- Chapter XVIII:
Procurement Collaboration With the Navy
The Army Service Forces was by no means
the only military procurement agency during World War II. Within the War
Department the ASF shared procurement and supply duties with the Army Air
Forces, an arrangement that has already been discussed.1
Within the federal government as a whole the ASF shared war procurement
responsibilities with the U.S. Maritime Commission (which contracted for cargo
vessels) and with a number of bureaus in the Department of the Navy.
The Navy bureaus-Ordnance, Ships,
Supplies and Accounts, Yards and Docks, and Aeronautics-were not organized into
a command comparable to that of the ASK Rather, on procurement activities these
bureaus operated under general policies determined by two units of the
Secretary's office the Under Secretary's office (assisted by the General
Counsel) and the Office of Procurement and Material.2
On supply activities the bureaus received instructions from a Vice-Chief of
Naval Operations.
Necessarily there were many common
interests between the ASF and the Navy. Many of the items purchased and used by
the Army and Navy were similar if not identical. Both Army and Navy procurement
officers entered into contracts with the same manufacturing companies.
Contractors in turn needed the same raw materials and component parts in order
to provide Army and Navy supplies. These factors gave the ASF good reason to
seek Navy collaboration on procurement and supply activities. Throughout the
war, General Somervell was a strong advocate of joint action with the Navy, and
after the war he was a firm believer in the unification
of the armed forces under single direction. Some of the difficulties that grew
out of efforts at voluntary co-operation no doubt helped to produce this
attitude.
The Army and Navy Munitions Board might
have become a joint agency for promoting co-operative procurement relationships,
but it practically went out of existence in 1942.3
In 1944 the only reminder of the ANMB that remained was a periodically revised
statement jointly approved by the Production Division,
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ASF, and the Office of Procurement and
Material in the Navy labeled: The Army and Navy Munitions Board List of
Prohibited Items for Construction Work. This was first issued in May 1942 and
the ANMB designation was continued in the succeeding years, even though
meaningless.4
In December 1945 an official announcement was issued by ASF headquarters saying
that "the Army and Navy Munitions Board has been reconstituted." 5
This order implicitly acknowledged that the board had lapsed.
In almost every instance where
procurement cooperation eventually developed between the ASF and the Navy, it
was only after some difficulty had first begun to hamper operations. In many
cases the technicians concerned with a common problem got together and worked
out a solution. Sometimes Army or Navy personnel anticipated a problem and
sought the cooperation of the other. Most relationships were either informal or
were set up to meet a special need. Two examples will illustrate. When the War
Department began its Army Specialized Training Program in December 1942, the
Navy was already using various university facilities throughout the country for
officer and other training programs. For a time, universities and colleges were
able to pit Army and Navy needs
against each other in obtaining the most favorable contract terms for training
facilities. Accordingly, in March 1943 the Under Secretary of War and the Under
Secretary of the Navy signed a joint directive creating a joint Army and Navy
Board for Training Unit Contracts and agreed upon a single individual to be
chairman and to represent both services. The agreement was revised and extended
in August 1943. The second example involved packaging. After long discussions
among staff officers, the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy on 10 February 1945 established a joint Army-Navy Packaging Board to
set up uniform procedure in issuing packing and packaging instructions to
contractors for various kinds of supplies.6
These two examples of jointly solving a special problem's and setting up a
standard practice were not unusual.
Fortunately, a complete and systematic
account of Army and Navy procurement relationships was prepared before the end
of World War II. This report arose out of peculiar circumstances. When in the
autumn of 1943 the War Department began to work closely with the Office of War
Mobilization on policies for contract termination, the Navy was invited to
participate. A joint Contract Termination Board was organized in the Office of
War Mobilization on 11 November 1943 under the chairmanship of Mr. John M.
Hancock. This board consisted of the Secretary of Commerce, the Under
Secretaries of War and the Navy, and representatives of other agencies such as
the WPB, the FEA, and the Treasury Department. A uniform ter-
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mination article to be used in prime
contracts having a fixed price was agreed upon and officially promulgated on 8
January 1944. To meet the need of guidance in terminating fixed price
subcontracts, the board framed and recommended for use a termination article on
21 May 1944. Then a series of four interpretations of the uniform termination
article was agreed upon. Thus, substantially complete understanding was achieved
between the War and Navy Departments on termination policies, except for
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. Thereafter, additional negotiations were begun
in an effort to achieve procedural uniformity in the termination practices of
the two departments. Eventually, on 1 November 1944 a joint Termination
Regulation was issued by the War and Navy Departments. A Joint Termination
Accounting Manual accompanied this regulation. Collaboration was extended even
to the point where one department arranged to settle the terminated contracts of
the other on a company-wide basis. The achievement in the field of contract
termination is probably the most outstanding example of success in the effort to
unify War and Navy procurement activities during World War II. Within the War
Department the entire termination effort was directed by Col. William H. Draper,
Jr., of ASF headquarters. His counterpart in the Navy was Capt. Lewis L.
Strauss.
With the successful conclusion of
Colonel Draper's work, Somervell thought the time propitious for a review of all
Army-Navy procurement relationships. In April 1944 both Under Secretary
Patterson and General Somervell had appeared before the House Select Committee
on Postwar Military Policy to urge unification of the armed forces.7
Somervell hoped Colonel Draper, by
exploring desirable collaborative relations between the Army and Navy, might
make a substantial contribution toward better Army-Navy procurement arrangements
and at the same time, lay the groundwork for the larger problem of service
integration after the war.8
A final report was submitted on 8
February 1945 by Colonel Draper and Captain Strauss and was accompanied by two
volumes of studies on existing procurement relations.9
The Functional Studies of the Draper-Strauss Report described the many different
relationships which had grown up during the war between ASF headquarters and the
Navy. The Mat6riel Studies presented the various collaborative arrangements
existing between the technical services of the ASF, the AAF, and the procurement
bureaus of the Navy. The two types of studies together enumerated most of the
formal and informal contacts between the War and Navy Departments. The number of
these was impressive. Equally noteworthy was the wide variety of measures taken
to bring about common action. In general, they fell into one of four broad
categories. First, the studies indicated extensive exchange of information on
research and development projects and an occasional division of development
responsibility between the Army technical services and the Navy bureaus. Second,
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for a number of different items, Army
technical services procured the requirements as indicated by a Navy bureau,
while Navy bureaus procured certain items for Army technical services. In the
third place, there were a few instances of joint Army-Navy procurement. Finally,
there had been considerable effort to work out joint procurement policies,
specifications, and procedures to be followed by the actual procuring agencies.
Each of these types of collaborative endeavor can be briefly illustrated.
The technical services of the Army and
the procurement bureaus of the Navy exchanged technical information on virtually
all research and development projects of any possible common interest. The
meetings of technical committees in each technical service were ordinarily
attended by Navy representatives, and reports and other development papers were
interchanged on a systematic basis. Frequently, co-operation on research matters
went much farther than attendance at meetings and exchange of reports. The
Ordnance development program is a case in point. The Navy Bureau of Ordnance had
for years done much work in the development of armor plate for ships. Tank
development in the Army brought many of the same problems into Army research and
procurement. The Navy made its heavy armor testing facilities at Dahlgren
Proving Ground available to the Army, while the Ordnance Department in turn made
experimental facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground available to the Navy. All
information from research in ballistics was likewise exchanged between the two
services. The Ordnance Department and the Navy Bureau of Ordnance also divided
up much of the work in developing rockets. Facilities were used in common by
both services, and agreements were made whereby each service would tend to
specialize in a different field of rocket development.10
In the field of communications, the Signal Corps of the Army, on the one hand,
and the Navy Bureau of Ordnance and the Navy Bureau of Ships, on the other,
worked closely together, through the Office of Scientific Research and
Development, in using the private research facilities at Westinghouse, General
Electric, and Western Electric plants. The Joint Communications Board under the
joint Chiefs of Staff was utilized as the agency for co-operation in the
development of radar equipment. This board had nine subcommittees, with
representatives from the two departments directing joint work on the design and
development of equipment for Army and Navy use.11
In 1943 a joint Army-Navy Standardization Committee for Vehicles and
Construction Equipment was established which resulted in agreement on standard
automotive equipment for the two services. The Navy agreed to use Army
specifications for automotive equipment. 12
In 1944 the Chemical Warfare Service was engaged in fourteen research projects
set up and financed by Navy funds. In its turn, the Navy Bureau of Ordnance
stationed Naval officers at both Edgewood Arsenal and Dug-way Proving Ground to
keep in touch with the research developments of the Chemical Warfare Service.13
All of these examples show the procedures used to achieve the maximum benefit
for both services in their common interest in research and development.
In the second place, for a number of
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different items the Navy obtained its
requirements from the Army, while the Navy in turn purchased some items and
delivered them to the Army. Thus the Marine Corps obtained all of its tanks from
the Army. The same was true of small arms, machine guns, and ammunition. Marine
Corps requirements for these items were incorporated in the ASF Army Supply
Program and deliveries were made to the Navy on a reimbursable basis.14
The Bureau of Ships purchased all landing craft for the Army. Early in 1941 the
Office of Production Management designated the Chrysler Corporation to produce
40-mm. antiaircraft guns for both the Army and Navy. In addition, Army arsenals
such as Watertown and Watervliet produced heavy guns for the Navy, while the
Navy frequently produced large guns and heavy ammunition for the Army.15
During the calendar year 1944 approximately 46 percent of the Navy's total
purchases of motor vehicles were obtained directly from the Army.16
The Chemical Warfare Service purchased incendiary bombs, gas masks, protective
materials, and other items for the Navy Department.17
A somewhat different arrangement was employed for the procurement of crawler
tractors and spare parts. In March 1942 the WPB froze all deliveries of tractors
because of competing demands from the military services. Thereafter the WPB
agreed to make 85 percent of all crawler tractor deliveries available to the
armed forces. This was a lump sum allocation and was not divided between the
Army and the Navy. Thereupon the Army Service Forces took the lead in developing
a plan whereby the Corps of Engineers purchased and accepted delivery of all
tractors under the WPB orders. The distribution of these tractors was then
controlled by a War Department Conference
Group for Tractors and Cranes. This committee was composed of representatives
from three bureaus of the Navy, the Marine Corps, seven ASF representatives, the
AAF, and representatives from the War Department General Staff. Working under
the aegis of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), this conference group
agreed upon the division of total deliveries among all the services.18
In all these instances the Army or the Navy was completely responsible for all
procurement, delivering the desired completed items to the other service on a
reimbursable basis.
In the third place, there were a number
of examples of joint procurement operations where the ASF and the Navy bureaus
worked together in the procurement of common items. The foremost example of
joint procurement occurred in the subsistence field. Procurement of all
nonperishable foodstuffs for the Army was directed by The Quartermaster General
through the Chicago depot. This office also let the contracts for the Navy or
assigned portions of contracts to the Navy. The Navy Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts then received grade certificates from the War Food Administration and
gave its contractors separate shipping instructions. Moreover, the Navy paid all
of its food bills directly to contractors. Perishable subsistence items were
bought through Quartermaster market centers and buying offices scattered
throughout the nation. The Navy maintained offices at fifteen of these market
centers and paid
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a proportionate share of the salaries
of civilian employees. The Navy market offices received requirements from Navy
yards and, depots for fresh foodstuffs and then turned these over to the
Quartermaster officers to be incorporated in the Army's buying program. Delivery
instructions to contractors were furnished by Quartermaster officers, but
reports of delivery went to the Navy market officer, who prepared the voucher
and arranged for payment. About 90 percent of all perishable food supplies for
the Navy were thus procured, while 85 percent of Navy nonperishable foodstuffs
were purchased through the Chicago Quartermaster Depot.19
Another joint procurement operation was
established in 1942 for the purchase of lumber for both the Army and Navy.
Because of difficulties in obtaining desired lumber supplies, the chairman of
the ANMB in August 1942 arranged for the creation of the Central Procuring
Agency on Lumber Procurement. The agency was staffed by both Army and Navy
officers but operated under the direction of the Army Chief of Engineers. This
device permitted one agency to present lumber requirements to the War Production
Board and to deal with contractors. The Central Procuring Agency established
various field offices, some of which were in charge of Army personnel and others
in charge of Navy personnel. In all instances both services had men in each
office. Each service paid directly for the lumber delivered to it, but contract
letting, production expediting, and production inspection were handled on a
joint basis under single direction.20
Close co-operation in the procurement of petroleum products was obtained through
the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, another agency of the joint Chiefs
of Staff. This board consolidated Army and Navy requirements for petroleum
products, presented these requirements to the Petroleum Administration for War,
and then designated producers to deliver petroleum products to the Army or Navy.
Joint action was also taken in shipping such products overseas.21
Because of competing demands for diesel engines, a Diesel Engine Subcommittee of
the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Assignments Committee was appointed to schedule
and allot production deliveries to the armed services.22
From 1942 to 1943 a joint Army-Navy Electronics Production Agency expedited
deliveries of tubes and other essential radar equipment.23
In the examples just cited, various co-operative methods were employed by the
two departments to bring about close collaboration in the procurement of
identical supplies. Each maintained certain phases of the procurement process
under its own control, but contracts were let on a joint basis and duplication
of facilities and personnel was avoided.
Finally, ASF headquarters worked
closely with the Chief of Procurement and Material in the Navy Department in
developing joint procurement policies. The outstanding achievement in this field
was the issuance by the two departments of the joint Termination Regulation and
the Joint Termination Accounting Manual, as already related. Another important
achievement in joint Army-Navy action was realized on 22 December 1942 when the
Chief of Procurement and Material of the Navy Department and the command-
[274]
ing general of the ASF established a
joint Army-Navy Committee on Specifications. This committee set up various
subcommittees to work out common specifications for such items as textiles,
chemicals, electronics, engineer equipment, transportation equipment,
communications equipment, medical supplies, photographic supplies, and packing
and packaging materials. No effort was made to duplicate standard federal
specifications. By the end of 1944 there were some 155 joint Army-Navy
specifications in use by both agencies.24
The two departments exchanged considerable information about pricing methods and
policies. Some contact was maintained through the WPB Procurement Policy Board,
but direct communication between pricing officials of the two departments
resulted in the adoption 'of many identical practices. On the other hand, the
two departments used different contract provisions and forms and very different
processes in administering contracts.25
A joint Army and Navy Patent Advisory
Board advised the U.S. Patent Office on which patent applications should be kept
secret for reasons of military security. This was the extent of co-operation in
the patent field.26
To a considerable degree, through
mutual co-operation and discussion, the two departments obtained substantially
uniform insurance policies. Thus both departments followed the same practices in
insuring government-owned property used by contractors, in using a comprehensive
rating plan for workmen's compensation, in providing marine war risk insurance
through the .War Shipping Administration, and in fixing the insurance provisions
for repair time-and-material contracts.27
On 31 March 1943 the Under Secretary
of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy
adopted a joint statement of principles to govern the renegotiation of
contracts. This was worked out in large part by the Renegotiation Division in
ASF headquarters. The two departments then voluntarily created a joint Price
Adjustment Board to fix renegotiation policies and procedures on a continuing
basis. In February 1944, Congress, by law, directed the establishment of a War
Contracts Price Adjustment Board representing all procurement agencies of the
government. The Price Adjustment Board of the War Department included a member
from the Navy, and the Price Adjustment Board of the Navy Department included a
member from ASF headquarters sitting on behalf of the Under Secretary. This
brought about a considerable degree of uniformity in renegotiation procedure.28
In the course of their studies, Colonel
Draper and Captain Strauss found a number of opportunities for further
procurement co-operation between the two departments. Interim Report 1 on 21
December 1944, recommended the creation of a joint Army-Navy Medical Mat6riel
and Specifications Board to design and develop medical equipment, a joint
Purchasing Agency for Medical and Surgical Equipment and Supplies, and a joint
Inspection and Laboratory Service. These recommendations were approved by the
Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of War. A second interim report on
28 December recommended that Army and Navy procurement officers be placed
[275]
in the same office for the procurement
of standard stock items, textiles, clothing, and shoes. This also was approved.
Interim Report 3 on 8 January 1945 recommended the creation of a centrally
located joint Army and Navy Petroleum Purchase Agency. Interim Report 4 on 11
January recommended the immediate establishment of a joint Marine Procurement
Board as a co-ordinating agency between the Navy's Bureau of Ships and the Army
Transportation Corps. Interim Report 5 on 23 January recommended detailed
studies of possible further co-ordination in the procurement of various types of
ordnance materiel. Interim Report 6 resulted in the creation of a joint
Army-Navy Packaging Board to resolve differences between the Army Packaging
Board and the Navy Packaging Board and to insure uniform instructions on packing
and packaging. Interim Report 7 on 1 February merely pointed out that further
co-operation in procurement of electronics equipment seemed desirable, but it
made no recommendations. Interim Report 8 on 5 February pointed to the need for
further co-operation in the procurement of construction machinery and mechanical
equipment and resulted in instructions from the Under Secretary of War and the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for further effort at realizing common basic
specifications and for assignment of procurement to a single agency. Interim
Report 10 on 9 February resulted in instructions from the Under Secretary of War
and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for further study of the advisability of
unifying the procurement of chemical warfare supplies.29
In their final report of 8 February
1945 Colonel Draper and Captain Strauss both agreed that all studies
demonstrated "the need for further co-ordination between the two
departments in procurement." While in some fields of procurement excellent
results had been obtained, in others very little had been accomplished.
Moreover, there was serious danger that the benefits of existing co-operation
might be lost without additional steps to put all of these arrangements "on
a firm and permanent basis." The report stated that the mere creation of
many joint committees and boards was not sufficient. Accordingly, it recommended
the creation of a staff organization patterned after the joint Chiefs of Staff
to insure uniform policies and procedures and to insist upon further
co-operation between the two departments. This joint staff organization was to
be known as the joint Materiel Chiefs and was to function under the direction of
the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The Joint
Materiel Chiefs would consist of the Commanding General, ASF, and the Commanding
General, AAF, or a representative designated by him, and two flag officers
designated by the Secretary of the Navy. Under the Joint Materiel Chiefs would
be a joint Director of Materiel who would establish general policies and
procedures to be followed in some twelve phases of procurement such as
purchasing and pricing, contract forms and procedures, financing of production,
insurance, renegotiation, contract termination, and the disposal of property.
The Joint Director of Materiel would also further co-ordination between the two
departments in item identification, inspection, design and specifications, the
use of facilities, production scheduling, production controls, and the
allocation of materials. He would also supervise co-op-
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erative arrangements between the actual
procurement offices.30
The recommendation for the creation of
the Joint Materiel Chiefs and a joint Director of Materiel was approved by the
Under Secretary of War but was opposed by the Navy Department. At first, in
their joint conferences on the report, Secretary Forrestal indicated his
approval to Under Secretary Patterson .31
Then, after long discussion inside the Navy Department, Secretary Forrestal
changed his mind and decided against action on any of the Draper-Strauss
recommendations. As a result, none of the broad proposals set forth in the
report was carried out.
In individual instances, further
co-operative action was achieved before the end of the war. The Surgeon General
of the Army and the Surgeon General of the Navy established a joint Medical
Materiel and Specification Board with a joint Catalog Branch and a Joint
Specifications Branch in New York City to bring about a greater degree of
interchangeability of medical items. The Quartermaster General and the Navy
Bureau of Supply and Accounts established a joint Purchasing Agency for textile
procurement in New York City and a joint Petroleum Purchasing Agency in
Washington. The creation of these three boards was the chief accomplishment of
the Draper-Strauss report. Little progress was made in attempting to further
co-operation between the Corps of Engineers and the Navy Bureau of Yards and
Docks; likewise, the Ordnance Department and the Navy Bureau of Ordnance opposed
a joint Procurement Agency for Rockets or the establishment of a co-ordinating
board for the two agencies. The Army and Navy Packaging Board made some progress
in developing and publishing joint packaging specifications and instructions for
use by all procurement agencies.32
With the conclusion of hostilities in August 1945 pressure for joint Army-Navy
procurement action came to an end. The whole issue was dwarfed by the larger,
more basic question of a single department of national defense.
Thus, under wartime conditions there
was a good deal of co-operation between the two military departments on
procurement matters. All of this effort was purely voluntary. There were also
instances of non-co-operation, as when the Army cut back 40-mm. ammunition
production at a plant in Erie, Pennsylvania, at the same time that the Navy was
expanding 40mm. ammunition production at a plant in Elgin, Illinois, and when
both bought Tenton bridge trestles from the same manufacturer in Covington,
Kentucky, but set different specifications on the tolerance and spacing of drill
holes. During World War II there never existed any systematic, institutional
device for promoting and directing procurement co-operation by the two
departments. The Draper-Strauss report recommended such machinery but, as
already indicated, no action was taken before the end of the war.
While the Draper-Strauss report was
under consideration General Somervell hoped it would be possible to create joint
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Army-Navy machinery in the procurement
field comparable to that which had been built up under the joint Chiefs of
Staff. He felt that such an arrangement would be entirely feasible, even though
in many respects he was inclined to believe that the JCS machinery was not
entirely satisfactory.
The elaborate structure of committees
and subcommittees functioning under the JCS were all intended to bring about
necessary co-operation between the armed forces in overseas operations. As far
as the Army Service Forces was concerned the most important of these committees
was the Joint Logistics Committee, which reviewed strategic plans in the light
of available supply and transportation resources. Through this and other
committees the various agencies of the War and Navy Departments arrived at a
common understanding of what was to be done. Each department then proceeded more
or less on its own to carry out these agreements. It remained for the single
commander in the field to weld the Army, Navy, and Air Forces components
assigned to his command into a unified military operation.
Somervell was not always satisfied with
these arrangements, as noted earlier. One of the steps he took, through General
Lutes, his deputy, was to persuade Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific to
create a joint Army-Navy staff, with an Army officer in charge of logistics.
Somervell even went further on one occasion when he recommended that there be a
unified Army-Navy supply and transportation system in the Pacific. 33
The Navy was not enthusiastic about the proposal, since the top operations
command of the Navy believed that prospective naval activities in the Pacific
would differ too much from those of the Army to permit a single supply and
transportation service. For example, the Navy was
already planning the "floating" supply system which in 1944 was to
enable combat task forces to remain at sea much longer than previously thought
possible.34
But even so, Somervell was convinced that much waste motion would be avoided by
joint action in overseas supply and transportation, especially as the number of
common problems increased with the establishment of more and more advance bases
in the steady progress across the Pacific .35
Many common Army-Navy concerns in
supply and in non-procurement operations began back in the United States.
Somervell enumerated some of these when he testified before the House Select
Committee on Postwar Military Policy on 26 April 1944.36
An Ocean Shipping Section of the Army and Navy Munitions Board (it was so
designated even though the ANMB had ceased to exist) was a body for bringing
together Army and Navy officials concerned with port operations, especially in
the San Francisco Bay area. In the early days of the war there was considerable
competition between the Army and Navy for piers, warehouses, and other loading
facilities. President Roosevelt spoke to Somervell about the situation on one
occasion, and Somervell went to work at once to push for Army-Navy collaboration
on the
[278]
west coast.37
A Storage Control Board was set up in 1944 to prevent competition for storage
space along the west coast, and some joint use of storage facilities followed. A
joint Military Transportation Committee, on which General Gross represented the
Army, studied ocean shipping plans and adjusted various military cargoes to
available shipping space. An Army-Navy Allocations Committee worked with the War
Shipping Administration in the actual process of allocating cargo vessels to
both services. In San Francisco a Pacific Coast Ship Repair and Conversion
Committee and a joint Routing and Scheduling Committee were set up, representing
the Army, Navy and WSA. Co-operation was complicated by the existence of varying
procedures. The Army exercised a close central control over surface transport
while the Navy left most of the control to the commandants of Naval districts or
to the chiefs of sea frontiers.
In addition to noting these supply and
transportation methods General Somerrvell called the attention of the House
committee to two other arrangements. A Joint Communications Board under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a means for common action on some communications
problems, although no standardization of engineering and operating practices in
this field was ever realized. A Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and
Recreation provided a clearinghouse for exchanging information and materials on
educational and other services to armed forces personnel.
But in Somervell's eyes all of these
arrangements in procurement, in supply, and in other fields, did not seem to go
far enough. Too much depended upon voluntary co-operation, leaving many
important fields uncovered. Thus, there were separate storage operations in the
interior of the United States,
separate maintenance facilities for the repair of automotive and other
equipment, separate rail transportation arrangements, separate hospital systems,
separate construction activities, separate military police practices, separate
fiscal systems, and separate personnel systems.
Like other military officers Somervell
was convinced that the JCS machinery had accomplished much, and he hoped that
joint procurement machinery would extend co-operative arrangements further in
this field. But in the long run, he believed the existing staff structure would
prove inadequate. On this point Somervell joined with others in advocating a
single department of national defense with a single chief of staff and general
staff. He believed that on procurement, supply, and other matters, such a
unified staff could and would do much to establish joint procedures and unified
operations between the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.
Somervell parted company with other
ranking officers of the War Department in his belief that in the future there
should be four component branches of the nation's armed forces: an Army (the
ground forces), a Navy, an Air Force, and a Service Force (to perform
procurement, supply, and many other services for all combat forces).38
His thinking was based upon
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two primary considerations. In the
first place, he believed in 1944 and thereafter as he had believed in 1941, that
procurement and supply were too inextricably combined to warrant two separate
supervisory organizations. He was willing in 1945 to contemplate a joint Chiefs
of Staff and a joint Materiel Chiefs only because on the Army side he expected
to combine procurement and supply in his own person and at the same time be
subordinate on all operational matters to the Army Chief of Staff. As a
long-term proposition, however, he thought this a faulty concept of
organization. Second, he believed that only a single command under one person
would be able to achieve maximum economy in the purchase and supply of common
items of equipment and in the performance of various services for the three
combat forces. In other words, Somervell was so convinced of the usefulness of
the Army Service Forces as a War
Department organizational arrangement that he wished to see it applied to all
the armed forces in terms of a single service force to procure military supplies
and participate in all matters pertaining to national economic mobilization.
Postwar events are not a proper part of
this present volume. It may be interesting to glance beyond 1945, however, to
note that when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed, it did not provide
for a fourth military command, a service force. It did create a Munitions Board
under the Secretary of Defense to exercise some supervision over procurement and
supply operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. While this board had new
fields to conquer, it also operated in fields that had already been explored by
voluntary Army-Navy collaboration and by the Draper-Strauss report.
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