1 History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-45, p. 9. This volume is No. 72 in the series, Japanese Studies in World War II, of which 113 are now available in OCMH in both the original and translated versions. Although both versions have been used in the preparation of this volume, reference throughout is to the translated version unless otherwise noted. For a description of this series see below, The Sources, pp. 595-96.

2 Statement of Lt Gen Masami Maeda, CofS 14th Army, 7 Mar 50, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), Document 56234, in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Philippines- Japanese Invasion, Mil Hist Div, GHQ Far East Command (FEC) and Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), 2 vols., II. Joint Statements of Col Takushiro Hattori and Capt Sadatoshi Tomioka, chiefs of the Army and Navy Operations Sections, respectively, of Imperial GHQ, 3 May 49, ATIS Doc 50459, and of Lt Gen Shinichi Tanaka and Col Hattori, 3 May 49, ATIS Doc 52361, both in Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, 4 vols., I, 352-53, IV, 196.

3 The plan of operations worked out by Imperial GHQ about the middle of November 1941 was destroyed by fire. Certificate of Yozo Miyama, Chief, Archives Sec, 1st Demobilization Bureau, Defense Doc 2726, International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE).
The description of Japanese strategic concepts is derived from the following documents: (1) Central Agreement Between the Japanese Navy and Army, (2) The Imperial Navy's Course of Action in Operations Against U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands, (3) Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order 1, 5 November 1941, and (4) Comments of Former Japanese Officers regarding The Fall of the Philippines. The first two are reproduced in United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), Apps. 13 and 14, pp. 43-49; copies of the last two are in OCMH. The orders and plans of the Army General Staff can be found in Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ; History of Southern Army 1941-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 21; 14th Army Opns, 2 vols., Japanese Studies in World War II, Nos. 1 and 2.

4 Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 10, 15; 14th Army Opns, I, 15.

5 Data on the strength of the Japanese Army and Navy are derived from Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, p. 30. A mixed brigade at this time consisted of three to six infantry battalions in addition to supporting and service troops. Strength varied from 3,000 to 10,000 men. An air regiment was generally composed of three squadrons and was the basic operational unit in the Japanese Army Air Force.

6 Southern Army Opns, p. 6. The operations order given by the commander of the Southern Army was destroyed by fire. Certificate of Yozo Miyama, 1st Demob Bureau, Defense Doc 2726, IMTFE.

7 Southern Army Opns, pp. 4-6. An air group was roughly the equivalent of a U.S. numbered air force, and was the largest tactical unit in the Japanese Army Air Force at that time.

8 Ibid., pp. 6-8; 14th Army Opns, I, 14. Unless otherwise specified, this account of the 14th Army's plan for the conquest of the Philippines is taken from the 14th Army Opns, I and II. The translation has been checked against the original Japanese study prepared by the 1st Demob Bureau.

9 Statement of Col Hattori, 2 Nov 47, ATIS Doc 49125, Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 315.

10 Japanese estimates of the strength and composition of the Philippine garrison, military installations, terrain, and weather, are discussed in 14th Army Opns, I, 5-8, 10-14.

11 Interrog of Gen Maeda, 10 May 47, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC; statement of Gen Maeda, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56234; statement of Lt Col Yoshio Nakajima, 6 Feb 50, ATIS Doc 56349; statement of Lt Col Monjiro Akiyama, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56232; statement of Lt Col Hikaru Haba, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56233; statement of Col Motoo Nakayama, 21 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56640. Colonel Nakajima was, at the beginning of the Philippine Campaign, Intelligence Officer, 14th Army, and subsequently its Operations Officer. When Colonel Nakajima was made Operations Officer, Colonel Haba, formerly Assistant Intelligence Officer, 14th Army, was promoted to Intelligence Officer. Colonel Akiyama was 14th Army Air Officer, and Colonel Nakayama, Senior Operations Officer, 14th Army. Copies of these ATIS documents and interrogations are in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I and II.

12 Statement of Col Moriji Kawagoe, CofS 48th Div, 9 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56354; statement of Maj Makoto Nakahara, Opns Officer, 48th Div, 13 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56372, ibid.

13 The material on naval plans is taken from Naval Operations in the Invasion of the Philippines, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 13, 2d Demob Bureau, pp. 1-6. Like other studies in this series, it is filed in OCMH and has been checked against the original. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 161-63, is useful for the organization of Japan's naval forces. See also Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order 1, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13, Exhibit 8, pp. 432-84.

14 The 11th Air Fleet had originally planned to use carrier-based fighters to neutralize southern Luzon, but the pilots trained for this mission were transferred with their planes to the Pearl Harbor operation. During the fall of 1941 the improvement of the Zero fighters and the rapid advancement in pilot training made it possible to utilize land-based fighters on Formosa for long-distance sorties against Luzon.

15 Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 166.

16 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the Philippine Department Plan ORANGE, 1940 Revision. (Short title: HPD WPO-3), AG 326. The author has also had the benefit of conversations with the Philippine Department Commander, General Grunert, with Generals Sutherland and Marshall, and with various division commanders and staff officers who participated in the planning and execution of the plan.

17 Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East," Military Review, XXIX (December 1949), 22-40.

18 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 388.

19 Interv, author with Col Diller, 20 May 49. Wainwright mentions also that as Philippine Division commander he worked during May, June, and July 1941 to secure revisions of WPO-3. General Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, the Account of Four Years of Humiliating Defeat, Surrender, and Captivity (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), p. 10.

20 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 21.

21 Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW 5, Joint Board (JB) 325, Serial 642-5, OPD Reg Doc.

22 Ltr, MacArthur to TAG, 1 Oct 41, sub: Opns Plan R-5, WPD 4178-18. MacArthur repeated the same request, in virtually the same language, in a personal letter to Marshall on 28 October 1951, WPD 4477-2.

23 Memo, Marshall for MacArthur, 18 Oct 41, sub: USAFFE, WPD 4175-18.

24 Brereton, Diaries, p. 19.

25 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 15.

26 Ltr, CofS to CG USAFFE, 21 Nov 41, sub: U.S.-British Co-operation in the Far East, WPD 4402-112. The first draft of this letter used the phrase "strong offensive air action" in the place of "strong air operations in the furtherance of the strategic defensive."

27 Ibid., incl, extract copy of Changes in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 5.

28 Ibid.

29 Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG North Luzon Force (NLF), 3 Dec 41, sub: Defense of Phil, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Rcds. Brig. Gen. Maxon S. Lough assumed command of the Philippine Division when General Wainwright transferred to North Luzon Force.

30 Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG SLF, 3 Dec 41, sub: Defense of Phil, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Rcds.

31 Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG V-MF, 3 Dec 41, sub: Defense of Phil, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Rcds.

32 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 17-18; Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG Phil Div, 6 Dec 41, sub: Movement Plans, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Rcds.

33 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 26.

34 Rad, OPNAV to Comdrs Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, 24005, 24 Nov 41 in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 14, p. 1405. This message was given to MacArthur by Hart.

35 Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 27 Nov 41, OCS 18136-118; Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Doc 244 (Washington, 1946), cited hereafter as Pearl Harbor Attack Report, pp. 199-201. The message sent to Hawaii, Panama, and the Western Defense Command included a statement that the civilian population should not be alarmed. Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 14, p. 1389. Ibid., Part 39, p. 84, contains Mr. Stimson's account of these events; Part 3, p. 1021, includes a memo, Gerow for Marshall, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation, WPD 4544-13.

36 Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 14, p. 1406.

37 Ibid.

38 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 1004, 28 Nov 41, OCS 18136-118.

39 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 36; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 156-57, 188-89. Specific instances of Japanese reconnaissance missions are noted in Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 61-63.

40 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 17.

41 Rad, MacArthur to Arnold, 6 Dec 41, quoted in Brereton, Diaries, pp. 36-37; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 191. 42 Col James V., Collier, Notebooks, 4 vols., I.

42 Colonel Collier was Assistant G-3, USAFFE and later G-3, Luzon Force. He kept these notebooks for his three sons while he was in prison camp. They were loaned to the author, and a photostat copy is on file in OCMH. They will be hereafter referred to as Collier, Notebooks, with the appropriate number.

43 Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 52.

44 Brereton, Diaries, pp. 37-38.

45 Collier, Notebooks, I, 42.

46 Col. Ernest B. Miller, Bataan Uncensored (Long Prairie, Minn., 1949), p. 64.

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