Chapter IX

1 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Aug 45 (S), Air Sum.

2 Unless otherwise noted the following account of FEAF activities in the Occupation of Japan is based on a report, HQ FEAF to G-2 GHQ FEC Hist Div, Nov 48, sub: FEAF Activ in the Occupation of Japan.

3 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Air Sum, Oct 45 (S).

4 See Ch. I. The Seventh Air Force, Pacific Ocean Area, assigned to FEAF on 14 July 1 945, was to be responsible for air defense and air traffic control on Okinawa and for operating the air-sea rescue control for all air forces. The Seventh was also responsible for the Army and Marine fighter units under its control, the radar warning system, and antiaircraft artillery units. The Fifth Air Force, commanded by Lt Gen Ennis C. Whitehead, was to move to Okinawa to carry the major load of the pre-invasion strikes. Part of the Thirteenth Air Force, commanded by Maj Gen Paul Wurtsmith, was to establish bases in southern Kyushu and supervise the air strikes for Operation "Coronet," while the Fifth was to be established on the Kanto Plain air bases.

5 See Ch. I.

6 HQ PACUSA, GO No. 1, 25 Dec 45. In HQ FEAF.

7 Gen Kenney left the Pacific in June 1945 for reassignment to the ZI, and was succeeded by Lt Gen Whitehead who was Deputy Commander at that time. Official transfer of command was made 30 December. Gen Kenney was the first CG of the Strategic Air Command which was activated in March 1946 as the US' long-range bombardment air striking force.

8 HQ FEAF, GO No. 3, 10 Jan 47, effective 1 Jan 47. In HQ FEAF.

9 On 7 June 1946 Headquarters, First Air Division was established at Kadena, Okinawa, and at the same time, Headquarters Eighth Air Force was reassigned to the Strategic Air Command, Washington, D. C., except for personnel and equipment which was transferred and/or reassigned to the First Air Division. Missions assigned to the Eighth Air Force remained the responsibility of the First Air Division.

10 HQ PACUSA, GO No. 160, 31 Dec 46.

11 Rpt, HQ FEAF to G-2 GHQ FEC Hist Div, Nov 48, sub : FEAF Activ in the Occupation of Japan. In the discharge of the general functions assigned, FEAF was committed to maintain an air power potential in the Far East Command area adequate to accomplish its missions, including: (a) maintenance of a balanced Air Force in the occupied areas of the theater; (b) provision of air defense of military and naval installations throughout the Far East Command; (c) provision of search and rescue operations in coordination with the Navy; (d) provision of aerial photography in support of the Army's post-hostilities mapping program in the Pacific; (e) assistance in operations to alleviate human suffering and preserve order in the event of disaster, and to quell disorders, riots, or other disturbances requiring use of the US armed forces; (f) establishment and control of military air routes, and operation of an internal air transport service in the Far East Command area.

12 Rpt, HQ FEAF to G-2 GHQ FEC Hist Div, Nov 48, sub: FEAF Activ in the Occupation of Japan.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Rad (TS), SCAP to COM3rdFLT, 26 Aug 45.

16 FLTLOSCAP, Confidential Rpt of Activ, 1 Oct 45.

17 See Ch. II.

18 Ibid. Third US Fleet consisted of 6 battleships (BB), 4 heavy cruisers (CA), 3 light cruisers (CL), and 18 destroyers (DD). Two battleships, 2 light cruisers, and 2 destroyers of the British Fleet augmented this force. Fifth US Fleet consisted of 6 battleships, 4 aircraft carriers, escort (ACE), 2 heavy cruisers, 8 light cruisers, 2 large cruisers (CB), 44 destroyers, and 83 mine sweepers (AM). Seventh US Fleet consisted of 4 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 2 aircraft carriers, escort, and 17 destroyers. North Pacific Force was made up of 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 6 aircraft carriers, escort, and 24 destroyers. (GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opus, Sep 45 [S], Naval Sum.)

19 See Chs. II and IV.

20 See Ch. II.

21 Unless otherwise noted, the following account is based on reports summarizing the Naval operations in Japan during the Occupation: FLTLOSCAP, Confidential Rpts of Activ, Sep, Oct, Nov 45, and COMNAVFE, Comd Narrs, 21 Jan-1 Oct 46, 1 Oct 46-31 Mar 47, 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, 1 Jul-30 Sep 47, 1 Oct 47-31 Mar 48, 1 Apr-30 Sep 48, 1 Oct 48-31 Mar 49.

22 Later Rear Adm. C.B. Momsen.

23 Incident to an oral request from SCAP the establishment of COMNAVJAP was authorized by CNO in a dispatch to CINCPAC/POA on 3o December 1945. The original plan contemplated the continuance of FLTLOSCAP but on 22 January, in, a second dispatch to CINCPAC/POA, this was modified and FLTLOSCAP was ordered dissolved upon the establishment of COMNAVJAP. Pursuant to the above, COMNAVJAP was ordered established by COM5thFLT on 19 January 1946. COMNAVJAP included all naval activities ashore which at that time consisted of Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, FLTLOSCAP, SCAJAP, Naval Technical Mission to Japan (NAVTECHJAP), and Port Directors at Yokosuka, Tokyo, Nagoya, Wakayama, Kure, Matsuyama, Kagoshima, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, and Sasebo. On 4 February, Fleet Activities, Sasebo, was established under COMNAVJAP, the latter reporting to SCAP for operational control, although still under administrative control of CINCPAC. (COMNAVJAP, Comd Narr, 21 Jan-1 Oct 46.) NAVTECHJAP completed its work in Japan on is March and transferred its headquarters to Pearl Harbor. On 18 March COMNAVJAP assumed all naval responsibilities held by Fifth Fleet incident to the enforcement of surrender terms and control of Occupation forces with the exception of mine-sweeping which Commander, Fifth Fleet, retained until his departure on 25 March 1946.

24 See Ch. III.

25 COMNAVJAP, Comd Narr, 21 Jan-1 Oct 46 [C], pp. 3, 4. SCAP Occupation Instructions set forth the basic mission of COMNAVJAP as follows: (a) control the coastal waters of Japan; (b) continue responsibility for all naval activities ashore in Japan; (c) continue to supervise Japanese mine-sweeping as directed; (d) continue control of Japanese naval vessels; (e) continue surveillance and inspection to verify the execution by Japanese naval forces of disarmament and demobilization and compliance with directives of SCAP; (f) continue to operate Japanese shipping and provide port direction as required; (g) continue to control all naval and merchant shipping in the area of Japan as required for safe navigation, furnishing proper routing and other advice as expedient; (h) assume operational control of such Allied naval forces as may be provided for enforcement of surrender terms in Japan; (i) continue to perform air-sea rescue as required, in coordination with Commanding General, Pacific Air Command, U S Army; (j) coordinate with Commanding General, Eighth U S Army, in plans to alleviate human suffering and preserve order in the event of disaster and to quell incipient disorder riots, or other disturbances which might endanger lives or property of Allied nationals; (k) secure and safeguard intelligence information of value to the Allied Powers and arrange with Commanding General, Eighth U S Army, and Commanding General, Pacific Air Command, U S Army, for mutual exchange and unrestricted access to matters of interest thereto.

26 See Ch. II.

27 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 3, 12 Feb 46 (R)

28 According to a plan prepared by COMNAVJAP and approved by SCAP on 2 April 1946, all former Japanese Navy combatant ships larger than destroyer class, which could be operated or towed, were to be completely scrapped within one year of their release from the repatriation service. It was also planned to sink wrecked and heavily damaged ships in deep water, and to dispose of all submarines afloat. Eighteen Japanese scrapping companies were assigned the job of scrapping the major ships. This tremendous task of disposing of the Japanese Navy was assigned to COMNAVJAP and was declared completed as of 15 January 1949. In all, 415 vessels were destroyed: 35 major vessels, 128 minor vessels, 42 submarines, and 106 midget submarines were scrapped, and 104 submarines were sunk; 190 vessels were distributed as reparations, and 80 remained in Japan subject to reparations. (Tokyo, Pacific Stars and Stripes, June 4, 1949, p. 9.) See Ch. V.

29 COMNAVFE, Comd Narr, 1 Oct 47 to 31 Mar 48 (C).

30 Physical control of Radio Tokyo (NDT) was transferred from Yokosuka to HQ COMNAVFE in Tokyo on 4 Feb 47.

31 Commodore O.O. Kessing, USN, was placed in command of Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, on 8 September 1945. He was relieved by Capt H. M. Briggs, USN, on 23 November 1945. Capt B. W. Decker, USN, replaced Capt Briggs on 3 April 1946. One of the outstanding accomplishments of the U S Navy in Japan was the industrialization of the former secret city of Yokosuka. Under the able leadership of Capt Decker, the ex-Japanese naval base became one of the most progressive communities of Japan.

32 Commem Prog, Flt Activ, Yokosuka, Japan, Navy Day, 27 Oct 48.

33 The duties assigned to Fleet Activities, Sasebo, included security, direction of recreational facilities for use of Fleet units based at Sasebo and shore and naval personnel, operation of Radio Sasebo and other available communication facilities, logistic support for shore based naval units and for the 2d Marine Division insofar as practicable, operation of boat pools, and supervision of harbor services and Fleet post office facilities. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, was also responsible for maintaining contact with all former Japanese naval vessels in ports of Kyushu and Shimonoseki. Port Directors, Sasebo, Nagasaki, and Fukuoka were supervised by Fleet Activities, Sasebo.

34 See Ch. VII.

35 Rpt (C), COMINPAC to CNO, 29 May 46, sub: Mine-sweeping Opns Supporting the Occupation of Japan and Korea, 31 Aug 45 to 7 Mar 46.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 The initial Occupation sweeps were completed about the first of November 5945. Channels had been cleared in the Tsugaru Strait, Tokyo, Nagoya, Sendai, Chosi, Wakanoura-Kii Suido, Kochi, Shikoku, and Bungo Suido in the Honshu area, and in harbors of Kagoshima, Nagasaki, Sasebo, Arcadia, Van Diemen Straits, and Kadoura in the Kyushu-Korea area. In the second phase of the mine-sweeping operations, additional Japanese ports required for occupation or repatriation were opened, and facilities of ports already opened to Occupation traffic were expanded.

39 In October the figures had been reduced to 565 vessels and 4573 personnel. (Rpt [C], COMINPAC to CNO, 29 May 46, sub: Opns of Minecraft 5th Flt for Period 35 Aug 45 to 7 Mar 46).

40 Tokyo, Pacific Stars & Stripes, October 24, 1948, p. 10, and June 4, 1949, pp. 8, 9, 11.

41 COMNAVJAP, Comd Narr, 21 Jun to 1 Oct 46 (C), pp. 19-20.

42 COMNAVFE, Comd Narr, 1 Apr-30 Sep 48 (C). Responsibility for the operation of certain categories of vessels was returned to their owners in February 1949, through the General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation. COMNAVFE, however, retained administrative control over these vessels. (COMNAVFE, Comd Narr, 1 Oct 48-31 Mar 49 [C].)

43 See Ch. VI for details of repatriation program as it operated under G-3, GHQ, SCAP.

44 See p. 287.

45 Tokyo, Pacific Stars & Stripes, May 29, 1949.

46 COMNAVJAP Opn Plan 3-46, Annex C (C), 8 Jul 46.

47 An intensive training program was set up and supervised by the US Coast Guard personnel at HQ, USAFIK. On r September 1947 the newly organized Korean Coast Guard assumed responsibility for the illegal shipping patrol in Korean waters, and the US naval forces assigned to COMNAVFE were accordingly reduced by three destroyer escorts. US and British units continued to operate out of Sasebo, Japan, on intermittent patrol for the purpose of interdicting such illegal shipping of southwestern Japan and in Tsushima Strait, and also stood ready to operate in Korean waters if required.

48 After 1 June 1948 operational control of the Japanese Coast Guard was vested in the Maritime Safety Board, operating under the guidance of the Public Safety Division.

49 (1) Its functions were: to enforce laws and orders pertaining to safety of vessels, to establish the qualifications and number of ship's officers required, to assist vessels in distress, to investigate marine disasters, to prevent and suppress crime at sea, to provide service concerning waterways and navigational aids, and otherwise to insure maritime safety. In addition, this bill placed under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Safety Board all former functions of the Secretariat of the Minister of Transportation, the Director General's Secretariat (under General Maritime Bureau), the Maritime Transport Bureau, the Ship Bureau, the Seamen's Bureau, the Commissioners of Marine Courts of Inquiry, the Lighthouse Bureau, and the Hydrographic Bureau. It provided for a fleet of vessels not to exceed 125 in number and limited to a total tonnage of 50,000 gross tons, with no individual vessel having a displacement greater than 1,500 tons or a speed in excess of fifteen knots, and for a total personnel strength not exceeding 10,000, only 720 of whom might be assigned to duty aboard ships. (COMNAVFE, Comd Narr, 1 Apr to 1 Sep 48 [C].) (2) After passage of the Maritime Safety Authorities Bill, COMNAVFE exercised no operational control over the Maritime Safety Board (MSB) except in the custody of ex-naval vessels and mine-sweeping operations. These were only temporary functions of the Maritime Safety Board; control was therefore retained through SCAJAP which functioned as a staff section of COMNAVFE.

50 MAG 31 was ordered to return to the US in June and by October the total aircraft assigned COMNAVJAP had been reduced to only six.

51 COMNAVFE, Comd Narr, 1 Apr to 30 Sep 48 (C).



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