Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the United States into World War II, American and British planners had agreed that in the event of a two-ocean war the Allies would defeat Germany before concentrating against Japan. Nevertheless, by late 1942, American forces had seized the initiative in the Pacific, landing on Guadalcanal and advancing into the South, Southwest, and Central Pacific. The generally subordinate role of the Army to the Navy in the war against Japan, along with the availability of marines for many missions performed by Rangers in Europe, precluded similar operations by the Army except in the Southwest Pacific (SWPA). There, General Douglas MacArthur, the imperious theater chief, and Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commander of the U.S. Sixth Army, made extensive use of guerrillas, scout units, and commando forces, particularly in support of the effort to recapture the Philippine Islands.
The Office of Strategic Services never played a major role in the Pacific. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the overall commander of the Central and South Pacific theaters, limited OSS activities to an intelligence and liaison office in Honolulu. Donovan's envoys were even less successful in their negotiations with the Southwest Pacific Theater. MacArthur and his staff intended to conduct their own brand of special operations in the theater without any interference from a semi-autonomous organization that had its own command channel to Washington. Although the OSS periodically attempted to "penetrate" the theater, MacArthur was able to close his command to Donovan's agency until the last days of the war.1
Despite his coolness to the OSS, MacArthur was generally receptive to special operations. Perhaps the most dramatic and controversial general of World War II, the charismatic SWPA
Page 64
chief possessed a quick, brilliant mind and cosmopolitan outlook; his prewar experience and broad intellectual background gave him a deep appreciation of political and social considerations in the Far East. Emotional and romantic in temperament, MacArthur viewed warfare more in spiritual and moral terms than as a struggle of numbers and resources. His strategic outlook for most of World War II was dominated by a sense of moral obligation, approaching obsession, to regain the Philippines, where he had spent much of his career and had developed many close ties. All of these factors contributed to his outlook on special operations, which he viewed not only as useful supplements to conventional military efforts, but also as a way of maintaining his army's will to fight. A keen student of military history, he was well aware of numerous instances where small units had defeated larger ones and where guerrillas had eroded the ability of conventional forces to fight. His own father had experienced the frustrations of counterguerrilla warfare while leading American troops in the Philippines at the turn of the century.2
Page 65
Guerillas in the Philippines
Even before Pearl Harbor MacArthur, as commander of the forces defending the Philippines, considered the possibility of waging a guerrilla war. Under existing war plans his forces were expected to hold off a Japanese attack for several months before an American relief expedition could reach them. As part of his strategy for such a contingency, MacArthur established an embryo underground intelligence service among the numerous American businessmen, miners, and plantation owners on the islands and also contemplated the withdrawal of some Filipino reservists into the mountains to serve as guerrillas. These initial ideas, however, amounted to little more than tentative proposals. The U.S. Army's lack of a doctrine for guerrilla warfare militated against such a course of action, as did MacArthur's own overestimation of the time available before the Japanese attack and the ability of his regulars and Filipino troops to stop or at least delay the enemy on the invasion beaches. His overconfidence was shared by many American officers in the islands, one of whom boasted that he could whip the Japanese with a company of Boy Scouts.3
When the Japanese invaded the Philippines in mid-December 1941, their rapid advance not only dispelled American delusions of superiority but also left little time to organize guerrilla warfare. By 23 December MacArthur's beach defense plan lay in ruins, and his remaining forces were withdrawing into the Bataan peninsula. Cut off from Bataan, Col. John P. Horan near Baguio, Capt. Walter Cushing along the Ilocos coast, Capt. Ralph Praeger in the Cagayan Valley, and Maj. Everett Warner in Isabela Province formed guerrilla units from the broken remnants of Filipino forces in northern Luzon, and MacArthur sent Col. Claude A. Thorp to organize partisans in central Luzon (Map 6). To meet the need for intelligence from behind enemy lines, Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus organized a network of about sixty agents who infiltrated by foot or by boat across Manila Bay and reported by radio to a central station in a Manila movie theater, which forwarded the data to MacArthur on Corregidor. Meanwhile, MacArthur directed Maj. Gen. William F. Sharp in Mindanao to intensify preparations for guerrilla warfare in the southern islands. When he made his dramatic escape to Australia in March, he hoped to retain control over his remaining units in the Philippines from
Page 66
Page 67
his theater headquarters, forcing the Japanese to defeat each force in turn. Through this command structure he also wanted to encourage a prolonged guerrilla resistance, paving the way for his return.4
The improvised arrangements for guerrilla warfare soon fell apart in the confusion of the surrender. Unaware of the reasons for MacArthur's command structure, Marshall designated Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright as the new commander of all U.S. forces in the Philippines. When Wainwright requested terms for the capitulation of Corregidor in May, the Japanese refused to accept his surrender unless he agreed to order all of the American troops in the Philippines to follow suit. Rationalizing that the guerrillas could do little, Wainwright submitted, sending staff officers to ensure compliance with his orders. Caught in a dilemma between surrender and insubordination, most commanders reluctantly complied, although many permitted their more recalcitrant subordinates to escape. In Mindanao Sharp, fifty-five and lacking the physical and mental stamina for active duty, had little enthusiasm for waging a guerrilla campaign, particularly against the wishes of Wainwright. Despite MacArthur's hopes that he could keep alive the torch of resistance from the southern islands, the American commander of Mindanao and the bulk of his forces thus laid down their arms.5
Those Americans who did not surrender faced a major battle to survive, let alone form a viable guerrilla movement. In addition to Japanese patrols, they had to cope with the tropical climate, disease, low morale, and lack of food, equipment, and other supplies. Col. Russell W. Volckmann noted later that the fugitives tended to fall into three categories: some gave up all hope and merely waited to die; a few resorted to stealing, cheating, and even murder to survive; others seemed to flourish, gaining in strength and determination with each successive challenge. In their wanderings they often found sanctuary at hidden camps deep in the interior, including the Fausett camp in central Luzon and the Deisher camp in the Lanao Province of Mindanao. They also received help from friendly Filipinos, who served as guides and cared for sick Americans who appeared at their doors.6
In this atmosphere of defeat and despair guerrilla chiefs faced a major challenge to their leadership and resourceful-
Page 68
ness.Some, including Horan and Warner, had been uncomfortable with their role and were happy to obey Wainwright's orders to capitulate. The rest, often confused and demoralized about their status, faced the prospect of increased enemy patrols. In October 1942 the Japanese caught and executed Thorp, whose arrogance had alienated many potential supporters. Praeger, unable to care for prisoners, naively released some who subsequently led a patrol to his hiding place. Two other officers who had escaped to northern Luzon, Cols. Martin Moses and Arthur K. Noble, launched a series of hastily arranged ambushes against enemy outposts in October. While meeting some success, the raids aroused the Japanese, who flooded the area with troops and informers. For months the guerrillas found it nearly impossible to obtain food and supplies from frightened civilians. In June 1943 Japanese forces captured the two colonels and subsequently executed them. Not long afterward, an enemy unit in Isabela killed Cushing, and throughout the archipelago Japanese control seemed secure. 7
From the ashes of the early guerrilla organizations a new, native Filipino movement arose. Initially, many Filipinos, bitter at their apparent abandonment by the American government, had collaborated with the Japanese. One American naval lieutenant pessimistically estimated that in the spring of 1942 only about 20 percent of the Filipinos supported the Allied cause. With time, however, Filipino loyalty to the United States reasserted itself. Most Filipinos retained an attachment to Western institutions, including democracy, as well as a familial, almost mystic sense of obligation to America. This attraction to the United States found expression in the idolization of MacArthur, whose dramatic flair, embodied in his promise to return, captured the Filipino imagination. Furthermore, Filipino faith in American promises of independence enabled the United States to draw on the rising strength of Filipino nationalism.8
The brutality of the Japanese occupation policy also aided the growth of the Filipino resistance. At first the Japanese attempted to convert the Filipinos to their cause. A puppet government proclaimed its "independence," while Japanese propaganda invoked Oriental solidarity and lectured the natives on the benefits of membership in the Greater East Asia
Page 69
Photo: Remains of victims of Japanese atrocities in Manila (U.S. Army photograph)
Co-Prosperity Sphere, a Japanese-dominated trade federation. Through a network of "Neighborhood Associations" the Japanese sought to keep an eye on strangers and to make village leaders responsible for the actions of their people. Such measures enjoyed only limited success. Filipinos readily perceived that the authority of the puppet government extended only as far as the reach of the Japanese Army and police, and the puppet police force often cooperated with the resistance. More important, Japanese promises of prosperity and brotherhood contrasted sharply with the local economic depression and deplorable treatment of Filipinos by the occupation force. With time, Japanese occupation policy grew more vicious, particularly as U.S. forces drew closer. Unable to bring the guerrillas to battle, Japanese soldiers and secret police took out their frustrations on the populace, mistreating civilians, burning villages, seizing hostages, and torturing and murdering captives. By the time of the American invasion in 1944 atrocities had become
Page 70
widespread, and hatred of the Japanese throughout the islands was almost complete.9
As Filipino sentiment hardened against the occupation, guerrilla bands formed spontaneously. Many traced their origins to vigilante groups formed by communities to preserve order in the lawless aftermath of the Japanese victory. After suppressing local bandits, they often turned their arms against the occupation forces. Some minority groups, such as the Hukbalahaps in central Luzon, sought political and social reforms in addition to freedom from the occupation. Others, led by a variety of adventurers and desperadoes, plundered civilians rather than fight the Japanese. The strength and character of each band reflected its leadership, the local strength and activities of occupation forces, and the terrain in which it operated. Scattered randomly along the coasts and interior valleys, they all faced nearly insurmountable communications and supply problems, which, in turn, exacerbated the question of command. Although in theory almost all submitted to SWPA direction, they quarreled incessantly over questions of local authority, often maintaining competing intelligence nets within each other's jurisdiction.l0
In the prevailing anarchic situation many groups turned for leadership to those Americans, both military and civilian, who had somehow managed to escape capture by the Japanese. Although many Americans were perfectly content to remain in hiding for the rest of the war, others accepted such roles with alacrity. Those who did faced a major task in maintaining control and keeping a force in the field, let alone fighting the Japanese. While Americans played a major role in guerrilla movements on Cebu,Leyte, Marindaque, and in central Luzon, the two most influential American guerrilla leaders were Lt. Col. Wendell W. Fertig on Mindanao and Col. Russell W. Volckmann in northern Luzon. 11
On Mindanao Fertig used geography and a relatively early contact with MacArthur's headquarters in Australia to build the largest guerrilla organization in the Philippines (Map 7). Although Mindanao's large area, rugged terrain, and limited road net made centralized command difficult, these factors also hampered punitive operations and tended to confine the small Japanese garrison to a few coastal cities and towns. Leadership
Page 71
was also essential, and in Fertig the movement found a chief with the magnetism, political skills, and flexibility necessary to survive and grow. A former mining engineer and Army Reserve officer, lanky, red-bearded, somewhat aloof Coloradan possessed courage, a sense of mission, and a keen sensitivity to the Filipino point of view. From the beginning he recognized the need for the Filipinos to provide the foundation of the movement without outside coercion. After the surrender he had remained in the interior of Lanao Province while rival groups formed around the island. In September 1942 Capt. Luis Morgan, a former police officer who had become a guerrilla chieftain, offered the command of his forces to Fertig on condition that he become chief of staff with command in the field. Fertig accepted and established his base in the province of Misamis Occidental.
Once in command Fertig displayed an instinct for consolidating and expanding his control over the movement. After sending Morgan on a liaison mission to neighboring guerrilla commanders, Fertig negotiated an alliance with Morgan's Moslem rivals, the fierce Moros of Lanao, and with the Catholic Church. Taking the rank of brigadier general to impress the Filipinos, he recruited and trained a force that even included an engineer corps, a commando school, and a makeshift navy. He installed a civilian government, drafted labor, and built a communications network. While consolidating his own organization, he also contacted other guerrilla leaders on Mindanao and nearby islands and, through persuasion and his assumed rank, brought many under his authority. Fertig frequently clashed with other equally ambitious chiefs, particularly Macario Peralta on Panay, but his leverage was greatly strengthened by the establishment of radio communication with the Southwest Pacific Theater in February 1943 and by MacArthur's subsequent recognition of him as the military commander on Mindanao. As he received and distributed supplies, his authority expanded, and he divided Mindanao into geographic divisions, each under an American chief. By May Fertig's army and government were operating openly to such an extent that life in the province had returned to prewar normality, except for the presence of fully uniformed guerrillas in the streets of Misamis City and on the waters of Panguil Bay.
Page 72
Page 73
Faced with an open challenge to their authority, the Japanese attacked in June, landing troops at several points along the Misamis coast and advancing from Panguil toward Pagadian Bay in an attempt to cut off Misamis Occidental from the rest of Mindanao. Although Fertig had laid plans for his troops to give ground and use hit-and-run raids against the Japanese flanks and rear, his forces quickly broke and ran in the face of the enemy onslaught. Fertig himself fled to Lanao Province, where he found refuge with the Moros and began rebuilding his guerrilla force. He maintained his support among the opportunistic Moro tribes in part through distribution of a Life magazine article in which King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia allied Islam with the United States. While with the Moros, Fertig had a final showdown with his chief of staff. Jealous of Fertig's power and prestige in the movement, Morgan had been acting increasingly mutinous since the Japanese attack on Misamis. Fertig finally removed him from the picture by sending him on a seemingly prestigious mission to Australia.
The American guerrilla leader had little chance to savor his
Page 74
victory. For over a year he repeatedly moved his headquarters, always managing to stay ahead of Japanese patrols. From Lanao he moved east to the Agusan Valley, established a base, and supervised the distribution of material from Australia to guerrillas on Mindanao and the surrounding islands. Seeking to cut off the flow of supplies, the Japanese launched an offensive up the Agusan in December. The guerrillas lacked the arms, ammunition, and training to do more than delay the Japanese, and Fertig moved his headquarters farther upstream. By April 1944 Japanese reinforcements were pouring into Mindanao, and enemy commanders were laying plans to wipe out the guerrillas before the anticipated U.S. invasion of the island. Cut off from supplies and forced into the barren highlands of Bukidnon Province, Fertig and his followers faced extinction. When American bombers began their raids on Mindanao in August, however, the Japanese withdrew from the interior and concentrated on preparation of beach defenses, permitting the guerrillas to regain control of most of the island.l2
Compared to those on Mindanao, the guerrillas of northern Luzon enjoyed little communication with MacArthur's headquarters, but they also benefited from favorable terrain, resourceful leadership, and popular support. The cool, healthful climate, pine-covered mountains, few roads, and self-sufficient native villages of the region proved conducive to guerrilla operations. Like Fertig, Volckmann, an energetic, personable West Pointer and former instructor of the Philippine Army's 11th Infantry Regiment, displayed political skills essential for success. In retrospect, his achievements seem all the more impressive since, like other American officers, he had never been exposed to the techniques and policies of guerrilla warfare. Accompanied by Capt. Donald D. Blackburn, Volckmann had escaped from Bataan and joined the guerrilla movement of Colonels Moses and Noble in northern Luzon. Following the abortive uprising in the fall of 1942, Volckmann and Blackburn had hidden among friendly natives in Ifugao Province, where they assembled a band of renegade Filipino soldiers and gradually reestablished contact with other groups.
After the capture of Moses and Noble in June 1943, Volckmann assumed command of the movement in northern Luzon and soon demonstrated that he had learned much from their mistakes. In accordance with orders from MacArthur's head-
Page 75
quarters, he concentrated on the development of an organization and intelligence net, avoiding major clashes with the Japanese. To gain public confidence and support, he brought rival tribes and factions together through personal diplomacy and instituted a crackdown against bandits who were looting and plundering the natives. Faced with an extensive Japanese network of spies and informers, he and his subordinates also launched a ruthless counterespionage campaign to eliminate the collaborators. Guerrilla agents infiltrated the Neighborhood Associations and the constabulary to identify the informers. Within six months those not executed had fled to the protection of Japanese garrisons. Once it became safe to support the guerrillas, Volckmann noted that "the so-called 'fence-sitters' began toppling in the right direction." 13
Having ensured popular support, Volckmann and his officers could develop the guerrilla organization, which they kept separate from the intelligence net. Dividing northern Luzon into seven districts, he placed each under a commander who was responsible for maintaining popular support and for organizing a unit along the lines of a Philippine Army regiment. For his officer corps he relied heavily on escaped American
Page 76
and Filipino officers on American miners from the region. Keeping their units in camps at a safe distance from the villages to maintain discipline, these officers trained their recruits in ambushes, demolitions, and night operations. Although they obeyed the SWPA directive against large-scale clashes, they periodically conducted a series of small ambushes to capture supplies and to build confidence among the troops. With time, the guerrilla fighting organization became quite elaborate, including engineer and hospital units and even artillery. However, Volckmann usually kept heavier weapons from his units to preserve their mobility. The guerrillas also developed a communications network of courier stations and even built a series of airstrips for future liaison with U.S. forces.14
Volckmann tried but failed to extend his organization into central Luzon. Here the guerrilla movement continued to be plagued by internecine rivalries that prevented it from achieving its full potential. In central Luzon the guerrillas had to cope with more open terrain, a more extensive road network, and a much larger Japanese presence than was the case in northern Luzon and Mindanao. Consequently, they kept their activities at a low level, concentrating on sabotage and intelligence when they were not battling one another. After Thorp's capture, Col. Hugh Straughan attempted to unite the various groups but was betrayed by jealous rivals and captured in August 1943. In Tayabas and Bulacan provinces Capt. Bernard Anderson and 1st Lt. Edwin Ramsey built a large organization that stressed psychological operations, intelligence, and sabotage. To the north Capt. Robert Lapham, a dashing young cavalry officer who had led the remnants of Thorp's forces in Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan provinces, rejected Volckmann's attempts to extend the authority of the northern Luzon command over his area.15
The guerrilla movement on Cebu also had to overcome major obstacles. Long, narrow, and almost completely deforested, Cebu hardly furnished an ideal environment for guerrilla operations; even in peacetime the island imported food for its large population. Nevertheless, by mid-1942, a movement had emerged under Lt. Col. James Cushing, a former mining engineer, and Harry Fenton, an ex-radio announcer with a burning hatred for the Japanese. The two agreed to a joint
Page 77
command under which Fenton handled administration and Cushing commanded in the field. By mid-1943, however, Fenton's paranoia and indiscriminate executions of suspected collaborators had turned the public against him and in favor of the more charismatic Cushing. While Cushing was visiting Negros in September 1943, his subordinates mutinied and executed Fenton. When Cushing returned, he suppressed the mutiny and rebuilt the organization, despite a lack of food and Japanese punitive operations. By April 1944 he had assembled a force of about 5,000 men and developed an effective intelligence network. He also demonstrated a sensitivity to the population, releasing a captured Japanese admiral rather than expose the natives to the reprisals of search parties.16
While the guerrillas struggled to survive and build their organizations, their constant appeals for help had been reaching SWPA headquarters, 3,500 miles to the south in Australia. In July 1942 SWPA technicians picked up a weak signal from the remnants of Warner's force in northern Luzon. During the
Page 78
autumn further radio signals from Praeger in northern Luzon and Peralta on Panay confirmed the existence of an incipient guerrilla movement. According to Col. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's confidant, "Probably no message ever gave MacArthur more of an uplift." 17 Obsessed with his "second homeland," the SWPA chief closely followed developments and personally interviewed American refugees who began to arrive in the autumn of 1942. In October Capts. William L. Osborne and Damon J. Cause, who had escaped from Corregidor, arrived off northern Australia in a small fishing boat. Two months later 1st Lt. Frank H. Young, an emissary from Thorp, and Capr. Charles M. Smith of Fertig's organization brought information on the guerrillas in central Luzon and Mindanao. Thus, by early 1943, MacArthur's headquarters knew that a movement existed but possessed little information on the leading personalities and Japanese counterguerrilla methods.18
In late 1942 and early 1943 MacArthur's theater command dispatched liaison parties into the Philippines to establish direct contact with the guerrillas and to obtain more information about their organization. Most of these activities were supervised by the Allied Intelligence Bureau, which was established under the SWPA intelligence section to collect information through clandestine operations in enemy territory. In December 1942 Capt. Jesus A. Villamor, a Filipino pilot with a distinguished record in the early days of the war, landed from a submarine on Negros with instructions to organize an intelligence net throughout the islands. As a national hero, Villamor could not appear publicly without recognition, but from a secret retreat he created a network that extended through Luzon and the Visayas. Meanwhile, Lt. Cmdr. Charles "Chick" Parsons landed in Mindanao in March 1943 to contact Fertig and evaluate his organization. On the same trip he installed a coastwatcher station on Leyte and helped unify the guerrillas on that island under Col. Ruperto Kangleon. Other SWPA emissaries established radio stations in Mindanao, and one even traveled to Manila to reach the underground there.19
Having established liaison with the guerrillas, MacArthur's headquarters now had to decide how to use them. As a command structure for the movement, the theater used the old Philippine Army districts, each under a guerrilla chief who had demonstrated his authority in the district, as well as the sincer-
Page 79
ity and resources for effective operations against the Japanese. In March 1943 theater headquarters further directed that the guerrillas "lie low" and concentrate on organization and intelligence. While this order seemed sensible at the time, it created problems for guerrilla commanders who found it hard to remain idle in the face of popular demand for action against the brutal occupation. In part, the directive reflected continuing uncertainty over the eventual role of the movement. Col. Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's domineering intelligence chief, discounted the value of the guerrillas except as providers of information. On the other hand, Whitney, a former Manila lawyer and the new director of the Philippine Regional Section (PRS) within the intelligence staff, argued for an expanded supply program and more aggressive exploitation of the guerrilla potential. More often than not, Whitney's view prevailed, largely due to MacArthur's emotional commitment to the guerrillas. Indeed, through Whitney's influence with MacArthur, the section achieved an almost autonomous status.20
Under Whitney's leadership the Philippine Regional Section acquired and trained personnel to penetrate the islands, expanded intelligence nets, and arranged for the shipment of supplies to the guerrillas. From Filipino regiments stationed in the United States Whitney selected about 400 men, who received training in communications, intelligence, and sabotage and formed parties to penetrate the Philippines. Many helped man the network of 134 radio stations that the section established throughout the islands by October 1944. The section also tried to complete SWPA's intelligence network in the Philippines. Perhaps because of American reluctance to trust a Filipino-run network, Whitney's agency neglected the Villamor operation in favor of American-run nets, using personnel from Australian bases. In November 1943 the section dispatched Smith to Samar and Maj. Lawrence H. Phillips to Mindoro to install radio stations and intelligence nets. A Japanese patrol killed Phillips, but in July 1944 Lt. Cmdr. George Rowe reestablished the station on Mindoro.21
Because of lack of communication with Luzon and lack of material support to networks in the southern Philippines with contacts on Luzon, MacArthur's headquarters did not develop the vast intelligence potential of the island until late 1944. With the capture of Praeger's radio in early 1943 the guerrillas
Page 80
in Luzon had lost contact with Australia. Nevertheless, remnants of the old de Jesus organization remained intact, and Villamor, Fertig, Parsons, and Peralta all established intelligence nets with extensive contacts on Luzon, including the highest levels of the puppet government. The Philippine Regional Section, however, went ahead with its own plans to establish nets through the radio stations on Mindoro and Samar.In April 1944 Smith, on Samar, sent 2d Lt. William Ball to install a radio station in the central Luzon province of Tayabas. Ball contacted guerrilla leaders in central Luzon and, through Lapham, got in touch with Volckmann in the northern part of the island. To help develop these contacts, the section dispatched specially equipped and trained parties of officers to various guerrilla leaders on the island.22
One of the liaison parties dispatched to Luzon by the Philippine Regional Section included Maj. Jay D. Vanderpool. While serving in the 25th Infantry Division's intelligence section on New Caledonia, he had responded to an SWPA request for each division to nominate an officer of field grade rank for a hazardous mission. After an intensive briefing by Whitney, Vanderpool, Capt. George Miller, and a number of experts in demolitions, communications, and meteorology boarded a submarine in October 1944 for a trip to Volckmann's area in northern Luzon. When they encountered heavy Japanese activity off the rendezvous, their superiors in Australia diverted them to Anderson in east central Luzon. While Miller joined a large band of guerrillas under an ex-policeman who took the pseudonym of Marking, Vanderpool weathered a hazardous journey, hiding in churches and slipping past Japanese patrol boats on Laguna de Bay, to reach the ROTC Hunters, a Filipino-led guerrilla force in the region south of Manila. Perceiving his role to be more a coordinator than a commander Vanderpool arranged the flow of supplies from Australia and worked to bring the feuding guerrilla groups in the area into an alliance against the Japanese. His stature grew to such an extent that Japanese intelligence soon concluded that he was a major general.23
By the time Vanderpool arrived on Luzon the supply effort had already grown to major proportions. The guerrillas had improvised skillfully, distilling alcohol for fuel, making bullets from curtain rods, and printing currency on the back of wall
Page 81
Photo: USS Narwhal, a submarine that ran supplies to the Filipino guerrillas (U.S. Navy photograph)
paper, but they desperately needed a regular source of supplies. Through his influence with MacArthur, who continued to take a personal interest in the effort, Whitney obtained carbines, ammunition, radios, medical supplies, and such propaganda items as chocolate, cigarettes, gum, pencils, and newspapers, each bearing MacArthur's pledge, "I shall return." To transport this material to the Philippines, Whitney turned to Lt. Cmdr. Charles "Chick" Parsons. Since running away to the Philippines at age nineteen, the colorful Parsons, an officer in the Navy Reserve, had dabbled in several different businesses and developed a large network of contacts throughout the islands. Using submarines detailed from Seventh Fleet, including two cargo-carrying monsters, his "Spy Squadron" began smuggling supplies into the island by night under the noses of Japanese patrol boats. In all, nineteen submarines delivered 1,325 tons of supplies to the guerrillas between 1943 and 1945.24
The Alamo Scouts
While Whitney's section built up the guerrilla forces in anticipation of the day of liberation, Krueger's Sixth Army was
Page 82
forming special units to aid its drive through the Southwest Pacific to the Philippines. Faced with a need for specific, reliable information in the dense jungles of the theater, Sixth Army in November 1943 activated the Alamo Scouts to obtain strategic intelligence and to perform other covert operations within Sixth Army's operational area. At Krueger's direction volunteers selected for courage, stamina, adaptability, and intelligence assembled at Fergusson Island off the southeast tip of New Guinea; reflecting anticipation of future operations, they included several Filipino-Americans. For four weeks they endured long marches, swimming tests, weapons training, and instruction in communications, navigation, rubber boats, and hand-to-hand combat; they then participated in two weeks of field exercises, including landings from PT boats under live fire. Survivors of this regimen, through secret ballots, named the fellow trainees with whom they would most like to serve. On this basis, Sixth Army formed teams of one officer and six or seven enlisted men.
Beginning in February 1944, ten teams carried out about sixty covert missions without the loss of a single man. Operating under Sixth Army's intelligence section, they reconnoitered beaches, observed enemy movements and garrisons, spotted for air strikes, and organized and trained guerrillas. Infiltrating by seaplane, parachute, submarine, or PT boat, they generally stayed in the field for three to five days, although they often remained in the field for longer periods when operating with guerrillas. They avoided combat, except when essential to their mission. In October 1944, for example, two scout teams landed in darkness from PT boats to rescue thirty-two natives from a prison camp at Moari, New Guinea. Within thirty minutes, they rescued the captives and eliminated the Japanese garrison without losing a man.25
The 6th Ranger Battalion'
For larger-scale special operations, particularly amphibious raids and diversions, Sixth Army, at MacArthur's direction, formed the 6th Ranger Battalion in January 1944. Elite Marine Raider formations, which conducted raids and spearheaded amphibious landings in the South Pacific, may well have inspired the creation of the unit, but Sixth Army based its orga-
Page 83
nization on that of the Rangers in Europe. To form the unit, Krueger converted the 98th Field Artillery Battalion, a pack outfit which had been idle since its arrival in the theater in January 1943. The artillerymen, restless from their long inactivity, were given the choice of Ranger duty or the replacement depot; most elected to stay, and volunteers from the depots soon filled out the unit. To command the battalion, Krueger chose Lt. Col. Henry A. Mucci, a 33-year-old West Pointer and former provost marshal of Honolulu. Short and stocky, with a trim mustache, piercing eyes, and a personal magnetism undiminished by a receding hairline and professorial pipe, the new commander demonstrated that he could more than keep up with his troops in the rigorous training program that followed. 26
Although the new Rangers may well have been impatient for action, they still faced over nine months of training before combat. In a sparse camp among the hills near Port Moresby,
Page 84
New Guinea, Mucci whipped his new charges into shape with a series of five-mile runs before breakfast, twenty-mile hikes, and races up a rather aptly named "Misery Knoll." Games, swimming, mass exercises, and an obstacle course completed the conditioning regimen. The Rangers also received instruction in weapons, communications, patrolling, scouting, and night operations. In June they moved to Finschhafen for unit and amphibious training, stressing night landings and the use of rubber boats. By the time of the battalion's official activation in September 1944 it was fully ready to participate in MacArthur's return to the Philippines.27
The Liberation of the Philippines
On 17-18 October the 6th Ranger Battalion seized three islands that guarded the entrances to Leyte Gulf, clearing the way for Sixth Army's invasion of Leyte on 20 October. Encountering little opposition on Dinagat and Homonhon is-
Page 85
lands, the Rangers installed beacons to guide the invasion fleet through the channel between them. On Suluan Island Capt. Arthur D. "Bull" Simons, commanding Company B. found the Japanese in a lighthouse surrounded by imposing cliffs on three sides and a steep trail on the fourth. In a daring night attack part of the company cut off a security detachment at the foot of the trail while the other Rangers climbed the cliffs, struck the surprised garrison from the rear, and annihilated them. Having accomplished its mission, the battalion moved to Leyte where it patrolled rear areas and served as a guard for Krueger's headquarters.28
In its advance across Leyte Sixth Army received invaluable aid from the guerrillas and Alamo Scouts. Reflecting SWPA's perception of their primary role, Kangleon's guerrillas operated under the intelligence section of Sixth Army, but they contributed much more to the success of the invasion. Prior to
Page 86
the American attack, they moved civilians from the landing areas to safety, and they later ambushed Japanese troops retreating inland from the invasion beaches. Once American forces had landed, the guerrillas provided intelligence, served as guides, harassed Japanese units, and mopped up bypassed detachments, releasing American troops for other duties. While the guerrillas vented their pent-up hatred for the enemy, the Alamo Scouts performed long-range reconnaissance of Japanese positions on Leyteand the surrounding islands. Scout teams landed on Samar, Masbate, and the Surigao peninsula of Mindanao to reconnoiter beaches, to watch enemy coastal traffic at key straits, and to organize guerrillas. One team landed on the north coast of Poro Island to establish a radio and coastwatcher station overlooking the sea approaches to Ormoc, the last Japanese stronghold on Leyte. Although bypassed Japanese detachments continued to fight for some time, the fall of Ormoc on 10 December freed MacArthur to turn his attention to Luzon.29
Following Sixth Army's unopposed landing on Luzon on 9 January 1945, American forces raided the Japanese prison camp at Cabanatuan (Map 8). The attack marked the high point of cooperation between Rangers, guerrillas, Alamo Scouts, and conventional American combat units. Ever since Lapham had notified Sixth Army of the camp's existence soon after the landing on Luzon, Krueger and his staff had been concerned about the situation of the prisoners there. When Sixth Army's spearheads were within twenty-four miles of the camp, Krueger's intelligence chief, Col. Horton White, called in Mucci and three scout team leaders and assigned to them the mission of freeing the prisoners. After the scouts went ahead to reconnoiter the position, a reinforced company of 107 Rangers infiltrated Japanese lines near Guimba in the early afternoon of 28 January. Guided by the guerrillas, the Rangers hiked through forests and open grasslands, narrowly avoiding a Japanese tank on the national highway by following a ravine that ran under the road. At Balincarin on the twentyninth, 1st Lt. Thomas Rounsaville and 1st Lt. William Nellist of the scouts notified Mucci of heavy traffic around the compound, causing the Ranger chief to postpone the raid until the evening of the thirtieth. While the Rangers rested at the village
Page 87
of Platero, the scouts conducted further reconnaissance from a nipa hut across the road from the camp.
The skillful reconnaissance and careful planning paid off in a swift, well-executed attack. In the early evening of the thirtieth the Rangers began their approach march, crawling across the last mile of open rice fields to take up a position on two sides of the camp. While one platoon, on signal, eliminated the guards in the rear and on one side of the stockade, another broke through the main gate to rake the garrison's quarters with automatic fire, and a third broke into the prisoners' section and liberated the astonished captives, most of whom had to be carried to freedom. Within half an hour the Rangers had destroyed the installation, killing about 200 Japanese guards and rescuing over 500 prisoners at the cost of two dead and seven seriously wounded. Covered by the guerrillas, who stopped an enemy relief effort northeast of the camp, the column of Rangers and liberated prisoners finally reached
Page 88
friendly lines by the following morning. The feat was celebrated equally by MacArthur's soldiers, Allied correspondents, and the American public, for the raid had touched an emotional nerve among Americans concerned about the fate of the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor.30
For the rest of the war the 6th Ranger Battalion performed a variety of necessary, if unspectacular, military odd jobs in Luzon. Operating in groups of platoon, company, or task force size, they conducted long-range reconnaissance and a few raids, mopped up bypassed pockets of resistance, and served as a headquarters guard. In their operations behind enemy lines they often received aid from partisans and friendly natives. Near Baguio in March two companies worked with Volckmann's guerrillas in a reconnaissance of enemy rear areas, and in June Company B and some of Blackburn'sguerrillas, as part of a task force, seized the port of Aparri and a nearby airfield, clearing the way for the landing of the 11th Airborne Division. Under the watchful eye of Krueger and Col. Clyde D. Eddleman, Sixth Army operations chief, the Rangers never performed line infantry missions, but their concept of proper Ranger tasks was so broad as to defy definition.31
Following Cabanatuan, the Alamo Scouts continued their collaboration with the guerrillas. In February Lieutenant Nellist's team landed on the Legaspi peninsula, south of Manila, to obtain information on beaches and enemy movements in the area. Taking command of the guerrillas in the Sorsogon region, Nellist and his scouts organized and equipped the partisans, who harassed the Japanese until the landing of the 158th Regimental Combat Team in early April. Two other scout teams deployed to Tayabas Province in March to establish radio stations and observe the retreat of Japanese units attempting to escape from southern Luzon before the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division cut the island in two. Both teams called in numerous air strikes on the withdrawing enemy and his supply dumps in the region. To the north Lieutenant Rounsaville's team reconnoitered the Ilagan area, called in air strikes on Japanese positions, and helped to complete the roadwatcher network of the partisans after arriving at a guerrilla airfield in mid-April.32
Page 89
In addition to their work with the Rangers and Alamo Scouts, Volckmann's guerrillas in northern Luzon were not only providing intelligence but also proving their value as combat troops. Prior to the landing on Luzon Volckmann had notified MacArthur's headquarters that the assault would meet no opposition. As Sixth Army came ashore Volckmann's guerrillas went into action, blowing bridges, cutting telephone wires, and attacking isolated garrisons. Faced with pressure from Krueger's conventional forces, the Japanese could not counter this threat to their communications and soon began to feel the lack of supplies. By June each of Volckmann's five regiments had largely cleared its district of enemy forces, and the guerrillas turned to more conventional tactics to root out the remaining Japanese defenders. After a tough fight among mountain peaks against entrenched positions, three guerrilla regiments, aided by a battalion of U.S. field artillery, captured
Page 90
Bessang Pass on 14 June, opening the way into the interior of northern Luzon where the Japanese were preparing for a final stand. The guerrillas joined the final assault on the Japanese mountain strongholds, fighting alongside American units up to the surrender on 15 August. Their performance won praise from American commanders, and MacArthur later equated their contribution to that of a frontline division.33
Few other guerrillas matched the performance of Volckmann's men. In central Luzon Marking's guerrillas overran a number of prepared positions in support of the 11th Airborne Division's drive toward the Ipo Dam, but such performances were rare. Most guerrilla organizations were plagued by internal rivalries and lacked the heavy equipment, leadership, training, and combat experience to perform conventional combat missions. Their inability to attack fixed positions sometimes confirmed the prejudices of more skeptical officers, who grumbled that the guerrillas would rather eat than fight. On the other hand, the guerrillas performed a wide variety of secondary tasks, guiding U.S. forces, harassing Japanese movements, assisting downed pilots, guarding captured areas, and eliminating bypassed enemy detachments, actions that released badly needed U.S. troops for other duties. On Mindanao, for example, Fertig's guerrillas seized the beaches at Macajalar Bay and Malabang in advance of Eighth Army's landings and guarded the 24th Infantry Division's communications in the drive on Davao; on Cebu, Cushing's 8,500 guerrillas helped mop up Japanese units. While guerrilla reports were often exaggerated and unreliable, they did constitute the single most important source of intelligence for U.S. forces. In short, they made a major, if not decisive, contribution to the eventual victory.34
Despite the collapse of MacArthur's early plans for guerrilla warfare and the lack of enthusiasm among many of his subordinates for such a program, the cooperation and coordination between guerrillas, commandos, and conventional forces was much more effective in the Southwest Pacific than in Europe. In both Europe and the Pacific popular support, intensified by the enemy's repressive occupation policies, created the proper climate for special operations. The need for troops to spearhead amphibious landings was also evident in both theaters. In the Southwest Pacific, however, unity of command and the
Page 91
personal interest of the commander, along with favorable terrain, combined to produce a remarkably favorable environment for special operations. The Southwest Pacific Theater was thus able to integrate the efforts of the Filipino guerrillas with those of the Alamo Scouts and to achieve better results in terms of their support of the invasion and ensuing U.S. ground campaign. The same factors enhanced the performance of the Ranger battalion, and the Rangers were able to undertake a variety of missions, which varied according to the demands of the tactical situation. Special operations thus played a much greater role in combat operations in the Pacific than in Europe, and the entire experience pointed the way toward a future operational doctrine that made more effective use of these types of military efforts.
1. Roosevelt, War Report of the Oss, 2: 358, 365; D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 2: 510-11; Smith, OSS, pp. 250-51.
2. James, The Years of MacArthur, 1: 557-59, 571-75, 2: 90-91, 153-54; Stanley L. Falk, "Douglas MacArthur and the War Against Japan," in William M. Leary, ea., We Shall Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), pp. 1-2.
3. David J. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 21-22; U.S. Army, GHQ, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation, 2 vols., 1: 1, Center of Military History (CMH); James, The Years of MacArthur, 1: 609; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 69; Royce Wendover Diary, 15 Dec 41 entry, USAMHI; MS, Robert Ross Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency [1963], p. 31, CMH.
4. Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New York: Norton, 1954), pp. 29-35; Larry S. Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement on Mindanao During the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945" (M.A. thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), p. 65; U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, 1: 2-4; U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officers Oral History Program: Project 83-9: Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn USA (Ret.) (hereafter cited as Blackburn interview), 1983, pp. 85, 122, USAMHI; Offcial Report of LTC Everett Lauman Warner, in Philippine Archives (1A), Invasion and Surrender, Box 2, RG 407, NARA;James, The Years of MacArthur, 2: 91, 105, 141-42.
5. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall Ordeal and Hope (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 256; James, The Years of MacArthur, 2: 105, 149; Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1946), pp. 130-31, 145; Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, CNO, Dept. Navy, 14 Sep 44, pp. 1, 9, in HRC Geog. S. Philippines 370.64 Guerrilla Activities, Historical Records Branch, CMH.
6. Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 48, 64, 69-70; Donald D. Blackburn, "War Within a War: The Philippines, 1942-1945," Conflict 7, no. 2 (1987): 131-32; Deisher-Couch Papers, USAMHI; Royce Wendover Diary, USAMHI.
7. Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 35-36, 88-89, 108, 119; Blackburn interview, pp. 50, 86-90, 104-09, 121-22, 170-71; U.S. Army, GHQ, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, 2 vols., 1: 9, CMH; Blackburn, "War Within a War," pp. 133-41; MS, Robert Ross Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency, pp. 31, 43.
8. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II, pp. 2, 4, 14-16, 38, 57, 71, 104, 167, 174; James, The Years of MacArthur, 2: 91.
9. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II, pp. 4, 56-60, 94-95; Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement," pp. 31-32; documents in HRC Geog. S. Philippines 370.64 Guerrilla Warfare— I.eyte, Historical Records Branch, CMH; John Keats, They Fought Alone (New York: Lippincott, 1963), pp. 80, 221, 345-46, 349-50; Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), pp. 146-47;
Page 93
Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 104-05; reports of punitive operations in Box 538, PA, Guerrillas as Seen by Japanese, Box 538, RG 407, NARA.
10. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II, pp. 93-94; Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, CNO, Dept. Navy, 14 Sep 44, pp. 1, 7, 12-13 and Thomas M. Scoville, Guerrillas in the Philippines During World War II [1969], pp. 1-5, both in HRC Geog. S. Philippines 370.64 Guerrilla Activities, Historical Records Branch, CMH; Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement," p. 79; Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, pp. 87-90; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 74; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla Soldiers of the Philippines (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1945), pp. 27-29.
11. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, vol. 1; see also Schmidt, "American Involvement is the Filipino Resistance Movement," p. 82; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 77; Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, p. 244; HRC Geog. S. Philippines 370.64 Guerrilla Warfare—Nueva Ecija, Historical Records Branch, CMH; 1st Lt J.H. Manzano for Chief, Claims Service Division, 9 Sep. 48, in Folder BMA (Bulacan Military Area), PA, Guerrilla Records, Box 246, RG 407, NARA.
12. Keats, They Fought Alone, and Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement," are the standard sources for information on the guerrilla movement in Mindanao. See also U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, The Guerrilla Movement in the Philippines, 1: 83-101; Eighth Army's report on the Mindanao operation, p. 14, PA, Liberation, Box 1475, RG 407, NARA; Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York: Viking Press, 1950), p. 217; Royce Wendover diary, USAMHI.
13. Volckmann, We Remained, p. 126.
14. In addition to Volckmann's We Remained, see the Blackburn article, "War Within a War," and the interview, as well as Philip Harkins, Blackburn's Headhunters (New York: Norton, 1955) and After Battle Report, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon Operations, PA, Liberation, Box 1477, RG 407, NARA.
15. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, 1: 9-22; HRC Geog. S. Philippines 370.64 Guerrilla Warfare— Nueva Ecija, Historical Records Branch, CMH; Memo, Manzano for Chief Claims Service Division, 9 Sep 48; Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, CNO, Dept. Navy, 14 Sep 44, pp. 12-13; Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 7778; Cable, Volckmann to MacArthur, 30 Sep 44, Russell W. Volckmann Papers, USAMHI; Forrest B. Johnson, Hour of Redemption: The Ranger Raid on Cabanatuan (New York: Manor Books, 1978), p. 95.
16. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, 1: 34-38; Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, CNO, Dept. Navy, 14 Sep 44, p. 7; Report of Examination of the Cash and Accounts of Accountable Officers, Cebu Area Command, USFIP, PA, Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records, Box 537, RG 407, NARA; Jesus A. Villamor, They Never Surrendered: A True Story of Resistance in World World II (Quezon City, Philippines: Vera-Reyes, 1982), pp. 107-08, 261-71.
17. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 128. See also Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 202-04.
18. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation, 1: 5-6, 12: Villamor, They Never Surrendered,
Page 94
pp. 69-70; Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 210-11.
19. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation, 1: 7-11, 14, 19, 21, 23, 28, 29, 33, 56; James, The Years of MacArthur, 2: 179, 509; Villamor, They Never Surrendered, p. 79.
20. Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, pp. 91, 133; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 202, 339; Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement," pp. 108-09, 189-91, 202; Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 120-21; U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation, 1: 7, 15, 31-32; Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, p. 209; MS, Robert Ross Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency, pp. 43-44.
21. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation, 1: 23, 30, 34-42, 45, 57; Villamor, They Never Surrendered, pp. 219, 243; Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, pp. 132, 135-36, 145.
22. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation, 1: 78-90; Blackburn, "War Within a War," p. 147; Volckmann, We Remained, p. 157.
23. USAMHI, Senior Officers Oral History Program: Project 83-12:Jay D. Vanderpool, Colonel, USA (Ret.), Project 83-12 [Carlisle, 1983], pp. 84-119; Ltr, Vanderpool to Commanding General, Ryukus Command, 5 Aug 47, Jay D. Vanderpool Papers, USAMHI.
24. Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine, pp. 20-23, 60-62, 134-45, 196-99; Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, pp. 140-45; Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, pp. 144, 156; Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, CNO, Dept. Navy, 14 Sep 44, pp. 2-3; Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement," pp. 173-74; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 323-40, Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, pp. 217-18.
25. See G-2 sections in Sixth Army's reports on the Luzon operation, Box 1477, and the Leyte campaign, Box 1478, in PA, Liberation, RG 407, NARA; see also Johnson, Hour of Redemption, pp. 119-20, 182; The Alamo Scouts—Sixth Army, U.S. Army, Intelligence, Decimal File, 1941-48, Box 874, RG 319, WNRC; George C. Shelton, "The Alamo Scouts," Armor 91 (September-October 1982): 29-30.
26. Cable, MacArthur to Commanding General, USAFFE, 27 Dec 43, U.S. Army, HQ, Sixth Army, G-3 Section, Decimal File, 1943-46, Box 36, RG 338, WNRC, Interv, author with Col Robert W. Garrett, USA (Ret.), 8 Oct 85, Potomac, Md. (hereafter cited as Garrett interview); Johnson, Hour of Redemphon, pp. 115, 127-28, 132-33.
27. See Ranger file in U.S. Army, Sixth Army, G-3 Section, Decimal File, 1943-46, Box 36, RG 338, WNRC; Garrett interview; The Sixth Ranger Battalion, Louis F. Lisko Papers, USAMHI; Historical Data, 6th Ranger Battalion, in Ranger Battalions of World War II (now in 1st Special Forces), Organizational Histories Branch, CMH.
28. History of the 6th Ranger Battalion in KING II Operation, and Operational Rpts of the 6th Ranger Battalion, both in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 6-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; Rpt, Simons to G-3, Sixth Army, 19 Mar 45, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 6-0.4, RG 407, WN8C.
29. See reports of Sixth and Eighth Armies on the Leyte operation, in PA, Liberation, Boxes 1477-78, RG 407, NARA; MS, Robert Ross Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency, p. 43; Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine, pp. 204, 219;
Page 95
M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 313.
30. See Johnson, Hour of Redemption; also Narrative of the Sixth Ranger Battalion from 2 January 1945 to 1 July 1945, WWII Ops Reports, INBN 60.3, RG 407, WNRC; Henry A. Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," Infantry Journal 56 (April 1945): 15-19; King, Rangers, pp. 55-71.
31. See Operational Rpts of the 6th Ranger Battalion in WWII Ops Reports, INBN 6-0.3, RG 407, WNRC; Garrett interview.
32. Sixth Army's report of the Luzon campaign, PA, Liberation, Box 1477, RG 407, NARA.
33. Sixth Army's report on the Luzon campaign and After Battle Report, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon Operations, PA, Liberation, Box 1477, RG 407, NARA; Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 179-220; Blackburn interview, pp. 184-86, 194, 200-206; Blackburn, "War Within a War," pp. 149-53; MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 241; James, The Years of MacArthur, 2: 688.
34. See Eighth Army's report on the Mindanao operation, Box 1475, and Sixth Army's report on the Luzon operation, Box 1477, both in PA, Liberation, RG 407, NARA; Jay Luvaas, ea., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-45, Contributions in Military History 2 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), pp. 204, 209, 228, 234-38, 245, 270, 295; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 410, 416; Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, pp. 203, 212, 217-19, 237, 252; Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement," pp. 230-31, 242-46; Harkins, Blackburn's Headbunters, p. 305; Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 216-17; Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, p. 231; James, The Years of MacArthur, 2: 679, 746.
