

THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

A Brief History



BY ERIC B. SETZEKORN



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A BRIEF HISTORY

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“ARMY OCLL [THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON] HAS REPEATEDLY DISTINGUISHED ITSELF AS AN AGENCY WHICH GOES BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY. THEY HAVE SERVED THE ARMY, THE CONGRESS, AND THE NATION ADMIRABLY, FAITHFULLY, AND WELL . . . I AM CERTAIN THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO SERVE IN OCLL, AND SERVE US, WILL CONTINUE IN THIS FINE TRADITION. I ASK MY COLLEAGUES TO JOIN ME IN PAYING TRIBUTE TO THOSE WHO SERVE IN ARMY OCLL, PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR SERVICE TO THE CONGRESS, THE ARMY, AND TO AMERICA.”

ROBERT J. DOLE

U.S. SENATOR, KANSAS, 1969–1996

World War II Veteran, 10th Mountain Division

in remarks to Congress, 5 October 1994

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FOREWORD



Congress exercises broad oversight over the military and provides the authorizations and appropriations essential to the defense of the United States. One hundred years ago, the Army recognized the importance of building and maintaining positive relations with Congress. In 1921, it created the Legislation Branch in the Office of the Chief of Staff and charged this new organization with carrying the Army's message to Congress.

Since its inception, the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL) has grown in capability and capacity. In 1955, the organization transferred to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Today, OCLL has become the largest legislative affairs organization in the Department of Defense. Charged with integrating the Army's congressional efforts, the men and women of OCLL work tirelessly to support Army senior leaders in conveying Army communications to Congress.

OCLL assisted with the lessons learned after World War I. It worked through the defense buildup and advanced efforts during World War II, and helped advocate for the Army during the Cold War. OCLL supported soldiers in Korea and Vietnam and participated in the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization. It built advocacy for the Army's "Big Five" efforts during the 1980s and continued its important work through Operation DESERT STORM, the post-11 September deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the establishment of Army Futures Command. Today, the men and women of OCLL focus their efforts on a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and the Pacific Theater.

OCLL accomplishes its mission in a variety of ways. We prepare Army senior leaders to testify before Congress and serve as a conduit for Army leaders by informing Congress on Army programs. OCLL ensures timely and accurate responses to congressional inquiries. We support legislative initiatives and execute congressional travel to Army sites around the world. Regardless of the mission or the policy, OCLL provides critical connections, linking the Army's message to Congress to support Army priorities and thus ensuring the necessary resources to implement the National Defense Strategy.

Over the past one hundred years, the people of OCLL have been its strength. They ensure our relationship with Congress remains relevant. Our organization draws from military officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians to provide continuity across the organization. Our liaisons, drawn from every component and branch within the Army, acquire the strategic perspective that allows them to flourish and share their experiences with the larger Army. Today, part of our organization comes from the Army Congressional Fellowship program, which is a model within the Department of Defense. This program provides education and congressional experience, which continue to build close ties between the Army and Congress.

We are all immensely proud to serve as members of the Army legislative community and we look forward to continuing to work with Congress to ensure the Army has the authorizations and resources to fight and win our nation's wars.

BRIG. GEN. TREVOR J. BREDEKAMP
Chief of the U.S. Army Legislative
Liaison Division
23 July 2021

INTRODUCTION



In January 1778, a congressional committee visited General George Washington and the Continental Army camped in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, during the frigid winter of 1777–1778. Arriving in Valley Forge on 24 January 1778, the congressional delegation saw firsthand that a lack of supplies and equipment left many soldiers barefoot in the snow and hundreds of others dead from disease. By visiting Valley Forge, meeting with senior leaders, and talking with soldiers, members of Congress gained an appreciation for the complexity and difficulty of supporting a professional, standing Army. Moreover, General Washington used this visit to implore Congress not only to increase supplies for the soldiers but also to make organizational reforms and legal changes that would help the Army become more effective. In a thirty-eight-page letter prepared by his aide, Lt. Col. Alexander Hamilton, General Washington urged Congress to expand benefits for soldiers and improve the system of promotions. The members of the committee stayed in Valley Forge for over a month, learning about the Army and gaining an understanding of how Congress should support General Washington’s forces. This congressional visit to Valley Forge demonstrates the importance of the relationship between the Army and Congress.

The history of the United States Army since 1775 has shown an enduring service to the American people, a stalwart defense of the nation in wartime, and constant evolution in response to American cultural and social changes. Legislative liaison between the Army and Congress has helped ensure that military and civilian leaders work together to defend our nation. In 1921, after more than one hundred years of unstructured and often poorly coordinated liaison activities, the Army established the forerunner to today’s Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL). Throughout its history, the office has coordinated the Army’s outreach efforts on Capitol Hill, developed strategies for Army senior leaders to connect with members of Congress, and disseminated critical information to inform congressional activities.

This historical pamphlet commemorates the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, highlighting its origins, developments, challenges, and successes over the years. Throughout this pamphlet, one theme is constant: legislative liaison, and the countless soldiers and civilians who have served in this role since 1921, quietly and diligently have ensured that the fundamental bond between the Army and Congress has been able to provide for the common defense.



THE EARLY AMERICAN ARMY AND THE CHALLENGE OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, 1775–1920



Communicating the needs of soldiers to political authority has been a fundamental requirement since the foundation of the Army. Between 1775 and 1920, liaison functions between the Army and Congress relied on the initiative of senior officers to communicate with political leaders. During the American Revolution, General Washington acted as that link between the Army and Congress. Legislative liaison continued to be important in the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century, but by the early 1900s, the increasing complexity of Army operations highlighted the limitations of ad hoc and poorly coordinated liaison efforts. Ultimately, the stress of World War I and its aftermath would force the Army to create a more comprehensive and sustained approach to legislative liaison.

The relationship between the Army and Congress began when the Second Continental Congress voted to create the Continental Army on 14 June 1775, and the following day chose George Washington to be its commander in chief. Congress also established the Army's administrative structure, a military



Copy of General George Washington at the battle of Princeton after Charles Willson Peale, 1781. (Yale University Art Gallery)

pay scale, a standard ration, and an Articles of War to set standards for conduct and discipline. Washington's exemplary behavior of cooperation and candor toward Congress helped build the framework for the Army's relationship with the legislative branch. It largely remains today, based on a foundation of honesty and a clear understanding of the subordinate role of military officers to civilian authority.

The 1781 Articles of Confederation created the position of secretary of war to simplify and streamline legislative liaison between Congress and the Army. Despite this change, poor communication between both was common in the 1780s. Congress lacked the financial resources to fully support military units, leading to a lack of supplies for military operations and significant arrears in payment for troops. Scattered mutinies by unpaid troops forced state governments to increase their military budgets. The mutiny of Pennsylvania troops in January 1781 and their subsequent march on Philadelphia, where the Continental Congress was meeting, led to Congress authorizing back pay, clothing allowances, and changes in military justice to mollify the troops. General Washington perceived a lack of efficient legislative liaison as a danger for the young nation, remarking, "The sufferings of a complaining army on one hand, and the inability of Congress and tardiness of the states on the other, are the forebodings of evil." In April 1789, Washington became the first president of the United States under its new Constitution, and on 7 August 1789, Congress created the Department of War. During this era, the Army had few formal procedures to coordinate legislative and War Department activities because many of the senior Army leaders, legislators, and political leaders had worked together unofficially for decades.

In the period from 1800 to 1860, Congress and the War Department largely conducted dealings through personal relationships. Without a structured and regular system of coordination between Congress and the Army, ad hoc and inefficient methods of communication remained common. Army officers sometimes even wrote letters to newspapers, calling for increased congressional support of federal forces. Personal friendships also continued to be important for Army legislative liaison efforts. Andrew Jackson, at that time a volunteer officer serving on the frontier, appealed directly to Representative John Rhea to increase the length

A LETTER FROM GENERAL
WASHINGTON TO CONGRESS,
10 JULY 1775

I most sincerely wish the whole Army was properly provided to take the Field . . . besides greater Expedition and activity in case of alarm, it would highly conduce to health and discipline. As m[aterials] are not to be had here, I would beg leave to recommend the procuring a farther supply . . . as soon as possible.

A letter from General Washington to Congress,
10 July 1775 (*Library of Congress*)

of militia enlistments and improve the discipline of militia forces by strengthening legal penalties for desertion. Personal appeals could be effective in resolving specific issues, but they were not a regular and consistent means of communication.

The American Civil War was a profound test for the Army, as the strain of four years of blood-soaked conflict reshaped the nation. Relations between the Army and Congress during the Civil War were extremely complex, with partisan politics on Capitol Hill creating difficulties. President Abraham Lincoln personally appointed many new generals during the war, some of whom were members of Congress, to give himself a broader base of political support. Many of these politically appointed officers regularly contacted representatives and senators to share opinions about Army policy, which complicated the War Department's own efforts to work with Congress. A point of contention between the Army and Congress throughout much of the Civil War was the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. The Joint Committee sought out graft and inefficiency in the War Department. It became a thorn in the side of not only President Lincoln but also of Army officers, whom Congress could subpoena to testify at hearings, taking them away from the front lines.

Following the end of the Civil War in 1865, Congress endeavored to use the Army as a source of jobs for their

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Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles (1819–1914) (*Library of Congress*)

MAJ. GEN. DANIEL E. SICKLES AND LEGISLATIVE LIAISON DURING THE CIVIL WAR

An important and colorful figure of Civil War era legislative affairs was Daniel E. Sickles, a New York congressional representative who became an Army major general in 1862. At the Battle of Gettysburg, a Confederate attack decimated Sickles' corps and Sickles publicly accused General George G. Meade of mismanagement of the battle. In response, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War launched a series of hearings on the Battle of Gettysburg, complicating legislative liaison activities.

districts and states. In 1870, the Army assigned troops to nearly 200 posts spread across the country. This placed a heavy burden on an Army of less than 40,000 personnel. Congress also took a direct interest in these small posts, regularly making inquiries on behalf of individual soldiers. Commanding General of the Army William Tecumseh Sherman remarked, "Members of Congress daily appeal to the Secretary of War for the discharge of some soldier on the application of a mother, or some young officer has to be dry-nursed, withdrawn from his company on the plains to be stationed near home. The Secretary of War, sometimes moved by private reasons, or more likely to oblige a Member of Congress, grants the order, of which the commanding general knows nothing till he reads it in the newspaper." General Sherman's frustration led him to transfer the headquarters of the Army out of Washington, D.C., to St. Louis, Missouri, which hindered effective coordination between the Army's civilian leadership, senior officers, and Congress.

In the post-Civil War period, legislators often worked directly with Army bureaus, such as the Adjutant General's Department, the Quartermaster's Department, the Subsistence Department, and the Pay Department, rather than going through senior military officers. Members of Congress often communicated directly with bureau heads if a bureau facility was in their district, without coordination through the secretary of

war. In addition, Congress approved the budget of each bureau separately, and senior Army leaders found it difficult to advise Congress on the Army budget as a whole.

By the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898, many in Congress recognized that the Army desperately needed structural reforms. Col. Theodore Roosevelt, who fought in Cuba with the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, was appalled that the American war effort against a weak power like Spain was “within measurable distance of a military disaster.” At times during the war, the secretary of war, the commanding general of the Army, and each Army bureau communicated separately with Congress, with little to no coordination.

A dramatic episode in congressional relations occurred during the Spanish-American War when Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, the commanding general of the Army, alleged that beef supplied to the Army in Cuba had been adulterated—“embalmed,” as he put it—with dangerous preservative chemicals. Miles described the beef arriving in Cuba as “putrid,” and an Army doctor observed that it gave off a smell similar to a decomposing corpse. Secretary of War Russell A. Alger disputed the allegation. As such, Congress was uncertain which voice spoke for the Army. The charges led to official investigations, which found no evidence of harmful chemicals in the beef. Nevertheless, the accusations appalled Congress, and Alger resigned on 1 August 1899.

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, Secretary of War Elihu Root worked in close consultation with Congress to limit the ability of bureau chiefs to develop their own relationships on Capitol Hill. Not everyone in the Army or Congress embraced Root’s reform efforts. A focal point of resistance was Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Ainsworth, who served in Washington with the Army for nearly twenty years. Ainsworth had taken charge of the Records and Pensions Division in 1891 as a major. He transformed the office into a highly responsive organization that frequently interacted with Congress and answered a wide range of congressional inquiries and letters from their constituents. In 1907, Ainsworth became the adjutant general, and continued to work closely with Congress, often independently of the secretary of war. Root’s successor,



Elihu Root, Secretary of War, 1899–1904, by Raimundo de Madrazo, 1907 (*Army Art Collection*)

Henry L. Stimson, and Chief of Staff of the Army Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood forced out Ainsworth as part of an effort to gain better control over Army liaison efforts. Stimson required that all departments and bureaus route legislative proposals through the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army for approval by the secretary. This order created the first formally structured legislative liaison process between the Army and Congress.

The next chapter in the Army's congressional relationship began in April 1917, when the United States declared war on Germany and entered World War I and the maelstrom of global conflict. To grow the Army quickly, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker lobbied Congress to enact the Selective Service Act, which it passed in May 1917. Congress also passed large Army spending bills, which provided millions of dollars for expanding Army camps, buying new equipment, and increasing military pay. Despite congressional support for the Army, inefficiencies in the Army war effort strained relations on Capitol Hill. In December 1917, Congress began a series of investigations into War Department failures and examined fraud and waste in the war effort. These investigations eventually included five Senate and House committees. In January 1918, Congress began public hearings, which often included dramatic testimony of extreme mismanagement by the War Department. By late spring, dozens of witnesses, including numerous Army officers, had testified before Congress.

Victory in November 1918 saw a return to intense congressional discussion over the force structure of the Army. Secretary Baker and American Expeditionary Forces commander General John J. Pershing advocated for a large peacetime Regular Army.



Capt. Harry S. Truman commanding artillery during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in September 1918. *Truman's Battery* by Dominic D'Andrea (*National Guard*)

The congressional response was less than positive: one member of Congress called the proposal a militaristic outrage, and another legislator, perhaps remembering the high-handed behavior of the Army during the war, said he had “a bellyful of the damned Army.” The management of the Army’s proposal on Capitol Hill largely fell on Senator James W. Wadsworth Jr., the chair of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. During the second half of 1919, Wadsworth called upon numerous Army senior leaders and experts to testify in an attempt to increase support for the Army’s proposal. To improve communication, Col. John McAuley Palmer, an expert in force structure, joined the Senate Military Affairs Committee as a military liaison. Ultimately, Congress rejected the Army’s proposals, and the perception of failure regarding Army legislative efforts would pave the way for the creation of a new Army staff office to handle liaison activities.

Looking at the Army’s relationship with Congress from 1775 to 1920, a clear historical pattern emerges of reliance on unstructured and episodic engagement for legislative liaison. Although personal relationships had been useful during the early years of the United States, after 1900, the size and scope of Army policies made developing a more structured approach and reliance of trained professionals increasingly necessary. The unprecedented challenges that the Army faced during the world war would provide the impetus for the creation of a new office for legislative affairs and the beginning of a new pattern of relations between the Army and Congress.



General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, addresses Congress on 19 September 1919. (*Library of Congress*)

LEGISLATIVE LIAISON IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND WORLD WAR II ERA, 1921–1949



On 1 September 1921, the War Department created a Legislation Branch in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army to handle congressional outreach. With the formation of a dedicated office for legislative liaison, the Army finally began to engage Congress in a coordinated and sustained manner. The Army languished with limited budgets in the 1920s and 1930s, but during World War II, General George C. Marshall as chief of staff of the Army and Brig. Gen. Wilton B. Persons as chief of the Legislative Liaison Division worked closely with Congress. By learning painful lessons in the aftermath of World War I, the Army rebuilt trust and confidence on Capitol Hill, and helped to shape the Allies' victory in World War II.

The Legislation Branch was answerable to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, a superlative staff officer who had worked with General Pershing during World War I. The Legislation Branch's mission was to develop a more efficient response to congressional inquiries, to communicate with Congress more effectively, and to better prepare Army leaders to testify on Capitol Hill. On 4 February 1931, the Legislation Branch merged with the budget staff to form the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch. The formation of a specific office for legislative liaison supported Army senior leaders by providing a dedicated staff and




Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, who helped establish the legislative liaison office in 1921. (*Library of Congress*)

experienced officers to ensure there was an efficient and effective link between Capitol Hill and the Army.

In the mid-1930s, as the possibility of foreign conflict increased, Congress authorized an increase in the size of the force and Army budgets rose. The German defeat of France in June 1940 led to further budget increases, and between May and October 1940 Congress appropriated over \$8 billion for new equipment. Despite these funding increases, the Army still was unprepared when the United States entered World War II on 7 December 1941 after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. During the war, legislative liaison would be critical to the success of procurement, personnel policies such as conscription, and good relations between the Army and Congress.


During the World War II period, the primary communicator of the Army message to Congress was General Marshall. Marshall had become acting chief of staff in 1939, and the Senate confirmed him in 1940. He continued to serve throughout the duration of the war. Marshall's patrician bearing and mastery of military details made him widely respected on Capitol Hill, and he was very successful in working with Congress. Early in Marshall's tenure, Congress and the War Department not only expanded the Army, but they also took steps to ensure that the growing Army staff had appropriate facilities in the Washington, D.C., area. In early 1941, Secretary of War Stimson informed President Franklin D. Roosevelt and members of Congress that the Army needed additional space for headquarters and administrative staff. With Army support and encouragement, in June 1941, Representative Clifton A. Woodrum began hearings and it quickly became apparent that a site on the Virginia side of the Potomac River offered sufficient space for the construction of a gargantuan new building. On 28 July 1941, Congress authorized



On 6 April 1937, a parade marked the tenth celebration of Army Day and the twentieth anniversary of the day the United States entered World War I. (Library of Congress)

General George C. Marshall (*left*), Army chief of staff, with Rep. Edward T. Taylor, chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee (*Library of Congress*)

construction of the Department of War building, which soon became known as the Pentagon because of its distinctive five-sided shape. The construction of the Pentagon, which went from a concept, through a process of congressional approval, to design and completion in less than two years, was a highlight of the efficient coordination between the Army and Congress during that time.



As the Army began to expand in 1940 and 1941, organizational problems became a burden to the mobilization effort. On 9 March 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9082, authorizing a reorganization of the War Department. As part of this reorganization, often referred to as the “Marshall Reorganization,” the order created a new Legislative and Liaison Division that would report directly to the deputy chief of staff of the Army. The War Department categorized this division as a special staff division, headed by a one-star general officer. This new division had responsibility for drafting legislation for Congress based on requests by the War Department, as well as responding to committee inquiries, preparing reports for Congress, and maintaining connections on Capitol Hill. In 1941, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, stressed the importance of the new Legislative and Liaison Division: “To centralize the coordination of all congressional contacts in one office, is essential to a proper relationship with the Congress. In no other activity of the War Department is meticulous coordination so vital to the efficient conduct of the Army’s business nor so important to the Army’s reputation.”

The Army needed further reorganization as the war expanded, and it struggled with the increasing number of congressional investigations. On 18 September 1944, the Legislative and Liaison Division formed a Congressional Investigations Branch that would handle all investigations. These organizational reforms ensured that the Army could manage liaison with Capitol Hill during the strain of a global conflict.

The first chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department Special Staff, was Wilton B. Persons, then a colonel who soon became a brigadier general. Persons was a politically savvy officer, familiar with how to operate in Washington and establish good relations with Congress. In a postwar interview, Persons remembered General Marshall’s brief instructions: “I was to keep in mind that he was somewhat

closed in by the four walls of his office and that he depended on me to bring directly to him everything of importance that occurred on Capitol Hill which might affect the Army.” Marshall and Persons had a close personal relationship, as demonstrated in a handwritten Christmas card from General Marshall to Persons that states, “the cordial relations of the War Department with Congress are due largely to your political acumen and tactful handling of situations that might easily have been sources of considerable embarrassment.” After retiring from active duty in 1949, Persons would serve as White House chief of staff from 1958 to 1961 during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration.

The Army made great efforts during World War II to maintain an effective relationship with Congress, although issues inevitably arose. During the war, the Army was the subject of numerous congressional investigations. To prevent waste and fraud in military spending, the Senate formed the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. It was known commonly as the Truman Committee because the committee chair was a then relatively unknown senator from Missouri, Harry S. Truman. The Truman Committee examined many of the new Army camps, looking for shoddy construction, unexplained cost overruns, and general inefficiency. In April 1941, the committee began hearings on their findings. The committee excoriated the Army for frequently ignoring its own rules and regulations, as well as for decisions that had not been considered properly, such as building a base in a swamp, constructing facilities far from water supplies, or in several cases, abandoning bases halfway through construction. In addition, the Army unwisely used fixed-fee contracts, which paid contractors specific amounts regardless of quality control. These issues were a serious concern because the Army needed to maintain support for its programs in Congress.

General Marshall relied heavily on the Legislative and Liaison Division to keep him updated on these issues. He encouraged full cooperation with congressional investigations, remarking, “it seems to me that a free and easy and whole-souled manner of cooperation with these committees is more likely to create an impression that everything is all right in the War Department than is a resentful attitude.” Senate criticism led the Army to increase the level of oversight over many of its programs and to communicate better with Congress about the ongoing issues it faced during World War II. By the end of the war in August 1945, the Truman Committee had saved billions of dollars and improved the efficiency of Army programs. Moreover, by working with Congress to address problems, rather than rejecting congressional assessments, the Army helped build trust on Capitol Hill.

In addition to expanding communication efforts on Capitol Hill during World War II, the Army also invited members of Congress on personal visits to show them how Army programs and policies functioned. Congressional delegations and congressional staff delegations visiting Army installations firsthand has been documented since the



Sen. Harry S. Truman on a congressional delegation visit during World War II
(Truman Library)

SENATOR HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ARMY LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

Harry S. Truman had strong connections to the Army, and during World War II, he was deeply involved in many Army issues. In World War I, Truman enlisted in the Missouri National Guard and fought in France in a field artillery unit. After his discharge in 1919 as a captain, Truman remained active in the Officers Reserve Corps, reaching the rank of colonel. Truman's experiences in the Army made him deeply concerned with Army policies. While a senator, he was in frequent contact with Army legislative liaison staff throughout World War II.

Revolutionary War, but it was not common, in large part because of the difficulties of travel. The rapid growth of air travel in the 1940s helped the Army greatly expand visit programs so that members of Congress could survey a wide range of Army activities both in their districts and across the country. Members of Congress routinely visited basic training facilities to see how the Army trained new soldiers and watched demonstrations of new tanks, rifles, and other weapons at proving grounds. Army legislative liaison staff took the lead in developing travel plans and itineraries for these delegations because personal visits were extremely important. They provided legislators with a better understanding of Army programs, and hopefully, more effective oversight and policy guidance.

Legislative liaison also played a role in the success of the Manhattan Project, the Army-led effort to develop an atomic bomb. General Marshall assigned General Persons the delicate and complicated mission to help Congress understand the Army's need for broad authority and enormous budgets, without providing details of the top secret project. Senator Truman met privately with Persons and Secretary of War Stimson to discuss the project. Afterward, Senator Truman reputedly said "that was all he needed to know," and he helped ensure that congressional committees did not scrutinize the atomic bomb program.

Throughout World War II, Army liaison efforts would also play a critical role in responding to congressional inquiries on behalf of constituents and soldiers. With a peak of over eight million Army personnel in 1945, every month tens of thousands of

letters and appeals came through the legislative liaison staff for processing. Victory in Europe in May 1945 and victory over Japan in August 1945 did not slow the deluge of inquiries and letters. In fact, inquiries surged in response to the desire of many soldiers and their families to get Army personnel home as quickly as possible. In the fall of 1945, Congress even formed a subcommittee to investigate the perceived slow pace of Army demobilization, and conducted numerous delegation visits to separation centers to talk with soldiers and view the process firsthand. The Army had planned for a gradual drawdown of strength after August 1945, but after pressure from Congress, the Army accelerated demobilization and it reduced its strength by 50 percent by 31 December 1945. Effective and timely responses to congressional inquiries, in World War II and at other times, would remain a key element of legislative liaison on Capitol Hill.

The end of World War II led to large-scale reforms of the Army as an institution. Legislative liaison personnel worked to inform Congress fully of the implications of legal and policy changes. In 1947, the National Military Establishment Act meant that Army appropriations would now pass through a defense-wide stage of coordination before moving to Congress. The National Security Act of 1949 further strengthened the powers of the secretary of defense, and led to the National Military Establishment being renamed the Department of Defense (DoD).

As part of the postwar Army reorganization, the service transferred the Legislative and Liaison Division to the Office of the Chief of Information on 1 November 1948. Congress made further changes in the Army Reorganization Act in 1950, which established the authority of the secretary of the Army as the primary administrator of Army departmental affairs and removed the chief of staff of the Army from any role in the command of field forces. The act clearly placed the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army under the authority of the secretary of the Army, and made the chief of staff of the Army responsible for readiness, planning, and providing support to field forces. A further change directed the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison to report directly to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army after 28 February 1950. This organizational change would help Army staff accommodate senior Army leadership in the emerging Cold War environment.

Throughout the interwar period and particularly during the World War II era, Army responsiveness to Congress highlights the tremendous importance of having good relations with Capitol Hill during a major conflict. Through investigations, inquiries, briefings, and numerous other circumstances, the Army demonstrated that effective communication with Congress was critical to fighting the war. In the next thirty years, the Army would face budgetary fluctuations, conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and personnel policy tensions as it defended the nation in the Cold War.

THE COLD WAR ARMY, OCLL, AND CONGRESS, 1950–1979



Throughout the period from 1950 to 1979, the Cold War's struggles shaped the Army, Congress, and the legislative liaison staff. In the Cold War, and for the first time in American history, the Army would maintain a large standing force in peacetime with ongoing conscription from 1948 to 1972, a situation that required close congressional engagement. During the Cold War, Congress was involved heavily in Army affairs, ranging from investigations of possible communist influence in the force to procurement and personnel issues. In particular, the stress of the Vietnam War, which was highly divisive politically, led to numerous problems and congressional inquiries of the Army from 1965 to 1973. Even after Vietnam, the Army struggled during the 1970s with recruitment and readiness. Throughout the decades-long Cold War, legislative liaison staff continued to work behind the scenes on Capitol Hill and in the corridors of the Pentagon to ensure effective connections between Congress and the Army.


The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 caught the United States off guard, and the Army had difficulty finding and training troops, equipping them, and sending supporting elements to the Far East. Following the Korean cease-fire in 1953, the Army had problems adjusting to the Eisenhower administration, whose “New Look” policy favored nuclear weapons over a conventional military capability. It also had friction with Congress on the funding levels of specific programs. In the 1950s, Army Chiefs of Staff Matthew B. Ridgway, Maxwell D. Taylor, and Lyman L. Lemnitzer all struggled to define Army programs to Congress in the context of the Cold War, and the budget of the Army declined as a percentage of total DoD spending throughout the decade. From 1954 to 1959, the Army's share of the U.S. defense budget decreased from 38 percent to 22 percent as Army appeals for more funding fell flat on Capitol Hill. The budget difficulties in the 1950s were a major constraint on Army activities, hindering a wide range of personnel and procurement programs.

Compounding the Army's budget difficulties, in the spring and summer of 1954, the service participated in a series of highly contentious hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations. Led by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, the subcommittee had become a prominent forum for questioning the activities of known or suspected communists employed by the federal government. The subcommittee began hearings in 1953 to examine the U.S. Army, and these hearings received widespread television coverage. Although the hearings did not have a significant impact on the Army as a whole, they absorbed a great deal of time and effort from Army legislative liaison efforts.

In the aftermath of the bruising Army-McCarthy hearings, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens made several organizational changes to streamline the Army's legislative liaison organization. On 17 February 1955, he transferred legislative liaison functions to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The general order specified that legislative liaison staff would be directly responsible to the secretary and would be responsive to the Office of the Chief of Staff for contact with Congress. The order also specified that liaison specialists would coordinate the testimony of representatives of the Army as well as clear correspondence and reports sent to legislators and committees.

In the late 1950s, changes in the federal budget process shaped how the Army interacted with Congress and created a new Army budgeting process. In 1959, the Senate Armed Services Committee attached a rider to the Military Construction Act to require prior authorization of appropriations to procure planes, missiles, and ships, beginning in 1961. There would now be two sets of hearings and votes, one for authorizations and one for appropriations. After 1961, an important area of effort for Army legislative liaison would be the passage of a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

As the 1960s began and the John F. Kennedy administration took office, the Army faced an increasingly powerful and assertive Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) under



The Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954 were a severe test for Army legislative liaison. At the table are (left to right) Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Roy M. Cohn, and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. (National Archives)

Robert S. McNamara. McNamara expanded his office's control over the military services, and service legislative liaison efforts were no exception. He became heavily involved in the services' congressional outreach efforts, and personally spent a significant amount of time on Capitol Hill. On 20 September 1961, a DoD directive established new procedures for the legislative liaison departments of the military services. The overall DoD legislative program would now centralize the management of the military legislative programs. The new procedures required all services to submit policy and budget recommendations to the DoD general counsel by 1 August of each year. The general counsel would then forward a combined legislative program to the Bureau of the Budget. The DoD general counsel, together with relevant DoD components, would be responsible for resolving any differences between the services. The changes made by Secretary McNamara and OSD during 1961 integrated the individual services' legislative liaison efforts for the first time, adding a new layer of coordination for Army endeavors on Capitol Hill.

The Army's relationship with Congress during the Vietnam War, from 1965 to 1973, was multifaceted, and Congress subjected a wide range of Army policies to intense scrutiny. As U.S. Army forces began to withdraw from Southeast Asia after 1969, discipline issues among American troops and congressional concern about possible corruption required coordinated Army legislative responses. Drug use among American troops was



General Frederick C. Weyand (1916–2010) by Bjorn Peter Egeli, 1975 (Army Art Collection)

GENERAL FREDERICK C. WEYAND AND LEGISLATIVE LIAISON IN THE 1960S

General Frederick C. Weyand was the first chief of legislative liaison to become chief of staff of the Army. Weyand received his commission through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program at the University of California, Berkeley. He served in staff assignments in the China-Burma-India Theater during World War II. In 1961, he became the chief of legislative liaison and adapted the office to the demands of the forceful OSD leadership of Secretary McNamara. Weyand left OCLL in 1964, and served for many years in Vietnam. General Weyand became vice chief of staff of the Army in 1973. He became chief of staff following the death of General Creighton W. Abrams in September 1974.

also a significant area of concern in Congress, and multiple hearings examined the Army's programs designed to assist soldiers addicted to narcotics. Another source of congressional interest during the Vietnam era was the Army open mess system and clubs on post, after reports surfaced of widespread fraud, corruption, illegal currency transactions, and abuse of authority by active and retired personnel. The U.S. Senate's Committee on Government Operations began conducting investigations and hearings in September 1969 on the military club system in the Republic of Vietnam. In response, the secretary of the Army testified in March 1970 on new Army programs to eliminate the problems, including better management and financial oversight over clubs and open messes. These discipline and criminal issues increased congressional skepticism of Army policies and management, hindering outreach efforts on Capitol Hill.

War crimes, most notably the Mỹ Lai massacre, also generated controversy in Congress, which in turn put tremendous pressure on the Army leadership. In March 1969, over thirty members of Congress received letters from a former soldier, Spc. Ronald L. Ridenhour, who had served near Mỹ Lai village, where he alleged Army personnel had killed several hundred Vietnamese civilians. In November 1969, the House Armed Services Committee began an investigation and formed a subcommittee led by Representative F. Edward Hébert. On 9 April 1970, Congress contacted OCLL to request the appearance of thirty-nine civilian and military personnel before the investigation subcommittee. Army legislative liaison efforts struggled to deal with many members of Congress who felt the Army's investigation process was not transparent and was more interested in protecting the service than in correcting soldiers' behavior. Ultimately, the House Armed Services Committee concluded that the Army had not properly investigated and reported on the massacre of civilians in Mỹ Lai village. The contentious Mỹ Lai hearings severely strained relations between the Army and Congress.

Army acquisition programs were not immune from increased congressional scrutiny during the late 1960s and 1970s. General William C. Westmoreland, then commander of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, bypassed the Army staff to personally appeal to Senator Richard B. Russell Jr., the powerful chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to procure the M16 rifle for soldiers in Vietnam. The Army quickly fielded the rifle, and soon after, personal letters and official reports began arriving in Congress that the weapon frequently malfunctioned. In response to appeals from constituents, the House Armed Services Committee established a subcommittee to hold hearings. Representative Richard H. Ichord Jr. led a visit to South Vietnam where the subcommittee determined that the Army had improperly substituted the gunpowder used in M16 bullets and used a more powerful but dirtier composition than had been designed for use in the rifle. Throughout the lengthy investigation of the M16, the dedicated professionals of the Army legislative liaison

staff worked diligently to coordinate witnesses and respond to inquiries in order to best support corrective policies.

As the conflict in Vietnam wound down, Army personnel policies became a key focus of activity on Capitol Hill during the late 1960s and 1970s. On 27 March 1969, President Richard M. Nixon appointed a commission to examine the possibility of eliminating the draft in favor of volunteers, and the commission unanimously determined “that the nation’s interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts.” Army leaders had conducted a similar analysis that concluded a volunteer Army would be more capable and have better morale, but that it would need significant pay raises and other monetary benefits to attract high-quality volunteers. General Westmoreland, chief of staff of the Army from 1968 to 1972, personally met with many members of Congress to emphasize that shifting to voluntary Army recruitment would only work if the Army increased pay to attract motivated and well-educated personnel. Representative Louis C. Wyman, on the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, wrote personally to Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke that although the Army plans to raise salaries were “all well and good, but where in the hell are we going to find the money?” The corresponding challenges of recruiting and funding would be major issues for OCLL throughout the 1970s.

Many of these new personnel programs and policies needed refinement in the late 1970s because the service was not attracting enough high-quality soldiers. By the end of the 1970s, over 60 percent of non-prior service enlistees did not have a high school diploma. In response, Senator Samuel A. Nunn sponsored legislation to reduce the size of the Army if the service failed to recruit a larger percentage of high school graduates, rather than continuing to recruit large numbers of lower-qualified recruits to fill enlistment quotas. Congressional interest intensified after Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander ordered the scores of the Armed Forces Qualification Test removed from personnel files, based on his belief that the test was biased. Some in Congress perceived Secretary Alexander’s order as a unilateral decision to decrease transparency into the qualifications of Army personnel, resulting in concern on Capitol Hill about the quality of new recruits.


To help attract well-educated volunteers, the Army and OCLL worked with Congress on policy changes to appeal to students. Congress authorized the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to allow new recruits to complete basic training one summer, followed by advanced individual training the next summer. Congress also eased legal restrictions on reserve training to improve coordination between Army components. In another improvement, in 1976, Congress lifted the ban on reserve component units participating in overseas training exercises with active

duty Army, joint, and foreign units. These changes provided recruiters and Army planners with the ability to accommodate the needs of high-quality volunteers and better integrated reserve forces.

In a difficult recruiting environment, legislative liaison coordination also helped to get the Army and Congress to increase women's participation in the Army. During World War II, Congress had authorized women to serve in the military in selected roles, and over 100,000 women served in the Women's Army Corps (WAC). The WAC continued to exist after the war, and in 1948 Congress passed legislation that formally established the WAC in peacetime but restricted the percentage of women in the Army to 2 percent of the total force. In 1978, the Army inactivated the WAC and integrated women into the Army as part of individual branches. Members of the House and Senate liaison divisions have continued to closely monitor and be attentive to congressional interest in gender issues since the late 1970s.

The post-Vietnam reform process was neither easy nor straightforward, and Congress had concerns about Army readiness, which senior Army leaders shared. In testimony on 29 May 1980, General Edward C. Meyer, chief of staff of the Army from 1979 to 1983, stated, "we have a hollow Army. Our forward deployed forces are at full strength in Europe, in Panama, and in Korea. Our tactical forces in the United States are some 17,000 under strength. Therefore, anywhere you go in the United States . . . you will find companies and platoons which have been zeroed out." Meyer explained to Congress that with Army units in the United States at low readiness levels and the majority of the Army's logistical assets in the reserve, the active duty force would have major issues in the event of a large-scale conflict. Meyer's candid assessment would help Congress understand the issues facing the Army, and help build support for the budget increases and innovative programs of the 1980s.

The 1950–1979 era was extremely challenging for Army legislative liaison. Numerous issues eroded the trust between



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ON THE HILL.”

NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, 1975–1977

Army leaders and Congress, and led to a poor working relationship between the Army and Capitol Hill. To face the challenges of the 1980s and 1990s, the Army would need to revitalize its relationship with Congress by building confidence in new and innovative policies.

LEGISLATIVE LIAISON IN THE ARMY RENAISSANCE, 1980–2000



The 1980s saw an increasingly close and productive relationship between the Army and Congress. In the 1980s, Congress was heavily involved in the acquisition of major new weapons systems that increased the Army's firepower and mobility, but were also very expensive. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Army also worked closely with Congress to expand benefits for soldiers, such as childcare facilities, housing, and the G.I. Bill. Although there were organizational issues that emerged in the late 1990s, reforms to streamline legislative liaison improved the Army's congressional responsiveness. The years from 1980 through 2000 were a time of productive and fruitful legislative liaison that helped forge a more capable Army that was ready for future combat. Effective coordination helped facilitate new policies and programs on issues such as procurement, recruiting, and family programs, all of which had a dramatic impact on the Army's ability to develop a modern, professional force.

In the 1980s, the Army began fielding the "Big Five" equipment systems: the Abrams tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache attack helicopter, the Black Hawk transport helicopter, and the Patriot missile. Legislative liaison played an important role in helping educate Congress on the necessity of these acquisitions, as well as providing accurate and timely responses to congressional requests. The M1 Abrams tank, named for Army Chief of Staff Abrams, had a lengthy development program and intense scrutiny from Congress. After nearly a decade in development, the Army began fielding the M1 in 1980, and by 1985 over 2,000 tanks were in the field with Army units. The development of two new aviation systems, the AH-64 Apache and the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, was also successful. These helicopter systems provided the U.S. Army with significantly improved mobility, lower maintenance costs, and better electronic capability than existing helicopters. A long development period complicated the advancement of the Patriot missile, as technology advanced so rapidly that it was difficult to finalize a production version.



Introduced in the 1980s, the M1 Abrams main battle tank is the backbone of Army armored forces. (U.S. Army)

The most challenging of the Big Five weapons systems was the Bradley fighting vehicle. During the 1980s, the problematic development of the Bradley was the subject of numerous congressional hearings, negative news reports, and even a movie, *The Pentagon Wars*. The manufacturer designed the variant M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle to transport soldiers into battle and provide additional firepower. Congress ordered two evaluations of the Bradley program, by both the General Accounting Office and the Department of the Army. In response to allegations of flawed live-fire testing, a congressional inquiry took the rare step to assess independently the accuracy of Aberdeen Proving Ground's testing of the Bradley. Throughout the Bradley's tortured development process, legislative liaison staff prepared Army leaders for testimony on the Bradley, handled inquiries, and worked to provide requested information to Congress.



The AH-64 Apache helicopter was a key part of the Army's weapons program in the 1980s, and continues to serve the Army. (U.S. Army)




The Bradley fighting vehicle had a lengthy development process. It has remained in Army service since it was fielded in 1983. (U.S. Army)

Congress also acted in the 1980s to improve the military command structure to streamline the relationships between service-based elements and joint commands. Congress passed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act for its primary sponsors Senator Barry M. Goldwater and Representative W. F. “Bill” Nichols, which removed the service chiefs from operational control of military units. After passage of the act, authority for war fighting moved from the president through the secretary of defense and then to the designated combatant commander. The expanded powers of combatant commanders added a new element to legislative liaison operations because Congress often sought the advice of frontline leaders. In the words of former Chief of Legislative Liaison Maj. Gen. William J. Lennox Jr., “The CINCs [commander in chiefs] carry an awful lot of weight on the Hill. If a CINC says, I need such-and-such for my warfight, that program accrues a certain amount of credibility, and a number of supporters. Even more than getting other services to support you, I think the CINCs’ support is important.” After 1986, OCLL would seek to work with combatant commanders and their staff to ensure effective coordination of Army legislative affairs.

During the 1980s, Congress passed large budget increases for military pay raises and the construction of new barracks to make Army service more attractive. Moreover, in 1984, Representative Gillespie V. “Sonny” Montgomery helped pass a new G.I. Bill which would include a range of benefits for former soldiers. The Montgomery G.I. Bill significantly increased educational benefits, providing up to three years of support to earn a college degree. The program was highly popular with soldiers, and the Montgomery G.I. Bill helped end the recruiting difficulties of the 1970s.

In addition, beginning in 1981, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. focused recruiting efforts on better-educated recruits, who had fewer discipline problems



Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh (1926–2019) by Sylvia Rogers Barnes, 1990 (*Army Art Collection*)

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY JOHN O. MARSH JR. AND CONGRESS

The excellent relations between Congress and the Army in the 1980s were partly because of Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. Secretary Marsh committed himself to restoring pride to the Army after the difficulties of the Vietnam era, once remarking, “I didn’t become Secretary of the Army to go around hangdog and half ashamed, apologizing for the United States Army in Vietnam, because it needed no apologies.” Marsh cultivated key relationships on Capitol Hill and was instrumental in getting large budget increases to revitalize the Army.

and were more likely to finish their enlistments. In fiscal year 1981, Congress authorized the Army to increase recruiting and reenlistment bonuses, with some reaching \$16,000 (1981 dollars). Congress also approved new funding and authority for 5,500 new ROTC scholarships per year, with the goal of improving the quality and educational training of officers. During Secretary Marsh’s tenure, the percentage of the lowest acceptable category of enlistees (category four) joining the Army declined from 57 percent in 1980 to 6 percent in 1988.

In addition to pay and quality of life improvements, Secretary Marsh worked closely with Congress to increase funding for Army family support programs. On 15 August 1983, Secretary Marsh signed the Army Family White Paper, which provided a framework for increasing support for spouses and children of Army personnel. Congressional and staff delegations during the 1980s helped Congress understand the impact that poor facilities had on soldiers and their families. A major issue for Army families, particularly those overseas, was inadequate housing. In Europe, for example, the Army needed 8,000 additional family housing units, and it estimated that over 20,000 young, married soldiers had family members living off-post. Families assigned to on-post housing often lived in facilities built in the 1950s. Moreover, in 1981, a \$500 million maintenance backlog meant broken heating systems that left families cold in the winter and old plumbing systems that could not support appliances such as washing machines.

As the threat of global military conflict with the Soviet Union faded in the late 1980s and the Cold War ended, the Army worked to adapt to a different world, with a diverse range of potential threats. The end of the Cold War also signaled the start of new challenges for the Army on Capitol Hill. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, a former member of Congress, submitted a five-year plan for personnel cuts of 25 percent across the Department of Defense. These plans cut the active Army from 770,000 to 520,000 personnel. General Gordon R. Sullivan, chief of staff of the Army from 1991 to 1995 remarked that on this issue he received sympathy on Capitol Hill, but little additional funding: “Members of Congress felt that the Army should be bigger than it was [520,000]. . . . My only problem was nobody was going to give me the money to maintain an Army of 560,000.” Throughout the 1990s, the Army would face an uphill battle on Capitol Hill when discussing budget issues, which would require new procedures and methods by legislative liaison staff.

Despite the decrease in force structure and declining budgets, legislative liaison staff continued their vital role of informing and educating Congress about Army programs. One example of this continuing responsibility was when legislative liaison personnel worked to successfully resolve congressional concern with the United States Army School of the Americas (SOA) at Fort Benning, Georgia, which trains foreign personnel, including civilians, from the Western Hemisphere. Several members of Congress expressed concerns that the personnel trained at SOA later committed human rights abuses. In fiscal year (FY) 1999, Representative John J. “Joe” Moakley and Senator Richard C. Durbin introduced bills to repeal the SOA authorization, effectively closing the institution. Army leaders and legislative liaison staff responded by working with Congress, and the school remained in operation.

An example of outstanding support to Congress during the 1990s was the massive preparations conducted by OCLL for the fiftieth anniversary of the D-Day Normandy landings. Senator Robert J. Dole was among those impressed by the office’s work: “Those who attended these ceremonies will recall just how well-planned, well-coordinated, and finely executed the events were,” he observed. “The quality of the support we collectively received was no accident. The men and women of Army OCLL, soldiers and civilians worked for months to ensure that success. They are to be commended for their extraordinary efforts on our behalf.” More than 150 members of Congress visited France in June 1994 to participate in a vast array of commemoration activities, and many members of Congress praised the competence of the event planning.

In the 1990s, Army housing and family support continued to be challenges. In 1996, in response to complaints about old, unimproved military housing, Congress passed the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, which introduced public-private partnerships to resolve housing issues. To help fulfill this congressional initiative, in 1999, the Army


began the Residential Community Initiative at Fort Carson, Colorado, where private contractors built or refurbished housing units, managed them, and then collected rent directly from their military tenants rather than receiving direct government compensation.

A key part of helping Congress understand the importance of these new programs was the numerous delegations and site visits during the late 1990s that allowed members of Congress and their staff to see these challenges firsthand. To better address the needs of the all-volunteer military, which tended to attract older, married personnel, Congress passed the Military Child Care Act of 1989. It specified a wide range of mandatory policies to improve military childcare, including better training and screening of childcare workers, unannounced inspections of facilities, and programs for accreditation of providers. By 2000, 95 percent of all military childcare centers had been accredited by the National Association for the Education of Young Children and by 2003, the Army had built or renovated 132 childcare centers at a cost of over \$325 million.

The changing composition of the force, with increasing numbers of women joining the Army, was of particular interest to Congress. Women had joined the Army in significant numbers after it became gender integrated in 1978. A little more than a decade later, during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989, women had been integral to aviation, military police, transportation, as well as medical support units. By 1991, 90 percent of Army military occupational specialties were open to women, and during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, 8.6 percent of all deployed soldiers were women. As women assumed vital roles within the Army, Congress took interest in training, promotions, and assignments, and tried to ensure that there was no gender bias or discrimination.

The Army implemented gender-integrated basic training in 1994, in contrast to the Marine Corps, which retained separate basic training programs for men and women. In 1996, a series of allegations about sexual assaults at the Aberdeen Proving Ground led to intense congressional scrutiny. The scandal involved male faculty and drill instructors who had sexually assaulted a number of female trainees. Army legislative liaison members worked closely with congressional committees, providing information on the investigation, coordinating senior leader engagement, and distributing the findings from the Army review panel. In 1998, a senator attached an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill to end gender-integrated training, but Senators Olympia J. Snowe and J. Maxwell Cleland stopped it. Interest in Congress regarding gender-integrated training remained high.

By the mid-1990s, in a period with declining military budgets, the Army, Navy, and Air Force found themselves desperately competing for congressional support. The Army senior leaders were sensitive to impressions that Army legislative liaison was not as



Capt. Linda L. Bray became the first female combat officer to lead troops in battle during the 1989 invasion of Panama, highlighting growing roles for women in the Army. (U.S. Army)

effective as it needed to be, and during the late 1990s they reexamined legislative liaison activities. One factor creating difficulties for Army legislative liaison in the 1990s was diverging levels of experience among the military services and decreasing military experience among members of Congress. Many Army officers tried to avoid assignments in the Washington, D.C., area, because they believed assignments in operational units, particularly command assignments, were more career enhancing than staff positions in the Pentagon. When these officers finally arrived in the Pentagon, often as general officers, they lacked the experience and knowledge of working with Congress. In contrast, the other services did not view Pentagon assignments as disadvantageous and regularly assigned officers to the Pentagon as part of their career progression. In practice, this meant that in 1995 the senior Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps general officers had more than twice as much experience working in Washington, D.C., than their Army counterparts. In addition, fewer members of Congress had served in the Army compared to previous decades. During World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the Army had included millions of personnel, and Cold War conscription also inducted Americans into the Army from all walks of life. This broad exposure to military life meant that in 1977, roughly 80 percent of the members of Congress were veterans. This percentage began a slow decline through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Without firsthand experience with the military, basic concepts such as the organization of a platoon or battalion, as well as the military lifestyle, were challenging ideas to present to Congress.

An additional issue was that Army briefings and presentations, particularly after the arrival of PowerPoint, rarely were brief or easy to understand. Speaker of the House Newt L. Gingrich described the stereotype of how Army presenters spoke to Congress: “A prepared briefing with layers of detail and dozens of backup slides and was determined to take you as far through them as your bladder would allow.” In addition to an overly

detailed style, the Army legislative liaison had a difficult time presenting the impact of force structure decisions to Congress because it was often hard to show the impact of funding cuts. R. Leslie Brownlee, a senior congressional staffer in the 1990s who later would become secretary of the Army, remarked, “The Army consists mainly of people. And buying people, over on the Hill, doesn’t scratch a lot of issues that they’re more interested in scratching. Large weapons programs do that. Ships, airplanes, things like that fascinate members of the Hill a lot more than building an Army and maintaining an Army.” A U.S. Army War College research report concluded that the perception on Capitol Hill was that the Army “not only does poorly when dealing with Congress but is consistently less effective than other military services on the Hill.” The report concluded that senior Army leaders rarely contacted committee members even regarding vital Army programs and that many general officers lacked any experience dealing with Congress, leading to lost opportunities to interact and engage with Capitol Hill. The challenging budget climate in the 1990s would have made developing support for Army positions in Congress difficult in any situation, but these perceived failings would lead, in part, to intense internal discussions about how the Army advised Congress.

Legislative liaison and Army staff personnel began a range of new initiatives to strengthen Army liaison procedures. In 1998, the Army formed a council of colonels within Headquarters, Department of the Army, to set the service’s main legislative priorities. Also in 1998, the Army created a strategy cell to align every member of Congress with an Army general officer, often an officer who dealt with an issue important to their district. In this way, the senior officer could serve as an informal source of information on issues and could help the representative or senator understand the Army perspective. The Army also began to improve training. The Command and General Staff College published a special edition of *Military Review*, its professional journal, in March/April 1999 with a focus on Army relations with Congress. The special edition emphasized that communication with Congress should be less about overly detailed briefings and dry statistics, and more about engaging with members of Congress and their staff in a personal, relatable manner. Numerous senior Army leaders and members of Congress quoted in the special edition added further weight to the message that engagement with Congress should be an Army priority.

Internal changes also helped to improve efficiency and focus in responding to Congress. In the late 1990s, legislative liaison support staff began working with information technology to better handle the growing number of congressional inquiries. In FY 1998 alone, Congress submitted 32,000 written requests and more than 100,000 telephone requests for information. The same year, legislative liaison staff helped prepare over 800 signed responses by senior Army leaders. To handle these requests, legislative liaison staff integrated new computer and database systems. Structural changes also improved

coordination efforts. In 2000, Army leaders decided to move the Congressional Activities Division in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, which encompassed a small team of roughly six military personnel and three civilians, into OCLL. The goal of these reforms was to increase efficiency, as well as avoid overlap and confusion.

These reforms were tested during the tenure of Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki, who sought to transform the Army into a more capable and deployable force. Challenges and contention between the Army and Capitol Hill were evident when General Shinseki ordered changes to the Army uniform. On 17 October 2000, he announced at the Association of the United States Army convention that the Army would adopt a black beret as standard headgear. The decision was not popular with many in the Army and among veterans, who felt the beret should be a distinctive symbol of elite units, such as the Army Rangers. Within five months, over seventy members of Congress made inquiries with the Army about the beret policy. A major factor driving congressional questions about the beret was the lack of prior notification of the headgear decision. Chief of Legislative Liaison Maj. Gen. Guy C. Swan remarked, “any time you don’t do the preparation for any policy change, for any change, you end up having to fight to sell that policy change after the fact. And that’s what we ended up doing.” In the case of the fielding of the beret, the lack of notice meant that the skills of trained liaison specialists were not used to build support for this policy change on Capitol Hill.

From 1980 to 2000, the Army changed dramatically and it became a more effective force through cooperation and engagement with Congress. The 1980s was a time of remarkably productive engagement between the Army and Congress, and although the 1990s saw issues emerge that posed challenges for legislative liaison, the overall trajectory for the twenty-year period was positive. By 2000, the Army had rebuilt trust with Congress. Effective legislative liaison had been a key element of forging relationships on a wide range of issues, including congressional engagement on the Army budget, procurement, and personnel policies. The lasting impact of the successes of the Army in the 1980s and 1990s would be shown in the new millennium, as the Army faced the challenges of terrorism and counterinsurgency, which required close contact and support from Congress.


THE POST-11 SEPTEMBER ERA AND LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, 2001-2021



A new era for OCLL began at 9:37 a.m. on 11 September 2001, when American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the west side of the Pentagon. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on that day began a period of ongoing, persistent conflict. After 11 September, coordinating delegations traveling to the Middle East became a common task for liaison staff because the Army had deployed units to Iraq and Afghanistan. Enduring issues, such as procurement, also remained salient after 11 September. Prolonged combat operations also led to pressure on Capitol Hill to improve Army medical care and benefits. During the 2010s, Congress also was highly interested in issues such as sexual harassment and sexual assault in the Army. Overall, the two decades from 2001 to 2021 saw numerous challenges, and effective legislative liaison would continue to be vital to the success of the Army.

The attack on the Pentagon on 11 September did not kill any members of the legislative liaison staff; however, many personnel were close to the impact area and the subsequent fire. Lt. Col. Adrian A. Erckenbrack, a member of the legislative liaison staff in the Pentagon with an office in the C-ring, remembered the impact: “In our office the effect was the whole office shook. Some of the ceiling tiles fell out. Lights went off and on, and [there was] the over-pressure associated with a large demolition.” After the initial impact, Colonel Erckenbrack sought to help other survivors, but the devastation shocked him. “As I ran out of the corridor of the Pentagon, that was my first view of the physical destruction that the plane had caused when it hit the building. Just everything at point of impact was on fire. Everything was smoking. I mean, just huge billows of black and gray smoke, rubble, debris at various places out to twenty to fifty yards from the building.” The destruction to Pentagon office space forced Chief of Legislative Liaison Maj. Gen. Joseph G. Taylor to lead an office located in multiple small, temporary locations scattered throughout the building for several years.

During the 2001-2010 period, as the Army adjusted to the new realities of the “War on Terror,” with ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army



Destruction at the Pentagon caused during the 11 September 2001 terror attacks. (Department of Defense)


continued to have significant challenges explaining the need for Army modernization to Congress. An important element of the Army transformation that met with congressional concern was the Crusader artillery system. The XM2001 Crusader, a replacement for the M109 Paladin self-propelled gun, would have an expensive gas turbine engine similar to the Abrams tank. Critics in Congress, and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, did not see the importance of a new, expensive, and very heavy artillery system on the modern battlefield. Rising program costs led Secretary Rumsfeld to cancel the program on 9 May 2002.

Before Secretary Rumsfeld's cancellation order, in April and early May 2002, talking points had circulated on Capitol Hill seeking to bolster support for the Crusader program. The Army did not make public which office had distributed the materials, but the talking points used florid language and stated that there would be dire consequences in any future battle without the Crusader. Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White called the talking points "offensive and insulting," and that unauthorized distribution of the message was "repugnant and contrary to the interests of our troops and country." Because of concern that the chain of command had not authorized these communications to Congress, in May 2002, the Army inspector general began an examination of legislative liaison activities, and Kenneth A. Steadman, principal deputy to the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, resigned on 10 May 2002. In the aftermath of the situation, OSD downgraded the position of chief of legislative liaison to a one-star billet, which put the Army at a disadvantage when the other services retained two-star legislative liaison positions. Ultimately, Congress would mandate in the FY 2004 NDAA that all military services would have a two-star legislative liaison chief, but the Crusader incident continued to impact the relationship between Army and OSD for many years.

In the 2000s, the Army had begun work on Future Combat System (FCS) program, but legislative liaison staff members who worked closely with the House and Senate quickly reported difficulties with the program on Capitol Hill. Many in Congress opposed an early controversial decision to use a single contractor for the FCS program. The contractor would be the lead systems integrator, overseeing the program and monitoring other contracts, rather than the Army monitoring contracts directly. The U.S. Air Force regularly used this approach, but the Army's decision was not

popular in Congress. One member of Congress remarked informally to Army legislative staff, "You guys [the Army] have contractors watching other contractors. What kind of oversight is that?" Ultimately, after sharp criticism by Senator John S. McCain Jr., senior military officers and civilian officials subjected the FCS program to regular program reviews, while Congress regularly conducted its own reviews and altered funding, and thereby contracts, each year.

In addition, as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continued, many in Congress felt that more immediate requirements, such as dealing with improvised explosive devices,



Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman during a congressional delegation in Iraq, May 2004 (*Department of Defense*)



Representatives E. A. “Rick” Crawford and Susan C. A. Davis, cochairs of the House Explosive Ordnance Disposal Caucus, meet Army explosive ordnance disposal personnel to learn about their role and equipment. (U.S. Army)

should take priority over long-term modernization programs. In April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates canceled the ground vehicle component of FCS, noting that the vehicle program did “not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.” The failure of these acquisition programs was a major blow to Army modernization efforts.

In the everyday tasks of engaging Congress, hard-working legislative liaison staff provided excellent support to the Army by organizing congressional and staff delegation visits and maintaining close contact with individual members. Conducting delegations to active combat zones required careful planning and coordination. The sheer volume of delegations was a significant challenge. In 2007 alone, over 50 delegations with more than 200 members of Congress visited Iraq, with many other delegations to Afghanistan. OCLL carefully planned these visits to provide insights into the Army’s operations and the activities of soldiers, while protecting the safety of nonmilitary personnel. Planning a delegation, particularly visits involving members of Congress, could take months, and involved coordination among congressional staff, units in the field, and a wide range of support organizations. Conditions in the field often were Spartan and hazardous, and demanded physical stamina as well as courage from legislative liaison staff.

The ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan made Army personnel end strength a significant issue. Army senior leaders stated in testimony to Congress that force strength needed to be increased to compensate for deployment requirements, and in 2007, the Army obtained congressional authority to add 74,000 personnel to its force structure by 2012. In 2009, Congress permitted a further increase of 22,000 so that by the end of FY 2010, the Army had grown to 561,000 Regular Army personnel, its largest size since the end of the Cold War. The rapid growth of the force to sustain the Global War



(Left to right) Col. Michael W. DeYoung (OCLL), Rep. Michael J. Rogers, Rep. A. G. “Joe” Wilson, and Tom Fuentes (*Michael DeYoung*)

CONGRESSIONAL AND STAFF DELEGATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Col. Michael W. DeYoung, chief of the House Liaison Division from 2002 through 2006, frequently led delegations to the Middle East. A trip to Iraq might begin with a predawn departure from the Washington, D.C., area. The delegation would make the trip on a small jet, which would make multiple refueling stops before reaching a military installation in Qatar or Kuwait for transfer to military aircraft. A packed schedule of meetings, visits with soldiers, and official functions are a severe test of stamina, particularly in the heat of the Middle East. All delegation members must wear helmets and protective vests. The stress of traveling in an active combat zone is high. In some cases, severe exhaustion required in-theater medical attention. Rapidly changing security conditions in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan required delegation members to be vigilant and closely coordinate movements with security detachments.

on Terrorism operations highlighted nearly a decade of successful Army messaging on Capitol Hill.

Army legislative liaison efforts also successfully achieved congressional support for increasing Army benefits and investing in quality-of-life improvements. From 2001 through 2020, Congress increased basic pay roughly half a percent higher than the employment cost index (a measurement for wages) and substantially increased housing

“THE CONSTITUTION
ESTABLISHES
THE STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE UNITED
STATES ARMY. THEY
ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR RAISING AND
SUPPORTING AN ARMY
BY THE CONSTITUTION.
BOTTOM LINE IS WE
CAN'T DO ANYTHING
WITHOUT CONGRESS
BECAUSE THEY
PROVIDE US ALL OF
OUR RESOURCES.”

MAJ. GEN. GALEN B. JACKMAN
CHIEF, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, 2005–2008

allowances. To compensate for lengthy and frequent deployments, Congress approved increases in hostile-fire pay, family separation allowances, and allowed premium-based TRICARE medical coverage for reservists. These changes to compensation and benefits were an attractive incentive to recruits, particularly during the economic downturn of 2007–2009.

Army legislative liaison efforts during the late 2000s faced a series of high-profile management issues in the Washington, D.C., area. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center was a historic installation, but by the 2000s, many of the facilities were outdated and unprepared for the large number of injured soldiers

returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. In February 2007, the *Washington Post* published a series of articles describing widespread neglect of wounded soldiers. One of the buildings at Walter Reed, Building 18, had rodent and cockroach infestations, as well as mold. Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey relieved the commander of the medical center, but under pressure from Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary Harvey resigned a day later on 2 March 2007. Army actions to replace the senior leaders responsible for hospital oversight did not mitigate congressional anger at the scandal. Beginning in March 2007, a House subcommittee began hearings on the Army medical system. Chair John F. Tierney deemed the Army's management failures at Walter Reed “appalling,” and called numerous witnesses to testify to severe lapses in care.

The Army's productive partnership with Congress during the 2000s and 2010s was not solely because of the hard work and efforts of legislative liaison staff, but also thanks to the personalities of two successive secretaries of the army with experience in Congress. In the wake of the Walter Reed scandal, Preston M. “Pete” Geren became secretary of the Army in 2007. Geren had been a member of Congress for four terms and had served on the House Armed Services Committee. He continued to serve in the Barack H. Obama administration until 21 September 2009, when John M. McHugh became secretary of the Army. McHugh had spent over fifteen years in Congress and had served on the House Armed Services Committee before his nomination. These two former members of Congress would help the Army stay in close contact with Capitol Hill.

“IF CONGRESS DOESN’T HAVE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN US, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AREN’T GOING TO HAVE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN US, AND THEY’RE NOT GOING TO ENTRUST THE TAX DOLLARS TO US; AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THEY’RE NOT GOING TO ENTRUST THEIR SONS AND DAUGHTERS TO US. SO, THE CONGRESS PAYS OUR BILLS AND KEEPS US ROOTED IN THE SOIL OF AMERICA, AND AT WHATEVER POINT WE LOSE THE CONGRESS’S CONFIDENCE, WE’VE GOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE ARMY.”

PRESTON M. “PETE” GEREN
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, 2007–2009

In the summer of 2010, congressional scrutiny of the Army again increased after reports uncovered mismanagement of the Arlington National Cemetery (ANC). ANC is the most visited military cemetery in the United States and holds a unique cultural resonance because many famous veterans, including President John F. Kennedy, are buried there. Secretary McHugh ordered an investigation by the Army’s inspector general, which found that numerous headstones had been placed on the wrong graves, that graves had been dug too shallowly, and that poor record-keeping caused significant issues identifying remains and graves. Reports of inappropriate behavior by senior ANC leaders, including sexual harassment, sudden firings of staff members, and lying to investigators led Secretary McHugh to relieve the ANC superintendent. Despite these actions, Congress held a series of hearings and initiated a large number of inquiries about ANC operations. In



U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno (*center*) and Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh (*right*), speak with Sen. Richard C. Shelby before a Senate Committee on Appropriations hearing in Washington, D.C., 11 March 2015. (*U.S. Army*)

the fall of 2010, Congress passed a bill that required the Army to provide a line-by-line accounting for the more than 320,000 graves at ANC. The Army report found that nearly 25 percent of ANC's burial sites had some sort of discrepancy in their records. To address criticism about the decaying infrastructure at ANC, the Army massively increased the budget for facilities maintenance and construction in 2011 and 2012, and OCLL kept Congress informed throughout the renovation process.

To better educate and prepare Army personnel to work with Congress, in the fall of 2010, OCLL began a partnership with George Washington University to create the Congressional Fellows Program.

A limited fellowship program had existed for several years, but Chief of Legislative Liaison Maj. Gen. Bernard S. Champoux worked to expand the program and link it to a university curriculum that would provide rigorous academic preparation. General Champoux also broadened participation in the fellowship by opening it to all Army personnel, including reserve personnel, National Guard officers, and even Army civilians. In the first phase of the fellowship, participants attended classes in George Washington University's legislative affairs program, leading to a master's degree. This education-and-training phase led to an assignment working directly on Capitol Hill for a representative or senator. Finally, fellowship recipients would spend two years on the Army staff in an assignment that engages with Congress. Following this program, participants would return to the Army better informed on how congressional relations and legislative liaison functions, and carry their experience throughout the force. The fellowship program was popular and valuable to the Army. Lt. Col. Jimmie Keenan, a congressional fellow, remarked, "The Fellowship gives the fellow an appreciation of the legislative branch, and it helps frame the Constitution." By being more familiar with Congress and able to understand the outlook and requirements of congressional staff, fellows are better prepared to work on legislative affairs and provide support to the Army.

In the 2010s, financial and budgetary issues strongly affected the Army's relationship with Congress. Because of the financial crisis and recession of 2007–2008 and the decline in deployments, Congress and the Obama administration sought to reduce

"TO INCREASE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARMY ON CAPITOL HILL, THE ARMY NEEDS TO SPEND TIME AND ENERGY ESTABLISHING RELATIONSHIPS WITH AS MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AS POSSIBLE. THE ARMY SHOULD NOT BE ON THE HILL ONLY WHEN IT NEEDS SOMETHING, FOR THEN IT CAN BE TOO LATE."

SENATOR JACK F. REED
CHIEF, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, 2005–2008
CHAIR, SENATE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE, 2021–



Defense fellow Cody Rush (*center left*) and Rep. C. A. “Dutch” Ruppertsberger (*center right*) with Secretary of the Army Ryan D. McCarthy (*far left*) and General James C. McConville (*far right*) at the House Army Caucus breakfast on 27 February 2020. (OCLL)

defense spending, and the Army’s budget declined. The 2011 Budget Control Act set clear limits on federal spending. In one savings effort, the Army undertook the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) to consolidate all AH–64 Apache helicopters in the Regular Army and transfer UH–60 Black Hawk utility helicopters to Army National Guard units. This plan would streamline maintenance requirements for the Apache, and improve the disaster relief and medevac missions of the National Guard.

The presentation of the ARI program to Congress was a textbook example of how facilitating communication and providing information forged a productive relationship between the Army and Congress. Army liaison staff assessed Congress and found general support for the program, with possible opposition from members of Congress that represented states with significant National Guard aviation units. This assessment proved correct because some felt the ARI changes hindered Reserve and National Guard components by moving high-value combat assets to the active duty force. In response, OCLL prepared follow-up information for Congress that highlighted the lengthy review process, and distributed copies of independent assessments by the RAND Corporation and the Government Accountability Office, which concurred with the Army’s plan. Another key OCLL task was working with other elements of the Army staff to ensure coordinated responses to congressional inquiries that represented the Army’s proposal accurately.

Despite these Herculean efforts, Congress created the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFCA) to conduct a comprehensive study on the structure of the Army, including ARI. The NCFCA released its report on 28 January 2016 and proposed that AH–64 helicopters be allocated to both the National Guard and Regular Army, with the majority in the active force. Although the Army plan for restructuring aviation assets changed over time, OCLL kept Congress well informed of the Army’s



Rep. John R. Carter (*left*) and Rep. J. Roger Williams (*right*) speak with soldiers of the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 449th, during a congressional delegation in Erbil, Iraq, on 3 May 2018. (U.S. Army)

concerns, challenges, and goals, thus ensuring a better and more productive outcome for Army policy.

In the 2010s, Congress deeply participated in Army personnel policy. The issue of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the armed forces was a frequent topic of discussion in Congress and required close attention. In 2013, Representative K. L. “Jackie” Speier sponsored a bill aimed at stripping commanders of their significant role in the court-martial process because of a perception that military commanders were unwilling to address sexual harassment and sexual assault issues. Although Congress did not pass the legislation, the bill became a focal point for steadily increasing congressional scrutiny of Army personnel policies, with one representative remarking to Chief of Legislative Liaison Maj. Gen. F. Benjamin Hodges III, “if you guys don’t fix this, then Congress is going to fix it for you.” In response, OCLL developed a new initiative to educate members of Congress on the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Sexual Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP), hoping to establish confidence in the Army’s ongoing efforts. This educational effort included multiple forums for congressional staffers and more than two dozen one-on-one meetings with military legislative assistants. The effort also included over a dozen personal visits with members of Congress by the Army’s judge advocate general and the SHARP director. Numerous delegations inspected Army posts, particularly West Point. Judge Advocate General Lt. Gen. Flora D. Darpino personally met with numerous legislators to explain the military legal system and Army policies. The Army was successful in communicating the extent to which the SHARP program spread throughout the Army, although sexual harassment and sexual assault in the Army remained a source of interest and concern in Congress.

Visits by congressional staff to Army installations are often a positive element of developing effective liaison and understanding of Army programs. In 2015, OCLL



Sen. Deborah A. Stabenow in the back of a Stryker vehicle with Maj. Gen. Gwendolyn Bingham (U.S. Army)

helped plan and conduct a large delegation to the Tank and Automotive Command by nearly a dozen Michigan representatives. Lawmakers had an opportunity not only to ride in Army vehicles, but also to see how sustainment and supply systems function.

In rare situations, these visits can result in difficulties between the Army and Congress. In October 2016, congressional staffers from the office of Representative James R. Langevin visited Fort Carson, Colorado. During the visit, the commander of the 4th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Ryan F. Gonsalves, allegedly made several inappropriate comments to the staffers. An investigation determined that General Gonsalves had failed to treat the staff members with respect, and he retired shortly thereafter.

Despite the continually high operating tempo of OCLL from 2016 through 2019, mandated reductions in the size of Army staffs and support elements significantly reduced the legislative liaison staff. At the end of FY 2019, OCLL had an average of 110 personnel, including individuals assigned to permanent positions, excess personnel,



A staff delegation member receives instruction from Sgt. Katie Bahten, Army Marksmanship Unit's Pistol Team, during a visit to Fort Benning, Georgia. (U.S. Army)

civilian over hires, and borrowed military over strength. The total number did not include personnel assigned to the fellowship program. Undeterred by staff reductions, the office continued to support a heavy workload. In FY 2019, there were 303 staff delegations and 109 congressional delegations to DoD installations all over the world. In addition, liaison staff continued to plan, support, and execute House and Senate socials, Army Birthday Week events, Army Caucus, and Veterans' Affairs Committee receptions, among many other activities. The continued ability of legislative liaison staff to operate at such a high tempo despite staff reductions highlights the diligence, spirit, and professionalism of the office.

Following repeated difficulties with procurement and modernization programs in the 2000s and 2010s, legislative liaison personnel worked diligently to increase understanding of these issues through numerous briefings, office calls, and sustained senior leader contact, but fundamental issues hindered engagement with Congress. In November 2017, the acting Secretary of the Army Ryan D. McCarthy ordered the formation of a task force to design and establish a new Army Command that would unify the Army modernization effort and put it "under one roof." Legislative liaison staff played a critical role in gaining congressional support for the creation of what became the Army Futures Command (AFC). In lengthy testimony on Capitol Hill by Army senior leaders, thorough responses to inquiries, and constant coordination, legislative liaison efforts helped pave the way for the 2019 establishment of AFC. This was a major organizational change to the Army's procurement process and brought together elements from numerous commands to consolidate the modernization process. Many observers saw the creation of AFC and the Army's responsiveness to legislators as a breath of fresh air, and optimism was high that the Army would begin to establish a pattern of modernization success to rival the 1980s. OCLL quickly established a close working relationship with AFC, ensuring that the Army could speak clearly and with one voice on Capitol Hill.

Also in 2019, legislative liaison staff responded to congressional concern over poor conditions in the privatized housing operations on military installations. Residents complained of numerous issues, including mold, lead paint, rodent infestation, all of which affected the health of military families. In the fall of 2019, OCLL worked to coordinate and prepare Army senior leadership for a series of highly charged hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committee on housing issues. The Army created the Army Housing Campaign Plan, which is an enduring program to inspect housing and shift housing authority to the commanding general of Army Materiel Command. The Army also responded to congressional concerns by creating a resident bill of rights. In collaboration with other DoD components and partner companies, it classifies housing rights for Army personnel and their families. Throughout the process



Lawmakers join Secretary of the Army Mark T. Esper (third from left), Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley (center) and Sergeant Major of the Army Daniel A. Dailey (right) in a celebration at the U.S. Capitol in honor of the Army's 244th birthday. (U.S. Army)

of refining the Army housing program, legislative liaison staff led a large number of meetings and briefings, and coordinated site visits with legislators and staff that strengthened confidence in the Army's approach to this ongoing issue.

Unfortunately, the 2020s began with reports of multiple instances of criminal behavior, including the deaths of several soldiers, and accusations of widespread sexual assault and sexual harassment at Fort Hood, Texas, which led to intense congressional scrutiny. The high degree of interest on Capitol Hill led to numerous inquiries from members of Congress and their staffs, seeking information and communication regarding sexual assault and sexual harassment, the handling of missing soldiers, and violent crime involving soldiers on the installation. OCLL played a vital role in preparing senior leaders for a 29 July House Armed Services Committee hearing titled, "The Military's #MeToo Movement: An Examination of Sexual Harassment and Perceived Retaliation in the Department of Defense and at Fort Hood." To further congressional understanding of the issues, multiple delegations visited Fort Hood to examine conditions and assess the command climate firsthand. In September 2020, a delegation led by Representative Speier, chair of the House Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommittee, visited Fort Hood to



Senate staff conduct an urban operation battle drill while visiting the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, in October 2019. (OCLL)

speak personally with soldiers and family members. Secretary of the Army McCarthy ultimately acted against fourteen officers and senior enlisted personnel at Fort Hood and stated that the behavior at Fort Hood was “totally unacceptable,” and that the Army “must do better” if it wanted to maintain the trust of the American people. Despite these strong actions, congressional concern remained over the Army’s culture and slow response to criminal behavior.

Overall, the period from 2001 to 2020 has been difficult and challenging for Army relations with Congress. The strain of large-scale conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan made engagement with Congress indispensably important. In addition, OCLL helped the Army understand the changing budget climate on Capitol Hill, and communicated with Congress the need for continued investment in Army programs and people.



Secretary of the Army Christine E. Wormuth and U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. James C. McConville testify before the House Armed Services Committee about the fiscal year 2022 defense budget request on 29 June 2021. Wormuth is the first woman to serve as secretary of the Army. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

CONCLUSION

THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON AT ONE HUNDRED



As the Army enters the 2020s, interactions with Congress remain important because of increasing budgetary concerns and complex policy issues. OCLL is the sole directive agency for Department of the Army congressional affairs. It is responsible for formulating, coordinating, and supervising policies and programs regarding the Army's relations with Congress. The mission of OCLL is enhancing trust and confidence in the Army as well as broadening congressional understanding of the Army so they can support the service's readiness, modernization, reform, and people.

Today, the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison has three primary instructions: Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 3014; DoD Directive 5400.4; and Army Regulation (AR) 1–20.

Title 10 provides the authorization for the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison. Section 3023 states, “(a) There is a Chief of Legislative Liaison in the Department of the Army. An officer assigned to that position shall be an officer in the grade of major general. (b) The Chief of Legislative Liaison shall perform legislative affairs functions as specified for the Office of the Secretary of the Army by section 3014 (c)(1)(F) of this title.”

DoD Directive 5400.4 delineates policy on providing information to Congress and applies to all branches of the active military.

AR 1–20 contains policy guidance for legislative and congressional activities. “The Chief of Legislative Liaison (CLL) is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army and responds to the Office of the Chief of Staff when required.”

To accomplish these missions and comply with taskings from Army senior leaders, OCLL has seven divisions:

- The Programs Division has four branches that focus on the annual NDAA, and deal with the Armed Services Committees and other Oversight Committees.
- The Legislation, Investigations, and Nominations Division works with congressional investigative actions and manages the confirmation process of senior civilians and general officers.



Members of OCLL coordinate their liaison efforts in the “Hog Pen” conference room, so-called because of the boar’s head mounted on the wall. (U.S. Army)

- The Congressional Inquiry Division handles constituent concerns from members of Congress, which in an average year can exceed 25,000 inquiries. This division also holds a biannual congressional casework orientation with congressional staff members to ensure that they understand the Army system and have a productive and mutually beneficial relationship.
- The Congressional Operations Division includes coordination and planning elements. In addition, this division is responsible for administering the Army Congressional Fellowship Program, which includes roughly seventy-three personnel.
- The Management and Support Operations Division handles the administrative issues of the office, including personnel, budget, security, and logistics. It also handles legislative liaison personnel’s travel with congressional members to Army installations and facilities.
- The Senate Liaison Division and the House Liaison Division both work closely with assigned partners on Capitol Hill. Their coordination includes personal contacts with Congress members and the committees relevant to Army affairs, such as the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.

For 200 years, the United States Army has served the American people, defended the nation in wartime, and changed as the nation has grown and developed. The United States Congress has supported the Army’s mission to protect and secure the nation. In turn, legislative liaison by the Army has improved congressional actions to coordinate, fund, and support military forces. Since the founding of the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison in 1921, the Army has continued to strengthen its ties to Congress to better support and defend the nation.

The past one hundred years clearly demonstrates the devotion of countless soldiers and civilians who have served OCLL since 1921, and their role in maintaining the intrinsic bond between the Army and Congress.

APPENDIX A:

Chiefs of the Legislative and Liaison Division

CHIEFS OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON DIVISION	
Maj. G. W. Cocheu	1921–1921
Lt. Col. J. H. Bryson	1921–1925
Col. F. R. Brown	1925–1928
Lt. Col. J. L. Benedict	1928–1930
Maj. A. W. Bloor	1930–1931
Maj. L. S. Tillotson	1931–1931
Maj. L. H. Hedrick	1931–1935
Lt. Col. Allen M. Burdett	1935–1937
Col. Russel H. Brennan	1937–1942
Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons	1942–1948
Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner	1948–1950
Maj. Gen. Miles Reber	1950–1953
Maj. Gen. Clarence Hauck	1953–1956
Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis	1956–1959
Maj. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup	1959–1961
Maj. Gen. Harrison A. Gerhardt	1961–1962
Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand	1962–1964
Maj. Gen. Frederic W. Boye Jr.	1964–1966
Maj. Gen. Howard W. Penney	1966–1968
Maj. Gen. William A. Becker	1968–1970
Maj. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers	1970–1972
Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Tackaberry	1972–1974
Maj. Gen. James M. Lee	1974–1978
Maj. Gen. Edward C. Peter	1978–1981
Maj. Gen. Charles D. Franklin	1981–1984

Maj. Gen. Burton D. Patrick	1984–1985
Maj. Gen. Richard D. Kenyon	1985–1987
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Dominy	1987–1992
Maj. Gen. Jerry C. Harrison	1992–1995
Maj. Gen. Morris J. Boyd	1995–1997
Maj. Gen. Bruce K. Scott	1997–1999
Maj. Gen. Joe G. Taylor	2000–2002
Maj. Gen. Guy C. Swan III	2002–2005
Maj. Gen. Galen B. Jackman	2005–2008
Maj. Gen. Bernard S. Champoux	2008–2010
Maj. Gen. James C. McConville	2010–2011
Maj. Gen. Frederick B. Hodges	2011–2012
Maj. Gen. William E. Rapp	2012–2014
Maj. Gen. Laura J. Richardson	2014–2017
Maj. Gen. Brian E. Winski	2017–2018
Maj. Gen. Brian S. Eifler	2019–2021
Brig. Gen. Trevor J. Bredenkamp	2021–

APPENDIX B: The Seal of the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison




In July 2020, OCLL, in conjunction with the Institute of Heraldry, designed an official seal. On the shield, the yellow and black rings encircle a shield comprised of yellow, red, white, and blue chevrons, illustrating how the Army upholds American values at its core, while also protecting and upholding them through its relationships with Congress. The compass rose positioned within the outline of a pentagon characterizes the crucial role the office provides to coordinate congressional inquiries in matters of national security. The Capitol building sits directly above the shield, conveying the oversight function of Congress and its committees.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Eric B. Setzekorn is a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. After serving in the U.S. Army, he earned a Ph.D. in history from George Washington University. He is the author of *The Rise and Fall of an Officer Corps: The Republic of China Military, 1942–1955* (University of Oklahoma Press, 2018). He has also written for the U.S. Army War College journal, *Parameters*, as well as Army University Press' *Military Review*.



HQDA STUDIES AND SUPPORT DIVISION
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY



“EVERYTHING THE
ARMY DOES OR
DOESN'T DO . . .
IT ALL COMES
THROUGH OCLL.”

BRIG. GEN. BRIAN S. EIFLER
2019–2021

