CHAPTER 4
The Third Reorganization
The Office of Civil Operations, representing the second attempt within a year
to improve U.S. organization for pacification, was at least a partial success.
Although during a short lifetime it had no discernible influence on the war
against the Viet Cong, it achieved organizational improvements that represented
an important half-way step in the formation of CORDS.
Washington officials had intended that Deputy Ambassador Porter run the new
organization directly, but Ambassador Lodge made the Office of Civil Operations
similar to a subsidiary corporation, with a director reporting to Porter.1
This development and Lodge's refusal to accept a second deputy ambassador meant
that Porter was still running the mission, particularly when Lodge, soon after
establishing the Office of Civil Operations, left for a month's home leave.
Porter was seldom at his desk in the new office and remained busy with activities
unrelated to pacification.
The choice of a director for the new office was Porter's, a choice narrowed
considerably by the need to find a senior civilian already serving in South
Vietnam so that the transition could be made swiftly. Porter chose the deputy
director of the Saigon office of the Agency for International Development, L.
Wade Lathram. Yet hardly had Lathram taken over the position when, like Lodge,
he left on a month's home leave.
The absence of both Lodge and Lathram reinforced the belief of Washington officials
that a second deputy ambassador to devote full time to pacification was needed.
Stressing that need to President Johnson in February 1967, Special Assistant
Komer noted that although Porter had originally opposed a second deputy, he
had come around to the view that one was needed.2
Yet by that time, in view of the pending creation of
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CORDS, the matter had become largely academic; but as the president was pondering
the precise form that CORDS was to take, the need for three strong senior civilians
was no doubt a consideration.
The new director, Lathram, had authority for directing all American civilian staffs
in Saigon concerned with pacification support and all American civilian programs
outside Saigon except clandestine operations of the CIA. In addition, he was to
coordinate among the various agencies other civilian programs not dealing with
pacification. Despite his interagency responsibilities, he was made only
an ex-officio member of the Mission Council.3
The structure and detailed concepts of operation of the Office of Civil Operations
were developed largely by members of Komer's White House staff on temporary duty
in Saigon, Richard Holbrooke and Colonel Robert M. Montague, Jr. Six divisions
were responsible for refugees, psychological operations, new life development
(improvement of economic conditions in the villages), revolutionary development
cadre, CHIEU Hoi (a program to encourage Viet Cong to rally to the government),
and public safety. Those were moved en bloc from their parent civilian agencies.
Above those divisions were an Executive Secretariat, a Management Division (internal
administration), and a Plans and Evaluation Division, the last having primary
responsibility for policy, concepts, strategy, plans, and programs and for reporting
on and evaluating all pacification activities.
At subordinate levels-corps, provinces, and eventually some districts civilian
operations fell under one man who was responsible up the chain of command to Lathram.
Except for the addition of a Military Program and Liaison Division, the staffs
in each of the four corps were similar to those in Saigon; and at province level,
where the senior civilian was called the province representative, there were,
as a rule, at least six subordinates whose duties paralleled those of the higher
staffs. Because divisions of the South Vietnamese Army were in the South Vietnamese
pacification chain of command, the Office of Civil Operations assigned to each
an American division tactical area coordinator.
The Office of Civil Operations was far larger than any of its civilian antecedents
in South Vietnam. The office contained nearly a thousand American civilians and
directed programs costing $128 million and four billion South Vietnamese piastres.4
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Moving offices to one location and choosing and acquiring people occupied much
of the time of senior officials of the new office, timeconsuming tasks that
would help smooth the later formation of CORDS but whose complexity was not fully
recognized by those in Washington who were impatient for results. By early December
Porter and Lathram had decided on three of the four regional directors: Ambassador
Koren (State Department) for the I Corps; John Vann (Agency for International
Development, a former officer in the US Army who had resigned his commission over
disagreements on policy in South Vietnam) for the III Corps; and Vince Heymann
(CIA) for the IV Corps. The position in the II Corps, declined by General Lansdale,
was filled in February 1967, near the end of the projected ninety-day lifespan
for the Office of Civil Operations, by Robert Matteson (AID). Selection of province
representatives was completed only in mid-January 1967, also rear the end of the
contemplated lifespan.5
Like many other American agencies in South Vietnam, the Office of Civil Operations
never had its full complement of people. By late February 1967, 485 vacancies
remained out of 1,468 positions, many, of them important managerial posts.6
Difficulty in recruiting civilians was neither new to the Office of Civil Operations
nor did it end with the establishment of CORDS.
In terms of personnel and funding, the Office of Civil Operations was essentially
an offspring of the Agency for International Development, which in fiscal year
1967 provided 54 percent of the financing and 78 percent of the people. In addition,
the parent office in Washington provided and financed administrative support.
The second largest contributor, the CIA, provided 44 percent of the financing
but a far smaller percentage of personnel.7
Although better than its predecessors', relationships of the new office with the
other US civilian agencies were often strained. Richard Holbrooke, for example,
noted that the office was "sniped and attacked almost from the outset by
the bureaucracies." The directors of the Joint US Public Affairs Office and
the CIA, Holbrooke remarked, were particularly possessive of their people and
programs. Just how jealously the CIA guarded its prerogatives was apparent from
a memorandum of un
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derstanding which gave the CIA station chief and the chief of the Revolutionary
Development Cadre Division, a CIA official, wide authority and veto power over
planning, programming, funding, and operating the Revolutionary Development Cadre
program.8
Although the Office of Civil Operations wrote the performance reports of its people
(but with comments by the parent agencies), the employees were supported, paid,
and housed by their parent agencies. Even though the Office of Civil Operations
directed a program, the agency to which that program had previously belonged remained
responsible for funding. This separate funding made the subsequent transition
to CORDS simpler, but it hampered reprogramming of money and resources to deal
with unexpected problems. The director had no authority, for example, to transfer
funds from the Revolutionary Development Cadre program to psychological warfare.9
There were clear benefits nevertheless. Senior officials working on pacification
were at least located together and saw each other daily. In relations with MACV,
the civilians spoke with one voice at all administrative levels, which made their
case stronger; and coordination with the military, especially in planning for
pacification, was facilitated. The South Vietnamese in turn benefitted by receiving
advice from two voices rather than from several directions.
The office was unquestionably a useful step toward a workable organization for
single management of US advice and support for pacification. The experience gained
would considerably ease the transition from civil to military responsibility.
Yet in its short lifetime the Office of Civil Operations had no visible effect
on the war in the countryside, where the situation was ill-disposed to quick improvements.
In measuring the successes even senior officials of the office saw them in terms
of American accomplishments, such as improved reporting and evaluating systems,
not in what those systems were reporting and evaluating.10
If the move
in the direction of military responsibility was to be halted, the Office of Civil
Operations would have had to produce results little short of miraculous.
Although the trend toward military responsibility was always there, General Westmoreland
continued to be discreet about it. Talking with Ambassador Leonhart in mid-December
1966, soon after the Office of
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Civil Operations was established, Westmoreland denied that he was seeking such
responsibility but indicated that he had no intention of being unprepared should
it come his way. Neither fragmented nor dual responsibility was the answer; leaders
in Washington, he observed, might be ill-judged by history if they failed to devise
more clear-cut organizational authority and responsibility.11
Returning to Washington, Leonhart voiced much the same opinion to President Johnson.
After noting that the civilians and the military still had problems agreeing on
operational priorities, he added: "I remain doubtful that we can get pacification
moving quickly or effectively enough with the present organization or that we
will have the requisite planning, retraining, and leverage applied to [the South
Vietnamese] until MACV is tasked with a single responsibility for the pacification
program." Copies of Leonhart's report went to the Defense and State Departments,
the CIA, and the Agency for International Development, where the views apparently
raised little protest except from one member of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee
who was "deeply troubled by the continuing and apparently growing pressure"
for military control.12
Visiting Saigon for ten days starting 13 February, Special Assistant Komer praised
the Office of Civil Operations as "a major step forward" that deserved
"full Washington backing by all agencies involved." Yet he also made
a strong plea for better management and cited the prerequisites of "a
vigorous top US team in Saigon," improved civil-military coordination, and
a more effective and coordinated effort by the South Vietnamese government.13
In the meantime President Johnson had begun to consider a radical reorganization
of the American command structure in South Vietnam, snore than simply giving responsibility
for pacification to the military. The president had begun to think in terms of
a sweeping reorganization of the US mission based on a suggestion by Secretary
McNamara, which General Wheeler endorsed, that Westmoreland be afforded powers
similar to those exercised by General Douglas Mac Arthur during the occupation
of Japan. Under that concept, Westmoreland would control all American civil and
military efforts but apparently would exercise no proconsulship over the South
Vietnamese. Wheeler's relay of this plan
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to Westmoreland did not note whether there would even be an ambassador.14
In response to specific queries from General Wheeler, Westmoreland proposed that
if the arrangement were adopted, he should have the title of Commander in Chief,
US Forces, Vietnam. He also proposed three deputies, one each for political affairs,
economics and national planning, and military operations, the latter to assume
his title as commander of MACV.15
When in mid-February Ambassador Lodge informed President Johnson that he wanted
to end his assignment as ambassador, General Westmoreland came under consideration
for that post. Secretary McNamara saw him either as a civilian ambassador or in
the dual role of ambassador and military commander. In the belief that a man in
uniform could better coordinate the US mission and with concern for Westmoreland's
continuing military career, General Wheeler recommended the dual position, to
which McNamara eventually subscribed.16
In late February and early March, President Johnson discussed the possibilities
with McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk. Although Rusk stressed that he had
no personal objection to Westmoreland as ambassador, he was concerned about American
operations becoming completely militarized because the projected South Vietnamese
elections would almost certainly result in a military president. That objection,
combined with McNamara's recommendation that Westmoreland remain in uniform, whatever
his position, killed the proposal.17
The roles of McNamara and Wheeler in those deliberations underscored the strong
desire of both men to see a consolidated American effort in South Vietnam, particularly
in pacification. The president's interest also appeared to reflect continued determination
to achieve a united effort, but the proposal for Westmoreland's appointment may
have been only one of several choices that the president considered. Even as Secretary
McNamara was recommending Westmoreland, he also suggested to the president that
Special Assistant Komer might be named to head
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the pacification program in South Vietnam, a possibility that the president mentioned
to Komer.18
Having decided against a change in Westmoreland's status, President Johnson remained
determined to put pacification under the military and, apparently for the first
time, decided to give Westmoreland a civilian deputy for pacification. That possibility
had gone largely unremarked since Komer had recommended it in his paper on pacification
prepared in August 1966. Knowledge of the president's decision, however, was limited
to a handful of senior officials-including almost certainly none who might have
opposed it until 15 March when, as a prelude to another high-level conference
on Guam, the president publicly announced that Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker,
would replace Lodge; the current ambassador to Pakistan, Eugene M. Locke, would
be the new deputy ambassador; and Komer would head the pacification advisory program.
On vacation at the time, Komer was somewhat chagrined at Locke's appointment,
for that made Komer the third-ranking civilian rather than the second. Komer had
expected to be both the deputy ambassador and General Westmoreland's deputy for
pacification.19 Yet having only one
deputy in the mission might have perpetuated the problems of Ambassador Porter.
In any event, with pacification placed under MACV, ambassador Locke was moving
into a job that would be downgraded to its original focus on merely administering
the US mission.
The conference in March at Guam was outwardly another in a series of joint conferences
among American and South Vietnamese leaders on the war's progress. Yet it also
had importance as a forum for introducing the new American team for Saigon and
for starting work on the details of reorganizing the US mission. The principal
proposal was that eventually adopted: creation of CORDS. At Guam, however, General
Westmoreland felt a trace of presidential hesitation. Details of the CORDS idea,
he noted were "put to the President, who seemed to accept them in principle
but stated he would refrain from making a decision" until later in the conference.20
Westmoreland went to Guam expecting that the chief of his Revolutionary Development
Support Directorate, General Knowlton, would head, under Komer, a new MACV staff
section combining the direc
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AMBASSADOR BUNKER
torate with the Office of Civil Operations; but by the end of the conference
he agreed instead on the director of the Office of Civil Operations, Lathram,
with Knowlton as his deputy. Having already established a good working relationship
with Lathram, Knowlton readily agreed.21
Komer and his military assistant, Colonel Montague, accompanied General Westmoreland
back to Saigon, there to spend several days working out details of the reorganization
and to consult with Westmoreland. Westmoreland recalled that they came to "a
meeting of minds." There were actually some stormy scenes, for Knowlton
and the MACV chief of staff, Maj. Gen. William B. Rosson, deduced from Komer's
proposed organization charts that he sought to command American units assigned
to support pacification. Their concern may have arisen from a notation on a
draft chart that American corps and provincial pacification advisory chiefs
should control US units if the units were "attached for pacification missions."
Or they may have been concerned over a key paragraph in the draft National Security
Action Memorandum directing the reorganization, which stated that "the
Deputy will supervise the employment of all US resources-civil and military,
and the conduct of all US programs directly contributing to pacification (Revolutionary
Development)." Komer, the author of the draft memorandum, had meant US
[50]
advisers rather than units. The paragraph was nevertheless removed from the draft
memorandum following the sessions at MACV; the US military was clearly sensitive
to any indication of civilian involvement in military command and tactical operations.22
More significant in the long run was what General Westmoreland and his future
deputy for pacification did agree on: a series of guidelines that set the pattern
for subsequent American organization. Pacification was still to be essentially
a South Vietnamese program with the American role limited to advice and support.
The American advisory program would have a single manager at each level with a
single chain of command from Saigon down to district, a single official voice
when dealing with the South Vietnamese, and integrated civil and military planning,
programming, operations, evaluations, logistics, and communications. Every effort
would be made to achieve a smooth transition by melding existing civil and military
organizations, the entire Office of Civil Operations being transferred to the
new organization. In managing pacification support, Korner was to maintain close
contact with applicable ministries of the South Vietnamese government. Komer was
not to be a political adviser or mere coordinator; he was instead to operate as
a component commander. Positions in the new organization were to be filled by
the best men available, whether military or civilian. In addition, the reorganization
was to proceed by careful and cautious steps; civilian agency staffs and budgets,
for example, were to be retained until at least; fiscal year 1969.23
Although at first Komer planned eventually to integrate or merge the civil and
military staff sections, the final structure as developed in June 1967 kept the
two sections relatively intact in the sense, for example, that staff sections
from the Office of Civil Operations retained their original names and nearly all
their former personnel. That would make a smooth transition back to civilian control
possible should negotiations with the enemy prompt a reduction in or withdrawal
of US military forces.
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PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT GUAM CONFERENCE, March 20, 1967.
Komer saw for himself a major role in allocation of resources, training, and
other activities of those South Vietnamese military forces involved in pacification;
but possibly in deference to a new deputy military commander, General Creighton
W. Abrams, whose primary responsibility was to be upgrading the South Vietnamese
Army, Westmoreland did not sanction it. In addition, Westmoreland directed that
Komer's command line run through the US field force (corps) commanders; yet
he did give Komer permission to maintain a direct channel of technical supervision
to the corps pacification advisers and their subordinates at province level.
In working on the draft National Security Action Memorandum, as originally prepared
by Komer, General Westmoreland made only a few changes, primarily wording to
assure his own primacy and responsibility for pacification support over that
of Komer and removal of the ambiguous paragraph on supervision of all US resources.
Returning to Washington, Komer on 27 March forwarded the memorandum to President
Johnson with the notation that Secretaries McNamara and Rusk, Deputy
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Secretary of Defense Vance, General Wheeler, and Ambassador Bunker endorsed it.24
Komer and Secretary Rusk insisted that Ambassador Leonhart, who was to take over
Komer's responsibilities in the White House, should receive the same full mandate
previously held by Komer. The president only grudgingly approved. At the same
time Komer made clear to the president that he expected to be equal in status
to General Abrams except when General Westmoreland was absent, in which case Abrams
as the military deputy would be filling Westmoreland's position. He also wanted
"free access to Bunker (who insists on it)." At McNamara's urging Komer
refused any role in such additional civilian functions as reducing inflation and
port congestion lest they take time from the primary task.25
Because the press was speculating on the new direction of pacification, Komer
urged the president to make a public announcement of the new organization soon,
but for a variety of reasons the president delayed until May. For personal reasons,
Ambassador Bunker was unable to proceed immediately to Saigon, and President Johnson
wanted him to make the announcement when he had assumed his new assignment. In
addition, official Washington was at the time involved in a new decision on force
levels for South Vietnam. Besides, the president himself apparently was still
uncertain as to Komer's and Leonhart's roles and for a while leaned toward Korner
dividing his time between Saigon and Washington.26
On 20 April Komer again urged a presidential decision in order that he could
be in Saigon by 1 May. Yet President Johnson continued to delay. He was still
considering three organizational schemes: the CORDS solution as recommended
at Guam and worked out with Westmoreland, Komer as director of an enlarged Office
of Civil Operations, and Komer handling pacification in both Saigon and Washington.
Although keeping the Office of Civil Operations would have been the most acceptable
solution to the civilian agencies, President Johnson ap
[53]
parently gave it little consideration. Komer later recalled that he recommended
strongly against his operating in both Saigon and Washington and made clear he
preferred the CORDS solution.27
When Komer arrived in Saigon on 1 May along with General Abrams, President Johnson
still had not signed the National Security Action Memorandum creating CORDS and
did so only nine days later. By that memorandum, the president charged General
Westmoreland with American civil and military support of pacification and named
Komer as his deputy for pacification with the personal rank of ambassador. On
any interagency disputes arising from the change, Ambassador Bunker was to have
full jurisdiction. In Washington, Ambassador Leonhart was to take over Komer's
former position as Special Assistant to the President. "I count on all concerned-in
Washington and in Vietnam," the president admonished, "to pull together
in the national interest to make this arrangement work."28
The signing of the National Security Action Memorandum marked a distinct turning
point in the US pacification advisory effort. The force behind the new organization
had come from Washington, particularly from Komer's office in the White House,
but the focus after the signing of the memorandum was in Saigon. As Komer later
put it: "The problem was one of field execution, not Washington organization
. . . the real problems were not in Washington any longer but in Vietnam . . .
we could not manage the "other `war' from 11,000 miles away."29
Washington agencies and offices were from that point onlookers, monitoring but
not initiating programs in pacification.
Few organizational changes during the war in Vietnam had such impact as placing
pacification under the military and creating CORDS. There were three compelling
reasons behind the president's decision to make the change.30
First, so intimately involved in pacification was every US agency in Saigon, and
so interwoven were civil and military tasks, that normal governmental coordination
was inadequate. Second, the problem was simply too large and complex for the civilian
agencies to handle alone. Third, pacification was failing for lack of adequate
military security, and the military would take security more seriously if directly
responsible for pacification. Aside from additional military
[54]
resources, Komer hoped that military operations might eventually be given a political
bent. That could hardly happen overnight, but in time the military did begin to
integrate its military operations with the political struggle. In the end, no
other American organization in South Vietnam would be as altered by the new organization
as was the military.
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Endnotes