- Despite the formulation of
several policies on their shipment, relatively few Negro troops of any
sort were overseas by the spring of 1943. None of the larger combat
units, including the non-divisional units, had been actively employed in an overseas theater. The 24th Infantry Regiment went to
the New Hebrides in the South Pacific in May 1942. Plans had been made
to employ it in the latter phases of the campaign on Guadalcanal, but
Japanese resistance there collapsed earlier than had been expected.
The unit did not reach Guadalcanal until the main fighting was over 1
There were antiaircraft and air base security units overseas but few
of these had gone to active areas. Converted units were assigned their
new functions with the expectation that they could then be shipped and
used more speedily and effectively, but these units usually required
further training in their new tasks. Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, who
had spoken frequently of the desirability of sending Negro troops to
active theaters, if only to counter the growing and morale-damaging
impression that they would not be sent out of the country, formally
recommended in April 1943 that the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop
Policies specifically propose that a Negro combat unit be sent to an
active theater without delay.2
-
- At the time, only 79,000 out
of 504,000 Negro troops were overseas-a little more than 15 percent
of the whole. The bulk of these were service troops; two thirds of the
whole were in engineer, quartermaster, and transportation units. Of
ground forces Negro troops, only 7 percent of all types were overseas. Steps were being taken to return the three Negro separate
infantry regiments from the defense commands to Army Ground Forces
for retraining and preparation for overseas movement. The 99th Fighter
Squadron was under orders to proceed to a port of embarkation. The 93d
Division could be ready for shipment on 1 October 1943 if desert
training were not given it and on 1 December if it received this
training. But there was no assurance that it would be accepted by an
active theater when ready. Proposals had been made to send the 93d to
Hawaii, but this, if done, would not solve the problem, for
- [450]
- Hawaii was only a training and
defense area. Moreover, the Hawaiian command was not anxious to give
main defense positions to a Negro division.3
-
-
- Of all the Negro combat units,
the Air Forces' 99th Pursuit Squadron got the most attention as an
immediate candidate for overseas shipment. The chief of the Army Air
Forces directed in February 1942, before the unit had obtained its
first pilot, that the 99th Pursuit Squadron should be prepared for
foreign service as soon as possible. At the time the Air Training
Command estimated that on a normal schedule the 36 pilots needed for
the first squadron would not be available before 9 October 1942. If
the schedule was speeded up by starting students in elementary
(without preflight) training, by doubling the entry rate, and by
entering pilots directly into basic training if they had completed
secondary civilian pilot training under the Civil Aeronautics
Administration program, 41 pilots would graduate by 3 July 1942 and 71
by October. There were 29 civilian pilot training secondary graduates
available. At least 20 of these were expected to complete aviation
cadet training successfully. This schedule did not provide for unit
training for the squadron. To provide loss replacements for the 99th
and the as yet unactivated 100th Squadron, yet another squadron
would be needed.4 To operate independently, the 99th
Squadron would require its own supplementary service detachments as
well. By March 1942 the Air Staff had selected the Liberia Task Force
for the 99th. The 100th would see foreign service, "but it's not
known at this time where it will go." 5
-
- As soon as it received its minimum
pilot complement and hastily provided service detachments, the 99th rushed
to complete its unit training and depart for overseas. Successive departure
dates came and went. During the waiting period, its pilots added hours of
training time, becoming so proficient as to evoke favorable comment from
many observers. This additional training time, later to be weighed against
it as though it was a formal part of its scheduled training, enabled distinguished
visitors, military and civilian-including Secretary Stimson, Mrs. Roosevelt,
and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax to observe the alert and anxious
personnel of the squadron, with the result that before long the legend grew
that the 99th, in addition to being well trained, was also made up of especially
selected personnel. It was true that the original enlisted specialists sent
to Chanute Field for training had been selected from a long list of applicants,
but many of these men were not included in the roster of the squadron. Most
of the 99th's pilots had been "selected" through the fortunate
chance of
- [451]
- meeting the requirement of
previous civilian pilot training, permitting them to enter the
truncated training program designed to fill the unit as quickly as
possible for early overseas use. The squadron, when finally filled,
included its share (as any unit filled from locally available
personnel did) of men and officers who, though qualified, were not so
keenly desired by Tuskegee's base units as those whom their personnel
officers did not offer to the 99th. The squadron was made up of better
than average Negro Army personnel, but it was hardly the handpicked,
selected unit that later comments made it out to be.
-
- The 99th
Squadron, still in the United States, technically remained a part of
the Liberia Task Force until January 1943 when, with the threats from
Vichy West Africa and Axis forces in the Middle East removed, it was
no longer necessary to provide for the air defense of Liberia.
Meantime, the proposal of the Air Staff that the 99th be sent to China
to join Brig. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's forces had been rejected by
the Operations Division as politically dangerous, since the
inexperienced squadron would there meet combat conditions that might
result in heavy losses. These could reflect unfavorably upon the War
Departments 6
The squadron continued its training while the Air Forces
sought a place to send it. Finally the North African theater was
selected, and it left Tuskegee on 2 and 3 April 1943, sailing from New
York on 24 April. It left behind the 332d Fighter Group, contributing
some of its personnel to the group's three partially filled squadrons.
The 992d departed Tuskegee a few days later for Selfridge Field,
Michigan, where it was to train so that Tuskegee Field might be
relieved of training so large a unit.
-
- It was generally understood
that when the 99th reached North Africa it would go into combat as
soon as possible, for upon its performance, it was also understood,
depended the future of Negroes in military aviation. As it worked out,
early reports of the performance of the 99th Squadron became entwined
with the future of Negroes in all other types of combat units as well.
-
-
- In May 1943, Lt. Gen. Carl
Spaatz, commanding the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa, advised
General Henry H. Arnold that although the desire for an early combat
test of the 99th was understood, it was believed that the squadron
should be handled on exactly the same basis as other squadrons
arriving in the theater.7 Like other
squadrons, therefore, the
99th was introduced to combat slowly. It was attached to the 33d
Group, 64th Wing, XII Air Support Command. News reports disclosed
that the 99th Squadron was used in the attack on Pantelleria in June
where its first enemy plane was shot down by Capt. Charles Hall, but
few details of its action there were known. In late August the
squadron commander, Lt. Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., was relieved
for return to the United States where he was to command and complete
the training of the 332d Fighter Group.
-
- On the occasion of Colonel
Davis' return, the news magazine Time pub-
- [452]
- lished under the title
"Experiment Proved?" not only an account of an interview
with Colonel Davis but also hints and rumors about the current status
of the squadron. So little operational data on the 99th had reached
Washington, the magazine observed, that it was impossible to form a
conclusive estimate of its abilities. "It has apparently seen
little action, compared to many other units," the magazine
reported, "and seems to have done fairly well; unofficial
reports from the Mediterranean theater have suggested that the top
air command was not altogether satisfied with the 99th's performance;
there was said to be a plan some weeks ago to attach it to the Coastal
Air Command, in which it would be assigned to routine convoy
cover." 8
-
- Time's account appeared in its
20 September issue, on newsstands four days earlier. It was not until
t 9 September that General Spaatz signed a second indorsement to a
report on the 99th that had originated three days before in Maj.
Gen. Edwin J. House's Headquarters, XII Air Support Command.
Protests and queries on Time's suggestion that the Negro flyers were
to be removed to less active duties therefore began to come into the
War Department at about the same time that official theater reports
arrived. As a matter of public policy, the War Department answered
inquiries with denials that anything of the sort had been
contemplated, but it was not many days before reports on the 99th
Squadron had begun to affect the developing policy on the movement of
Negro combat units overseas and the formation of
further Air Corps units.
-
- General House reported to Maj. Gen.
John K. Cannon, deputy commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force,
that since t 2 June when he took command of the XII Air Support Command
he had visited the 99th Squadron frequently and that he was particularly
impressed with its commander, Colonel Davis. "On the day of the 99th's
first encounter with enemy aircraft," he wrote, "I happened to
be on the airdrome and was very complimentary and encouraging to the personnel
I met." Since then, he had compared the 99th with a white fighter squadron
operating in the same group (33d) and with the same type of equipment. The
group commander, Col. William W. Momeyer, had reported to him:
-
- The ground discipline and
ability to accomplish and execute orders promptly are excellent. Air
discipline has not been completely satisfactory. The ability to work
and fight as a team has not yet been acquired. Their formation
flying has been very satisfactory until jumped by enemy aircraft,
when the squadron seems to disintegrate. This has repeatedly been
brought to the attention of the Squadron, but attempts to correct this
deficiency so far have been unfruitful. On one particular occasion, a
flight of twelve JU 88's, with an escort of six ME tog's, was observed
to be bombing Pantelleria. The 99th Squadron, instead of pressing home
the attack against the bombers, allowed themselves to become engaged
with the log's. The unit has shown a lack of aggressive spirit that is
necessary for a well-organized fighter squadron. On numerous instances
when assigned to dive bomb a specified target in which the
anti-aircraft fire was light and inaccurate, they chose the secondary
target which was undefended. On one occasion, they were assigned a mission
with one squadron of this Group to bomb a target
- [453]
- COLONEL DAVIS HOLDING A PRESS
CONFERENCE
- in the War Department on his return from the MTO, 10
September 1943. Seated at right of
- the younger Davis is his father,
General Davis: Truman Gibson, Civilian Aide, is on his left.
-
- in the toe of Italy; the 99th
turned back before reaching the target because of the weather. The
other squadron went on to the target and pressed home the attack. As
later substantiated, the weather was considered operational.
-
- The group commander went on to
remark that the squadron had averaged 28 sorties per man; yet
Colonel Davis had requested that his men be removed from combat for 3
days during the battle of Sicily because of fatigue, while pilots in
the white squadrons of the group, with an average of 70 sorties after
continuous operations for nine months, continued to fly. "Based
on the performance of the 99th Fighter Squadron to date," he
continued, "it is my opinion that they are not of the fighting
caliber of any squadron in this Group. They have failed to display the
aggressiveness and desire for combat that are necessary to a
first-class fighting organization. It may be expected that we will get
less work and less operational time out of the 99th Fighter Squadron
than any squadron in this group." 9
-
- General House observed that he
had released Colonel Davis, although he did not believe that the next
ranking officer would approach Col. Davis' standard; that in many
discussions which he had held with officers of all professions,
"in-
- [454]
- cluding medical," the
consensus was that "the negro type has not the proper reflexes to
make a first-class fighter pilot." On the rapid moves made
within his command, "housing and messing difficulties arise
because the time has not yet arrived when the white and colored
soldiers will mess at the same table and sleep in the same
barracks." Details were not being presented, he said,
"because it is desired that administrative features not be a
part of this report." He recommended that the 99th be assigned to
the Northwest African Coastal Air Force and equipped with P-39's so
that its P-40's could be used as replacements for active operations
still to come and that "if and when'-' a Negro group was formed
in the United States, it be kept there for defense command duties.
This would release a white fighter group for movement overseas.10
-
- General Cannon shared the
opinion that the 99th's men lacked the stamina and lasting qualities
of pilots of other squadrons. They had, he concluded, "no
outstanding characteristics in which they excel in war the pilots of
other squadrons of this command.11
General Spaatz,
forwarding these reports to General Arnold, added:
-
- 1. Since the arrival of the
99th Fighter Squadron in this theater, I have personally inspected the
organization several times. There has been no question of their ground
discipline and their general conduct. It has been excellent.
- 2. In processing them for
combat action they were given the benefit in our training system of
the supervision of instructors with much combat experience. They
were processed into combat action very carefully.
- 3. I am forwarding this report
with full confidence in the fairness of the analysis made by both
General Cannon and General House. I feel that no squadron has been
introduced into this theater with a better background of training than
had by the 99th Fighter Squadron.12
-
- With the arrival of these
reports, immediately hand-carried to the chief offices concerned,
the Army Air Forces recommended that the 99th be moved to a rear
defense area, that the three fighter squadrons still in training be
assigned to a rear defense area, thus releasing white squadrons
for a forward combat area, and that the continuation of the Negro
combat training program, which involved the activation and training
of a medium bombardment group, be abandoned. The Air Forces
recommended that this be done only with President Roosevelt's
approval. It prepared a draft letter to the President for General
Marshall's signature.13
-
- The Air Forces attached to its
recommendation an analysis indicating that the 99th had required
eight months of training in comparison with three months for white
units, and that its requirements in supervisory personnel had been
"completely out of proportion to the results achieved." 14
Illogically, the unorthodox arrangements through which the 99th
completed its training at a flying training command school while under
the control of the Third Air Force, with all the attendant delays and
problems of supervision, were now
- [455]
- charged against the squadron. After
noting a shortage of P-40 aircraft available for training the 99th, the
Air Forces declared that it had had difficulty finding "capable personnel
to train for the various duties" both in this squadron and in the 332d
Fighter Group. The 332d had been re-equipped with P-47's but "thru
difficulties of retraining mechanics" this group was again equipped
with P-40's, thus further delaying its training. When it was learned that
P-40's would not be available in the theater to which the group was . committed,
another change was made to P-39's. With the group only half equipped with
its newest planes, training was now further delayed. The "full time
duty" of the specially erected white "training" squadron,
a "luxury not afforded similar white units," was also charged
against the 332d Group. Time lost from the necessity for changing airplanes
twice in the pilot replacement training system so that equipment in the
group might be standardized was also added to the time and expense of training
the group.15
-
- In view of the Air Forces
recommendations, General Marshall in early October 1943 directed
G-3 to analyze again the entire Negro combat unit situation, ground as
well as air.16
-
-
- The Air Forces'
recommendations arrived at a time when, under the impact of manpower, training,
and deployment problems, the whole program of providing Negro units
was being pondered by both G-3 and the Advisory Committee. G-3,
pursuing further the answer to the problem of the deployment of
Negro troops overseas and the conversion of combat units to service
types, had already sent messages to the commanding generals of the
South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, North African, and China theaters
asking for statements on the combat efficiency of Negro units in their
theaters under hazardous conditions. Instances of unsatisfactory
combat efficiency of Negro officers were specifically requested.17
-
- The South Pacific theater
reported no Negro combat or service units further forward than areas
subject to occasional bombing; there their services were satisfactory.
The theater had no instances of unsatisfactory combat service,
though it asserted that individual soldiers lacked initiative and
alertness and that neither Negro officers nor replacements were as
effective as comparable white personnel.18 The Southwest
Pacific
theater responded that though it had no Negro combat units in action,
its service units had been used in forward areas under the general
hazards and privations of campaigning with entirely satisfactory
service. Negro officers' service, General MacArthur said, he would
rate as average.19
-
- From India came the report
that though no other Negro units in the the-
- [456]
- ater had been under fire, the
conduct of the 823d Engineer Aviation Battalion under hazardous
conditions of combat during Japanese raids on Assam in October 1942
was "magnificent." After the strafing, these engineers
returned to their work promptly and began airfield repairs at once.
One member of the unit received the Silver Star for action under fire
during these raids; another received a Purple Heart for wounds
received while removing government property from a burning
warehouse. There was no known unsatisfactory combat conduct in this
unit, whose only Negro officer was a chaplain reported efficient in
his duties.20
-
- The North African theater
replied that its reports were incomplete, but that its only Negroes
actively engaged in combat were in the 99th Squadron. The theater
summarized the reports on the 99th sent from the Commanding General,
North African Air Force, to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
on 19 September. The conduct of Negro service units under occasional
air attacks was generally satisfactory. Negro officers in the theater
were generally satisfactory, but the Commanding General, Services of
Supply, had stated that his Negro officers were inferior to white
officers of similar grade, training, and experience.21
-
- G-9 supplemented these reports
with some additional information drawn from its own files. General
Eisenhower had reported that during the week ending 5 August the 99th
Squadron had successfully carried out difficult missions, strafing Axis
communications and supply columns in Sicily. The same communication
affirmed that ordnance and supply units which had landed at Gela
during the earliest days of the invasion of Sicily were continuing
to carry out vitally important supply assignments with the same
efficiency they had previously exhibited in North Africa; that
antiaircraft units were executing regular missions; and that the 41st
Engineers were engaged in construction and repair work at North
African invasion ports.22 Moreover, an extract from a personal letter
available to G-3 indicated that an air base security battalion in
the same theater had held fast at Faid Pass when a white organization
ran through it to the rear.23 The
theater reports had shown that
white troops were generally preferred, G-9 noted, but combat
experience had not been cited in support of this preference.
- [457]
- In reporting this information
to General Marshall, G-3 advised that Negro units had not yet been
employed "in combat on a scale which would justify a conclusion
as to their value, nor any fundamental change in the present War
Department policies for such troops." Furthermore, G-3
recommended that the Army send both the 93d Division and the 332d
Fighter Group to the Mediterranean area in order to provide a
"just and reasonable test" of the value of large Negro units
in combat .24
-
-
- The report on the combat efficiency
of the 99th Squadron was presented to the Advisory Committee on 13 October
for discussion and comment. General White, the G-1, informed the committee
that he had received similar reports from the 332d Group's commander when
he was in Africa. Truman Gibson was of the opinion that contrary to general
reports the 99th Squadron did not have personnel particularly selected and
that white squadrons had done worse upon commitment. The squadron had had
no flight leaders with combat experience and, Gibson reminded the committee,
all of the facts were not currently available. He recalled that the Air
Forces had initially believed that Negroes could not fly; now it believed
that they lacked the ability to fight. General Davis suggested that veterans
could not be made in one campaign and that therefore the program should
be continued; he did not wish to criticize General Arnold, but he did not
believe that the report justified scrapping the program.
General Porter informed the committee that his G-3 Division had recommended
that the program be continued but that, in a study then being made, it was
shown that Negroes were reluctant to follow Negro leaders. He suggested
that an infantry division be developed with all white officers which, after
successful combat experience, could receive substitute Negro officers. To
this General Davis responded that, although available Negro leadership was
limited, such a division would be discouraging. He added that training Negroes
in the South put two strikes against them already; they would rather train
in forty degree below zero weather anywhere else.
-
- With the discussion rapidly
moving into general philosophies on the proper training and use of
Negro troops, Secretary McCloy recommended that everybody on the
committee reserve his opinion until Colonel Davis, the former
commander of the squadron, could be brought to Washington to discuss
the matter. Before the war was over, McCloy continued, all manpower
might be needed; perhaps training methods needed changing. He directed
that a copy of the report be sent to Colonel Davis and that he be
brought in for a conference.25 The conference was set for 16 October,
three days later.
-
- In the meantime, G-3, the
Operations Division, and General Arnold, in an agreement arrived at
through Mr. McCloy, decided to submit the problem to Maj. Gen. Walter
B. Smith, General Eisenhower's chief of staff in Italy. The Operations
Division wished his comment on both the original Air Forces
- [458]
- plan and the new G-3 proposal
that both the 332d Fighter Group 26
and the 93d Division be sent to
the Mediterranean. After discussing the matter with Maj. Gen. Thomas
T. Handy, Col. Edward J. Rehmann, acting chief of OPD's Troop Movement
Section, tried to brief the problem. He concluded that the reports on
combat units, particularly the 99th Squadron, were "somewhat
conflicting." The injection by G-3 of the question of the
employment of ground forces into the problem brought up new
questions, those of shipping and the acceptability of a division to
the North African theater. "In view of the limited use of these
units and the conflicting viewpoints it would appear desirable to have
the matter fully investigated by the Theater Commander in order to
obtain sufficient data to back up the proposed letter to the
President," Colonel Rebmann advised. He noted that General
Eisenhower's willingness to accept a division might be greater if it
were not used as a substitute for the white units already planned for
the Mediterranean, and that one advantage of sending a division to the
Mediterranean was that from this location it could easily be sent to
other theaters "in the event the unit proves its combat
efficiency." 27
-
- A portion of the Advisory
Committee met with Colonel Davis on 16
October 28
Colonel Davis began his answers to the committee's queries
by saying that the main part of General House's letter was quoted from
Colonel Momeyer's report and that what Colonel Momeyer, one of the
best fighter pilots known to him, had to say, was entitled to respect.
Colonel Davis then went on to state that the squadron had entered
combat with certain handicaps. Because no one in the squadron had had
combat experience there was a lack of confidence despite the high
quality of the squadron's training. Mistakes, arising out of
inexperience, occurred on the squadron's first missions. For these
he would offer no excuse. On the squadron's first encounter with the
enemy, over Pantelleria, it failed to maintain a flight of sixes,
breaking down to twos. There was one occasion when the squadron failed
to dive-bomb a target. Colonel Davis had led that mission and turned
back on account of weather. No secondary target was involved. That
the squadron had a reputation for disintegrating when jumped came as
a surprise to him, for only the one incident, the one which he had
mentioned, had been called to his attention. The squadron met fighters
on 8o percent of its sorties; if there was a lack of aggressiveness,
Colonel Davis felt, it was at first only. "Later we had it,"
he declared.
-
- He had asked on 15 August that
the squadron have 48 hours off, but he thought the circumstances
should be considered. The squadron had operated continuously for two
months without receiving replacements although the
- [459]
- standard set up was 4 per
month; consequently the 99th Squadron had only 26 pilots as compared
with 30 to 35 in other squadrons. On heavy days, therefore, his pilots
flew from three to six missions. If he had had a full quota of
pilots, the strain would have been lighter.
-
- As to the stamina of the
individual pilots, Colonel Davis had noted no differences between
his pilots and others; his pilots had received the same food as
others, and were in good condition. Housing and messing difficulties
had not arisen, although they might in winter. Each squadron had
bivouacked separately and his squadron was not a member of a group
except for operations. His men were more tense, but Colonel Davis
attributed this to the smaller number of pilots available. He had no
complaint about his pilots or their training. The impression that
the squadron was not aggressive enough had not been brought to his
attention in the theater. "I carried out my mission-if given a
mission to bomb a target," he said, "I went ahead and bombed
it." 29
-
- The Operations Division in the meantime
went ahead with the preparation of its own recommendations for the Chief
of Staff. If the conclusion on the value of Negro combat troops was not
justified for ground troops on the basis of existing evidence, as G-3 had
said, it certainly was for "air combat units, particularly fighters,"
General Handy insisted. The one fighter squadron had been made up of especially
selected and very well trained personnel, Operations Division reiterated.
"I do not believe we should activate any more such units and
that the squadrons now in existence should be used in other than active
combat areas," General Handy wrote, adding that there were several
other matters to be considered in connection with G-3's recommendations.
If the 93d Division was moved to the Mediterranean, it was doubtful that
it would be used in combat. General Smith, Chief of Staff, Allied Force
Headquarters, had stated that a maximum of sixteen divisions could be maintained
in Italy. Faced with active German opposition, "one of the sixteen
will certainly not be the colored division as long as tested white divisions
were available." The question of over-all command of American Negro
units could not be ignored. "In my opinion," General Handy stated,
"our colored divisions should be employed in a theater where it can
be reasonably expected that they will always serve under American high command."
The chances of the 93d's entry into combat would be just as good if it went
to Hawaii. He therefore recommended that the action proposed by Army Air
Forces be approved, that the 93d Division be sent to Hawaii with a view
to its later employment in the Central, South, or Southwest Pacific, and
that the proposed letter requesting the President's approval of the alteration
in the air program be dispatched over Secretary Stimson's signature. 30
-
- General Arnold felt that these
Operations Division recommendations were all right, but noted that
action should be deferred until word came from General Smith.
General Handy concurred
- [460]
- on 20 October.31 The whole
proposal, now comprising a thick sheaf of papers, was deposited with
the Deputy Chief of Staff at the end of the month, pending receipt of
General Smith's comments.32
-
-
- Action on the medium
bombardment group could not await decision
on the continuation of the general
combat program. Consideration of this
group had been under way since the
spring of 1943 33
a Complicated schedules
for the training of necessary enlisted
specialists, arranged so that the necessary
space for the required numbers of Negro
students would be available in
specified classes at Air Forces training centers
at the proper times, had been set up.34 Enlisted specialist trainees
were already enrolled in some schools.
Tuskegee Field was to continue training
all pilots. Bombardier-navigators, the
original group coming from former
Tuskegee
- cadets, were scheduled to
enter navigation school in the Central
Flying Training Command in October and to join bombardiers later at
another central command school.35
-
- The Air Forces' shift in policy
for training flying officers had grown out of developments at Tuskegee as
well as o>et of a recognition of the economies and improvements in training
efficiency to be obtained by the use of existing school facilities. Tuskegee
had developed into a unique school. While most training fields were devoted
to one specialized phase of training only, Tuskegee carried the cadet from
the college training stage to graduation and initial tactical assignment,
all in fields and-installations within a radius of about five miles of the
main post.36
Not only the increase in numbers of men but also the variety of activities
caused administrative and training problems there. At times, portions of
the field were under the Third Air Force, the Air Service Command, the Technical
Training Command, and the Flying Training Command, most of which had little
knowledge of the variety of activities supervised by other commands through
the one small post headquarters. By late 1943 the field was the training
station for Negro pre-aviation cadets, preflight pilots, preflight bombardier-navigators,
preflight bombardiers, basic pilots, advanced single-engine pilots, advanced
twin-engine pilots, and pilots in transitional training in the P-40 after
graduation from the advanced single-engine school. The field also trained
field artillery liaison pilots for the
- [461]
- Ground Forces and Haitian and
French colonial- cadets. It also acted as a pool, holding enlisted and
officer specialists awaiting assignment. The commandant of cadets
had eight different types of classes to supervise. Training was so
closely confined to the facilities of this field that cadets were not
given standard classification tests to predetermine flying aptitudes
until April 1943 when the field got its own psychological section.37
Screening Negro applicants to determine their relative aptitude as
pilots, bombardiers, or navigators, not used when all candidates were
presumptive fighter pilots, began in November 1943.
-
- Because Tuskegee was
officially classified under the Advanced Training Wing of the
Training Command, directives concerning the preflight schools
sometimes never reached it, with the result that training there was
often out of step with that at other stations. One advantage of the
compact school was that all previous records of a particular cadet
were always available, but "one of the disadvantages of the
concentration of training at the field is trouble in the traffic
pattern resulting from the various speeds of planes; neither can the
over-all field be used but one runway must be operated from at a
single time." 38
-
- Periods of crowding, followed
by slack periods, were normal for the station. In late 1943 when the
question of superimposing the bombardier-navigator program upon
existing activities at Tuskegee came up, the station was already
complaining that excess men, for whom no assignments existed, were
arriving in large numbers. Tuskegee informed the Air Forces:
-
- For the past six (6) months,
enlisted men have been sent to this station, especially from technical
schools of both the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, classified and
trained in jobs for which, in the main, there are no positions at this
station .... At the present time the number is approximately 120 and
this station is operating under a Manning Table anti has no personnel
available to care for these men. No further training can be given them
as they are all specialists and in most cases due to their rank are
not suitable for reclassification nor for assignment to any other
job on the station. Not only are these men presently at this station,
but daily men are transferred into this station . . . . This is
certainly a waste of manpower and malassignment of personnel and a
serious imposition on this station as these men are not needed, can
serve no useful purpose at this station, and constitute a serious
drain upon our personnel which has to be assigned to care for them.
This office has made repeated reports of this matter and to date no
relief has been forthcoming.39
-
- Some of these men were
technical trainees scheduled for use in the now doubtful bombardment
group and its supporting units. Tuskegee was falling heir to a
byproduct of indecision in Air Forces headquarters. To complicate
- [462]
- training at Tuskegee further
by the addition of bombardier and bombardier-navigator training to
the types already there would have been nearly intolerable.
-
- The Air Forces, breaking
quietly with the concentration of flying training at Tuskegee and
avoiding thereby the previous year's experience with Jefferson
Barracks, decided to schedule the new trainee classes into existing
schools formerly used for white trainees only. Some of these schools
were located in areas previously thought of as impossible for
training Negroes.
-
- The first class of navigation
cadets, selected from men eliminated from the Tuskegee fighter pilot
training program, arrived at Hondo Field, Texas, on 25 October for
cadet navigation training, although a definite decision on the
bombardment unit had not yet been made.40 Since the activation of
this unit was involved with the outcome of discussions on the future
of Negro combat units then under way, hesitancy about continuing
plans for the new bombardment group increased within Air Forces
headquarters. In some conferences and communications the group was
definitely mentioned as being "out"; in others, planning for
the group went ahead.
-
- "We must have a decision,
a definite one soon, on the above subject," Brig. Gen. Mervin E.
Gross wrote to Brig. Gen. Howard A. Craig on 2o October. The training
schedule then being followed for Tuskegee would provide more pilots than could be used by
the fighter group. If the bomber group was to be discontinued, no
directive eliminating it had been given to the responsible chiefs of
staff. If it was to be continued, the First Air Force had to be
directed to prepare to receive its personnel and activate its units.
If the bomber group was not to be activated, then the Air Operations,
Commitments, and Requirements and the Air Training Divisions
should be informed so that other uses of personnel earmarked for it
could be made. Otherwise, the Air Forces would find it difficult to
explain why it had trained so many men for whom it had no need.41
-
- General Arnold, who, in the
spring of 1943, had reacted to the suggestion of the Tuskegee
commander that political pressures might force a change in the Air
Forces' training program with the remark that the training program
would be determined by him in the future as it had been in the past,
and that it would be based only upon the foreseeable use of Negro
squadrons '42 decided on
27 October to go ahead with the bombardment group. He directed that it be organized, trained,
equipped, and sent to North Africa.43
-
- It would now be necessary to
set up auxiliary supporting service units as well, General Gross
advised.44
Although Air Training had warned of
- [463]
- these needs as far back as
July, it now appeared that there would be insufficient pilots to
activate the Replacement Training Unit Medium Bomb Group in December
as planned.45 Delays of this type were to play a continuing part in
the career of the new 477th Bombardment Group. Demands on Tuskegee
for single-engine pilots continued to grow in order to meet the needs
of the 3324 Fighter Group and the 99th Squadron. As schedules for
twin-engine training were trimmed and altered to fill these demands,
one or another phase of the supply of men to the bombardment group
went out of kilter.
-
- The Air Training Division
requested that Tuskegee be relieved of the responsibility of
producing all types of Negro pilots because its production rate was
not sufficient to meet replacement fighter requirements and, at the
same time, turn out enough pilots to meet O-Day (Operational Day)
requirements for the bombardment group. Restriction to the maximum
production possible at Tuskegee, Air Training predicted, would mean
a delay in the bomb group until July 1945. Excess Negro flying cadets
could be entered in existing white schools, thus increasing the
output of Negro pilots.
-
- Instead of acquiescing or
increasing facilities at Tuskegee, Headquarters, Army Air Forces,
rescinded the requirements for the bombardment group on 15 November.
With the exception of B-25 transition, all pilot training continued
at Tuskegee, with successive 0-days set for the bombardment group.
O-day for the group inched forward, until it eventually reached 10 January
1945 .46 Navigators alone were
trained elsewhere.
-
- Hondo Field's first class of
navigators -the first air cadets to train outside of
Tuskegee-graduated on 26 February 1944, after flying a training
mission to New York City which attracted national attention. By the
time four classes had entered, with two of them graduating, Hondo
Field had some observations to make about the Air Forces' departure in
training Negro cadets at the Texas school:
-
- The morale of negro cadets is
as high as the morale of any group of cadets on the field, according
to their instructors, and there is no question that they doubt the
value of their opportunity here. Instructors report almost no
complaining or faultfinding on their part and they state the colored
cadets take additional study classes and the restrictions imposed on
all cadets without losing their sense of humor.
-
- There have been very few cases
of animosity toward negro cadets from white cadets; if animosity has
been felt, it has not been shown. White cadets often ask negro cadets
to oppose them in games on the P. T. field. Except during P. T. hours,
there is little association between the two groups, however. The
strenuous class-room and flying schedule makes leisurely association a
luxury which cadets seldom enjoy.
-
- In the opinion of their
instructors, it is difficult and perhaps unfair to compare the negro
cadet to his ground and air work with the white cadet. Class 44-11-9-B
was equal to the average white classes in flying and considerably
above average in ground school. A great deal of additional effort,
however, was expended by their instructors in order to master even the
smallest details of ground school work.
- [464]
- With class 44-50-N-9 on the
other hand, a pronounced diminution in the quality of work has been
observed and there is every reason to believe that the explanation
lies in the native quality of the students, not in the quality of the
instruction. Of the thirty-two cadets who entered with the class, ten
had stanine scores [composite scores from special Air Corps
psychological tests] of four; five had stanines of five; eleven had
stanines of six; two had stanines of seven; three had stanines of
eight; and one had a stanine of nine. Thus only six of the thirty-two
have stanines of seven or above and no white cadet is accepted for
navigation training unless his stanine score is seven or more.
-
- Men with stanines of seven or
above are doing work that compares well with accepted, standard
work; the others are noticeably slower in learning and a great deal
slower in retaining the material. In the opinion of their instructors
these men will, inevitably, be less proficient navigators than the
average white graduate.
-
- In the most recent class to
enter Hondo, however, the situation is very different; only four of
the twenty-nine men have stanines below seven, these four having
stanines of six. Up to the end of the period of this installment this
class had done no flying, but the composite on the first examination
was 78% compared to a white composite of 85 % .
-
- Though this class promises to be
very much superior to 44-50-N-9, their instructors are nevertheless inclined
to believe, on the basis of the first test, that the students are somewhat
slower in grasping the material or at least in retaining it than are average
white cadets. The evidence of the quality of work that can be expected from
white and colored cadets of equal stanines is inconclusive and it does not
point to any marked difference in any event. Instructors are agreed, however,
that no cadets, whether white or colored, with stanine scores below seven
should be accepted for navigation training.
-
- Colored cadets live in their
own barracks and have their own classroom. They eat in the same mess
as white cadets and have equal privileges and enjoy
access to the same recreational facilities, namely, the Cadet Club,
the cadet P. X., the cadet Day Room, and (for colored officers) the
Officers Club and the B. O. M.
-
- Colored cadets fly missions
prescribed by the standard details of the missions. White pilots fly
the planes. Extended missions have been flown to many fields and
colored cadets have received the courtesies extended to white cadets.
Like white cadets, they are usually fed in the enlisted men's mess
unless they land at a field that has cadets, in which event they are
fed at the cadet mess.
-
- The extension of equal access
to post facilities has resulted in some grumbling by white personnel,
it goes without saying. It can be said, however, that behavior by all
post personnel has at all times been "correct." 47
-
- In the meantime, an imbalance
in the production of pilots and aircrewmen, followed by a shortage of
trainees, developed. By the spring of 1944, Tuskegee noted that
the balance in production of pilots, bombardiers, and navigators was
going askew. Originally the stanine numbers for Negroes were set at
not less than 4 for pilots and bombardiers and 5 for navigators. At
the same time, the white minimums were 6 and 7, respectively. In
April 1944 the stanine number for all Negro aircrew trainees was
raised to 5, reducing the number of men eligible for pilot training.
As early as 6 March 1944, the psychological unit at Tuskegee saw
Negroes with high stanines diverted from pilot to bombardier and
navigator training. While Tuskegee was turning out classes of 7 to 15
twin-engine pilots, classes of 20 to 87 preflight bombardiers and
bombardier-navigators were leaving the school for
- [465]
- advanced training, with some
of the bombardiers and navigators in these unbalanced classes having
stanine pilot scores of 8 or 9 but only 6 in the specialty to which
they were assigned. These assignments were often based on
predetermined quotas which were filled at the expense of the pilot
classes. Tuskegee, at the same time, was producing single-engine
pilot replacements. Eventually, a pilot shortage resulted. The
backlog of Negro applicants was soon exhausted. In the spring of
1944 applications for flying training from men in the Ground and
Service Forces were discontinued, thus slowing up production
further.
-
- Not until January 1945 did the
balance begin to right itself. By then applications from nonflying
Negro Air Forces officers (many of them men who, originally hopeful of
a cadet appointment, had chosen an Officer Candidate School
appointment while on the once long waiting lists) were readmitted;
then bombardier navigator training stopped and excess
bombardier-navigators were returned for pilot training; and, in
February 1945, applications from Ground and Service Forces personnel
were again accepted for Air training. About the middle of March 1945,
personnel again began to "pour in for Aviation Training from
all headquarters." 48
On 15 March 1945, the shortage was further
alleviated when the Eastern Flying Training Command again lowered
pilot stanine requirements to 4.49 The net result, as originally
predicted by Air Training, was that the
477th Group was not fully manned with pilots and aircrewmen until the
early summer of 1945-
-
-
- By 9 December 1943, when General
Arnold, returning from the Cairo Conference, briefly visited the 99th Squadron
at Madna Airfield, Italy, in company with Generals Spaatz and Cannon, the
career of the squadron had changed considerably since the first reports
on its operations had reached the War Department in September. After several
weeks of duties in which its pilots saw few enemy planes and its men wondered
what its future would be, the 99th joined the 79th Fighter Group at Foggia
NO-3 in Italy on 17 October 1943. The 79th had been operating as an independent
fighter group since the preceding March, and was already on its third compliment
of pilots by the time the 99th joined it. It was flying missions "every
hour on the hour." In November the group moved from Foggia to Madna,
a landing strip so bogged down in mud that the units had to wait until British
Basuto (East African) Engineers laid additional landing mats in order to
operate. When the weather improved the 99th kept up with the older squadrons.
For the men of the 79th's four squadrons, "That meant rebombing, rearming,
refueling, and repairing. Damaged aircraft were repaired, props were changed
and instruments adjusted practically on the spot." 50
On 30 November the 79th Group flew 26 missions, a new record. Of these the
99th flew nine.
- [466]
- Pilots of the 99th, under Maj.
George S. Roberts, gained in experience and confidence in their
association with the 79th Group. After two months with the 79th, the
99th, which, in the absence of a means of direct comparison, had
thought of itself as a combat wise veteran of the Pantellerian and
Sicilian campaigns, found that it had learned a great deal more
through the adoption of the flight tactics, take-off system, and
formations of the older, more experienced group. "With these
changes comes more experience and with the experience comes
confidence. These two attributes are precisely what pilots of the
99th Squadron are getting," the unit reported.51 Shortly after
joining the group, one 99th pilot took off with landing gear jammed
by a collision before take-off, but continued and completed a
dive-bombing mission. Ground crewmen of the Negro squadron were
surprised and pleased when, in servicing and gassing their allotted
twenty of fifty P-38's landing at Sal Sola Field, they received
"splendid cooperation" from men of the 79th in their joint
project.52 Pilots of the 99th eligible for return to the United States
after flying fifty missions began to request longer tours. The unit began to feel that in
its association with the 79th Group it had at last joined the air
team.
-
- By early January 1944 General
Spaatz had told General Arnold that he no longer believed that this
one squadron was sufficient for a thorough test of Negro flyers'
capabilities. Spaatz now wanted "one or two more squadrons there
to make a full group," General Arnold informed General Craig of
the Air Staff. Arnold suggested that the Twelfth Air Force be queried
on the dates when a second and third squadron should arrive.53
General Craig replied on 11 January that the 332d Fighter Group had
already left for the Twelfth Air Force and the 553d Fighter Squadron
had been set up in the United States to furnish pilot replacements for
the units overseas.54 On the same day, the binder containing the
October proposals for the further reduction of Negro air units and the
reassignment of those in existence was filed without further action.55
The fighter units were now fully deployed and their prospects for full
employment were brighter than for many months past.
- [467]