operation against Sardinia in the spring of
1943. To meet the shipping requirements of an operation against
Sardinia would immeasurably complicate the preparations for a campaign
in Burma.
General Stilwell was showing progress in reorganizing and training the
Chinese fighting forces. By early December, 32,000 Chi-
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nese troops, armed with American weapons, were being trained in India
at Ramgarh. Chinese forces in Yunnan Province, moreover, were being
reorganized and consolidated b the Generalissimo. But Stilwell still
lacked the necessary road-building machinery and engineers, medical
service, and communication troops. To make tip the deficiencies would
require the shipment from the United States of 63,000 measured cargo
tons and 5,000-6,000 men during January and February 1943. The problem
was to secure the necessary shipping. The JCS agreed, on 8 December, to
direct further study of the logistical and strategic implications, of
the projected operation, and to acquaint the President with the plan.43
Meanwhile, the projected operation against northern Burma for March
1943 was being studied in the theater. The limited offensive, as
conceived in General Marshall's proposal of early December 1942 ( JCS
162) , had the approval of Chiang Kai-shek, at least in principle.44 But
complex and delicate issues in connection with such art undertaking
were being raised in New Delhi and Chungking. One great obstacle in
the « ay of any combined Burma operation was the, problem of command.
Relations among the three nationalities participating were already characterized
by command arrangements as intricate as their military
and political objectives were diverse. , After several conferences
between Stilwell and the Generalissimo and Stilwell and Wavell, the
three of them reached an agreement whereby the Generalissimo would in
person command the Chinese forces from China. The Generalissimo, Wavell,
and Stilwell were apparently in agreement also that the command of all
forces operating from India would be under the British. Stilwell
recommended to Chiang that he accept British Supreme command when the
British and Chinese efforts converged in Burma. But no decision had been
reached on this score by the end of the year.45
The question of mutual support also threatened to affect a spring
operation. In November 1942 Chiang had agreed to a combined operation
for the spring of 1943- -as then proposed by Field :Marshal Wavell
provided
lie was reasonably assured of Allied air superiority and naval control
of the Bay of Bengal. ,On these conditions he promised to have fifteen
divisions ready for the operation by mid-February.46 But it was far
from certain that these conditions Would be fulfilled. In the early
part of December one of the War Department planners went so far as
to declare flatly, "It should be clear enough b now that the
British do not want the Chinese to go into Burma." He went on to
predict:
They Will by one means or another do Everything possible to
block any Chinese forces front operating in Burma. This is, of course, a political matter . . . . In any event, do not expect the
British to allow Chinese operations in Burma, nor themselves to be aggressive
in their el\n operations. if any.47
Events appeared to bear out this prediction. Toward the close of the year the
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Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, Admiral Sir James Somerville,
advised that it would not be practicable, with the naval forces
available, to control the Bay of Bengal. (:hung thereupon complained
to the President that the British were going back on earlier promises to
furnish the necessary naval support in the Bay of Bengal for a Burma
operation.48 At the same time Chiang also told the President that Field
Marshal Wavell had two months earlier promised that the British would
provide seven divisions for the recapture of Burma. More recently,
Chiang declared, the British commander had told Stilwell the British
could use only three divisions for limited operations aimed at taking
Akyab and forming a lisle oil the Chindwin River. It would be
impossible, Chiang informed the President, for the Chinese to
undertake the offensive unless the British carried out their
undertakings.
The British on their part were also stressing the logistical
difficulties in the way of their own advance beyond the Chindwin River
into Burma.49 On the question of naval support, Sir John Dill
explained to the Chief of Staff that the British had no destroyers to
guard their old battleships, which did not dare venture into the Bay of
Bengal unprotected. He saw little possibility of Securing destroyers
in time for all operation at the end of March 1943.50
The inevitable reaction set in at Chungking. Oil 27 December 1942,
Chiang announced to Stilwell that the Chinese would make all
preparations to jump off oil the date set, and then, if the British
Fleet appeared, they would jump off. If not, they would not "move a
finger."51 On 9 January 1943 Chiang cabled to the President
that lie was convinced that the attempt to retake Burma would have to be
a combined overland and seaborne operation. Unless the Allied navies
could prevent enemy reinforcements by sea, or enable a landing force
to attack the Japanese in the rear in south Burma, the enemy would be
in a position to concentrate rapidly against the armies ill the north.
Therefore, he considered that in all advance restricted to north Burma
the Allies would be risking probable defeat. He w as also convinced that
the Allies would have to muster adequate forces oil both the Indian and
the Chinese sides for success in the limited spring operation. In his
opinion, the forces which Field Marshal Wavell currently proposed to use
were too small. He announced to the President that, with no hope of naval
support, it would be better to wait a few months, or even until the fall,
to begin the Burma campaign, but that an all' offensive to China Should,
in the meantime, be undertaken as a preparatory measure. , He repeated
that the Chinese were proceeding with preparations for the Burma offensive
and that they would be ready when their -Allies were ready.52
Just before the Casablanca Conference in accord with Marshall's
desire---the President urged Chiang Kai-shek to delay a final decision
not to take part in the north Burma operation until after the President
had conferred with Churchill.53 The War Department staff, of
course, prepared plans for the Burma campaign to be taken to the
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conference.54
But the development of American military- policy with reference to China
was likely simply to take the form of an extension of the policy of
1942--"keeping China in the war"-- is a policy that presupposed, and had
so far succeeded in eliciting, only very limited collaboration from the
British and the Chinese.55
'Though the British and American planners had been discussing
post-TORCH operations since the launching of the North African
operation, the British and American Chiefs of Staff did not enter into
any general exchange of views on world strategy for 1943 until the last
hurried days of preparation before Casablanca. On 26 December 1942 the
JCS circulated for the consideration of the British Chiefs of Staff a
summary of their views on operations in 1943.56 They pointed out
that the accepted principle of British-American strategy, reduced to its simplest form, read:
To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the
Atlantic Western European theater at the earliest practicable date, and
to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate
forces.
The JCS assured the British that they still regarded this version as
basically- sound, but they prepared it modified version that gave notice
of their intention to match operations in the Mediterranean with
operations against Japan.
Conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western European Theater
directly against Germany. employing the maximum forces consistent with
maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other theaters. Continue
offensive and defensive operations in the Pacific and in Burma to break the-
Japanese hold on positions which threaten the security of our communications and positions. Maintain the strategic
defensive in other theaters.
The JCS recommended, it will be noticed, that the principal
offensive effort of the United Nations in 1943 be made "directly
against Germany" in Western Europe, rather than against satellite
states. They did not even mention the possibility of post TORCH seaborne offensives in the
,Mediterranean. They argued for an
integrated air offensive from the United Kingdom, from North Africa,
and, as far as practicable, from the Middle East, and the build-up as
rapidly as possible of adequate balanced forces in the United Kingdom in
preparation for a land offensive against Germany in 1943. After the
expulsion of enemy forces from North Africa, they looked to
consolidating the North African position, safeguarding the Allied lines
of communication, and preparing for intensive air operations against
Italy. Furthermore, the
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JCS recommended the eventual transfer of excess forces from North
Africa to the United Kingdom in anticipation of the invasion of
Western Europe in 1943. They proposed that Turkey should be maintained
in a state of benevolent neutrality until such time as help, in the form
of supplies and minimum specialized forces, would insure the security of
Turkish territory and make it available for Allied use.
Turning to the Pacific, the JCS recommended offensive and defensive
operations to secure Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and the
lines of communication thereto, and to keep the initiative in the
"Solomon --Bismarck ---East New Guinea Area." As for the Far
East, the JCS urged offensive operations in Burma, with the immediate
aim of reopening the supply routes to China.
The British Chiefs of Staff replied on 2 January 1943 that on most
issues they were in agreement with their American colleagues57 The
British Chiefs stated that the main point of difference was that
We advocate a policy of following up TORCH vigorously accompanied by as large a
"BOLERO" build-up as possible, while the U. S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting their main effort
into "Roundup," while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean other than in the
air.
The British Chiefs proposed the exploitation of TORCH in order to
knock Italy out of the war, bring Turkey into the war, and give the
enemy no time for recovery. The exploitation of TORCH during the
spring of the year would, in the British view, offer a good chance of
eliminating Italy by the combination of an air offensive on the largest scale
and amphibious assaults (as against Sardinia, Sicily, and finally
the mainland of Italy) . Along with the American Chiefs of Staff, they
urged the increased bombing of Germany. They also proposed the
(lathering of forces in the British Isles-but only to the extent that
the other operations proposed by them would permit. The British
estimated that about twenty-odd British-American divisions would be
ready to re-enter the Continent in August or September 1943, if
conditions at that time appeared favorable for success. In their
opinion, this course of action would give greater relief to the USSR
than would concentration on BOLERO at the expense of all other
operations; nor would it render improbable the main Burma operation
(ANAKIM) in the winter of 1943-44.
The British Chiefs contended that the strongest force that could be
assembled by August 1943 for an attack upon northern France would be at
most thirteen British and twelve American divisions. Of these divisions,
six (four British and two American) would be the most that could be
organized as assault forces with the shipping and landing craft that
could be made available. The gathering of these forces, the British
Chiefs argued, would result in curtailment of activities in other
theaters; lead to only a slight increase in the scale of bomber
offensive
against Germany and Italy; and mean the abandonment of operations
against Sardinia and Sicily and of any amphibious operations in the
eastern Mediterranean. ANAKIM, moreover, could not be undertaken in
1943 because all available landing craft would be wanted in the United
Kingdom. Even if this cross-Channel operation were undertaken, an
expedition on an adequate scale to overcome strong German resistance
could not be staged. A force of
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twenty-five divisions would be only slightly over one half the force
originally planned for Roundup; for seven months, while the. force was
being built up, the USSR would be getting no relief and the Germans
would have time to recuperate.
The British Chiefs therefore recommended "limited offensive
operations in the Pacific on a scale sufficient only to contain the bulk
of Japanese forces in that area."58 They also proposed that
operations to reopen the Burma Road be undertaken as soon as resources
permitted. The British estimated that the Japanese were engaged almost
to the limit of their resources and that their capabilities would not
increase so long as "communications with Germany are kept
severed.
The unsatisfactory exchange between the American and British Chiefs
before Casablanca was accompanied by the failure of the planning
subcommittee of the CCS to agree on a course of action subsequent to
TORCH. The planners reported that they were helpless because of the lack
of agreement on higher levels as to over-all strategy and even as to
the general area for subsequent offensive action.59
In the remaining week before the departure of the American
delegation for Casablanca, the JCS had their planners review the
American and British proposals. General Marshall was particularly
concerned
over the difference in British and American estimate of the cost of post TORCH Mediterranean operations. He pointed out to the American
military chiefs that the British were evidently "adamant in relation to
establishing a front in France." On the other hand, he was
"adamant against operations which would result in unwarranted loss
of shipping." Admiral King was especially anxious to counteract
what he believed to be the British underestimation of Japanese
capabilities. In his opinion, unless constant pressure were maintained
to prevent Japanese consolidation of their conquests, the Allied cause
would be jeopardized. He went so far as to suggest the desirability of
the Allies' deciding on a percentage basis what part of the over-all
effort should henceforth be directed against Japan. General Marshall questioned the feasibility of this approach.60 On the basis of
detailed findings of the joint planning committees, the joint Chiefs
were prepared to reargue, at the conference, the case for immediate
concentration of forces in the British Isles.61
The choice for 1943 appeared to be either to continue operations in
the Mediterranean and in the Pacific on a large scale, while sending to
the United Kingdom whatever U.S. forces could be spared from these
operations, or to open no new land campaigns in the Mediterranean or
the Pacific so as to accumulate forces for an invasion
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of the Continent and a campaign in Burma. There was every reason to
expect the President and the Prime Minister to choose the first
course, although General Marshall would do his best to dissuade them.
Staff Planning and the President's Position
General Marshall's intention to do just that became very evident in
the discussion of the JCS with the President at the White House oil 7
January 1943-the only such meeting held in direct preparation for the
forthcoming conference.62 At this meeting the President inquired of the JCS whether all were in agreement that the American delegation should
meet the British "united in advocating a cross-Channel
operation." General Marshall told the President that there was a
difference of opinion, particularly among the planners, although the
American Chiefs themselves regarded a cross-Channel operation more
favorably than an operation in the Mediterranean. For Marshall the issue
was "purely one of logistics." Though he was willing to take
some "tactical" risks, "logistical hazards" were
unacceptable. In accord with the reasoning of his staff, he went on to
say that Sicily was probably a more desirable objective than
Sardinia----apparently preferred by the British-but that any operation
in the Mediterranean would, of course, reduce the strength and resources
that could be sent to the United Kingdom.
Marshall warned above all against the loss of tonnage from operations
in the Mediterranean. He personally favored a cross-Channel operation against the Brest peninsula sometime after July
1943. The losses in that operation would be in troops. The current
shipping situation was so critical that "to state it cruelly, we
could replace troops whereas a heavy loss in shipping, which would
result from the Brimstone [Sardinia] Operation, might completely
destroy
any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the
near future."
Marshall concluded that in view of current differences in American
and British military opinion oil the critical issue of cross-Channel
versus Mediterranean operations, "the question had resolved
itself into one thing or the other with no alternative in sight."
The President, seeking to postpone a final decision, renewed the
request he had made in early December 1942 that the JCS consider the
possibility of an intermediate, compromise position. He suggested
the possibility of gathering American forces in England and making plans
for operations in northwestern Europe as well as in the Mediterranean,
leaving the actual decision in abeyance for a month or two. The decision
would then be made on the basis of the existing situation.
In spite of the President's warning that "at the conference the
British will have a plan and stick to it," the JCS and the
President
reached no understanding about what they would say to the British oil
the great issue of European strategy. The President left the JCS free to
state their own views at the forthcoming conference. He did not commit
himself specifically- to those views. Left undefined was the American
position oil the relations of any new action in the Mediterranean to a
cross-Channel offensive and air operations in Europe, and to operations
in the Pacific and Far East. Oil the significant question, then under
con-
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sideration in Washington, how much more lend-lease aid to promise the
USSR, the President left the JCS uncertain how far he was willing to go.
He did not define his views on the conflict--which had long troubled
Generals Marshall and Arnold and their staffs-- between increased air
aid to the USSR and American air training programs and plans and
operations. He simply proposed not to answer Soviet requests for more
aircraft and to send General :Marshall to discuss the matter with Stalin
after the Casablanca Conference.
The most striking illustration of the want of understanding between the White House
and the military staffs was the President's announcement, military the 7 January
meeting, of his intention to support the ,"unconditional surrender" concept as the basic Allied
aim in the war.63 The President simply told the JCS that
he would talk to the Prime Minister about assuring Stalin that the
United States and Great Britain would continue on until they reached Berlin and
that their only terms would be "unconditional surrender." No study of the
meaning of this formula for the conduct of the war was made at the time by the Army
staff, or by the joint staff, either before or after the President's announcement.
Without having made even a real effort to reach agreement on the
problems of the coming year, the President and a small military staff
delegation departed, a few days later, for Casablanca.
The Casablanca Conference
On 14 January 1943 the President and the Prime Minister met, in
company with their leading political and military advisers, at
Casablanca. They spent ten days reviewing the questions at issue in
global strategy and considering the next move after TORCH. There were
practical reasons for the choice of Casablanca as a meeting place. Any
plans for subsequent action were directly related to the course of the
North African campaign, and it was desirable to canvass the
possibilities with the commanders on the spot. The hopes for a quick
termination of that campaign had been dis. appointed, and uncertainty
when it would end complicated and unsettled all British American planning for the future.
AS the exchange of opinion before the Casablanca Conference indicated,
General Marshall had felt neither obliged nor encouraged to try at
once to unite the American representatives, from the President down,
on a revised version of the plan to concentrate forces in the British
Isles. At the conference General Marshall fought a strong rear guard
action in defense of the plan. This was a logical course for him to
follow, since his own planning staff had at first taken the TORCH
decision so ill and had afterwards been so engrossed in carrying it out
that they had had only a few weeks in which to face the situation it had
created. This course also served notice on all that concentrating for a
major cross-Channel operation was still a cardinal objective in American
strategic planning.
The British brought to the conference a very complete staff and fully
prepared plans and positions-in striking contrast to the small American
staff and incomplete Amer-
[380]
MAJ. GEN. T. T. HANDY, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, and other planners of the division. Sealed left to
right: Col. C.
A. Russell, Col. J. E. Upston, Brig. Gen. P. H. Tansey, General Handy,
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Col. 1;. R. Partridge, and Col. R. F..
Starr; standing left to right: Col. R. C. Lindsay, Col. V. H. Connor,
Col. F. L. Fair, Col. J. C. Blizzard, Jr., Col. C. W. Stewart, Jr.,
Col. b1'. 1.. Ritchie, Lt. Col. E. B. Gallant, Col. D. 1'. Johnson, Col.
H. 1. Hodes, Col. 7'. S. Timberman, Col. L. Mathewson, Col. G. Ordway,
Jr., Col. C. K. Gailey, Jr., Col. C. D. Silverthorne, Col. W. C.
Sweeney, Jr., Col. .T North, and Col. R. T. Maddocks.
ican preparations. It appeared at the time to the American staff that
the British thoroughness had a decisive influence at the conference.64 In
any event, General Marshall succeeded in making no real change in the
direction Allied strategy had taken in the second half of 1942. The
Casablanca Conference merely recognized that the Initiative would be
maintained by the Allies both in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean,
and defined short-range objectives in those areas in terms of operations
in the South and Southwest Pacific and against Sicily. No real long-range
plans for .the defeat of the Axis powers emerged from the conference.
The questions of Asiatic and cross-Channel operations were simply left
open for future negotiation and decision. Agreement on a
round-the-clock bomber offensive from the United Kingdom was reached,
but it was not tied precisely to Mediterranean or cross-Channel
operations. Nor were the relationships among these operations and
Pacific-Asiatic undertakings clearly defined. There were significant
portents
in the American staff's stress on enlarg-
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ing the scope of operations against Japan and in the President's
announcement of the unconditional surrender concept. But the important
thing for the immediate future was that the advances already begun in
the Mediterranean and in the Pacific would be carried on in the two
areas in which U. S. deployment had been especially heavy in 1942.65
The indecisiveness of the Casablanca Conference on basic strategic
issues-which appeared to the American staff to be a victory for the
British Chiefs-brought home to the Army strategic planners the need to
adjust themselves to a new phase of coalition warfare. The effect of
General Marshall's rear guard action at the conference was to give
them the time they badly needed to regroup for a
"counteroffensive" in their dealings with the British in 1943.
The problem of limiting operations in "subsidiary" theaters,
which the War Department planners had tried-and failed-to solve in
simple terms, had become so complex that the Army planners had not only
to start all over again but also to work much more patiently and
thoroughly--and as a result more slowly--than they had in early 1942.
The boldness and simplicity of the studies that General Eisenhower had submitted, the sense of conviction and
urgency that had appeared in the oral and written presentations of the
War Department case-by Stimson and Robert A. Lovett, Marshall, Arnold,
and Wedemeyer -had had their effect, though not the effect intended. But
their arguments were most evidently not strong enough in themselves to
overcome the gravitational pull on the President of the diverse claims
urged by the British Prime Minister, Admiral King, and General
MacArthur. What was needed was a far more elaborate and extensive
analysis of the "American position" than could be developed
in the minds of a few War Department officials who had strong
preconceptions and enormous operating responsibilities. To this task
of analysis, similar to that that the British staff had long since
made for the "British position," the American planners would
have to address themselves.
The strategic planners had to face up to the problems of preparing for
maximum offensive effort in the global conflict. The effect of the
Casablanca Conference was to drive home to the Army planners what had
already begun to be apparent to them in the closing weeks of 1942: The
new stage of the coalition war demanded new planning processes,
techniques, quantitative calculations, and ideas. On the basis of the
bare beginnings made in these directions in late 1942, the Army
strategic planners would have to start anew in 1943 to plan for
victory.66
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Endnotes
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