1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Rear Adm. Katsuhei Nakamura, Imperial Japanese Navy. Duty assignments of this officer were as follows: Chief Secretary, Navy Ministry, 5 Nov 40-24 Feb 43; Commander, H. M. S. Myoko, 2 Mar-10 Dec 43; Naval Attache, Japanese Embassy at Nanking, and concurrently Vice-Chief of Staff, China Area Fleet, 4 Jan-23 Jul 44; Directer, General Affairs Bureau, Navy Aeronautical Department, 7 Aug 44-5 Sep 45. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.
3 This was one of the most controversial passages in the Rescript. As originally drafted for Cabinet approval, it read: "Despite the gallant fighting of the Officers and Men of Our Army and Navy .... the war situation worsens from day to day, and the general world situation also is not to Japan's advantage." During the Cabinet discussion of the text on the afternoon of 14 August, War Minister Anami objected to this wording as carrying too strong an implication of the total defeat of the Japanese armed forces. A compromise was finally reached whereby the italicized passage was amended to read, "the war has not necessarily developed in Our favor." Shusenki (Record of the Termination of the War) by Hiroshi (Kainan) Shimomura, Oct 48, p. 161.
4 Owing to poor radio reception, there were some outlying districts in which the Emperor's broadcast was not understood and many thought that they were being urged to fight on. Press publication of the Imperial Rescript, however, promptly corrected this misunderstanding.
7 The ringleaders of the coup d'etat plot were principally subordinate officers of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry but also included two officers of the Army General Staff. On the night of 13 August, five of the conspirators called on General Anami at his official residence and secretly disclosed their plans to him, seeking his approval. (Cf. Chapter XX, p. 669) Anami was non-comittal at this time, but after conferring with General Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff, the following morning, he told the plotters that the coup d'etat must be abandoned in view of Umezu's disapproval. Anami made no move to arrest the ringleaders, among whom was his own brother-in-law, but he ordered Lt. Gen. Sanji Okido, Commanding General, Army Military Police (Kempeitai), and Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori, Commanding General, 1st Imperial Guards Division, to exercise precautionary surveillance over them lest they proceed to act in defiance of his orders. Cooperation of the Guards Division, assigned to protection of the Imperial Palace, was vital to the coup d'etat plan. Lt. Gen. Mori, on 12 August, had already rejected a request by the plotters for his support in executing the plan, but some of his staff officers had been independently won over by the conspirators. (Statements by Col. Saburo Hayashi, Private Secretary to War Minister Anami and Lt. Col. Masahiko Takeshita, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry.)
8 (1) Field Marshal Hata was in Tokyo as the Emperor had summoned a meeting of all the Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals at 1000, 14 August. (2) The joint resolution was originally suggested to them by Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy-Chief of Army General Staff, the main purpose of which was to reaffirm the unwavering loyalty to the Imperial will under these extraordinary circumstances. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy-Chief, Army General Staff.)
9 General Anami declared in his address that the entire Army must act in complete accord with the Imperial decision. "Even if it means sleeping on grass and eating stones," he added, "I ask you all to do your utmost to assure the preservation of the national polity." (Statements by Lt. Gen. Masao Yoshizumi, Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry ; Lt. Col. Shiro Hara, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section ; and Lt. Col. Takeshita, previously cited).
12 According to Lt. Col. Takeshita, brother-in-law of War Minister Anami and a key member of the original coup d'etat plot, the young officers considered it essential from the first that the coup be assured of unified Army support so that it would not become "a mere local attempt" opposed by sections of the Army forces. The approval of the War Minister and Chief of Army General Staff was therefore regarded as "an absolute prerequisite" for execution of the plan. When the Army leaders finally came out for rigid compliance with the Emperor's decision, most of the original plotters decided that no action could be undertaken. (Statement by Lt. Col. Takeshita, previously cited.)
13 Account of the attempted military uprising led by Maj. Hatanaka and Lt. Col. Shiizaki is based on the following sources: (1) Chian Gunchitsu Kankei Hatsu Rat Kan Tsuzuri (File of Incoming and Outgoing Communications on Public Peace and Military Discipline) Military Police Headquarters, Dec 45: a. Report Concerning August 15th Incident and Military Police Measures; b. Eastern District Army Headquarters Report; c. August 15th Incident. (2) Kido Nikki (Kido Diary) Entries for 15 Aug 45. (3) Shusen Hishi (Untold History of the Termination of the War) by Hiroshi (Kainan) Shimomura, May 50, pp. 115-181. (4) Statements by Baron Yoshihiro Tokugawa, Chamberlain, Imperial Household Ministry; Lt. Col. Masao Inaba and Lt. Col. Masataka Ida, both of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry ; Col. Hiroshi Fuwa, Staff Officer (Operations) and Maj. Kiyoshi Tsukamoto, Adjutant, both of Eastern District Army Command; Col. Hayashi and Lt. Col. Takeshita, previously cited.
14 The false order was issued as Kin (Guards Division Operations Order No. A-584, 0200 15 Aug 45. File of Incoming and Outgoing Communications on Public Peace and Military Discipline, op. cit. Eastern District Army Headquarters Report.
15 The Area Army was apprised of the false division order by the commander of the 7th Guards Infantry Regiment, Col. Minami. Because of the dubious nature of the order, Col. Minami personally went to General Tanaka's headquarters to report the matter. This report was made shortly after the Area Army learned from Col. Mizutani and Lt. Col. Ida of the, assassination of the Guards Division commander. Ibid.
16 "Great wrongs" in one of the suicide messages of War Minister Anami is interpreted as the repeated crimes committed by the Army particularly since the Manchurian incident of 1931. (Statement by Col. Hayashi, pre viously cited.)
17 Lt. Col. Ida, in view of the fact that he did not participate in the insurrection after the initial stage and tried to persuade Hatanaka, Shiizaki and the others to abandon the attempt, was let off by a military court with light punishment. Maj. Ishihara, Guards Division staff officer, also was exonerated in view of his change of heart. On 19 August, however, he was shot and killed in Ueno Park, Tokyo, while assisting in efforts to pacify a band of recalcitrant anti-surrender troops from the Army Air Signal Training Division at Mito. These troops, carrying arms and led by several officers, travelled to Tokyo by train on 17 August and encamped in the Ueno Art Museum. Prompt security measures by Twelfth Area Army headquarters and the Imperial Guards Division prevented any serious outbreak of disorder and the troops returned to Mito on 20 August. The officers involved committed suicide. File of Incoming and Outgoing Communications on Public Peace and Military Discipline, op. cit. August 15th Incident; and Activities in Tokyo of Officers and Troops of the Mito Army Air Signal Division.
18 Other acts of violence, entirely unrelated to the Hatanaka-Shiizaki plot but motivated by anti-surrender sentiment, were committed during the night of 14-15 August by a small group of soldiers and civilians from the Yokohama area, led by Capt. Takeo Sasaki. Driving to Tokyo in motor trucks in the early hours of the morning, this band fired machine-guns into and then set fire to, both the official and private residences of Premier Suzuki and the private residence of the President of the Privy Council, Baron Hiranuma. Capt. Sasaki and his followers were rounded up by military police and returned to their units for disciplinary measures on 16 August. File of Incoming and Outgoing Communications on Public Peace and Military Discipline, op. cit. August 15th Incident.
19 General Shizuichi Tanaka, Commanding General, Eastern District Army and Twelfth Area Army, committed suicide on 24 August. On 11 September, ex-Premier General Hideki Tojo unsuccessfully attempted to kill himself when American Military Police went to his home to place him under arrest. Field Marshal Sugiyama, First General Army Commander, killed himself the following day. Other general and flag officers who committed suicide later included General Shigeru Honjo, General Teiichi Yoshimoto, Lt. Gen. Kumaichi Teramoto, Lt. Gen. Yoshio Shinozuka, and Vice Adm. Matsuo Morizumi. In addition to the suicides of military officers, there were a few instances of mass suicides by members of nationalistic and patriotic societies in the later part of August. (1) Untold History of the Termination of the War, op. cit., pp. ,80, 224, and 248. (2) Foreign Office Memorandum No. 1734 (LCR), 24 Aug 50, and No. 1711 (LCR), 21 Aug 50.
26 The full Cabinet list was as follows: Premier and War Minister, Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni; Navy, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai; Foreign Affairs, Mamoru Shigemitsu; Home Affairs, Iwao Yamazaki; Finance, Juichi Tsushima; Justice, Chuso Iwata; Welfare, concurrently Education, Kenzo Matsumura; Agriculture and Commerce, Kotaro Sengoku; War Provisions, Chikuhei Nakajima; Transportation, Naoto Kohiyama; Ministers without Portfolio, Prince Ayamaro Konoye and Taketora Ogata. A few changes were made in the original Cabinet prior to the formal signing of the surrender on 2 September, General Sadamu Shimomura becoming War Minister, Tamon Maeda Education Minister, and Binshiro Obata Minister without Portfolio.
30 (1) Daikairei Dai Shijuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 48) 16 Aug 45. (2) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakuhachijuni-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1382) 16 Aug 45.
32 Imperial General Headquarters Communique, 22 and 23 Aug 45. Yomiuri-Hochi Newspaper, Tokyo, op. cit., 23 and 24 Aug 45. (2) Radios exchanged between SCAP and Imperial General Headquarters. File on Soviet Entry into War, op. cit. Part I, Docs. No. 38, 39 and 62 ; Part II, Doc. No. 26.
34 (1) Daikairei Dai Gojushi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 54) 22 Aug 45. (2) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakuhachyuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1388) 22 Aug 45.
36 Imperial General Headquarters received no reports confirming the cessation of hostilities by units in the Philippines until early in October. Dates given for the other areas are based on special reports prepared by the First Demobilization Bureau, 1 Dec 47 and Second Demobilization Bureau, 24 Nov 47.
37 (1) File on Soviet Entry into War, op. cit. Part I, Docs. No. 42, 52 and 53. (2) Full composition of the delegation was as follows: Chief delegate, Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe; Army representatives, Maj. Gen. Masakazu Amano, Col. Arata Yamamoto, Lt. Col. Masao Matsuda, Lt. Col. Kiyoshi Minami, Lt. Col. Mamoru Takakura, Lts. Sadao Otake and Harumi Takeuchi; Navy representatives, Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama, Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Capt. Hidemi Yoshida, Comdr. Yoshimori Terai, Mr. Shuichi Mizota and Mr. Kazuma Sugita; Foreign Office, Mr. Katsuo Okazaki and Mr. Morio Yukawa.
40 Those participating in the first conference were: For the Allied Supreme Commander, Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, Maj. Gen, A. J. Chamberlin, Maj. Gen L. G. Whitlock, Brig. Gen. D. R. Hutchinson, and Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman. For the Japanese, Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Maj. Gen. Masakazu Amano, Col. Arata Yamamoto, Lt. Cols. Matsuda, Minami, and Takakura, Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama, Capts. (Navy) Ohmae and Yoshida, and Comdr. Terai. Manira Haken Teikoku Daihyo no Kaigungawa Shuseki Zuiin Nimmu Hokokusho (Duty Report of the Senior Naval Member, Manila Delegation) Aug 45.
46 The Japanese delegation was unanimously impressed by the firm but fair attitude of the American staff officers with whom they dealt. Lt. Gen. Kawabe later stated that "the Americans listened carefully to what we had to say, expressed sympathy, and studied our suggestions with a cooperative attitude." Mr. Katsuo Okazaki, Foreign Office member of the delegation, similarly remarked that the American attitude "was stern, but they were not arrogant nor did they mock the vanquished." (Statements by Mr. Katsuo Okazaki, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Lt. Gen. Kawabe, previously cited.)
47 The second plane, carrying the remaining members of the surrender mission, left Ie-Shima at 0830 on 21 August after undergoing repairs. It arrived safely at Kisarazu in the afternoon of the same day.
49 The "area of initial evacuation" had been specifically defined by General MacArthur's headquarters in the documents handed to the Japanese surrender mission at Manila. These documents also defined a larger "Tokyo Bay area" inclusive of the "area of initial evacuation." (Plate No. 171) Certain requirements, such as the disarming of all coastal batteries, anti-aircraft guns and artillery, applied to the whole "Tokyo Bay area."
52 (1) Dairikushi Dai Nisengohyakushijuku-go naishi Dai Nisengohyakugojuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directives Nos. 2549-2551) 21-22 Aug 45. (2) Daikaishi Dai Gohyakusanjusan-go naishi Dai Gohyakusanjuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directives Nos. 533-538) 22-24 Aug 45.
60 Shusenzen no Sakusen Gaikyo narabini Teisen (Outline of Operations Prior to Termination of the War and Activities Connected with the Cessation of Hostilities) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Feb 49, p. 16.
65 Special Report, Military Intelligence Section, GHQ SCAP, Final Progress of Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Dec 46. pp. 12 and 79. (Report based principally on figures provided by the 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus).
67 As an example of the latitude given to local commanders, an Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section directive issued 19 August stated that when necessary to facilitate smooth procedure, agreements may be entered into with the senior local commander of the Allied forces. "It further gave permission" to take expedient measures in accordance with the actual situation." Daikaishi Dai Gohyakusanjuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 531) 9 Aug 45.
69 (1) Daikaishi Dai Gohyakusanju-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 530) 9 Aug 45. (1) Similar directive was issued by the Army Section. Dairikushi Dai Nisengohyakushijuku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2549) 21 Aug 45.
70 (1) Daikaishi Dai Gohyakushiju-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 540) 26 Aug 45. (2) Dairikushi Dai Nisengohyakugojuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2558) 2 7 Aug 45 (3) Dairikushi Dat Nisengohyakugojuku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2559) 31 Aug 45.
72 Secretariat Personnel Confidential Radio No. 210,110, Navy Ministry, 21 Aug 45. File of Incoming and Outgoing Communications on Public Peace and Military Discipline, op. cit. Navy Gazette No. 5176, 6 Sep 45.
74 Demobilization of Army and Navy personnel in the homeland was completed by the end of November 1945. At this time the War and Navy Ministries were dissolved, being replaced respectively, by the 1st and 2d Demobilization Ministries which continued to handle the demobilization of personnel repatriated from overseas. The ministries later became bureaus under the Welfare Ministry.
75 (1) SCAP Directive to Imperial General Headquarters, 1 Sep 45. File on Soviet Entry into War, op. cit. Part III, Doc No. 79. (2) It was initially estimated, in view of the almost complete destruction of Japanese shipping, that more than four years would be required to complete the repatriation program. Progress was more rapid than expected, however, due to the loan of over 200 ships-104 Liberty ships and 104 LST's-by SCAP for repatriation purposes between February 946 and February 9 47.
76 General Shimomura had been relieved on 23 August of command of the North China Area Army in order to assume the portfolio of War Minister in the Higashikuni Cabinet. Until Shimomura's appointment, Prince Higashi kuni had filled the post of War Minister concurrently with the premiership.
80 The headquarters of both the United States Eighth Army and the Far Eastern Air Force were set up in the New Grand Hotel near the Yokohama Customs House. Rear Adm. J. J. Ballentine acted as the U. S. Fleet liaison officer with SCAP.
81 Yomiuri-Hochi Newspaper, Tokyo, op. cit., 12 Sep 45. Lt. Gen. Eichelberger's order coincided with the "solicitations" which the Japanese mission to Manila left with Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's G-2, at the conclusion of the surrender parleys. (Cf. p. 694).
82 The nine attendants were: Messrs. Katsuo Okazaki, Toshikazu Kase and Saburo Ota, of the Foreign Office; Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Maj. Gen. Yatsuji Nagai, and Col. Ichiji Sugita, of the Army; Rear Adms. Sadatoshi Tomioka and Ichiro Yokoyama, and Capt. Katsuo Shiba of the Navy.
84 The nine powers whose representatives signed the instrument of surrender were the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, Commonwealth of Australia, Dominion of Canada, Provisional Government of the French Republic, Kingdom of Netherlands and the Dominion of New Zealand. Ibid.
85 A specially prepared copy of this Rescript, signed by the Emperor and countersigned by Premier Prince Higashikuni and all other Cabinet Ministers, was handed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by the Japanese delegate aboard the Missouri prior to their signing of the surrender instrument. Ibid, Doc. No. 91.
87 (1) Kyu Nihongun Kofuku no Nichiji Basho (Time and Place of Formal Surrender of Japanese Armed Forces) 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, 24 Dec 48. (2) After the surrender of arms in all areas had been completed, the Imperial General Headquarters was first abolished on 13 September, and the Army and Navy General Staffs were dissolved on 15 October 1945.
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