Chapter II
[1] The precise reasons for the selection of Antwerp as the German objective are none too clear. The city represented the main supply base for British operations and it might be expected that the British public would react adversely to an Allied command responsible for the loss of an area so close to England which could be employed for V-2 attacks at short range. Later, at Nuremberg Rundstedt would say that the Meuse bridgeheads and Liège actually were the ultimate objectives. The Fifth Panzer Army commander, General der Panzertruppen Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel gives his story in Seymour Freiden and William Richardson, eds., The Fatal Decisions (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1956), Part 6.
[2] The remaining records of the German High Command show clearly that Keitel no longer had a hand in the actual direction of the war or in strategic planning.
[3] The German term Oberbefehlshaber West, which may mean either the Commander in Chief West or his headquarters, has been rendered as OB WEST when it refers to the headquarters and as C-in-C West when it refers to the person.
[4] The relations between Rundstedt and Model are described by one of the latter's staff officers Thuisko von Metzch, in an unpublished report made for the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1952, Charles V. P. von Luttichau, Report on the Interview With Mr. Thuisko von Metzch [14-19 March 1952] on Operations of Army Group B and Its Role in the German Ardennes Offensive, 1944. Copy in OCMH.
[5] Rundstedt Testimony, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 12 August 1946) vol. XXXI, p 29.
[6] Interv, Luttichau with Metzsch, 14-19 Mar 52.
[7] Ltr, Jodl to Westphal, 1 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 30-31.
[8] Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 3 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 47-50.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ltr, Westphal to Krebs, 6 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I pp. 67-70.
[12] OKW Operation Directive of 10 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 95-104.
[13] On the attacks made by the U.S. First and Third Armies in November 1944 see Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1963) and Cole, The Lorraine Campaign.
[14] Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 18 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 152-59.
[15] Msg, Jodl to Rundstedt, 22 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. II, p. 12. (Quotation is from Hitler.)
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Last updated 13 December 2005 |