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Actions and Reactions

The Spring 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign Revisted

By Robert S. Rush

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's 1862 campaign in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley prolonged the life of the Confederacy by two to three years. Within a one-month period, his Confederate Valley Army, never exceeding 17,000 men, marched more than 200 miles, fought three battles, and neutralized more than 70,000 Union soldiers in a campaign that caused the Federal focus to shift, at least momentarily, from the peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers to the Shenandoah Valley. During this period Jackson took advantage of every opportunity in pursuing his primary objective to keep Union troops from reinforcing Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac in its drive on Richmond, Virginia.

Decisions made by the Union's senior civilian leaders also contributed to General Jackson's success. If President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton had not influenced the Federal military strategy in the valley, General McClellan's Peninsula campaign might have attained its strategic goal. Instructions issued by Secretary Stanton, not any victories won by General Jackson, effectively stopped Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks' successful march up the valley toward Staunton in April 1862. Jackson's subsequent military successes against Banks at Front Royal and Winchester are directly attributable to Stanton's actions, which reduced Banks' force from 23,000 soldiers at the beginning of May to fewer than 9,000 by 21 May.[1]

For the Confederates, General Robert E. Lee's efforts to have Jackson attack resulted in a diversion into the valley of 20,000 Union soldiers who would have better served the Federal cause by participating in the battles around Richmond. Had Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell's corps been available to McClellan in late May, General Joseph E. Johnston and his 60,000 soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia would have faced a combined Union force of more than 135,000, or an imbalance of roughly two to one. Defeating the Army of Northern Virginia would have cleared the way for General McClellan to take first Richmond and then all of Virginia with its substantial population and industrial and agricultural output.[2] In that case, the war might not have lasted another year.

The use of the telegraph made the Shenandoah Valley campaign one of the first in which civilian government officials could influence events almost instantaneously, without openly campaigning themselves. As a byproduct, this situation left a legacy of excellent primary sources. Published in the *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, these communications are the only sources that were not modified to fit perception or memory, as were after-action reports and personal accounts. Relying on the *Official Records* and the personal papers of the participants, this article will evaluate the effects of the messages received by those involved in the Valley campaign and suggest how these directives influenced its course. The paper will compare the understanding and instructions of higher headquarters with the reality of the battlefield situation. Among the significant challenges Generals Banks and Jackson faced was the need to balance reality with their superiors' perceptions. Military campaigns are not fought in vacuums. The Shenandoah Valley campaign is a primer on how individuals off the battlefield can decisively influence a campaign.

An Overview of the Eastern Theater

On 21 April 1862, the American Civil War was just over a year old. After the bloody First Battle of Manassas, fought between the ill-prepared forces of

the Union and Confederate armies in July 1861, President Lincoln had given the command of the Union forces to General McClellan. While "Little Mac" organized and trained the Army of the Potomac around Washington, just thirty miles west, General Johnston's Confederate Army of the Potomac went into winter quarters at Centreville, Virginia.

After watching McClellan intensively train the army around Washington for eight months, the president prodded him into moving against the Confederates. McClellan's initial plan to ferry his army to Urbana on the Rappahannock was thwarted when General Johnston pulled his army back to Fredericksburg. McClellan then proposed to move by sea to Union-held Fort Monroe located at the foot of the critical peninsula. This would place the Union army nearer to Richmond than was the Confederate army, and if McClellan moved quickly he could cut Johnston off in Northern Virginia. Although concerned about separating the main Union army from Washington, President Lincoln agreed to the plan.

On 14 March the president limited McClellan's command to the Army of the Potomac and organized the remaining Union forces in eastern and central Virginia into the Departments of the Shenandoah and Rappahannock. The commanders of those departments, Generals McDowell and Banks, would report directly to the president. Lincoln wanted McClellan to focus on the Peninsula campaign and would rely on other generals to ensure that Washington was defended. On 17 March 1862, McClellan's Army of the Potomac began embarking for Fort Monroe.

By 21 April 1862, the Union forces were closer to Richmond and to ending the war than they would be for the next two-and-a-half years. While General McClellan's 105,000-strong Army of the Potomac was marching up the peninsula southeast of Richmond, General McDowell's approximately 32,000 soldiers at Aquia Creek, about ten miles north of the Rappahannock River, waited for orders to resume their advance on Richmond. President Lincoln had ordered McDowell to move on Richmond by way of Manassas Junction and Fredericksburg on 3 April, but Secretary Stanton modified those orders on 11 April when he made clear to McDowell that the protection of Washington took priority over the move south. Stanton further restricted McDowell on 23 April by ordering him not to advance across the Rappahannock.[3]

Meanwhile, in the Department of the Shenandoah, General Banks' contingent of 15,000 soldiers was marching south up the Shenandoah Valley with its lead elements in Harrisonburg. West of the valley, in the Mountain Department that had been established earlier, Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont's army of 8,000 was slowly moving east through the Allegheny passes into the upper valley near Staunton. Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker and his division of 7,000 soldiers of German descent were marching west from Warrenton Junction to reinforce Frémont.[4]

Banks and his corps had arrived in the Shenandoah Valley in February 1862 with the mission to protect Washington and defend the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Later that month McClellan, who then still commanded Banks, wired him to clear the valley of Confederate forces to forestall any attempt by the Confederates to move against Washington through the Blue

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Ridge Mountains. Banks was then to reunite his corps with the Army of the Potomac at Manassas Junction.

In late March Banks wired Washington that the Confederate forces had left the valley, and he put his corps in motion towards Manassas Junction. His opinion changed after 23 March, however, when General Jackson attacked Brig. Gen. James Shields' division at Kernstown, just south of Winchester. Although the battle was a clear victory for the North, it convinced Banks and his superiors that the Southerners were still in force in the valley. As a result, on 1 April McClellan notified Banks to drive Jackson up the valley and away from the Potomac River. That accomplished, his soldiers were to keep the Confederates away from the northern valley and the Blue Ridge Mountain passes.[5]

General Shields, one of Banks' more outspoken division commanders, wanted to accomplish more than just keeping Jackson away from the Potomac. He proposed to Secretary Stanton on 20 April that he take his and Blenker's divisions, along with the cavalry detachments of Brig. Gen. John T. Geary and Brig. Gen. Louis Abercrombie, and march on Richmond from the west. Stanton sent no reply to his proposal.[6]

West of the Shenandoah in the Mountain Department, General Frémont wanted to capture Knoxville, Tennessee. He suggested to President Lincoln on 21 April that his army move into the valley at Staunton, cut the railroad at Salem on the Roanoke River, and continue southwest toward Knoxville. Secretary Stanton approved Frémont's plan to capture the railroad but withheld final approval for taking Knoxville.[7]

For the Confederates, General Johnston's mission was to prevent the fall of Richmond while keeping the Southern army intact. To accomplish this, he had to keep his Army of Northern Virginia between General McClellan's Union army and Richmond, while simultaneously declining to fight a battle of attrition. Besides the forces he moved to face McClellan, Johnston commanded four small contingents in the Shenandoah and Rappahannock Valleys. Since McClellan's landing on the peninsula, he had had little time or energy to devote to the detachments and sent few messages to their commanders. He sent occasional communications to these elements by telegraph, but since there was no direct telegraph line between Johnston and the forces west of Gordonsville, most of his messages were routed through the

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Confederate War Department and the recently named General of Confederate Armies, Robert E. Lee.[8]

The outlying detachments, totaling 19,000 soldiers, opposed the 63,000 Union troops of Generals McDowell, Banks, and Frémont. Directly opposing Banks' move south was General Jackson's 6,000-man Army of the Valley, located at Conrad's Store (now Elkton) in the eastern valley. General Johnston's orders to Jackson were to prevent the Union forces in the valley from reinforcing General McClellan. Just south of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, 2,000 soldiers under the command of Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field warily watched McDowell's corps assemble on the opposite side of the river. On 21 April an additional 11,000 Confederate soldiers were marching to reinforce Field and his small command. About twenty miles west of Staunton, Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson and his two brigades of 2,800 soldiers each were camped on Shenandoah Mountain guarding the passes through the Allegheny Mountains against General Frémont and his army. The last detachment, comprising Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's division of 8,000, was stationed along the upper Rappahannock protecting the wide area between Field's and Jackson's forces. Ewell's division was the only Confederate element not directly facing Union forces and could thus assist either Jackson or Field as the need arose.[9]

Setting the Stage and Engendering Action

General Lee believed that with the disparity of numbers in Virginia all Confederate forces had to focus on the defense of Richmond. Both he and General Johnston realized that to save Richmond, the relative strengths of the Confederate and Union armies had to remain close. For this to occur, the Confederates either had to interrupt Union army reinforcements going to McClellan or mass every Southern soldier available to defend Richmond. In mid-April, when Lee looked at the forces arrayed in Virginia, he believed there was an opportunity for Jackson and Ewell to hinder the Federal forces located northwest of Richmond. On 21 April he wired the two commanders to suggest they attack the Union forces near them in an effort to relieve the pressure on Fredericksburg.[10]

Lee's message encouraged Jackson to look for options other than waiting for Banks to attack him. Jackson's reply on the twenty-third outlined a plan to attack Banks' flank at either Harrisonburg or New Market if the Federals continued their advance toward Staunton. Jackson also let Lee know that although he favored attacking, he believed this contrary to Johnston's guidance.[11]

General Lee saw the Confederate situation around Fredericksburg worsen as more Union troops massed on the north side of the Rappahannock. On 25 April he again queried Ewell and Jackson if either saw an opportunity to attack. More specifically, he asked Ewell if, when combined with Jackson or Field, he saw any possibility of striking the Union forces along the Rappahannock. Lee mentioned to Jackson that the Federals were moving more men toward Fredericksburg: "For this purpose they must weaken other points, and now is the time to concentrate on any that may be exposed within our reach." He recommended that Jackson consider striking McDowell's forces around Warrenton if he could not attack Banks. Realizing that the changing situation would not allow him to select the best opportunity, Lee wrote Jackson: "I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations depending on circumstances unknown to me and requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment as to time and execution."[12]

Although Lee was in contact with General Johnston daily by telegraph, he did not inform him of this series of messages between Lee, Jackson, and Ewell. Lee either felt it unnecessary to inform Johnston of his efforts to relieve the pressure on Fredericksburg or feared that Johnston might try to quash his efforts at encouraging Jackson or Ewell to attack the Federal forces opposite them.[13]

Putting on the Brakes and Yielding the Initiative

On 21 April, the same day Lee urged Jackson to strike, General Banks' Union columns were approaching Staunton. The Federal troops had been averaging three miles a day against Jackson's troops, watching them cautiously as they pulled back to the south and east. Although their pace was slow, it was still too fast for Secretary Stanton. Probably noting Jackson's main force sitting passively at Conrad's Store while the Union army marched past him down the western valley towards Staunton, the secretary of war wired Banks to congratulate him on the "activity and cautious vigor of his command," while at the same time admonishing

him not to let his column get too far from Winchester. On 25 April, when Banks reported his lead elements only eight miles from Staunton, Secretary Stanton stopped his move farther up the valley and informed him there was a good chance he would lose General Shields' division to General McDowell's command on the Rappahannock.[14]

At the time of Stanton's message, Banks' advance guard was outside Staunton, two brigades plus artillery were at Harrisonburg, one brigade was between Harrisonburg and New Market, and the remainder of his troops were at New Market. West of Staunton, General Frémont's lead brigade under Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy was slowly forcing General Edward Johnson's brigades back from the mountain passes.[15] Unwittingly, when Stanton halted Banks, he also prevented what Jackson feared most, Banks' merging with Frémont. If they had combined, Jackson and his army would have been reduced to watching the Union forces march freely up and down the valley.

Stymied by Stanton, Banks proposed on the twenty-eighth and again on the thirtieth to move his command against the Confederate forces to the east. He stated that Jackson had left the valley and that he believed that his forces were marching toward Gordonsville and Richmond. Banks offered to take his army and march through the Blue Ridge Mountains by way of either Luray or Madison, which would force Field to retreat from the Rappahannock. He hoped this would also enable the Federal forces to cut the rail line between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley.[16]

Additionally, this advance would have forced Jackson to pull back toward Richmond or risk being cut off in the valley. General Banks got his reply on 1 May. Instead of approving Banks' plan of march, Secretary Stanton directed him simply to send Shields' division to General McDowell and to pull his remaining units back to the area surrounding Strasburg. Banks' command now consisted of Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams' division of 8,000 soldiers, and his charge was not limited to protecting the lower valley and its railroad.[17]

Although Stanton must have believed he was correct to bolster the Union forces around Fredericksburg, his decision to remove Shields' division from Banks' command proved to be the cardinal error of the campaign. Both Banks and McDowell had reported that Jackson was moving out of the valley towards Richmond. With the Confederates gone, it would not appear cost-effective to keep 18,000 Federal soldiers in the valley to prevent small Confederate raids. What Shields' departure really did, however, was to leave Banks with barely enough strength to face Jackson alone, and against Jackson and Ewell combined he would be heavily outnumbered.

Within the Confederate lines, Jackson had watched Banks march up the valley turnpike into Harrisonburg. On 26 April, when Jackson thought Banks was about to attack his position, he called up Ewell's division. Jackson wanted Ewell's troops fresh, so he cautioned Ewell not to march his soldiers too hard. Ewell received another message the next day, telling him to continue his march to Swift Run Gap after his soldiers had rested.[18] Jackson may also have been considering executing an attack on Banks' flank, as he had earlier outlined to Lee.

During this period, sending a message from the Valley Army and receiving a response from Richmond required one-and-a-half to two days. There was no telegraph line through Swift Run Gap, so couriers carried the messages from Jackson's headquarters to Gordonsville, and from there they were telegraphed to Richmond. The couriers waited for a reply and then took it back to Conrad's Store. Often, messages passed one another in transit, confusing the recipients as to which question the answer pertained.

On 28 April Jackson wired Lee that he had called up Ewell's division. In the same message, he requested 5,000 reinforcements to join the attack on Banks. Lee wired back that there were no reinforcements to send. Additionally, Lee informed Jackson of the possibility of Ewell's being transferred to a more active front if Jackson did not attack soon.[19]

Like Stanton, Lee did not want to leave too many soldiers in an inactive theater. Both the North and South were looking at reducing the numbers of soldiers in and around the valley so they might participate in the critical phase of the campaign developing in the area between Fredericksburg, Richmond, and Williamsburg. Lee's message appears to have caused Jackson to review his available options. He faced much the same dilemma as did Banks. If Frémont joined Banks at Staunton, Jackson stood no chance of clearing the valley, even with Ewell's help. If Ewell left, his Valley Army would be outnumbered by either of the Union

columns. On the twenty-ninth Jackson offered Lee three offensive options for his Valley Army.

Jackson's first plan was to keep Ewell at Swift Run Gap to threaten Banks' rear while Jackson, combined with General Edward Johnson's brigade, attacked Frémont's forces west of Staunton. From there, they would march east, unite with Ewell's division, and defeat Banks. The second option, which he had earlier outlined to Lee, was to combine with Ewell to attack the Federal forces located just west of New Market. A successful attack, Jackson believed, would allow him to press forward, take New Market, and cut Banks off from his base of operations at Winchester. The third alternative was to march down past Luray toward Front Royal, cross the Shenandoah River, and threaten Winchester. Jackson preferred the first option, because it massed the combined Confederate strength against each Union detachment in turn and, unlike the latter options, did not require the Valley Army to cross either the Shenandoah River or Massanutten Mountain before launching its attack.[20]

General Ewell had also been receiving messages, not only from Lee, but also from Jackson, Field, and Johnston. His frustration with not knowing how to respond was apparent when he wired Lee on the thirtieth that "it seems important to me that the whole line, including the forces south of Fredericksburg (Generals Field and Anderson), should be under one general, authorized to combine them against any point deemed advisable. This does not seem the case at present."[21] Ewell wanted unity of command; he did not like the separate commands that were providing him conflicting guidance.

The Campaign

General Jackson did not wait for an answer before moving his army from Conrad's Store. Because of Banks' continued advance toward Staunton, Jackson must have decided he could no longer wait for Banks to come to him. On the afternoon of 30 April the Valley Army broke camp and began marching toward Port Republic. As its movement veered toward the Union positions near Harrisonburg, Banks reported he expected an attack, but then Jackson turned away and began to march east out of the valley. Rain began falling, and the army pressed on five miles in the mud. During the night, Ewell's division moved into the area around Conrad's Store and bedded down at the Valley Army's old campsite.[22]

Jackson received a reply to his options message while on the march. Lee left the selection up to Jackson and simply warned him not to waste his soldiers in operations that would not improve the overall situation.[23]

Accounts written after the battle maintain that Jackson had planned from the beginning to reinforce General Edward Johnson and to strike Frémont's lead brigade. Jackson's message to Ewell on 3 May throws doubt on that assumption, however. That message informed Ewell that their plan to turn Banks by way of New Market would not work as long as Federal forces remained strong there. The next day Ewell learned that Jackson was marching toward West View to assist General Johnson, who was being pushed back by General Milroy's brigade of Frémont's army.[24]

The Valley Army's route was circuitous and thus gave the impression the Confederates were deserting



General Jackson

the valley. The army headed south from Conrad's Store through Port Republic, crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains at Browns Gap, and continued south to Mechums River Depot. There, the soldiers boarded commandeered trains that took them back into the valley, and they arrived in Staunton on 4 May.[25]

Jackson confirmed on 6 May that Banks had halted his movement toward Staunton and was pulling back to Harrisonburg. He saw this as his opportunity to strike General Milroy's advance brigade near the hamlet of McDowell without having to worry about Banks' moving forward and trapping him in the mountains west of Staunton. Jackson ordered Edward Johnson and his brigades forward to attack Milroy and followed with the remainder of his army on the seventh.[26]

Milroy was not totally surprised when he discovered Jackson in Staunton. Banks had wired Frémont on 2 May, telling him he believed Jackson was moving towards either Waynesboro or Staunton and that Jackson might attack Milroy. Frémont voiced Banks' concerns to Milroy on the fourth, but Milroy was skeptical that Jackson would attack with Banks' army in his rear. If attacked, he planned to call on Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck's brigade located at Franklin.[27]

First contact between the two forces occurred on the afternoon of 7 May, when Milroy's artillery shelled Johnson's lead brigade as it marched along the Chambersburg-Parkersburg turnpike. Milroy pulled his forces back to McDowell and wired for help.[28]

Schenck, receiving the call, marched his brigade an incredible thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours, arriving at McDowell by 1000 hours on the eighth. As the senior of the two generals, Schenck assumed command. It was obvious to the Union generals that an attack was coming, and it was just as clear that their small force could not stop it; so, rather than waiting for the Confederates to attack, Schenck gained tactical surprise by striking first.

The outcome was never in question because of the disparity in numbers—2,268 Federal troops to 6,000 Confederate—but the Union attack so disorganized the Confederates that Schenck's and Milroy's forces were able to break away and march unhampered back toward Franklin. Although the Confederates had been on the defensive, their casualties were higher—498 versus 256 for the Union. Nevertheless, with the Federal forces in retreat, Jackson wired the Confederate high command that "God blessed our arms with victory."[29]

Jackson's troops pursued the soldiers of Milroy and Schenck north toward Franklin, with the Confederates marching through woods set ablaze by the retreating Federal troops. Jackson sent his topographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, and a troop of cavalry to search for a way through the Alleghenies and to block the mountain roads between Franklin and Staunton. He wanted to find a route that would allow his army to get behind Banks' army and to prevent Banks from uniting with Frémont.

Jackson's troops were arrayed outside Franklin by 10 May. Schenck expected their attack on the eleventh, but it did not come. Federal forces continued to arrive, and by 12 May there were 15,000 Union soldiers in Franklin, almost double the number in Jackson's besieging force.[30]

Jackson received two messages on 12 May that hastened his army's return to the valley. The first, from Johnston through Lee, instructed him to return to the valley and attack Banks if possible. The second message, from Ewell, informed him that Shields was marching east to join General McDowell's corps at Catlett's Station southwest of Manassas. That afternoon, the Valley Army began marching back towards the hamlet of McDowell. Before his departure, Jackson wrote Ewell that he believed Banks would unite with General Frémont rather than with General McDowell, but as a contingency Jackson instructed Ewell to follow Banks if the Federals did pull back.[31]

Frémont's adjutant notified the War Department on 13 May that Jackson was on his way back into the valley. The Valley Army arrived in McDowell on the fourteenth and continued its march toward Staunton.[32]

Meanwhile, Banks, attempting to carry out Secretary Stanton's order of 1 May, was pulling back as slowly as he had moved forward. His soldiers did not like withdrawing. Some felt that because of their reduced numbers they were acting as decoys to trap the Confederate forces. General Williams wrote his daughter about his chagrin over "marching back, like a retreating force, over the same ground that we had driven the Rebels before us, and . . . that without a gun being fired or a man killed."[33]

It appears that Secretary Stanton became concerned about leaving Banks exposed well up the Shenandoah Valley the day after he informed Banks of

Shields' departure. He instructed Shields on 2 May not to join McDowell until Banks was in position at Strasburg, but he gave no additional guidance on how to implement his instructions. Banks and Shields were both confused about who was to pull back first. With the Union forces arrayed along the valley turnpike from Harrisonburg north to Strasburg, Banks warned Stanton that too much distance between the withdrawing forces might bring defeat in detail. Despite this confusion, all Federal soldiers were out of Harrisonburg and consolidated at New Market by 5 May.[34]

On 6 May, while his troops rested, Banks wired Secretary Stanton to ask which of the two forces, his or Shields', would pull back first to Strasburg. He received no answer, but the War Department did notify General McDowell to prepare to move toward Richmond. McDowell then sent two telegrams, the first to the War Department, asking where Shields was, and the second to Shields, telling him to speed up his march. Again, there was no answer from the War Department. Banks wired Stanton again on the seventh, informing him his division was ready to move. Stanton did not answer any of these messages because he had gone to Fort Monroe with President Lincoln.[35]

The president and his secretary of war had taken personal charge of the military departments around Washington in March. Now, when the two leaders visited General McClellan on the peninsula, they forgot those departments. For six days, from 2 to 8 May, Stanton sent no messages to Federal commanders in the valley. On 8 May Stanton passed to Banks and McDowell a peninsula rumor that the Confederates were sending a large force toward the Rappahannock and Shenandoah Rivers to attack Washington. This message worried McDowell, who, believing the enemy was massing in front of him, again wired Shields to move his division quickly.[36]

Stanton sent a flurry of messages on the ninth, after he had returned to Washington and realized that Banks and Shields were in almost the same positions in which he had left them on the second. He ordered Banks to release Shields to McDowell and to draw back his own forces to Strasburg immediately. In response to Stanton's telegram, Frémont wired that the withdrawal of Banks had allowed Jackson to concentrate against him. Banks agreed and pointed out that Jackson now would concentrate against any small force in the valley. In a letter to his cavalry commander, Brig. Gen. John Geary, who was also being assigned to McDowell, Banks complained that the government's policy was allowing the "grand army of the rebels" to escape and adding another year to the war.

By 13 May Banks' main column was in Strasburg and Shields' division was near Front Royal, preparing to board trains for McDowell's corps. With Shields gone, Banks had less than 9,000 troops in the valley; of these 7,000 were in Strasburg, another 1,000 were at Front Royal, and scattered detachments were stationed along the Manassas Gap Railroad.[37]

During the time Banks' forces were pulling back to Strasburg, General Ewell continued to receive suggestions from Lee and instructions from Jackson. On 8 May, as the pressure mounted on Fredericksburg, Lee informed Ewell that he saw no reason for his division to remain so far west and suggested he move it either to Gordonsville or to the Rappahannock. Ewell wired back that he was under orders from Jackson not to leave the valley unless Banks did.[38]

One of the messages from Ewell or Jackson must have reached General Johnston, who now learned what was going on with his outlying detachments. Wiring Lee on the eighth, Johnston complained that he controlled only those parts of his command that were nearby. He protested that he did not have any means of receiving information from the other commanders in his department and that Lee had provided him with none. Lee rather disingenuously answered that Johnston had not asked that information be forwarded to him. Johnston then wired Lee that he was either in command of the far-flung elements or he should be relieved of their responsibility.[39]

As the historian Douglas S. Freeman has observed, the Confederate leaders were working at cross purposes. Both Johnston and Lee had as their ultimate objective the defense of Richmond, but the two generals were trying to use the same resources to achieve different intermediate goals. Johnston wanted concentration at Richmond, meeting mass with mass, while Lee was focusing on how to keep the Union forces at Fredericksburg from uniting with McClellan. His messages to Ewell and Brig. Gen. Joseph Anderson, who in late April had superseded Field in command of the Confederate forces south of Fredericksburg, show that he had almost abandoned the strategic option of

Jackson and Ewell concentrating against Banks and now looked at a more workable arrangement. When Jackson left the valley in pursuit of Frémont, Lee felt Ewell would be more useful supporting Anderson and Field, thus demonstrating that the bond between Lee and Jackson was not so strong as to deter Lee from pursuing his own solutions to the dilemma facing the Confederates near Fredericksburg. As the pressure on Fredericksburg mounted, Lee urged Anderson to mount an attack against the Union forces gathering there.[40]

On 13 May, after a three-week lapse in his correspondence with Jackson and Ewell, General Johnston notified Ewell that he had recalled Jackson to the valley and wanted the two forces to unite and attack Banks if possible. In the event Banks moved east to support McDowell, Ewell was instructed to leave Jackson, march east, and unite with either the Confederate army on the peninsula or General Anderson at Fredericksburg.[41]

It is commonly assumed that prior to 20 May Jackson planned to attack Banks through the eastern valley. His messages to Ewell, however, indicate otherwise. Jackson sent Ewell a message on 17 May, telling him to have his division at New Market in the western valley by the twenty-first and to try to find a route over Massanutten Mountain from Luray to Edenburg. Jackson's first choice was an attack through the western valley, but he held open the option of attacking Banks through Front Royal. Ewell in turn forwarded Johnston's message of the thirteenth to Jackson. Since it appeared that Shields was leaving the valley to join McDowell and that Ewell was interpreting his instructions from Johnston to require him to march east in this situation, Jackson could see his plan of uniting with Ewell against Banks coming to naught. Jackson immediately wrote Johnston, explaining that Ewell's departure would upset his scheme to attack Banks and that he was continuing to pursue his plan, pending further word from Johnston.[42]

When Jackson met with Ewell at Mount Solon on 18 May, he had not yet received a reply from Johnston. Ewell was in a dilemma. He was under instructions from Johnston to march his division toward Gordonsville if Banks moved east, yet believed himself still under Jackson's command. Jackson wrote Ewell a letter stating that, as long as he was in the valley, he remained under his command and that, unless advised differently, Ewell was to obey Jackson's orders. The command problem thus solved, the generals sat down and planned the next phase.

The Confederate generals saw the Union army split into four parts at the same time the Confederate forces were concentrating. Frémont's army was still at Franklin on the other side of the Allegheny Mountains. McDowell's command was at Fredricksburg, and Shields' division, released from the valley, was moving east to join him. Banks and his one remaining division were immediately to their front at Strasburg and Front Royal. Against any of these separate Federal detachments, Jackson and Ewell could engage 16,000 Confederate soldiers. Banks was their target. Jackson directed Ewell to bring his division north of New Market in the western valley by the night of 21 May.[43]

The Valley Army marched on 19 May, passing through Harrisonburg and stopping on the twentieth just short of New Market, where Brig. Gen. Richard Taylor's Louisiana Brigade, an element of Ewell's command, joined it. Jackson had ordered this brigade to join the Valley Army there. The Louisianians had been camped west of the Shenandoah River and south of Massanutten Mountain, several miles from Ewell's headquarters at Conrad's Store. Jackson now sent Ewell another message, changing his orders of the previous day. He instructed Ewell to move his contingent farther up the western valley and to establish camp north of Mount Jackson.[44]

Ewell halted his march at Luray on 19 May after receiving a new telegram from Johnston that told him that an attack against an entrenched Banks was too risky and that instead ordered his division to move east while Jackson would stay merely to observe Banks. Taylor, now separated from Ewell, did not receive the message to move east. Johnston's message was dated 17 May, the day before Ewell's meeting with Jackson. Seeing no option but to obey Johnston's orders, Ewell forwarded the message to Jackson and prepared to move east. When informed of the telegram, Jackson again saw his attack plan thwarted. This time, rather than again appealing to Johnston, he wired General Lee: "I am of [the] opinion that an attempt should be made to defeat Banks, but under instructions just received from General Johnston I do not feel at liberty to make an attack. Please answer by telegraph at once."[45]

Lee did not respond. General Johnston had sent two messages to Jackson on 18 May, both addressing Jackson's telegram of the seventeenth and advocating that Jackson attack Banks if possible. The messages further defined the Valley Army's mission to keep Banks from joining General McDowell. One or both messages may have passed through Lee's office. Jackson received both the night of the twentieth.[46]

Capt. John Imboden was at the telegraph station when the first message came in. He described the message in substance as follows, "If you think you can beat Banks, attack him. I only intended by my orders to caution you against attacking fortifications."[47]

The Valley Army continued its march down the valley on 21 May. Johnston's warning against attacking Banks in entrenchments and his hope that the Valley Army could keep Banks from reinforcing McDowell forced Jackson to reconsider his plans. Now, instead of marching from Harrisonburg through New Market to Strasburg as planned, the army turned right at New Market and headed across the Massanutten to Luray. Jackson decided to move down the eastern valley to Front Royal only after Johnston had warned him not to attack Banks in his entrenchments. Jackson overrode his initial judgment when he attacked through the eastern valley, as he understood full well the risks involved in attacking across a river, but he also knew that even if his attack did not succeed, this move would keep Banks away from McDowell by severing the Manassas Gap Railroad.

At Luray, the remainder of Ewell's Division joined the Valley Army, bringing its strength to more than 16,000 men and 40 cannon. The march continued north, and by the afternoon of 22 May the Valley Army was just ten miles south of Front Royal, a town held by only 1,000 Federal troops.[48]

Banks knew that Jackson was coming; although he did not know when, he believed he knew where. In messages to Stanton, Banks predicted that Jackson would come down the valley west of Massanutten Mountain. Banks realized that since he had pulled back from New Market the way was open for Jackson to consolidate with Ewell, and he warned Stanton that the disparity in strength between his force and Jackson's combined army invited a Confederate offensive against Strasburg. Before the attack on Front Royal he wrote, "I regard it as certain that [Jackson] will move north as far as New Market, a position which commands the mountain gap and the roads into the Department of the Rappahannock, and enables him also to cooperate with General Ewell." Far from being a bumbler as he was frequently portrayed, Banks realized that he was in trouble, but he could not get Washington to understand his predicament.[49]

The Valley Army began its final march before battle in the early morning of the twenty-third with Ewell's division leading. While the infantry marched, Jackson's cavalry struck Buckton Station, between Front Royal and Strasburg, and the Manassas Gap Railroad west of Front Royal; this cut off the Front Royal garrison from the Federal forces at Strasburg and Winchester.

Col. John Kenly, the Federal commander at Front Royal, counted 1,000 soldiers of his 1st Maryland Volunteer Infantry Regiment (U.S.) in his garrison. Upon identifying the defenders as Marylanders, Jackson ordered his own newly formed 1st Maryland Infantry (C.S.) to attack. The fight on the east side of the Shenandoah was short—hopelessly outnumbered, Kenly withdrew his regiment over the bridges crossing the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. As Kenly's men pulled back, they set both the North and South Fork bridges on fire, hoping to prevent the pursuing Confederates from crossing. The lead Confederate brigade, however, rushed through the burning embers and began putting out the fires, while the Confederate cavalry, along with Jackson and his staff, continued the attack.

When the Federal troops began forming another line of battle on the hill west of Front Royal, Jackson ordered Col. Thomas Flourney's cavalry to attack the Union troops. There were four times as many Federal infantry as there were Confederate cavalry, but the mass and speed of the attack shattered the Union line and resulted in a total rout. The final casualty figure for Kenly's regiment was 32 killed, 122 wounded, and 750 captured, while Confederate casualties were less than 100. About 90 Union soldiers made it back to Banks' lines at Strasburg.[50] With the capture of Front Royal, Banks' force had shrunk to 6,000, just one-third the size of Jackson's Valley Army.

Initially, General Banks disbelieved the eyewitness reports on Confederate strength. As more survivors of the Front Royal garrison made it back to the

General Banks

entrenchments at Strasburg and told their stories, however, Banks concluded that Ewell was on his left flank and Jackson to his front.[51]

There was little time for Banks to ponder his next move before he would be faced with a much larger Confederate army between him and his base at Winchester. Banks saw that he had three choices: stay in Strasburg and possibly have his entire army captured; retreat along the Strasburg-Moorefield Road and seek refuge with Frémont; or retreat the eighteen miles to Winchester with his flanks exposed to an attack by Ewell. Banks quickly discarded the first option, recognizing that he could not hold Strasburg against the combined force of Jackson and Ewell. Banks' second choice was probably the safest alternative for his combat units, but it would have left his wagon trains at Strasburg and the supplies at Winchester open to capture. He chose to retreat to Winchester and notified his commanders on the night of the twenty-third to prepare to pull back. Less than six hours later, at 0300, a twelve-mile-long column of Union wagons began to roll down the turnpike.[52]

On the morning of 24 May Jackson, unsure of Banks' intentions, began probing the Union positions east of Strasburg with General Taylor's Louisiana Brigade and Col. Turner Ashby's cavalry regiment. The Union main body had cleared Middletown when the Confederates made contact with Banks' rear guard. Jackson believed for a time that he had intercepted Banks' main body and sent a message to Ewell telling him not to move closer to Winchester. When Jackson learned that the Federals engaging him were the rear guard, he sent a hurried message to Ewell, ordering him to move on Winchester in the hope that he might cut Banks off. The running battle between Taylor's brigade and the Union rear guard on the valley turnpike continued to Newtown and beyond before Banks' column was able to break contact with the Confederates. By nightfall, Banks' command was concentrated on the hills south of Winchester.[53]

General Jackson pushed his troops towards Winchester through the night and by daybreak on 25 May had his army of 15,000 weary soldiers facing General Banks' equally exhausted 6,000. The battle began as the sun broke through the morning fog, but it did not develop as Jackson expected. The Stonewall Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Charles Winder, made the initial attack, driving Banks' men from a prominent hill on left flank of the Union defenses; then with the sound of cannon echoing through the fog, General Ewell launched the brigades of Brig. Gen. Isaac Trimble and Col. John Campbell at the Union center. When this attack stalled, Jackson sent the Louisiana Brigade into the attack on the Federals' far right flank. With pressure coming from three sides, the Northern line collapsed. Banks' troops broke away from the assaulting Confederate infantry and raced north through Winchester toward Maryland. Jackson's exhausted men could not keep pace, and the Federals pulled away from the Valley Army virtually unmolested. At Winchester, unlike Front Royal, Jackson's cavalry was not available when needed, and the pursuit was attempted only by a few infantrymen mounted on artillery horses. During the course of 25 May 1862, Banks and his troops retreated over thirty miles to Williamsport, Maryland.[54]

On 24 May, after learning of Jackson's attack on

Front Royal, President Lincoln expressed concern about Jackson's rampage in the valley and worried about the Army of the Potomac's isolation from Washington. He sent telegrams to Generals Frémont and McDowell, putting into motion a plan to capture the Valley Army. Lincoln ordered Frémont to enter the valley by way of Harrisonburg and attack Jackson. The telegram to McDowell canceled his march on Richmond and instructed him to send 20,000 soldiers into the Shenandoah Valley to capture Jackson and Ewell. Lincoln told McDowell to try to coordinate his movements with Frémont, although he believed McDowell had enough soldiers to defeat Jackson by himself.[55]

At 1700 hours on 24 May 1862, the day before the battle at Winchester, General Jackson had won the Valley campaign. President Lincoln's perception of Jackson's threat to Washington was such that, rather than allow McDowell to continue his march south towards Richmond and the potentially war-ending struggle being waged there, the president directed him west into the valley to pursue a subsidiary campaign against Jackson. Later on the night of 24 May McDowell wired President Lincoln in dismay, arguing that Jackson would be gone by the time his soldiers got to the valley. McDowell concluded, "I shall gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here." McDowell told Brig. Gen. James Wadsworth, the commander of the Washington garrison: "If the enemy army can succeed so readily in disconcerting all our plans by alarming us first at one point, then at another, he will paralyze a large force with a very small one." Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, who was with McDowell's army at Falmouth, also questioned the move, suggesting it would be better for McDowell to isolate Jackson from Richmond by capturing Charlottesville.[56] Twenty-five May ended with Jackson and his troops resting at Winchester, Banks' soldiers crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and Frémont and McDowell's forces preparing to move their commands into the Shenandoah Valley to confront Jackson.

Conclusion

The Valley campaign proved eminently successful to the Confederate cause on both the strategic and operational levels. Jackson's efforts not only successfully engaged all the Federal forces in the valley but also diverted substantial potential reinforcements from



President Lincoln

General McClellan. When the time came to fight the battles around Richmond, the Union superiority in manpower was 105,000 to 78,000 (or roughly 4:3), rather than the 137,000 to 68,000 (or roughly 2:1) disparity the Confederates might have faced.[57]

The campaign in the valley was not a matter of two generals fighting one another without direction from higher command. The following sequence of decisions made by leaders outside the valley decisively influenced the events that transpired there:

1) Secretary Stanton's message of 25 April stopped General Banks from occupying Staunton. Had Banks continued to Staunton, Confederate General Edward Johnson would have had to withdraw from the mountain passes or be crushed between Generals Banks and Frémont.

2) Stanton's orders of 1 and 8 May forced General Banks to send General Shields' division to General McDowell's command. Without the diversion of Shields, Banks probably would have had sufficient men to handle the forces of Jackson and Ewell combined.

3) A later message from Stanton called on Banks to pull back to Strasburg. Had Banks remained at the strategic town of New Market, Jackson could not as easily have united with Ewell for an attack on Banks.

4) General Lee proposed on 5 May that General Ewell join with Generals Field and Anderson at Fredericksburg. Had Ewell acquiesced, Jackson would not have had enough manpower to attack Banks. Lee, however, was looking for a diversion to keep McDowell away from Richmond, and he did not care from whence it came.

5) Johnston instructed Jackson not to assault Banks in his entrenchments at Strasburg. Had Jackson continued up the western valley, he might have been unable to carry a frontal attack against Banks. Instead, Jackson detoured east of Massanutten Mountain, accepting the risk that the garrison at Front Royal might burn the bridges over the Shenandoah River before the Valley Army crossed. Even had he failed to cross the Shenandoah, however, Jackson would have successfully accomplished his mission by cutting the railroad between Banks and McDowell.

6) Nevertheless, *all the above would have been moot had President Lincoln not issued instructions sending McDowell into the valley after Jackson.* The true significance of the campaign lay in this diversion of McDowell's corps into the valley and away from a linkup with McClellan outside Richmond. On 23 May the immediate military outlook for the Confederacy appeared dire. General McClellan's troops could see the church spires of Richmond, and General McDowell's corps was pressing south from Fredericksburg. To prevent the two Union armies from uniting, General Johnston was preparing to launch a desperate attack across Chicahominy Creek against McClellan's entrenched right wing. Only the realization that McDowell had reversed his march halted the Confederate assault and its almost certain defeat.[58]

General Banks' comments made before the engagement at Front Royal that Lincoln and Stanton's actions in the valley went far towards prolonging the life of the Confederacy are justified. The history of the United States would be dramatically different had the Civil War ended in 1862.

Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Robert S. Rush served in ranger, light, and mechanized infantry units and at every organizational level from squad to army. While assigned to the Center of Military History in 1995–1996, he provided historical assistance to the Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremism, and he subsequently assisted the Advisory Panel on Sexual Harassment. Currently a Ph.D. candidate in military history at Ohio State University, he has been awarded a CMH dissertation year fellowship.

NOTES

1. U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 107; pt. 1, p. 523 (hereafter cited as *OR* with series and volume numbers).

2. Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations, Directed, During the Late War Between the States, by Joseph E. Johnston, General, C.S.A.* (1874; reprint ed., Bloomington, Ind., 1959), pp. 106, 131; Vincent J. Esposito, ed., *West Point Atlas of American Wars*, 2 vols. (New York, 1959), vol. 1, map 50. The Union forces counted in the above tally consist of McClellan's army (105,000) plus Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell's corps (30,000), without the addition of Shields' division. Confederate forces include the 60,000 troops of the Confederate Army in and around Richmond.

3. Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography*, 4 vols. (New York, 1934–35), 2: 32; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 39, 66.

4. Esposito, *Atlas of American Wars*, vol. 1, map 50; James S. Pula, *The History of a German-Polish Civil War Brigade* (San Francisco, 1976), p. 10.

5. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 164–65; 234–35; pt. 3, pp. 15–16, 27.

6. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 94–95.

7. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 7; pt. 3, p. 104.

8. Esposito, *Atlas of American Wars*, vol. 1, map 50; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 5, p. 1099; Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, pp. xvii, 74; Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, 2: 32.

9. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, pp. 106, 110; Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, 3 vols. (New York, 1942–44), 1: 336; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 11, pt. 3, p. 458.

10. Clifford Dowdey, ed., *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee* (Boston, 1961), p. 174; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 111–12, 118–19, 859–60.

11. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 862–63.

12. Dowdey, *Papers of Lee*, pp. 155–57; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 865–66, with the quotations on p. 866.
13. Dowdey, *Papers of Lee*, pp. 155–58. Between 21 and 25 April Lee sent three messages to Johnston, none commenting on either Jackson or Ewell.
14. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 105–07, with the quotation on p. 105.
15. Ibid., pp. 106–07, 110, 119.
16. Ibid., pp. 111–12, 118–19.
17. Ibid., pp. 50, 122.
18. Ibid., pp. 869–70.
19. Ibid., pp. 870–71; Dowdey, *Papers of Lee*, pp. 160–61.
20. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 872.
21. Ibid., p. 876.
22. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 878.
23. Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer* (Dallas, 1973), pp. 34–35.
24. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 878–79; William Allen, "Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862," *Southern Historical Society Papers* 7 (January 1879): 14–15; David G. Martin, *Jackson's Valley Campaign, November 1861–June 1862* (Bryn Mawr, Pa., 1988), pp. 61–62.
25. Robert L. Dabney, *Life and Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. Jackson* (New York, 1866), pp. 338–39; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, p. 36.
26. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 881–82; pt. 1, pp. 470–71.
27. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 126, 133, 137.
28. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 465; pt. 3, p. 141.
29. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 141, 146; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, p. 350; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 470–76, with the quotation on p. 470.
30. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 473; pt. 3, pp. 173, 181, 184; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 352–53; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, pp. 43–45.
31. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 473; pt. 3, pp. 888–89; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 352–53.
32. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 184; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, p. 45.
33. Milo M. Quaife, ed., *From the Cannon's Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus S. Williams* (Detroit, 1959), pp. 73–74, with the quotation on p. 74.
34. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 125, 129, 135.
35. Ibid., pp. 136–38, 140, 884–85.
36. Ibid., pp. 142, 144.
37. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 523–24; pt. 3, pp. 154–55, with the quoted words on p. 154.
38. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 884–85.
39. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 11, pt. 3, pp. 499–500, 506, 510.
40. Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, 2: 34; *OR*, ser 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 867, 881, 883–84, 885–86, 896–97.
41. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 888.
42. G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, 2 vols. (New York, 1898), 1: 236; Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, 3 vols. (New York, 1944), 1: 366; Robert G. Tanner, *Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862* (Garden City, N.Y., 1976), p. 198; Frank E. Vandiver, *Mighty Stonewall* (1957, reprint ed., College Station, Tex., 1992), pp. 237–38; Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War* (New York, 1994), p. 25; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 894–95.
43. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 897. The books cited in note 42 either leave out Jackson's instructions to Ewell or do not explain why Jackson, in a face-to-face conversation with Ewell, ordered Ewell to move his division west of Massanutten Mountain. The strengths of the Union detachments were Frémont with 15,000; McDowell with 30,000; Shields with 11,000; and Banks 8,000.
44. Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War* (New York, 1879), p. 48; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, p. 46; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 359–60; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 898.
45. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 896–98, with the quotation on p. 898.
46. Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, pp. 46-47; Tanner, *Stonewall*, pp. 201–02.
47. John Imboden, "Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley," in Robert U. Johnson and C. C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4 vols. (1884–1888, reprint ed., New York, 1956), 2: 288.
48. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 536–37, 555–58, 702–03, 733–34; Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, pp. 50–51; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 364–68.
49. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 524–27, with the quotation on p. 524; Fred H. Harrington, *Fighting Politician: Major General N. P. Banks* (Philadelphia,

1948), castigates Banks for being an unskilled political general and faults Banks for his role in the Valley campaign. Banks had served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and governor of Massachusetts in the years prior to the war.

50. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 536–37, 555–58, 702–03, 733–34; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 365–68.

51. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 525–26.

52. Ibid., pp. 527–28, 546–47.

53. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 546–49, 614–16, 703–04; pt. 3, p. 899.

54. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 527, 549–52, 595–98, 616–18, 705–06, 736–37.

55. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 219; pt. 1, p. 643.

56. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 220, 221, 229, with the quotations on pp. 220 and 221.

57. The first numbers represent McClellan's army (105,000) without McDowell's reinforcing corps (40,000) versus Johnston (Lee) (60,000) supplemented by Jackson and Ewell (18,000 together). The second set comprises McClellan plus McDowell (less Shields' division of 8,000) versus Johnston (Lee) plus Ewell (8,000), but without Jackson. See Esposito, *Atlas of American Wars*, maps 42 and 51.

58. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, p. 131; Gustavus W. Smith, *The Battle of Seven Pines* (New York, 1891), p. 14.

Call for Papers: June 2000 Conference of Army Historians

The Center of Military History is soliciting papers for the June 2000 biennial Conference of Army Historians. The theme of the conference will be "The Korean War." Papers may address the background, conduct, or impact of the war. The conference organizers are seeking papers relating to all aspects of military operations in Korea, including the impact of military and civilian leaders, the contributions of various branches and organizations in the Army, the roles of other U.S. military services, and the operations of the military forces of other nations. Discussions of the diplomatic and political context of the war are also welcome. A secondary focus of the conference will be the Cold War, and the Center is particularly interested in papers addressing the impact of the Korean War on other facets of the Cold War.

The conference will be held on 6–8 June 2000 in metropolitan Washington, D.C. Prospective participants should send their proposed paper topics to by mail to Dr. William Stivers, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FPF, 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058 or by electronic mail to stivewa@hqda.army.mil. Further information may be obtained by calling Dr. Stivers at 202-685-2729.

Center of Military History News

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