

ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

PB-20-97-2 (No. 41)

Washington, D.C.

Spring 1997

The Army's Historical Coverage of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR

Bruce H. Siemon

No doubt many readers have already seen the Center of Military History (CMH)'s Homepage on the Internet, including the special section called "Historians in JOINT ENDEAVOR." That story, the account of the Army's historical activities in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, actually began in February 1995—almost a year before the first deployments.

That was the month the U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army (USAREUR) historian met with the USAREUR Chief of Staff, then Maj. Gen. Robert E. Gray (now lieutenant general and the USAREUR Deputy Commander in Chief). Among other subjects, General Gray asked about plans for historical coverage of operations in which USAREUR forces might be deployed outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Central Region. He believed the Army history community in the past had always been forced to create *ad hoc* arrangements for historical coverage after an operation had begun. Since the probability was high that USAREUR would be called upon in the future to participate in contingency operations of one kind or another, General Gray did not want similar last-minute improvisations in our theater. Rather, he expected to have in place a generic planning document governing military history operations; that is, something that could be pulled off the shelf, modified to fit the situation, and plugged into operations and contingency plans whenever the need should arise.

Based on that guidance, the USAREUR Military History Office established contact with the Plans and Operations Divisions of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (ODCSOPS) in March 1995 and, at the action officer level, worked out a concept for a model historical annex that could be used in USAREUR contingency and operations plans and orders. It was virtually certain that any future contingency operation

would be joint, so the annex explained the principles that would govern the designation of joint theater or task force historians, as well as uniservice Army component-command historians—issues that would be handled at echelons considerably higher than ours—and then established a concept of operations and tasks that would need to be performed by commanders within USAREUR to insure the preservation of a complete and accurate record of the command's participation in such operations. One area of potential concern was the former Republic of Yugoslavia, which had begun to break up in June 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Fighting between Croats and ethnic Serbs broke out and soon spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, leading the United Nations to impose economic sanctions in the spring of 1992 in an effort to stop the bloodshed. But the fighting continued, and in November 1992 the United Nations (UN) imposed a naval blockade on Yugoslavia. Despite repeated attempts to negotiate peace, and the presence of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the fighting between Bosnian government forces and Serbia-supported Bosnian Serbs continued to escalate during 1993 and 1994, to include the use of heavy weapons.

In May 1995 the Bosnian Serbs renewed attacks on besieged Sarajevo, NATO resumed air strikes against Bosnian Serb elements, and the latter attacked United Nations safe areas, taking UNPROFOR personnel hostage and chaining many of them to such potential targets as bridges, or holding them in military facilities (e.g., ammunition dumps). The potential for U.S. involvement was growing daily, and USAREUR began a series of "what if" actions—developing plans for different options and conducting training exercises to evaluate those scenarios. The draft historical annex

was tested in one of those exercises and found adequate to meet the basic requirement.

In the first week of August the USAREUR and V Corps historians met with the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) historian, who had just returned from attending the National War College. Three significant points emerged from that meeting: (1) there was (and to this day still is) no formal agreement among the services and the Joint History Office on the conduct of joint historical operations; (2) the Joint History Office did not have deployable joint history teams—that is, anything similar to the Army's military history detachments (MHD); and, (3) the Joint History Office had issued no policy guidance in 1995 on the collection and preservation of records of joint operations.

Thus, to insure adequate historical coverage of any operations involving forces deployed from the USEUCOM area of responsibility, it would be necessary for the Department of Defense historians of the joint and component commands in Europe to develop their own operational concepts and to provide deployable assets from within the theater. At the same time, all agreed that the historians of any one service had neither the responsibility nor the authority to involve themselves in the activities of joint or com-

bined staffs, except in the case where an officer of their service was the commander. Accordingly, USAREUR's responsibility would properly be limited to coverage of the Army component of any deployed joint task force.

In the late summer and early fall of 1995, the situation in those regions formerly part of Yugoslavia continued to deteriorate, contingency planning went into high gear, and the USAREUR headquarters staff began holding daily Bosnia-Herzegovina update briefings. On 10 October the Chief of Staff—by that time Maj. Gen. David L. Benton III—directed that a representative of the USAREUR Military History Office attend all future Bosnia-Herzegovina updates. More significantly, he announced this decision at a headquarters staff meeting and directed the staff to insure that historians were provided full access to all information concerning planning for possible operations in that area. This chief of staff endorsement opened doors, assured access, and made the staff acutely aware of the importance USAREUR's senior leadership attached to the historical mission. For example, all members of the USAREUR Military History Office were placed on the access rosters for the War Room and the Crisis Action Team (CAT)—meaning that we could come and go in those secure areas at will and without escort, which greatly facilitated our efforts.



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On 20 October 1995 we submitted a memo to the Chief of the CAT outlining the regulatory requirements for historical coverage and recommending that USAREUR contact CMH formally to request two things: assistance in identifying a qualified officer to serve as the Army Component Command Historian (ACCH) in the event USAREUR should be called upon to deploy; and coordination with U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to identify MHDs to augment USAREUR—one to be attached to the Army component command headquarters, the others to tactical headquarters, all in accordance with doctrine as outlined in AR 870-5.

During a brief visit to USAREUR 1-6 November 1995, Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle, assured USAREUR of his support and advised that CMH was already coordinating informally with both the Army staff and FORSCOM with regard to the deployment of MHDs—news that was enthusiastically welcomed by the USAREUR Chief of Staff. In the following weeks the USAREUR Military History Office coordinated closely with the ODCSOPS Plans Division to forward a formal request for the designation of an interim ACCH pending selection of a permanent one, and to insure that MHDs were included on the USAREUR time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) that was submitted through USEUCOM for JCS approval. Simultaneously, the V Corps historian, Dr. Charles Kirkpatrick, prepared a corps-specific version of USAREUR's generic historical annex for inclusion in the campaign plan then being prepared by the corps staff.


Obviously, USAREUR could not undertake any action until appropriate political decisions had been made. Nevertheless, planning continued so as to be prepared to implement when ordered to do so. The Dayton Accords were initialed by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia on 21 November, with the formal peace agreement signed at Paris, France, on 14 December.

Deployments of advance parties had already begun, and on 27 November USAREUR had learned that CMH had designated Maj. Mark Gillespie of the Center's Research and Analysis Division to deploy for 90 days on temporary duty to serve as the interim ACCH. Following an initial processing period at Fort Benning, Major Gillespie actually reached Germany in

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mid-December, after which he went to Seventh Army Training Center (7ATC) at Hohenfels for the Individual Readiness Training (IRT)—also known as Situational Training Exercise (STX)—required of all those deploying to the forward area of operations. After completing that training, he departed Germany on 23 December, arriving on Christmas Eve at the USAREUR (Forward) headquarters, which had opened formally on 21 December at Tazsar, Hungary.

On 22 December the USAREUR Chief of Staff forwarded a memo to the Chief of Staff of USAREUR (Forward) urging that Major Gillespie be assigned to the Command Group under the overall supervision of the Chief of Staff.

While these events were transpiring in Europe, on 8 December a selective call-up of Reserves had been announced in the United States, and four MHDs—49th, 90th, 102d, and 130th—had been selected to support Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. As in the case of Major Gillespie, they first underwent preparatory processing in the United States; three arrived in Germany on Christmas Eve, just as Major Gillespie was arriving in Hungary, while the final MHD (the 49th) arrived on Christmas Day.

The reception and staging of these MHDs was not without problems, not least because of the holiday season and the number of personnel on leave. While eager to proceed to Bosnia, and trained and ready to perform their assigned tasks, the MHDs required various types of organizational and personal equipment (for example, cold-weather clothing, tire chains for vehicles) before they could proceed "down range." Orders had to be amended. For the detachments staying at Heidelberg, billeting and logistical support (e.g., borrowed vehicles) had to be arranged. While USAREUR was able to meet all these requirements, they exacted a considerable toll on the small three-person Military History Office.

While the MHDs were processing in Germany, Major Gillespie established himself in the Tazsar headquarters, arranging with various staff elements for the routine collection of records, both on paper and in digital format. On 30 December he traveled to Zapanja, Croatia, where he personally observed the completion of the floating bridge across the Sava River, photographing the event and conducting a number of oral history interviews with the commander, other officers,

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and soldiers. In short, within a week of his arrival, a viable military history collection program was established and functioning in the USAREUR (Forward) headquarters.

Having completed their STX training at Hohenfels, the 102d and 130th MHDs deployed to Tazsar on 8 January 1996. They were provided a memorandum signed by the chief of staff in the name of the commander in chief and addressed to "all USAREUR commanders and staffs." The memo served both as a letter of introduction that established the detachments' bona fides and also as a statement of their mission and functions, coupled with the request that they be granted unrestricted access to information and maximum freedom of movement in the forward area of operations. (The later iterations of Reserve Component MHDs were all provided similar memos.)

A week later they began their deployment to the Task Force Eagle (TFE) area of responsibility in Bosnia, stopping en route at the Sava bridge site to take additional photographs and conduct more oral history interviews to supplement the work begun in that area by Major Gillespie, and arriving at the TF Eagle headquarters at Tuzla on 17 January. The 49th and 90th MHDs remained in Heidelberg to augment the USAREUR and V Corps historians' staffs, respectively, concentrating their efforts on collecting documentary records within the two headquarters and conducting oral history interviews.

In the meantime, Chief of Military History, General Mountcastle, requested that Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provide Lt. Col. Walter Kretchik, from the Combined Arms Center, to serve as the permanent ACCH, and he replaced Major Gillespie in Hungary in February. As in the case of Major Gillespie, the USAREUR Chief of Staff provided him a memo establishing his bona fides, explaining his mission, and making him directly subordinate to the USAREUR (Forward) Chief of Staff. Colonel Kretchik, in conjunction with the USAREUR historian's office, established an MHD document collection plan, interview schedules, and reporting procedures for the MHDs, thus ensuring systematic and complete historical coverage of the operation.

In April the 49th and 130th MHDs switched assignments—the 49th moving forward to support TFE, while the 130th joined the USAREUR Military History

Office at Heidelberg.

As these developments were taking place—and after some rather extensive exchanges of correspondence, e-mail, and telephone calls—in May a formal memorandum of agreement was concluded between USAREUR and the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth. Under the terms of that agreement, FORSCOM's 44th MHD deployed to Heidelberg on 19 May to perform a mission of potentially great significance to the future of the military history program—at the very least throughout the Army, but possibly also in the entire Department of Defense. Equipped with a scanner, computers, and matching tape drive, the 44th MHD began on 29 May to convert paper records pertaining to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR to digital format, preserving these on tape and forwarding the tapes to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) for incorporation into the CALL classified data base, making the information instantly available on-line to DOD subscribers worldwide who have access through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

In July there was a major shuffling of assets as the first iteration of Reserve Component MHDs departed and the second iteration replaced them. The 126th and 317th MHDs went forward to Bosnia, while the 48th and 326th MHDs joined the V Corps and USAREUR historians' offices, respectively. The commander of the 44th MHD, Maj. (now Lt. Col.) Robert Leach, deployed to Hungary to serve as the interim ACCH with USAREUR (Forward) pending the arrival of Colonel Kretchik's regular replacement, Lt. Col. Lee Harford, of U.S. Army Reserve Command, who deployed in October.

After training personnel of the 326th MHD to perform the scanning mission, the enlisted personnel of the 44th MHD returned to the FORSCOM historians' office in August.

August also saw the deployment to the forward area of an Army Artist, Sgt. Brian K. Long, of the 1st Infantry Division, who had been selected for this mission by the CMH Collections Branch. After spending a month in Hungary and Bosnia, Sergeant Long returned to Wuerzburg, where he produced a series of paintings and monochrome works based on the sketches and photographs made during his field deployment.

The redeployment of units from the forward area

back to their home stations in Germany, and the deployment of replacement units to serve as a sustaining force, occasioned a significant flow of units through the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Hungary and a concomitant increase in the workload of the ACCH and the detachments in Bosnia. Accordingly, in October the 317th MHD left Bosnia to augment the ACCH staff at Taszar, while the commander and one NCO of the 326th MHD deployed to Bosnia as temporary replacements for the 317th, not returning to Heidelberg until 4 December. The third member of the 326th remained at Heidelberg to continue processing the incoming shipments of documents from the forward area—a Herculean task in light of the volume (over three tons) of material collected.

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was scheduled to terminate on 20 December under the terms of the Dayton Accords, and only a small residual force was expected to remain in the forward area. Accordingly, and in keeping with the doctrinal principles of AR 870-5, USAREUR requested only one MHD to replace the two in the forward area. The 50th MHD arrived in Germany on 12 January 1997, immediately went to 7ATC for STX training, and departed for Hungary on 19 January. All four of the second iteration of Reserve MHDs departed Europe in February.

In addition to the historical coverage in the forward areas, General Mountcastle arranged for a reserve officer and historian, Maj. Al Koenig, to serve a six-month tour as the acting V Corps historian, so that Dr. Kirkpatrick could complete a special study of the V Corps' participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR.

In conclusion, one may ask what the Army gained from all this effort. By actual count of the USAREUR (Forward) Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (G6), who pays the shipping costs, by the end of January 1997 the ACCH had shipped 6,400 pounds of collected documents to Heidelberg. The real total is higher, for on a number of occasions personnel from the forward area hand-carried shipments of documents to USAREUR, and these figures do not include the documents collected within the USAREUR and V Corps staffs. There have been no actual page counts, but the MHDs processing the documents—including those collected in USAREUR and V Corps as well as the forward area—estimate over 500,000 pages. This collection includes plans, operations orders (OPORDs),

fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), situation reports (SITREPs), staff journals, correspondence and message traffic, maps and overlays, chronologies, newsletters, public affairs releases, and a wide range of miscellaneous documents, photographs, and videotapes. We know there is duplication, and in fact several boxes of duplicate documents were separated and forwarded to the Center of Military History. No doubt, much of the material will be of questionable long-term significance, but the collection effort has insured that a detailed record will be available for study and analysis in the future.

In addition to the documentary record, more than 700 oral histories were conducted, ranging from the TF Eagle commander and USAREUR (Forward) deputy commander down to the private level, and including some U.S. civilian employees, as well. Significantly, and despite a consensus during the planning stages to focus only on the U.S. Army component, a number of interviews were conducted with key foreign staff officers. These interviews were made possible through the personal initiative of the MHD commanders in Bosnia, who established contacts with foreign liaison officers that then led to invitations to visit foreign formations. Interviewees included seven members of the Russian Brigade, among them the brigade chief of staff and deputy chief of staff for intelligence (G2), the commander and four staff officers of the Nordpol Brigade, three French officers, and two Hungarian officers.

For lack of manpower, few interviews could be transcribed, but with the aid of a high-speed tape duplicator provided by CMH, the 326th MHD duplicated most of the recordings and forwarded these to CMH for transcription under contract.

As noted, the rotation of forward deployed units with others coming from the Central Region began in the summer. At the time, Major Leach of the 44th MHD was Acting ACCH, and he began a program to compile short histories of each unit passing through the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Hungary. These short histories were published in *Daily Endeavor* and *American Endeavor*—the newspaper and magazine published by the USAREUR (Forward) Public Affairs Office. The short histories had a morale impact for members of the affected units and also served to establish the historian as a friend, which in turn made it easier to gain cooperation for oral history interviews. Moreover, while certainly not in sufficient detail to

serve as organizational histories of units' participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR, these short histories do provide at least a skeletal outline of each unit's role in the operation. The V Corps Public Affairs Office has seen fit to put more than 60 of these short histories on its Homepage, where they can be read by countless users of the Internet.

The document scanning project conducted by the 44th and 326th MHDs resulted in more than 26,000 pages of documents being converted to digital format and provided to CALL. CALL advises that over 10,500 of those pages have already been placed into the classified data bank, where they are available online through the SIPRNET throughout the Department of Defense. This project, which is still ongoing, is potentially the most significant development to come out of the historical operations supporting JOINT ENDEAVOR. If collected information can be made available in near real time, the value to the entire Army will be incalculable.

One brief anecdotal example will serve to underscore that point. During a confrontation and firefight between Muslim resettlers and Serbian paramilitary police at Celic on 12 November 1996, personnel of the 126th MHD were present with the 258th MP Company and were able to document the incident with still and video photography in addition to recording their own experiences and conducting oral history interviews. Maj. Michael Pacheco (126th MHD) and Maj. John Lyon (326th MHD) prepared a detailed account of the incident, which was presented to the Secretary of Defense during his visit to Tuzla on 28 November and briefed to the IFOR commander and his multinational division commanders the following day.

This event alone serves to demonstrate the potential utility of military history field collection operations, if properly exploited.

The daunting task of combing through the vast collection of raw data held at the USAREUR Military History Office—and of producing a coherent narrative history of USAREUR's role in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR—has fallen to Dr. Bruce Saunders. Although the study was directed by CINCUSAREUR, from the outset the Chief of Military History, General Mountcastle, has declared that the USAREUR study, together with the parallel V Corps study to be written by Dr. Kirkpatrick, would be published as a coimprint with the Center of Military History, thereby ensuring

much broader distribution and utility.

Moreover, the experience of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR should better enable the history community to meet the challenges of Force XXI and the Army After Next. The standard operating procedures (SOPs) developed by the officers who served as Army component command historians, together with the after action reports they prepared, will serve as guides for those who will be called upon to perform similar functions in future operations. After action reports prepared by the MHD commanders will enable CMH to develop improved mobilization tables of organization and equipment (MTOE), which will further strengthen the col-

lection capabilities of military history detachments, enhancing their contributions to the Army and the nation.

In short, the field collection activities conducted today not only provide the raw materials for the Army historians who will write history tomorrow, but they also point the way to revitalizing the Army's history program to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Mr. Bruce H. Siemon is Chief, Military History Office, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, in Heidelberg, Germany.

Third International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium Scheduled 17-20 June 1997

The Command and Control Research Program, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), is sponsoring the Third International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, beginning 19 June 1997 in Washington, D.C. The theme for 1997 is "Partners for the 21st Century," and symposium organizers hope to focus on issues related to the collaborative efforts of ministries of defense, other governmental and non-governmental organizations, and industry in designing, developing, acquiring, and unitizing C4ISR systems and capabilities. Particular areas of interest include coalition command and control, COTS integration, defense information warfare, and leveraging information.

The symposium, which will be held at the National Defense University, is being coordinated by Evidence Based Research, Inc., of Vienna, Virginia. For more information, contact Ms. Lisa W. Davidson at (703) 287-0373, or Mr. Richard Layton at (703) 893-6800 at Evidence Based Research. Their electronic mail address is EBR@EBRINC.COM.

Symposium To Commemorate Fiftieth Anniversary of the U.S. Air Force, 1947-1997

The Air Force History and Museum Program is presenting a two-day symposium, 28-29 May 1997, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S. Air Force. Noted air power historians and distinguished retired and active-duty officers will gather in Washington, D.C., to present papers addressing significant developments during the U.S. Air Force's first fifty years. Invited speakers include U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Foglemann; the Honorable Eugene Zuckert, former Secretary of the Air Force; General David C. Jones, former Air Force Chief of Staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Generals Bernard A. Schriever, Devol Brett, Howell M. Estes, Jr., Bradley C. Hosmer, Charles D. Link, Bryce Poe II, and William Y. Smith.

In conjunction with the symposium, the Air Force History and Museums Program will hold a one-day worldwide gathering of Air Force historians on Friday, 30 May 1997.

For more information, interested readers should contact Dr. Roger G. Miller, AFHSO/HOP, 110 Luke Avenue, Suite 405, Bolling AFB, D.C. 20332-8050, or phone (202) 767-4713, ext. 226, or FAX (202) 767-5527.

The Chief's Corner

John W. (Jack) Mountcastle

Spring has come to Washington. As often as I can, I jog along the Mall just so I can do some "people watching." The school groups marching along from place to place remind me of an April day when my high school class came to Washington. We fortunately dodged the "weather bullet" here this winter, with very little snow and the cataclysmic traffic problems that always seem to occur when we have more than one inch of the white stuff on the Beltway. I wish that our friends in other parts of the country had been as fortunate. Of course, one of the great advantages to a mild winter was the lack of disruptions for the CMH workforce. Given the pace and scope of our activities during the recent months, having a full staff here was important.

In my last column, I talked about the role we played last year in setting up and implementing new procedures for collecting, scanning, and electronically archiving operational records from DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. I am also very proud of the way our historians have subsequently pitched in to assist Army organizations as they scoured their unit files and installation record-holding sites around the United States and Europe, searching for additional DESERT STORM operational records. We continued to do this, even though the control of the Army's Gulf War Declassification Project was passed to The Adjutant General on 1 January 1997. I believe that the ongoing discussion over record-keeping practices will result in genuine improvements, as the Army takes steps to remedy mistakes made back in the 1980s regarding Army record-keeping responsibilities.

As many of you know, the Army's leaders have been wrestling with the current and future allocation of personnel and funding across the force. One area under very close scrutiny has been Headquarters, Department of the Army. A task force was formed in late 1995 to look at potential redesign concepts for the Army Staff, the Secretariat, and the various staff support agencies (SSAs) and field operating agencies (FOAs) that directly support the Headquarters. One of the decisions recommended by the Redesign Task Force, and subsequently approved by the Army's leadership, directly involved the Center of Military History.

Effective 1 October 1997, the Center will no longer be a field operating agency of the Army Staff. In the future, we will be an activity of the Army War College. The Chief of Military History will be rated by the Commandant of the War College but will retain his authority as a Special Staff Officer of the Chief of Staff. The Director of the Army Staff retains Army Staff proponentcy for the two regulations written by CMH, AR 870-5, *Military History*; and 870-20, *Museums and Historical Artifacts*. He will continue to serve as the Senior Rater for the Chief of Military History. To improve synergy within the Army history program, the Center will assume the responsibility for policy guidance of the Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Under the new arrangement, MHI will become a separate division of CMH.

Currently, we are working through the tough mission of reducing our previously authorized strength by 30 percent during this fiscal year. We will lose 34 civilian spaces, and also forfeit 11 of the 17 currently authorized military spaces. Because one of the military spaces was that of a Division Chief, we will combine the Histories and Research and Analysis Divisions this year under a single head. As you might guess, this has been a major challenge for those of us charged with writing the Army's official history, supporting military history education throughout the Army, promulgating policy guidance and conducting certification and training visits to the Army's many museums, interacting effectively with sister services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other Federal agencies, and providing the best possible support to the Army Staff and Secretariat. Working closely with the CMH Division Chiefs, Chief Historian, and the Deputy Commander, I developed the list of positions to be deleted from our

TDA. They span the entire organization and run the gamut of grades (GS 14—GS 7, and Colonel—Sergeant). I am not certain what the full impact eventually will be on the Army's history program, which we and others regard as the best of the service history programs, but I am committed to executing the directed actions in a professional manner and to searching for innovative ways in which we can continue to serve our many constituents effectively in the future.

Another area that was studied by the HQDA Redesign team was our location. It concluded that the cost of maintaining our offices at 14th and L Streets was simply too great to sustain beyond FY 98. So, in addition to *realigning*, *reorganizing*, and *reducing*, we are also planning to *relocate* the Center. In May 1998 we should cut the ribbon on a renovated building at Fort McNair in Washington. Building 35, the former commissary, will be the new home of CMH. In planning this move, we have enjoyed the personal support of General Ron Griffith, the Vice Chief of Staff, and the total commitment of LTG John Dubia, the Director of the Army Staff. Because of their unstinting interest and determination, and similar priority of effort from the Chief of the Army Reserve, the CG of the Military District of Washington, the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, and a host of helpful officials within the Army Corps of Engineers, the Army Staff, and the Secretariat, we will once again be on an Army installation. Being just a stone's throw from the National Defense University will be a special benefit for the CMH staff.

For those of you who are served by an Army museum, you may have noted the visit of a team of Army Audit Agency (AAA) staff members or a study group from the Army Materiel Command. There are several reasons for their visits around the Army. As you may know, CMH is responsible for safeguarding the Army's historic artifacts. We have received large shipments of flags, trophies, and historical material from VII Corps and the eight divisions that have left the force since 1991. This mission, along with the constant stream of material coming to us for safekeeping as a result of base closures, has overwhelmed our Museum Division in Washington, D.C., and the CMH Clearinghouse staff at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama.

Recent news accounts critical of the way in which the Defense Department disposes of excess property have also made mention of the process used by CMH to trade excess military equipment for goods or services needed by the Army museum system. Having become aware of our difficult challenge, the Secretary of the Army directed last December that the Army Materiel Command (AMC) conduct an in-depth assessment of the way in which CMH operates, with special emphasis on the ways in which we manage the Army's artifacts. The Army must ensure its methods of accountability for historic equipment are truly effective. Given the guidance of the talented staff of AMC, and the detailed inspections conducted by the AAA, we will certainly improve our ability to manage the historic material for which we are held accountable.

A number of people have expressed their deep concern over the decisions we have been directed to implement. The Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee has asked that it be permitted to discuss its concerns with the Secretary of the Army. The President of the Society for Military History has written to the Chief of Staff to voice his misgivings over program cuts. The Army Historical Foundation continues its campaign for the establishment of a National Army Museum. Many historians throughout the country have contacted us to offer assistance and advice. The support of all who feel that the Army History Program is crucial to the change, continuity, and growth of the Army is treasured by those of us who work every day to support the Army, as it marches into the future.

I hope that this Situation Report has been informative. I am open to any suggestions that you may have for me, as the leader of an organization undergoing change. You may reach me via e-mail at the two addresses below. In closing this "Chief's Corner," I'd like to extend my best wishes to each of you. Let's stay in touch. E-mail:

john.mountcastle@us.army.mil or mountcas@pentagon-hqdadss.army.mil

The Cold War and the Foundation of the Japanese Self-Defense Force

Arakawa Ken-ichi

Lt. Col. Arakawa is an associate professor at Japan's National Defense Academy. This article derives from a paper he presented at the June 1996 Conference of Army Historians in Washington, D.C.

Introduction

The Cold War is over. The role of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is being questioned. Should it continue to exist? If so, what is its current function? In 1996 the Japanese government approved the new National Defense Program Outline, amending its national defense concept, set forth in the National Defense Program Outline of 1976. Since its conception more than forty years ago, the JSDF has not made significant changes in its organization and structure. How, then, did the Cold War affect the framework of the Japanese Self-Defense Force? This paper will examine the growth process in the JSDF from a Cold War point of view.

From the National Police Reserve Force to the JSDF

When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, Japan was still occupied by the Allied Powers. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, ordered the creation of a National Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men and authorized expansion of the Maritime Safety Agency's personnel by 8,000. The mission of the National Police Reserve Force was domestic: to preserve the peace and the public from disorder. Although its model was the U.S. Army, its organization and headquarters' structure were peculiar to the Japanese experience.

As a general rule, former military officers initially were prohibited from joining this force.

In 1952 the occupation of Japan ended, and the National Safety Force (NSF) was created, combining together the National Police Reserve Force and the Coastal Safety Force. The mission of NSF remained that of preserving the domestic public peace. As the occupation ended, forty-nine nations signed the peace

treaty with Japan, and the U.S.-Japan security treaty was negotiated. That security pact provided the basis upon which the Japanese defense posture was constructed.

Within two years, the National Safety Academy (later, National Defense Academy) was founded to train future officers, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed, and the Japanese Defense Agency and JSDF were established. In addition, an air component (the Air Self-Defense Force) was added to the JSDF, as the mission of Self-Defense Forces expanded to include dealing with external aggression. Also, the Joint Staff Council was created, with the most senior general chosen to chair the council. In 1957, the government formulated and decided upon a Basic Policy for National Defense, which reflected the security arrangements between Japan and the United States.

The Birth of the National Police Reserve Force in 1950

Early Occupation Policy, 1945-46: No one would disagree that the root of the Japanese Self-Defense Force was the National Police Reserve Force, which, as noted, was born by order of General MacArthur. The Korean War prompted his action, but, prior to the Korean War, what was the Allied thinking regarding Japanese rearmament? Under SCAP, the primary objective of American occupation policy had been the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, in both the physical and mental dimensions. Japan was to be reconstructed as a peace-loving nation, with militarism far from the Japanese mind. Certainly, the new constitution, especially article nine, underscored this objective. In February 1946 General MacArthur outlined for his staff the principles of the new constitution. Japan would renounce war as a sovereign right, entrust her security to an international peace based on justice, and never again have an army or navy. In June 1946, once the contents of the new Japanese constitution became known, a Communist Party member in the Diet asked Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru if it were not natural

for an independent country to be permitted to defend itself. Yoshida answered that the Japanese had renounced warfare, even their right as a nation to defend themselves.

Fundamental Change in the Occupation Policy: The Cold War steadily emerged. In Asia, the United States failed in its efforts to mediate the Chinese civil war between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communists won. In October 1949, the People's Republic of China was founded, fundamentally altering American foreign policy in Asia.

Between 1947 and 1949, the United States altered the occupation policy toward Japan. George F. Kennan, after the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe, began to examine American policies in Japan. He led the way for the fundamental shift in occupation policy, criticizing MacArthur's plans for the Japanese, and warning that the general's policies would foster Japanese communism. Since Kennan believed that the internal Communist threat was more likely than external aggression, it followed that the United States should not bolster Japanese military power, but rather, promote the economic recovery of Japan. This way of thinking corresponded to Prime Minister Yoshida's priority on economic development over rearming. Kennan visited Japan February-March 1948 to exchange views with General MacArthur. Kennan's report, which included MacArthur's opinions, was incorporated in NSC 13/2, the National Security Council's recommendations regarding American policy toward Japan.

During the exchange of views at this time, General MacArthur was advised that the Department of the Army was considering establishing a minisize Japanese defense force in anticipation of the U.S. Army's withdrawal. MacArthur stated his total opposition to Japanese rearmament. His reasons were logical enough, but if he recognized the threat posed by the Soviet Union, there appeared to be a contradiction between his willingness to sign an early peace treaty with Japan and his objection to rearmament. To work around this dilemma, he put forward the idea that the American bases on Okinawa should immediately be developed. In short, a powerful Air Force umbrella, based on Okinawa, would be able to defend Japan. This concept was consistent with NSC 13/2. Implementing this idea meant that Okinawa bases would undertake the role of defending the defenseless Japanese home islands. Here,

then, was the origin of the Okinawa bases problem.

Ikuhiko Hata identified the Cold War as the greatest external factor in Japanese rearmament. What, then, was the Cold War? Raymond Aron characterized it as a situation in which peace was impossible, yet war could not occur. Yunosuke Nagai defined the Cold War as the nonmilitary exchanges of independent actions when the impossibility of negotiations was mutually recognized. During these years, the American policy toward Asia fundamentally was one of decreasing the power and influence of the Soviet Union, with the goal of eliminating it altogether. In 1949, the "loss" of China was a critical development that forced the United States to look for an alternative, stable power in Asia. Japan emerged as this alternative, and also as an important strategic base.

In January 1950, in his New Year statement, General MacArthur declared that the Japanese had a right to defend themselves. He stated that article nine of the constitution could not be interpreted as denying a nation's inviolable right to defend itself against aggression. This statement on the right to self-defense stood in marked contrast to MacArthur's 1946 guidance for the new Japanese constitution.

Influence of the Korean War on Japanese National Security

In June 1950, the Korean War broke out. Early in July, General MacArthur ordered the establishment of the National Police Reserve Force, consisting of 75,000 men. Enlistments began at the end of August. MacArthur still resisted Washington's concept for a rearmed Japan. In his directive he avoided using the word "military," and he emphasized that the National Police Reserve Force merely was the police power—enlarged. At the same time, he permitted an expansion in the Maritime Safety Agency by 8,000. Their mission was to maintain domestic peace. The staff of the Yomiuri newspaper noted that the figure 75,000 corresponded to the number of four U.S. Army divisions—the number then in Japan. In reality, however, these divisions were understrength, numbering less than 50,000.

As noted earlier, NSC 13/2 clearly set forth George F. Kennan's belief that it was more important for the Japanese to recover than to invest in rearmament as a defense against Communist aggression. He realized that the success of any recovery program depended in

large measure on hard work, a minimum of work stoppages, austerity measures, and an inflation rate held in check. In December 1948, officials in Washington ordered SCAP to implement nine specific measures for domestic economic stabilization in Japan. The goal of these measures was to stop the Japanese inflation, over time, by stringent curtailing of expenditures, while at the same time stabilizing the international exchange rate. To supervise these efforts, the president dispatched Joseph Dodge to Tokyo. Inflation was indeed curbed, price controls were abolished, and Japan moved from a controlled to a free economy. At the same time, however, Dodge's efforts aggravated a very deep recession at the end of 1949 and the first part of 1950. Because of this near depression, many companies went bankrupt and unemployment rose dramatically.

The Japanese economy was moving toward a panic, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. The fighting led to a special demand for U.S. Army supplies. Many products and services were suddenly in demand: all types of munitions, heavy industrial products, textiles, and numerous services, such as construction, vehicle repair, and machine repair. A huge stockpile (especially fiber and metal products, and machinery), generated by the deep recession, dis-

appeared overnight. At the same time, orders for general exports increased dramatically. In 1950, Japan's international balance of payments moved "into the black" for the first time since World War II. Although the Japanese economy was dependent on this special demand, the Japanese could now balance their international payments and move toward economic independence by investing foreign money to rationalize the nation's industry.

After gaining considerable confidence from the success of the Inch'on landing, General MacArthur suddenly was confronted with the People's Republic of China's entry into the war. Faced with a dramatically new situation, MacArthur urged President Harry S. Truman to authorize naval and air attacks on the Chinese mainland; possibly even the use of atomic weapons. In April 1951, President Truman recalled MacArthur, replacing him with General Matthew B. Ridgeway.

Origins of the Internal Bureau's Superiority

There is an organization, the Internal Bureau, which primarily consists of civilians in the headquarters of the Japanese Defense Agency and JSDF. One of this organization's characteristics is that this Internal Bureau controls the performance of all SDF operations

Editor's Journal

I am very pleased to offer as our lead article in this issue Bruce Siemon's account of our military history efforts in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Mr. Siemon, Chief, History Office, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army (USAREUR) has captured the planning, coordination, and dedication required to capture accurately the Army's history of this operation.

Three other articles, all from our most recent Conference of Army Historians, look at Japan and Okinawa during the Cold War years.

This is my last issue as managing editor. I have been the principal behind *Army History* since no. 14 (April 1990), but now I am taking early retirement and returning to teaching. Your new managing editor is Dr. Charles Hendricks, an experienced Army historian and a key member of our Field and International Branch. I have every confidence that he will make an excellent editor.

A.G. Fisch, Jr.

in the areas of both military command and administrative functions. At the time the headquarters of the National Police Reserve Forces was formed, there were two separate departments, one for civil administration and one for military operations. How, then, did the civil administration department very quickly assume control over both administration and military command? Frank Kowalski, Jr., who ultimately was in charge of Japanese rearmament, has written on this subject in *The Rearmament of Japan*. One reason was that the Japanese, at that time, did not understand the essence of civilian control of the military. A second reason was that those who were assigned to the military operations department were not military careerists (most were bureaucrats—policy makers or internal affairs specialists). The Internal Bureau's ascendancy was completed by the following year, when the National Safety Agency was formed.

The Model of the National Police Reserve Force

When the National Police Reserve Force was organized, there was an important decision to be made. That is, which was the better model to adopt for the National Police Reserve Force, the Imperial Japanese Army or the U.S. Army? After much consideration, the latter was adopted, so the Japanese doctrine, manuals, and tactics were modeled after the U.S. Army. By August 1951, former majors and lieutenant colonels in the Imperial Japanese Army were entering the force. During their orientation and training in a two-month staff course, all of them were surprised at certain U.S. Army-style training methods and tactics, especially the principles of firepower and maneuver. One former officer noted that the American approach had not been adopted in the Imperial Japanese Army because it required a vast amount of ammunition.

From the National Police Reserve Force to the National Safety Force

The Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty: The outbreak of the Korean War brought the issue of a peace treaty with Japan to the forefront. The matter had long been postponed. Now, during the fighting in Korea, two treaties were signed. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty provided the framework in which Japan's post-World War II defense posture is grounded. Although the treaty was revised in 1960, the basic

structure of the security system is unchanged: (1) If Japan is invaded, the American and Japanese forces jointly will deal with the invader; and (2) U.S. armed forces are authorized to remain in and around Japan.

In January 1951, John Foster Dulles used the occasion of the peace treaty to press Prime Minister Yoshida for rearmament. The prime minister was urged to enter into a secret treaty, establishing a National Safety Force of 50,000, in addition to the National Police Reserve Force. But Yoshida officially refused to rearm.

When the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed, the Japanese began rearmament planning in earnest. On 6 March 1952, Prime Minister Yoshida told the Diet it was not a violation of the constitution to have a force to defend the nation, but on 10 March he clarified his position. The American initiative had prompted the Yoshida cabinet to promote rearmament, while the Japanese people remained unaware of actual circumstances and events.

The National Safety Agency Established: In August 1952, a new agency, the National Safety Agency, was established under the cabinet's direct control. This agency administered both the National Police Reserve Force and the Maritime Guard Force. The ground force was known as the National Safety Force, while the maritime component was called the Coastal Safety Force. The mission of the National Safety Force was to maintain peace and order in Japan, and to protect life and property, as special situations arose. Some have said that Yoshida's secret understanding with Dulles was realized in this force.

The establishment of the National Safety Force brought to the fore certain opposing groups, such as the tension between the Ministry of Home Affairs civilians and the Maritime Guard Force career officers, and the opposing interests of the land and maritime officers among the careerists. Finally, under strong American pressure to act quickly, Prime Minister Yoshida and Liberal Party Policy Research Committee chairman Ikeda Hayato crafted a compromise for a smaller size force, which would become the JSDF, making it a joint civilian/career officer operation.

The Policy of Lightly Armed, with First Priority to the Economy: In 1952, the year of independence following World War II, Japanese government policy called for a lightly armed country emphasizing eco-

conomic development. Japan was no longer disarmed, since the outbreak of the Korean War had led to the establishment of the National Police Reserve Force. But this force was created when Japan was not in a position to say "no" to the occupation forces. Now, Japanese officials could use their own judgment in setting a course for an independent country.

As soon as the Japan-United States Security Treaty took effect, American requests for rearmament suddenly escalated. U.S. officials now urged the Japanese to provide for their initial defense with ground force of ten divisions—300,000 when combined with adequate air and sea forces. Since Prime Minister Yoshida was promoting policies to gradually enlarge the National Police Reserve Force from 75,000 to 110,000 in the National Safety Force, the figure 300,000 was on a scale he could not have imagined. Finally, after more than a year of negotiations, the two sides agreed that the ground forces should be built up to 180,000.

In January 1953 General Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated as President of the United States. At a National Security Council meeting that following June, Eisenhower attempted to balance the objectives of an expanded Japanese armed force on the one hand and a growing Japanese domestic economy on the other. He stressed the need to assist the Japanese, if there was an expansion from four to ten divisions. At a time when American officials were seeking to reduce the U.S. defense budget, the goal of a lightly armed Japan focusing on economic matters seemed to be in the best interests of both nations.

The Ultimate Defense Buildup Objective for Japan: In July 1953, officials in Washington stated that, under the bilateral security treaty, the Japanese should assume an increasing share of the burden for their own defense, that is, an expansion goal to 350,000. Congress would be asked to provide assistance through the Mutual Assistance Program. During discussions that took place that autumn, it became clear how the American officials arrived at that figure. U.S. estimates of Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia were at least 500,000 ground troops, with airborne and amphibious potential. Taking Chinese Communist forces into account, the potential existed for joint simultaneous attacks on Korea and Japan. At least ten Japanese divisions (325,000 men in American estimates) would be needed to counteract such an assault. In other

words, American strategists wanted Japanese force goals to be based on a worst case scenario involving allied Soviet-Chinese forces and a dual pronged plan of attack.

Ikeda Hayato, speaking for the Japanese side, noted that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) divisions averaged 18,000, with some as low as 12,000. In their own minds, National Safety Force staff had concluded that the ideal size for a Japanese division was approximately 18,600, but that a reasonable goal might be 180,000 in 10 divisions within 3 years. The talks concluded with no concrete strength figures mentioned in the joint statement. In the end, 180,000 as the ground forces quota of the Self-Defense Force continued to be the norm for the next 40 years, until after the Cold War ended.

The Inauguration of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces

In 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida noted that the discussions concerning the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was the appropriate time to reorganize the National Safety Agency as the Defense Agency, and to inaugurate the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. He stated that if, under this agreement, the Japanese accepted assistance, then it followed that they have a duty as well. Every other country that accepted mutual defense assistance had a military; Japan was the only exception. Therefore, the Japanese should amend their domestic law as necessary to meet this obligation. As the United States hoped it would, the reality of the Korean War helped the Japanese discuss defense issues for dealing with a foreign aggressor. Yoshida began the process for revising the laws such that the National Safety Force and Coastal Defense Force, with the mission of keeping internal peace, now could have the mission of defending against foreign invasion.

Yoshida Shigeru-Shigemitsu Mamoru Talks: In September 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida held talks with the head of the Progressive Party, Shigemitsu Mamoru. They agreed to a number of things affecting national defense policy, including the need to build up national defense as American forces decreased, and the need to amend the National Safety Agency law to create, instead, the Defense Agency. In contrast to the National Safety Agency, the new Defense Agency would (1) focus on foreign military aggression, and (2)

have an air self-defense component. In addition, new military ranks were provided for the agency personnel.

Basic National Defense Policy Adopted: In the mid-1950s, the National Defense Council, organized under the Defense Agency Establishment Act, and chaired by the prime minister, faced the fact that merely having armed forces does not constitute a comprehensive defense policy. In May 1957, their deliberations led to the Basic National Defense Policy. This terse statement of policy has remained unchanged for more than forty years:

Basic National Defense Policy

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and, once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan, founded upon democratic principles. To achieve this purpose, the government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

(1) To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

(2) To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for their country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.

(3) To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.

(4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the United States-Japan security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling aggression.

This author believes that the core of these policies is in the fourth principle. It posits the defense of the Japanese mainland against external aggression through cooperative action between Japan and the United States. At least one respected Japanese scholar has expressed doubts about this policy: this idea appears sound formally, in treaties, but would it work in actuality? Direct, external aggression against Japan is possible only in the event of a general war between the United States and Russia. If such an all-out war should occur, the United States would be in no position to protect Japan, so defense of the mainland of Japan through

cooperative action is impossible.

Whether one accepts this argument or not, it begs the question, in the event of general war, what would be the role of American forces in Japan? It is difficult to imagine American armed forces based in Japan being used in another theater of war, so what is their role? It appears these forces not only deter aggression against Japan, but also serve as a forward anchor in Asia of American hegemony. The world's military powers know that total war would lead to mutual self-destruction, so it is not likely, but it still is possible that direct aggression against Japan could occur if American forces were removed. It would appear that a system that keeps U.S. forces in Japan is the best guarantee of Japanese security.

Conclusion

It is characteristic of Japan's military build-up that it is not the type designed to cope with massive external threats. The 1976 National Defense Program Outline provided that, without external assistance, Japan would resist only limited and small-scale acts of aggression. This, then, is the ability of the JSDF, in light of domestic considerations, and, especially budget constraints. With the emphasis in the National Defense Program Outline on internal, rather than external, factors, changes in the international situation have not fundamentally influenced the Japanese defense-build-up. But the Cold War did give birth to United States-Japan security arrangements, which became the basis for post-World War II Japanese national defense and made it strong. Under this system, Japan could manage to increase its own national defense capabilities commensurate with its economic power, focusing only on internal requirements.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan had been forced by the United States to open its society to foreign intercourse. The years since have included a period of warfare, the last being World War II. Since then, the Japanese have neither experienced war nor directly joined in any warfare. There was more than one reason for this, but one important factor was the existence of the Cold War. The Cold War, in effect, protected Japan and gave the Japanese people an historic fifty years of peace.

The Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952 The View from the *Dai Ichi* Building

Edward J. Boone, Jr.

This article is derived from a paper Mr. Boone presented in Washington, D.C., to the June 1996 Conference of Army Historians.

Introduction

When I decided on the title for this paper, I really thought I could give a detailed view of the occupation of Japan from the viewpoint of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), both the individual and the headquarters staff, in a twenty-five minute paper. I do not believe it has been done heretofore. I now realize it will not be done here either. There is much more to say about that occupation than can be covered in this limited time and space.

At this time, perhaps, the best summary of the Occupation of Japan is the third volume of D. Clayton James' *The Years of MacArthur*. Even that "summary" runs to hundreds of pages with hundreds of very dense footnotes.

For over twenty years at the archives of the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia, I was involved with arranging, declassifying, researching, copying, and microfilming the papers of General Douglas MacArthur and of some of his associates. Researchers from the United States and abroad have visited or written the archives—facsimiles and the Internet are now increasingly popular research tools—for documentation, both printed, written, and photographic, on General MacArthur and his activities.

The bulk of the research inquiries when I began work in 1973, as when I retired in April 1994, was about the same subject: the occupation of Japan. The library of the archives has received copies of many of the books, articles, and critiques written about General MacArthur and the occupation of Japan. Until recently, photographic documentation of the occupation had been weak. A few years ago, however, G. Dmitri Boria, a photographer on MacArthur's staff, gave to the MacArthur Memorial his photo and slide collec-

tions, not less than 30,00 items, most in color, covering the occupations of Japan and the Ryukyus, and the Korean War. The Memorial now has a full-time photograph archivist working on this truly professional collection.

From November 1975 through October 1991, eight symposia on the occupation were conducted by the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, the MacArthur Memorial, and Old Dominion University. During these symposia, presenters, speakers, interlocutors, and the public described, criticized, and theorized on various facets of the occupation: education, legal reforms, the Constitution of 1947, women's rights, economic reforms, including breaking up the *zaibatsu* (financial cartels), taxation and fiscal policy, the effects of the Korean War, international considerations and repercussions, the peace treaty, the press, radio, art, films, and yes, one of my own favorites: whaling and fishing.

These symposia, taken as an entity, are as comprehensive a review of the occupation as I have seen, excepting the above-mentioned Volume 3 of James' MacArthur biography. However, these symposia and their proceedings are episodic, too disconnected; we tried to maintain a contiguous series, but gaps were inevitable. Something more is needed to tell the story of the Allied occupation of Japan. Something must be written to enliven and consolidate the hundreds of thousands of documents in the various archives and to broaden the numerous specific accounts of aspects of the occupation: the peace treaty, *zaibatsu* reform, the constitution, political reforms, and so on.

I only hope that this essay will encourage someone to turn to the task of synthesizing the history of the occupation.

The Occupation of Japan

The planning for the occupation of Japan, as far as those on General MacArthur's staff were concerned,

began with the planning for the invasion of Japan—invading armies must provide some sort of governing organization as they seize enemy territory and peoples. However, the first steps to the occupation were strictly military, cessation of hostilities, establishment of direct communication, primary directives on disarmament, initial envoys from Japan, and the interchange of documents.

Military government teams had been gathering in the Philippines for some time, and were already on the scene in the Ryukyu Islands. The first American personnel sent into the Japanese home islands were airborne troops, while Navy and Marine units were close offshore. The next echelon was centered around the Supreme Commander and key members of his staff.

The formal ceremonies on the U.S.S. *Missouri* ensued, followed by the decision that a "military" government would not be established. The Supreme Commander and his staff would work through the Japanese government; however, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers would be just that. Justin Williams, in his study *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur*, has described this system most graphically. But military government did not simply fall into oblivion—the personnel, both on staff and as teams, had plenty to do during the occupation. They served as the eyes and ears and, sometimes, the implementers of occupation reforms in the field. Much of their work is reported in personal memoirs, but also in the eighth and last of the symposia at the MacArthur Memorial, "The Occupation of Japan: the Grass Roots."

In a memorandum to his commander in chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby suggested that he, Willoughby, administer the occupation; he apparently felt he was best qualified to control the people of a foreign land. General MacArthur, both during the war and the occupation, depended heavily on the recommendations and information he received from his intelligence chief, but the Supreme Commander often, unfortunately not always, knew when to ignore or disregard Willoughby's advice.

Although military government personnel were available to the occupation forces, most of the initial SCAP organization were regular service officers. Whatever their competency in Japanese and the history and spirit of Japan, they had received some basic instruc-

tion in their duties, however vaguely understood. SCAP, however, did reject the services of many who might have been termed "Japan hands." George Atcheson, who became the Political Advisor (POLAD) to SCAP, that is, the U.S. State Department's man in Tokyo, was an "old China hand." He was a fortunate choice to this position, both for State and for SCAP. On the other hand, his duties and responsibilities led to his terrible fate in the sea off Hawaii. "Japan hands" did find their way into SCAP, most notably Atcheson's deputy and successor, William Sebald.

In discussing the subject of knowledge of Japan and of the Japanese among the occupiers, and especially in headquarters, SCAP, I'm really hedging about a major criticism of the occupation. That is, the purported lack of American understanding of the Japanese before and during the occupation: the American—indeed, Allied—insensitivity to Japanese culture, history, and governmental forms. Many critics, especially regarding the Constitution of 1947, have emphasized the imposition on the Japanese of Western concepts of government, social structure, and ethics. Such criticism appears to ignore the fact that the Meiji Constitution which was being radically amended by SCAP was adapted from Western models, and that it was simply "given" to the Japanese people—that is, imposed on them by the Emperor. At least General MacArthur and the Government Section of SCAP permitted the Japanese Diet to debate and amend this newly "imposed" revision to the Meiji Constitution.

Whatever the origins and popular drafting of the Japanese constitution, SCAP did not dawdle in trying to instill modern democratic rule in Japan. Directives, SCAPINS (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers instructions) began flowing to the Japanese government at the very onset of the Occupation.

SCAP and its advanced echelons moved into the Yokohama/Tokyo area. Demobilization and demilitarization began without delay, and General Willoughby pronounced Japan proper demilitarized within two months. As there were directives from the Dai Ichi building to the Japanese government, so there were directives from Washington to SCAP. Vagueness and inconsistency were not the exclusive property of General MacArthur and his staff. Washington and its Allies had their differences. For instance, in August 1945 MacArthur was told not to arrest or do anything

else with the Japanese Emperor; instructions on his disposition would be issued at a later date. The subject was not broached again.

Incidentally, Emperor Hirohito called on General MacArthur at his quarters, the former U.S. Embassy, on 27 September 1945. MacArthur mentions this visit in his *Reminiscences*. Nowhere in his papers, other than the manuscript of *Reminiscences*, was any mention made of this or any other meeting between Hirohito and MacArthur. The record was silent. Japanese researchers and journalists have often asked us at the MacArthur Memorial for accounts of the numerous meetings between these two leaders; we could only shrug our shoulders. I note that Richard Finn has identified eleven such meetings, yet I can offer absolutely no explanation for the lack of documentation in MacArthur's papers on this matter. However, I can say that rarely in any meeting MacArthur held with *anyone* did he permit taking of minutes or notes.

SCAP not only had to comply with directives from official Washington, he also had to cope with the practical problems of occupation: supplying, training, and disposing his own forces, who were simultaneously being demobilized. Meanwhile, considerable confusion existed among SCAP staff and Japanese officials about who was to do what in reorganizing the Japanese government. The arrival in Japan of the new-born Far Eastern Commission added to the confusion and haste—the commission was suspected of having its own ideas concerning what sort of constitution to give the defeated Japanese. SCAP saw to it that Japan received a new constitution in February 1946. All things considered, it was quickly debated in the Japanese government and Diet, approved, and promulgated by the Emperor, with an effective date of 3 May 1947. In April 1946 the first national elections were greeted enthusiastically by the newly-, broadly-enfranchised Japanese people.

Let me pause for a moment in the midst of this discussion of economics, government, and education, to mention a point or two regarding the more human/humane activities of the early months of the occupation.

Dr. James has written that General MacArthur rejected directives from Washington only once or twice. The most important occasion was the feeding of the Japanese people, first from surplus U.S. Army food

reserves, then from food provided from the United States. Humane considerations aside, SCAP could not permit starvation because of the unrest, even revolution, that might ensue, and because of the delays that would occur in the rebuilding of Japan. In *Reminiscences* (p. 307), the General related that he pled with Congress:

Under the responsibilities of victory the Japanese people are now our prisoners, no less than did the starving men on Bataan become their prisoners.... [W]e have tried and executed the Japanese officers upon proof of responsibility. Can we justify such punitive action if we ourselves, in reversed circumstances but with hostilities at an end, fail to provide the food to sustain life among the Japanese people over whom we now stand guard within the narrow confines of their home islands? To cut off Japan's relief supplies in this situation would cause starvation to countless Japanese—and starvation breeds mass unrest, disorder and violence. Give me bread or give me bullets. (See Radiograms, WD OUT, 20 Feb 47, [except last sentence], RG 9, MacArthur Memorial).

MacArthur did not quite end this radiogram with that last sentence, but he meant the message to be taken that way. SCAP saw to it that the Japanese received at least minimal sustenance; SCAP also urged that the Japanese fishing and whaling efforts be given greater latitude. After all, were the objecting Allies prepared to feed the Japanese themselves?

The occupying forces found that even in the best of times Japanese medical and sanitation facilities needed considerable improvement. Wartime conditions, followed by the repatriation of millions of Japanese to the home islands, exacerbated the situation. SCAP created a Public Health and Welfare Section, headed by a fine physician, which was responsible for momentous improvements in the health of the people. Feeding and rebuilding the physical stamina of the Japanese were early and ongoing tasks. To name just a few, Crawford Sams, Hubert Schenck, and William Marquat were among the many heroes of the successful occupation—and they were not “old Japan hands.”

Progress in SCAP's democratization of Japan encountered many rough spots, most—if not all—of which were overcome, as in the case of some of the

U.S. Air Force Pre-1954 Still Photo Collection Update

The following information from the National Archives and Records Administration is an update of an announcement which appeared in the Winter 1997 issue of *Army History*.

On 18 December 1996, representatives of the Air Force, the National Air and Space Museum (NASM), and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), met to discuss the disposition of the U.S. Air Force's pre-1954 Still Photo Collection, currently maintained at the NASM. At that meeting, the Air Force representatives informed both NARA and NASM that they had decided that the records should be transferred to NARA. For a variety of practical reasons, it was agreed that the transfer date should be set for the beginning of January 1998. The staff of both institutions wish to make clear to the readers of *Army History* that the records are not closed to researchers at this time. In addition, the NASM has informed NARA that it will cease accepting reproduction service orders on 15 October 1997, so that all the records will be back in their proper location at the time of transfer. Reference service by the NASM will continue after 15 October, but the museum will advise all those who request reproductions after the cut-off date to contact NARA after the records have been transferred to the Still Picture Branch. The branch can be reached by telephone at (301) 713-6625, or by mail at 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5360, College Park, MD 20740.

Once the transfer is completed, NARA will then be able to preserve and make available to researchers in one location, all of the official still photographic archives created by the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army, and the Air Force through 1981. NARA staff expects the transfer of the records to take no longer than four or five working days, and that the records will be available for use by researchers approximately two weeks from the time they arrive at NARA.

educational reforms imposed on the Japanese. Since the Americans had just won a major war, they felt that their education system shared responsibility for the victory. Thus, such a system should be a benefit for the losers of that war! Lack of knowledge of Japanese culture in a key section of SCAP resulted in some considerable embarrassment for SCAP (I could elaborate on a number of instances in the area of education reform).

The Japanese had the good sense to re-reform some of the educational reforms as soon as feasible. Moreover, they did reject much of their own prewar elitism vis-a-vis university education. Higher education boomed during and after the American occupa-

tion. Entirely new universities were created during the Allied occupation and many new ones have appeared since then.

SCAP frequently has been criticized for the war crimes trials (International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or IMTFE), and for the various purges of Japanese government officials, businessmen, teachers, leftist labor leaders and civil servants, and Japan Communist Party (JCP) members. General MacArthur himself was not exactly enthusiastic about the war crimes trials, and with the completion of the Class I trials in November 1948 (Hideki Tojo, *et al.*), he felt Japan's recovery would be swifter and much less bitter if the trials of those still waiting arraignment, Sasegawa

Ryoichi and many other ultranationalists, for example, were foresworn. This did not prevent MacArthur in 1945-46 from ensuring that General Tomoyuki Yamashita and Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma were tried and sentenced by American military tribunals in the Philippines.

In early 1947 General MacArthur intervened in a threatened general strike; that is, he determined there would be no strike, and there was none. The Japanese were reminded that their nation, for all its reforms and democratization, was occupied by the Allied Powers. The Japanese also learned that some democratic nations, such as the United States, did not approve of general strikes. This, after all, was the era in America of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Also during 1947, General MacArthur felt that the time was at hand for a Japanese peace treaty. But Japan had not really recovered from its war devastation; industry had a long way to go; many "democratizing" reforms had not yet been effected or even enacted. Indeed, the new constitution had not become effective. The peace treaty had to be deferred to another, more appropriate time.

By mid-1948, some historians described in their writings a "reverse course" in the Allied occupation of Japan. This reverse course has been given various descriptions, and depicted in different shadings. Some writers have averred that the early years and efforts of SCAP were rejected, and the new course meant first and foremost that Japan must and would join in the Cold War. Economic development, finances, and fiscal strengthening were to be emphasized. Joseph Dodge's advisory mission to SCAP in early 1949 was a major step in balancing Japanese finances, while the breakup of the *zaibatsu* was already being deemphasized.

In 1946-47 Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, SCAP intelligence chief, had already begun an internal purge with his report to General MacArthur entitled "The Leftist Infiltration of SCAP". By 1949-50 Willoughby had more interesting "leftists" to concern his agents, and the Japanese themselves joined in purging the JCP and other leftists and in rehabilitating the reputations of many of those who earlier in the occupation had been cited for ultranationalism and warmongering.

The Korean War technically had nothing to do

with the occupation of Japan, but, in fact, Japan became deeply involved in logistic support for United Nations' efforts. Japan became the indispensable base for maintenance, logistic, and training support of the war in Korea. The "rearming" of Japan—the creation of the National Police Reserve—was given urgency by the events in Korea. Of course, General MacArthur, as SCAP and as Commander in Chief Far East Command (CINCFE), was concerned about the defense of Japan, especially air defense, long before the Korean War. By mid-1950, with a "hot" war nearby, he was better able to persuade Department of Defense officials to provide Japan more U.S. protective forces, and National Guard divisions, and to impress on one and all the need for the National Police Reserve.

The Peace Treaty with Japan was signed, ratified, and went into effect even before the armistice in Korea. By April 1952 Japan was a free nation, with U.S. "guest" forces in place to protect a nation with—legally—no armed forces.

Despite the reversals of many of the Allied reforms, such as deconcentration, education, police, and purges of nationalists—despite the purges having turned to the left, and despite the increasing conservatism of Shigeru Yoshida's government, the essentials of the occupation remained. Especially noteworthy were the Constitution of 1947, with its social and political freedoms and its no-war clause, and the creation of a purely titular, yet absolutely critical role of the Emperor. These lasting, fundamental reforms have led other historians to ask "What reverse course?" In truth, there were no basic changes in 1948, merely some changes in emphasis.

Conclusion

The occupation of Japan was the work of men and women from the West, principally from the United States. Only a few of these occupationnaires had much understanding of Japan and the Japanese people. Those who did know the language, history, customs, and politics of Japan were still Westerners, imbued with a Western outlook. The relatively few *Nisei* in the occupation were of some help in balancing this bias, but by 1945 most of these were proud of their Americanization. It would have been virtually impossible for SCAP, the person and the staff, the VIII Army, the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, and others

involved in the occupation to try to democratize Japan except from their own respective points of view.

It is easy today to look back and say how presumptuous, racist, and naive of these Western occupiers to have tried to impose their values—political, ethical, and social—on the Japanese. But whose or what values were to be utilized? SCAP, essentially an American organization under an American general, chose to reform Japan the best way feasible and practicable—the American way. A participant in and strong critic of the occupation, Harry Emerson Wildes, maintained that neither official Washington nor the higher ranks of SCAP knew what they were about in Japan; nonetheless, the occupation succeeded. I agree.

One implied question has been left, rather dangling, throughout this presentation: when will a history of the occupation of Japan be written? To date, in English, there are personal memoirs, essays, analyses of aspects of the Occupation, such as the constitution, legal and governmental reforms, the peace treaty, biographies of Generals MacArthur and Matthew Ridgway; but no true history of the occupation. Perhaps the Japanese have already brought out such a history—we may never know.

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Call for Papers and Panels

The award-winning Louisiana State University in Shreveport Deep South Conference Series will host its fourth multidisciplinary and international conference 17-19 September 1998 on the Louisiana State University in Shreveport (LSU) campus. The conference theme will be George Washington: Life, Times, and Legacy.

Proposals for papers and panels, as well as other program offerings, on all aspects and approaches to American's founding experiment in self-government as related to the life, era, and legacy of George Washington, are encouraged by the conference selection committee. Possible topics include—but are not limited to—Washington's leadership, his personality, his foreign policy, his domestic policies, his cabinet, his impact on others, his legend and legacy, Washington and America's identity, Washington and art/culture/humanities, Washington and the Supreme Court, Washington's legacy at the intersection of the third century and millennium, Washington and Congress, George and Martha, Washington and the presidency, Washington and the South, Washington's relationships, and Washington and the West.

Brief proposals (ten to fifteen lines) accompanied by a five to ten line biographical sketch written in the third person and submitted on the same sheet of stationery (letterhead preferred) are solicited. Multiple proposals from the same individual are permitted, as the topic is often a key consideration in selection.

The proposal deadline is 15 September 1997, with early submission encouraged. Selections are made on a "rolling basis." Selected papers will be considered for a published volume.

For information, contact William D. Pederson, Department of History and Social Sciences, LSU in Shreveport, One University Place, 148 Bronson Hall, Shreveport, LA 71115-2301.

"Okay, we'll go."—An Analysis of Eisenhower's Decisions Launching OVERLORD

Roger Hand

General Dwight D. Eisenhower made two critical decisions in the few days before the landings of the Allied Forces on the coast of Normandy on 6 June 1944. Early on 4 June, he postponed the launching of the attack for twenty-four hours, and then the next morning, ordered it forward. Eisenhower called the first, the decision to postpone, the most difficult decision he had to make during the war. The second, the decision to go, has been called one of the truly great decisions in military history.

While the events surrounding those two decisions are well documented, the probabilities and payoffs Eisenhower used to make them are not. Decision analysis can give us some insight into these. It is a management technique we can use to outline the events involved in a decision and to insert likely probabilities and payoffs that might affect the alternatives. It does not make decisions. It is a formal method that allows the decision maker to specify the factors that are important and weigh them in such a manner as to suggest the best outcome. In this article, I will employ this method to show how Eisenhower might have made the decisions that led to his embarking the troops for OVERLORD.

The Background (1)

By mid-May, 1944, the Allies had completed the plans for the D-day landings at the five beaches along the coast of Normandy. Eisenhower's senior commanders and staff had resolved or put aside their misgivings and differences and all were confident, Eisenhower included, that the landings would succeed if they had the agreed upon weather. There were several essential weather and timing factors. The landings had to be at dawn to conceal the approach to the beaches. They had to be at low tide to uncover the static obstacles the Germans had placed on the beaches. The moon had to be full to provide for the airborne operations that would precede the beach landings by several hours. Air and naval gun support required a minimum ceiling of 3,000 feet. The wind had to be

light for the airborne landings and to create calm seas for the landing craft. It also should be an onshore breeze to blow the smoke and dust of battle inland. The required timing of moon and tides would occur on 5-7 June. The next dawn ebb tides would be 19 June, and the next conjunction of dawn ebb tides and full moon would be early July.

The first of June was Y-day, the day the troops had to be in readiness in order to land four days later. It was dull and gray over southern England, but Group Captain J.M. Stagg, Eisenhower's senior meteorologist, was somewhat optimistic about the weather four days hence since a high pressure system that would produce the desired weather over the English Channel was moving up from the Azores. But he was concerned about a low pressure system over the North Atlantic near Iceland that might displace the high pressure system. He was very uncertain about cloud cover and could not rule out high winds. The following day he felt that the weather was untrustworthy, but tipped toward the favorable side. Eisenhower and his staff continued with preparations to launch the invasion.

By early 3 June, the weather was clear over Portsmouth in southern England, where Eisenhower had his advanced headquarters. However, the meteorologists were uncertain if it would hold. The weather maps showed that the North Atlantic depression might displace the high pressure system.

Eisenhower met with his principal staff and commanders at 2130 on 3 June. The meteorologists could not reach consensus as to whether the storm would arrive the following day. While Stagg predicted the possibility of high winds and low cloud cover with a ceiling of 1,000 feet for the morning of the 5 June, other meteorologists were uncertain. The senior leaders agreed that invasion should be postponed if the bad forecast held. On the hope that the forecast would improve, Eisenhower embarked the land forces. He would be able to recall them within the next few hours if the forecast did not improve. He met again with his staff at 0430 on 4 June. The forecast had not changed.

After a brief discussion, Eisenhower ordered the postponement and the fleet was recalled to England. This was decision number one. There was the possibility of weather conditions inadequate for success of the landings if he went ahead, balanced against the potential for loss of surprise, troop degradation and a host of other factors if he postponed. It is easy to see why Eisenhower felt that this was the most difficult he had to make during the war.

The forecast for poor weather was correct. During the day of 4 June, the weather worsened; clouds moved in and winds increased. There were gale warnings for the English Channel. By evening, a heavy rain had started at Portsmouth. Eisenhower met again with his staff and commanders at 2130. Stagg reported a new forecast. A cold front had developed west of Ireland. He predicted the front would arrive in Normandy at dawn on 6 June. If so, the rain would stop at midnight and the present storm would break for about thirty-six hours. The seas would moderate and there would be almost perfect visual conditions for air and naval operations from the evening of 5 June through the forenoon of 6 June. Clouds would again move in by the evening of 6 June.

Eisenhower again ordered the troops embarked and called for a meeting at 0400 on June 5 for reassessment. At that time, the rain had not stopped as predicted and winds were still at gale force. Stagg persisted in his forecast that the storm would break. Eisenhower's commanders and staff did not reach consensus on whether to go or postpone. An additional pressure was that, if a decision to postpone was taken, it had to be taken within thirty minutes. Otherwise, the fleet would not have enough fuel upon returning to port to embark the following night. This would necessitate postponement until 19 June. While the rain and gale-force winds continued outside, Eisenhower deliberated a few moments. He then said quietly, "Okay, we'll go."

This was the second decision, made against the pressure of time. With the weather outside his headquarters absolutely horrible, Eisenhower had to weigh the accuracy of the forecast that the weather would improve against the effects of a second postponement. The weather cleared as the troops crossed the channel and held for the time required to make the initial lodgment. The Germans were caught by surprise.

Their senior commanders, not having the same degree of sophisticated meteorological support, had all assumed the weather precluded enemy landings.

Analysis of the Decisions (2)

A very simple decision tree is shown in Figure 1. It describes the situation for the mornings of 4-5 June. The square decision node gives rise to the alternatives of go immediately or wait twenty-four hours. These end in circular probability nodes that each give rise to two branches that indicate the probability of good or poor weather for the landings. The probabilities themselves are identified below these labels as "p_{good}" and "1-p_{good}." The probability of good weather is assigned a value between 0 and 1. The probability of poor weather is assigned the complementary value, since the sum of the probabilities emanating from a decision node must be equal to 1.

Each of the four weather branches ends in a probability node that gives rise to two branches indicating the probabilities of successful or failed landings under the weather conditions from which they emanate. Each of these branches ends in triangular terminal or payoff nodes. The top branch at the right indicates the payoff for a successful landing under the conditions of going immediately and having good weather, the second branch from the top the payoff for a failed landing under conditions of going immediately and having good weather, and so forth.

The probabilities and payoffs are assigned values. These, initially, are arbitrary and are a guess at the values Eisenhower might have implicitly used. On the morning of 4 June, the meteorologists were predicting, with some uncertainty, that a storm system would move in shortly, bringing high winds, low cloud cover and rain. These were the likely conditions that the troops would face if Eisenhower decided to go immediately. We will arbitrarily assign the probability of good weather for the landing at 25 percent or 0.25. The probability of poor weather then becomes 0.75. The values are shown in place of the named probabilities in Figure 2 (the numbers in the boxes will be explained below). The meteorologists were completely uncertain at that time as to what the weather would be like twenty-four to thirty-six hours hence and Eisenhower would have had to assume it was a toss-up or fifty-fifty. We will assign the probability of good weather at the

landings if the launch was delayed 24 hours as 0.50, with the probability of poor weather also at 0.50.

Eisenhower had complete confidence that the landings would succeed given good weather, so the top "succeed" and "fail" branches on the "go" branch are assigned probabilities of 1.00 and 0.00. The probability of success given poor weather on the "go" branch were somewhat less, and we'll arbitrarily assign a value of 0.50 to it and a value of 0.50 to the "fail" branch. If Eisenhower decided to wait twenty-four hours, he would have had to take into consideration the effects this would have on the probability of success, for example, troop degradation from the delay and the potential for loss of surprise. We'll subtract 10 percent or 0.10 from the probabilities for success on the "wait 24 h" branch. Thus, the probabilities of a successful landing on this branch in good weather is 0.90 and in poor weather is 0.40 with their complements—the probability of failure—being 0.10 and 0.60.

The payoff for a successful landing Eisenhower might have estimated would be 100 times that of a failed landing. It is therefore given a value of 100 and that for a failed landing, a value of 1. While it could be argued that the value of a failed landing would be zero or even a negative number, assigning it the lowest possible integer value makes the later mathematical manipulation of the tree easier to follow. Following the paratrooper's adage that any landing you walk away from is a successful landing, all four "succeed" branches are given a payoff of 100 and all four "fail" branches are given a payoff of 1.

The tree is solved by rolling it back. (3) First, each payoff is multiplied by its associated probabilities. For the top branch the payoff of 100 is multiplied by the probability of 1.00 to yield a value of 100. This product and all other values obtained by multiplication during the roll-back are called expected values. For the second branch, the payoff of 1 is multiplied by the probability of 0.00 to yield an expected value of 0.00; these two expected values are summed and multiplied by the probability of 0.25, to yield an expected value of 25. For the third and fourth branches, the payoff of 100 is multiplied by the probability of 0.50 and the payoff of 1 is multiplied by the probability of 0.50; these two expected values are summed to 50.50 (rounded to 51) and this is multiplied by the probability of 0.75 to give an expected value 38. The expected values of 25 and 38

are summed to yield a final expected value for the "go" branch of 63, it being shown in the box next to the first probability node on that branch. The "wait 24 h" branch is solved in the same way, yielding a final expected value of 65, marginally higher than the 63 of the "go" branch. Thus, the favored decision is to wait twenty-four hours, and this is indicated in the box next to the square decision node at the left side of Figure 2. The recommended path is shown further by the filled nodes and the nonrecommended path now has two bars across it. The four payoff boxes at the end of the recommended path also contain the probabilities of those outcomes or payoffs, given a decision to wait. These are the products of the probabilities along each of the four paths, for example, 0.50 multiplied by 0.90 gives 0.45. These are the probabilities of the four outcomes, given the decision to wait. The most likely is a successful landing in good weather, although this is at less than an even chance.

The tree as constructed supports Eisenhower's decision on the morning of 4 June to wait. However, it is a close call, with the final expected value of the "wait 24 h" branch being just marginally higher than that of the "go" branch. Also the probability of the most desired outcome on this branch, a successful landing in good weather is less than 50 percent.

A similar process can be followed to examine Eisenhower's decision to go on the following morning, 5 June. This is shown in Figure 3. By 5 June, Eisenhower's meteorologists were predicting, still with some uncertainty, a thirty-six-hour break in the storm, but were not confident of the forecast beyond that. Thus we can assign the probability of good weather on the "go" branch at 0.75 with its complement of 0.25 for poor weather. On the "wait 24 h" branch, we'll still assign it as a 50-50 toss-up. The probabilities of success or failure are assigned using the same reasoning we used for the decision tree for 4 June in Figure 2. Because of the decision to delay, the probability of success in good weather if the decision is to go is 10 percent less or 0.90, and the other three "succeed" branches are decreased by 0.10. The payoffs remain the same.

The roll-back on this tree gives an expected value of 78 to the "go" branch and an expected value of 55 to the "wait 24 h" branch, supporting Eisenhower's decision to go. In addition, the probability of a successful

landing in good weather is now raised to 0.68. The tree as constructed fully supports Eisenhower's decision on the morning of 5 June.

Assigning static probabilities and payoffs limits the usefulness of the decision tree. It can rightly be argued that these might not correspond to the values that Eisenhower would have assigned. This limitation can be overcome by using sensitivity analysis. The value assigned to a payoff or probability is systematically varied over a range and the expected values calculated for multiple points over the range. The uncertainties surrounding the decision to postpone on 4 June make it the more interesting to subject to sensitivity analysis.

In Figure 2, the probability of good weather on the "go" arm initially was assigned a value of 0.25. This can be varied from 0 to 1, holding all other assigned values constant. The results of this one-way sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 4. They reveal that the tree would have supported a decision to go if Eisenhower had considered the probability of good weather at 0.35 or higher, these probabilities being on the horizontal axis of the graph. At that probability or higher, the expected value, on the vertical axis, calculated by the roll back of the "go" branch, is greater than the expected value of 65 for the "wait 24 h" branch.

A one-way sensitivity analysis of the probability of a successful landing given poor weather on the "go" branch (the third branch from the top on the right of Figure 2) is shown in Figure 5. The value of "psucceed" on that branch is varied from 0 to 1. The tree would have supported a decision to go if Eisenhower had estimated the probability at 0.52 or higher.

These two probabilities can be varied simultaneously in a two-way sensitivity analysis. This is shown in Figure 6. The filled portion of the graph at the lower left shows the range of probabilities supporting the decision to wait twenty-four hours. The limits here are a probability of 0.00 for good weather and a probability of a successful landing in poor weather of 0.62 on the vertical axis and a probability of 0.00 for a successful landing in poor weather and a probability of good weather of 0.62 on the horizontal axis. This graph can be interpreted as follows: if, for example, Eisenhower had felt that the probability of good weather was 0.25 and the probability of a successful landing in poor weather was 0.25, that point on the graph would

fall within the filled portion at the lower left, supporting a decision to wait. If, instead, Eisenhower had felt that the probability of good weather was 0.75 and the probability of a successful landing in poor weather was 0.75, that point would fall within the clear area of the graph, supporting a decision to go. If we could assign these numerical probabilities to Eisenhower's thinking on the morning of 4 June, they clearly would fall within the filled area on the graph.

Any of the other values could have been varied in one- or two-way sensitivity analyses, depending on the concerns and interest of the analyst. It is also possible to vary more than two simultaneously, but graphic depiction of the results becomes difficult.

In this analysis, we used a very simple method of assigning a value to the payoff, merely giving the payoff of a successful landing a number 100 times larger than the value of a failed landing. The payoff could be broken down into several factors, such as the ability of the landed troops to move inland, second lift requirements, logistic requirements, and so forth. These could have been put into some mathematical formula equal to a payoff, and values assigned to the individual factors. For example, one could assign a lower payoff to a delayed landing if it was felt that the delay would impair the ability of the troops to achieve their twenty-four-hour or forty-eight-hour phase lines. As well, the assigned probabilities could have been arrived at in a more complex manner. For example, the probability of a successful landing could have had factors such as the potential for loss of secrecy and troop degradation from delay.

Adding these factors would increase the validity of the analysis and would clarify exactly what had to be considered in reaching the decision. Again, it is worth emphasizing that the tree does not make the decision, the decision maker does. The tree simply makes him or her aware of the probabilities and payoffs that should be considered. Also, the tree is no better than the decision maker who creates it. Simplistic trees yield simplistic analyses.

The assigned values in this analysis were carefully chosen to reflect the historical record. The decision of 4 June was difficult and must have been close to a toss-up. The decision of 5 June, although even more critical, was somewhat easier, assuming Eisenhower had some faith in the forecasts of his meteorologists. I have not

recapitulated Eisenhower's thinking during the critical hours before D-day. Nowhere in the record are numerical values given to the probabilities and payoffs. Currently, however, meteorologists routinely give forecasts in terms of probabilities ("75 percent chance of showers today"), and managers thinking in terms of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness routinely assign numerical value to payoffs. The decision analysis presented here can, perhaps, give us some insight into what Eisenhower faced during those critical days before the landings.

Brig. Gen. Roger Hand, USAR, is Commander, 330th Medical Brigade, Fort Sheridan, Illinois. He is a professor at the College of Medicine and School of Public Health at the University of Illinois (Chicago). General Hand has published many research articles in peer-reviewed journals on medical management and decision-making. His military service includes as a commander of army hospitals and as a medical officer with Special Forces. This article results from his professional interest in decision analysis and his avocation of military history.

Notes

1. For background material, see David Eisenhower, *Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945*. (New York: Random House, 1986); and Merle Miller, *Ike the Soldier: as They Knew Him*. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1987). These two comprehensive biographies are consistent on the events detailed in the background and are not contradicted by older sources.
2. Decision analysis is often taught as part of a basic course in management science. A straightforward text is Gerald E. Thompson, *Management Science: An Introduction to Modern Quantitative Analysis and Decision Making* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976). Because of the author's background, he has learned most of his decision theory through the more specialized field of medical decision analysis. Two excellent texts are Milton C. Weinstein, *Clinical Decision Analysis* (Philadelphia, PA: Saunders, 1980); and Harold C. Sox, Kieth I. Marton, and Michael C. Higgins, *Medical*

Decision Making (Newton, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1988). A short but comprehensive treatment of the subject appeared in S.G. Pauker and J.P. Kassirer, "Decision Analysis," *The New England Journal of Medicine* 316 (1987):250-258. Neither of the biographies cited above assigns values to the probabilities and payoffs; these are the responsibility of the author.

3. The calculations for the roll-backs and sensitivity analyses in the present article were done using a decision analysis software package, "Data for Windows, Decision Analysis" by TreeAge, ver. 2.66, TreeAge Software, Inc., Boston, MA. The user's manual can also serve as an introductory text. The graphs were put in a form suitable for publication using PowerPoint for Windows, ver. 4.0, Microsoft Corporation.




Figure 1. Decision tree depicting the alternatives open to Eisenhower at 0430 4 June 1944 and 0400 5 June 1944. The square node at the left is a decision node with the two choices, "go" and "wait 24 h" emanating from it. Both give rise to circular chance or probability nodes. These give rise to branches labeled "good weather" and "poor weather": with the probabilities of each below these labels as "pgood" and "1-pgood." These end in probability nodes that give rise to two branches each labeled "succeed" and "fail" with the probabilities of each below these labels as "psucceed" and "1-psucceed." These branches end in triangular terminal or payoff nodes.




Figure 2. Roll-back of the decision tree with the static assigned values for the probabilities and payoffs for the morning of 4 June 1944. The roll-back indicates marginal support for the decision to wait twenty-four hours.




Figure 3. Roll-back of the decision tree with the static assigned values for the probabilities and payoffs for the morning of 5 June 1944. The roll-back indicates support for the decision to launch the D-day assault.




Figure 4. One-way sensitivity analysis on the probability of good weather for the landings if they were launched the morning of 4 June 1944. The square symbols indicate a decision to go, the round symbols a decision to wait twenty-four hours. Whereas a static probability of 0.25 was assigned to this node in Figure 2, in this figure, the value is varied from 0 to 1. The graph indicates that if Eisenhower assigned a probability of good weather of less than 0.35, the tree would support a decision to wait twenty-four hours.




Figure 5. One-way sensitivity analysis on the probability of a successful landing given poor weather for the landings if they were launched the morning of 4 June 1944. The square symbols indicate a decision to go, the round symbols a decision to wait 24 hours. Whereas a static probability of 0.50 was assigned to this node in Figure 2, in this figure, the value is varied from 0 to 1. The graph indicates that if Eisenhower assigned a probability of a successful landing in the presence of poor weather of less than 0.52, the tree would support a decision to wait twenty-four hours.




Figure 6. Two-way sensitivity analysis of the probability of good weather and the probability of a successful landing in the presence of poor weather were the operation launched on the morning of 4 June 1944. These are the same two probabilities varied in the one-way sensitivity analyses in Figures 4 and 5. The filled plot area at the lower left of the graph shows the range of these two probabilities that Eisenhower might have assigned for the tree to support the decision to wait twenty-four hours.

Strategic Decisions and American Military Government on Okinawa, 1945-50

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

This article derives from a paper Dr. Fisch presented at the June 1996 Conference of Army Historians in Washington, D.C.

The account of America's early military government efforts on Okinawa is a textbook study in theory and practice, in trial and error, and in idealism and frustration. In many instances, it is also a story of conflicting priorities between the tactical forces and those individuals responsible for military government. Those who are interested in a more detailed account, can refer to the author's *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950*, published by the Center of Military History. This study focuses on only one particular aspect of that story; namely, the impact of Cold War strategic decisions on the military government effort.

In retrospect, one can see that during the brief period of just five years (1945-50), civil administration in the Ryukyus underwent three separate phases, all shaped by strategic considerations outside the realm of military government. The assault and early garrison phase began in the fall of 1944 and lasted through the Japanese surrender in September 1945. It was followed by a period of apathy and neglect which continued until the Berlin Blockade and events in China in 1948 jolted the world into a new era. The onset of the Cold War brought the final phase, one of base development, economic planning, and a commitment to a comprehensive civil administration. This brief examination considers each of these three phases, beginning with the assault and early garrison phase.

Assault and Early Garrison Phase

In the autumn of 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a strategic decision which called to mind Commodore Matthew Perry's visit to Okinawa in 1853. Once again, the American military hoped to use the largest of the Ryukyus as a steppingstone to the Japanese home islands. The joint planners determined that an invasion of Japan, preceded by an intensive aerial

bombardment, would be necessary to force an Imperial surrender. To secure the necessary bases for these air raids, they devised Operation ICEBERG, and directed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to launch an assault on Okinawa early the following year.

Military government planning was an integral part of the preparations for ICEBERG. In 1944 the Navy promulgated a comprehensive civil affairs handbook for the Ryukyus. In January 1945, drawing upon both international law and previous humanitarian examples, Tenth Army operations staff defined the expedition's military government responsibilities and objectives in an operational directive with the convoluted title "Operational Directive Number 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General Tenth Army." Admiral Nimitz contributed a CIPAC-CINCPOA directive on the subject in March.

By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Navy was responsible for military government in captured Japanese island areas, including the Ryukyu Islands. But once the amphibious phase of the assault was ended, ICEBERG in large measure would be an Army operation, so from the onset, military government was conceived as a joint operation.

When the Army and marine divisions of the American Tenth Army landed on Okinawa's western beaches on 1 April 1945, military government personnel arrived along with the first assault waves. Their objectives were modest: to facilitate combat operations and to minimize civilian casualties. The first task was to assemble the islanders, many of whom were wandering around the battlefield in search of food or relatives. These citizens had to be removed from the front-line areas to collection points where care and custody could be provided.

The camps were very modest affairs, sometimes only a circle of barbed wire and a pit latrine. Many lacked even canvas protection from the chilly Okinawan nights. Some islanders willingly came forward; others, conditioned by Japanese propaganda to fear the invaders, had to be captured during searches by military

government personnel.

Once the refugees had been gathered into the various camps, the most immediate concern was the food supply, followed closely by medical care, clothing, and shelter. Military government planners knew that the Ryukyu Islands had never been self-sufficient in food production. Not knowing how the preinvasion bombardment or Japanese defense preparations might have affected the food supply, the invasion force prepared for the worst. Each division was issued 70,000 civilian rations for emergency feeding. These modest portions, averaging 1,530 calories each, included rice, flour, dried fish, cooking oil, soybeans, and sugar.

Because the civilian population had managed to hoard food in the island's coral caves, there was no immediate food crisis. Only 22 percent of Okinawa's food was imported in June 1945. During the battle, quantities of processed foodstuffs—totaling 1,402 tons—and 2,079 tons of harvested crops were salvaged and rationed. By July 1945, however, these local supplies were exhausted, and the level of imported foodstuffs had risen to 59 percent.

During the battle, the retaining walls of numerous terraced fields and the intricate irrigations systems developed over years—sometimes over generations—had been seriously damaged. Once the fighting ended, the agricultural situation deteriorated further. Bulldozers, heavy trucks, and graders, carrying out the base development plans for airfields, continued the destructive work begun by tanks and artillery. These conditions, plus the constant shifting from one camp to another, left the Okinawans with very little incentive to plant new crops. By September 1945, the caloric content of the civilian rations, already modest, had to be cut in half. Despite the hardships and instances of malnutrition, actual starvation was averted, but Okinawa's inability to feed itself would remain a major concern long after hostilities ceased.

Experience in the Pacific, most notably on Saipan, convinced military government planners that all medical care would have to be imported. Fearing a large number of civilian battle casualties, as well as widespread tropical disease, Tenth Army planners hoped to provide at least minimal humanitarian care. They found filariasis, dengue fever, and tuberculosis to be widespread on Okinawa, and some cases of malaria appeared, but not in the epidemic proportions ex-

pected. Because of the large number of people hiding for long periods in the island's caves, flea and louse infestation affected three-fourths of the population. These people were liberally dusted with DDT by the first military government personnel they encountered. During the campaign phase, almost 30 percent of the civilians encountered required some medical care.

While the medical personnel struggled with their limited resources, other civil affairs officers addressed the need for clothing and shelter. Both were in short supply. The use of surplus and cast-off uniform parts, which the Far East Command permitted until 1947, helped ease the clothing shortage.

Housing was another concern. Tenth Army planners anticipated that a large number of civilian dwellings would be destroyed in the fighting, but there was no way to predict with accuracy the actual extent of the destruction. Somewhere between 11,000 and 12,000 Okinawan houses survived the assault, although at least half of these were extensively damaged. The 20 percent of the capital, Naha, that had survived the air raids of October 1944 was destroyed during the invasion. After the fighting ended, other buildings—sometimes whole villages—fell victim to base construction. Despite the adverse circumstances, military government, assisted by a Navy construction battalion ("SeaBees"), succeeded in sheltering Okinawa's homeless on an emergency basis. But this was only accomplished through severe overcrowding.

The Okinawans came to appreciate the efforts of the military government teams during the assault and early garrison phase. Medical personnel were especially effective in forging a strong bond between the occupation forces and the civilian population. Much of this goodwill quickly dissipated, however, when the military's need for acreage came into conflict with the Okinawan's traditional attachment to the land.

Most islanders wanted nothing more than to return to their family plots to rebuild and to resume farming. Unfortunately, the land most suitable for farming was also the best available for airfields, ammunition dumps, and other military installations. Base construction plans now called for eighteen airstrips on Okinawa and another four on nearby Ie Shima. These plans necessitated wholesale relocations of the population, utterly demoralizing the islanders and thoroughly undermining any concerted attempts at agriculture.

In September 1945, strategic considerations once again came into play. Japan surrendered, and base construction was abruptly scaled back. At the same time, the few hundred experienced military government officers on Okinawa were called away for desperately needed occupation duty with the Tenth Army in Korea and the Eighth Army in the home islands. Others were quickly demobilized, gradually replaced by individuals who lacked their predecessors' singular advantages in training and experience. These postwar manpower realities, along with the winding down in base development and official Washington's sudden lack of interest in Okinawa, ushered in the years 1946-48; years of apathy and neglect that may accurately be characterized as the nadir of America's tenure on Okinawa.

The Years of Apathy and Neglect

In the weeks following the military collapse of Japan, the Joint Planning Staff of the JCS surveyed the world-wide base situation and decided that Okinawa should remain a primary base area. Department of State officials disagreed, arguing that the Ryukyus should be demilitarized and returned to Japan. They advised the new president, Harry S. Truman, that retaining possession of the Ryukyus could create diplomatic and political problems and would, in any event, certainly be an economic drain on the United States. The military chiefs contended, on the other hand, that the secretary of state underestimated the military value of Okinawa, and that the cost of maintaining the island was minimal compared to the lives and treasure expended in capturing it—or to the cost of recapturing Okinawa from a hostile power.

This debate took several curious turns as the basic assumptions behind it changed during the immediate postwar years. Both the Joint Chiefs and the Department of State assumed initially that international affairs in Asia would revolve around a democratic China, controlled by the Nationalists and assisted by American aid; that the United States and the Soviet Union would continue to work in approximately the same sort of cooperative spirit demonstrated in their wartime partnership; and that decolonization of South and Southeast Asia would come quickly and easily with a number of independent, democratic nations emerging. All these assumptions proved incorrect, although it was

not until the late 1940s that the new realities would be fully appreciated. Meanwhile, Okinawa, now in competition with base projects in Korea and the Japanese home islands, remained in political and economic limbo.

As the funds for base construction worldwide dwindled, projects for Okinawa and opportunities for the islanders suffered accordingly. In February 1946, Headquarters, Army Forces, Western Pacific, submitted an estimate for funding needed to build permanent base facilities in the Ryukyus. The War Department cut this figure by more than half, and Congress actually provided \$13 million less than that. By May 1947 MacArthur had revised his construction program downward for fiscal year 1948, only to be advised that Congress had failed to authorize *any* additional construction funds for Okinawa.

The decline in military construction, the absence of a meaningful occupation, the intense boredom, unrelenting humidity, and substandard quarters all combined to make Okinawa a military backwater. In 1949 *Time* magazine, in an article entitled "Okinawa: Forgotten Island," described it as "the end of the Army's logistics line," characterized the garrison as those "depressed and sullen troops," and concluded that "as a major American base...Okinawa is no credit to America." Throughout the Army, the impression developed in the late 1940s that only the worst were sent to duty stations on the island. In his classic study, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People*, George Kerr observed that Okinawa was "a place of exile from GHQ (SCAP) and Japan proper, and for ambitious civilians with the Army a 'no man's land'".

Yet even during those bleak days, military government sought in various areas to restore a degree of social and economic normalcy. One can see the fruit of these efforts by focusing on just two examples: education and commercial fishing. Thanks to military government initiatives, rudimentary school facilities began to reappear soon after the battle for Okinawa ended. Military government officers were very anxious to restore a modicum of education, both as a way to occupy the children and as a means to instill democratic ideals. By October 1945, despite the acute shortage of building materials, military government officers had established 72 schools, first through sixth grades, operating on a part-time basis, and accommo-

dating some 40,000 students. By September 1947 approximately 90 percent of school-age children were receiving some type of formal instruction in over 500 schools, and on 22 May 1950 military government officers established the first university in Ryukyuan history. At the Army's behest, academicians from Michigan State University served as advisers to the University of the Ryukyus, which was organized to resemble an American institution of higher learning. It began with an entering class of 560 students and quickly became a source of pride for the people of the archipelago.

As was the case with agriculture, fishing had been a traditional Ryukyuan occupation, though perhaps not so much as one might have imagined. Estimates are that never more than 9 percent of the Ryukyuan population ever engaged in full-time fishing. Before World War II, Japanese fishermen from Kyushu had dominated the best fishing areas in the Ryukyus. Moreover, Okinawans traditionally had limited their efforts to the immediate coastal waters because of the small size of their boats and their lack of refrigeration. Nevertheless, Okinawan fishermen once had been able to produce a modest, exportable surplus of smoked skipjack and bonito. About 100 motorized sampans (10-12 tons) produced 75 percent of the catch, with some 1,500 inshore rowboats accounting for the remainder.

The battle for Okinawa temporarily obliterated Okinawa's fishing industry. All motorized boats and 71 percent of the smaller, oar-powered boats were destroyed. The American forces, fearing enemy infiltration by sea, banned the use of the remaining craft during the campaign. The wooden boats deteriorated out of the water, and fishing line rotted in the sun.

All the while the food supply situation worsened. In July 1945 military government advised the island commander that, with the islanders' principal source of protein cut off, a deficiency now existed. The following month, fishing from oar-powered canoes was opened along a limited stretch of coast, but no motor or sail-powered boats were permitted until November, and the island's primary fishing grounds remained closed until April 1946. Still, military government officers persisted in their efforts to ease the restrictions and to obtain substitute fishing craft. By June 1946 native crews under military government supervision were operating a number of converted Navy landing craft.

Between July 1946 and July 1949 the catch more than tripled. In 1950, with Okinawa back on the minds of American strategic planners, money was found for the construction of 65 new diesel-powered fishing vessels.

America's Expanded Commitment

Undoubtedly, the key to Okinawa's revitalized economic fortunes had more to do with international politics and geography than with economics. The spirit of friendship and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union did not survive World War II. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia marked the lowering of the Iron Curtain in Europe. In Asia, the advance of Mao Tse Dong's forces across northern China convinced many in the West that the Communists sought to extend their hegemony over the Far East. In June 1948 General MacArthur, the Far East commander, warned official Washington that Communist successes in China might give the Soviets access to air bases from which to threaten Japan. Reassessing the image of the Ryukyus in the light of this threat, he strongly favored retaining and developing the Okinawan bases, and he was joined by senior Air Force officials in this assessment.

Cold War realities in Asia were also being discussed in the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that if China fell, Taiwan might also be occupied, thus threatening Japan from a previously safe quarter. In October 1948 the council recommended to President Truman that the United States retain and develop Okinawan facilities on a long-term basis. National Security Council paper NSC 13/3, which Truman approved and which became official policy on 6 May 1949, also included a significant statement at the insistence of the Department of State. State now accepted the need for military facilities in the Ryukyus for a protracted period, but for both political and practical reasons insisted that the United States "promptly formulate and carry out a program...for the economic and social well-being...of the natives," a program that would lead to the "eventual reduction to a minimum" of Okinawa's deficit economic condition. Unlike the home-island Japanese, whose economic infrastructure had survived the war in far better shape than the Ryukyus', the citizens of Okinawa were not able to underwrite occupation costs.

But Department of State officials were looking

beyond economic issues toward relations with a soon-to-be sovereign Japan. They were aware that language in the forthcoming peace treaty would grant the United States administrative control over the Ryukyus for an indefinite period, while leaving open the question of—to use John Foster Dulles' words—Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the islands. A sovereign Japan could hardly be expected to provide material support for an American occupation of an area over which it retained only an implied sovereignty at best. The obvious short-term solution was for the United States to assume that portion of the burden then being borne by the home-island Japanese. The formula of 6 May 1949, therefore, established a pay-as-you-go policy for the armed services on Okinawa, and freed occupied Japan from any burden of underwriting Okinawan occupation costs. Since MacArthur had long argued that government agencies on Okinawa should seek separate, direct appropriations from Congress, acceptance of the Department of State's position by the National Security Council was a victory for General MacArthur as well as for the economy of Okinawa. By December 1949, in an important symbolic development in semantics, the Department of State's Far Eastern Affairs Office had begun to use the term "civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands," instead of "military government," when reporting to the secretary of state on MacArthur's stewardship of the archipelago.

As if to underscore Okinawa's new importance in the Cold War world, Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees made an unannounced inspection trip to the island in September 1949. His inspection confirmed the deplorable state of facilities on Okinawa, as reported in the popular media. Voorhees' trip, and a subsequent visit by Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins in October, produced immediate results, starting with a new Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, Maj. Gen. Josef R. Sheetz, whose most recent assignment had been as chief military government officer in Korea. Known to be an energetic officer, Sheetz now presided over an expanded construction program that included \$22 million for military housing, with procurement of materials and services being made, as far as possible, in the Ryukyus. This stipulation was included so the program, although designed for military purposes, would serve to stimulate the civilian economy as well.

Also during October 1949, Brig. Gen. George J. Nold, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Military Construction, conducted a thorough study of military construction requirements on Okinawa. The Nold mission resulted in a comprehensive plan emphasizing joint-use projects, such as roads, bridges, utilities, and harbors that would benefit both the military establishment and the local economy. One month after General Nold's visit, General Sheetz wrote to MacArthur that:

the conduct of the troops is improving. The local native officials are demonstrating that they can handle the added responsibilities which we are passing to them progressively. The native people are anticipating an improvement in their economic conditions. In short, Sir, although we have barely scratched the surface on the things to be done, I am confident that we are on the right track.

Conclusion

From a relatively simple concept of military organization as a vehicle for population and disease control, the military government mission experienced what we today might call "mission creep," and evolved into a long-term civil administration, taking the form of a comprehensive politico-socio-economic stewardship.

This evolution took place, unevenly, depending upon strategic considerations. Already, during the assault phase, certain military government officers understood that conditions on Okinawa required a commitment of men and resources beyond anything anticipated in Operation ICEBERG. But it took major events and changes in Asia before the United States accepted this commitment in the late 1940s. During the interim years, the island suffered from apathy and neglect. Only the emergence of the Cold War convinced the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a minimalist approach to civil administration was detrimental to American strategic interests in the region. Once that awareness took hold, America's strategic planners insisted on a long-term administration of the islands that lasted until other international considerations, beyond the scope of this article, permitted the reversion of the Ryukyus to Japanese control in 1972.

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Book Review

by Paul F. Liston

Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests in World War II

by Donald F. Crosby, S.J.

University Press of Kansas. 328 pp., \$27.50

As one of the Modern War Studies available from the University Press of Kansas, *Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests in World War II* is the only full-length study of any denomination that sent chaplains into wartime combat. While later volumes by Donald F. Crosby promise to relate the home front experience and related matters, the emphasis here is on Catholic chaplains in battle. Very much like their Protestant and Jewish counterparts, they shared the same frightful anticipation of battle, terror of assault, and the same exposure to wounding and death as the enlisted men. For that very reason, Crosby, a Jesuit priest, makes the apt observation that chaplains held a unique position in the American war machine: "They had a special vantage point from which they could see the successes and achievements of the military people they served, their sufferings and ordeals, and their religious and psychological states of mind." This study vividly depicts in a manner available nowhere else the life of the foot soldier and the sailor.

Aside from supplying varied personalities and compelling anecdotes, *Battlefield Chaplains* likewise provides a sweeping overview of World War II, covering, as it does, the principal engagements in both the European and Pacific theaters. From the vantage of the chaplains hugging the ground in foxholes or clinging to fire-swept ship decks, you taste anew the carnage of that hard-won global conflict. And, in addition to his broad feel for the scope of the war, you have to admire the author's devotion to the detailed research that shows us the individual faces. His labor has assembled harrowing and often deeply moving combat descriptions through the eyes of men of God become men of war.

You do not need a Catholic background to follow these chaplains along the battle lines or from island to

island. If anything, the Chaplain Corps required and fostered ecumenism. Often enough it was the first close experience of priests with Protestants and Jews, a primal stepping stone to today's interfaith relations. Where appropriate, Crosby makes the point that what was true of Catholic chaplains applied as well to their confreres in other religions. This account certainly whets the appetite for a like study of other denominations.

Chaplains of all stripe were almost generally revered and much decorated out of proportion to their numbers. Still, this work is not out to paint halos on Catholic clergymen in the services. Honest reportage tells us as well of the few chaplains who could not toe the mark and were accordingly reprimanded or booted out. On balance, though, the chaplains compel our admiration for their endurance in battle and, afterwards, for rescuing the wounded and for picking up the pieces of those fatally shattered. It is both painful and enlightening to follow their steps.

Some might fault *Battlefield Chaplains* for stringing together chains of engaging anecdotes. There is much of that, yet there can be no substitute for personal narrative when it comes to painting battle conditions, like the mud and heat of the oppressive New Guinea jungle or the searing North African desert. In addition to the personal narratives, the book does step back to offer the larger narrative when, occasionally, the strategic value of a campaign is given. Welcome assessments of the enemy to be faced also place the conflicts in context. An evenhanded approach could not leave out the humor that now and then lightened the chaplain's long day. Fortunately, the light as well as the dark moments are included. The author rightly regrets saying little about the remote outposts of the war and the sea battle for the Atlantic and Pacific.

Both the professional and amateur historian can benefit from *Battlefield Chaplains*. Other such studies to come could be as profitable.

Paul F. Liston is a Catholic parish priest working in Washington, D.C. His special interest is Maryland history.

Book Review

by Cole C. Kingseed

Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945

by Michael D. Doubler

University Press of Kansas. 354 pp., \$40.00

In recent years an increasing number of military historians have opined that American victory in Europe during World War II was chiefly the result of this country's preponderance of material resources and combat power against an exhausted adversary. Compared to their German counterparts, Russell Weigley argues in *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, that the American Army suffered long from a relative absence of the finely honed professional skill that characterized its opponents in every aspect of tactics and operations. Weigley states that the *Wehrmacht* remained qualitatively superior to the American Army, formation for formation, throughout far too many months of the U.S. Army's greatest campaign. In *Fighting Power*, Martin van Creveld echoes Weigley's analysis and posits that American combat leadership was mediocre at best, and that the American personnel replacement system, with its tendency to treat soldiers as adjuncts to machines, was the single greatest reason for the Army's problems.

At long last, a new generation of historians has begun to reassess the combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army that fought from the Normandy beaches to the Elbe. In *Closing with the Enemy*, author Michael D. Doubler argues persuasively that American success principally was due to the capacity for quickly adapting to the changing conditions of the battlefield. Implementing change was a complex process that permeated virtually every function the U.S. Army performed. Analysis of the Army in the European theater of operations (ETO) demonstrates that the U.S. Army's doctrine, organization, training, tactics, weapons, and soldiers all underwent improvisation and change from its antebellum antecedents. According to the author, the large number of adaptations in the ETO permitted Americans to close with and destroy the enemy more rapidly and effectively, while minimizing their own casualties and inflicting maximum damage on the

German forces.

In reaching his conclusions, Doubler draws upon a large number of primary and secondary sources, not the least of which is the *Reports of the Army Ground Forces (AGF) Observers Board*. The AGF includes 6 volumes containing reports from over 1,500 sources, that discuss a wide range of topics, from the Army's operations from Tunisia to Bavaria. SHAEF and 12th Army Group headquarters also conducted detailed histories from virtually every battle during the campaign in northwest Europe. Other primary sources include those housed in the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives, in Records of the Adjutant General's Office, World War II Operations Reports, 1940-1948. Doubler also draws heavily, perhaps too much so, on the "green books," the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II.

It was in what the author terms "the schoolhouse of war" that seeds of ultimate victory were sown. In encountering unexpected challenges on the battlefield, American soldiers required little guidance from senior headquarters. Commanders discovered that the Army's prewar doctrine was essentially correct, but recognized that success hinged on how well senior commanders applied doctrine to disparate circumstances. Local commanders were particularly successful at the tactical level of war, where they improved air-to-ground operations, tank-infantry coordination, and the conduct of military operations in urban, forested, and open terrain. Publication of battle experiences by several army-level headquarters was just one example of the dissemination of combat techniques. By late 1944 and early 1945, close coordination between all arms was the norm.

Doubler is also quick to point out the areas in which the U.S. Army did not adapt so readily. The Army's inefficient and impersonal replacement system eluded improvement until near the end of the war. As a result, morale, discipline, and proficiency suffered throughout the conflict. Nor did tactical units demonstrate much flexibility in overcoming German defenses in the Hürtgen Forest. Moreover, it took nearly two years of combat to effectively address institutional deficiencies resulting in poor air-ground coordination. In the final analysis, however, the U.S. Army improved continually and reached its highest level of performance and capability by V-E Day.

Doubler feels that he will have achieved his purpose if this book stimulates disciplined thinking by strategists and planners on the challenges of future battlefields, and promotes among "peace-trained officers something of the viewpoint of the veteran." As the number of soldiers who have experienced prolonged combat is diminishing, the armed forces must turn to military history as a substitute for combat experience. Doubler's analysis of combined arms operations in the ETO illustrates dramatically how a peacetime army adapted during wartime to meet unexpected challenges, and demonstrates how armies' functions on training maneuvers and command post exercises can change dramatically after contact with the enemy.

In summary, Doubler has produced a masterful monograph that is an important contribution to comprehending how men and organizations react to—and help shape the outcome of—combat. In his conclusion, Doubler states the greatest lesson the Army learned in World War II was that the learning process itself is an integral part of a conflict, and can spell the difference between victory and defeat. The performance of the U.S. Army in DESERT STORM indicates that the Army as an institution learned and applied lessons from the Vietnam conflict. Critical analysis of a victorious

army, however, is just as important as the analysis of a defeated force. It is in this regard that *Closing with the Enemy* makes its greatest contribution.

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