1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Lt. Col. Iwaichi Fujiwara, Imperial Japanese Army. For duty assignments of this officer cf. n. 1, Chapter XVIII. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.
2 Minor urban areas fire-bombed during this period were Amagasaki, Fukuoka, Hamamatsu, Moji, Nobeoka, Okayama, Omuta, Sasebo, Shizuoka, Toyohashi, Tsu, and Yokkaichi. Typical of the destruction was the city of Hamamatsu, one of the largest producers of airplane propellers in Japan and an important railhead on the main Honshu network. This city was 72% burned out. Okayama, an important producer of plastics, explosives, and metals, was 62% destroyed. The incendiary raids on the major urban areas, which had begun with the great Tokyo raid of 9 March, ended in June. The total gross percentage for each city was computed by the author on the basis of the total number of buildings destroyed. Due to the extensive decentralization of Japanese industry, the gross damage percentage furnish a fairly accurate index of the total physical damage to industrial floorage. Tokei Chosa Hokoku (Statistics and Analysis Reports Japanese Research Group, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ FEC, 30 Nov 50, Report No.5: Extent of Air Raid Casualties and Property Damage on Small and Medium Cities during the War.
3 In addition to the urban area raids, B-29 formations conducted precision attacks on a variety of industrial targets using heavy loads of high explosives. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 6: Bombing of Japanese Homeland by Allied Aircraft, May-Jul 45.
4 American carrier planes flew 1645 sorties against Japan during May, but did not show up at all in June, giving the Japanese a short respite from at least one type of attack. Ibid.
5 (1) Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 7: Extent of Air Raids and Property Damage and Casualties on Principal Cities during the War. (2) "Shimonoseki Strait was closed from March 1945 up to the end of the war. During each month, approximately 15 days represented complete closure due to the necessity for sweeping operations. In spite of the supposedly safe periods, the danger to navigation was still existent. . ." U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogation of Japanese Officials, 1946, Vol. I, p. 19. (Interrogation of Capt. Kyuzo Tamura, Mine Division, Naval Technical Department, Navy Ministry. (3) "Beginning with the mine blockade.. .of Shimonoseki Strait on 27 March 1945, all important ports and navigation routes as far north as Funakawa, Akita Prefecture, and Rashin, Korea, were subjected to repeated aerial mining. . .we were forced to abandon the use of ...the Inland Sea first and later the major ports on the Japan Sea. The most effective and disastrous blockades were those of Shimonoseki Strait, Osaka-Kcbe, Hakata, Maizuru, Fushiki, Nanao, and Niigata. . ." Statement by Capt. Atsushi Oi, Staff Officer (Operations), General Escort Command.
6 Typical of the damage suffered in the hardest hit of the smaller urban areas was Hamamatsu where 2,447 were killed, 1,702 wounded, 31,108 buildings destroyed or damaged, and 129,895 persons, or about 8o% of the population rendered homeless. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report Nos. 6, 7.
7 Evacuation of the other large urban complexes was as follows: Nagoya, about 740,000 (55%), Osaka-Kobe, 2,250,000 (60%). In each case, a small percentage were evacuated as part of the program of industrial dispersal, and, in some cases, a few of the displaced persons commuted back to their jobs. For the most part, however, the figures represent a total, permanent loss to the labor force of the city in question. Statistic and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 8: Population, Death by Air Raids and Number of People Evacuated during the War (Eight main Japanese Cities).
8 (1) Gikai Hokokusho (Reports to the Diet: Labor Situation in the Greater East Asia War, Sep 45. (2) On the basis of questionnaires prepared by leading Japanese industrialists, it had been found that the absentee rate had climbed to 49% by the end of the war. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Urban Areas Division, The Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy, Mar 47, Table 21, p. 28.
9 (1) "After the May 23-25 ...raids on Tokyo, civilian defense measures in that city, as well as other parts of Japan, were considered to be a futile effort." U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Interrogations, No. 118, 1945 (Interrogation of Mr. Genki Abe, Minister of Home Affairs.) (2) "The public began to realize that equipment and general preparations for air raids were futile. . ." Ibid., Interrogation No. 132. (Interrogation of Mr. Kingo Machimura, Chief, Police Section, Air Defense General Headquarters.)
10 Cf. Chapter XVIII, pp. 533-4, 553.
11 The production of coal during the period April-June was 10,890,019 metric tons or 71% of the wartime peak achieved during the first quarter of 1944. Of this total, only about 4,900,000 tons were actually moved to key industrial zones. (1) Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 2 : Output of Strategic Materials in the Japanese Homeland. (2) Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi Tsuzuri (Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council) Part I: Report of Lt. Gen. Tsukizo Akinaga, Chief, Cabinet Coordination and Planning Bureau, 6 Jun 45.
12 The importance of the coal shortage and its decisive role in the decline of Japanese industry is attested by leading industrial officials. USSBS, Interrogations, op. cit., Nos. 10, 15, 30 and 218. (Interrogations of Adm. Teijiro Toyoda, Munitions Minister; Mr. Y. Taguchi, Chief Engineer, Coal Section, Fuel Bureau; Mr. Matsuo Araki, Chief Electric Power Bureau; and Mr. T. Numabe, Coal Mining Department, Greater East Asia Ministry.)
13 Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 2. The production of pig iron and ingot steel was peaked in January-March 1943 and that of carbon steel in April-June 1944. Due to raw material shortage, this industry was well off its peak before the first B-29 appeared over the Homeland. USSBS, Interrogations, op. cit., Nos. 281 and 290. (Interrogation of Officials of the Yawata Plant, Japan Iron Works.)
14 Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 2. A similar situation obtained in the case of tin, lead, and zinc. The gross domestic production and imports of ferroalloy ores and concentrates (chromium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, tungsten, titanium, and vanadium) was 176,557 metric tons in the first quarter of 1945 or only about 77% of the average quarterly production in the peak year, 1944. The chief cause of the decline was in shutting off of imports by the blockade. No manganese or titanium was imported after 1943 and the inflow of chromium and vanadium ceased at the end of 1944. The average quarterly production of ferro-alloys dropped in 1945 to 29% of the peak in the second quarter of 1944. The shortage of ferroalloys, copper, and light metals had an exceedingly disruptive effect upon the productivity of many industries, particularly electrical equipment, machine tools, precision instruments, and aircraft. USSBS, Interrogations, op. cit., Nos. 22, 143, 196, 326 and 363. (Interrogations of Mr. D. Yasukawa, President, Electrical Equipment Control Association; Mr. S. Nakajima, President, Japan Wireless Equipment Co.; Mr. S. Fujii, Managing Director, Metals Distribution Control Co.; Mr. Sozo Kano, President, and Officials of the Onoda Cement Co.; and Mr. Masatsune Okamoto, Plant Manager, Osaka Plant, Mitsubishi Copper Refinery.)
15 In the pre-war years, Japanese industry had used about 1,000,000 metric tons of salt per year, while a like amount was used for food. About three-fourths of this was imported. By June 1945, quarterly imports had fallen to 26o,000 tons and domestic production to a mere 70,600 tons or 39% of the wartime peak. (1) Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit., Report of Adm. Teijiro Toyoda, Munitions Minister, 17 Jul 45. (2) U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Over-all Economic Effects Division, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, Dec 46, p. 146.
16 The situation in other critical chemicals was even worse. Naphthalene, acetone, and butanol were producing at about 20% of wartime peak, while sulfuric acid, tetraethyl lead, transparent plastic, methanol, soda ash and oxygen were down to an average of 3790. A special case was alcohol where vigorous production efforts were made to supplement the supply of aviation fuel, resulting in a rise in production of 173% for the period April-June, when compared with the preceding three months. (1) Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit. Report No. 2. (2) USSBS, The Effect of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, op. cit., pp. 156-7, 162-9, 171-2,
17 USSBS, The Effect of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, op. cit, p. 145.
18 Throughout the war, oil had been the most critical basic raw material problem faced by the Armed Forces. As a result of the terrific attrition in tankers caused by enemy submarine operations, imports of oil from the southern area had begun to decline in mid-1943. Ibid., p. 135.
19 (1) Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Reports No. 2; and No. 9: Inventory of Aviation Fuel in the Japanese Homeland after Apr 45. (2) Notes of Maj. Gen. Kikusaburo Okada, Chief, War Plans Section, Economic Mobilization Bureau, War Ministry. (Cf. Chapter IV, n. 4.)
20 (1) "Originally a plane was given a two-hour flight test, but by January 1943, shortage of fuel had reduced this time to one hour. Moreover, if the plane seemed satisfactory after a one-half hour test, it was landed and accepted ...At the end of the war ...types of planes which had been in production for some time were merely flown once or twice around the field. If found satisfactory, they were accepted forthwith." USSBS, Interrogations, op. cit., No. 300. (Interrogation of Maj. Gen. Sadao Yui, Commanding Officer, Kagamigahara Air Depot.) (2) "...shortage of fuel prevented planes from averaging more than two hours flying time a month. It worked out that a plane was only used on an average of once every three weeks. No attempt was made to keep the engines in condition by running them every day or so. . ." USSBS, Interrogations, op. cit., No. 299. (Interrogation of Lt. Comdr. Ono, Staff Officer, 13th Air Flotilla.)
21 Data regarding aviation gasoline, including consumption, production, stockpile, and decisive battle reserve, was obtained from the following source : Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 9.
22 This estimate was predicated upon a further reduction of monthly consumption, an increase in production of gasoline substitutes, and negligible losses due to air raids on stockpiles, the bulk of which by now was dispersed and concealed in underground caves.
23 Statistics and Analysis, Reports, op. cit., Report No. 2.
24 Cf. Chapter XVIII, pp. 549-0.
25 Particularly "soft" items were infantry cannon, mortars, tanks, artillery, and motor transport. The Navy was able to maintain a fairly good rate of production of land combat munitions due, in part, to the abandonment of the production of ship ordnance. Since the production of fighting vessels had been all but given up, the need for ship ordnance was fast disappearing. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No.10: Japanese Ordnance Production Apr Jun 45 and Percentages to Peak Production.
26 During June the first losses incurred by enemy submarine action in the Sea of Japan were confirmed. Twenty-three vessels were sunk or damaged off Hokkaido and northern Honshu while 24 were sunk or damaged by enemy submarines off Korea, western Honshu and in the Korean Strait area. Anticipating the complete severance of supply lines to the continent, Imperial General Headquarters, on 28 June, set-up an emergency operation to run food and war materials through the blockade. This was known as the Nichi-Go Operation. The routes were between ports in Korea and northern and western Honshu. Orders were issued to the Commanders-in-Chief, General Escort Command, Air General Army, and First and Second General Armies to give all possible sea and air protection to the convoys. The operation was to begin immediately. (1) Nihon Kaigun Hensei Suii oyobi Heiryoku Soshitsu Hyo (Table Showing Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forces) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 49, pp. I-62-4. (2) Dairikushi Dai Nisengohyakujugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2515) 28 Jun 45.
27 (1) Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report. No. 1: Gross Tonnage of Japanese Merchant Shipping Losses through Allied Action Dec 41-Aug 45 and Report No. 11: Amount of Cargo Transported by Japanese Ships during the War. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Michinori Ureshino, Staff Officer (Shipping), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
29 Soy beans, largely imported from the Continent, were 31% off the 1941 level as a result of the shipping crisis; meat was 70% off, due to lack of imported forage; fish products, the chief source of animal protein in the Japanese diet, were down a disastrous 78% as a result of lack of boats and fuel and enemy air and naval interdiction of the fishing grounds; vegetables were down 81% due to shortage of manpower and fertilizer, and salt was off 52% as a result of the conversion of domestic table salt to industrial uses. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 12: Japan's Food Supply Situation during the War.
30 The food market was actually in the grip of a ruinous inflation which the Government seemed powerless to control. By the end of June, for example, the black market (i. e. free market) price of rice was 46 times the legal ceiling, of flour 76 times, of potatoes 24 times and of sugar 200 times. However, through the use of home gardens, foraging trips into the countryside, and purchases on the black market, the average daily food consumption was actualy raised to around 1,800 calories.
31 (1) Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit., Part I. (2) Statement by Maj. Tosaku Hirano, Staff Officer (Logistics), Second General Army.
32 Two Army headquarters (Fiftieth and Fifty-fourth) scheduled for activation during the second mobilization were postponed until the third. (Cf. n. 69) Hondo Sakusen Kiroku (Homeland Operations Record) Vol. II: First General Army, 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46. Attached Map.
33 In addition, one Army headquarters (Fifty-eighth) was activated in Korea. (1) Homeland Operations Record, Volume V: Seventeenth Area Army, p. 19. (2) Dairikumei Dat Sennihyakukyujushichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1297) 8 Apr 45.
35 (1) Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku (Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, pp. 348-9. (2) Hengo Butai Gaikenhyo (Unit Organization Tables) Army General Staff. (3) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakujugo, Sensambyakunijuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders No. 1315 and 1328) 21 Apr and 10 May 45. (4) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1297, op. cit.
36 This Army headquarters (Thirty-sixth) had been activated in 1944 as a part of the Sho No. 3 plan. All other Army headquarters in the list were activated during the second mobilization.
37 The 205th Division was assigned directly to the Sixteenth Area Army upon activation. Late in May, however, the Second General Army transferred the division to the Fifty-fifth Army to strengthen the defenses of Shikoku. Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III : Second General Army, p. 20.
38 Concurrently with this redeployment from Manchuria to the Homeland three coastal combat divisions, (111th, 120th, and 121st) were diverted from Manchuria to Korea. Homeland Operations Record, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 20.
39 The transfer of these units from the Continent was very successful. In spite of the shipping shortage and enemy air interdiction of the Japan Sea, it was still possible to operate at night across the Korea Strait. Units transferring from Manchuria were therefore able to arrive in Kyushu and Japan Sea coast of central Honshu with even more supplies and equipment than had been called for in the Ketu-Go plan. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 328-9. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit., Vol. II, Attached Map; Vol. III, Attached Map. (3) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1297, op. cit.
40 Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakujukyu-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1319) 28 Apr 45.
41 (1) Statements by Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy-Chief, Army General Staff, and Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief, Second Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 9-11.
42 The 3d Amphibious Brigade suffered heavy losses while displacing from the Kuriles to Hokkaido en route to Kyushu. Although the remnants immediately took up positions upon arrival in their newly assigned sector, the southeastern tip of Satsuma Peninsula, they were subsequently absorbed by the 125th Independent Mixed Brigade upon activation of the latter in the third mobilization. (Cf. p. 584) (1) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakuniju-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1320) 1 May 45. (2) Rikugun Butai Chosa Hyo (Table of Army Units) War Ministry, 28 Oct 45, Part I, p. 95. (3) Statement by Maj. Yasunobu Haba, Staff Officer (Operations), Sixteenth Area Army. (4) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. IV: Fifth Area Army, pp. 30-1.
43 The Area Army was also charged with preventing the entry of enemy submarines into the Japan Sea. Dai-rikumei Dai Sensambyakunijuroku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1326) 9 May 45.
44 It was the intention of Imperial General Headquarters not to reinforce Fifth Area Army in the event of an enemy landing in the northeastern area. The forces then deployed there would exert the maximum possible delay on the enemy. (Statement by Lt. Col. Shiro Hara, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)
45 Imperial General Headqurters Army Order No. 1328, op. cit.
46 Dairikume Dai Sensambyakunijushichi, Sensambyakunijukyu-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders No. 1327 and 1329) both 14 May 45.
47 To implement these emergency preparations, plans were made to transport all the remaining supplies scheduled for Ketsu No. 3 to Kyushu during the last week in May. Due to transportation difficulties only about 80% of the amount had actually been concentrated on the island by early June. (1) Homeland Operations, Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 9-15, 47-8. (2) Statement by Maj. Hirano, previously cited.
48 Units of the second mobilization scheduled for Kyushu had not yet even begun their training in early May. There was a 6-8 week time lag between the activation of new units and completion of the assembly of the cadre and filler replacements.
49 Fifty-seventh Army headquarters, responsible for southeastern Kyushu, had just completed organization. Fifty-sixth Army, responsible for northern Kyushu had not yet completed organization. Fortieth Army, designated for transfer from Formosa to assume responsibility for southwestern Kyushu, was, in mid-May, still awaiting transportation. (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 5-6, 23, 26, 46-7, Chart I. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1327, op. cit.
50 The lone exception was the Thirty-sixth Army. This decisive battle reserve continued to be in a high state of training and preparedness. At the beginning of May it was composed of the 81st, 93d, 201st, 202d, and 214th Divisions and the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions.
51 Major units disposed in the Kanto district at this time were as follows:
In addition, the 147th Division was beginning to arrive in the Kujukuri Beach area. This transfer was expected to be completed about the end of May. (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 8-10, Map. No. 1. (2) Statement by Col. Hiroshi Fuwa, Staff Officer (Operations), First General Army.
52 This misunderstanding was attributable to the haste with which the Ketsu-Go plan was evolved in Imperial General Headquarters. The implementing directives failed to describe clearly and in sufficient detail the conception of the policy for an aggressive beach defense. The maximum effort of the participating staff officers had been devoted to planning the broader aspects of the decisive battle, thus allowing little time for a reexamination of the doctrines of tactics and techniques or inspection of progress registered. (Statement by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)
53 (1) Kokudo Kessen Sempo Hayawakari (Key to Homeland Decisive Battle Tactics) Im perial General Headquarters, Army Section. 6 Jun 45. (2) Homeland Operations, Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 7-8, 20-3, 29, 51-8.; Vol. III, pp. 6-7, 29-33.
54 Cf. Chapter XVIII, pp. 559 - 60.
55 Statements by Maj. Gen. Joichiro Sanada, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Second General Army; Lt. Col. Masakatsu Hashimoto, Staff Officer (Operations), Second General Army; and Col. Ichiji Sugita, previously cited.
56 Pending alert for the Ketsu-Go operation, the 1st Air Division still remained under the operational control of Fifth Area Army, the Second Air Army under Kwantung Army, and an element of Fifth Air Army was retained under the Commander-in-Chief, China Expeditionary Army. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakunijugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1325) 8 May 45. (2) Hondo Koku Sakusen Kiroku (Homeland Air Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Dec 46, pp. 19-20.
57 Dairikushi Dai Nisenyonhyakushichijugo-go (Imperial General Headquaters Army Directive No. 2475) 8 May 45.
58 Even after the Army began to shift the emphasis from Ten-Go to the forthcoming Ketsu-Go operations, the Navy clung tenaciously to the idea of preventing enemy consolidation of his Okinawa base. The participating units had reported that, in operations between 18 March and 28 May, 358-360 enemy vessels had been sunk or heavily damaged. The Navy was confident that, if this high attrition rate could be maintained, the Homeland invasion would be indefinitely postponed. Navy pursuance of the Ten-Go objectives thus continued to delay formulation of joint arrangements for Ketu-Go. (1) Jokyo Handan (Estimate of the Situation) 1st Section, Navy General Staff, 1 Jun 45. (2) Statements by Maj. Gen. Kazuo Tanikawa, Staff Officer, and Col. Hiromu Hosoda, Staff Officer (Operations), both of Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
59 (1) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakusanjuroku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1336) 26 May 45. (2) Dairikushi Dai Nisenyonhyakukyujuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2491) 26 May 45.
60 Statement by Lt. Col. Takeshi Murata, Staff Officer (Air Defense), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, and later, Staff Officer (Air Defense), Second General Army.
61 On 6 May, the Nagoya AAA Unit was reorganized into the 2d AAA Division, the Chubu (Osaka) AAA Group into the 3d AAA Division, and the Seibu (northern Kyushu) AAA Group into the 4th AAA Division. Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakunijuyon-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1324) 6 May 45.
62 Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 38, Vol. III, pp. 35-6.
63 The fighters which the Navy had attached to the air defense forces (Cf. Chapter XVIII, p. 541) had long since been withdrawn. Daikaishi Dai Gohyakukyu-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 509) 19 Feb 45.
64 Hondo Boei Sakusen Sono San (Homeland Defense Naval Operations, Part III) 2d Demobilization Bureau, May 49, p.33.
65 (1) Rikugun Chosabu Shitsumon Sho (Sono Juroku) Kaito (War Ministry Reply to USSBS Questionnaire No. 16) 20 Nov. 45. (2) Homeland Defense Naval Operations Part III, op. cit., p. 35. (3) One consequence of the growing ineffectualness of Japan's air defenses was a fear that various sectors in the Homeland might be isolated from the remainder through raids on the transportation network. In anticipation of such a situation and to strengthen local passive air defense measures, the Government, on 10 June, issued instructions setting up local authorities to assume complete responsibility for civil administration in event of emergency. These officers, designated governors-general, were located at or near the headquarters of each district Army, and their zone of authority was coextensive with that of the district Army. They were to render such cooperation and assistance to the district Army and naval station as needed to expedite operations, to maintain law and order, and, in general, to function in loco regis in event of severance of communications with the civil government. (a) Chokurei Dai Sambyakugoju-go (Imperial Ordinance No. 350) 10 Jun 45. (b) Naikaku Kunrei Dai San-go (Cabinet Instructions No. 3) 10 Jun 45.
66 Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part I. Cf. Chapter XX, pp. 643-4.
67 (1) Bogyo Senryaku oyobi Senjutsu ni kansuru Kaito (Reply to a Questionnaire Concerning Defense Tactics and Strategy) 1st Demobilization Bureau, 31 Mar 46. (2) Giyu Heieki Ho (Horitsu Dai Sanjuku-go) (Volunteer Service Act Law No. 39) 87th Diet, 23 Jun 45. (3) Kokumin Giyu Sentotat Tosotsu Rei (Regulations for Command and Organization of National Volunteer Units) 23 Jun 45. (4) Kampo (Official Gazette) Special Issue, 9 Jun 45, containing Stenographic Record Proceedings of the House of Representatives, 87th Diet.
68 The third mobilization was advanced to enable the units slated for Kyushu to gain some time in their emer- gency preparations. Because of this as well as the delay in fulfilling production goals, units of the third mobilization were slightly weaker in artillery than the early mobilizations. (Cf. Chapter XVIII, p. 548) (1) Statements by Maj. Hirano, previously cited and Maj, Yasuji Komuratani, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 19.
69 These were the Fiftieth and Fifty-fourth Army headquarters activation of which had been postponed from the previous mobilization and the Fifty-ninth and Tokyo Defense Army headquarters which were not provided for in the original plans drafted in February. The Fifty-ninth Army headquarters was activated to command the defense of western Honshu, and the Tokyo Defense Army headquarters to command the units in the capital city. (1) Table of Army Units, op. cit. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 10-1, 26; Vol. III, pp. 24-5.
70 The 355th Division, not included in the original plans, was organized to strengthen the defenses of Nagoya area about which concern was being increasingly felt. (1) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Hara, previously cited.
71 The 234th Division was not included in the original mobilization plans. Unit Organization Tables, op. cit.
72 In addition, one coastal combat division (320th) and one independent mixed brigade (127th) were activated in Korea. The 320th Division, not provided for in the original plans, was organized to strengthen the defenses of southern Korea. (1) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. Cit. Vol. V, pp. 28-30 32.
73 (1) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakugojuichi, Sensambyakugojugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders No. 1351 and 1355) 19 and 23 Jun 45. (2) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (3) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 10-1, Map 1; Vol. III, p. 19, Chart 3, Attached Map. (4) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 349-50, 402-3.
74 Tokyo Bay Group was the designation assigned to the Tokyo Bay Fortress Unit on 8 April by Imperial General Headquarters. This step authorized the commander, Tokyo Bay Fortress Unit, to command other combat units assigned for the defense of Tokyo Bay as well as the fortress units. Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1297, op. cit.
75 The Fortieth Army headquarters completed its displacement from Formosa by mid-June at which time it took over control of operations in southwestern Kyushu. Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 25-6.
76 This total of line combat divisions did not include the 1st Imperial Guards Division which was assigned as security force for the Imperial Household. (Cf. Chapter XVIII, n. 17.)
77 Of this total line strength the 7th and 42d Divisions and 101st Independent Mixed Brigade were stationed on Hokkaido. The total does not include the 89th and gist Divisions and the 129th Independent Mixed Brigade (organized 16 July 1945) stationed in the Kurile Islands, the 88th Division on Karafuto, or the seven coastal combat divisions, three line combat divisions, and two independent mixed brigades in Korea. (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 37-8, Attached Map No. 2 ; Vol. V, pp. 4-5, 17-21, 28-30, 32, 38. (2) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit.
78 The 4th Amphibious Brigade was absorbed by the 1st Armored Division. Unit Organization Tables, op. cit.
79 Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1351, op. cit.
80 These figures include Fifth Air Army (about 700 planes) but do not include 1st Air Division and Second Air Army which were to contribute 65 and 120 aircraft, respectively. Of the total projected for September, about 5,400 were scheduled for the Army and the balance for the Navy. Fighters, reconnaissance planes, bombers, and trainers were all being converted for tokko purposes. In addition, the Navy was concentrating on the production of types engineered for tokko use exclusively. In addition to Oka (Cherry Blossom) which participated in the Ten-Go operation (Cf. Chapter XVIII, pp. 555-7), the Navy had developed Kikka (Orange Blossom) and the Toka (Wisteria Blossom). The former was a ground-launched missile, propelled by rocket turbines, with a range of about 350 miles at 400 m.p.h. carrying a 1,100 pound bomb. The Toka was a simply-built, generally conventional type plane with a 700 mile range at 300 m.p.h. carrying a 1,100 pound bomb. The Navy planned to make 1,000 of these special types before September. (1) Kokuki Seisan Jisseki oyobi Kushu To ni yoru Seisan Noryoku Soshitsu Gaikyo (Summary of Production of Aircraft, Loss of Capacity through Air Raids and Allied Matters) Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1 Sep 45. (2) Koku Tokko Sembi (Battle Preparations of Naval Air Tokko) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 46, pp. 2, 4-5, and Attached Table (Data of Special Planes). (3) Homeland Air Operations Record, op. cit., p. 39. (4) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 48- 9. (5) Statements by Rear Adm. Katsuhei Nakamura, Chief, General Affairs Bureau, Naval Aeronautical Depart ment; Lt. Col. Katsuo Sato, Staff Officer, Air General Army; and Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, Staff Officer (Air Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
82 Dispersion to a large number of small strips was emphasized as was the use of caves for hangers. (1) Statement by Lt. Col. Katsuki Mizumachi, Staff Officer (Operations), Sixth Air Army. (2) Battle Preparations of Naval Air Tokko, op. cit., p. 7 and Attached Chart (Air Installations).
83 Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 17: Production of Japanese Army Ordnance.
84 The total numbers of each type available by the end of June were as follows:
(1) Hondo Joriku ni taisuru Hangeki Sakusen Jumbi (Preparations for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Homeland) 2d Demobilization Bureau, May 47, Attached Chart No. 3. (2) Showa Nijunendo Zenki no Kokuki Tokko Heiki no Seisan Keikaku to Seisan Jisseki (Planned and Actual Production of Aircraft and Tokko Weapons in the First Half of 1945) 2d Demobilization Bureau, 15 Jul 49 . (3) Statement by Maj. Kanetoshi Mashita, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
85 (1) Statement by Col. Fuwa, previously cited. (2) Author's memory. (Lt. Col. Fujiwara was a staff officer of Second General Army at the time and later of the Fifty-seventh Army.)
86 Tables of equipment for artillery units of the third mobilization had already been cut almost to nothing. Artillery weapons on hand were therefore sufficient to immediately equip these units. Units of the second mobilization had completed their equipment in Kanto except for antitank guns and 120 mm mortars. In Kyushu, the second mobilization units were about 70% equipped with 31 July as a completion target. First mobilization units were already equipped. (Statements by Col. Fuwa and Maj. Hirano, previously cited.)
87 (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 44. (2) Statements by Maj. Hirano, previously cited and Lt. Col. Shinroku Iwakoshi, Staff Officer (Supply), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
88 After the abortive general offensive of 4-5 May, the Japanese Army and Navy air forces flew five more general attacks interspersed with minor operations. A total of 2,784 sorties were flown between 5 May and 22 June. Reports of damage to enemy vessels continued to be high. Although the official end of the Okinawa campaign came on 25 June and the Army had long since withdrawn its units from Ten-Go, the Navy refused to give up the idea of preventing enemy use of Okinawa and continued the Ten-Go operation using hit and run tactics until early in July. In the meantime, the 7th and 98th Air Regiments (Torpedo bombers), which had been under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, since 1 February 1944, reverted to the Sixth Air Army on 28 June. (Cf. Chapter XVIII, n. 10.) (1) Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No 4: Commitment and Losses of Japanese Aircraft and Damages Inflicted on Allied Forces in the Okinawa Air Operations, 25 Mar-22 Jun 45. (2) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakugojushichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1357) 28 Jun 45. (3) Daikaishi Dai Sambyakunijuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 328) 1 Feb 44.
89 (1) The end of the Okinawa campaign was dramatized by the ceremonial harakiri of Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima, Thirty-second Army commander and members of his immediate staff. This gesture followed closely the samurai tradition constituting an apology for failure. Dai Sanjuni-Gun Shijitsu Shiryo (Historical Data, Thirty-second Army) Home Depot Division, Mar 47, pp.73-4.
90 The end of the Okinawa campaign brought home to the people the desperate plight of the nation. The beginning of the battle had been accompanied by a great deal of public fanfare hailing the "decisive stand" at Okinawa. Failure there was a great blow to national morale.
91 According to the President, the Americans would, (a) nail down and isolate Japanese forces and annihilate them one by one, (b) concentrate overwhelming strength against attack objectives. (c) attain victory through massive concentrations of weapons, keeping personnel losses to a minimum, and (d) mobilize maximum strength and bring unremitting pressure giving the Japanese no chance to rally. Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper) Tokyo, 4 Jun 45.
92 A majority of the officers in Imperial General Headquarters actually desired that the enemy attempt to invade the Homeland before the end of the year. Not only would this give the nation a chance to strike a heavy blow, but also the over-all logistics situation was deteriorating so rapidly that the longer the invasion was postponed, the weaker the nation became. Actually, a tightening of the blockade with no attempt to invade the home islands was feared by the leaders and, for Japan, was the worst of all the alternate courses open to the enemy. (1) Statements by Lt. Gen. Kawabe and Lt. Gen. Arisue, both previously cited. (2) Showa Nijuichi Nen Haru goro o Mokuto to Suru Josei Handan (Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and the Spring of 1946) Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1 Jul 45, p. 5-7.
93 Arguments advanced by the "quick decision" school of thought were: (a) If termination of the Pacific war were delayed, the United States would be harassed by many foreign and domestic political problems; (b) American public opinion will demand an early decisive battle in keeping with the fast-paced advance across the Pacific; and, (c) the United States, believing that defeat of the nucleus of the Homeland Army is an essential prerequisite to national surrender, and having the power and the confidence necessary for opening the campaign, will not allow their powerful military establishment to stand idly by when the job remains to be done. (Statements by Lt. Gen. Arisue, previously cited, and Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.)
94 Adherents to the "advance bases first" school of thought argued that the United States, with the lessons of the Okinawa campaign in mind, would use the full strength of their air and sea forces to support the invasion of Japan, attacking only when assured of an absolutely safe margin of strength. But since bases in the Marianas, on Okinawa, and in the Bonins would not be sufficient for the necessary forward air deployment and were too far from Japan to offer advantageous turn around time for shipping, the enemy would undoubtedly endeavor to secure bases farther forward. Ibid.
95 (1) Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and the Spring of 1946, op. cit., pp. 6, 34. (2) Statements by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited, and Maj. Gen. Masakazu Amano, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
96 Several times during June, Second General Army renewed its recommendation that the decisive battle reserve scheduled for Kyushu be shifted immediately without waiting for activation of the Ketsu-Go operation. Due to the latent fear of a direct attack on Kanto, Imperial General Headquarters had not, by the end of the war, reached a final decision to transfer the planned strength. (Statements by Maj. Gen. Sanada, Col. Sugita, and Maj. Mashita, all previously cited.)
97 There existed a divided opinion in the High Command as to whether enemy operations against Kyushu would take the form of a limited objective invasion designed only to seize advance bases or of an annihilation battle to crush the Japanese Army. The majority opinion held that, although the invasion of Kyushu would be large scale, it would be only a limited objective operation preliminary to the even bigger landing at Kanto. (Statements by Maj. Gen. Amano and Capt. Ohmae, both previously cited, and Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, Staff Officer (Air Operations), Combined Fleet.
98 (1) Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and the Spring of 1946 op. cit., pp. 5-13, 3-49, 46-60, 78-80. (2) Estimate of the Situation, op. cit., pp. 6-8. (3) Preparations for Counterattack Operations in the Defense of the Homeland, op. cit., pp. 3-9. (4) Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit., Part I. (5) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 9-12, 28-9, (6) Statements by Maj. Gen. Amano and Rear Adm. Tomioka, both previously cited, and Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
99 In addition to the United States ground strength there were 67 divisions of the British Commonwealth Forces in East Asia and the Pacific and it was expected that this number would be increased to 82 by the end of the year. The Japanese did not expect the British to contribute ground strength to the invasion of Japan. At this time, too, it was estimated that the Chinese had so fully American-equipped divisions and 25 partially equipped, the number of the former to reach 20 by the end of the year. Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and the Spring of 1946, op. cit., pp. 7, 10-11.
100 British land-based planes in the Orient were estimated at 2,200 to be increased to 2,700 by September and 3,400 by the end of the year. The Japanese believed that these aircraft would be used only to support peripheral operations by British Commonwealth Forces. Ibid., pp. 10-1.
101 By September the strength of British carrier air in the Far East was expected to reach 700 aircraft. The Japanese definitely expected that this strength would be used against the Homeland. Ibid., p. 11.
102 In addition to the U. S. strength, the British Pacific Fleet was estimated to have four battleships, five carriers, eight escort carriers, three light cruisers, five heavy cruisers, and about 40 destroyers. Also available if needed were an estimated so batteships, seven carriers, 23 escort carriers, 35 cruisers, 106 destroyers, and 50 submarines of the British fleets in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Ibid., pp. 7, 79-80.
103 The estimated earliest possible date of the Kyushu invasion was moved up at least a full month between the the time of the Imperial conference on 8 June and the promulgation of the Army Section estimate on 1 July. This change was made for the following reasons: (a) The enemy had not yet begun air raids against tactical objectives; (b) The Okinawa campaign had lasted until late in June, much later than anticipated; (c) Signal intelligence did not report any unusual increase in traffic and no sign of immediate preparations for a task force sortie; and (d) It was felt that the enemy would prefer to postpone the invasion until after the typhoon season. (Statements by Lt. Gen. Kawabe and Lt. Gen. Arisue, both previously cited.)
104 Daikaishi Dai-Gohyakunijugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 525) 5 Jul 45.
105 (1) Daikaishi Dai-Gohyakunijuroku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 526) 13 Jul 45. (2) Homeland Air Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 33-40.
106 In the past there had been considerable controversy between the Army and the Navy over the mission of land-based aviation. In the Philippines the Army, by joint agreement, had concentrated on transport convoys, and the Navy on enemy carriers. (Cf. Chapter XI, p. 296.) At the outset of the Ten-Go operation the Navy kept this arrangement until late April when it was agreed that henceforth all air forces would concentrate on transport convoy. This agreement was extended to include Ketsu-Go.
107 Strength figures given in this agreement were based on the 8,500 operational aircraft available at the time the agreement was formulated. It was hoped that an additional 2,000 planes could be produced by the time of the invasion. The Japanese, however, were not counting on their availability. (Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.)
108 In compliance with this provision, Sixth Air Army was to move its command post to Oita to join Fifth Air Fleet headquarters. First Air Army and Tenth Air Fleet were both to be located in Takasaki, Gumma Prefecture, Air General Army was at Taisho airfield on the outskirts of Osaka, and Third Air Fleet and General Navy Command were to be at Yamato airfield in Nara Prefecture. (1) Preparations for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Home-land, op. Cit., p. 20. (2) Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.
109 Statement by Lt. Gen. Arisue, previously cited.
111 Another problem concerning the Tokai district was that it lay on the boundary between general armies. This presented special command and communication difficulties. Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 26-7.
112 The Japanese High Command, beginning in September 1942, had effected the transfer from the Kwantung Army of many front-line combat units to reinforce other fronts. In all, 17 infantry and two armored divisions, one independent mixed brigade, one tank brigade, two amphibious brigades, numerous smaller combat units and many miscellaneous supporting units were withdrawn. Although later mobilizations helped fill this gap insofar as personnel requirements were concerned, the heavy drain of equipment could not be replaced. Moreover, the over-all level of experience and training of the troops was sharply reduced. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 14: Number of Japanese Units Transfered from Manchuria to the Pacific Front, Jan 42-Aug 45.
113 Statement by Maj. Gen. Amano, previously cited.
114 The 230th Division and 124th Independent Mixed Brigade, both of which were organized during the third mobilization, were deployed in the beach sector of Yamaguchi Prefecture during July. Moreover, a strong element of the 231st Division, also organized in the third mobilization, was disposed in the vicinity of Tottori. At the same time, construction of coastal positions near Maizuru and Tsuruga was begun. Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 21-2, Attached Map.
115 Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 6.
116 Cities receiving more than 1,000 tons were Hiratsuka, Ichinomiya, Kochi, Kumamoto, Kure, Kuwana, Numazu, Sendai, Shimizu, Shimotsu, Tokushima, Tsu, Ube, and Uwajima. Ibid., Report No. 13: Extent of Air Raid Casualties and Property Damage on Small and Medium Cities in Japan, July 45.
117 Added to the weight of these air attacks was the bombardment, for the first time, of selected industrial targets along the coast of Honshu by enemy surface units. Ibid., Report No. 6.
118 Typical of the damage to these cities was Hiratsuka, containing important aircraft parts factories and one of Japan's largest naval arsenals, which was 63% burned out. Numazu, containing both Army and Navy arsenals as well as being one of the chief producers of automatic weapons in the nation, was 58% destroyed. Ibid., Report No. 13.
119 Among the heaviest hit of the air bases was Misawa near Hachinohe in northeast Honshu. The most important single effect of the carrier raids was the virtual severance of Hokkaido from Honshu. The choking off of the flow of coal, iron ore, lumber, and marine products was a death blow to the already crippled Japanese industrial machine. The attacks against Kyushu and the Inland Sea area were particularly severe. On one day (28 July) the amazing total of 2,772 sorties were flown against air bases, railways, factories, and power stations on Kyushu. (1) Senkyo Shubo (Daily Record of the War Situations) Operations Section, Army General Staff. (2) Homeland Defense Naval Operations, Part III, op. cit., 53-69.
120 The High Command released from the decisive battle reserve 11 fighter regiments which were distributed as follows:
Plans were made to concentrate the bulk of these forces, together with the fixed air defense units (10th, 11th, and 12th Air Divisions) in the threatened sector during each big raid. Due to lack of warning, interdiction of bases, and other hindrances these plans were seldom successfully executed. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakugojukyu-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1359) 30 Jun 45. (2) Dairikushi Dai Nisengohyakujuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2518) 30 Jun 45. (3) Homeland Air Operations Record, op. Cit., pp. 27-32.
121 One result of these continued attacks was to interdict Japanese efforts to assemble a long-range bomber attack force for operations against enemy rear areas. The carrier plane raids of 14 July against Misawa airfield on northeast Honshu, for example, completely destroyed 25 naval medium bombers that had been assembled to take an airborne raiding force to enemy bases in the Marianas in late July. The Japanese were never able to carry out any part of the plans for such operations called for in the Ketsu-Go policy. (Cf. Chapter XVIII, p. 558-9) Homeland Defense Naval Operations, Part III, op. cit., pp. 55, 57.
122 The strategists at Imperial General Headquarters believed that if they could succeed in inflicting unexpectedly heavy damage on the enemy in the Homeland battle, convincing him of the huge sacrifice involved in pursuing the campaign and making him aware of the determined fighting spirit of the entire Japanese nation, it would lead to the termination of hostilities on comparatively advantageous terms for the Japanese. (Statements by Lt. Gen. Arisue and Lt. Gen. Kawabe, both previously cited.)
123 (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 9-12, 28-9. (2) Statements by Maj. Gen. Yasumasa Yoshitake, Chief of Staff, Fifty-seventh Army, Maj. Ryoichi Tabata, Staff Officer (Operations), Fifty-seventh Army, Lt. Col. Hashimoto, and Maj. Haba, both previously cited.
124 In addition to large airfield groups, such as Chiran, Kanoya, Miyakonojo and Nyutabaru, southern Kyushu embraced large ship bases such as Kagoshima Bay and Ariake Bay. Furthermore, while its location at the tip of Kyushu made the movement of troops difficult for the Japanese, the Americans could easily use small vessels and fighter planes from Okinawa.
125 It seemed inevitable that all Japanese air bases, with the exception of those skillfully concealed, would be destroyed in this strategic and tactical bombing. Furthermore, it was expected that not only would Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu and Hokkaido be isolated from each other but that the interior of each island would be subdivided, that rail transportation on the battle fronts would be disrupted, and that daytime travel on main highways would become difficult.
126 The specific enemy landing area on Shikoku was estimated as Tosa Bay. Enemy objectives in this operation were believed to be (a) to extend his air perimeter over all of the Inland Sea by establishing forward fighter bases on Shikoku and (b) to neutralize tokkotai bases on Shikoku.
127 Although northern Kyushu was the industrial center of western Japan and constituted an area vital to the security of the Korea Strait and the Inland Sea, with ship bases in Hakata Bay and at Shimonoseki-Moji and several airfield groups near Fukuoka, an invasion in this sector would have been complicated by the protection afforded by Japan's strategic naval and air bases on Quelpart, Goto, Tsushima, and Iki Islands.
128 Only those units in which fighting elements were actually present at the end of July are listed here. In addition, in order to lend flexibility to the organization for combat and provide special air task force headquarters, the Sixth Air Army had available the Headquarters, 7th and 21st Air Brigades. (1) Homeland Air Operations, Record, op. cit., pp. 117-8, Attached Chart 1 (2) Table Showing Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forces, op. cit., pp. L-49-50.
129 As an extra available command organization, First Air Army had the Headquarters, 5th Air Brigade. Ibid.
130 (1) Homeland Air Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 108-19. (2) Preparations for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Homeland, op. cit., pp. 16-12
131 In addition, the Army had eight surface raiding regiments (the 31st through the 38th), of about 90 boats each, deployed on Kyushu. The control of these units was decentralized to local commanders, and it was expected that the Army boats would attack in cooperation with the Naval surface tokko forces' mass attack. The deployment of all these special-attack forces was completed by 1 August. Tactics to be employed by them have already been discussed in Chapter XVIII, pp. 564, 566. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakurokujuni-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1362) 11 Jul 45. (2) Preparations for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Homeland, op. cit., Attached Charts 3, 4.
132 The composition of the assault unit was extremely flexible, depending on the mission. Some units had all three general types of sea special-attack weapons (suicide boats, midget submarines, and human torpedoes), while others had only boats or only undersea craft., reparations for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Homeland, op. cit., Attached Chart 3.
133 (1) Ibid., p. 21. (2) Another Navy contribution to the battle was in the realm of mine warfare. All key harbor and bay entrances were sewn with large mines, while plans were being layed for the "seeding" of all the principal landing beaches with small anti-boat mines which would be layed along the water's edge. Bakugeki Chosa Dan ni taisuru Dai Ni Fukuinsho Kaito Sakusen Tosui Kankei Joho Yokyu no Ken Kaito Sono Ni (Information Concerning Task Organization and Operations, Submitted by the 2d Demobilization Bureau in Reply to an USSBS Questionnaire, Part II) Nov 45.
134 Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit., Part I.
135 The final tally of damages inflicted upon the enemy forces in the Ten-Go operations included 196 ships reportedly sunk. It was not until after the war that access to Allied records revealed to the Japanese that only 35 ships were actually sunk though about 31 other vessels were heavily damaged and a much larger number less severely damaged.
136 This estimate was arrived at during a joint study conducted at Fukuoka, Kyushu, on 4-5 July at which time Army and Navy air and sea tokko operations were discussed in detail. The conference discussions, presided over by Maj. Gen. Kazuo Tanikawa, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, and attended by staff officers from all Army and Navy headquarters connected with Ketsu No. 6 operations, proceeded from the following basic assumptions: (a) Enemy invasion strength would number 16 divisions: (b) Invasion armada would include many small troop carrying craft in addition to large transports; (c) At the time of the invasion, the strength of the Japanese special-attack forces would be equal to the strength at the end of July. It was concluded that about 500 enemy transport craft, lifting about four divisions, would be destroyed by air tokko, and an additional too craft by surface special-attack units, making the total estimated losses about 600 craft carrying about five divisions or nearly 30% of the invasion force. On the other hand, if the Japanese tokko strength could be materially increased over the July figure or if the enemy invasion fleet included more large transports than the Japanese estimated, the staff officers participating in the conference felt that destruction of 50% of the enemy convoy would not be impossible. (Statements by Maj. Gen. Tanikawa, Lt. Col. Hara, Lt. Col. Sato, and Lt. Col. Mizumachi, all previously cited ; and Comdr. Yoshimori Terai, Staff Officer (Air Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.
137 Statements by Lt. Col. Hashimoto and Maj. Haba, both previously cited.
138 Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, Supplement, Essentials of Sixteenth Area Army Ketsu Operation Plan, Attached Map. No. 1.
139 (1) Statements by Maj. Gen. Yoshitake, Col. Fuwa, and Maj. Hirano, all previously cited. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 49. (3) Heiseiso Mitsu Dai Hachihyakushichijukyu-go: Heiki Jusoku Jokyo (Dispatch No. 879 Secret, Report on the Condition of Repletion of Ordnance) Army Ordnance Department, 10 Aug 45,
140 Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, Suppl., Attached Map No. 1.
141 Cf. Chapter XVIII, p. 549.
142 The Ketsu-Go plan called for the rapid advance to Kyushu of four line combat divisions from Thirteenth and Fifteenth Area Army forces as so on as the operation was activated. (Cf. Chapter XVIII, pp. 559-60). Three or four additional line combat divisions (Thirty-sixth Army) were to be sent from Kanto to western Honshu, there to wait in readiness for commitment to Kyushu. Although serious consideration had been given throughout the summer to advancing the Thirty-sixth Army directly to Kyushu without waiting for activation of Ketsu-Go, Imperial General Headquarters remained reluctant until the end of the war to weaken the defenses of Kanto for such a move.
143 (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 13-6, 30-3 and Suppl. (2) Statement by Lt. Gen. Kanji Nishihara, Commanding General, Fifty-seventh Army; Maj. Haba and Maj. Tabata, both previously cited.
144 This hope was based on the fact that the Kyushu coast was well suited to the use of enfilade fire. Heavy artillery installed in caves was so arranged as to cover the entire approaches to the principal beaches. In Ariake Bay, for example, four 280mm howitzers, of our 240 mm howitzers, seven 150 mm guns, two 120 mm guns, eight 100 mm guns as well as the light artillery and infantry cannon of the 86th Division were emplaced in coastal cave positions east of Shibushi, south of Kasebaru, north of Uchinoura and on Bindare and Binro Islands so as to cover the entire bay. In addition, preparations had been made so that heavy artillery units under Army control and the divisional artillery units of the mobile reserve units could be moved into previously prepared positions wherever the decisive battle developed. Statements by Lt. Col. Fujiwara, author (cf. n. 1, Chapter XVIII) and Lt. Gen. Wataro Yoshinaka, Commanding General, and Col. Takashi Okuyama, Chief of Staff, 86th Division.
145 The ground strength which it was expected could be massed by the Japanese within a week in the decisive battle area, including coastal combat divisions already in the areas, was about six divisions at Ariake Bay, seven divisions on the Miyazaki plain, and seven on the Satsuma Peninsula, each case being exclusive of the other two. Hope of victory was strengthened by the remembrance of the Okinawa campaign, in which Thirty-second Army, though ringed by enemy naval fire and possessing a strength of only 21 divisions, held out for 100 days against an American force five or six times as large. The decisive battle on Kyushu was to be fought under conditions incomparably more advantageous to the Japanese.
147 As was the case with regard to Kyushu, these various opinions were not assembled in a single publication representing the view of one staff or commander. (Statement by the author.)
148 (1) Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and the Spring of 1946, op. cit., pp. 36-9. (2) Estimate of the Situation, op., cit. pp. 6-7. (3) Preparations for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Homeland, op. cit., pp. 10-11. (4) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 39, Attached Map No. 2. (5) Statements by Col. Fuwa, Lt. Cot. Hara and Rear Adm. Tomioka, all previously cited.
149 The specific sectors estimated to be the probable targets in each of the three areas were the Togane sector of Kujukuri Beach, left bank of the Sagami River, and the Hokota sector on Kashima Sea. Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, Attached Map No. 2.
150 The order of battle of these air forces was the same as outlined for employment in Ketsu No. 6 operation. (Cf. pp. 608-9.)
151 Statement by Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, previously cited.
152 Only the small type submarines and the navy Koryu special-attack boats were to move up from bases near Kyushu and' participate in Ketsu No. 3. 31st Destroyer Squadron could not be employed because of fuel restrictions. The large type submarines would carry out the same mission regardless of the target of the initial invasion. Preparation for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Homeland, op. Cit., pp.21-4.
153 Ibid., Attached Chart 3-4.
154 The Yokosuka Assault Unit, responsible for training Kairyu pilots until the enemy invasion commenced, was composed of the 101st, 102d and 103d Kairyu Units and included a total of 36 Kairyus. Ibid.
155 The line combat divisions were the 44th, 221st, 3d Imperial Guards, 234th, 84th, 8rst, 93d, 201st, 202d, 209th, and 214th Divisions. The first five of these were deployed in positions near the beaches. (Cf. Plate No. 161.)
156 (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 44. (2) Statement by Col. Hiroshi Fuwa, previously cited.
157 (1) Reply to Questionnaire Regarding Defense Tactics and Strategy, op. cit. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, Attached Map 3. In addition to the forces outlined above, the 1st Imperial Guards Division, charged with security of the Imperial Palace, was located in Tokyo under the command of the Eastern District Army Commander. Statement by Col. Fuwa previously cited.
158 The 209th Division, although assigned to the Thirty-sixth Army on 19 June, was actually stationed in Kanazawa because of more adequate training and billeting facilities at its old station, movement of which had not been started as of the end of July. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakugojuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1351) 19 Jun 45. (2) Statement by Col. Fuwa, previously cited.
159 Each of these landing parties was composed of from two to four battalions. Supporting units, such as artillery and engineers, were included in the battalion organization. Total strength of these landing parties was about 18 battalions. (Statements by Vice Adm. Kyuichi Kudo, Commander, Yokosuka Combined Special Naval Landing Force and Lt. Comdr. Satoru Yunoki, Staff Officer (Operations), Yokosuka Combined Special Naval Landing Force.
160 Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 15, 18-20; Vol. III, pp. 12-3.
161 First General Army simultaneously released a Decisive Battle Outline which set forth major points emphasized by the High Command with regard to the conduct of the decisive battle. The following points were discussed in detail: (a) The Homeland Operation must be a decisive one in which the invasion forces will be quickly sought out and annihilated. (b) The key to ultimate victory rests in the annihilation of the enemy at the water's edge in the period when his landings are still in progress. The assault must be undertaken with the resolve that each man will take an enemy to death with him at the water's edge. (c) The decisive battle area must be determined irrespective of the enemy's plans, and thee nemy must be made to fight at that point. (d) All available manpower must be concentrated for a swift offensive in depth. (e) Fortifications for offensive purposes must be emphasized. Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 21-2, 51-60.
162 (1) Ibid., pp. 18-26, 51-63 and Attached Map No. 2. (2) Statements by Col. Fuwa and Lt. Col. Hara, both previously cited.
163 Preparations for the defense of Tokyo in case a powerful enemy force should break through the coastal positions during the decisive battle received individual emphasis from the High Command due to the place the capital occupied in the minds of the Japanese. It was recognized that maintenance of morale required adoption of special measures to defend the city to the last. Imperial General Headquarters accordingly issued the Tokyo Defense Operations Outline on 23 June 1945, simultaneously with the activation of the Tokyo Defense Army headquarters. The plan provided for the construction of underground fortifications capable of withstanding an enemy assault for one year. By the end of July, however, positions were still being reconnoitered and surveyed. It was estimated that construction would be started about 20 August. Ground forces to strengthen these defenses were not yet designated by the end of the war although it was planned that two or three divisions, one tank brigade and other supporting units would be added to the three brigades garrisoning the city at this time. Greatest emphasis was to be placed on preparation of positions west of the city and around the Imperial Palace on the basis that the Sagami Bay sector would be the most seriously threatened while the Thirty-sixth Army was being committed on the Kujukuri Beach sector. Almost a year previously, however, as a precautionary measure to prepare for the worst eventuality, the High Command, in complete secrecy, had begun the construction of facilities in Matsushiro, Nagano Prefecture, capable of housing the Government and the Imperial General Headquarters. All installaions, set underground and shielded by hard cement capable of withstanding powerful and sustained bombing attacks, were practically completed by the end of July 1 945. (1) Dairikushi Dal Nisengohyakujusan-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2513) 23 Jun 45. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1355, op. cit. (3) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 26, 61-3. (4) Statements by Lt. Gen. Jo Iimura, Commander, Tokyo Defense Army, and Maj. Gen. Sanada, previously cited.
164 During the first six days of August, in spite of a brief respite on 3-4 August because of a typhoon, the Japanese counted a total of 1,703 sorties flown over the Homeland by enemy land based aircraft. Of these 1,015 were flown by B-29's attacking cities in the Kanto, Tokai, Osaka-Kobe and Japan Sea coast areas and sewing mines in the Korea Strait, Shimonoseki-Moji channel and in the Inland Sea. The remaining sorties were carried out by fighters based on Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Enemy carrier planes did not appear over the Homeland during this period. Daily Record of the War Situation, op. cit.
165 By 31 July about 188,300 Japanese had been killed and 257,000 wounded in the air attacks on the four main islands. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 16: Number of Air Raid Casualties in the Japanese Homeland through Jul 45.
166 Twenty-six of these urban area were towns in the immediate vicinity of important military installations, such as airfields or coastal defense positions. The remaining 72 urban areas were classed as cities, the population of which exceeded 30,000. (1) U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Civilian Defense Division, Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan, 1947, pp. 200-3. (2) Jiji Nenkan (Jiji Yearbook Jiji Press Co., Tokyo, 5 Jan 47, pp. 390-1.
167 Typical examples of the decline in production within basic industries by the end of July are to be found among the metal and chemical plants. The Wanishi and Kamaishi plants of the Nihon Iron Mfg. Co., two of the largest steel producers, suffered production drops of 21% and 65%, respectively as a direct result of air raids. In addition thereto, production drops attributable to other causes, such as raw material shortages, amounted to 62% and 35% in the same plants. The Hodogaya Chemical Industry Co., Koriyama, suffered a production drop of 50-70% due to air raids and a total production drop of 80% compared to the peak out-put during the war. The Nihon Synthetic Chemical Industry Co., Ogaki, and the Mitsui Chemical Industry Co., Omuta, suffered production drops of 60% and 100%, respectively, from all causes. Domestic coal production was running about 50% of the peak established in January-March 1944. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 15: Effect of Air Raids on Production Facilities of Important Japanese Industries.
168 July production amounted to about 40% of the average monthly rate of 2,482 planes established during the peak quarter of April-June 1944. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Co., Oemachi Plant, Nagoya, where airframes were manufactured, and the Mitsubishi Aircraft Co., No. 4 plant, maker of engines, were typical producers within the aircraft industry suffering from both the air raids and raw material shortages. The damage sustained within each plant resulted in a production drop of approximately 50%. An additional 30% drop was attributed to other causes. Ibid., Report Nos. 2 and 15.
169 Of this total only 832 were considered combat operational planes. An additional 768 planes were either repaired or converted for combat purposes, making a total of 1,600 compared with losses during the same month of 1,146. Ibid., Report No. 18: Statistical Situation of Production and Losses of Japanese Aircraft, Jun-Jul 45.
170 Total number of operational combat planes available to the Army and Navy at the end of July numbered 10,308. Ibid.
171 Within the munitions industry, the Aichi Clock and Electric Funakata Plant, producers of guns, torpedoes and mines, and the Kure Naval Arsenal, where guns, torpedoes, searchlights and hydrophones were manufactured, offer examples of this drop in production. Air raid damage caused a drop of from 35-90% and 20-70%, respectively, while the overall production loss due to all causes amounted to 80% and 60%, respectively. Ibid., Report No. 15.
174 Nihon Kaiun no Hembo (Situation of Japanese Sea Transportation) Mr. Genko Tsuboi, Sea Transport Board, Ministry of Transportation, 20 Aug 46, Chart No. 15. (Writer's note: The Nichi-Go operation, established for the emergency transportation of troops and supplies from the continent to the Homeland, (Cf. n. 29.) was still being carried out at the end of July though on a considerably reduced scale. Highest priority was now given the transportation of food, all designated units having completed the transfer across the Japan Sea.
175 (1) Showa Nijunendo Busshi Doin Keikaku (Plans of Mobilization of War Materials Based on the Yearly Plans of 1945 Munitions Ministry, Vol. I, 24 Apr 45, Chart Nos. 1, 4; and Vol. II, 3 0 Jun 45, Chart Nos. 1, 4.
176 Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 9.
177 The vital underwater railroad tunnel connecting Shimonoseki and Moji and other important railroad tunnels had not yet been attacked. Enemy strafing operations over Kyushu had now reached such proportions, however, that daylight travel over the railroad network was becoming increasingly difficult. Moreover, the longest bridge on the island, crossing the Chikugo River, was destroyed in an air raid on July. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kiyoshi Ohta, Staff Officer (Supply), Sixteenth Area Army.
178 (1) Kokuyu Tetsudo Rikuun Tokei (Statistics of Transportation in the National Railway Railway Department, Ministry of Transportation, 1943, 1944 and 1945 editions. (2) Unyu Setseki Tokei Nempo (Yearly Statistics of Land Transportation) 1944-45, Railway Department, Ministry of Transportation.
179 Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and the Spring of 1946, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
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