CHAPTER 3
The Second Reorganization
Following several months in charge of Washington support for pacification,
Special Assistant Komer set in motion events that were destined to lead to a
second reorganization of American support when in August 1966 he circulated
a paper entitled, "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification: Analysis, Concept,
and Management."1 No other document so accurately
forecast the future course of the U.S. pacification advisory program.
Komer divided the problem of pacification into three main parts: local security,
breaking the hold of the Viet Cong over the people, and programs to win active
popular support. He felt that because of recent victories over the enemy's large
units, the time was propitious to step up work in all three fields. "As
pacification is a multifaceted civil/military problem,"' he noted, "it
demands a multifaceted civil/military response." No single program would
provide a breakthrough. "The path to both quick impact and accelerated
progress is through better management and coordination of the host of contributory
programs--most of them already in existence."
Komer then proposed a system of priorities: continuous local security to include
improving local defense forces and diverting regular South Vietnamese Army units
not "gainfully employed" against the enemy's main forces to local
security missions; breaking the hold of the Viet Cong over the people; positive
development programs to win popular support; functional priorities for field
pacification operations with work proceeding first in locales where the most
progress was feasible; additional human and material resources for pacification;
more performance goals with adequate criteria to measure progress and a system
to monitor it; better security for key roads; using the flow of refugees as
an asset in pacification; and better control over the rice supply.
Implicit throughout the paper was a concept of mass. Korner saw the road to
success--or at least visible results-to be through a massive
[31]
application and better management of South Vietnamese manpower and American material.
He also felt that pacification had to be pressed throughout the country, not just
in priority areas or specialized local programs. Only with a truly massive effort
could a turn-around be achieved, and that was what the president required if he
were to maintain public support for the war. Throughout Komer's association with
pacification, he would constantly strive to get more and more people and more
and more material involved in the effort. That was what lay behind his desire,
almost from the first, to give responsibility for pacification to the military,
for only the military-both American and South Vietnamesehad the men and resources
to do the job on a large scale.
Although Komer proposed three possible organizations, he had enthusiasm only for
one. The first would give Ambassador Porter full operational control over all
US pacification activities, including those of the military, and merge field staffs
and advisers at all levels into coordinated teams with a designated chief and
a channel of communications direct from the district to Porter. The second would
retain separate civil and military command channels but strengthen the management
structure of MACV and the mission by appointing a senior deputy for pacification
in MACV and giving Porter control of all civilian pacification personnel at all
levels. The third-which Komer favored-would assign responsibility for both civil
and military pacification programs to General Westmoreland, whose MACV staff would
be partially restructured to provide an integrated civil-military staff under
a civilian deputy (Komer recommended the deputy ambassador for the position) while
at lower echelons there would be a single manager for pacification at each level.
Despite the forcefulness of Komer's presentation, the paper had little immediate
impact. Although Komer sent a copy to the president, he received no reaction from
him. However, Secretary McNamara and his Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs, John T. McNaughton saw it as a means to give new life to pacification.
Komer's deputy, Ambassador Leonhart, carried a copy to Saigon, but Ambassadors
Lodge and Porter cared for none of the proposed changes. Preoccupied with the
war against the enemy's big units, General Westmoreland displayed no enthusiasm
for any change, although as Komer later recalled, Westmoreland told Leonhart,
in effect, "I'm not asking for it, but if I'm told to manage pacification,
I will do it."2
Just a few weeks later, aware of various proposals and counterproposals then
floating about Washington, Westmoreland saw pacifica
[32]
tion in a more positive light: "I'm not asking for the responsibility, but
I believe that my headquarters could take it in stride and perhaps carry out this
important function more economically and efficiently than 1 under] the present
complex arrangement."3
Nk'hen Westmoreland turned Konier's paper over to his planning staff for study,
the reaction was quite the opposite. The planners saw in it no approaches to pacification
not already recognized by the US mission, deemed none of the three alternate organizational
concepts capable of achieving the desired results, and maintained that the current
organizational structure was adequate.4
Charged further with preparing a plan for possible assumption of the responsibility
for pacification by Westmoreland, the staff came up with a two-stage variant on
Komer"s third alternative. In both stages there would be both civil and military
pacification officers on the MACV staff; but in a first stage, there would be
a civilian chain of command to the districts, and in a second, to be put into
effect if the first failed to work, the entire field program would be unified
under a military officer at each level.5
That was strictly a planning exercise, for there was no move or conspiracy by
MACV to take control of pacification. Although Westmoreland himself believed that
military management was inevitable, he thought the logic of that solution would
eventually sell itself on its own merits. He was also conscious that even the
slightest indication that he was seeking the responsibility would. provoke strong
adverse reactions from the civilian agencies both in Saigon and Washington.6
The civilian agencies, meanwhile, made no proposals of their own to counter those
in Komer's paper, simply letting the paper go with a flat no as if nothing further
would come of it.
In September, Komer began an active campaign to transfer responsibility for pacification
to the military. Since the military provided 90 percent of the resources and the
civilian agencies only 10 percent, putting pacification tinder the military was
to Komer "obvious." He also considered that General Westmoreland "had
the clout."' with the South Vietnamese government and armed forces that was
needed, and "the men in Washington who were really pushing hardest on Vietnam
were Robert McNarnara and his people, like McNaughton if paci
[33]
fication was to work, there had to be "strong auspices" behind it; Komer
was convinced the Defense Department was "far stronger behind pacification"
than was the State Department, "not that State didn't understand it but the
State people just weren't doing anything." In getting programs moving, he
believed, the Defense Department was "infinitely more dynamic and influential."7
Working with Assistant Secretary McNaughton, Komer arranged for Secretary McNamara
to make the official proposal for the military to assume responsibility for pacification.
Details worked out in McNaughton's office were not exactly what Komer wanted,
but he and his staff saw that as no disadvantage since those could be changed
once the secretary's proposal had drawn the first fire from the civilian agencies.8
The McNamara proposal provided a strong concept but one unfinished in details,
possibly deliberately so. Under the proposal, all pacification personnel and activities
were to be placed within MACV under a deputy for pacification who would also be
in charge of all pacification staffs in Saigon and the field. Whether the deputy
would be military or civilian and which activities would be classified as part
of pacification were left unanswered, matters so obviously requiring decision
that their omission may have been deliberate in order to be available to be used
with the civilian agencies as carrots.9
Although Secretary McNamara never formally submitted his memorandum to President
Johnson, he discussed the concept with him and obtained his agreement.10
The memorandum then was staffed out to the State Department, the Agency for International
Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Komer. The reactions were predictable; only Komer
and the Joint Chiefs concurred.
The State Department cited the political nature of pacification, the alleged failure
of the 1964 Hop TAC pacification operation that the military had managed, and
a need to emphasize civilianization of the war. The State Department also wanted
the views of the US mission in Saigon solicited. Indirectly providing comment
on the efficacy of , Ambassador Porter's efforts to manage pacification, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Unger stated that "the problem of management" would
be better
[34]
solved by putting Ambassador Porter in a position to carry out his full responsibilities
"as originally envisaged.11
The Agency for International Development's Assistant Administrator for the Far
East, Rutherford Poats, proposed like Unger a strengthening of Porter's position,
noting that "Porter should be given the job originally conceived for him."12
Poats wanted a pacification command structure with Porter directing the agency
staffs in Saigon and with committees at the corps and province levels chaired,
in the main, by military officers. The results would have been a deputy ambassador
with a small staff, four powerful deputies at corps level, and a hierarchy of
small committees at lower administrative levels, a solution putting a high premium
on coordination and not providing truly integrated management.
At the Central Intelligence Agency, one official saw McNamara's proposal raising
the basic pacification issue of military security versus popular involvement,
i.e., should pacification aim at inspiring the local populace to resist the insurgents
or should pacification be imposed by military power? Another CIA official raised
doubts about the military's ability to handle pacification by expressing undisguised
scorn for MACV's efforts to train and motivate the South Vietnamese Army and local
defense forces and their leaders. He proposed a joint pacification staff under
the ambassador, stressing unified direction rather than unified management. Although
he envisaged a staff large enough to supervise and direct the contributing agencies,
lie did not advocate melding the personnel and resources of the agencies into
a unified organization at all command and operational levels.13
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the "McNamara'' proposal with marked
enthusiasm. Recognizing that the new organization would re
quire increased help from US combat and combat support forces, they nevertheless
suggested, among several small changes in the text, one that
[35]
was intended to prevent interference with General Westmoreland's authority to
employ his combat units.14
Stressing the primacy of local security and the need for resources, Komer asserted
that coordination was no longer sufficient and that the military was better set
up to manage the large support effort that was required. While expressing no view
as to whether the deputy for pacification in MACV should be civilian or military,
he noted that the ambassador and deputy ambassador should retain their authority
in overall supervision of pacification support. The new deputy in MACV, he observed,
should control field activities and the Saigon staff that would direct field operations
but should be excluded from overall economic policy, anti-inflationary programs,
CIA programs other than police and pacification cadre, and such programs of the
Agency for International Development as medicine and education. Logistical support
for pacification, he believed, should remain with the parent agencies along with
administrative responsibilities for their personnel. "To be perfectly candid,"
Komer concluded, "I regard your proposal as basically a means of bringing
the military fully into the pacification process rather than of putting civilians
under the military."15
While discussions were proceeding, Deputy Ambassador Porter arrived in Washington,
expressed strong opposition to McNamara's proposal, and warned against a possible
"serious reaction" from Ambassador Lodge if Washington officials made
a quick decision on the issue. He cabled Lodge to alert him about the proposal
and to recommend that the US mission form a study group to evaluate various reorganization
possibilities.16
The Agency for International Development and the State Department meanwhile solidified
their positions. The administrator of the Agency for International Development,
William Gaud, proposed a second deputy ambassador whose only function would be
directing the US pacification program. The deputy would have an interagency staff
and would chair a Revolutionary Development Council made up of deputy directors
of all agencies, while similar structures would be set up at subordinate advisory
levels. The State Department's solution was much the
[36]
same : a strengthened deputy ambassador directing pacification at all levels but
leaving execution to the agencies. The deputy ambassador would have a military
director who would command MACV's corps, province, and district advisers and would
coordinate with a deputy for pacification within MACV.17
In the face of the unanimous opposition from the civilian agencies, President
Johnson decided to defer a decision. By giving the civilians a short time to try
to put their house in order, he intended to clef use the opposition. Like McNamara
and Komer, the president had made up his mind that the management of pacification
had to be unified under the military.18
In Saigon the civilian officials continued to misread the way the trend was developing
in Washington. On 8 October, for example, Porter told Lodge that the pressure
for a swift decision on reorganization had given way to "careful consideration."
As events would soon demonstrate, that was not to be the case. On 10 October,
Secretary McNamara, Chairman of the Joint. Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler,
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, and Komer arrived in Saigon for
a, brief visit before joining a conference in Manila with the president and heads
of several Asian states. Because Porter was still in the United States, the visitors
received their briefing on pacification from Porter's deputy, Ambassador Henry
Koren, who had only recently arrived in Saigon. Poorly prepared and weakly presented,
the briefing did nothing to create an impression of efficient civilian leadership.
To Komer it was a "'fiasco," and he was convinced that it confirmed
Secretary McNamara's commitment to pacification under the military.19
Ambassador Koren himself was left with no doubt where McNamara's sentiments on
organization for pacification lay. To the State Department he reported that the
secretary "expressed himself as utterly dissatisfied with progress on pacification"
and that the current US organization was "incompetent" to deal with
the problem.20 Having had a, chance
to tell McNamara privately that the 'lack of progress in pacification was attributable
to inadequate security for the population,
[37]
which was the fault of the military, Ambassador Lodge thought that McNamara had
changed his mind; but Koren failed to share that view.
General Westmoreland discerned the drift of events but continued to approach responsibility
for pacification with caution and care. As he noted following the McNamara visit
McNamara feels it is inevitable that I be given executive responsibility for American
support of the Revolutionary Development program. He is convinced that the State
Department officials do not have the executive and managerial abilities to handle
a program of such magnitude and complexity. I told McNamara I was not volunteering
for the job but I would undertake it if the President wished me to do so, and
I felt we could make progress. He stated that he thought there would be an interim
solution-that they were giving the civilian agencies another try. He stated that
if this does not work after approximately three months, I could expect to take
over.2l
Upon returning to Washington, McNamara and Katzenbach presented their findings
to the president separately. Although admitting failure of the political and social
aspects of pacification, Katzenbach labeled the lack of sustained security as
the major stumbling block, for which he fixed blame on both the American and South
Vietnamese military. He nevertheless proposed only a strengthening of the existing
separate civilian and military pacification support channels with overall authority
to remain with Porter but with a second deputy ambassador to relieve Porter of
nonpacification duties. Under his proposal, administrative control of civilians
working in pacification would remain with their parent agencies, but Porter would
have operational control over them. Katzenbach also recommended that a senior
general officer be assigned as Porter's principal deputy, one who could assist
in administration and coordination and who might also increase the military focus
on pacification. (Since the preceding August, a brigadier general, Willis D. Crittenberger,
Jr., had been so serving.) He added the proviso-which indicated that he was aware
of the drift of events-that should the civilian solution fail, the same general
would be an ideal choice to head a single, unified command for pacification under
Westmoreland.22
At the time undergoing a difficult personal reappraisal of the war, McNamara in
his assessment for the president was highly pessimistic "I see no reasonable
way to bring the war to an end soon . . . we find ourselves-from the point of
view of the important war (for the com
[38]
plicity of the people) -no better, and if anything worse off. This important war
must be fought and won by the Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the
beginning. But the discouraging truth is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963
and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst; for training and inspiring
them into effective action."
The solution, as McNamara saw it, lay in girding, openly, for a longer war and
in taking actions immediately "which will in 12 to 18 months give clear evidence
that the continuing costs and risks to the American people are acceptably limited,
that the formula for success has been found, and that the end of the war is merely
a matter of time."23
McNamara made five recommendations to implement that approach, but the one which
he saw as the most important and the most difficult to achieve was a successful
pacification program. As Korner later observed, the Secretary of Defense was markedly
unhappy with what he saw as a failure of Lodge, Porter, and Westmoreland to do
anything in pacification. "Pacification," he noted, "is a bad disappointment
. . . [and] . . . has if anything gone backward . . . full security exists nowhere."
Either directly or by implication, he attacked the lack of sustained local security,
the lack of attention accorded local security by both the American and South Vietnamese
military commands, the apathy and corruption of South Vietnamese officials, the
weakness of the South Vietnamese in dedication, direction, and discipline, and
"bad management" on the part of both Americans and South Vietnamese.24
Apparently aware of President Johnson's plan to afford the civilian agencies a
period of grace, McNamara recommended leaving the military and civilian pacification
channels separate and with all civilian pacification activities under Porter;
but he warned that "we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails after
a fair trial, the only alternative in my view is to place the entire pacification
program--civilian and military--under General Westmoreland."25
Presented with those two reports, President Johnson on 15 October called together
Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Cyrus Vance, and General Wheeler and made clear his dissatisfaction with the current
direction and execution of the pacification program. He was nevertheless unwilling
at that point, he said, to override the strong civilian objections, particularly
of Secre
[39]
tary of State Rusk and Ambassador Lodge, to transferring the program to military
control. He intended, he said, to give the civilian agencies a period of ninety
days to produce acceptable results and implied that if the status of pacification
were still unsatisfactory after that time, responsibility might be transferred.
At a subsequent meeting of the National Security Council, the president made clear
to all concerned the necessity to strengthen the pacification program.26
To General Wheeler it appeared that the pressure for results allowed little hope
for a civilian solution. With this in mind, he recommended that Westmoreland name
a senior member of his staff to he concerned solely with pacification. He wanted
MACV to be ready with both a man and a functional organization when the seemingly
inevitable call came to take over the entire pacification program.27
Yet the civilian agencies were to have their chance. Thus was born what became
known as the Office of Civil Operations. That it came to exist at all was due
to strong civilian opposition to placing pacification under the military. To some
it may have appeared as a common bureaucratic compromise, but the president clearly
saw it as nothing more than a temporary step to deflate civilian objections to
another plan to which he was already committed. As Korner recalled it: "I
said they can't do it in [even] six months, but the President said: `That doesn't
bother me.' He deliberately gave them a very short deadline . . . McNamara told
him it wouldn't work. I told him . . . it wouldn't work. So he stacked the deck."28
As President Johnson left on an Asian tour that was to culminate in the Manila
Conference, Komer made another trip to Saigon where he warned Porter that there
would definitely be a reorganization and left behind two members of his staff,
Richard Holbrooke and Lt. Col. Robert M. Montague, Jr., to help him plan for it.
On 4 November, Secretary Rusk sent a message to Lodge, with input from McNamara
and Komer, directing Lodge to reorganize the mission for pacification. It was
to be, the message made clear, a "trial organization" and a final chance
for civilian management. Lodge would be given a second deputy ambassador so that
Porter, relieved of all other duties, could command a unified civilian pacification
organization which would be strengthened by assignment of a two-or three-star
general officer to assist in administration and in liaison with MACV, where Westmoreland
was to have a
[40]
Deputy for Revolutionary Development. The arrangement was to he on trial for 90
to 120 Clays, "at the end of which we would take stock of progress and reconsider
whether to assign all responsibility" for pacification to MACV.29
When Lodge replied two days later, he agreed that some reorganization was necessary
but again blamed the military's failure to provide security for the lack of substantial
progress. While agreeing to consolidate civilian lines of command under Porter,
he wanted no second ambassador. Contrary to the judgments of many observers, Lodge
maintained that "Ambassador Porter does not now absorb substantial other
responsilbilities which distract his attention from revolutionary development."30
Although General Westmoreland promptly moved to upgrade the staff section in his
headquarters that had been handling pacification, for more than a week little
information reached Washington to indicate that Ambassador Lodge was moving on
his reorganization. On 15 November Secretary Rusk told him tersely that the president
"wished to emphasize that this represents final and considered decisions
and . . . expressed hope that the indicated measures could he put into effect
just as rapidly as possible."31
Two days later Lodge told Washington what the new organization would look like.
Since Westmoreland, like Lodge, wanted no second deputy, there would be no Deputy
for Pacification in MACV but instead a Special Assistant for Pacification. Rather
than have a second deputy in the embassy, which Lodge felt would downgrade Porter's
position within the American community and in the eyes of the South Vietnamese,
Porter would he relieved of duties other than pacification by delegating responsibilities
for running the mission to other officials of the mission. Under Porter's authority
but not his administration, there would be a civilian Office of Operations, which
would consist of the personnel and activities of those offices of the Agency for
International Development dealing with Field Operations, Public Safety (Police),
and Refugees; the Field Services of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office;
and the Cadre Operations Division of the CIA. All civilians at the corps and province
levels would have a single director, thus reducing to two (mili
[41]
tary and civilian) the channels of American advice to South Vietnamese corps commanders
and province chiefs.32
With sharply contrasting speed, General Westmoreland on 7 November had already
created in his headquarters a Revolutionary Development Support Directorate and
named as director his Secretary of the Joint Staff, Brig. Gen. William A. Knowlton,
who would have direct access to Westmoreland on policy matters. Knowlton remembered
that Westmoreland saw this step as temporary, a move to prepare for complete assumption
of responsibility. When that time came, a more senior officer, possibly the commander
of the 25th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Fred C. Weyand, whom both civilians and
military men saw as an excellent choice to manage pacification, probably
would replace Knowlton.33
After consulting Lodge and Porter, Westmoreland named a member of his staff, Maj.
Gen. Paul Smith, to serve as principal deputy and executive officer to Porter,
thus upgrading that slot, previously filled by a brigadier general. The impetus
for upgrading the position had consistently come from the civilians, both Komer
and Katzenbach having recommended it. Although Porter wanted General Smith to
have a role in planning military operations, thus, in effect, giving Porter a
voice in orienting military operations in support of pacification, General Westmoreland
refused to accept such a plan or anything that might reduce his flexibility and
ability to respond to enemy pressures. That Komer failed to back Porter on the
issue was an indication of how transitory he deemed the Office of Civil Operations
to be.34
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Endnotes
