Bibliographical Note
Existing accounts of the organization and administration of the War Department, later the Department of the Army, do not deal with the central theme of this study at all, except obliquely. The framework for this account came not from military historians and public administration specialists but from Alfred Dupont Chandler, Jr., in his pioneering studies on the development of modern American industrial management, principally: "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry," "The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern Corporate Management," and "Management Decentralization: An Historical Analysis," all in James P. Baughman, ed., The History of American Management: Selections from the Business History Review (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969) . Chandler's major works include Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1962) and, as coauthor with Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. Du Pont and the Making o f a Modern Corporation (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) . His essay, "The Large Industrial Corporation and the Making of the Modern American Economy," in Stephen E. Ambrose, ed., Institutions in Modern America: Innovation in Structure and Process (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967) , summarizes and further refines his basic thesis. Louis Galambos in "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," Business History Review, XLIV, No. 3 (Autumn 1970) , has summarized this trend in organizational history, as does Robert D. Cuff's incisive analysis in "American Historians and the Organizational Factor," The Canadian Review of American Studies, IV, No. 1 (Spring 1973) . Glenn Porter's The Rise of Big Business, 1860-1910 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973) is the largest and most concise synthesis of business institutional history over the past decade. Particularly valuable is its bibliographical essay on the

principal works in this field, including monographs and journal articles.
Professor Cyril E. Black in his stimulating study, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Contemporary History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) , distinguishing between traditionalists and modernists, writes of the "consolidation of policy-making," both public and private, aided by technological advancement. He points out that the modernists have sought "to mobilize and rationalize the resources of society with a view to achieving greater control, efficiency, and production."
Robert E. Wiebe in The Search for Order, 1877-1920 New York: Hill and Wang, 1967) , discusses the breakdown of America's rural-oriented society and its replacement by the "regulative, hierarchical" needs of urban-industrial life. "Rules with impersonal sanctions . . . sought continuity and predictability in a world of endless change," encouraging the centralization of authority. His latest book, The Segmented Society: An Historical Preface to the Meaning of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) , demonstrates how the "segmentation" of American society into competing interest groups has traditionally dominated its government and society. Rowland Berthoff in An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) describes the disruptive effect rapid urban industrialization has had on American individualism and society in general.
A military historian, Russell F. Weigley, several years ago suggested that historians examine the thesis of this volume in "The Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era," published in Lt. Col. William Geffen, USAF, "Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare," Proceedings of the Second Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 2-3 May 1969 (Boulder: USAF, 1969) .
The major obstacle to an understanding of rationalization or modernization in American society by historians has been, as John Braeman pointed out some time ago in "Seven Profiles: Modernists and Traditionalists," Business History Review, XXV, No. 4 (Winter 1961) , their insistence on lumping both groups under the amorphous title "progressive." The tradi-

tionalist reformers were Jeffersonians seeking, as Theodore Roosevelt noted, to turn the clock back to a rural America with less government and less centralized authority. The modernists on the other hand were Hamiltonians, like Roosevelt, Root, and Stimson, seeking centralized authority in the interests of efficiency and order. Historians could recognize the fundamental incompatibility of traditionalists and modernists more easily if they were to drop the term progressive, but the argument among them continues, based in part upon uncritical acceptance of earlier accounts now seriously outdated.
Published and Unpublished Works
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in several of his reports, printed in American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. I (Washington, 1832) and vol. II (Washington, 1834) , outlined his administrative reforms of the War Department which established the bureau system as it existed throughout the nineteenth century.
U.S. 82d Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 170, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation . . . , Edwin S. Corwin, ed. (Washington, 1953) , contains an authoritative discussion of the development of the role of the President as Commander in Chief as laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as the practices and procedures developed by individual presidents.
Historical Documents Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and to the Present National Defense Act, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, 1927) is a collection of documents on the organization of the War Department from 1900 to 1923. Particularly valuable are the Congressional testimony and excerpts from the annual reports of Secretary of War Elihu Root and a "Personal Narrative of Maj. Gen. William Harding Carter on the Creation of the American General Staff." The annual reports of the Secretaries of War during this same period, together with the attached reports of the Chief of Staff and the bureau chiefs, are another invaluable source of detailed information. The best published account of the managerial crisis within the War Department

during the winter of 1917-18 is in the Annual Reports for 1918 and for 1919 of the Chief of Staff submitted by General Peyton C. March. Valuable statistical data on the War Department during World War I are contained in U.S. Army, Order of Battle of the Land Forces in the World War (1917-19), Zone of the Interior (Washington, 1949) . In the National Archives, Record Group 165, in particular the files of the General Staff: Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, contains valuable material, most of which has not been thoroughly examined, on the organization and reorganization of the Army's supply system under Generals March and Goethals. Of particular value is the history of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division prepared by Maj. W. M. Adriance and assisted by Capt. S. T. Dana and 1st Lt. J. R. Douglas about March 1919 which appeared in a much-abbreviated form in the Chief of Staff's Report for 1919. Also in these same files under 029 PS&T Div. is a proposed article by Lieutenant Douglas that was never published, The War's Lessons with Reference to the Supply System of the Army . . . . Douglas in this case is listed as an instructor in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. The 029 files contain most of the documents dealing with the reorganization of the Army's supply system employed in this study. Testimony on the postwar reorganization of the Army from Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, General March, General John J. Pershing, on down to disgruntled bureau chiefs may be found in Army Reorganization, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Afairs, House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions (Washington, 1920) . The discussion of the origins and development of the Army General Staff by Col. John McAuley Palmer on 15 October 1919 is especially important.
The important private manuscript collections consulted for the period before World War II were the Papers of Henry L. Stimson at Yale University and the Papers of Newton D. Baker in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress. A memoir by Mr. Stimson written just after he left the War Department in 1913 contains information on his dealings with a more or less hostile Congress, and the correspondence of Secretary Baker's private secretary Ralph Hayes, included in the Baker Papers, contains useful information on the lack of

effective control over the department's operations during the early months of the war. The author used neither the Papers of Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress nor those of Bernard Baruch at Princeton University. These papers of Goethals and Baruch should be consulted as well.
The sources used for Chapter II were Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch's interviews in September 1945 `with veterans of the Marshall reorganization of 1942, General Marshall, General McNarney, General Harrison, and General Nelson. They form part of the files of the Patch-Simpson Board on the reorganization of the War Department. Copies of these interviews are in OCMH files. Also consulted was a copy of an autobiographical memorandum prepared by Mr. Stimson's special assistant, Goldthwaite Dorr, entitled Memorandum-Notes on the Activities of an Informal Group in Connection With the Supply Reorganization in the War Department, Jan-Mar 42, written in early 1946, a copy of which is in OCMH files.
The principal published source for General Marshall's views on the postwar organization of the Army and on unification of the armed services is his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on unification in the fall of 1945. Among unpublished sources the Diary of Secretary Stimson at Yale University contains summaries of interviews with General Marshall on unification of armed services in April 1944 before the opening of the hearings by the Woodrum Committee referred to in Chapter IV. OCMH has a copy from Stimson's correspondence that paraphrases an interview the Secretary had with General Marshall on 24 April 1944 on unification, in which the general discussed the matter more freely than in his public testimony.
Also in OCMH files is a special collection of the various Somervell-ASF Post-War Organization proposals made from 1943 through the spring of 1948 and a draft manuscript history of the War Department Special Planning Division which includes documents and reports on the history of that unit and on the development of plans for the postwar organization of the Army before the latter's functions were taken over by the Patch-Simpson Board.
The material used in Chapter IV on the reorganization of

1946 came from the files of the Army staff, particularly files 020 and 320 on the organization and reorganization, respectively, of the Army. File 320 for 1945-46 contains the records of the so-called Patch-Simpson Board. The Patch Board's interviews in September 1945 with major War Department and Army staff officials from General Marshall down to the chiefs of the technical services and in Europe with members of General Eisenhower's headquarters staff are especially important for an understanding of the reasons behind the decision to scrap the wartime Marshall organization of the Army staff with its tight executive control over operations. Copies of the principal interviews are in OCM H files. The records of the Army staff in this period are located in RG 165 in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Also in this group are file 334 of the War Department Special Planning Division containing material on the Patch-Simpson Board from 19 August 1945 to 4 April 1946 and those of the Organization and Management Section of G-3. The latter's files contain material only from January to April 1946 and are labeled as backup material for the so-called Eberle Report.
The principal published sources for Chapter V on unification of the armed services between 1946 and 1950 are the series of hearings held between 1944 and 1947 by various committees of the House and Senate. The first unification hearings were conducted in the spring of 1944 by a Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy of the House of Representatives under the chairmanship of Congressman Clifton A. Woodrum of Virginia. Nothing came of these hearings, and the next ones held were in late 1945 by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs under Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, followed by hearings in the spring and summer of 1946 by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee under Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts. Following a reorganization of Congress, the next hearings were held by the Senate Committee on the Armed Services in the spring of 1947 under Senator Chan Gurney of South Dakota. The final hearings were conducted by the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments under Congressman Clare Hoffman of Michigan at about the same time.
Material on the reorganization of the Army staff from 1948

to 1950 was drawn from the files of the Management Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Army located in RG 819 (Army Staff) in the National Archives and Records Service. The specific files used are referred to in the footnotes. The Chief of Staff's office file 320 on reorganization for 1949 was also used. General Lutes' files on The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command, compiled in the spring of 1948, is in the Somervell-ASF Reorganization Proposals file, referred to above, in OCMH. The Final Report of the War Department Policies and Programs Review Board, known as the Haislip Board, of 11 August 1947, is now declassified.
The Johnston plan for realigning the Army staff on functional lines was mimeographed as Organization of the Department of the Army: A Staff Study, 15 July 1948. The files of the Management Division, OCA,.contain valuable documents on events leading to the publication of the Johnston plan as well as to the publication of the Survey of the Department of the Army-Final Report by Cresap, McCormick and Paget of 15 April 1949. The Management Division also compiled and mimeographed a very valuable collection of documents to accompany the Cresap, McCormick and Paget Report entitled Tabbed Materials to Accompany a Study on Improvement of Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army, dated 22 July 1949. Only the original copy in the Management Division files contains the formal comments in writing by the Army staff including the chiefs of the technical services. In the OCMH files is a copy of an address by Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, the Chief of Ordnance, to the Chief of Staff on 15 September 1948 on Reorganization of the Army as Viewed From the Technical Service Level.
A very helpful commentary on the Army Organization Act of 1950 was prepared by Lt. Col. George Emery Baya of the Management Division, OCA, entitled An Explanation of the Army Organization Act of 1950, dated 27 July 1950 and reproduced for distribution within the Army. A copy is in OCMH files.
The principal archival material used in preparing Chapter VI were the Chief of Staff's 320 (Reorganization) files for 1953 and 1954 in RG 319, NARS, and the Annual Historical Report of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for FY 1955. The

latter contains a sizable file of documents bearing upon the Army staff reorganization of 1955. Included are the Davies Committee Report of 18 December 1953 and the Secretary's Report on Army Reorganization of 17 July 1954, both of which were reproduced and distributed throughout the Army. General Williston B. Palmer discussed the rationale behind the 1955 changes in the organization of the Army staff in "The General Staff, United States Army," Armed Forces Management, IV, No. 1 (October 1957) .
Karl Bendetsen's proposals in 1952 for reorganizing the Army staff appeared in the Military Review, XXXIII, No. 10 (January 1954) , as "A Plan for Army Organization." His second plan, dated 1 June 1955, for Army Organization in Peace and War is located in the files of Group B, Army Headquarters, OSD Project 80 (the Hoelscher Committee Report), referred to below. Mr. Lovett's letter of 18 November 1952 to President Truman, suggesting a reorganization of the technical services among other things, appeared in the Army, Navy, and Air Force Journal, 10 January 1953. The review and analysis of the organization of the Army staff prepared by McKinsey and Company, dated March 1955, was reproduced in two volumes.
The unclassified First Army Survey Appraisal of Relationships Now Established by SR 10-500-1, October 1953, a mimeographed copy of which is in OCMH files, is the best analysis of the housekeeping problems encountered by the continental armies and the technical services after World War II.
For Chapter VII useful material on common supplies and services is contained in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background Materials on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply, 86th Congress, 2d Session. An ICAF lecture on the origins of the single manager concept by its chief architect, Robert C. Lanphier, Jr., entitled Single Manager Plan on 23 November 1955 was also consulted. L. Van Loan Naisawald's unpublished draft manuscript, acknowledged in the preface, The History of Army Research and Development, Organization and Programs: Part I, Organization: The Formative Years, 1961, was indispensable because of the au-

thor's intimate personal knowledge of the background and events described.
For Chapter VIII the hearings and reports on national security organization published by the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, the so-called Jackson Subcommittee, provided illuminating background material as well as criticism of the organization and management of defense policies under President Eisenhower. Particularly helpful were the statements of former Secretaries of Defense Robert S. Lovett and Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Wilfred J. McNeil, and Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Budget, under President Eisenhower, General Taylor, and Secretary McNamara.
A number of speeches, statements, and articles by Charles J. Hitch, including testimony before the Jackson Committee, were useful in tracing the development of the planning programming-budgeting system. The Economics of National Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961) , which he wrote with Roland N. McKean as a member of the RAND Corporation, outlined in detail its fundamental concepts. Also of value was Mr. Hitch's Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965) .
Important documents bearing upon the creation of the Defense Supply Agency are included in the Project 100, Single Manager Activities file of Project 80's Group D files referred to below.
Material on Project 80 and the Army reorganization of 1962 came from the files of the Hoelscher Committee and its successor, the Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office (DARPO). This material was turned over to OCMH where it is presently located. These files include the published reports of the study groups as well as the final summary report and the Green Book of December 1961, the latter containing the reorganization plan finally approved by Secretary McNamara. The most important materials are in the files of Mr. Hoelscher's executive office and the backup files of the several study groups, particularly those of Group D on Army logistics. Also of much help were the formal criticisms of the Hoelscher Committee Report by General Illig and Dr. Garvin of DCSLOG in September 1961 contained in Mr. Hoelscher's personal files

and the transcript of a speech by Hoelscher before the Army Management School in March 1963, The Story of Project 80 and the Reorganization of the Army.
Unfortunately because the Hoelscher Committee was dissolved immediately after its report was presented to the Chief of Staff in mid-October 1961 a gap in documentation exists between that date and mid-February 1962 when DARPO began operations. Transcripts of the interviews with General Taylor in November and December, however, were preserved as well as the Traub Committee Report. Otherwise material for this period, when Secretary McNamara was making vital decisions affecting the reorganization, was culled from personal papers retained by a few officers who remained on duty after October, particularly Lt. Col. Lewis J. Ashley and Maxey O. Stewart.
Material dealing with the execution of Project 80 came from the files of DARPO, especially its correspondence files. On the vital issue of personnel transfers few records survived of the bitter debates between the Army staff and DARPO on transferring the former's personnel to the newly created AMC and CDC.
Secondary Works
For the nineteenth century, three volumes in the late Leonard D. White's studies in the administrative history of the federal government were of great value: The Jeffersonians, 1801-1829 (New York: Macmillan, 1951) , The Jacksonians, 1829-1861 (New York: Macmillan, 1954) , and The Republican Era, 1869-1901 (New York: Macmillan, 1958) . William B. Skelton has filled in an important gap in our knowledge by tracing the origins of the continuing feud between the Commanding General, on the one hand, and the bureau chiefs, backed by the Secretary of War, on the other, in "The Commanding General and the Problem of Command in the United States Army, 1821-1841," Military Affairs, XXXIV No. 4 (December 1970) .
Until the publication of Graham A. Cosmas' An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1971) , there was no reliable or authoritative account of the role the Army and the War Department played in that conflict. The

first chapter is an excellent summary of the organization and administration of the department and the Army in the field in the years before the war. While concentrating on the Army during the war itself, Cosmas carries his account right up to the appointment of Elihu Root as Secretary of War on 1 August 1899. It is a fair, balanced account and one every student of American military history should have in his library.
Secondary works on the organization and administration of the War Department for the period 1900-45 include Otto L. Nelson, National Security and the General Staff (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), largely an unorganized miscellaneous collection of documents printed in full. It is more likely to mislead the reader than to inform him. Furthermore, government and War Department documents printed in full, while useful, are to some extent indigestible. Nelson's selections for the period before World War II are arbitrary, omitting many important items. Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959) is much broader in scope, including European armies and their experiences and tracing the development of American military thought from the Revolution until after World War II. Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961) , provides a useful comparison of the experiences and problems of all three services as well as of the Department of Defense down to the end of 1958. In discussing the Secretary of War's alliance with the Chief of Staff he does not seem to realize that such an alliance existed to only a limited extent during the two terms that Henry L. Stimson was Secretary, first with Leonard Wood and later with George C. Marshall. During World War I Newton D. Baker did not align himself with the Chief of Staff until Peyton C. March took over that office. Marvin A. Kriedberg and Merton G. Henry in DA Pamphlet No. 20-212, A History o f Military Mobilization of the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington, 1955) , cover the organization and administration of the Army in a superior fashion, although the emphasis is on mobilization procedures. Unfortunately the book lacks an index. Richard D. Challener's Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1978) indicates the Army had much less influence on American foreign policy than the Navy. Howard Moon is preparing a study on war plans during this period, emphasizing particularly those involving Japan and Mexico.
For the period before World War I, Mabel E. Deutrich,
Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of General Fred C. A insworth (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962) , and Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960) , are indispensable. John Dickinson, The Building of an Army (New York: The Century Company, 1922) , who served on the General Staff during World War I, provides one of the best accounts of the development of the Army from 1900 to 1920, including the controversy between the Regular Army and the National Guard, the background and content of the National Defense Act of 1916, the nation's first draft law, the reorganizations of the War Department during 1918, and the Congressional hearings which led to passage of the National Defense Act amendments of June 1920. George C. Herring, Jr., published a valuable article, "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 1915-1916," in the Journal o f Southern History, XXX, No. 4 (November 1964) , although he did not discuss the impact of the National Defense Act of 1916 on the General Staff.
Concerning America's role in World War I, Frederick Palmer's two-volume biography Newton D. Baker, America at War (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1931) and his Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker Howard Bliss (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934) are still commendable accounts. Daniel R. Beaver's "Newton D. Baker and the Genesis of the War Industries Board," Journal o f American History, LII, No. 1 (June 1965) and Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966) are the most valuable and most recent accounts of Baker as Secretary of War and of his negative attitude toward industrial mobilization. Robert D. Cuff's recent The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations during World War 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) is by far the most detailed, thorough, and sophisticated treatment of the WIB that has been pub-

lished. Edward M. Coffman, first in "The Battle Against RedTape: Business Methods of the War Department General Staff, 1917-1918," Military Afairs, XXVI, No. 1 (Spring 1962) , and later in his authoritative The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966) , has written a detailed treatment of March's efforts to reorganize the General Staff in the last six months of the war. His The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) is the best over-all treatment of our participation in the war, but it deals only summarily with the problems in the War Department's supply system. Very little has been written about the crises in industrial mobilization during World War I. Grosvenor B. Clarkson in Industrial America in the World War, The Strategy Behind the Line, 1917-1918 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923) has told the story of industrial mobilization from the War Industries Board viewpoint. Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson in The Armies of Industry and The Road to France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) have also dealt with the problem of the disorganization caused by the independence of the bureau chiefs during the first year of the war effort. All of these accounts, however, tread very lightly on the subject of Secretary Baker's failure to recognize the need for effective control over the bureaus' operations and over war industry. Only Irving Brinton Holley, jr., in Ideas and Weapons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953) has dealt exhaustively with one aspect of industrial mobilization-the development of the infant aircraft industry and its efforts to produce serviceable military aircraft. His detailed treatment of the relationship between research, development, and production of aircraft and the extreme difficulties which led to at least two major investigations is a model that could well be followed by other historians dealing with this area from drawing board to battlefield.
The following volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series have valuable material on the period of the long armistice between 1919 and 1939: Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, 1950) ; Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington, 1951) ; and Stetson Conn,

Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts (Washington, 1964) . OCMH also has a copy of a praiseworthy Ph.D. dissertation by John W. Killigrew, The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929-1936, Indiana University, 1960. The best and most comprehensive treatment of the development of the Air Corps during the interwar years may be found in Irving Brinton Holley, jr., Buying Aircraft: Materiél Procurement for the Army Air Forces, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1964) . It not only covers the organization of the Air Corps but deals with the corps' attempts to secure money from Congress for aircraft and with the struggling aircraft industries' efforts to survive in those years of pacifism and isolation. It goes right up to the defeat of France and to President Roosevelt's casual decision to ask Congress for 50,000 aircraft in May 1940. The Air Force's official history and historical studies for the interwar years are more narrow in their frames of reference and understandably more biased.
The most valuable account of General Marshall's reorganization of the War Department in 1942 is Col. Frederick S. Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941March 1942," Military Afairs, XVI (1952) . The McNarney Committee appointed to carry out the reorganization left few documents behind. Colonel Haydon had to reconstruct events laboriously from scattered sources and from the volumes of Watson and Cline cited above. He left well-organized notes and copies of his interviews with participants. These interviews are in OCMH files. Forrest C. Pogue has an excellent account of Marshall's views on reorganization in the second volume of his biography of the general, Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1966) .
In addition to the volumes of Morison, Cline, and Watson, cited above, the following volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series were especially helpful in preparing Chapters II and III: R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington, 1959) ; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943 (Washington, 1955) ; Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy:
1943-1945 (Washington, 1968) ; Kent Roberts Greenfield,

Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization o f Ground Combat Troops (Washington, 1947) ; John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces (Washington, 1954) ; Constance McL. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War (Washington, 1955) ; and Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States (Washington, 1973) , which the author consulted in draft form. Of the offical "Army Air Forces in World War II" series edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, Men and Planes, vol. VI (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) , was useful, as were portions of Holley's volume on Air Force procurement.
The following unpublished official monographs, all located in OCMH files, were consulted: Kent Roberts Greenfield, A Short History of the Army Ground Forces, AGF Historical Studies No. 10, c. 1944; D. L. McCaskey, The Role of Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment, AGF Historical Series, No. 34, 1946; John D. Millett, Organizational Problems of the Army Ground Forces, 1942-1945, c. April 1945; Richard M. Leighton, History of the Control Division, ASF, 1942-1945, April 1946; Research and Development Division, ASF, History of the Research and Development Division, ASF, 1 July 1940-1 July 1945 with Supplement to 1 January 1946, c. 1946. Personnel Division, G-1, War Department General Staff, History of the Personnel Division, G-1, War Department General Staff, n.d.; Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, History of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945, n.d.; Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff, c. 1953; Richard W. Armour and Others, History of the G-3 Division, War Department General Staff During World War II, c. February 1946; Supply Division, War Department General Staff, History of the Supply Division, G-4, War Department General Staff, n.d.; Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, War Department Special Staff, History of the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, n.d.; George W. Peck, History of the War Department Manpower Board, c. May 1946; Edwin L. Hayward, History of the Civil

Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, During World War II to March 1946, n.d.; New Developments Division, War Department Special Staff, History of the New Developments Division, War Department General Staff, c. April 1946.
Among monographs used that were prepared by the Army Air Forces were Chase C. Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1945, AAF Historical Study No. 10, Air Historical Office, April 1947, and L. V. Howard and C. C. Mooney, Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF, AAF Histories Studies No. 28 (revised), Air Historical Office, Hq., AAF, August 1946.
An unpublished doctoral dissertation by Theodore Wyckoff, Jr., The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, 1940-1945, Princeton University, 1960, copy in OCMH files, was also used.
Two OCMH studies on Army personnel management were valuable: R. W. Coakley, B. C. Mossman, and B. F. Cooling, Review of Deployment Procedures in World War Il and in the Korean War, 1965, and R. W. Coakley, Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System, 1965.
In preparing Chapter IV John C. Sparrow, History o f Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army, DA Pamphlet 20-210 (Washington, 1954) , and an OCMH study prepared by Robert W. Coakley, Ernest F. Fisher, Karl E. Cocke, and Daniel P. Griffin, Resume of Army Roll-Up Following World War II (revised), 1968, were of value in analyzing the Army's proposals for universal military training.
The best published account of the battle over unification discussed briefly in- Chapter V is Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) .
The most significant published analysis of national defense policy from World War II to 1960 is Samuel P. Huntington's The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) . For the period between 1947 and 1953 Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder's Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) was invaluable. Schilling's "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal Year 1950" brilliantly demonstrates what General Mar-

shall had warned, the futility and irresponsibility of attempting to determine the size of defense budgets without considering American military commitments and strategy. Schilling also shows how this development inevitably led to the bitter interservice rivalry that loomed so large in defense policy from 1947 to 1961.
The most useful study on the evolution of the Army's program budgets during the 1950s is Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgets: Theory and Practice (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1954) . An article by Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform," in the December 1966 issue of the Public Administration Review, XVI, No. 4, provides an excellent historical background, while an OCA official, William O. Harris, in an ICAF student thesis in March 1961, An Appraisal of Military Comptrollership, Thesis No. 59, M61-92, traced the development of OCA during the fifties with emphasis on the increasing authority of Wilfred J. McNeil, the DOD Comptroller, over defense budgets.
Since much of the services' research and development was conducted on contract by outside "think tanks," the author consulted Bruce L. R. Smith's The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966) , a thorough account of the background and development of the first and still the foremost of these scientific advisory groups.
Two historical studies on combat developments within the Army were used: Marshall D. Moody, The Transportation Corps Combat Developments Program: Its Origin and Status, Office, Chief of Transportation, 30 April 1958, and Historical Background of United States Continental Army Command Participation in Combat and Materiél Development Activities, prepared in 1963 by the Historical Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Unit Training and Readiness, Hq., USCONARC.
ICAF and AWC student theses on the development of integrated supply management were useful, including J. S. Goldberg, Fourth Military Service, Student Report on Policy No. 288, ICAF Economic Mobilization Course, 1951-52; H. D. Linscott, The Evolution of Integrated Material Management in the Department of Defense, IG`AF Student Thesis No. 76, M61-49, 31 March 1961; and Robert S. Cunningham, The

Organization and Management of the Department of Defense Wholesale Supply System, U.S. Army War College Student Thesis AWCLG 61-2-41V, 10 February 1961.
The most valuable treatment of Army logistics from the creation of ASF through the Army reorganization of 1962 is an OCMH study, Three Studies on the Historical Development of Army Logistical Organization, prepared for the Board of Inquiry on Army Logistics Systems (the Brown Board), July 1966. Part B on Army logistics between World War II and 1960 was of great help in preparing Chapter VI.
Martin Blumenson's Reorganization of the Army, 1962, OCMH Monograph 87M, April 1965, was used extensively in preparing those sections dealing with Project 80.

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