



American Occupation
of
Germany




The American "Watch on the Rhine"

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917-1919

American Occupation of Germany

Volume 11



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UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919

Volume 1	Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 2	Policy-forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 3	Training and Use of American Units With the British and French
Volume 4–9	Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 10	The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents
Volume 11	American Occupation of Germany
Volume 12–15	Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services
Volume 16	General Orders, GHQ, AEF
Volume 17	Bulletins, GHQ, AEF

FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . , [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army's historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War*, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army's months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of "the war to end all wars." Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C.
1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

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MEMORANDUM:

With this volume, the publication of *selected* documents is completed. Volumes 12 to 15 inclusive will contain the final reports of the Commander in Chief, the Staff sections, and the Arms and Services of the American Expeditionary Forces. These will be printed without modification of any kind. This same treatment will be accorded the publication of the General Orders and Bulletins issued at General Pershing's Headquarters, Vols. 16 and 17.

No documents dealing with the activities of American forces in Siberia or North Russia have been selected for publication since all such records were still classified and not available for general use at the time this publication project was initiated.

Robert S. Thomas
Editor

American Occupation
of
Germany

THE AMERICAN THIRD ARMY

Preface

ORGANIZATION, ASSEMBLY, AND ADVANCE TO THE RHINE

On Nov. 7, 1918 the American Third Army was officially established by orders from GHQ, AEF. The III Corps, consisting of the 2d, 32d, and 42d Divisions; the IV Corps, consisting of the 1st, 3d, and 4th Divisions; and certain army troops were designated for duty with the Third Army. On Nov. 15, 1918, at Ligny-en-Barrois, the formal organization of Third Army Headquarters took place, Major General Dickman assuming command.

On Nov. 17, 1918 the advance elements began crossing the Armistice line with the two corps in line, abreast on the army front, the IV Corps on the right. The French Tenth Army, on the right of the American Third Army, and the French Fifth Army on its left, advanced abreast of the American Army.

During the period November 17/20 the army was engaged in its march to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. On November 21 and 22 it advanced through the Grand Duchy, arriving at the Luxemburg-German frontier on November 23, where it remained in position until November 30. On Dec. 1, 1918 advance elements of the army crossed the Luxemburg-German frontier. The march through the Rhineland continued until December 12, when it was halted along the west bank of the Rhine River.

Throughout the following text, many place names occur which admit of two or more spellings. This depends upon whether or not the map consulted is a French or German print. For the convenience of the reader, the following table lists the spellings by nationalities.

French

GANDRANGE
THIONVILLE
MALLING
REDANGE
SAARELOUIS
VOLMERANGE
MONDERCANGE
AUDUN-le-TICHE
SARRALBE
CATTENOM
SURE [River]
TREVES
CASSEL
MAYENCE
STRASBOURG
COBLENCE
COLOGNE
EVRANGE
CANACH
HAYANGE

German

GANDRINGEN
DIEDENHOFEN
MALLINGEN
REDINGEN
SAARLOUIS
WOLLMERINGEN
MONNERICH
DEUTSCH-OTH
SAARALBEN
KATTENHOFEN
SAUER
TRIER
KASSEL
MAINZ
STRASSBURG STRASZBURG
COBLENZ or KOBLENZ
KOLN
EWRINGEN
KANACH
HAYINGEN

French

BURMERANGE
GAVISSE
AIX-la-CHAPELLE
BERNCASTEL
ALGRANGE
NILVANGE
KNUTANGE
LOMMERANGE
ROUSSY-le-VILLAGE
ROUSSY-le-BOURG
HAUTE-PARTHE
BASSE-PARTHE
SANEM
CLEMENCY
CONZ
ERFT [River]
CUES
COCHEM
TROINE
CLOTTEN
CASSEL

German

BURMERINGEN
GAUWEIS
AACHEN
BERNKASTEL
ALGRINGEN
NILVINGEN
KNEUTTINGEN
LOMMERINGEN
RUTTGEN
BURG-RUTTGEN
OBER-PARTH
NEIDER-PARTH
SASSENHEIM
KNUTZIG
KONZ
URFT
KUES
KOCHEM
TROTTE
KLOTTEN
KASSEL

GHQ, AEF: Orders

Organization of Third Army

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 198

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
November 7, 1918.

I. In accordance with authority contained in War Department Cablegram 743-R, the Third Army, A. E. F., is organized as indicated hereinafter, to take effect this date.

II. The Third Army, A. E. F., will consist of the following organizations:

A. Headquarters:

Commander - Major Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, U. S. A. (Temporary).

General Staff:

Chief of Staff - Brig. Gen. Malin Craig, G. S.

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1 - Col. James A. Logan, Jr., G. S.

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2 - Col. Richard H. Williams, G. S.

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3 - (To be designated later).

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4 - Lieut. Col. James H. Perkins, G. S.

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5 - (To be designated later).

Chief of Artillery - (To be designated later).

Administrative and Technical Services:

Adjutant General - (To be designated later).

Inspector General - Col. A. C. Read, I. G.

Judge Advocate - Lieut. Col. Kyle Rucker, J. A.

Chief Quartermaster - (To be designated later).

Chief Surgeon - (To be designated later).

Chief Engineer - Col. Jay J. Morrow, C. of E.
Chief Signal Officer - (To be designated later).
Chief Ordnance Officer - (To be designated later).
Chief of Air Service - (To be designated later).
Chief of Motor Transport Service - (To be designated later).
Chief of Chemical Warfare Service - (To be designated later).
Provost Marshal - (To be designated later).
Headquarters Troop - (To be designated later).

Such assistants as may be necessary will be designated in orders of the Third Army.

III. The staff officers mentioned in Sec. II above, other than the Chief of Staff, will report for duty as soon as state of operations permits. Brig. Gen. Malin Craig will report at these headquarters not later than November 13, 1918.

By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

193-12: Letter

Operations of American Third Army

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
November 14, 1918.

From: The Chief of Staff

To: The Commanding General, American First Army
The Commanding General, American Second Army

1. For your information and guidance there is enclosed a copy of a letter of instructions and certain documents which have been sent the Commanding General, Third Army.
2. It is desired that you arrange directly with the Commanding General, Third Army, all details concerning the assistance (outlined in the letter to the Commanding General, Third Army), which you are charged with giving to that army.
3. Your attention is especially invited to paragraphs 2 and 6 of the letter to the Commanding General, Third Army.

J. W. McANDREW,
Major General, General Staff.

From: The Chief of Staff

To: The Commanding General, American Third Army

Subject: Instructions for operations in connection with Armistice

1. Your army is designated for duty in connection with occupying the territory to be evacuated by the German forces.

2. The III and IV Army Corps Staffs and troops (less artillery), and the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 32d and 42d Divs. are assigned to your army. The 66th F. A. Brigade; the 322d Field Signal Bn. now on duty with the I Corps; the 51st Telegraph Bn. now on duty with the VII Corps; and the 417th Telegraph Bn. now on duty with the VI Corps are also assigned to your army as army troops. Other army troops will be assigned from time to time as the necessities of the service demand.

The command of all these troops passes to you at 5 hours on Nov. 17, 1918. The First and Second Armies will comply with any requests which you may make directly to them for movement of the troops mentioned prior to the passing of command.

The First and Second Armies will also assist you in all matters of supply until such time as you are able to dispense with such assistance.

3. The limits between the Group of Armies of the East and your army have been defined as THIAUCOURT, CHAMBLEY, CONFLANS, MOYEUVRE, GANDRANGE, THIONVILLE, MALLING, SCHENGEN with all inclusive belonging to your zone. THIONVILLE is not, however, available to you for billets and you will avoid as far as possible utilizing the roads passing through the center of that village.

During the actual movement to the front you are authorized, notwithstanding the limits above stated, to utilize all billets on the west bank of the MOSELLE with the exception of those at METZ and THIONVILLE.

The limits between your army and the French Group of Armies of the Center have been defined as MOUZON, CARIGNAN, FLORENVILLE, JAMOIGNE, ETALLE, HABAY-la-NEUVE, REDANGE, GROSBOS, DIEKIRCH, WALLENDORF; all places mentioned belonging to the French Group of Armies of the Center.

4. It is desired that you march with four divisions in first line and two in second line. The two divisions in second line will follow the leading divisions at a maximum distance of two marches.

The following axes, from right to left, of march of your first line division are suggested as probably best conforming to the existing state of roads and location of division:

Right Division: THIAUCOURT---WAVILLE---CHAMBLEY---CONFLANS---BRIEY---GANDRANGE---THIONVILLE---SCHENGEN

Right Center Division: VERDUN---ETAIN---AUDUN-le-ROMAN---ESCH-sur-ALZETTE---BETTEMBOURG---REMICH

Left Center Division: DAMVILLERY---LONGUYON---LONGWY---LUXEMBOURG---GREVENMACHER

Left Division: STENAY---MONTMEDY---VIRTON---ARLON---MERSCH---ECHTERNACH.

5. Your advance will cross the present front at 5:30 h., November 17.

The rate of march and the halts on various lines will be arranged in conformity with the directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief * * * Your forces will be kept well echeloned in depth both during the march and at halts.

Your attention is invited to the fact that under the above instructions it will be possible for you to delay moving your 2d line divisions beyond the present front until November 21 in the event that you find such action desirable.

6. The Second Army will assure the repair of the principal roads and railroads leading from its present front as far as the highway CONFLANSETAIN. Similarly, the First Army will assure the repair of the main roads and railroads from its present front as far as the line marked by the highway ETAIN---SPINCOURT---LONGUYON---MONTMEDY inclusive.

7. You will arrange to maintain liaison with the French Armies on your right and left.

J. W. McANDREW,
Major General, General Staff.

Assumption of Command

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 1

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 15, 1918.

1. In accordance with the provisions of G. O. 198, c. s., November 7, 1918, G. H. Q., American E. F., the undersigned assumes command of the Third Army, American E. F. The following staff is announced:

Personal Staff

Captain F. G. Dumont, A. D. C.
Captain E. F. Smith, A. D. C.
Captain Peter Richardson, A. D. C.

General Staff

Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Malin Craig, G. S.
Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. George Grunert, G. S.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1, Colonel James A. Logan, Jr., G. S.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Colonel R. H. Williams, G. S.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, Colonel John C. Montgomery, G. S.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4, Lt. Col. James H. Perkins, G. S.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5, Colonel Walter C. Short, G. S.

Administrative and Technical Services

Adjutant General,	Lt. Col. William A. Haverfield, A. D. G.
Inspector General,	Colonel A. C. Read, I. G.
Judge Advocate,	Lt. Col. Kyle Rucker, J. A.
Chief Quartermaster,	Major J. S. Harvey, Q. M. C.
Chief Surgeon,	Colonel J. W. Grissinger, M. D.
Chief Engineer,	Colonel W. J. Barden, C. E.
Chief Signal Officer,	Colonel Alvin C. Voris, S. C.
Chief Ordnance Officer,	Colonel Lucian C. Moody, O. D.
Chief of Air Service,	Brig. Gen. Wm. Mitchell, U. S. Army
Chief of Motor Transport Serv.	Lt. Col. A. M. Graham, M. T. C.
Provost Marshal,	Lt. Col. Julian L. Dodge, Infantry
Headquarters Troop,	1st Lieut. Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr., Cavalry

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General.

Advance, November 17 and 18, 1918

FIELD ORDERS
No. 1

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 15, 1918--24 h.

Maps: MEZIERES)
LONGWY)
METZ) 1:200,000
CHALONS)

[Extract]

1. The enemy is withdrawing his forces across the RHINE, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice.

The French Fifth Army on the left and the French Tenth Army on the right advance abreast of our army.

2. (a) The American Third Army will begin its march to the RHINE at 5:30 h., November 17, at which hour all leading divisions will cross the present front line * * *.

(b) The zone of advance of the army will be:

Northern (left): MOUZON---CARIGNAN---FLORENVILLE---JAMOIGNE---ETALLE---HABAY-la-NEUVE---REDANGE---GROSBUS---DIEKIERCH---WALLENDORF (all exclusive).

Southern (right): THIAUCOURT---CHAMBLEY---CONFLANS---MOYEUVRE---GANDRANGE---THONVILLE---MALLING---SCHENGEN (all inclusive).

(c) The advance elements of the army will reach the general line ECOUVIEZ---SORBEY---GOURAINCOURT---MARS-la-TOUR at the end of the first day

Advance elements will reach the general line ETALLE---St-LEGER---RUETTE---AUBANGE---LONGWY---AUDUN---BRIEY at the end of the second day * * *. This line will not be crossed until further orders.

3. (A) The III and IV Army Corps will advance with two divisions each in the first line and one division in the second line. Second line divisions will follow the flank divisions of the first line at two days march.

(B) III Corps:

Boundaries of Advance:

Northern (left): Same as northern boundary of army.

Southern (right): ORNES (exclusive)---SPINCOURT (exclusive)---St-SUPPLET (inclusive)---MERCY-le-BAS (exclusive)---VILLE-au-MONTOIS (inclusive)---MONTFONTAINE [MORFONTAINE?] (inclusive)---REDANGE (exclusive)---MONDERCANGE (exclusive)---LEUDELANGE (exclusive)---LUXEMBOURG (inclusive)---SCHUTTRANGE (inclusive)---WINCHERINGEN (exclusive).

(C) IV Corps:

Boundaries of Advance:

Northern (left): Same as southern boundary of the III Corps.

Southern (right): Same as southern boundary of the army.

The IV Army Corps is authorized to use, during the actual advance all available roads and billets on the west bank of the MOSELLE, excepting in METZ and THIONVILLE.

(D) Plans of artillery and air service will be issued later.

(E) The movement forward of army troops will be the subject of later orders.

(X) Troops will be well echeloned in depth and will provide for their security both on the march and during halts.

Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.

Army Corps will maintain liaison with the corps on their flanks.

* * * * *

5. ***

Posts of Command:
Third Army: LIGNY-en-BARROIS
III Army Corps: DUN-sur-MEUSE
IV Army Corps: WOINVILLE

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 1

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 17, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The advance of the Third Army to the RHINE is proceeding according to schedule and without incident. The country appears to be deserted with the exception of a few civilians.

II. OWN CHANGES AND MOVEMENTS DURING DAY: The Third Army assumed command of the III and IV Corps at 5 h., November 17. The advance began this morning at 5:30 h., from the line held since the cessation of hostilities.

The zone of advance for the Third Army is enclosed by the following boundaries:

Northern (left): MOUZON---CARIGNAN---FLORENVILLE---JAMOIGNE---ETALLE---HABAY-la-NEUVE---REDANGE---GROSBUS---DIEKIERCH---WALLENDORF (all excl.).

Southern (right): THIAUCOURT---CHAMBLEY---CONFLANS---MOYEUVRE---GANDRANGE---THIONVILLE---MALLING---SCHENGEN (all incl.).

The advance elements of the army are to reach the general line ECOUVIEZ---SORBEY---GOURAINCOURT---MARS-la-TOUR at the end of the first day.

The IV Corps, with the 3d and 1st Divisions (from right to left) in line and the 4th Division in reserve, is on the right. The III Corps, with the 32d and 2d Divisions (from right to left) in line and the 42d Division in reserve, is on the left.


MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

ADVANCE OF AMERICAN THIRD ARMY TO THE RHINE

17 NOVEMBER - 11 DECEMBER 1918

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 KM

MAP REF FRENCH 1:200 000 AIX-LE-CHAPPELLE No 5-614 COBLENZ No 5-741
MEZIERES No 10 LONGWY No 11 MAINZ No 11-914 CHALONS No 17 METZ No 18
TROYES No 26 NANCY No 27



From 5:30 h., Nov. 17, to 12 h., Nov. 17, 1918

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our advance began this morning at the prescribed hour and continued without incident.

II. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: Civilians state that the 65th Ldw. Regiment, 5th Ldw. Division left HARMEY [not identified] on the 16th inst., after noonday. The 8th Ldw. Division left CHAREY, November 12, 1918.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: German troops were seen moving E. in region around METZ, all wearing red arm bands.

IV. MORALE OF ENEMY TROOPS: Poor, according to statement of civilians and repatriated soldiers. Interrogation of prisoners and civilians denotes considerable pillage. Horses, cattle, and poultry are reported to have been driven before the Germans in their retreat.

V. PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF ENEMY TROOPS: Nothing to report.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY: Civilians in left sector state the conduct of the enemy harsh and brutal. American prisoners of war, on the contrary are unanimous in the statement that their treatment was not particularly harsh.

VII. OBSERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE: In no manner has it developed that any clause has been disregarded.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS ENEMY DATA: Right sector: Ex-prisoners, Russians, Italians and French coming from a camp E. of METZ, met no German soldiers on their way. The military guards at their camp left on the 15th inst. These prisoners were released by the civilian authorities. All were in pretty bad physical condition.

Left sector: Two returned Belgian civilians, who crossed our lines this morning, having left ATHUS, near the State of LUXEMBURG, on November 4, states that the roads were crowded with German troops moving in a N. E. direction. They report a large dump containing a great quantity of gasoline about 4 kilometers S. W. of ATHUS. Near this dump there was a large artillery park containing a great many guns of both large and small caliber. Five released prisoners (British) state that they were thrown upon the mercy of civilians for food, that they saw no atrocities; the Belgian women were not forced to labor in the fields as were the French women and were treated with more consideration. They state that during the past six months they were compelled to work on farms and were beaten with clubs and struck with the butts of rifles. They also state that a great many prisoners of war were troubled with failing limbs, caused by too much liquid food. They further state that the shops of Belgian citizens were open, while those of the French have been closed.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The advance of the American Third Army to the RHINE is progressing without incident. The enemy appears to be withdrawing in fairly good order.

II. OWN CHANGES AND MOVEMENTS DURING DAY: Advance elements of the army reached on schedule time the line ECOUVIEZ---SORBEY---GOURAINCOURT---MARS-la-TOUR, the objective set for the first day's march. The advance was resumed this morning toward the general line ETALLE---St-LEGER---RUETTE---AUBANGE---LONGWY---AUDUN---BRIEY. Upon reaching this line troops will be halted until November 21.

The order of battle is as follows (from right to left):

IV Corps	III Corps
3d Div., 1st Div.	32d Div., 2d Div.
4th Div. in reserve	42d Div. in reserve

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 2

THIRD ARMY,
November 18, 1918.

From 12 h., Nov. 17 to 12 h., Nov. 18, 1918

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our advance continued according to schedule with no untoward incident. Our troops were welcomed joyfully by the inhabitants. Large numbers of Russian prisoners came into our lines.

II. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: 3d and 4th Companies, Landsturm Leonberg were the last troops to leave LONGUYON. The Wurttemberg Etappen Commander 42 had been previously located at LONGUYON. Munitions and supplies released to the Americans are reported to have been authorized by Gruppe Louthed. (No such Gruppe name has been previously identified).

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Estimated that 15,000 troops passed through LONGUYON November 12 to November 17, all going in a N. and N. E. direction. Last troops passed through MONTMEDY, November 16. The last Germans left MARVILLE on November 14. Civilians were unable to give identifications.

IV. ENEMY MORALE: Generally reported from low to poor. Some cases of insubordination, especially lack of saluting and insults to officers have been reported. Men spoke

of a desire to be home by Christmas, and stated before the Armistice that whether the Germans won or lost, the war would be over by that time. Escaped French prisoners report officers have been stripped of their insignia in some units, and a number have been murdered. On the other hand, occasionally men were found who believed that the war should be carried on for better peace terms.

V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIAL, ETC.: Animals were reported in poor condition. Large numbers of cannon, so far found in the area, are apparently in good condition.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY: (a) On the march: Discipline seems to be lax, especially in the matter of looting just previous to leaving the cities, when German warehouses have been broken into. This looting seems to have been confined to German stores. They are reported as having driven before them a great deal of the cattle and live stock.

(b) So far no reports of serious looting to the civil population since the Armistice, have been received.

VII. OBSERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE: Nothing to report.

VIII. POPULATION OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY: (a) Nothing unusual to report except a hearty reception by the civil population.

(b) Attitude of the civil population was friendly. The only food the civil population has received since the commencement of the war was through the Belgian Relief.

IX. RELEASED PRISONERS OF WAR: (a) Italians, French, and Russians, Physical condition fair. Italian prisoners complain of very harsh treatment under the Austrians; better treatment under the Germans. The Russians were the best treated, then the French, then the English. On signing of the Armistice, one prisoner states that the prisoners at VIRTON were given all the food they could eat. Four French prisoners state that while the food was of poor quality, they were given enough to sustain life. The Germans fared but little better than the prisoners. The general treatment of the prisoners seems to have been varied, according to the camps which they were in. Reports have been received of looting by the Russian prisoners while on their way to our lines, this being especially true in the town of LONGWY.

X. MISCELLANEOUS: Shortage of rolling stock made the moving of supplies on a large scale impossible, consequently, it is reported that many guns and supplies were left behind in addition to the amounts provided for by the terms of the Armistice. A certain number of trucks and automobiles were left for the lack of gasoline. Station master at LONGUYON reports that rails were intact between his station and MONTMEDY, LONGWY---AUDUN-ROMAN and ARRANCY. Practically all railroad equipment was left intact, switches, block-lights, etc., the only two exceptions found, are the removal of a couple of dynamos and the shooting by soldiers through the railroad water tanks.

The secretary to the Mayor of LONGUYON reports that since the beginning of the war, the Germans have taxed the town 2,282,305 francs. Had the war lasted until November 15, they would have had to pay 250,000 francs additional. 56 civilians, mostly men, were shot without trial in this town since the beginning of the war.

Generally speaking, the treatment of civilians has depended largely upon individual commanders in different towns

It is reported that there have been marauding bands of German civilians in the vicinity of AUMETZ: they were out of control of the civilian authorities who had appealed for help to the Mayor of MURVILLE. Several reports received, state that German troops, returning, were out of hand, throwing away their equipment, paying no attention whatsoever to their officers, and most of them wearing the red arm band of the revolution. Soldiers were seen to kick their officers and take away their food from them.

* * * * *

Intentions of the enemy: Instructions for the 5th Ldw. Division are reported to have been to move back 25 kilometers each day towards SAARLOUIS.

The 8th Ldw. Division is reported to be moving on foot towards SAARBRUCKEN.

From information received it appears tonight as though the division on the right sector of this army were moving in a N. E. direction with the intention of crossing the MOSELLE and withdrawing through the general area of SAARBRUCKEN and SAARELOUIS.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 18, 1918.

Advance P. C., G. H. Q.

LIGNY-en-BARROIS

Post of command opened at specified place at eighteen hours. All divisions reached line number one without incident.

DICKMAN.

193-32.1: Orders

Advance, November 20, 1918

FIELD ORDERS
No. 2

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 19, 1918--20 h.

Maps: MEZIERES)
LONGWY)
METZ) 1:200,000
CHALONS)

[Extract]

1. The enemy continues his withdrawal.
The Allied Armies advance on November 20.
2. (a) The American Third Army will advance on November 20 to the general line GRENDEL---AUTELBAS---MONDERCANGE---DUDELANGE---VOLMERANGE---GANDRANGE. This line will not be crossed until further orders.
(b) Boundaries of the Army Zone of Advance:
Northern (left): MOUZON---CARIGNAN---FLORENVILLE---JAMOIGNE---ETALLE---HABAY-la-NUEVE---REDANGE---GROSBUS---DIEKIRCH---WALLENDORF---(all exclusive).
Southern (right): THIAUCOURT---CHAMBLEY---CONFLANS---MOYEUVRE---GANDRANGE---THONVILLE---MALLING---SCHENGEN (all inclusive).

3. (A) The III and IV Corps will advance with two divisions each in the first line and one division in the second line. Second line divisions will follow the first line divisions at two days' march.

(B) III Corps:

Boundaries of Advance:

Northern (left): Same as the northern boundary of the army.

Southern (right): ORNES (exclusive)---SPINCOURT (exclusive)---MORFONTAINE (inclusive)---REDANGE (exclusive)---MONDERCANGE (exclusive).

(C) IV Corps:

Boundaries of Advance:

Northern (left): Same as the southern boundary of the III Corps.

Southern (right): Same as the southern boundary of the army.

(D) The forward movement of army troops will be covered in separate orders.

(X) Troops will be echeloned in depth and will provide for their security both on the march and after halting.

Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.

Army corps will maintain liaison with the corps on their flanks.

Barrier posts now established by army corps along the French frontier from FLORENVILLE to MOYEUVRE will remain in place and continue to perform their mission.

* * * * *

5. Posts of Command:

Third Army - LONGUYON

III Corps - LONGUYON (to open at LONGWY 22 h., November 20)

IV Corps - ETAIN (to open at JOPPECOURT 24 h., November 19)

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 3

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 19, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

1. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The lack of established authority in the region being evacuated makes it necessary for the Third Army to follow the enemy more closely and to accelerate its advance into LUXEMBURG. A safety zone of 10 kilometers in width will be maintained between the American and German forces.

II. OWN CHANGES AND MOVEMENTS DURING DAY: Advance elements of the Third Army have reached, as planned, the objective set for November 18. The army front now follows the general line ETALLE---St-LEGER---RUETTE---AUBANGE---LONGWY---AUDUN---BRIEY. Troops will remain on this line until November 20 when the march will be resumed to the line GRENDEL---AUTELBAS---MONDERCANGE---DUDELANGE---VOLMERANGE---GANDRANGE.

Headquarters have been changed in the last 24 hours as follows:

Third Army to LONGUYON
III Corps to LONGUYON
IV Corps to ETAIN

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS:

P. C. of the Tenth Army on our right is at METZ
P. C. of the French Fifth Army on our left is at CHARLEVILLE

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligency Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 4

THIRD ARMY,
November 20, 1918.

November 19/20, 1918, 12 h. to 12 h.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Our troops resumed their march this morning. They were received everywhere with enthusiasm by the population, who met them with delegations, bands, and flowers. The LUXEMBURG border was crossed. No incident of a hostile nature occurred. The general line reached by our troops is GRENDEL---AMELIE [not identified] ---MONDERCANGE---DUDELANGE---VOLMERANGE---GANDRANGE.

* * * * *

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The enemy is withdrawing more rapidly on our right than on our center and left. When our troops were entering ESCH, the last Germans were reported as having cleared BETTEMBOURG only about one hour previous. * * *

Headquarters Gen. von Marwitz will remain at COCHEM until Nov. 23 or possibly the 24th or 25th. * * *

IV. ENEMY MORALE: Enemy morale may be summarized: The relations between officers and men have in many cases been bad; insubordination is frequent; troops at the rear going farther to the rear discarded much of their equipment. Troops coming from the front, however, were on the whole better disciplined, and retreated armed, and in good order.

The bearing of troops varied in different regions. Troops from the region of METZ were contaminated by Bolshevism, and were often out of control, though not extremely disorderly. Inhabitants of BRIEY report that the troops marching through there all carried the red flag, but on the whole were orderly, and in good spirits.

In LUXEMBURG the report is general that troops passing through in good marching order, and apparently under control. Many of them carried the red flags, but on the 18th and 19th German flags were brought by them in large quantities in the city of LUXEMBURG and again appeared in the columns.

Especially on the entry of LUXEMBURG and of GERMANY a conscious effort was made to keep up the morale. Bands played, flags were flying, and the troops though fatigued, were on the whole happy that the war was over.

German reports say that the withdrawal in the Rhineland is orderly. In BADEN and WURTEMBERG, however, the food supply service has broken down and there are conflicts between the troops and their own people.

V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIAL, ETC: The inability of the Germans to increase their available rolling stock for the evacuation applies even more to motor transportation. For some weeks prior to the Armistice, there had been serious shortage in gasoline (prisoners' reports from LONGWY and BRIEY). To this was added the complete cutting off of supplies by the new government about November 10. When the order for withdrawal came the Combres Gruppe cars were allotted an average of 3-4 gallons of gasoline each. As this was insufficient for some of them to reach the frontier, they were drawn by horses. Civilians in LONGWY report that the enemy met the shortage in horses by hitching cattle to the wagons. Most of the livestock in the region, was driven along with the retreating troops.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY: Even in regiments where decisions were made entirely by the soldiers council and where only red flags were accepted, the retreat order does not appear on the whole to have been had. Pillage in general has been limited to German supply depots, and in the last weeks has not affected the civil populations. This is especially true of Luxembourg, the Mayor of which declares that in the last three weeks the attitude of the German forces abruptly changed for the better. He has no complaints of violation of international law other than the conventional one which his country has constantly made against the compulsory billeting of troops on the population.

Livestock, however, has been taken in large quantities from Northern FRANCE. Withdrawing troops refused to distinguish between their own cattle and those of the farmer where their's were grazing.

The civil authorities in both LONGWY and Southern LUXEMBURG region welcome American occupation to check looting by stragglers in connection with unruly elements of the civil population.

VII. OBSERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE: The enemy in retiring, appears to intend observing the articles of the Armistice. They are reported as distributing or selling material, but on the other hand, are driving off the horses and cattle of the inhabitants.

VIII. POPULATION, ETC., OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY: The condition of the French in the regions invaded by the Germans appears to be as follows: Their food came entirely from foreign relief funds and activities. The most useful being the American. With this aid they appear to have had enough to sustain life and somewhat more. Anything in the way of crops or garden produce grown by the people was taken away promptly and sometimes paid for and sometimes not. Cattle, horses and poultry were also taken, the confiscation of the two former preventing any attempt at real farming, although the Germans grew crops by the forced labor of French men and women. The forced contributions of money on the towns drained most of the remaining wealth. Recent orders also required the taking of blankets, wool from the mattresses, and even shoddy cloth. After the first brutalities of the invasion, the conquerors' treatment of the inhabitants improved and apart from the confiscations, the rule seems to have been bearable. The appearance of the people, particularly of the children, seems no worse than in other parts of FRANCE. The people seem to have resented particularly their inability to circulate, that is, villagers could not visit the towns and the reverse. An order was issued in August urging energy in securing subscribers and readers for the "Gazette des Ardennes", and there appears to have been a growing increase in consideration for the inhabitants and a steadily decreasing arrogance on the conquerors' part. A very honest gratitude and welcome to our army is evident everywhere, and in a thousand ways, all indicating deep feeling and recognition of their salvation, both by the American purse and the American arms.

IX. RELEASED PRISONERS OF WAR: Nothing to report.

X. MISCELLANEOUS: From investigation we find that on Sunday, November 16, a number of Luxemburgers dressed in German uniforms to hide their identity, came to LONGWY in conveyances. Soon after their arrival in LONGWY, they set to work in looting stores, boxcars, etc., in the LONGWY Station. Quite a number were arrested by the French authorities and

taken to the Mairie, where they were deprived of their loot, but the majority made their escape across the border with their loot. It appears that a number of Russian prisoners underfed by the Germans, also assisted in the pillaging, but apparently solely for the sake of nutrition. A few French civilians also were implicated in the robbing of some stores. During a conversation with the sisters at the convent at LONGUYON, the nuns and the employees were unanimous in stating that the Wurtemberg Regiment, which was quartered here, although having lost much of their former discipline, were far from being disorganized, and treated the civilian population fairly well.

About a week before the Armistice was signed, they were ordered to go up to the front, and a train was made up with an engine in front and one in the rear to push. When the time came to start, the soldiers expressed their unwillingness to go. The soldiers operating the rear engine, instead of pushing, reversed and broke the train. The employees of the convent and a number of civilians witnessed the incident.

An aide to the Commissaire de Police at LONGWY stated that when the 19th Bn. of Infantry, XX Corps Rocklitz, left LONGWY on the night of November 16 and 17, that their organization was very bad.

This unit departed by the AUDUN-le-TICHE Road, officers removed their insignia (shoulder straps) in order to nullify their authority, and were at times seen to eat with their men; discipline was exceedingly lax and saluting was omitted. The men showed a revolutionary spirit and compelled officers to lead their riding horses, while the men of the 19th Bn. of Infantry XX Corps, sang revolutionary songs and a number of the soldiers carried red flags. Some of the wagons were decorated in a similar manner.

Bearing out the report of this semi-revolutionary spirit, two liberated prisoners (French) stated that the 335th Infantry with artillery, was seen in retreat on the road to HAUCOURT, red flags were carried by the troops and one soldier was noted carrying a French tricolor. The morale of the men seemed to be very low and the officers were much dejected, some frankly stating that they were glad that it was all over as they could do nothing with the men, as they seemed to have the situation in hand; many Bavarian troops passed through LONGWY, marching apparently as they liked and doing much as they pleased, much confusion seemed to exist.

Further indications and late reports tend to the belief that this revolutionary spirit is to a great extent local, and was developed prior to the signing of the Armistice, which would be borne out by the retreat of the Germans through the city of LUXEMBOURG on the 20th. This may have been inspired by the order of the day issued by General von Marwitz "Soldiers of Germany, retreat in an orderly and disciplinary manner and show the Luxemburgers that even a defeated army can do so."

On the 20th German troops marched through the city of LUXEMBOURG in close formation, bands were playing, and no signs of disorder was seen.

In the city proper, most of the buildings were decorated with flags of Luxembourg, France, Belgium, and some American, and all indications point to an enthusiastic welcome of our troops by the inhabitants. Individual American officers in the city were cheered by the people.

This information was given by the Mayor of LUXEMBOURG.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Advance, November 21, 1918

FIELD ORDERS
No. 3

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 20, 1918--15 h.

Maps: Same as Field Orders No. 2

[Extract]

1. The enemy continues his withdrawal across the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier. The French Tenth Army will advance tomorrow to the line THIONVILLE---BOUZONVILLE---SARRALBE; the French Fifth Army to the line ARLON-BASTOGNE.
2. The American Third Army will advance tomorrow, November 21, to the line VICHTEN---MERSCH---SCHUTTRANGE---RENTGEN---CATTENOM. This line will not be crossed. The boundaries of the army zone of advance are unchanged.
3. (A) The III and IV Corps will advance with two divisions each in the first line and one division in the second line. Second line divisions will follow the first line divisions at two days' march.
(B) The boundary line between the III and IV Corps is extended - LUXEMBOURG-NIEDERANVEN (both to the III Corps).
(C) The forward movement of army troops will be covered in separate orders.
(X) Troops will be well echeloned in depth and will provide for their security both on the march and after halting.
Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.
Army corps will maintain liaison with the corps on their flanks.
Barrier posts now established by army corps along the French frontier from FLORENVILLE to MOYEUVRE will remain in place and continue to perform their mission.
The cities of LUXEMBOURG and THIONVILLE will not be entered by American troops (formed bodies marching through are excepted).

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5. Posts of Command:
Third Army - LONGUYON
III Corps - LONGWY (to open at MAMER, 22 h., November 21)
IV Corps - JOPPECOURT (to open at DUDELANGE, 22 h., November 21)

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The march of the Third Army to the Rhine has been resumed one day in advance of the prearranged schedule owing to the lack of established authority in the region being evacuated by the enemy. The latter is having difficulty in complying with the terms of the Armistice because of the limited number of roads available for his withdrawal across the MOSELLE and SURE Rivers.

II. OWN CHANGES AND MOVEMENTS DURING DAY: The advance of the Third Army was resumed this morning in the direction of LUXEMBOURG. The objective for the day's march is the general line: GRENDDEL---AUTELBAS---MONDERCANGE---DUDELANGE---VOLMERANGE---GANDRANGE. Troops will not cross this line until further orders. The divisions in reserve, the 4th Division (IV Corps) and the 42d Division (III Corps), have moved forward from the areas occupied since the cessation of hostilities, in compliance with orders to follow first line divisions at two days' march.

Headquarters of the IV Corps changed from ETAIN to JOPPECOURT at 24 h., November 19. The order of battle is as follows:

IV CORPS

3d Div., 1st Div.
4th Div. in reserve

III CORPS

32d Div., 2d Div.
42d Div. in reserve

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 5

THIRD ARMY,
November 21, 1918.

November 20/21, 1918, 12 h. to 12 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our advance continued throughout the day. Our troops continued to be received with great enthusiasm by the people especially in the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBURG. In passing through the city of Luxembourg, our troops were showered with flowers by the people who lined the streets and windows of the houses along the line of march. No hostile demonstration of any kind was encountered. The general line reached by our troop is: VICHTEN---MERSCH---SCHUTTRANGE---RENTGEN---CATTENOM. German troops marched E. through the city of LUXEMBOURG yesterday afternoon, Nov. 20 in good order. Indications are that the German troops are now under better control than they were during the first days of the retreat.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: During the first three days of the Armistice, the movement of enemy forces was towards METZ; after the 14th by LUXEMBOURG. This may account for the appearance of divisions from other fronts than the MEUSE-MOSELLE region in the area now occupied by our armies. It is quite likely that the large congestion of troops from CHARLEVILLE to E. of VERDUN to meet the attacks of our First Army has caused the Germans to evacuate as many divisions as possible from this region first; as there were only 9 divisions in Detachment Army C, it is probable that then most available divisions in the Fifth Army moved out through the general area of METZ before the troops in Army Detachment C started to move. In fact the general movement of Army Detachment C did not begin much before the 16th. With the clearance of the surplus troops of the Fifth Army accomplished the balance of that army, together with some divisions in the First and Third Armies, have been withdrawn through the LUXEMBOURG area. The S. limit of this army appears to be the LONGWY-LUXEMBOURG Road. With the exception of those divisions which held the line DAMVILLERS-DAMLOUP, which were withdrawn directly to LUXEMBOURG or the towns lying S. of that city.

The Mayor of LUXEMBOURG states that between 600,000 and 1,000,000 men passed. This figure is probably exaggerated, but the reported congestion is at least indicative of a very large number of troops having passed through this city. 50% of these troops went toward TREVES, 30% toward GREVENMACHER and ECHTERNACH, and 20% by smaller roads to the N. of the city. The headquarters of Gen. von Gallwitz is reported at TREVES, Nov. 18.

IV. ENEMY MORALE: As the withdrawal continues, the morale of the Germans improves. It is stated that the march through LUXEMBOURG was well conducted and showed little signs of being demoralized. The troops appear to be much more orderly and under better discipline than during the first few days of the Armistice, the state of which has probably been exaggerated. Apparently most of the insubordination came from lines of communication troops.

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V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIEL, ETC.: Nothing to report.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY: Further conversation with the people of LUXEMBOURG confirmed the orderly withdrawal of German troops across the state.

LONGWY was the assembly point where troops were regrouped together. Here they were given emphatic orders to maintain close marching formation. Of the five divisions which passed through the city of LUXEMBOURG on the way TREVES, only one of them gave the appearance of being but fragments badly formed together.

The troops in their retreat were in general not billeted in the towns, and made their crossing as rapidly as possible at TREVES. They are being regrouped on the farther side of LUXEMBOURG. Many of the peasants complain that the Germans ransacked their houses for food, carrying off poultry with them.

VII. OBSERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE: From information received, the enemy is reported to be serving the terms of the Armistice.

VIII. POPULATION, ETC., OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY: The population along our routes of march continues its friendly attitude.

The occupied territory presents a normal appearance with no signs whatsoever of wanton destruction by the enemy. The roads and railways in the country occupied by us today are in excellent conditions; while there appears to be sufficient, though not abundant, food supply with high prices predominating.

IX. RELEASED PRISONERS OF WAR: French, English and Russian prisoners of war continue to come into our lines. Physical condition fair. Their morale appears to be good.

X. MISCELLANEOUS: The enthusiasm of the people continue to greet our troops at each successive stop forward. On our entry into LUXEMBOURG today, the city was in gala attire, a holiday had been declared, and people from surrounding towns gathered there to do homage and pay tribute; bands were playing, Luxemburg Societies, Workman's Unions, Boy

Scouts and Women's Societies escorted our troops through the city. One of the banners carried by one escorting party was the inscription, "To the Saviours of our Country." The Union Nationale had posted about the city proclamations written in several languages headed, "TO OUR DELIVERATERS."

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No report received from the IV Corps.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.1: Orders

Advance, November 22, 1918

FIELD ORDERS
No. 4

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 21, 1918--15 h.

Maps: Same as Field Orders No. 1

[Extract]

1. The enemy continues his withdrawal across the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier.
2. (a) The American Third Army will advance November 22 to the general line INGLEDORF---BETZDORF---WORMELDANGE---thence the MOSELLE River to SCHENGEN. This line will not be crossed until further orders.
(b) The boundaries of the army zone of advance are unchanged.
3. (A) The III and IV Corps will advance with two divisions each in the first line and one division in the second line. Second line divisions will follow the first line divisions at two days' march.
(B) The boundary line between the III and IV Corps is extended - ROODT-sur-SYRE BERG-sur-SYRE---WASSERBILLIG (all to the III Corps).
(C) The forward movement of army troops will be covered in separate orders.
(X) Troops will be well echeloned in depth and will provide for their security both on the march and after halting.
Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.
Barrier posts now established by army corps along the French frontier from FLORENVILLE to MOYEUVRE will remain in place and continue to perform their mission.
No American troops will be billeted in the cities of LUXEMBOURG and THIONVILLE.

* * * * *

5. Headquarters:
Third Army - LONGUYON (to open at HAMM, 15 h., November 22)
III Corps - HAMER (to open at JUNGLINSTER, 15 h., November 22)
IV Corps - DUDELANGE (to open at SCHUTTRANGE at 15 h., November 22)

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

VII Corps passes under Command of Third Army

OPERATIONS ORDERS
No. 1

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 21, 1918--22 h.

[Extract]

1. Under instructions from higher authority, the VII Army Corps, consisting of the VII Corps staff and the 5th, 89th and 90th Divisions, will pass under the command of the Third Army at 5 h., November 22.

2. The 5th Division is detached from the VII Army Corps, effective 5 h.; November 22, for duty in the zone of the line of communications.

The Commanding General, 5th Division, is designated as the commander of the line of communications.

3. The VII Army Corps will be assembled, under the direction of the corps commander, in the area: ETALLE---JAMOIGNE---FLORENVILLE---CARIGNAN---MOUZON all inclusive; thence along the MEUSE River to DUN-sur-MEUSE; MARVILLE-VIRTON all inclusive. The assembly to be completed before 18 h., November 25.

The assembly of the corps will be made with a view to its following up the III and IV Corps, after they cross the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier about December 1, with one division in rear of each corps.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The advance of the Third Army through LUXEMBOURG continues without untoward incident. The enemy is carrying out the terms of the Armistice by withdrawing his troops across the LUXEMBOURG - GERMAN frontier.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: Advance elements of the Third Army reached on schedule time the objective set for November 20. The march is being continued this morning to the general line: VICHTEN---MERSCH---SCHUTTRANGE---RENTGEN---CATTENOM. Troops will not cross this line until further orders. Headquarters of the III Corps opened at LONGWY at 22 h., November 20. Headquarters of the IV Corps remained at JOPPECOURT.

The order of battle is, from right to left, as follows:

IV CORPS	III CORPS
3d Div., 1st Div.	32d Div., 2d Div.
4th Div. in reserve	42d Div. in reserve

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Headquarters of the French Tenth Army on our right are at St-AVOLD.

Headquarters of the French Fifth Army on our left are at NEUFCHATEAU.

Liaison with neighboring units is maintained by telegraph, wireless, and liaison officers.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 6

THIRD ARMY,
November 22, 1918.

November 21/22, 1918, 12 h. to 12 h.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our advance continued throughout the day. The enthusiastic reception of our troops continues. The general line reached is INGLEDORF---BETZDORF---REMICH and then along the MOSELLE River to SCHENGEN. The enemy has cleared the eastern boundary of the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBURG. The enemy troops are withdrawing in good order, and all indications of rioting and disorder among them seems to have passed.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Heavy stream of troops reported moving from WASSERBILLIG toward TREVES. Line practically continuous for 32 kilometers. Reliable reports show that the enemy has withdrawn behind the MOSELLE between PERL and GREVENMACHER to the general line of the PERL-SAARBURG Road. The S. limit of the Fifth Army is apparently somewhere between SIERK and THIONVILLE, as none of the troops belonging to this army have been identified below the former place. The German Fifth Army will probably rest during the next two days before resuming its withdrawal.

General von Huringen, who was at one time in charge of the coast defense, is reported as taking an active part in the direction of the retirement.

IV. ENEMY MORALE: Improvement is shown as the troops withdraw. They are marching in good order and well under the control of their officers. No equipment is found along the road.

V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIEL, ETC.: Many reports indicate that the horses are few and in bad condition. In passing through MACHTUM yesterday a German supply column of approximately a mile in length was using 100 oxen as draft animals.

The enemy seems to be taking with him all of his baggage. Very little materiel has been abandoned.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY: On the REMICH-TREVES Road, Nov. 20 there was a steady stream of troops. They were in good humor, singing marching songs and joking together. The officers seemed to have the troops well in hand. Troops marched in good order. A German officer orders a break in the line to let the American cars pass. A heavy team stopped promptly to permit this.

The troops have not harmed the civilian population in any way, and only petty thefts have been reported. They are, however, driving before them a considerable amount of cattle, apparently brought from farther S., as there are no reports of thefts in the immediate vicinity.

VII. OBSERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE: The articles of the Armistice appear to be observed.

VIII. POPULATION, ETC., OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY: The population of the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBURG, although there is every evidence of resentment at the German occupation have not the causes for complaint common to the other invaded peoples. The Germans at least paid something for what property they requisitioned, and made no wanton ravages.

German stragglers in the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBURG were hooted on their ways; on the other hand, every American is greeted as a friend with marked cordiality.

The country presents practically a peace time aspect, except for the presence of the Allied flags and Allied soldiers. The people show signs of joy at their relief, and seem to feel that now the food situation will be considerably bettered, while the occupied territory has apparently not been harmed in any way.

IX. RELEASED PRISONERS OF WAR: Released prisoners of war, and there were many of all nationalities along the road, had received food before starting out from TREVES. They were in good physical condition, and had no particular complaint to make.

X. MISCELLANEOUS: In the retreat of the German Army through the territory that we are to occupy and hold under the terms of the Armistice, our investigation shows that any previous disorder reported heretofore has not spread, but that, on the contrary, discipline has improved to a marked extent.

Horses and vehicles were decorated with green leaves and branches, and some of the wagons the words PAROLE HEIMAT - meaning THE WATCHWORD IS HOME. Many German and Bavarian flags were carried.

A large number of soldiers who lived at TREVES, or in the near vicinity to there, have returned to their home, and immediately upon arrival abandoned their weapons for civilian clothing.

On November 20, TREVES was full of German troops which were passing through the city, which was gaily decorated with flags and inscriptions, one of which read: WELCOME

TO OUR VALIANT UNBEATEN WARRIORS; in the city everything was in order, and the military authority appeared to be in control.

It seemed to be universally assumed that the war was completely over and that there was no possibility of any resumption.

* * * * *

In our rear area: no disturbances reported. Comparatively few ex-prisoners passed through our lines during the day.

* * * * *

Conditions in Luxemburg

LUXEMBURG preserves in general its prewar aspect. Prices of food and wine are high, while wooden soles for resoling shoes are in the shop windows.

The people seem to have sufficient food to keep in health and appear adequately clothes; at present they are very jubilant at the coming of the Allies.

The tricolor of the Grand Duchy, suppressed by the Germans during their occupation, flies everywhere and many Allied flags are to be seen. Men, women, and children, wearing colors and flags in their buttonholes, salute American officers when they pass.

The passing in review of the American troops aroused great enthusiasm, civic, municipal and military organizations of LUXEMBURG taking part in the parade.

The feeling against the Germans is strong and stragglers were hooted, even Luxemburgers, who had previously showed German tendencies, seem glad to wear the Allied colors. Newspapers in the French language (suppressed by the Germans) are now reappearing.

* * * * *

Supplementary Paragraph V (STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIEL, ETC.): The general impression of troops on the REMICH-TREVES Road was that their equipment was in good condition. Supplies were horse-drawn and only for troops, consisting of baggage and provisions and no munitions. On the entire route but 15 guns were seen and no machine guns. Through MACHTUM, reports indicate that horses are few and in bad condition, a German supply column of approximately a mile long was using 100 oxen as draft animals.

The enemy seems to be taking with him all his baggage and to be abandoning very little materiel.

* * * * *

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Advance, November 23, 1918, to the Luxemburg-German Frontier

FIELD ORDERS
No. 5

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 22, 1918--16 h.

Maps: Same as Field Orders No. 1

[Extract]

1. The enemy has completed his withdrawal from LUXEMBURG.
2. The American Third Army will advance November 23 to the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier (the SURE River to its mouth - thence the MOSELLE River). The frontier will not be crossed until further orders.
3. (a) The III and IV Corps will advance with two divisions each in first line and one division in second line. All elements of these corps will be east of the line ARLON---ESCH---MOYEUVRE by 18 h.; November 23.
(b) The VII Corps and the 5th Division will continue their movements as prescribed in Operations Orders No. 1.
(c) The forward movement of army troops will be covered in separate orders.
(x) Troops will be well echeloned in depth and will provide for their security both on the march and after halting.
Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.
Barrier posts established by the III and IV Army Corps along the French frontier from FLORENVILLE to MOYEUVRE when relieved by the Commanding General, Line of Communications, will proceed to join their organizations.
No American troops will be billeted in the cities of LUXEMBOURG or THIONVILLE.

* * * * *

5. Headquarters:

Third Army - HOLLERICH
III Corps - JUNGLINSTER
IV Corps - HISPERANGE
VII Corps - DUN-sur-MEUSE (to open at VIRTON, 12 h., November 23)
5th Division - LONGUYON (after 12 h., November 23)

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The march of the Third Army through LUXEMBURG continues under the most favorable conditions. The enemy has completed his withdrawal across the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier. His march was well conducted and his troops showed few signs of demoralization.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: Advance elements of the Third Army reached as planned the objective set for November 21. The march is being continued this morning to the general line INGELDORF---BETZDORF---WORMELDANGE---Thence the MOSELLE River to SCHENGEN. Troops will not cross this until further orders.

The VII Corps consisting of the 5th, 89th and 90th Divisions passed under the command of the Third Army at five hours, November 22. The 5th Division has been detached from the VII Corps for duty in the zone of the line of communications.

The VII Corps, less the 5th Division, will follow the III and IV Corps after they cross the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier with one division in rear of each corps.

Headquarters are as follows:

Third Army - HOLLERICH (to open at 15 h.)

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 7

THIRD ARMY,
November 23, 1918.

November 22/23, 1918, 12 h. to 12 h.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our advance continued and we have reached the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN Border. The enemy had cleared the border well ahead of us except on one road in the N. E. part of LUXEMBURG, where the rear of the enemy column crossed the river only a few minutes before we reached it. The enthusiastic reception of our troops by the population of the country occupied by us continues. In the eastern portion of the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBURG, some German units did considerable looting and destroyed trees, but most of the German army passed through in an orderly manner.

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III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Enemy continues to withdraw. None of his troops were seen today W. of the heights on the E. bank of the MOSELLE. According to prisoners' statements, the enemy line for the night of Nov. 22/23 was to run from MERZIG---N. E. to BESSERINGEN---WEITEN---PIASSEN [not identified]---MERZKIRCHEN to KOLLIG.

On the night of Nov. 23/24, the line would run LOSHEIM---BRITTEN---BERGEN---TETZHAUS [not identified]---NIEDERZERF and OBEREMMEL. The last troops were reported leaving TREVES at noon on the 24th. In addition it was stated that some units intended to entrain at TREVES, which would be for the first time since our advance that movement by rail was reported.

IV. ENEMY MORALE: Further evidence has been received that the greatest demoralization came just before and just after the signing of the Armistice. Since then the officers have recovered their control over the men to such an extent, at least, that good road discipline is maintained. On the other hand, deserters are coming into our lines with permits to return to their homes in ALSACE, which permits are said to have been signed by the soldiers' committee. Whether the apparent improved morale is due to the fact that some of the best German divisions form the rearguard or because greater discipline has been restored throughout the German army is a question.

V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIEL, ETC: It is reported at OLINGEN that the horses which have gone through were in poor condition. At RODENBOURG the horses were noted to have hoof and mouth disease. Reports from the IV Corps indicate that the troops retreating to the MOSELLE were obliged to make extensive use of handcarts to compensate the shortage in horses.

Railroad traffic, LUXEMBOURG-TREVES: Instead of an increase in the rolling stock for the withdrawal, there was a decrease as compared with normal freightage facilities. The removal of materiel from FRANCE began to pass through here October 20 and lasted until November 18. Averaging the number of transport freight trains of 45-50 cars coming from the front to TREVES this gives:

Oct 26-31:	Average number of trains per day -	5
Nov. 1-11:	" " " " "	6
Nov. 12-17:	" " " " "	4
Nov. 18-19:	No trains.	

Most trains were little used for troops; most of them were for materiel, guns, machinery, etc. Others were sanitary trains.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY:

LUXEMBURG: Three weeks before the Germans left LUXEMBURG, there was an abrupt change in their bearing. They became less arrogant, and no longer forced their demands when refused. A garage owner, for example, refused them the privilege of quartering their cars in his shop. They remonstrated but went away. The same happened frequently in billeting.

A Soldiers' Council (Soldatenrat) was established in LUXEMBURG. Among its members were several marines. They were never very active here except in the first days of the withdrawal. The S. O. S. troops were the first to go. They were disorderly, insubordinate, and impregnated with Bolshevist doctrines. There were the usual red flags, removal of shoulder straps from some of the officers, etc. A few freight cars of supplies were plundered at the station November 10. * * *

When the troops began coming back from the front, the council sank into insignificance. Many of the S. O. S. troops, however, remained behind to influence the troops from the front. They met with a cold reception from many of the divisions coming back. These knew nothing of the political changes at home. In LUXEMBURG, for example, one regiment put up a machine gun to keep the damned S. O. S. troops away.

Officers made patriotic speeches to their men, urging them to make a favorable appearance when marching through LUXEMBURG. On the Town Hall Square, the general commanding one division reviewed his troops. An officer stood some twenty yards above him and appealed to the men to pass in parade step. This they did. The general showed an unusual concern for their well-being, by asking them if they had received hot coffee that morning and noted the omissions. This method apparently succeeded in keeping the troops in hand;

in the region between LUXEMBOURG City and the MOSELLE, the general reports that the withdrawal of the Germans was orderly and carried out without molesting the inhabitants. The only two exceptions to this rule were at HAZELDORF [HAGELSDORF?], where there was looting accompanied by threats of setting fire to the town, and OLINGEN, where foodstuffs were taken without payment.

WALFERDANGE: The mayor states that in general the Germans conducted themselves in an orderly manner. He reports only one instance of insubordination. A battalion of infantry declined to obey march orders, stating they were being taken in a direction other than toward their homes. The column disbanded, men broke their rifles against trees, and threw away most of their military equipment, retaining only blankets and food.

OLINGEN: Petty thefts by passing troops.

RODENBOURG: Here the soldiers made decisions without consulting their officers, and even attempted to order them about. They fell in line at their leisure.

VII. OBSERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE: The articles of the Armistice have been observed by the enemy.

VIII. POPULATION, ETC, OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY: In the parts of LUXEMBURG now occupied by our army, the people have no specific complaints to make of the German troops. Interrogated civilians, however, invariably express dislike of the Germans, and relief at their withdrawal. The people continue their friendly welcome to our army at all points.

The Germans destroyed no property in the Grand Duchy, and generally behaved quite differently from the way they conducted themselves in those parts of FRANCE occupied by them, and passed through by our troops.

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X. MISCELLANEOUS: It is interesting to note that the German prisoners examined today (all of whom were Alsations and Lorrainers), in most cases had orders showing that they had been discharged from the German army and were proceeding to their homes in ALSACE and LORRAINE. Upon investigation it was found that on or about Nov. 17, an order was issued by the German High Command in which it was stated that any Alsatian or Lorrainer could be discharged from the army and sent to their homes at their request.

The following is a translation of the release order given the Alsations and Lorrainers:

This certificate will serve as R. R. ticket.

Demobilization Department,
1-3-R2.

Hanau, November 22, 1918.

Pioneer Mikol Holzen, 1st Ersatz Company, is to be discharged at his home, ESCH---LUXEMBOURG---THIONVILLE Recruiting District. He has been rationed and paid respectively to Nov. 30, and has been given bread to Nov. 25. (He has been paid 65 marks.)

As soon as he reaches his destination he is to report to the local district sergeant-major. A military pass will be forwarded later.

For the Soldiers' Council,
Theede

Soldiers' Council.

Grunwalden,
Lieut. and Co. Commander.

Some of the prisoners belonging to and attached to the 80th Reserve Division stated that a divisional order had been issued a few days ago in which it was stated they would be demobilized immediately, and that the orders for same were en route to the division.

Interrogation of some civilians at OLINGEN elicited the fact that the Germans had taken a considerable quantity of foodstuffs without remuneration, excusing their action by saying, "The Americans, who are biggest robbers in the world, will take it anyway when they come."

In MOUZON, on November 4 and in CARIGNAN, on Nov. 5, the German troops broke into the commissary stores and looted them. Their officer made no attempt to stop them, and in some cases smoked cigars which had been taken by the soldiers.

An unter-offizier from 9th Ersatz Flieger Battalion, formerly located in BELGIUM, near MAARTRIGHT [MAASTRICHT?], was on his way to his home at THIONVILLE. Had been to CASSEL, MAYENCE, and TREVES. He and a commercial traveler stated that German troops were retiring in orderly fashion until they passed the RHINE. Beyond there all discipline was lost. Soldatenraten were formed everywhere, and these soldier committees tried to take charge of the military administration. They had very little control, and the soldiers were doing as they pleased.

The troops were mostly going home except for the classes of 1898 and 1899, who were supposed to remain in charge of police and communications. Such was the situation at CASSEL. The soldiers on the W. of the RHINE retained military discipline and did not interfere with the civil authorities because they knew that Allied troops would be coming there. No disorder at MAYENCE or TREVES for that reason. Many Allied prisoners were being allowed to take steamers down the RHINE to HOLLAND. Others were proceeding through STRASBOURG. There was no apparent interference or hostility to such released prisoners. There are sufficient food supplies in GERMANY for several months. The men are needed for harvesting three year's crops and for transportation. The great majority of them are trying to reach their homes with the intention of resuming civil work at once.

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By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 hours

THIRD ARMY,
November 22, 1918.

Chief of American Mission Senlis - 13

Day's objective reached. Line now is: Ingeldorf---Betzdorf---Wormeldange---thence the Moselle River to Schengen. Headquarters as follows: Third Army Hollerich: III Corps, Junglingster: IV Corps, Hesperange: VII Corps Dun-sur-Meuse: 2d Division, Mersch: 42d Division, Arlong 32d Division, Niederanven: 3d Division, Fixem: 1st Division, Canach: 4th Division, Briey: 5th Division, Lion-devant-Dun: 89th Division, Stenay: 90th Division, Mouzay.

DICKMAN.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The march of the Third Army across the State of LUXEMBURG continues without untoward incident. The enemy is still retiring in good order.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: Advance elements of the Third Army reached in the early afternoon the objective set for November 22. The advance is being continued this morning to the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier. The 3d Division (IV Corps) remains in position. Troops will not cross the frontier until further orders.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French Fifth Army on our left reports that a German regiment was surrounded and disarmed at GROSBUS.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, G. S.
No. 8

THIRD ARMY,
November 24, 1918.

November 23/24, 1918, 12 h to 12 h.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: After reaching their objective, the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border, our troops halted. The orderly retreat of the enemy as a whole is confirmed as is also the fact that certain of his units looted from the civilians, and were not under the control of their officers.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The withdrawal continues in the general direction of TREVES, although some units are reported as withdrawing on SAARBRUCK. Considerable congestion has been reported on the frontier due probably to the haste to withdraw into German territory in the allotted time.

IV. ENEMY MORALE: Little new to report excepting that bad feeling is stated to have been exhibited between the Prussian and Bavarian troops. In one instance they are reported to have refused to divide rations or use the same billets.

V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIEL, ETC.: Inhabitants in the N. of LUXEMBURG declare that such was the shortage of horses among the retreating troops that Russian prisoners were obliged to draw carts.

Inhabitants at ROODT and RODENVAIN [not identified] note that the Germans took a

considerable amount of cattle back with them. This was taken in part from the French and Belgians. It was diseased and is supposed to have contaminated the local stock.

A part of the horses on the lines of retreat belonged to the Russians.

At EVRANGE, the horses were in good condition; at WALLSTEIN [not identified] they were exhausted.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY:

BEIDWEILER: Discipline among the troops passing through was lax; in others it did not exist. The officers here paid small attention to the men, and gave few orders.

In SCHIEREN, on the other hand, the officers had their men well under control. The Mayor here states that while an officer here and there was without insignia, nevertheless they were able to maintain a rigid discipline.

VII. OBSERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE: The articles of the Armistice appear to have been observed.

VIII. POPULATION, ETC., OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY: The people of LUXEMBURG, on the frontier bordering on GERMANY were treated by the Germans with some consideration. The population of the occupied territory show the greatest friendliness and hospitality to our troops. The towns are decorated in our honor.

The country is in very good sanitary condition. There are good roads well maintained. There is sufficient food, though prices are high. Shoe leather is scarce and soap and grease difficult to obtain.

IX. RELEASED PRISONERS OF WAR: British soldiers, coming from various camps along the RHINE tell much the same story. They were released some ten days ago and told to shift for themselves. They sought assistance from the German Soliders' Councils in the towns through which they passed. Here they were directed toward LUXEMBURG. They say that the population in the towns through which they passed were kindly toward them and even gave them food when they could spare it. The British declare that on returning, German troops were open in their happiness that the war is over.

A French civilian prisoner released from TREVES says that this was done by marines who had come down from HAMBURG. They opened his cell and shook hands while singing the "Marseillaise." They then told him to return to FRANCE and tell the people there of the marvelous transformation in GERMANY.

X. MISCELLANEOUS: Information received to the effect that on November 11, approximately, 10,000 Marines arrived at COLOGNE from KIEL. They broke open the prison doors and released all the civil and military prisoners, and clothed them with new clothes taken from stores. They compelled the various factories turning out war materiel to close down. They next freed the prisoners of war, and told them they were at liberty to return to their homes. They seized the administration offices, including the post office, railway stations, etc., and were still in possession of them on the morning of November 21. The troops returning from the front by the roads were under much better control than those in the interior. They marched with their officers with them, had their arms, and in some cases the military bands were playing.

Civilians living near the border state that discharges for troops living W. of the RHINE, including Alsace-Lorrainers, are being granted in TREVES. There is a scarcity of animals. It is stated that Russian prisoners, taken back by the enemy, were compelled to draw carts and wagons.

It is reported that in their retreat the German troops sold their equipment at ridiculously low prices. Horses have been sold for as low as 25 marks and rifles for 5 marks.

Interrogation of civilians shows that the Germans who passed through ROODT had about 200 cows with them that were taken from the Belgians.

At RODENVAIN [not identified], the enemy had about 60 or 70 head of cattle, a large percentage of which had hoof and mouth disease. These cattle are said to have affected the stock of the inhabitants, and while in the village the enemy slaughtered about 15 head.

The inhabitants further state that the enemy appropriated forage, straw and wood without making any arrangement for payment.

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Important:

Many reports have been received to the effect that many of the cattle in possession of the retreating enemy had hoof and mouth disease. Reports also to effect that these diseases are prevalent E. of the MOSELLE.

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The Mayor of SCHIEREN states that on November 19, 20 and 21, the town of SCHIERIN was so crowded with heterogeneous enemy units that the surrounding meadows were filled with encampments in addition to the town buildings. It was not possible for the civil authorities to draw up billeting lists, nor did the enemy pay or give receipts for his accommodation as had previously been his custom.

On November 21, 18 h., the estimated number of 8,000 troops quartered in and near the town were alarmed by a sudden rumor that the French in GROSBUS had captured and were holding a German battalion. March orders were at once issued, and at 20 h., the town was cleared, all troops having withdrawn in considerable haste, but yet in good order, over the road to DIEKIRCH.

Early on the following morning an American advance guard entered the town.

Officers of a Prussian division (said to contain either the 172d or 173d I. R. (?)) stated that they were returning to GERMANY with the avowed intention of replacing the Kaiser on his throne. Had his majesty seen fit to call to his aid this division and one or two others equally loyal he would have had a bodyguard strong enough to permit him to retain his sceptre, if only in name. These officers expected civil war in Germany between the Monarchists and Socialists. Whether or not this proved true GERMANY would take up arms again against her present enemies within ten years. Men of the 171st I. R. (115th Division) said that they were going home not to lay down their arms, but to reestablish the Monarchy.

* * * * *

The German Withdrawal

The German withdrawal of troops beyond the RHINE appears to be proceeding in an orderly manner. General von Eberhard published an order from the Hq. of the First Army forbidding the display of red badges, requiring rigid discipline, and urging the civil population to cooperate in facilitating the movements of this body comprising 150,000 men and 60,000 horses.

General von Hutier makes a similar appeal to the civil population on behalf of the Eighteenth Army with its 25 divisions, comprising about 500,000 men and 150,000 horses.

The troops of the Sixth and Seventh Armies should be passing through COLOGNE on November 23 and 24. The Sixth Army passed through AIX-la-CHAPELLE, no red flags were displayed, but the men were bedecked with small national flags or rosettes and flowers and marched to music in good order.

The German troops returning home through HUNGARY have been delayed by lack of coal for the railways, and it is reported that the Czechs hindered them by removing rails from the railway.

An appeal signed by Ebert, Haase, and Gohre, urges people and soldiers alike to refrain from plundering supply trains and storehouses, as that menace seriously threatens the supply of the withdrawing troops.

Erzberger, Chairman of the Armistice Commission, issues a proclamation to all

demobilized persons, including officers, who are inhabitants of ALSACE-LORRAINE, that they may remain in their homes, and that during the occupation, the German civil officials will perform their regular duties.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army 17 hours

G-3, G. H. Q.
No. 22

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 23, 1918.

Line of Third Army is: Luxemburg-German frontier. No forward movement tomorrow. IV Corps and III Corps separated by line: Mertert-Luxembourg. Line between 3d and 1st Divisions: Stadtbredimus-Dalheim: Between 1st and 32d Divisions: Mertert-Betzdorf: Between 32d and 2d Divisions: Berdorf-Fischbach. 4th and 42d Divisions in second line. Headquarters are as follows: Third Army, Hollerich: III Corps, Junglinster: IV Corps, Hesperange: VII Corps, Virton: 2d Division, Medernach: 32d Division, Consdorf: 42d Division, Mersch: 3d Division, Remich: 1st Division, Canach: 4th Division, Hayange: 5th Division, Longuyon: 89th Division, Stenay: 90th Division, Mouzay changes to Marville November 24. No other changes projected.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 8

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 24, 1918.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Third Army will not cross the LUXEMBURG GERMAN frontier until about December 1.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: Advance elements of the Third Army reached as planned the objective set for November 23. The line now follows the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier along the entire army front. Officer's posts have been established at all bridges and ferries to prevent unauthorized crossing. The pause in the advance is being utilized for training, inspection, and reorganization.

The VII Corps comprising the 89th and 90th Divisions is being assembled in the area bounded by: ETALLE---JAMOIGNE---FLORENVILLE---CARIGNAN---MOUZON (all excl.)---thence along the MEUSE River to DUN-sur-MEUSE---MARVILLE---VIRTON (all incl.).

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French army has reached the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier and the LORRAINE-GERMAN boundary.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 9

THIRD ARMY,
November 25, 1918.

November 24/25, 1918, 12 h. to 12 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We remained halted during the day on our entire army front, the general line being the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier. Many discharged German soldiers are entering the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBURG. No units of the enemy remain in LUXEMBURG.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Enemy continues to withdraw on the general lines of TREVES and SAARBURG.

V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIEL, ETC.: Horse Depot No. 33 of the Fifth Army had at TEMMICK [not identified], November 19, 271 horses and 340 colts. The horses were in fair, the colts in excellent, condition. Artillery passing through this town on these days had a full compliment of horses.

Shortage of horses obliged troops passing through NIEDERNACH [not identified] to draw their carts by hand.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE ENEMY: Troops on reaching German soil disposed of some of their live stock in too bad shape to drive farther with them.

VIII. POPULATIONS, ETC. OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY: The German occupation of LUXEMBURG in 1914 was accomplished in an orderly way with no violations of discipline or injuries to the inhabitants. The welcome to our army continues, but some indifference is shown on the river. One of the principal LUXEMBURG papers reminds the inhabitants that the town would be disgraced if they asked unfair prices of the American and French troops.

No serious destruction of property has been reported. The country presents the appearance of times of peace.

X. MISCELLANEOUS: It is estimated that of the 1 1/2 million prisoners to be released by the Germans, approximately 200,000 of these will pass through our lines, and must be handled by us.

A German soldier of the 4th Battery, 280th Field Artillery, states that all German soldiers are being discharged except the classes of 1898 and 1899, who are being held in service until General von Hindenburg sees fit to discharge them. That von Hindenburg is commander of all the German armies at present.

That there are at present no civilian police in Germany, only military police, and as yet no stable form of government has been organized. That conditions in Germany are good, people being at work and all is quiet. That there is enough to eat, but it is not distributed as it should be, and part of the food spoils.

Statement from a reliable source that for several days after the Armistice was signed, all railroad trains leading from the French front were packed with German soldiers who had deserted their commands and were returning home. All passenger and freight trains were loaded with them, and in some cases they had taken entire possession of the train, including the engine, and were directing its movements.

The stations, and particularly the one in the city of LUXEMBOURG, were the scenes of much disorder. Officers had no control over their men, those who were on the trains or at the stations being treated with gross disrespect. While he had heard of cases of assault made upon the officers, but had no knowledge of specific cases. He had, however, knowledge that officers had been compelled to remove their insignia of rank and were openly disrespected by their soldiers. Pillaging of military stores was open. It was estimated that there passed through LUXEMBURG in this demoralized condition at least 100,000 of the enemy.

Immediately the general retreat began, the troops that marched through on the roads were not at all disorganized, but on the contrary, showed very good discipline and were well under the control of their officers. The condition of the animals and equipment, and the state of the men was normal. There was a shortage of forage for the horses and some shortage of animals for transports. He judged that many of the officers had left their commands and were returning home.

From the statement of a discharged German soldier who entered our lines we learned that on November 10, the day before the signing of the Armistice, street riots took place in BERLIN, and his battalion, with a number of similar battalions was called out. They occupied the SCHOENEBERGER railroad station. He said that marine troops agitated most of the riots, and that members of a railroad regiment advised him and his comrades to throw away their rifles, which they did. He saw none of the riots himself, but was told that the marines and other troops had besieged the Imperial Palace for several days and finally succeeded in driving out the officers and soldier garrison which occupied the place. He said the houses and stores which line the Unter den Linden were all occupied by machine guns. He, as well as other prisoners, travelled by train through the greater part of GERMANY and they declare that a reaction has now set in and the rioting has ceased, at least for the present. This man further states that his own officers, as well as those of other units, were disarmed by their own men and that a soldiers' council is now in charge of the situation. This body is composed mostly of enlisted men and only a few subaltern officers are members.

Our engineers report that the following bridges across the MOSELLE, in the IV Corps area, are all suitable for two way traffic, and are in good condition. Further details will be furnished after more complete reconnaissance:

GREVENMACHER
WORMELDANGE
REMICH
SCHENGEN

Over the SURE River the following:

WASSERBILLIG-KONZ
ROSPORT-WILTINGEN
ECHTERNACH-SAARBURG

All of these bridges will take heavy traffic.

A partial inventory of materiel turned over to us by the enemy shows the following: 695 cannon; 324 minnenwerfers; 4,455 heavy and light machine guns; 5 anti-aircraft guns; 31 aeroplanes; 38 locomotives; 495 railway cars; numbers of limbers, caissons, auto trucks, different kinds of dumps, etc.

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Appendix to Paragraph III

From the French Fifth Army we learn of certain moves made by the enemy in their retirement. From this information together with information gathered by the American Third Army the following conclusion may be deducted:

1. That the German Second Army has been absorbed by the German Seventeenth Army.
2. The German Fourth Army moved out along the line Malines---Aerschot---Hasselt.
3. The German Sixth Army moved out through the General area of Liege and south thereof.
4. The German Eighteenth Army moved out through the Malmedy area.
5. The German Seventh Army moved out through the Ciney area.
6. The German First Army moved out through Waxweiler area.
7. The German Fifth Army moved out through Treves area.
8. The Army Detachment C moved out through Bouzonville area.

If we follow the probable routes from these points to the RHINE it is fair to assume that:

1. The German Fourth and Sixth Armies pass through Aix-la-Chapelle and hence probably towards Dusseldorf.
2. The Seventeenth (combination of old Seventeenth and Second Armies) and the Eighteenth Armies from Malmedy and thence probably on Cologne.
3. The First and Seventh and probably part of the German Third Armies through Waxweiler and thence to Neuwied.
4. The Fifth and part of the German Third Army through Treves to Coblenz.
5. Army Detachment C through Bouzonville to Saarelouis and Bingen or Mayence.

These armies appear to be grouped under two higher commands known as Group A and Group B, of which the German Fourth, Sixth, Seventeenth and Seventh Armies are under Group A, and the First, Third and probably Fifth under Group B. No information is at hand as to what group the balance of the German armies are under, but it is probable that a third Group C exists which may be composed of the Fifth, Detachment C, Nineteenth and B Armies.

Confirmation of the above is given in German newspapers of recent date which state that General von Eberhard, commanding the First Army announced on November 18 that he has taken command of sector Rhine---Asselborn---Arzfeld---Walsdorf---Heckenbach---Brohl---Neuwied---Mayen---Daun---Birsborn---Karlshausen---Nieder-Wambach, this sector being that over which the First Army will cross the Rhine Province.

General von Hutier, Commanding the Eighteenth Army announces that the sector through which his troops will pass is bounded on the north by Malmedy---Gemund---Schwerfen---Metternich---Hersel and on the south by St-Vith---Stadtkyll---Meckenheim and Godesberg.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 24, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q.

G-3, No. 26

Line unchanged no forward movement tomorrow. Corps and division boundaries remain the same. Headquarters 90th Division opened at Marville today. Headquarters 89th Division opens at Dampicourt November 25. No other changes in headquarters made or projected.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 9

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
Luxembourg, November 25, 1918---10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Third Army is in position on the LUXEMBURG GERMAN frontier.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The III and IV Corps remained in position on the left bank of the SURE and MOSELLE Rivers. Only minor changes in the location of troops have been effected in the last 24 hours.

The assembly of the VII Corps in its new area is still in progress.

Elements of the 5th Division are en route for stations along the line of communications.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

November 25/26, 1918, 12 h. to 12 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our line remained unchanged along the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border. Many discharged German soldiers whose homes are in Luxemburg entered our lines. The day has been quiet and without any disturbing incident.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: A train of 60 cars passed through WINTERSDORF today crowded with soldiers. This is the first formation of movement by rail aside from materiel since our advance. Congestion continues at TREVES and it is reported that this congestion has caused units to proceed by foot toward COBLENCE which it had been previously intended to ship by rail. Troops are still moving through TREVES yesterday, some of whom arrived from SAAREBOURG. The last troops were expected to leave today.

Identifications of units belonging to the same division have been received from both sides of the MOSELLE. It would seem therefore that the enemy was forced to divide his larger units up as he approached the river on account of the congestion at the bridgeheads.

IV. ENEMY MORALE: Nothing to report.

V. STATE OF THE HORSES, MATERIEL, ETC.: On their retreat, the Germans, on reaching CATTENOM, had no horses with them and were forced to purchase some from the civilians by reason of necessity; while at GAVISSE, they had stock with them, the horses appearing to be in good condition. Supplementing the above, the enemy had a number of motor vehicles among which were French touring cars. The population in areas evacuated by the Germans in northern FRANCE declare that practically all of their live stock was taken by the enemy on his retreat.

At BURMERANGE, some 150 horses passed. A number of machine-gun carts were pulled by the men. Horses passing through ECHTERNACH were noted to be underfed and exhausted. An exception should remain, however, for the artillery units where the horses were in good shape.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Situation Report, Third Army, at 16 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 25, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q No. 28

Line unchanged. No forward movement tomorrow.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
Luxembourg, November 26, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Third Army remains in position on the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier. Plans are being made for resuming the advance about December 1.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: In the III and IV Corps only minor changes in the location of troops have been made in the last 24 hours.

The assembly of the VII Corps in its new area has been completed.

Elements of the 5th Division are en route for stations along the line of communications.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French Fifth Army reports that the 61st Div. (XI Corps) withdrew on November 25 to the line BOCKHOLZ---HOSCHEID---BOURSCHEID. The 48th Div. (XI Corps) advances on November 26 to the line BOURSCHEID-MERZIG--GROSBUS ---BETTBORN.

The XXI Corps (Fifth Army) remains in position.

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 11

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 27, 1918.

November 26/27, 1918, 12 h. to 12 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our line remained unchanged along the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border. The retreating German army is steadily moving eastward in good order.

* * * * *

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The enemy continues to retire down the MOSELLE. There are very few troops W. of BERNCASTEL. Reliable information indicates that the German Fifth Army is not crossing the RHINE in any force at COBLANCE, but is following the left bank of the RHINE to BINGEN and MAYENCE, at which point it will probably cross over to the E. bank. The headquarters of General von Marwitz, commanding the Fifth Army was at BINGEN on RHINE on November 25.

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By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 16 Hours

THIRD ARMY A. E. F.,
November 26, 1918.

Chief of American Mission

Senlis

G-3, No. 37. Line unchanged. No forward movement tomorrow. No changes in headquarters. This report will be discontinued until situation changes.

DICKMAN.

From 10 h to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Third Army is still in position on the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The III and IV Corps remained in position on the west bank of the SURE and MOSELLE Rivers.

The 166th F. A. Brig. (VII Corps) is moving from the Bois de BROCCOURT to the region of MOUZAY.

The 6th Inf. (5th Div.) is en route from LONGWY to the City of TREVES, of which it will constitute the garrison.

A few other minor changes in the location of troops have taken place in the last 24 hours.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Liaison maintained with neighboring armies.

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 12

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 28, 1918.

From 12 h. Nov. 27 to 12 h. Nov. 28, 1918

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our line remained unchanged along the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border. The German army is being demobilized on a large scale, the soldiers being sent to their homes.

* * * * *

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: A few scattered units have been observed on the other side of the frontier. Apparently the enemy has withdrawn his guards from the bridges at BOLLENDORF, ECHTERNACH, MINDEN, ROSPORT and WINTERSDORF.

Considerable congestion is reported on all the roads between TREVES and COBLANCE.

The German Sixth and Seventeenth Armies are reported as due to pass through COLOGNE between November 6 and 17. Some of the transport columns of the German Fifth Army are said to be crossing the RHINE at COBLENZ and LIENZ.

Headquarters of Field Marshal von Hindenburg is in the SCHULSSHOF Hotel, WILHELMSHOHE, a suburb of CASSEL.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 27, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q.

G-3 No. 39. Line unchanged. No forward movement tomorrow. Corps and division boundaries remain the same. No changes in headquarters made or projected.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 12

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 28, 1918.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The line of the Third Army remains unchanged on the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: In the III and IV Corps no changes have been made in the dispositions of troops during the last 24 hours.

The VII Corps begins tomorrow to close on the III and IV Corps, this move being preliminary to the resumption of the general advance about December 1.

The movement of the 166th F. A. Brigade (VII Corps) from RARECOURT to STENAY was completed November 27.

The 164th F. A. Brigade and the 314th Amm. Train, now in the vicinity of HEUDICOURT, will march on November 29 to join the 89th Div. east of VIRTON on December 2.

The 6th Inf. (5th Div.) is en route for the City of TREVES, of which it will constitute the garrison.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Liaison maintained with neighboring armies.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 13

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 29, 1918.

November 28/29, 1918, 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our line remained unchanged along the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border. The day has been quiet with no disturbing incident.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Very few troops are reported with 15 kms. of the left sector of our front. The 5th Res. Div. and 105th Div., are said to have been the last formations withdrawn from BELGIUM. German officers, according to a citizen's statement, were heard to say that all troops of eastern and central Germany would march to FRANKFURT and from there would go home by rail.

The Fourth and Seventeenth Armies are reported as crossing the RHINE to COLOGNE.

The following is quoted from the Frankfurter Nachrichten Nov. 26, 1918.

Troops movements across the XVIII Corps district:

The district of the XVIII Army Corps will be crossed from W. to E. by seven armies, as follows:

By the Seventeenth Army: N. of the line SIEGBURG---WINTERSCHEID---ECKENBOGEN [ECKENHAGEN?]-HILCHENBACH---WINTERBERG---CORBACH.

By the Eighteenth Army: S. of the previously mentioned line and N. of the line KONIGSWINTER---SIEGEN---EIDENKOPF---GEMUNDEN.

By the Seventh Army: S. of the previously mentioned line and N. of the line of HERSCHBACH---STEIN-NEUKIRCH---HERBORN---HOMBERG.

By the First Army: S. of the previously mentioned line and N. of the line BENDORF---WESTERBURG---WETZLAR---GIESSEN---ULRICHSTEIN---MARBACH.

By the Third Army: S. of the previously mentioned line and N. of the line EMS---HIRSCHBERG---WESTERBURG---WESTMUNSTER [not identified]---KLEEBERG---BERSTADT-bet-NIDDA---FREIEN-STEINAU---FLIEDEN---GERSFELD.

By the Fifth Army: S. of the previously mentioned line and N. of the line KREUZNACH ---SPRENDLINGEN---HOCKENHEIM [NACKENHEIM ?]---GROSS-GERAU---OBER-ODEN---MAINFLINGEN.

By Army Detachment C: S. of the previously mentioned line.

The roads to be taken have not yet been definitely arranged. It must be taken into account that in the various territories, all roads will have to be used by the troops during their passage. The movements will take from 8 to 10 days.

The cities and villages on the lines of demarcation lie partially in the reach of the northward marching armies, and partially in that of the southward marching armies.

The Fifth Army, which is to pass FRANKFURT within the next few days, is marching in splendid order, and in good spirits, through the MOSELLE Valley. Villages everywhere are decorated in honor of the home comers. Their reception by the populace is hearty and they are being well cared for.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 28, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 44 Line unchanged. VII Corps moves November 29/December 1 to area bounded by Thiaumont---Robelmont---Dampicourt---Revemont---Domprix-Lommeringen---Deutsch-Oth---Sanem---Clemency. The 164th Field Artillery Brigade and 314th Ammunition Train marches November 29, from Heudicourt to join 89th Division east of Virton December 2. Movement of 166th Field Artillery Brigade VII Corps from Rarecourt to Stenay completed November 27. Corps and divisions boundaries remain the same. Headquarters 89th Division opens at St-Leger, 90th Division at Petange, both 18 h. November 30. No other changes in headquarters made or projected.

DICKMAN.

193-32.1: Orders

Plans for the Crossing of the German Frontier

FIELD ORDERS
No. 6

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 29, 1918--12 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000
Operations Map No. 2

[Extract]

1. The enemy is withdrawing across the RHINE.
The French Tenth Army on the right and the British Second Army on the left advance abreast of our army.

2. (a) The American Third Army will cross the German frontier on December 1.
- (b) Boundaries of the zone of advance of the army:

Northern (left): As at present between CARIGNAN and MERZIG; thence MERZIG (exclusive)---OBERFEULEN---NIEDERFEULEN---BOURSCHEID---HOSCHEID---CONSTHUM---BOCKHOLZ (all inclusive)---MUNSHAUSEN (exclusive)---MARBOURG---RODER (both inclusive)---HEINERSCHEID---KALBORN (both exclusive) thence the eastern frontier of LUXEMBURG; thence the administrative boundary separating the Districts of COBLENZ and TREVES from those of COLOGNE and AIX-la-CHAPELLE, approximately the line LOMMERSWEILER---MANDERFELD---KRONENBURG---WALDORF---ROHR---HILBERATH---OBERWINTER.

Southern (right): As at present to SCHENGEN; thence the southern limit of the Circle [Kreis] of SAARBURG; thence the northern and eastern limits of the Circle of MERZIG; thence the northwestern limit of the Principality of BIRKENFELD; thence the northwestern limit of the Circle of KREUZNACH; approximately the line: SCHENGEN---SAARBURG---SITZERATH---MUHLFELD---ZUSCH---KEMPFELD---KELLENBACH---DICHTELBACH---TRECHTINGSHAUSEN.

(c) The advance elements of the army will reach the following general lines on the days indicated:

First Day: ALFERSTEG---WINTERSCHEID---MASTHORN---MULBACH---KYL---CORDEL---TREVES---KONZ; thence the SAAR River within army limits.

Second Day: KREWINKEL---ROTH---NEUENDORF---DAUSFELD---NEIDENBACH---METTERICH---RIEVENICH---MORSCHIED---MANDERN---HIRCHFELDERHOF.

Third Day: DAHLEM---GLAADT---OVER BETTINGEN---KALENBORN---WALLENBORN---EISENSCHMITT---WITTLICH---ZELTINGEN---BERNCASTEL---OSANN---REINSFELD---STEINBERG.

Fourth Day: Same as third day to BERNCASTEL: thence GORNHAUSEN---HUNOLSTEIN---BASCH---MALBORN---NONNWEILER---OTZENHAUSEN. (Phase Line No. 4)

This line will not be crossed until further orders.

(d) Boundary between III and IV Corps: As at present to WASSERBILLIG; thence the WASSERBILLIG---EHRANG---NOVIAND---BERNCASTEL Road (to the IV Corps), thence the MOSELLE River to its mouth.

3. (A) The III Corps will advance to its successive objectives with three divisions in first line and two divisions in second line. Second line divisions will follow first line divisions at two days' march.

(B) The IV Corps will advance to its successive objectives with two divisions in first line and one division in second line. Second line division will follow first line divisions at two days' march.

(C) The VII Corps will advance on December 2, to the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers, in three marches, covering the leading corps with one division in the region of ECHTERNACH and one division in the region of Remich.

(D) The 5th Division will remain in place and continue to perform its present mission.

(E) The forward movement of army troops will be covered in separate orders

(X) First line divisions will advance in combat formation well echeloned in depth.

Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.

American troops will not be billeted in the cities of THIONVILLE or LUXEMBOURG or in the city of TREVES except by authority of army headquarters.

No organizations or detachments will cross the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier before 5:30 h., December 1.

* * * * *

5. Headquarters:

Third Army - HOLLERICH (to open at BITBURG at 15 h., December 3).

III Corps - JUNGLINSTER (to open at ECHTERNACH at 15 h., December 1, and at KYLLBURG at 15 h., December 3).

IV Corps - HESPERANGE (to open at GREVENMACHER at 15 h., December 1, and at SCHWEICH, 15 h., December 3).

VII Corps - VIRTON (to open at GREVENMACHER at 15 h., December 4).

5th Division - LONGUYON (to open at HOLLERICH at 15 h., December 4).

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 13

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
Luxemburg, November 29, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Third Army remains in position on the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier until December 1, when the march to the RHINE will be resumed.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Liaison maintained with neighboring armies.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 14

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 30, 1918.

November 29/30, 1918, 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our line remained unchanged along the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border. Our troops continue to be received with great courtesy by the population throughout the German Duchy of Luxemburg.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The withdrawal continues. The route of withdrawal of the 13th Res. Div. is stated to have LEEDA [LEDE ?]---MERCHTEM---VILVORDE---WESTCLARE [WESPELAER ?]---AERSCHOT---LANG---HERKESTAAT---AACHEN---EUCHEN---JULICH.

The withdrawal from FLANDERS began November 11, the division being reported as reaching DUSSELDORF, Nov. 28.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 29, 1918.

Chief American Mission, Senlis

G-3 No. 48. Line unchanged. Corps and divisions boundaries remain the same. VII Corps moving today to area given at last report. Headquarters 89th Division opens at St-Leger, 90th Division at Rodange, both 18 h., November 30. No other changes in headquarters made or projected for tomorrow. Second dismounted cavalry division and 48th Division, both French, pass to Third Army 5 h., December 1, and will be attached to III Corps, effective same date and hour. Headquarters 2d Dismounted Cavalry Division Trois-Vierges: 48th Division Redange.

DICKMAN.

193-32.1: Orders

Changes to Orders

FIELD ORDERS
No. 6

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 30, 1918--17 h.

2. (d) Change the boundary between III and IV Corps to read: "As at present to WASSERBILLIG; thence the WASSERBILLIG---EHRANG---HETZERATH---WITTLICH Road (to the IV Corps)." The extension of this boundary will be announced later.

3. (A) Change to read: "The III Corps will advance to its successive objectives with two divisions in the first line and one division in second line. Second line division will follow first line divisions at two days' march."

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Situation unchanged. The Third Army resumes the general advance tomorrow December 1.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Liaison maintained with neighboring armies.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-10.5: Strength Report

Statistical Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 1, 1918--17 h.

	LOCATION	O.	ENL. MEN	EFF. RIFLES	CASU- ALTIES	ANIMALS
Third Army	Hollerich	A 612	11,743	7,090		383
5th Div.	Longuyon	A 802	14,925	6,597		1,608
III Corps	Echternach	B 399	8,785	6,171		1,176
2d Div.	Mettendorf	1,079	25,583	14,118		6,575
32d Div.	Welschbillig	1,015	24,176	8,184		6,327
42d Div.	Mersch	921	24,339	9,400		6,146
Total		3,414	82,883	37,873		20,224
IV Corps	Grevenmacher	B 379	7,660			944
1st Div.	Conz	915	22,965	13,693		5,191
3d Div.	Saarburg	1,024	24,445	10,521		6,533
4th Div.	Hayange	1,064	24,485	10,954		5,600
Total IV Corps		3,382	79,555	35,168		18,268
VII Corps	Virton	B 432	6,392	3,962		410
89th Div.	St Leger	380	14,312	8,340		1,372
90th Div.	Rodange	820	19,950	7,174		1,788
Total VII Corps		1,632	40,654	19,476		3,570
Total Third Army		9,842	229,760	106,204		44,053

CHANGE IN STATION LIST

ARMY TROOPS

56th Pioneer Infantry	En route to Pfalzel
Co. A	Longwy
Co. B	Longwy
Co. D	Mersch
1st Bn. and Co. C	Aubange
Cos. K and L	En route to Treves
Co. M	En route to Wecker
2d Cav., Hq. and 1st Squadron	En route to Ehrang
Third Army (314th) Remount Squadron	En route to Lintgen
Det., 417th Motor Supply Train	Hollerich

ROSCOE D. BROWN,
Major, Adjutant General,
Personnel Adjutant.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 15

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 1, 1918.

November 30 to Dec. 1, 1918, 10 h. to 10h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We crossed the border into GERMANY along our whole army front this morning, the general line reached being ALFERSTEG---WINTERSCHIED---MASTHORN---MULBACH---KYL---CORDEL---TREVES---KONZ, thence to the SAAR River within army limits. No disturbing incident of any kind took place. All the flags and decorations that were up for the retreating German army had been removed before we crossed the border. The German people received us quietly, simply standing along the roads, and in the towns, gazing at our passing troops, but saying little. They showed no animosity when asked questions as to directions, etc., and seemed perfectly willing to answer ordinary questions.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Rear of German Seventh Army, Dec. 2, will be MAHLBERG (51) ---WERSHOFEN (560)---BARWEILER (602).

A newspaper report states that part of the Fourth Army is marching via HOMBURG---RUHRORT---MEIDERICH---OBERHAUSEN. The balance on the main highway to DUSSELDORF. It further states the army is going to WESTPHALIA for separation and demobilization.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
November 30, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q.

G-3 No. 54. Line unchanged. Corps and division boundaries remain the same. The VII Corps moving to line Thiaumont-Clemency. No change in headquarters. Changes projected for tomorrow: III Corps, Echternach; 2d Division, Mettendorf; 32d Division, Welschbillig; 42d Division, Mersch; IV Corps, Grevenmacher; 1st Division, Konz; 3d Division, Saarburg; 4th Division no change. Line to be reached December 1, Alfersteg---Winterscheid---Masthorn---Mulbach---Kyll---Cordel---Treves---Konz; thence the Saar River within army limits.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 15

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
Luxembourg, December 1, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Third Army crossed the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier. The advance was made without incident. The attitude of the German people in the territory passed through is passive. No hostile acts occurred.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The general advance began at 5:30 a. m., December 1 from LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier in direction of general line ALFERSTEG ---WINTERSCHIED---MASTHORN---MULBACH---KYLL---CORDEL---TREVES---KONZ---thence SAAR River within army limits. Reports indicate that this line will be reached today.

6th Infantry staged night of November 30/December 1 at WASSERBILLIG and is now advancing to TREVES.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: General advance made in liaison with neighboring armies.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

DECEMBER 1/2, 1918, 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We continued our advance into Germany without encountering any disturbing incident. The general line reached is KREWINKEL---ROTH---NEUENDORF---DAUSFELD---NIEDENBACH---METTERICH---RIEVENICH---MORSCHHEID---MANDERN---HIRSCHFELDERHOF.

The inhabitants show only an indifferent curiosity toward our troops. As we reach new areas there is more or less nervousness shown by the inhabitants, but after our troops actually occupy these areas, this nervousness rapidly disappears.

Opposite our left sector travel is difficult due to the hilly country with a few good roads.

There appears to be no serious food shortage.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The enemy continues to withdraw. Reliable information indicates that the rearguards of the German Sixth, Seventeenth, First, and Third Armies had reached the following lines on the dates indicated:

Sixth Army: No troops W. of the ERFT between BEDBURG and MODRATH on December 1.

Seventeenth Army: Dec. 1 - NORVENICH-WICHTERICH.

Dec. 2 - GYMNICH---LIBLAR---ROSBERG.

Dec. 4 (6 a. m.) - E. bank of the RHINE.

First Army: Nov. 30 - KALENBORN---LISSINGEN.

Third Army: Dec. 1 - DAUN---UDLER---STROHN.

Dec. 2 - URSFELD---AUDERATH---URSCHMITT.

Dec. 3 - MONREAL---HAMBUCH---CLOTTEN.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 1, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 60. No change army headquarters. Headquarters III Corps, Echternach; Headquarters 2d Division, Mettendorf; Headquarters 32d Division, Welschbillig; 42d Division, Mersch. Headquarters IV Corps, Grevenmacher; Headquarters 1st Division Konz; 3d Division Saarburg; 4th Division, Hayange. Headquarters VII Corps, Virton; 89th Division, St-Leger; 90th Division, Rodange.

Projected changes 2d Division, Rittersdorf; 32d Division, Speicher; 42d Division, Consdorf; 1st Division, Schweich; 4th Division, Remich. Front line, Alfersteg--Winterscheid--Mulbach--Cordel--Konz thence to Saar River to army limits. Line for December 2, Krewinkel--Roth--Dausfeld--Metterich--Morscheid--Hirchfelderhof. Boundary line between III and IV Corps road Ehrang-Wasserbillig. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions Ferschweiler-Wolsfeld. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions, Wincheringen-Wiltingen.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 16

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
Luxembourg, December 2, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

- I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy continues his retirement across the RHINE.
- II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: Third Army marched as per schedule. Troops in billets early yesterday with exception of some elements of 2d Division which were slowed down by poor roads and steep grades. General advance made at 7 a. m. today towards line: KREWINKEL--ROTH--NEUENDORF--DAUSFELD--NEIDENBACH--METTERICH--RIEVENICH--MORSCHIED--MANDERN--HERCHFELDERHOF. Early reports indicate that this line will be reached by 4 p. m.
- III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Liaison maintained with neighboring armies. The French Tenth Army reports that it will reach Phase Line No. 4 today.

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 2, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 65. No change army headquarters, corps headquarters since last report. Headquarters 2d Division Rittersdorf, Headquarters 32d Division, Speicher; Headquarters 2d Division, Consdorf; Headquarters 1st Division, Schweich; Headquarters 3d Division, Saarburg; 4th Division, Remich; Headquarters 89th Division, St-Leger; Headquarters 90th Division, Rodange; Headquarters 5th Division, Longuyon. Projected changes III Corps, Kyllburg; IV Corps, Schweich; 2d Division, Prum; 42d Division, Helenenburg; 1st Division, Wittlich; 3d Division, Reinsfeld, 89th Division, Mersch; 90th Division, Bettembourg. Front line Krewinkel---Roth---Neuendorf---Dausfeld---Neidenbach---Metterich---Rievenich---Morscheid---Mandern---Hirschfelderhof. Line to be reached December 3, Dahlem-Glaadt---Ober-Bettingen---Kalenborn---Wallenborn---Eisenschmitt---Wittlich---Zeltingen---Berncastel---Osann---Reinsfeld---Steinberg. Boundary between III and IV Corps, Ehrang-Wittlich Road. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions Kyllburg---Rittersdorf---Ingendorf. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions, Niederfeld---Filsch---Wiltingen.

DICKMAN.

193-32.1: Orders

Continuation of the Advance

FIELD ORDERS
No. 7

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 3, 1918---17:30 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000
Operations Map No. 2

[Extract]

1. The enemy continues his withdrawal in accordance with the terms of the Armistice.

The French Tenth Army and the British Second Army remain on our right and left respectively.

2. (a) The American Third Army will continue its advance on December 5.

(b) Boundaries of the zone of advance of the army are unchanged.

(c) The advance elements of the army will reach the following general lines on the dates indicated:

December 5: UDELHOVEN---NOHN---STEINBERG---WALLSCHEID---SCHEIDWEILER
---RAVERSBEUREN---BRUCHWEILER---RINGEL-KOPF.

December 6: RUPPERATH---BOOS---LAUBACH---DRIESCH---TODENROTH---NEIDER-
WORRESBACH.

December 7: MECKENHEIM---BLASWEILER---KEMPENICH---MAYEN---
GREIMERSBURG---BUCH---SIMMERN---KELLENBACH.

December 8: OBER-WINTER---REMAGEN---KEMPENICH---MAYEN---GREIMERSBURG---BUCH---SIMMERN---KELLENBACH. (Phase Line No. 5) This line will not be crossed until further orders.

(d) Boundary between the III and IV Corps is extended: WITTLICH---WALLSCHEID---LUTZERATH---DRIESCH---GEVENICH---LANDKERN (all to the IV Corps).

3. (a) The III and IV Corps will advance to their successive objectives each with two divisions in first line and one division in second line. Second line divisions will cover the outer flank divisions of the first line, following at two days' march. Their rear elements will clear Phase Line No. 4 by 20 h., December 8.

(b) The VII Corps will cross the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier on December 6. The left division will be advanced to the area BITBURG---PRUM---DAUN---WITTLICH. This movement will be completed on December 9. The right division will be marched in the direction REMICH---TRIER---WITTLICH, the leading elements to arrive on the line WITTLICH-BERNCASTEL on December 10 with the rear elements east of TRIER.

(c) The forward movement of the 5th Division and of army troops will be covered in separate orders.

(X) First line divisions will advance in combat formation, well echeloned in depth.

Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.

Troops will not be billeted in the city of LUXEMBOURG or in the city of TRIER, except by authority of the garrison commander in each case.

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5. Headquarters:

Third Army - BITBURG

III Corps - KYLLBURG (to open at DAUN at 15 h., December 6)

IV Corps - SCHWEICH (to open at ZELL at 15 h., December 7)

VII Corps - GREVENMACHER

5th Division - HOLLERICH

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 17

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
Luxembourg, December 3, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy continues his withdrawal across the RHINE in accordance with the terms of the Armistice.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The general advance was made in good order and without incident. The VII Corps is marching with two divisions in rear of the III and IV Corps.

The 5th Division is advancing in conformity with forward movement of the army. Early reports indicate that the day's objective will be reached by 4 p. m.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 17

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 3, 1918.

December 2/3, 1918, 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We continued our advance into GERMANY. No disturbing incident took place. The general line reached is DAHLEM---ORMONT---PRONSFELD
---ARZFELD---MANDERFELD---OLZHEIM---SALM---EISENSCHMITT---WITTLICH---BERNCASTEL
---NOVIAND---HEIDENBURG---BEUREN---WADRILL.

The marked reserve and curiosity shown by the German people during the past two days in the areas occupied by our troops is rapidly disappearing, but is still apparent as new areas are approached.

No serious food shortage has been noted, and the inhabitants appear anything but starved.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: During the period of eight days approximately 270,000 men and 70,000 horses, said to belong to the German Third and Fifth Armies, were reported to have passed through RITTERSDORF. The last troops passed through this place on November 28.

Pontoon bridges are said to have been thrown across the RHINE at COBLENZ to facilitate the withdrawal of the troops, which is believed to be proceeding in good order and dispatch in spite of the congestion caused by the arrival of large numbers of troops on the W bank of the RHINE.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Modification of Field Orders No. 7

FIELD ORDERS
No. 8

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 4, 1918--22:30 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000
Operations Map No. 2

1. The left (2d) division of the III Corps will remain in place December 5 on the line GLAADT-WEIDENBACH. It will resume its advance on December 6, to arrive on the line OBERWINTER-KEMPENICH on December 9.

Headquarters: III Corps KYLLBURG (to open at DAUN at 15 h., December 7).

2. Field Orders No. 7, these headquarters, is modified accordingly.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 18

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 4, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy continues his withdrawal in good order across the RHINE. No armed forces were encountered.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The day's march completed without incident. Rainy weather and muddy roads retarded the march of troops and transport.

Early reports indicate that advance elements will reach day's objective by 4 p. m.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: French Tenth Army resumes its advance December 5. British Second Army report the movement of a brigade of cavalry to COLOGNE on December 6.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We continued our advance into Germany. No disturbing incident took place. The general line reached is DAHLEM---GLAADT--OBER-BETTINGEN---KALENBORN---WALLENBORN---EISENCHMITT---WITTLICH---ZELTINGEN---BERNCASTEL---GORNHAUSEN---HUNOLSTEIN---BASCH---MALBORN---NONNWEILLER---OTZENHAUSEN.

The weather was bad, and the roads very muddy and slippery. There are many discharged German soldiers still in uniform, in the territory occupied by us. Both discharged German soldiers and civilians are going quietly about their business, and so far have caused no trouble whatsoever.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: German troops are reported to be still in COLOGNE on Dec. 3. Another unconfirmed report states that no hostile troops are now in COBLENZ. The general withdrawal appears to be continuing without incident.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S. G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 4, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 67. Headquarters Third Army, Bitburg; 5th Division, Hollerich, III Corps, Kyllburg; 2d Division, Pruem; 32d Division, Speicher; 42d Division, Welschbillig; 4th Division, Saarburg; 3d Division, Osburg; 1st Division, Hetzerath; IV Corps, Schweich; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Echternach; 90th Division, Femich. Projected changes in headquarters for tomorrow: 2d Division, Gerolstein; 32d Division, Manderscheid; 42d Division, Speicher; 1st Division, Wittlich; 3d Division, Morbach; 4th Division, Pallingen. Location of front line: Dahlem---Ober-Gertingen---Salm---Wittlich---Berncastel---Gornhausen---Merscheid---Malborn---Hermeskeil. Line which army is expected to reach tomorrow: Udelhoven---Nohn---Steinberg---Wallscheid---Scheidweiler---Raversbeuren---Bruchweiler---Ringel-Kopf.

Boundary between III and IV Corps Hetzerath---Wittlich---Wallscheid. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions Seinsfeld---Weidenbach---Steinborn. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions Gornhausen---Fronhofen---Tellig.

DICKMAN.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Location of Front Line at 16 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 4, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 66. Dahlem---Ober-Bettigen---Salm---Wittlich---Berncastel---Gornhausen---Merscheid---Malborn---Hermeskeil. Line to be reached December 5: Udelhoven---Nohn---Steinberg---Wallscheid---Scheidweiler---Raversbeuren---Bruchweiler---Ringel-Kopf.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 19

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 5, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

- I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy continues his withdrawal.
- II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The left (2d) division, III Corps, and the VII Corps remain in place December 5.
The 32d and 42d Divisions (III Corps), and the IV Corps are advancing towards the RHINE in accordance with F. O. No. 7, December 3, 1918.
The 66th Arty. Brig. completes movements to WASSERBILLIG area today.
- III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The cavalry of the British Second Army reached line KRONENBERG---DUREN---thence along ROER River, December 4.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: With the exception of our left flank we continued our advance toward the RHINE, the general line reached being GLAADT---WEIDENBACH---DAUN---WALLSCHEID---SCHEIDWEILER---RAVERSBEUREN---BRUCHWEILER---RINGEL-KOPF. No act of hostility by either returned German soldiers or civilians occurred. In the main, the feeling shown by them is either one of curiosity or stolid indifference. There is an inclination towards friendliness on the part of many of the civilian population whenever an opportunity arises.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The withdrawal continues. The German Sixth Army (opposite the army on our left) is reliably reported to have been completely withdrawn across the RHINE on December 6. The last three divisions in the vicinity of DUSSELDORF are said to have been withdrawn across the RHINE by November 30. These would probably belong to the German Fourth Army. Confirmation of this report is required as the other armies have not withdrawn so quickly. The passage over the RHINE is reported as relieved by the completion of temporary pontoon bridges near BENDORF, NIEDERWERTH and ANDERNACH: The headquarters of General von Marwitz are reported to be in FRANKFURT.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Location of Front Line

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 5, 1918.

G-3 No. 74. Reference your number twenty three hundred G-3. Front line reached December 3 should be: Dahlem---Ormont---Olzheim---thence as given.

DICKMAN,

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 5, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3, No. 75. Headquarters Third Army, Bitburg; 5th Division, Hollerich; III Corps, Kyllburg; 2d Division, Pruem; 32d Division, Daun; 42d Division, Speicher; IV Corps, Schweich; 1st Division, Wittlich; 3d Division, Morbach; 4th Division, Pelligen; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Echternach; 90th Division, Remich. Projected changes for tomorrow: 2d Division, Gerolstein; 42d Division, Birresborn; 1st Division Alf; 4th Division, Osburg. Location of front line: Glaadt---Weidenbach---Steinborn---Kradenbach---Steinberg---Wallscheid---Scheidweiler---Raversbeuren---Bruchweiler---Ringelkopf. Line which army is expected to reach tomorrow: Nohn---Neichen---Kelberg---Boos---Laubach---Driesch---Todenroth---Nieder-Worresbach. Boundary between III and IV Corps: Wallscheid-Gevenich. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions: Weidenbach-Kelberg. Boundary between 1st and 4th Divisions: Cornshausen-Raversbeuren.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 20

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 6, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

- I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy continues his withdrawal.
- II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The advance to the Third Army continues with the III and IV Corps in line and the VII Corps in support.
The general line reached today at 18 h.: UDELHOFEN---OBER-EHE---DOCKWEILER---NEICHEN---KELBERG---BOOS---LAUBACH---DRIESCH---TODENROTH---NIEDER-WORRESBACH.
- III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British Second Army (on our left) has reached the general line: BLANKENHEIM---KALL---thence along ERFT River. Hq. of Canadian Corps (on our left) is at VIELSALM and opens at noon tomorrow at SCHLEIDEN. The French Tenth Army on our right reached objectives at 16 h., without incident.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chife of Staff.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We continued our advance toward the RHINE on the entire army front reaching the general line UDELHOVEN---OBER-EHE-DOCKWEILER---LAUBACH---DRIESCH---TODENROTH---NEIDER-WORRESBACH. The weather was foggy, the roads muddy and slippery. There is still no evidence of suffering from lack of food by the inhabitants in the territory occupied by this army. No hostile act has occurred.

* * * * *

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: Troops of the German Seventeenth Army will be on the E. bank of the RHINE on December 5, 6, and 7. On December 8, at 6 a. m., on the line BENSBERG---ROSRATH---ALTENBRATH. At 6 a. m. on the 9th, near WERMELSKIRCHEN, W. edge of MUCH, E. edge of MEUNKIRCHEN, and on December 12, 6 a. m., on E edge of neutral zone. The neutral zone will remain occupied by German military police.

The German Seventeenth Army is crossing the RHINE just S. of COLOGNE.

The German Seventh Army will be across the RHINE on the evening of December 5. The S. limits of the army extends to BROHL, (between COLOGNE and COBLENZ) on [the] RHINE

Troops belonging to the German Fifth Army are crossing the RHINE between COBLENZ and MAINZ. The advanced party of this army is reported to have crossed the RHINE on November 27. Apparently a very large percentage of the enemy troops on the front of our army have crossed over the RHINE. In fact two separate reports indicate that there are now no troops in COBLENZ.

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By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 6, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 78. Headquarters Third Army, Bitburg; 5th Division, Hollerich; III Corps, Kyllburg; 2d Division, Gerolstein; 32d Division, Daun; 42d Division, Birresborn; IV Corps, Schweich; 1st Division, Alf; 3d Division, Morbach; 4th Division, Cues; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Echternach; 90th Division, Remich. Projected changes in these

headquarters for tomorrow: III Corps, Daun; 2d Division, Nohn; IV Corps, Zell; 3d Division, Kirchberg; 90th Division Konz. Front line of army: Udelhofen---Ober-Ehe---Dockweiler---Neichen---Kelberg---Boos---Laubach---Driesch---Todenroth---Nieder-Woerresbach. Line to be reached tomorrow: Rupperath---Gilgenbach---Drees---Kempenich---Mayen---Greimersburg---Buch---Simmern---Kellenbach. Boundary between III and IV Corps: Driesch-Wallscheid. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions: Dreis---Waldkoenigen---Salm. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions: Kesweiler [not identified] Raversbeuren.

DICKMAN.

193-32.1: Orders

Continuation of the Advance

FIELD ORDERS
No. 9

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 7, 1918--19 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000
Operations Map No. 2

[Extract]

1. The German army has withdrawn across the RHINE
The French Tenth Army on our right and the British Second Army on our left are moving forward abreast of our army.
2. (a) The American Third Army will continue its advance on December 9.
(b) The advance elements of the army will reach the following general lines on the dates indicated.
December 9: RHINE River from ROLANDSECK to BROHL; thence WASSENACH---KERBEN---MUNSTERMAIFELD---LIESENFELD---RHEINBOLLEN.
December 10: RHINE River to ANDERNACH; thence BASSENHEIM-BOPPARD; thence RHINE River to TRECHTINGSHAUSEN.
December 11: RHINE River.
The RHINE River will not be crossed until further orders.
- (c) Boundary between the III and IV Corps is extended: NAUNHEIM---RUBER---KOBERN (all to the IV Corps); thence the MOSELLE River to its mouth.
3. (a) The III and IV Corps will advance to their successive objectives each with two divisions in first line and one division in second line. Second line divisions will cover the outer flank divisions of the first line following at two days' march. The second line divisions will halt when their advance elements reach the line ADENAU-SIMMERN.
(b) The VII Corps will advance its right (90th) division north of the MOSELLE River on December 11 to reach the line NACHTSHEIM-KLOTTEN on December 13. The left (89th) division will complete the movement directed by Field Orders No. 7.
(c) The 5th Division will remain in place and continue to perform its present mission.
(d) The forward movement of army troops will be covered in separate orders.
(x) First line divisions will advance in combat formation, well echeloned in depth.
Corps commanders will so dispose their forces as to be able to resume the offensive on receipt of orders from higher authority.
Troops will not be billeted in the cities of LUXEMBOURG or TRIER.

5. Headquarters:

Third Army - BITBURG (to open at MAYEN at 16 h., December 10)

III Corps - DAUN (to open at POLCH at 16 h., December 10)

IV Corps - ZELL (to open at COCHEM at 16 h., December 9)

VII Corps - GREVENMACHER

5th Division - HOLLERICH

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 21

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 7, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h. to 10 h.

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The rear elements of the enemy are crossing the RHINE.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The advance of the Third Army continues without incident. The general line: UDELHOFEN---DOCKWEILER---BOOS---LAUBACH---DRIESCH---TODENROTH---NIEDER-WORRESBACH was reached December 6.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British Second Army (Canadian corps) has arrived on the line: WEILERSWIST-RHEINBACH.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Fldr. 5: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 21

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 7, 1918.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We continued our advance toward the RHINE on the whole army front, the general line reached being RUPPERATH---GILGENBACH---DREES---BOOS---KEMPENICH---MAYEN---GREIMERSBERG---BUCH---SIMMERN---KELLENBACH. Practically all German troops have crossed the RHINE on our army front. Our occupation continued without any disturbing incidents. There are many indications that the civil population appreciate the liberality of our occupation.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The withdrawal continues. Further reports indicate very few, if any, enemy troops W. of the RHINE.

All units of the German Seventh Army will be across the RHINE on December 5. The rear of this army will be, on the evening of December 7: AEGIDIENBERG---LINZ---RHEINBROHL---SACHERUNGEN---[not identified]---HONNEF on the RHINE.

The German Eighteenth Army will have crossed the following line by the evening of December 7: TROISDORF---OBER-PLEIS.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 7, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 84. Headquarters Third Army, Bitburg; 5th Division, Hollerich; III Corps, Daun; 2d Division, Nohn; 32d Division, Muellenbach; 42d Division, Birresborn; IV Corps, Zell; 1st Division, Alf; 32d Division, Kirchberg; 4th Division, Cues; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Echternach; 90th Division, Konz. Projected changes in these headquarters: 2d Division, Adenau; 42d Division, Dries; 89th Division, Kyllburg. Location of front line today: Rupperath---Gilgenbach---Boos---Kempenich---Mayen---Greimersburg---Buch---Simmern---Kellenbach. Line expected to be reached tomorrow: Meckenheim---Kempenich---Mayen---Greimersburg---Buch---Simmern---Kellenbach. Boundary between III and IV Corps: Landkern-Lutzerath. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions: Kempenich---Boos---Cockweiler. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions: Morsdorf-Hahn.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 22

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 8, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 7 to 10 h., December 8, 1918

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The German forces have withdrawn east of the RHINE River. The Third Army with four divisions in line continues its advance without incident. The recent rainy weather and heavy traffic have reduced the roads to such a condition that our troops are experiencing some difficulty in completing their days' marches.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The advance of the Third Army with two corps in line and one in reserve continues. Each front line corps has two divisions in line and one in support. The VII Corps in reserve advances with one of its two divisions

in the trace of each corps, the 89th Division on the left following the III Corps and the 90th Division on the right of the IV Corps. Due to the extension of the army boundary to the north and the consequent lengthening of the distance to be marched over, the northern division (2d Division) on the left of the III Corps is echeloned one day's march to the rear of the 32d Division. The 2d Division advances December 8 while the 32d Division remains in place, so that when the advance from the next phase line is commenced December 9, the corps front will have resumed its contemplated alignment. The IV Corps finished its advance December 7 to Line 5 and remains in place December 8. Line reached December 7 was RUPPERATH---GILGENBACH---BOOS---KEMPENICH---MAYEN---GREIMERSBURG---BUCH---SIMMERN---KELLENBACH. The VII Corps with the exception of corps troops in the vicinity of GREVENMACHER and the 165th Field Artillery Brigade at MOUZAY cleared the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers. Troops of the VII Corps and 5th Division are relieving detachments left on guard at important points by the III and IV Corps. One battalion, 39th Infantry, was sent to COBLENZ by train to prevent disorders during the interim between the departure of the German troops and the arrival of the American troops.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The Canadian corps on our left reached with its advance cavalry elements the line: GELSDORF-WEILERSWIST. Canadian headquarters remain at SCHLEIDEN. Active contact with Canadian corps was lost December 8. Liaison with the French II C. A. C. on our right is maintained at KELLENBACH. Headquarters II C. A. C. - BIRKENFELD.

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Fldr. 5: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 8, 1918.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We advanced only on our left toward the RHINE today, the general line is MECKENHEIM---KEMPENICH---MAYEN---GREIMERSBURG---BUCH---SIMMERN---KELLENBACH. The country passed over is very hilly, the roads being in poor condition due to the wet weather. There is beginning to show, on the part of the inhabitants of the occupied territory, a tendency to overcharge. There is no evidence of political unrest.

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III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The withdrawal continues. It is reliably reported that at 6 a. m., on December 8, there will be no troops of the German Seventh Army W. of the general line MILLRATH---HAAN---OHLIGS---LEICHLINGEN---BURSCHEID---ODENTHAL---BERGISCH-GLADBACH except around LEICHLINGEN and BERGISCH-GLADBACH.

The last of the Fifth and Third Armies are reported to have passed MAYEN (606) ON December 5.

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Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 8, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 89. Headquarters Third Army, Bitburg; 5th Division, Hollerich; III Corps, Daun; 2d Division, Adenau; 32d Division, Muellenbach; 42d Division, Dreis; IV Corps, Zell; 1st Division, Alf; 3d Division, Kirchberg; 4th Division, Cues; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Kyllburg; 90th Division, Konz. Projected changes in these headquarters: 2d Division, Neuenarh; 32d Division, Mayen; 42d Division, Adenau; IV Corps, Cochem; 1st Division, Treis; 3d Division, Simmern; 90th Division, Wittlich. Front line of army today: Meckenheim---Kempenich---Mayen---Greimersburg---Buch---Simmern---Kellenbach. Line which army is expected to reach tomorrow: Rhine River from Rolandseck to Brohl; thence Wassenach ---Kerben---Munstermaifeld---Liesenfeld---Rheinbollen. Boundary between III and IV Corps, Landkern-Strotzbusch. Boundary 2d and 32d Divisions, Ettringen-Boos. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions, Morsdorf-Hahn.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 23

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 9, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 8 to 10 h., December 9, 1918

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: In our continued advance to the RHINE, no resistance or impediment is to be expected from the German forces or the civil population. The poor condition of the roads will delay the march of columns and trains, but the short daily marches should be completed without difficulty.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: All units remained in place on December 8 except the 2d Division which completed its movement to its contemplated position, and the 90th Division which advanced to the line EHRANG-SCHWEICH. The reserve divisions of each corps moved forward in order to prepare to follow up the front line divisions on December 9. On December 9, the advance was taken up by the entire front line followed by the support divisions in accordance with Field Orders No. 9, Third Army.

The cavalry patrols in advance of the III Corps reached the RHINE River at REMAGEN on December 8 and on December 9 are reconnoitering southward toward BROHL. They report their march without incident except at the railroad bridge at REMAGEN. Although found to be in good condition, it was blocked with cars of coal and rock. A suitable guard was placed at this point to protect the bridge from possible injury until the arrival of the infantry units.

The VIII Corps continued to establish guard detachments at important points and the 5th Division carried out the normal functions of line of communication troops.

Due to the lack of horses the 165th F. A. Bridge of the VII Corps remains at MOUZAY, awaiting the arrival of sufficient horses to enable them to advance.

The units of the air service pertaining to the Third Army have been advancing since December 5 to airdromes in the vicinity of TRIER, the movement being necessarily slow, due to the shortage of transportation.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: On our right, the French Tenth Army has reached the general line: SOBERNHEIM-GRUNSTADT. Army headquarters St-WENDEL. The French II C. A. C. rested December 8/9, keeping liaison with our right element at KELLENBACH.

The cavalry of the British Second Army, on our left, reached the RHINE River and infantry of the Canadian II Corps advances to the line GELSDORF-BULLINGEN today, December 9. Headquarters of the Canadian corps remain at SCHLEIDEN. Liaison is being maintained by our left element with the right element of the Canadian II Corps.

IV. WEATHER: Rainy and misty.

V. VISIBILITY: Poor

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: The advance was resumed on the entire front of the Third Army, December 9 and is continuing according to schedule.

VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: The 2d, 42d, 4th and 90th Divisions completed their marches December 8, rectifying the front and preparing for the resumption of the general advance December 9.

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Fldr. 5: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 23

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 9, 1918.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We continued our advance along the whole army front, our left reaching the RHINE River. The general line today is, RHINE River from ROLANSECK to BROHL, thence WASSENACH---KERBEN---MUNSTERMAIFELD...LIESENFELD---RHEINBOLLEN. No hostile act has occurred. There are indications of less satisfaction at our occupation by the population near the RHINE, than that shown in the areas farther to the W.

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III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The route followed by the German Fourth Army across the RHINE is reported to have been through DUISBURG-WESEL. From hence the withdrawal continued through OBERHAUSEN---WESEL---BOCHOLT.

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Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 9, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 94. Headquarters Third Army, Bitburg; 5th Division, Hollerich; III Corps, Daun; 2d Division, Ahrweiler; 32d Division, Mayen; 42d Division, Adenau; IV Corps, Cochem; 1st Division, Treis; 3d Division, Simmern; 4th Division, Cues; VII, Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Kyllburg; 90th Division, Wittlich. Projected changes in these headquarters for tomorrow. Third Army, Mayen; III Corps, Polch; 32d Division, Ochtendung; 3d Division, Rheinbollen; 4th Division, Kirchberg. Front line of army today: Rhine River from Rolandseck to Brohl, thence Wassenach---Kerben---Muenstermaifeld---Liesenfeld---Rheinbollen. Line which army is expected to reach tomorrow: Rhine River to Andernach; thence Bassenheim-Boppard; thence Rhine River to Trechtingshausen. Boundary between III and IV Corps: Ruber-Laufeld. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions: Laacher See-Boos. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions: Liesenfeld-Strimmig.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 24

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 10, 1918---10 h.

From 10 h., December 9 to 10 h., December 10

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The situation is unchanged as far as concerns the advance to the RHINE River. As units arrive at the RHINE, all means of crossing the river will be protected from injury in order to assure the rapid and efficient crossing of troops when ordered.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: Front line divisions experienced difficult road conditions December 9 and with the exception of the 32d Division, which reached its objective by noon, columns did not arrive at destinations until after 17 h. Artillery columns found the marching especially hard and did not report themselves in position until after 18 h. The fog and mist rendered the advance of transportation somewhat uncertain, and coupled with the slippery condition of the roads, delayed all units until a later hour. Those units which were ordered to move December 10 resumed the march promptly, and early reports indicate an easy march. The cavalry patrols on the bank of the RHINE, in advance of the III Corps, pushed southward to BROHL December 9. Army troops commenced their forward movement to conform with the advance of army headquarters to MAYEN at 8 a. m., December 10.

Second line divisions remained in place and the 5th Division fulfilled its usual functions on the line of communications. The VII Corps advanced its right (90th) division in accordance with plan.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French army, on our right, advanced to the line: BRETZENHEIM-GAUORDERNHEIM, the II C. A. C. remaining on the line: KELLENBACH ---OBER-STREIT. Headquarters at SOBERNHEIM. December 10, advance was resumed toward the line: BINGEN-OPPENHEIM. No information received as to changes of II C. A. C. (British Second Army) on the left.

IV. WEATHER: Rainy and foggy.

V. VISIBILITY: Very poor.

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: The two flanking front line divisions advanced to the RHINE, December 9; other units moving forward to prescribed positions. The advance was resumed December 10.

VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: All front line divisions having some elements on the RHINE, the necessary reconnaissances preliminary to the completion of plans and arrangements for the crossing of the RHINE may be made. The safety of bridges and ferries is assured by the posting of suitable guard by those troops which have reached the river.

VIII. REMARKS:

(c) ***

Projected changes in headquarters December 10.
Third Army - MAYEN

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Fldr. 5: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 24

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 10, 1918.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We continued our advance and have reached the general line, west bank of the RHINE River from ROLANDSECK to ANDERNACH, thence BASSENHEIM, BOPPARD, thence west bank of RHINE River to TRECHTINGSHAUSEN. No act of hostility has occurred. The impression today is, that the people near the RHINE River show more annoyance at our arrival, than did the people farther west.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The withdrawal continues. A reliable report states that the German Eighteenth Army will have crossed the line NEUNKIRCHEN-ELSOFF by the evening of December 9. The rear of the German First Army will have reached the general line DIERDORF-ALSBACH on December 9. The German Seventh Army will have cleared the bridge-head at COBLENZ, with all its units, by the evening of December 9.

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 10, 1918

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 98. Headquarters Third Army, Mayen; 5th Division, Hollerich; III Corps, Polch; 2d Division, Ahrweiler; 32d Division, Ochtendung; 42d Division, Adenau; IV Corps, Cochem; 1st Division, Treis, 3d Division, Rheinbollen; 4th Division, Kirchberg; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Kyllburg; 90th Division, Wittlich. Changes in these headquarters for tomorrow: 32d Division, Bassenheim. Front line of army today: Rhine River to Andernach; thence Bassenheim-Boppard; thence Rhine River to Trechtingshausen. Line which army is expected to reach tomorrow: Rhine River. Boundary between III and IV Corps: Dieblich-Driesch. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions: Andernach---St-Johann. Boundary between 3d and 4th Divisions: Boppard-Sevenich.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 25

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 11, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 10 to 10 h., December 11

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Third Army being in position on the left bank of the RHINE has halted preparatory to crossing the river on the thirteenth instant in accordance with plans. The attitude of the inhabitants indicates that no difficulties are to be expected from that quarter.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The interior front line divisions (1st and 32d) completed at an early hour their day's march, December 10, and today are advancing to the river.

The 90th Division completed its movement to the BERNCASEL-WITTLICH line, December 10, and today is advancing towards the line: NACHTSHEIM-CLOTTEN in accordance with Field Orders No. 9, Third Army. Minor changes in other divisions were made in preparation for the next phase of the advance.

The relief of troops by the 5th Division of all detachments left by the IV Corps in the zone of their advance is being effected, all detachments remaining at their post until so relieved.

The 66th F. A. Brigade is marching toward DREIS. Early reports indicate that the 148th Regiment will reach the vicinity of PRUM and the 146th Regiment will reach the vicinity of BITBURG this afternoon.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British Second Army has reached the general line: BERZDORF-BONN. Headquarters Canadian II Corps - BONN. All advance elements of the French Tenth Army reached the RHINE. Hq. French Tenth Army - KREUZNACH.

- IV. WEATHER: Rainy
- V. VISIBILITY: Poor
- VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: Early reports indicate that the arrival of all advance elements of the Third Army on the RHINE will be completed by noon today.
- VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: The Third Army occupies with its advance elements the left bank of the RHINE and ROLANDSECK to TRECHTINGSHAUSEN.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Fldr. 5: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 25

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 11, 1918.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: We have reached the RHINE River on our whole army front. The attitude of the people in the territory occupied by our army, especially the part near the RHINE, is less agreeable than it was at first.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The withdrawal continues. The German Sixth Army will be on the line N. of WULFRATH---N. of ELBERFELD---W. of RADE [not identified] by 6 a. m., December 12.

The rear of the German First Army will be on the line HERSCHBACH-VIELBACH, on December 10 (a. m. or p. m. not stated). The last elements of the German First Army (the 10th Res. Div.) crossed the RHINE on December 5.

The German Seventh Army withdrew through SINZIG, crossing the RHINE at BROHL on temporary pontoon bridges. The last enemy units withdrew from BAULER December 2 and NEUENHR December 6.

A discharged soldier of the 7th Res. Div., states that he was discharged at MAGDEBURG and the whole division dissolved. He further states that he has received a letter from a friend of the 69th Inf. Regt., 113th Division, dated about December 5, who said he was to be discharged in BADEN.

Conflicting reports are being received regarding the number of men to be retained. A discharged railroad employee says that he knows positively that only the classes of 1918 and 1919 are to be retained.

The original intention of the higher authorities had been to retain the classes of 1916-17-18-19, but this had been changed.

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 11, 1918.

Chief of Staff, Advance Section, G. H. Q.

G-3 No. 108. Headquarters Third Army, Mayen; 5th Division, Merl; III Corps, Polch; 2d Division, Ahrweiler; 32d Division, Bassenheim; 42d Division, Adenau; IV Corps, Cochem; 1st Division, Treis; 3d Division, Rheinbollen; 4th Division, Kirchberg; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Kyllburg; 90th Division, Bertrich. Projected changes in headquarters for tomorrow: VII Corps, Wittlich. Front line of army today: Rhine River. Tomorrow front line troops will rest on the left bank of the Rhine River. Boundary between III and IV Corps: Coblenz-Rubergevenich. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions: Andernach-Baar. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions, Boppard-Zilshausen.

DICKMAN.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 26

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 12, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 11 to 10 h., December 12

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy has completed his withdrawal from the area included in the bridgehead of COBLENZ. The front line divisions are in position on the left bank of the RHINE and the III Corps is completing arrangements to cross the river on the 13th. The tactical situation remains the same. There are no signs of hostile demonstrations on the part of the inhabitants.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The 1st Division has received orders for a concentration today in the vicinity of the city of COBLENZ. This movement is made pursuant to orders changing the limits of the army zone.

The 33d Division is assigned to the VII Corps, Third Army, and the 5th Division is assigned to Second Army, both transfers to be effective at noon today.

The 48th D. I. and the 2d D. C. P. (both French) are moving today towards the RHINE. The area bounded on the north by the line: OUREN---PRONSFELD---BITBURG---MEHRING (all incl.)---thence the MOSELLE River to its mouth, and on the south by the line: USSELDANGE---LUXEMBOURG---REMICH (all incl.), thence the MOSELLE River to SCHENGEN is available for the passage of these two divisions. The 90th Division remains in place until further orders.

The 66th F. A. Brigade continues its march by regiments to the area of DREIS. The 148th Regiment will reach the vicinity of DREIS and the 146th Regiment will reach the vicinity of PRUM by sixteen h. today.

A troop of cavalry (2d Div.) has moved to REMAGEN.

The southern boundary of the army has been changed beyond BUNDENBACH to follow the

general line: KELLENBACH---TRABEN---MOSELLE River---KOBERN---RHENS---LAHNSTEIN---MALMENEICH.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Headquarters French Tenth Army: KREUZNACH.

The advance of the British Second Army to the RHINE is nearing completion.

IV. WEATHER: Foggy with light rains.

V. VISIBILITY: Poor.

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: Reconnoitering parties are investigating means of crossing the RHINE.

VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: The Third Army has completed its march to the RHINE. The troops, with the exception of the 1st Division, are resting and cleaning their equipment, etc. The 5th Division has practically completed the relief of detachments left by the IV Corps. The relieved detachments will proceed to join their proper organizations under instructions issued by the Commanding General, Line of Communications.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-20.1: Fldr. 5: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 26

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 12, 1918.

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Our front has been shortened. We are on the west bank of the RHINE from ROLANDSECK to BREY. There has been a tendency on part of the officials in the territory occupied by us within about forty kilometers of the RHINE, to endeavor to quarter our officers in the poorer houses of towns. The people as a whole in this territory show far less hospitality than did those farther west.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: The eastern boundary of the territory evacuated by the German First Army on December 11 runs through SCHENKELBURG-HAHN. The 4th Division, Seventeenth Army, was in BECKENHAGEN [not identified] on December 7. The XXVIII Reserve Corps was in HALLENBERG on December 11. The corps is under the command of the German Eighteenth Army.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Situation Report, Third Army, at 17 Hours

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 12, 1918.

Chief of Staff, Advance Section, G. H. Q.

G-3 No. 117. Headquarters Third Army, Mayen; III Corps, Polch; 2d Division, Ahrweiler; 32d Division, Bassenheim; 42d Division, Adenau; IV Corps, Cochem; 1st Division, Coblenz; 3d Division, Rheinbollen; 4th Division, Kirchberg; VII Corps, Grevenmacher; 89th Division, Kyllburg; 90th Division, Bertrich; 33d Division, Esch. No changes in headquarters for tomorrow. Troops remained in position on the left bank of the Rhine with the exception of the 1st Division which moved to the vicinity of Coblenz. Tomorrow the III Corps, consisting of the 1st, 2d and 32d Divisions, will cross the Rhine. Boundary between III and IV Corps, Metternich-Illicherich. Boundary between 2d and 32d Divisions, Andernach-Baar. Boundary between 1st and 3d Divisions, Boppard-Zilshausen.

DICKMAN.

193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

Advance of Third Army

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 12, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 113. Troops remained in position today on the left bank of the Rhine. 1st Division moved to immediate vicinity of Coblenz. Tomorrow the III Corps crosses the Rhine.

DICKMAN.

193-32.1: Orders

Plans for Organization of Northern Sector of Coblenz Bridgehead

FIELD ORDERS
No. 10

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 12, 1918--12 h.

Maps: German - 1:100,000
Operations Map No. 3

PLAN OF ACTION - THIRD ARMY

1. (a) Enemy forces are north and east of the neutral zone beyond our bridgehead.
- (b) The forward limit of the COBLENZ bridgehead is defined by the arc of a circle, whose radius is 30 kilometers, described about the eastern abutment of the PFAFFENDORFER bridge.

(c) The British Second Army will occupy the bridgehead of COLN and the French armies the bridgehead of MAINZ, and the southern sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead.

2. The American Third Army will occupy the northern sector of the bridgehead of COBLENZ with one corps of three divisions. One corps of three divisions will be in support on the left bank of the RHINE. Both corps will occupy, within the territory assigned them, positions in readiness, prepared for aggressive offensive action.

3. (A) Organization of the Ground:

1. A first, or outpost, position, following as closely the outer perimeter of the bridgehead, as tactical considerations may justify.

2. The second, or main position of resistance, on the general line LIMBACH ---ASBACH---NEUSTADT---OBER-HUMMERICH---WILLROTH---KIRCHDORF---GIERSHOFEN---BRUCKRACHDORF---SESSENHAUSEN---ELLENHAUSEN---EBERNHAHN---MONTABAUR---HOLLER---ISSELBACH---HOLZAPPEL.

3. The third position, following the general line GRATZFELD---WINDHAGEN---LORSCHIED---HONNINGER Wald---EHLSCHEID---THALHAUSEN---ALSBACH---HOHR---KADENBACH---WELSCHNEUDORF.

4. The fourth, or reserve position, following generally the left bank of the RHINE, from ROLANDSECK to RHENS.

5. Switch positions will be constructed on the general lines WILLROTH-RHEINBROHL and THALHAUSEN---OBER-BIEBER---ALTWIED---LEUTESDORF. These will be held until such time as our left is advanced to connect with the British.

Each position will be organized into a series of mutually supporting strong points, well disposed in depth.

Plans for positions to be constructed in the neutral zones on our left flank will be made, but no work will be done on the ground.

6. Urgency of work:

(a) Marking out firing trenches of the lines of resistance of all positions.

(b) Marking out wire belts of the lines of resistance of all positions.

(c) Construction of wire obstacles.

(d) Construction of trenches.

(B) Disposition of Troops: Troops will be billeted with a view of occupying:

The outpost position with not to exceed one-fourth; the second position (main resistance line) with not to exceed one-half; the third position with the remainder of the troops occupying the bridgehead.

At least one-third of the divisional artillery of troops occupying the bridgehead will be billeted with a view to its occupying the ground between the second position (main position of resistance) and the third position.

In the outpost position, machine guns will constitute the principal support of the infantry; the major portion of the artillery being placed with a view to use on the second and third positions.

(C) Use of Troops: The mission of the troops occupying the outpost position is to engage the enemy until the troops on the main position of resistance are in place, prepared to move forward. Outpost troops will be withdrawn only under the orders of the corps commander, and then by pre-determined routes.

The main position of resistance will be held.

(D) Support Corps: The mission of this corps is to support the corps occupying the bridgehead, being at all times prepared to push its divisions across the RHINE. The left division of this corps will be used to cover the neutral zone between the American Third and British Second Armies.

(E) The Chief Engineer, Third Army, will hold in reserve material for one pontoon bridge across the RHINE.

* * * * *

- 5. Projected Headquarters:
- Third Army - COBLENZ
- III Corps - NEUWIED
- IV Corps - COCHEM
- VII Corps - WITTLICH

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

Plans for Crossing Rhine

FIELD ORDERS
No. 11

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 12, 1918--13 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000
Operations Map No. 4

[Extract]

1. The enemy has completed the withdrawal of his forces from the territory west of the RHINE, and from the area included in the bridgehead of COBLENZ. The British Second Army is advancing to occupy the bridgehead of COLOGNE and the French armies the bridgehead of MAINZ and the southern sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead.

2. (a) The American Third Army will occupy the northern sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead. Its advance elements will cross the RHINE at 7 h., December 13.

(b) Army Boundaries:

Northern (left): Unchanged.

Southern (right): As at present to near SCHNEPPENBACH; thence to administrative boundary separating the Kreise of BERNCASEL, WITTLICH, COCHEM, MAYEN, COBLENZ, MONTABAUR and WESTERBURG from those of SIMMERN, ZELL, St-GOAR, St-GOARSHAUSEN, DIEZ and LIMBURG.

3. (a) III Corps: The 1st Division will pass to the command of the III Corps at 6 h., December 13. With three divisions (1st, 2d and 32d), the III Corps will occupy the American sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead, * * * All elements of the corps will be east of the RHINE River before 24 h., December 14, and the movement of its troops into position will be completed by 16 h., December 16. The following bridges are available for crossing the RHINE:

- Permanent pontoon bridge at COBLENZ)
- Floored railroad bridge at ENGERS) Suitable for all traffic
- Floored railroad bridge at REMAGEN)

All available ferries will be used.

(b) IV Corps: The 42d Division will pass to the command of the IV Corps at 6 h., December 13. This corps will continue its march on December 13, and, in support of the III Corps, occupy with its divisions the Kreise of MAYEN, AHRWEILER, ADENAU and COCHEM. All elements of the corps will be within the area assigned the corps by 16 h., December 17.

(c) The VII Corps (33d, 89th and 90th Divisions) will occupy that portion of the Regierungsbezirk of TRIER within the army limits * * * The movement will be completed before 16 h., December 18.

- (d) The forward movement of army troops will be covered in separate orders.
- (x) Upon arrival in areas assigned, troops will occupy and organize the defensive positions prescribed in Field Orders No. 10.

* * * * *

5. Headquarters:

Third Army - MAYEN (to open at COBLENZ at 16 h., December 15)

III Corps - POLCH (to open at NEUWIED at 16 h., December 15)

IV Corps - COCHEM

VII Corps - GREVENMACHER

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

OCCUPATION OF THE COBLENZ BRIDGEHEAD

The forward limit of the American sector of the Coblenz bridgehead was defined as the arc of a circle, the radius of which was 30 kilometers, centering at the Pfaffendorf bridge at Coblenz, the perimeter passing through a number of villages. The Plan of action called for the occupation of the northern sector of the bridgehead by the III Corps, the IV Corps, in support of the bridgehead troops was to take positions on the left bank of the Rhine; both these corps were to occupy positions in readiness, prepared for aggressive offensive action. The VII Corps was to be placed in a reserve position in the rear of the IV Corps. The bridgehead was to be organized in the usual manner, with an outpost position, a main position of resistance, and a reserve position, together with such switch lines as fitted the terrain. On December 13 the advance elements began crossing the Rhine.

193-10.5: Strength Report

Statistical Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.
December 13, 1918--17 h.

	TOWN	LOCATION Prov.	COUNTRY	O.	ENL. MEN	EFF. RIFLES	CASU- ALTIES	ANIMALS
Third Army	Mayen	Rhenish	Germany	A 860	13,393	7,746		543
III Corps	Polch	Rhenish	Germany	B 398	8,649	6,123		1,214
1st Div.	Montabaur	Rhenish	Germany	982	22,991	14,650		5,545
2d Div.	Heddesdorf	Rhenish	Germany	1,093	26,216	15,626		6,370
32d Div.	Sayn	Rhenish	Germany	1,003	23,600	11,840		5,760
Total III Corps				3,476	81,456	48,239		18,889
IV Corps	Cochem	Rhenish	Germany	B 383	8,692	6,055		933
3d Div.	Rheinbollen	Rhenish	Germany	998	23,554	11,185		6,170
4th Div.	Alf	Rhenish	Germany	1,015	23,328	12,810		5,631
42d Div.	Adenau	Rhenish	Germany	903	22,517	11,852		5,990
Total IV Corps				3,299	78,091	41,902		18,724
VII Corps	Greven- macher		Luxemburg	B 401	6,567	4,120		609
33d Div.	Esch		Luxemburg	890	22,773	7,396		4,691
89th Div.	Kyllburg	Rhenish	Germany	596	19,827	8,494		5,137
90th Div.	Bertrich	Rhenish	Germany	828	20,264	7,215		3,227
Total VII Corps				2,715	69,431	27,225		13,664
Total Third Army				10,350	242,371	125,112		51,820

CHANGES IN STATION LIST

66th Field Artillery Brig. Hq.

Hillesheim

By command of Major General Dickman:

ROSCOE D. BROWN,
Major, Adjutant General,
Personnel Adjutant.

A - Army Troops
B - Corps Troops

From 10 h., December 12 to 10 h., December 13

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy has completed the withdrawal of his troops from the neutral zone beyond our bridgehead. The Third Army is proceeding to the occupation of the American bridgehead with one corps across the RHINE, one corps in support, and one corps in reserve.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING THE DAY: The III Corps is crossing the RHINE, using all bridges and ferries available within the army limits. The IV Corps is preparing to move to a position west of the RHINE in support of the III Corps, and the VII Corps is preparing to move to a reserve position in rear of the IV Corps, in accordance with instructions contained in Field Orders No. 11, Third Army, December 12.

The 66th F. A. Brigade has halted. The 148th Regiment remained in the vicinity of DREIS, and the head of the 146th Regiment is at BUDESHEIM. Orders for the continuation of the march will be issued later.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Two regiments of the French 48th Division are moving by truck to BOPPARD. The remainder of the 48th Division and the 2d D. C. P. are in the vicinity of MAXWEILER-BITBURG.

Headquarters of the French I Cavalry Corps will be established at EMS tomorrow.

The advance elements of three divisions of the French Tenth Army have crossed the RHINE in the vicinity of MAINZ.

British Second Army is in process of the occupation of the COLN bridgehead.

IV. WEATHER: Rainy.

V. VISIBILITY: Poor

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: The 1st Division passed to the command of the III Corps and the 42d Division passed to command of the IV Corps at 6 h., December 13. The transfer of the 33d Division and the 5th Division to the Third and Second Armies respectively, was completed, 12 h., December 12.

VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: On December 12, the 1st Division completed the movement to the vicinity of COBLENZ. The remaining divisions rested and cleaned their equipment preparatory to a resumption of the march towards, and the occupation of, the new army area, as prescribed in Field Orders No. 11, December 12, Third Army.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Forward Limit of American Sector of Coblenz Bridgehead

FIELD ORDERS
No. 12

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 13, 1918--6 h.

Maps: German 1:100,000
Operations Map No. 3

1. The forward limit of the American sector COBLENZ bridgehead is determined by straight lines joining the following villages: MALMENEICH (point of liaison with French army)---HUNDSANGEN (incl.)---MOLSBERG (incl.)---SALZ (excl.)---MAHREN (incl.)---ELVINGEN ---OBERSAIN (incl.)---WOLFERLINGEN (incl.)---SEEBURG (excl.)---MUNDERSBACH (incl.)---HILGERT (incl.)---STEIMEL (incl.)---LAHRBACH (excl.)---DOTTESFELD (excl.)---HECKERFELD (incl.)---EULENBURG (incl.)---BORSCHHEID (incl.)---FERNTHAL (incl.)---NESCCHEN (incl.)---WEISSENFELS (incl.)---ARNSAU (incl.)---HAHEN (incl.)---ROTCHKREUZ (incl.)---ARIENDORF(incl.).

2. The Commanding General, III Corps, will at once take steps to have this line plainly marked by signs on each road crossing the boundary, and will prevent all Allied troops from crossing this line under any pretext whatever unless specifically authorized in writing by the army commander.

3. The corps commander will cause the civil authorities in each village on the boundary to be notified of the above prescribed limits.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 28

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 14, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 13 to 10 h., December 14

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Third Army is completing the occupation of the American sector of the bridgehead of COBLENZ without incident. The crossing of the RHINE by the front line divisions is being effected in good time and without confusion. Troops upon crossing the RHINE, and reaching their assigned areas, are billeted preparatory to occupying selected positions for defense.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The movement of the front line divisions (1st and 32d) of the III Corps across the RHINE is being completed. The second line division (2d) is taking station across the RHINE. The IV Corps Headquarters remain at COCHEM. The 3d Division moves via COBLENZ towards ANDERNACH---MAYEN---OCHTENDUNG area, when the movement by truck of two regiments of the 48th D. I. has been completed. The 4th Division is moving towards COCHEM-ADENAU area in liaison with the 90th Division which is clearing this area and moving to the area prescribed in Field Orders No. 11, Third

Army, December 12. The 42d Division is moving into position on the left bank of the RHINE, from ROLANDSECK to BROHL, and is occupying the Kreis of AHRWEILER. Headquarters of the VII Corps is moving today to WITTLICH. The 89th Division is moving towards the PRUM-BITBURG area; the 90th Division is moving towards the DAUN-WITTLICH area. The 33d Division stood December 13 in order to permit, without delay, the movement of the 48th D. I. and the 2d D. C. P.; December 14, moves toward SAARBURG. The following change in the northern boundary and the Third Army is announced: As at present to WILLIERS: thence VILLERS-devant-ORVAL (excl.)---CHANTEMELLE (excl.)---HACHY (incl.)---GREISCH (incl.)---BOEVANGE (incl.)---NIEDER-MERZIG (incl.)---BOURSCHEID (incl.)---CONSTHUM (incl.)---TROINE (incl.)---WATERMAL (excl.) OUREN (incl.); thence as at present to the RHINE River.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: the 2d D. C. P., is moving today to the area whose western boundary is the SURE [SAUER], southern boundary the MOSELLE; eastern boundary the line: BITTERHEIM [not identified]-MEHRING; and northern boundary the line: PRIEST---IDESHEIM---MELLENBORN [not identified]---MENDEN. Certain elements of the 48th D. I., including the 13th Tirailleurs, are moving today to a position south of the MOSELLE; their advance elements today will be on the line: RUWER---WALDRACH---OSBURG---RHEINFELD ...All elements of the 48th D. I. and 2d D. C. P. will be entirely in the French area on December 19. The French Tenth Army is completing the occupation of the MAINZ and southern COBLENZ bridgehead. The British Second Army on December 13 was crossing the RHINE at the BONN-COLN and MULHEIM Bridges.

IV. WEATHER: Fair to cloudy.

V. VISIBILITY: Fair.

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: Posts have been established along both banks of the RHINE to maintain the prescribed blockade.

VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: The III Corps is practically across the RHINE and occupying with its advance troops the outer circle of the bridgehead.

VIII. REMARKS:

* * * * *

(c) * * *

Changes in headquarters for tomorrow:
Third Army - COBLENZ

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 29

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 15, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 14 to 10 h., December 15

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The occupation of the American sector of the bridgehead of COBLENZ is nearing completion. The corps in support and reserve are moving into their assigned areas as per schedule.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The III Corps is completing the crossing of the RHINE. The IV Corps is moving to its position on the left bank of the RHINE. The 42d Division has its advance elements established on the left bank of the RHINE. The 3d Division is in the vicinity of COBLENZ, and is continuing the march to its assigned area. The 4th Division is crossing the MOSELLE and continuing its march in accordance with instructions. The IV Corps will complete its movement to this position on the left bank of the RHINE by 16 h., December 17. The VII Corps is marching to its area in rear of the IV Corps and will complete this movement by 16 h., December 18.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The movement of the 2d D. C. P. and the 48th D. I. to the southern sector of the bridgehead of COBLENZ continues. The French Tenth Army is completing the occupation of the MAINZ and southern COBLENZ bridgehead. The British Second Army has reached the line: ROMLINGHOVEN [not identified]-SIEGBURG.

IV. WEATHER: Clear.

V. VISIBILITY: Good.

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: Troops of the III and IV Corps reached their day's objective at an early hour. The appearance of all troops and animals continues to be good.

VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: Positions of defense are being reconnoitered and selected in accordance with instructions contained in Field Orders No. 10, Third Army, December 12.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

Amendment of Orders

FIELD ORDER
No. 13

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 16, 1918--18 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000
Operations Map No. 4 (as amended)

1. Paragraph 3 (c), Field Orders No. 11, is amended to read as follows:
The VII Corps (89th and 90th Divisions) will occupy that portion of the Regierungsbezirk of TRIER (exclusive of the Stadtkreis of TRIER), within the army limits * * *
The movement will be completed by 18 h., December 23.

2. The 33d Division passes to the command of the Second Army at 12 h., December 17, 1918.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h., December 15 to 10 h., December 16

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Outposts have been established on the perimeter of the American bridgehead.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The III Corps has completed the crossing of the RHINE and is occupying the bridgehead. The IV Corps has all troops north of the MOSELLE, with the exception of a few elements. The 42d and 4th Divisions will complete their movements to the areas assigned them by 14 h. today. The VII Corps is moving as per schedule, and will be in position by 16 h., December 18. The 33d Division has withdrawn to a position west of the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier, preparatory to its transfer to the Second Army, on December 17. The 66th F. A. Brigade remains in position.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British Second Army is occupying the COLN bridgehead. The French Tenth Army is completing the occupation of the MAINZ bridgehead. The 2d D. I. and the 48th D. I. are continuing their march to the southern sector COBLENZ bridgehead.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

German-Luxemburg Boundary Announced as Rear Limit of Third Army

OPERATIONS ORDERS
No. 78

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 16, 1918--11:30 h.

1. The GERMAN-LUXEMBURG boundary is announced as the rear limit of the Third Army, effective 12 h., December 17, 1918.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

PERIOD OF OCCUPATION

The movement into the Coblenz bridgehead was completed on December 17, with the Third Army Headquarters established at Coblenz, the III Corps at Neuweid, the IV Corps at Cochem; the VIII Corps at Wittlich. Units were recruited up to war strength, and training was started to prepare American troops for future contingencies.

During January, February, and March, routine duties of occupation and training were carried on. On July 2, 1919 the Third Army was discontinued, its headquarters and all personnel and units under it being designated the "American Forces in Germany."

G-3. GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 31

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 17, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 16 to 10 h., December 17

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The movement of the Third Army into German territory has been completed.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: The III Corps remains halted. The 3d Division is moving into its area. Minor changes only are being made in the disposition of troops in the 4th and 42d Divisions. The 33 Division passes to the command of the Second Army at 12 n. today. The limits of the 89th and 90th Divisions are extended to include the Kreise of BERNCASEL, SAARBURG, and TRIER (exclusive of the Stadtkreis of TRIER). The garrison of COBLENZ will consist of two battalions of infantry from the 4th Division. The GERMAN-LUXEMBURG boundary is announced as the rear limit of the Third Army, effective December 17, 12 h.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British Second Army, on our left, occupies the bridgehead of COLN. The French Tenth Army, on our right, is occupying the bridgehead of MAINZ and the southern sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3. GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 32

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 18, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 17 to 10 h., December 18

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The occupation of the American sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead has been completed. The organization of this bridgehead is being perfected.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: Slight changes in dispositions of troops were made in accordance with the plan of organization of the terrain, as prescribed in Field Orders No. 10, Third Army, December 12.

The VII Corps is preparing to extend its area in accordance with Field Orders No. 13, Third Army, December 16.

The 66th F. A. Brigade remains in the HILLESHEIM-BUDESHEIM area.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Headquarters French I Cavalry Corps are established at BOPPARD. * * *

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-10.5: Strength Report

Statistical Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 19, 1918---17 h.

RECAPITULATION THIRD ARMY			ARMY TROOPS		
ORGANIZATION	O.	MEN	ORGANIZATION	O.	MEN
Total Headquarters	616	3,045	Headquarters	157	773
Total Infantry	3,645	95,796	Infantry	96	3,190
Total Artillery	1,951	46,013	Artillery	131	3,030
Total Engineers	554	16,994	Engineers	48	1,431
Total Trains	1,023	26,226	Trains	29	695
Total Machine Gun	637	16,232	Machine Gun		
Total Miscellaneous	1,212	16,764	Miscellaneous	478	5,327
Grand Total	9,638	221,070	Total	939	14,446
Eff. Rifles		117,406	Eff. Rifles		7,843
Animals		47,973	Animals		543

III CORPS										
ORGANIZATION	III CORPS		1st DIV.		2d DIV.		32d DIV.		TOT. III CORPS	
	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN
Headquarters	90	416						90	416	
Infantry	70	2,679	462	11,209	592	13,011	455	10,598	1,579	37,997
Artillery	20	1,112	196	4,443	200	4,888	239	5,924	654	16,367
Engineers	64	1,630	50	1,403	53	1,751	58	1,689	225	6,473
Trains	49	1,157	99	2,783	129	2,993	76	1,546	353	8,479
Machine Gun			86	2,424	105	2,568	90	2,523	281	7,515
Miscellaneous	96	1,647	144	1,644	79	934	72	1,107	391	3,359
Total	389	8,668	1,037	24,406	1,158	26,145	989	23,387	3,573	82,606
Eff. Rifles		6,005		14,780		14,339		12,654		47,778
Animals		1,017		5,554		6,218		5,677		18,466

IV CORPS										
ORGANIZATION	IV CORPS		3d DIV.		4th DIV.		42d DIV.		TOT. IV CORPS	
	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN
Headquarters	82	472	50	249	50	193	46	248	228	1,162
Infantry	69	2,889	456	12,691	506	11,028	409	10,321	1,440	36,929
Artillery	34	1,261	199	4,574	175	4,059	192	4,621	600	14,515
Engineers	43	1,479	51	1,398	46	1,470	44	1,251	184	5,597
Trains	52	1,010	114	2,609	112	2,946	89	2,796	367	9,361
Machine Gun			84	1,761	104	2,347	56	1,515	244	5,623
Miscellaneous	105	1,516	17	342	29	1,015	17	565	168	3,439
Total	365	8,626	971	23,824	1,022	23,059	853	21,317	3,231	76,626
Eff. Rifles		6,000		12,447		13,286		11,920		43,653
Animals		917		6,013		5,673		5,871		18,474

VII CORPS										
ORGANIZATION	VII CORPS		89th DIV.		90th DIV.				TOT. VII CORPS	
	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN
Headquarters	90	462	51	232					141	694
Infantry			204	9,814	326	7,866			530	17,680
Artillery	170	2,767	203	4,397	193	4,937			566	12,101
Engineers	29	779	25	1,348	43	1,366			97	3,493
Trains	56	1,483	82	2,664	136	3,544			274	7,691
Machine Gun			43	1,339	69	1,755			112	3,094
Miscellaneous	78	1,229	28	606	69	804			175	2,639
Total	423	6,720	636	20,400	836	20,272			1,895	47,392
Eff. Rifles		2,332		8,631		7,209				18,172
Animals		624		5,480		4,386				10,490

CHANGES IN STATIONS LIST

Third Army	Coblenz
III Corps	Neuwied
1st Division	Montabaur
2d Division	Heddesdorf
32d Division	Rengsdorf
IV Corps	Cochem
3d Division	Andernach
4th Division	Bertrich
42d Division	Ahrweiler
VII Corps	Wittlich
89th Division	Kyllburg
90th Division	Daun

ARMY TROOPS

Third Army M. P. Bn. Hq.	Coblenz
Cos. A, B, C, D.	Coblenz
Cos. C and F, 26th Engineers	Transferred to Second Army
Cos. C and E and Regt. Hq., 24th Engineers	Transferred to Second Army
Evacuation Hosp. No. 6	Coblenz
Evacuation Hosp. No. 8	Mayen

All stations in * * * Germany, except those otherwise noted.

By command of Major General Dickman:

ROSCOE D. BROWN,
Major, Adjutant General,
Personnel Adjutant.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 33

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 19, 1918 10 h.

From 10 h., December 18 to 10 h., December 19

Extract

* * * * *

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: In the III Corps the western and south-western boundaries of the 1st Division are changed as follows:

As at present from the outer perimeter of the bridgehead circle to BENDORF (excl.)---thence WEITERSBURG (excl.)---VALLENDAR (excl.)---SIMMERN (excl.)---ARZBACH (excl.)---thence due south to the southern boundary of the corps.

* * * * *

VII Corps: The 165th F. A. will stage tonight in the vicinity of WEITEN. The 166th F. A. moves to HETZERATH---RIEVENICH---FOHREN. * * * The 355th Infantry moves towards EHRANG.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Liaison with the French troops is being established by means of patrols, along the road NIEDER-ERBACH---ELZ.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 34

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 20, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 19 to 10 h., December 20

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: * * *

VII Corps: Two battalions of the 356th Infantry en route to BITBURG. The 89th and 90th Divisions are extending their areas as per instructions.

The 66th F. A. Brigade will move December 21 towards the area of BASSENHEIM---RUBENACH---KARLICH---KETTIG---WEISSENTURM.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French 4th Cavalry Division is passing through the southern area of the VII Corps.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 35

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 21, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 20 to 10 h., December 21

[Extract]

* * * * *

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: * * *

VII Corps: Minor units moving to area south of the MOSELLE. The 66th F. A. Brigade is moving today to BASSENHEIM---RUBENACH---KARLICH---KITTIG---WEISSENTURM area. Staging area night December 21/22. 146th Regiment at KELBURG-BOOS; 148th Regiment in vicinity of

MAYEN. Headquarters to open at BASSENHEIM December 22, 12 h.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Liaison maintained with neighboring armies.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 36

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 22, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 21 to 10 h., December 22

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: ***

VII Corps: The following movements took place December 21: 89th Division, 353d Infantry, from WEINSHEIM and vicinity to PRUM and vicinity. 354th Infantry from PRUM and vicinity to the WAXWEILER-LUNEBACH area. 356th Infantry from BITBURG and RITTERSDORF to SCHWEICH; 90th Div. - headquarters moved from DAUN to BERNCASEL. 179th Brigade Headquarters moved from HILLESHEIM to DAUN. The 359th Infantry from GEROLSTEIN-LISSENGEN area to staging at NEUNKIRCHEN---DAUN---MEHREN. 360th Infantry from MEHREN---DAUN---STEINBORN area to staging at GILLENFELD---STROHN---STROTZBUSCH---HONTHEIM area.

The following movements are taking place today: 89th Div., 178th Inf. Brigade Hq. from BITBURG to PALLIEN. 90th Div., Hq. 180th Brigade, from DAUN to WEHLEN; 357th Inf. from STADTKYLL to HILLESHEIM; 358th Inf. from HILLESHEIM and vicinity to DAUN and vicinity, 359th Inf. from DAUN---NEUNKIRCHEN---MEHREN to stage night December 22/23 at GILLENFELD---STROHN---STROTZBUSCH---HONTHEIM area, 360th Inf. from HONTHEIM---GILLENFELD---STROHN---STROTZBUSCH to stage night December 22/23 at URZIG---KINHEIM---CROV. The 66th F. A. Brigade continues its movement to the area of BASSENHEIM.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French 4th Cavalry Division staged night of December 21/22 in the WALDRACH-OSBURG area, with its headquarters at WALDRACH. Liaison maintained with the British Second Army and the French Tenth Army.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h., December 22 to 10 h., December 23

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: * * *

VII Corps: The following changes took place December 22: 89th Div. - 178th Inf. Brigade, headquarters from BITBURG to PALLIEN. 90th Div. - 357th Inf. from STADTKYLL to HILLESHEIM; 358th Inf. from HILLESHEIM to DAUN. The following changes are taking place today: 90th Div. - 165th F. A. Brigade, headquarters from WEITEN to KENN.***The 66th F. A. Brigade completes its movement to the area of BASSENHEIM.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French 4th Cavalry Division will move forward on December 23 and establish headquarters night December 23/24 at THALFANG. Liaison was maintained with neighboring units.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 275: Cablegram

Composition of Third Army as of This Date

No. 2004-S

December 23, 1918.

AGWAR Washington

Paragraph 14

For Chief of Staff. Reference A 2,339 Paragraph 2. Following units outside of divisions are serving with Third Army this date: Army troops: Headquarters Troop, 66th Field Artillery Brigade, 322d Field Signal Battalion, 51st Telegraph Battalion, 417th Telegraph Battalion, 2d Cavalry Headquarters, 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry, 37th Engineers, 56th Pioneer Infantry, Third Army Military Police Battalion, Evacuation Hospitals 3 and 12, 314th Remount Squadron, 303d Remount Squadron, Army Post Office 927, Sanitary Train, Third Army, 542d, 590th, 601st, 603d Ambulance Service Sections, Third Army Provisional Supply Train, Truck Companies 441, 463, 466, 467, 469, Third Army Air Service Headquarters, Headquarters 1st Pursuit Group, Pursuit Squadron 94, 4th Air Park, Headquarters Bombardment Group, Day Bombing Squadron 166, Headquarters Army Observation Group, Aero Squadrons 9 and 91, Photo Sections 2 and 10, Branch Intelligence Office, 462d and 463d Construction Squadrons, Third Army Regional Replacement Depot, Ordnance Depot No. 303.

III Army Corps, Corps Troops: Headquarters Troop, 308th Engineers and Train, 52d Telegraph Battalion, 308th Field Signal Battalion, III Corps Military Police Company, 1st Pioneer Infantry, Troop K, 3d Cavalry, Motor Supply Train 415, Field Remount Squadron 302,

Mobile Veterinary Hospital No. 1, Machine Shop Truck Unit 405, I Corps Artillery Park, 501st Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop, Headquarters III Army Corps Air Service, 1st Aero Squadron, 6th Photo Section, III Corps Balloon Group Headquarters, 1st Balloon Company, Branch Intelligence Office, III Corps Sanitary Train, Field Hospitals 162, 163 and 332, Ambulance Companies 162, 163 and 332, Sales Commissary Unit No. 33.

IV Army Corps, Corps Troops: Headquarters Troop, Headquarters Detachment, 51st Pioneer Infantry, 301st Engineers and Train, 310th Field Signal Battalion, 405th Telegraph Battalion, IV Corps Air Service Headquarters, 12th Aero Squadron, Photo Section No. 4, Branch Intelligence Office, Balloon Group Headquarters, IV Corps, 2d Balloon Company, 413th Motor Supply Train, Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop, Machine Shop Truck Unit 369, IV Corps Sanitary Train, Ambulance Companies 301, 302 and 303, Field Hospitals 301, 302, 303, Troop M, 2d Cavalry, 306th Field Remount Squadron, Detachment 5th Mobile Veterinary Hospital, IV Corps Military Police, Sales Commissary Unit No. 31, IV Corps Artillery Park.

VII Army Corps, Corps Troops: Headquarters Troop, Military Police, 326th Field Signal Battalion, Provisional Motor Supply Company, 396th Machine Shop Truck Unit, 114th Sanitary Train, less horse section, Army Post Office 792, 308th Mobile Veterinary Section, 88th Aero Squadron, 3d Balloon Company, 54th Pioneer Infantry, VII Corps Field Veterinary Unit 166th Field Artillery Brigade, 310th Engineers, 1 battalion, 602d Engineers, 1 battalion, 414th Supply Train, 2 companies, 418th Supply Train, 2 companies, 312th Remount Squadron, 310th Engineer Train, 55th Telegraph Battalion.

PERSHING.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 38

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 24, 1918 - 10 h.

From 10 h., December 23 to 10 h., December 24

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: ***

VII Corps: The following movements took place December 23: 90th Division: 165th F. A. Brigade from WEITEN to KENN. 343d F. A. Regiment from OBER-LEUKEN---FAHA area to WILTINGEN. 344th F. A. from KORRIG-KIRF area to KONZ. 345th F. A. from KONZ to NEUMAGEN. No movements scheduled for December 25.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British IX Corps is in the area north of the 89th Division. The French 4th Cavalry Division will move from the area of THALFANG and establish headquarters December 24/25 at MORBACH.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 39

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 25, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 24 to 10 h., December 25

[Extract]

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French 4th Cavalry Division is staging December 25 at MORBACH and will clear the VII Corps area on December 26.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 40

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 26, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 25 to 10 h., December 26

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: *** December 26, the 343d F. A. (90th Div.) began its march to the area of THALFANG.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French 4th Cavalry Division is moving from the vicinity of MORBACH and clears the VII Corps area today.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h., December 26 to 10 h., December 27

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: * * *

VII Corps: The 165th F. A. Brigade moved from KENN to establish permanent head-quarters at BERNCASEL.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French 4th Cavalry Division has cleared the VII Corps area.

The horse transport of the French 48th D. I. crossed the PFAFFENDORFER bridge night December 26/27, en route to their division in southern sector COBLENZ bridgehead.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h., December 27 to 10 h., December 28

[Extract]

* * * * *

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: * * *

The following movements will take place December 28: In the 89th Division, 356th Inf. Headquarters from SCHWEICH to EHRANG. 90th Division: 244th F. A. Brigade Headquarters from HERMESKEIL to HOXEL.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The II Colonial Army Corps is relieving the I Cavalry Corps, the relief to be effected by January 1.

The southern COBLENZ bridgehead will be occupied by the 10th Colonial Inf. Div. and the 48th D. I.

The 2d D. C. P. is moving into the region of MAINZ---ALZEY---WORMS in reserve of the MAINZ bridgehead.

The 4th Cavalry Division, with headquarters at SIMMERN, will occupy the left bank of the RHINE.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 43

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 29, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 28 to 10 h., December 29

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: *** The 344th F. A. Brigade is moving today from HOXEL and will establish headquarters at KEMPFELD.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 6: Operations Report

No. 44

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 30, 1918--10 h.

From 10 h., December 29 to 10 h., December 30

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: ***

VII Corps: 90th Div. The 344th F. A. Regt. moved December 29 from HOXEL and established permanent headquarters at KEMPFELD. The 164th F. A. Brigade is moving today from MALBERG to BITBURG. The 66th F. A. Brigade is marching today from the BASSENHEIM-WEISSENTURM area to the HOHR-GRENZHAUSEN area. Movement to be completed by December 31. Headquarters will open at HOHR, December 31, 1918, 12 h.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British Fourth Army is guarding the BELGIAN-GERMAN frontier.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h., December 30 to 10 h., December 31

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: * * *

VII Corps: 89th Div. The 164th F. A. Brigade moved from MALBERG to BITBURG on December 31. The 344th F. A. Regt. will move from KEMPFELD and vicinity and establish headquarters at MORBACH. The 66th F. A. Brigade completes its move to the HOHR-GRENZHAUSEN area. Headquarters will open at HOHR, December 13, 12 h.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French XIV Corps, with headquarters at THIONVILLE is occupying the front of LORRAINE southwest of the VII Corps. This corps will take over the area of the 5th Division in LUXEMBURG.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

Amendment of Field Orders No. 10, 1918

FIELD ORDERS
No. 14

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
December 31, 1918--18 h.

Maps: German 1: 100,000
Operations Map No. 3 (as amended)

1. The 2d, 3d, and 5th subparagraphs of Paragraph 3 (A), Field Orders No. 10, are amended to read as follows:
 2. The second or main position of resistance, on the general line LIMBACH---NEUSTADT---EPGERT---KIRCHDORF---GIERSHOFEN---SESSENHAUSEN---QUIRNBACH---NIEDERAHR---DAHLEN---GIROD---EPPENROD.
 3. The Third position, following the general line WINDHAGEN---LORSCHIED HARGARTEN---DATZEROTH---HARDERT---KAUSEN---DERNBACH---MONTABAUR---NIEDER-ELBERT---DAUBACH.
 5. Switch positions will be constructed on the general lines HORHAUSEN---BREITSCHIED---GASBITZE---ARIENDORF and WILLROTH---KURTSCHIED---NIEDER-BREITBACH---FRORATH---NONNINGEN.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 1

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
January 1, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., December 31 to 10 h., January 1

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: *** In the 90th Division, the 344th Field Artillery Regiments move from KEMPFELD to MORBACH.

The 66th F. A. Brigade completed its movement to the area across the RHINE. The 148th Regiment is at GRENZHAUSEN and the 148th is at HOHR.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The II Colonial Army Corps relieved the French I Cavalry Corps.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 4

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
January 7, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., January 3 to 10 h., January 4

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: In the III Corps, the 6th Infantry Brigade Headquarters of the 32d Division, moved to SAYNECK. ***

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Supplement to Field Orders No. 10, 1918

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
January 8, 1919.

From: The Chief of Staff

To: Commanding General, III Corps
IV Corps
VII Corps
Army Staff

1. In the absence of instructions from higher authority, the following tentative plan of action of the army, supplementing Field Orders No. 10, dated December 12, 1918, is furnished, effective in the event of a renewal of hostilities:

(a) The 3d, 4th and 42d Divisions will be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, III Corps, and will cross the RHINE under his orders, the 3d Division using the pontoon bridge at COBLENZ and the railroad bridge at ENGERS, to strengthen the right of the III Corps, and the 42d Division, over the bridge at REMAGEN, to extend the front to the left and gain contact with the British forces. The 4th Division will follow the 3d Division across the bridges at COBLENZ and ENGERS.

(b) After the crossing of the divisions is completed, the III and IV Corps will be reconstituted, as follows: III Corps - 1st, 3d and 4th Divisions; IV Corps - 2d, 32d and 42d Divisions. It is contemplated that the army will advance in the general direction MARBURG-CASSEL: the III Corps on the right with the 3d and 1st Divisions in the front line and the 4th Division in reserve; the IV Corps on the left with the 32d and 42d Divisions in the front line and the 2d Division in reserve.

(c) The VII Corps will move forward by marching, and prepare to cross the RHINE: one division over the REMAGEN bridge and one division over the bridges at COBLENZ and ENGERS. It is not expected that rolling stock will be available to assist this movement by rail other than the forwarding of supplies.

(d) The 1st Squadron of the 2d Cavalry will be assigned to the III Corps for use with the front line divisions. When the corps are reconstituted, two troops will be transferred to the IV Corps.

(e) The air service is now being concentrated at COBLENZ and WEISSENTURM, and observation squadrons will be assigned to corps when needed.

(f) A German pontoon bridge is assembled in the vicinity of NEUWIED, and will be available for use of the divisions in crossing the RHINE, as will all river transport procurable.

2. It is to be remembered that all agreements as to restrictions in the neutral zone become void when hostilities appear imminent. The present front line divisions will hold their advance positions, pushing out reconnoitering detachments of cavalry and motorcyclists into the neutral zone.

3. Detailed plans will be submitted by each corps before January 15, 1919, to accord with the plan of the army as above outlined. March tables will be constructed by divisions, and practice had in putting them into execution.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 16

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
January 16, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., January 15 to 10 h., January 16

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: ***

VII Corps: The 166th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters is moving today from ERLNBACH to DODENBURG.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 21

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
January 21, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., January 20 to 10 h., January 21

[Extract]

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The E. N. E.* of the French XXXIII Corps passed through the VII Corps area en route to AIX-la-CHAPELLE and stayed night January 20/21 at STADTKYLL.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

* E. N. E. - Non-divisional elements.

193-10.5: Strength Report

Statistical Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 23, 1919--17 h.

RECAPITULATION THIRD ARMY			ARMY TROOPS			3d DIV.		4th DIV.	
ORGANIZATION	O.	MEN	ORGN.	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN
Total Hq.	476	2,534	Hq.	201	845	54	249	30	205
" Inf.	1,906	46,937	Inf.	216	6,255	252	6,114	185	5,142
" Arty.	765	16,698	Arty.			188	4,057	159	4,089
" Engrs.	207	5,790	Engrs.	59	1,544	33	764		
" Trains	449	11,710	Trains	89	2,104	91	2,381	58	1,362
" M. G.	335	8,310	M. G.			51	987	61	1,637
" Misc.	1,325	19,707	Misc.	794	12,310	30	795	59	1,192
" Cav.	65	1,147	Cav.						
Grand Total	5,528	112,833	Total	1,359	23,058	699	15,747	552	13,627
Eff. Rifles		53,441	E. R.		9,892		7,268		4,026
Animals		19,730	Anls.		350		1,797		3,327

III CORPS

CORPS TROOPS		1st DIV.		2d DIV.		III CORPS RE. BRIG		FR. 2d CAV. DIV.		TOTAL		
ORGN.	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN
Hq.	85	467	52	471	54	297					191	1,235
Inf.			474	11,290	542	12,630	237	5,506			1,253	29,426
Arty.			182	3,828	222	4,328	*	*	14	396	418	8,552
Engrs.			42	1,415	54	1,565	19	502			115	3,482
Trains	34	870	55	2,219	114	2,589	8	185			211	5,863
M. G.			83	2,629	98	2,077	42	980			223	5,686
Cav.									65	1,147	65	1,147
Misc.	239	2,276	1,165	1,896	27	904	2	104	9	230	442	5,410
Total	358	3,613	1,053	23,748	1,111	24,390	308	7,277	88	1,773	2,918	60,801
E. R.		897		12,743		13,557		5,058				32,255
Anls.		353		5,398		5,163		1,322		2,020		14,256

This date is correct.

*One bn. artillery, not yet designated, shown under strength of 3d Div.

CHANGES IN STATIONS LIST

Headquarters Third Army	COBLENZ
Army Troops:	
3d Bn., 39th Inf. Regt.	COBLENZ-NEUENDORF
Co. L	" "
3d Division:	ANDERNACH
Amb. Co. No. 26	ANDERNACH
4th Division	NIEDER-BREISIG
III Corps:	NEUWIED
1st Division	MONTABAUR
2d Bn., 16th Inf. Regt.	HAHN
2d Division	DIERDORF
2d Sn. Tn. Hq., Hq. F. H. Sec., Hq. Amb. Sec.	GROSS-MAISCHEID
Amb. Cos. 1, 15, 16	" "
F. H. 14, 15, 16	" "
III Corps Reinforced Brigade	MAYEN
French 2d Cavalry Division	PUDERBACH
5th Division (atcd. for administration)	ESCH-sur-ALZETTE (LUXEMBURG)

All stations in GERMANY, unless otherwise noted.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

HENRY WOLFSON,
Capt., A. G. D.,
Actg. Personnel Adjutant.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 26

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
February 1, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., January 25 to 10 h., February 1

[Extract]

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French 52d Artillery Regiment, marching from MAINZ to AIX-la-CHAPELLE, passed through the 90th Division area during the period January 21 to 27.

The French VII Army Corps Headquarters, including the corps troops and the French 41st Infantry Division, en route from the vicinity of COLOGNE to BESANCON [FRANCE], began crossing the 89th Division area by train January 25. The movement through this area will be completed about February 2.

The Canadian corps was relieved from the command of the right sector of the COLOGNE bridgehead by the British X Corps, and opened headquarters at ANDENNE, NAMUR area [BELGIUM] January 26.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 27

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
February 8, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., February 1 to 10 h., February 8

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: The 17th Field Artillery Regiment of the 2d Division moves from BENDORF to EHRENBREITSTEIN on February 5.

VII Corps: The 354th Infantry Regiment of the 89th Division moved February 5, from NEUERBURG to TRIER and relieved the 6th Infantry of the 5th Division, which formerly garrisoned TRIER. ***

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French VII Army Corps Headquarters, including the corps troops and the French 41st Infantry Division, en route from the vicinity of COLN to BESANCON, completed their movement through the area of the 89th Division on February 3.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 28

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
February 15, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., February 8 to 10 h., February 15

[Extract]

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The 33d Brigade of the French 17th Infantry Division began movement February 14 from the District of MERZIG to District of EMS to replace regiments of 48th Infantry Division and 10th Colonial Infantry Division.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 29

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
February 22, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., February 15 to 10 h., February 22

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

VII Corps: *** The 358th Infantry Headquarters of the 90th Division moved from DAUN to GEROLSTEIN. ***

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The following changes have taken place in the French Tenth Army:

The 73d Infantry Division relieved the 15th Colonial Infantry Division stationed at BINGEN.

The 127th Infantry Division relieved the 18th Infantry Division at SARREBRUCK.

The 18th Infantry Division moved from the district of SARREBRUCK to the District of EMS to complete the relief of the 48th Infantry Division and the 10th Colonial Infantry Division, who are under orders to return to MOROCCO.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Boundary between British Second Army and American Third Army

FIELD ORDERS
No. 1

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
February 26, 1919--12 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000

1. In accordance with an agreement with the Commanding General, British Second Army, the boundary, within the neutral zone, between the British Second Army and the American Third Army is announced to be that portion of the administrative boundary of the Kreis SIEGBURG, as is included between the RHINE River and the point of intersection of the Kreis boundary and the circumference of a circle, whose radius is 40 kilometers, and whose center is the eastern abutment of the PFAFFENDORFER bridge at COBLENZ (approximately 2 kilometers west-southwest of BUCHHOLZ).

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 30

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
March 1, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., February 22 to 10 h., March 1

[Extract]

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS:

On our right - French Tenth Army: The II C. A. C. Hq. and the 10th D. I. C. Hq. moved February 27 by rail to KREUZNACH, where they will be disbanded.

The E. N. E., 9th Division and the 17th Division, less the 33d Brigade, have commenced their movement toward the BOPPARD District, to complete the relief of the divisions of the II C. A. C.

The 29th D. I. replaced the 15th D. I. C. in the BINGEN area.

The 73d D. I. is in the sector south of MAINZ and will replace the 45th D. I. in army reserve.

The 45th D. I. will move to the right bank of the RHINE to constitute the reserve for the MAINZ bridgehead, replacing the 51st D. I., which is being dissolved.

The IV D. C. is being placed in army reserve in the District of KREUZNACH.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 31

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
March 8, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., March 1 to 10 h., March 8

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

VII Corps: Relief of railroad and frontier guards in the 89th Division ***

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The headquarters of the French Fourth Army is moving from STRASBURG to COLMAR.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 32

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
March 15, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., March 8 and 10 h., March 15

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

VII Corps: In the 89th Division, the 3d Battalion of the 353d Infantry Regiment, moved from LUNEBACH and PRONSFELD to NEUERBURG. In the 90th Division, the 3d Battalion of the 354th F. A. Regiment, moved from ALTRICH to DHRON. ***

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The relief of the divisions of the II C. A. C. by the French IX Army Corps has been completed.

The French Fourth Army Headquarters completed its movement from STRASBURG to COLMAR.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h., March 15 to 10 h., March 22

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK: ***

IV Corps: The 42d Division was relieved from duty with the IV Corps and designated as army reserve, effective March 17, 1919.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

VI Corps assigned to Third Army

FIELD ORDERS
No. 2

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
March 30, 1919--11 h.

Maps: French 1:200,000

1. In compliance with telegraphic instructions dated G. H. Q., A. E. F., March 23, 1919, the VI Corps, including VI Corps troops, 5th and 33d Divisions, is assigned to the Third Army, effective zero hours, April 1, 1919.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

No. 35

From 10 h., March 29 to 10 h., April 5

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

IV Corps: Two battalions of the 39th Infantry Regiment (4th Div.), moved from the vicinity of KEMPENICH to ROLANDSECK and WEIBERN for the purpose of guarding and administering the civil affairs of Kreis AHRWEILER.

VI Corps: The VI Army Corps, including the VI Corps troops, 5th and 33d Divisions, was relieved from duty with the Second Army and assigned to the Third Army, effective zero hours, April 1.

The 5th F. A. Brigade Headquarters (5th Div.), moved from DUDELANGE to PEPPANGE.

The 20th F. A. Regiment Headquarters (5th Div.), moved from PEPPANGE to DUDELANGE.

The 42 Division was relieved from duty with the Third Army, as army reserve, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., effective April 1. Movement of the 42d Division to base port will commence, April 5, 11 h.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

Move of 4th Division

FIELD ORDERS

No. 3

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,

April 6, 1919--12 h.

Maps: Operations Map No. 5

[Extract]

1. The 4th Division will move by marching from its present area (Area No. 7) into the area being vacated by the 42 Division (Area No. 5), less the town of SINZIG.

3. The execution of this movement will be under the direction of the Commanding General, IV Corps, and will be completed not later than 18 h., April 15.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 36

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 12, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., April 5 to 10 h., April 12

[Extract]

* * * * *

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: The 32d Division (less 158th F. A. Brigade) was relieved from duty with the III Corps and Third Army, April 8, and placed at the disposal of the commanding general for return to the UNITED STATES.

The 158th F. A. Brigade was relieved from duty with the III Corps and Third Army, April 10, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES.

IV Corps: The 4th Division is marching from its present area (Area No. 7) into the area vacated by the 42d Division, and will occupy Area No. 5, less the town of SINZIG, which is reserved for the use of the air service.

VII Corps: The VII Corps boundary was extended to include the area of the 5th Division and Belgian Area No. 2.

VI Corps: VI Corps Headquarters and corps troops were relieved from duty with the Third Army and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S.

The 33d Division was relieved from duty with the Third Army, April 12, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES.

The 5th Division was relieved from duty with the VI Corps and assigned to the VII Corps.

The 115th Engineers and certain small units of VI Corps troops were relieved from VI Corps and assigned as army troops.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

From 10 h., April 12 to 10 h., April 19

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: The 1st and 2d Divisions are preparing to move units of their command into the area now being vacated by the 32d Division.

IV Corps: The 4th Division completed its movement to Area No. 5 and established division headquarters at NIEDER-BREISIG.

The 6th Division was relieved from duty with the First Army and assigned to the Third Army. The 6th Division will be under the command of the IV Corps and will occupy Area No. 7. Advance parties of the 6th Division arrived in COCHEM April 16, the 318th Engineers and advance signal detachments completed movement to this area April 18.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

Boundaries

FIELD ORDERS
No. 4

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 21, 1919--12 h.

Maps: Operations Map No. 5

1. The boundary line between FRANCE and LUXEMBURG is announced as the southern boundary of that part of the Third Army area west of the MOSELLE River.

2. The VII Corps area is extended to include Area No. 11 (Operations Map No. 5), now occupied by the 33d Division.

3. The Commanding General, VII Corps, will provide for the occupation of Area No. 11 by units of the 5th Division, effective upon departure of units of the 33d Division.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Reorganization of Third Army Area

FIELD ORDERS
No. 5

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 24, 1919--10:15 h.

Maps: Operations Map No. 6

1. The area of the Third Army is reorganized effective April 25, 1919, * * *

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 38

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 26, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., April 19 to 10 h., April 26

[Extract]

* * * * *

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III. Corps: Units of the 1st and 2d Divisions completed the relief of the 32d Division.

IV Corps: The 59th Infantry Regiment (4th Division) completed its movement to the right bank of the RHINE, April 24, 1919, as per Operations Orders No. 107, and established regimental headquarters at VALLENDAR.

VII Corps: The VII Corps area was extended to include Area No. 11, which will be occupied by troops of the 5th Division upon the departure of the 33d Division.

The 89th Division was relieved from duty with the VII Corps and Third Army, April 24, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES.

The boundary line between FRANCE and LUXEMBURG was announced as the southern boundary of that part of the Third Army area west of the MOSELLE River.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Army Plan of Action

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 30, 1919.

From: The Chief of Staff

To: Commanding General, III Corps
IV Corps
VII Corps
Army Staff

1. In the absence of instructions from higher authority, the following tentative plan of action of the army, supplementing Field Orders No. 10, dated December 12, 1918, is furnished, effective in the event of a renewal of hostilities.

This plan is based upon the assumption of an Allied advance in a northeasterly direction toward the ELBE, with the British Second Army on our left and the French Tenth Army on our right.

The 1st Phase of the advance will be in the nature of a forward concentration, in which the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Divisions form on Line D with the 6th Division in support and the VII Corps in reserve on the left bank of the RHINE.

(a) The 4th Division will cross the RHINE on the bridge at REMAGEN and will extend the front to the left and gain contact with the British forces.

(b) The 3d and 6th Divisions will be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, III Corps, and will cross the RHINE under his orders, the 3d Division using the pontoon bridge at COBLENZ and the railroad bridge at ENGERS will extend the right of the III Corps. The 6th Division will follow the 3d Division across the bridges at COBLENZ and ENGERS.

(c) The 3d, 4th and 6th Divisions will, in addition to the bridges prescribed, use pontoon bridges, ferries and all other available means to effect their crossings.

(d) After the crossing of these divisions is completed (and Line D has been reached by the four leading divisions), the III and IV Corps will be reconstituted as follows:

III Corps: 1st, 3d and 6th Divisions

IV Corps: 2d and 4th Divisions

The advance will be made with four divisions (3d, 1st, 2d and 4th from right to left) in front line, the 6th Division covering the right flank division of the III Corps.

(e) The VII Corps will move forward by marching and motor transportation and prepare to cross the RHINE, one division over the REMAGEN bridge and one division over the bridge at COBLENZ and ENGERS. It is not expected that rolling stock will be available to assist this movement by rail other than the forwarding of supplies.

(f) When the corps are reconstituted, two troops of the 2d Cavalry will be transferred from the III to the IV Corps.

(g) The army boundaries are as follows:

Left (northwest): From the RHINE River to BUCHHOLZ (incl.) along the Kreis SIEGBURG boundary: OBER-EIP (incl.)---STEIN (excl.)---LEUSCHEID (incl.)---PRACHT (incl.)---HAMM (excl.) ROTH (excl.)---SCHONSTEIN (excl.)---SCHEUERFELD (excl.)---ALSDORF (excl.)---HERDORF (excl.)---ZEPPENFELD (incl.)---SIEGEN (excl.)---NETPHEN (excl.)---ERNDTEBRUCK (excl.).

Right (southeast): OBER-LAHNSTEIN---SCHEUDREN---SPELBACH [SEELBACH ?] (all incl.)---BREMBERG (excl.)---STEINSBERG---BALDUINSTEIN---BIRLENBACH---FREIENDIEZ---LIMBURG---VILLMAR---AUMENAU---BRAUNFELS---WETZLAR---GIESSEN (all incl.).

Dividing Line between III and IV Corps the line: WOLFERLINGEM---LANGENHAHN---HOHN---HELLENHAHN---REHE---ROTH---BURG---EISEMROTH---BODEWBORN [BOTTENHORN ?]---HOLZHAUSEN; all to the IV Corps.

Advance elements will reach and outpost the following line on D day (referred to above as Line D), STEIN---ALTENKIRCHEN---HACHENBURG---WESTERBURG---HADAMAR---LIMBURG (all incl.).

2. It is to be remembered that all agreements as to restrictions in the neutral zone become void when hostilities appear imminent. The present front line divisions would promptly push out reconnoitering detachments of cavalry and motorcyclists into the neutral zone.

3. Detailed plans will be submitted by each corps before May 10, 1919, to accord with the plan of the army as above outlined. March tables will be constructed by divisions, and practice had in putting them into execution.

By command of Major General McGlachlin:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-11.4: Fldr. 65: Report

Organization of American Third Army

Operations Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 30, 1919.

From November 15, 1918, to April 30, 1919

[Extract]

The first problem *** was the movement of the Third Army to the RHINE which was to begin at 5:30 a. m., November 17. *** The army consisted at that time of the III Corps with the 2d, 32d and 42d Divisions, in position on the left of our zone of advance, the 2d and 32d Divisions holding the line as of 11 h., November 11, and the 42d Division in support. The IV Corps on the right of our zone of advance with the 1st and 3d Divisions in front line with the 4th Division in support. The front of our advance was between the lines MOUZON---FLORENVILLE---DIEKIRCH on the north and the line THIAUCOURT---CHAMBLEY---CONFLANS---THIONVILLE---SCHENGEN on the south. On the right flank was the French Tenth Army and on our left flank the French Fifth Army.

*** Field Order No. 1 was published at 24 h., November 15, 1918, and directed an advance of two days; the advance elements to reach the line: ETALLE---St-LEGER---RUETTE---AUBANGE---LONGWY---AUDUN---BRIEY. At 11 h., November 16, a supplement was issued to this order, giving the advance post of commands after 11 h., November 18, Third Army at LONGUYON, III Corps at LONGUYON and IV Corps at ETAIN.

In planning this advance the orders were based on two considerations; first, the possibility of treachery on the part of the enemy, and second, the roads available. ***

The security of the advancing troops was left in the hands of the corps and division commanders.

The advance was continued from November 20 to November 23, both inclusive, when the army reached the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border * * * On November 22 the army headquarters was moved to HOLLERICH * * *

The VII Corps, consisting of the 5th, 89th and 90th Divisions passed to the Third Army on November 22. The 5th Division was detached from duty at this time and assigned to duty in the zone of the line of communications. * * * The VII Corps was to concentrate in the vicinity of MOUZON---DUN-sur-MEUSE by 18 h., November 25. * * *

Instructions were received at this time from higher authority that on December 1, the French 2d D. C. P. and the French 48th D. I., were to be attached to the Third Army, but this order was revoked before December 1. * * *

This was the beginning of a series of negotiations with the French, based on the order of the Allied command to have French troops in our bridgehead, which caused a great deal of difficulty in the working out of the problems of the section, as it led to a number of changes in the major units and of the army limits, and culminated in a change in our bridgehead which has been a heavy handicap on the proper working out of the problems confronting this section.

The advance was resumed on December 1, under orders requiring a continued march for four days to reach the general line DAHLEM---OBER-BETTINGEN---WALLENBORN---WITTLICH---BERNCASTEL---HUNOLSTEIN---MALBORN---OTZENHAUSEN, and on December 3, at 15 h., the headquarters moved to BITBURG.

The VII Corps was to move forward until its advance elements were on the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers, and the corps was given three days to complete the movement, beginning December 2. * * * The VII Corps was to cross the German border December 6, and reach the WITTLICH-BERNCASTEL line with its advance elements by December 8, with its rear elements east of TRIER. * * *

The advance elements of the army reached the RHINE on December 8, and the entire front line was halted on the RHINE on December 11, where the line was held until further orders.

The forward movement of army troops was handled in operations orders. Elements of the VII Corps, as it was well to the rear, were regulated as troop movements. * * *

On December 12, the 33d Division was transferred to the Third Army and the 5th Division to the Second Army. * * *

* * * * *

J. C. MONTGOMERY,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

Occupation of Coblenz Bridgehead

Operations Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 30, 1919.

From November 15, 1918, to April 30, 1919

[Extract]

In the evening of December 11, instructions were received from the Allied headquarters notifying us that our bridgehead had been cut down to its present size, taking away from us the LAHN Valley and all of the bridgehead south of that. This required an immediate change in the plans for holding of the bridgehead which had been worked out, and has since been a source of difficulty in properly working up any plan for an advance.

The revised order for the holding of the bridgehead was published at noon, December 12, and placed the III Corps with three divisions in the bridgehead, supported by the IV Corps with two divisions on the RHINE and one in close support. The bridgehead was to be held awaiting further orders for the advance, and, during the stability, was organized in the usual manner, with an outpost position, a main position of resistance, and a reserve position, together with such switch lines as fitted the terrain. In view of the actual conditions, it was not felt necessary to push the construction of work, but the same was cited and practice was regularly held in taking the alert. ***

The actual crossing of the RHINE was made at 7 h., December 13. ***

The VI Corps consisting of the 5th and 33d Divisions was transferred to the Third Army on April 1. ***

J. C. MONTGOMERY,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 39

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
May 3, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., April 26 to 10 h., May 3

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: The III Corps area was extended to include the Kreis of AHRWEILER.

IV Corps: The 4th Division was transferred from the IV Corps to the III Corps, effective April 30, 1919, 24 h. This transfer involved no change of station.

The 6th Division is moving into the area formerly occupied by the 4th Division and has established division headquarters at BERTICH, the movement being about now half completed.

VII Corps: Units of the 5th Division are moving into the area formerly occupied by the 33d Division.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

7th Division Assigned

FIELD ORDERS
No. 6

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
May 6, 1919--11 h.

Maps: Operations Map No. 6

1. The 7th Division is assigned to the VII Corps, effective upon the arrival of the division in the army area.
2. The 7th Division will occupy Area No. 9, now being vacated by the 89th Division.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 40

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
May 10, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., May 3 to 10 h., May 10

[Extract]

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II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: 1st Bn., 58th Infantry relieved 1st Bn., 39th Infantry as garrison of COBLENZ, and Regimental Headquarters, 58th Infantry, moved to COBLENZ from 4th Division area.

IV Corps: Units of the 6th Division continued their movement to Area No. 7, until May 7; all infantry organization having arrived in the Third Army area. The 6th Division was relieved from duty with the Third Army, effective May 8, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES.

VII Corps: The 90th Division was relieved from duty with the Third Army, May 5, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the United States.

The 7th Division was assigned to the Third Army and was to occupy Area No. 9, formerly occupied by the 89th Division, to take effect when elements of the 7th Division arrived in the area; this order was rescinded May 8, 1919, and the 7th Division was placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

3d Division Transferred

FIELD ORDERS
No. 7

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
May 11, 1919--10 h.

1. The 3d Division is transferred from the IV Corps to the III Corps, effective this date.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 41

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
May 17, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., May 10 to 10 h., May 17

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: The 66th F. A. Brigade was relieved from further duty with the III Corps and Third Army, May 10, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S.O.S., for return to the UNITED STATES.

The 4th Division was relieved from further duty with the III Corps and Third Army, May 11, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES. Attached units will accompany the division to the UNITED STATES.

The 3d Division was transferred from the IV Corps to the III Corps, effective May 11, 1919.

IV. Corps: IV Corps Headquarters and headquarters troops, and a number of corps troops were relieved from duty with the Third Army, May 11, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES. The remaining organizations not covered by the above order, were relieved from duty with the IV Corps and assigned as army troops at present station.

VII Corps: The 5th Division was relieved from further duty with the VII Corps and Third Army, May 11, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES. Attached units will accompany the division to the UNITED STATES.

VII Corps Headquarters and headquarters troop and a number of corps troops were relieved from duty with the Third Army, May 11, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the commanding General, S. O. S., for return to the UNITED STATES. The remaining organizations not covered by the above order, were relieved from duty with the VII Corps and assigned as army troops at present station.

A number of army troops were relieved from duty with the Third Army, during the period covered by this report, and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, S.O.S., for return to the UNITED STATES.

The entire air service of the Third Army, excepting that of the III Corps and one aero squadron, one air park, and one construction squadron of the army troops, were relieved from further duty with the Third Army, May 12, 1919, and ordered to proceed to COLOMBEY-les-BELLES.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army, Fldr. 278: Letter

Preparation for Advance into Germany

From: Chief of Staff

May 22, 1919.

To: Commanding Generals, III Corps and 3d Division

1. Should the enemy refuse or decline to sign the Treaty of Peace presented to him, the Allied and Associated Powers will renounce the present Armistice and resume the march of their armies into the enemy's territory, advancing between the LIPPE and the MAIN Rivers to the general line WURZBURG---GEMUNDEN---SCHLUCHTERN---KIRCHHAIN---FRANKENBERG---ARNSBERG---SOEST---HAMM. The purpose of this advance would be: to separate northern and southern GERMANY by the occupation of the valley of the MAIN; to reduce the enemy's resources by the seizure of the RUHR industrial district; and to threaten his seats of government - WEIMAR and BERLIN.

2. American Third Army (III Corps, 3d, 4th and 5th Divisions): The zone of advance of our army will be limited on the north by the line REMAGEN---SIEGEN---BRILON---BEVERUNGEN (all exclusive) and on the South by the line LAHNSTEIN---LIMBURG---GIESSEN ---EISENACH (all inclusive). All arrangements will be made to begin the advance by crossing the present outer limits of the bridgehead on or after May 30.

(a) III Corps (1st and 2d Divisions and French 2d Cavalry Div.): Preparations will be made to concentrate the corps, upon receipt of orders, in the outer limits of the bridgehead ready to advance on D day. the corps will advance with its leading division transported on trucks in two main columns to reach the line FRANKENBERG-KIRCHHAIN on the

first day of the advance. These columns will advance in combat formation well covered and connected by armored cars and motor patrols armed with rifles and machine guns. This division will seize and leave guards over all principal railway stations and junctions, important telephone and telegraph centrals, and all other sensitive points on the lines of communication east of the RHINE River. These guards will be as small as is consistent with safety so that the greatest possible strength of the division will be with the advance available for combat. The civil population of the country passed over, especially those engaged in operating public utilities, will be required to remain in place and continue their functions.

The remaining infantry division will follow the leading division on D day by marching assisted by such motor and rail transportation as is available. It will be advanced with its main forces on the left so as to protect the northern flank of the leading division and to ultimately occupy the northern sector of the front. It will relieve the guard detachments of the preceding division within its zone of advance.

The French 2d Cavalry Division will advance on D day to cover the left of the advance of the army, gaining and maintaining contact with the British forces to the north. It will reach the vicinity of WINTERBURG on D plus 1 day.

(b) 3d Division: The 3d Division will operate directly under army control and will begin to cross the RHINE at H hour on D day by the REMAGEN, ENGERS and COBLENZ bridges. Its advance will extend to the line WETZLAR---DILLENBURG---SIEGEN. It will relieve all guard detachments left by the III Corps and will assume control of the territory between the last named line and the RHINE River, concentrating its main forces in the vicinity of DILLENBURG and WETZLAR.

(c) 4th and 5th Divisions: The 4th and 5th Division will remain in place and continue their present duties.

3. You will be given further instructions on or after May 24.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 42

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
May 24, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., May 17 to 10 h., May 24

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: The 4th, 7th, 30th, and 38th Infantry Regiments were detached from the 3d Division, May 17, 1919, and assigned to duty with the Third Army under G-4, relieving the 1st, 51st, 54th and 56th Pioneer Infantry Regiments. The order assigning the infantry regiments was revoked May 20, 1919, when the 39th, 47th, 58th Infantry Regiments were

detached from the 4th Division (which had been reassigned to the Third Army) and assigned to this duty.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army: Fldr. 7: Operations Report

No. 43

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
May 31, 1919--10 h.

From 10 h., May 24 to 10 h., May 31

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The command is held in readiness to the necessary action to compel acceptance, by the Germans, of the terms of the Peace Treaty.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

III Corps: The area of the 1st Division was extended to include the towns of HOHR and GRENZHAUSEN upon the departure of the 66th F. A. Brigade.

4th Division: Infantry and Engineer Regiments of the 4th Division completed the relief of units of the pioneer infantry regiments at all railheads, depots, etc., and on all guard duty at critical points. The 77th F. A. Regiments moved to NEUENAHR and minor changes occurred in the stations of units of the 4th Division.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-33.1: Fldr. A: Operations Report

No. 45

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 14, 1919--10 h.

10 h., June 7 to 10 h., June 14, 1919

[Extract]

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING WEEK:

Advance G. H. Q. was discontinued at noon, June 9, and all troops at that station were turned over to the Third Army.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

Plans for Concentration of Third Army

FIELD ORDERS
No. 8

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 17, 1919--12 h.

1. The French 2d Cavalry Division (hq. NIEDER-LAHNSTEIN), is assigned to the III Corps, effective at once.
2. The 3d Division (less III Corps Reinforced Brigade, consisting of: 1 infantry brigade; 1 battalion of engineers; 1 battalion 75-mm. artillery; 1 field signal detachment; and motorized machine-gun battalion) is detached from the III Corps, effective at once and will operate directly under the army.
3. The 3d Division (less 3d Field Artillery Brigade and less detached reinforced brigade) will be concentrated before 24 h., June 19, on the RHINE River prepared to advance on June 20 as directed by F. O. No. N.

The division will take over from the III Corps the guarding of the ENGERS bridge.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-32.1: Orders

Plans in case Germany refuses to sign Peace Treaty

FIELD ORDERS
No. 9

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 17, 1919.

Maps: Operations Map No. 7

1. The enemy has refused to sign the Treaty of Peace presented to him. The Armistice has been renounced by the Allied and Associated Powers, effective at H h of D day.

The enemy occupies with one corps of approximately 10,000 second class troops, the territory through which this army will advance. His forces are scattered and are not prepared to offer an organized resistance. Resistance from stubborn detachments of a battalion or less may be expected. No troops have been reported as moving from the east to reinforce this corps. The attitude of the enemy civil population will probably be passive.

The British Army of the RHINE on the left, and the French Tenth Army on the right, advance abreast of our army.

2. (a) The American Third Army will resume its advance on D day.
(b) The limits of the zone of advance of the army will be:
Left (northern): REMAGEN---SIEGEN---BRILON---BEVERUNGEN (all excl.)
Right (southern): The LAHN Valley railroad to GIESSEN, thence GIESSEN-EISENACH
(all incl.).

3. (a) The III Corps (1st and 2d Divisions and the French 2d Cavalry Division) will upon receipt of later orders, assemble its divisions before H hour D day near the outer limit of the present bridgehead. It will advance one infantry division by motor transportation at H hour on D day to reach KIRCHHAIN and FRANKENBERG before H plus 24 h., and cover the advance of the army. The cavalry division will advance by marching at H hour on D day, establish and maintain contact with the right of the advancing British forces, and reach the region of WINTERBURG on D plus 1 day. The remaining infantry division will advance on D day by marching, assisted by available rail and motor transportation, to reach the region of FRANKENBERG within five days, when it will occupy the left sector of the front. From 18 h. D plus 3 days the rear limit of the III Corps area will be the line WETZLAR---DILLENBURG---SIEGEN (all excl.).

(b) The 3d Division will cross the RHINE by the REMAGEN, ENGERS and COBLENZ bridges beginning H hour D day and will advance in four marches to the line WETZLAR (incl.) ---DILLENBURG (incl.)---SIEGEN (excl.). The heads of its columns will arrive on the lines indicated, as follows:

D day: NASSAU---MONTABAUR---DIERDORF---HORHAUSEN.

D plus 1 day: LIMBURG---HADAMAR---WESTERBURG---HACHENBURG.

D plus 2 day: WEILBURG---DRIEDORF---FREUSBURG.

D plus 3 day: WETZLAR---DILLENBURG---SIEGEN.

It will relieve daily all guards left by the III Corps between the RHINE River and the line to be reached by the advance elements of the division.

The division will advance in two main columns by the LAHNSTEIN---LIMBURG---WETZLAR and the BENDORF---SELTERS---DILLENBURG Roads. The major portion of the division will be concentrated in the vicinity of WETZLAR and DILLENBURG.

(c) The 4th and 5th Divisions will remain in place until further orders

4. (a) ***

(x) The leading division will advance in combat formation with the main columns covered by armored cars, motor patrols, and motorized machine guns at close supporting distance. Connection between columns will be maintained by the same means.

Armed resistance of enemy troops will be promptly overcome. Any opposition by the civil population to the advance of the army or to the occupancy of the country will be suppressed and the offenders severely dealt with. The inhabitants will be required to continue their civil pursuits.

Telegraph, telephone and railroad centers and other sensitive points on the lines of communication will be properly guarded.

No troops will advance beyond the present line of outposts before H hour D day.

5. (a) ***

(b) ***

(c) Headquarters:

Third Army - COBLENZ. Adv. message center to open at WETZLAR at 16 h., D plus 1 day.

III Corps - NEUWIED. To open at HERBORN at 16 h., D plus 1 day; and at BIEDENKOPF at 16 h., D plus 3 day.

3d Division-ANDERNACH. To open at MONTABAUR at 16 h., D plus 1 day; and at WEILBURG at 16 h., D plus 3 day.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Substitutions to be made in Field Orders No. 9

FIELD ORDERS
No. 10

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 17, 1919--12:15 h.

1. The following substitutions will be made in Field Orders No. N to make the order operative:

N equals 9

D minus X equals June 17, 1919

D equals June 20, 1919

H hour equals to be announced later

2. The following changes are made in Field Orders No. 9:

(a) Change first subparagraph of Paragraph 1 to read:

In the event that the German Government refuses to sign the Treaty of Peace presented to it, the Armistice will be renounced by the Allied and Associated Powers, effective at H hour, June 20.

(b) Change Paragraph 2 (b) to read:

The flank boundaries of the zone of advance of the army will be: Left (northern) - ERPEL---SIEGEN---BRILON---BEVERUNGEN (all excl.); right (southern) - BRAUBACH (excl.)---SINGHOFEN (excl.)---WEILMUNSTER (incl.)---GROSS-RECHTENBACH (incl.)---GRUNBERG (incl.)---LAUTERBACH (excl.)---VACHA (excl.)---EISENACH (incl.)

(c) Change the first sentence in Paragraph 3 (b) to read:

The 3d Division (less reinforced brigade) will cross the RHINE by the REMAGEN, ENGERS and COBLENZ bridges and begin its advance at H hour June 20 to the line: WETZLAR (incl.)---DILLENBERG (incl.)---SIEGEN (excl.).

3. The III Corps Reinforced Brigade will be moved by rail and marching on June 20, 1919, to the vicinity of WETZLAR to guard the COBLENZ---LAHNSTEIN---CASSEL Railway and to support the leading division of the advance.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Advance only on Further Orders

FIELD ORDERS
No. 11

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 18, 1919--12 h.

Maps: Operations Map No. 7

1. After the concentrations prescribed in Field Orders Nos. 8 and 9, Third Army, 1919, have been completed, troops will remain in place and the advance directed in Field

Orders Nos. 9 and 10, Third Army, 1919, will not begin until receipt of further orders from these headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-33.1: Fldr. A: Operations Report

No. 46

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 18, 1919--10 h.

10 h., June 14 to 18 h., June 18, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Armistice having been provisionally renounced by the Allied and Associated Powers contingent only upon the non-acceptance by GERMANY of the proposed Treaty of Peace before June 23, 1919, it has become necessary to concentrate and prepare our forces for the anticipated resumption of the advance into GERMANY.

As no great resistance to our forward movement is expected, we may, by a rapid movement of our advance troops, seize important centers and lines of supply and communication far to the east of the present limit of the bridgehead, thus providing for an extensive forward movement upon further orders from the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Consequently F. O. No. 9, as amended by F. O. No. 10, becomes effective and troops must be assembled prepared to advance on June 20, 1919.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING PERIOD:

Third Army: The Third Army Composite Regiment entrained June 15 for Pershing Stadium near PARIS.

The 4th Division was ordered to reequip and prepare for active service June 18.

The 3d Division (less III Corps Reinforced Brigade) was relieved from duty with the III Corps June 17, by Field Order No. 8, Third Army Headquarters, and ordered to assemble along the RHINE in readiness for forward movement.

The III Corps Reinforced Brigade was concentrated June 18, at MAYEN and NIEDER-MENDIG prepared for entrainment.

The 3d Field Artillery Brigade began June 16, a practice march toward the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier designed as a test for motorized artillery.

III Corps: The III Corps pursuant to F. O. No. 9, Third Army, directed the assembly marches of its divisions to begin June 18, and to be completed by June 20.

The French Cavalry Division, consisting of the 2d Brigade of Light Cavalry and the 12th Brigade of Dragoons supported by a cyclist detachment, armored cars and one battalion of the 8th Artillery was assigned to the III Corps June 17 and moved June 18 from NIEDER-LAHNSTEIN to the III Corps area; the 12th Brigade of Dragoons to the region north of Engers, and the 2d Brigade of Light Cavalry to the region northwest of MONTABAUR, with division headquarters and divisional troops at ENGERS.

1st Division: The infantry regiments of the 1st Division moved June 18 to positions in the close vicinity of towns as follows:

16th Inf. - SELTERS and HERSCHBACH

18th Inf. - MOGENDORF (1 bn. at NENTERSHAUSEN)

26th Inf. - NENTERSHAUSEN

28th Inf. - OBER-HAUSEN

The artillery of the 1st Division remained in place near assembly positions.

2d Division : Regiments of the 2d Division moved June 18 to areas in close vicinity of towns as follows:

9th Inf. - MARIENHAUSEN
23d Inf. - KIRCHDORF
5th Marines - STRASSENHAUSEN
6th Marines - RENGSDORF
12th F. A. - ANHAUSEN
15th F. A. - DIERDORF
17th F. A. - ELLINGHAUSEN

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French Tenth Army on our right and the British Army of the Rhine on our left, have commenced their assembly marches preparatory to a general forward movement of the Allied Armies.

Headquarters French IX Corps moved June 18, 1919, from BOPPARD to NASTATTEN.

* * * * *

VI. OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD: Regiments of the III Corps were concentrated and movement toward their designated assembly points begun by all units in compliance with F. O. No. 9, Third Army, and corps and division orders based thereon.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Third Army: Gen. Corres. 3: Fldr. 279: Letter

Seizure of Railway Line

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 19, 1919--15 h.

From: Chief of Staff, Third Army

To: Commanding General, III Corps

1. Referring to * * * telegram from Marshal Foch to General Pershing, the army commander directs that between 19 h. and darkness on the 23d Instant, you move forward your advance forces to seize the railway line LIMBURG---WESTERBURG---HACHENBURG---ALTENKIRCHEN, with covering patrols in front of this line.

2. Preparations will be completed to continue the advance, as directed by F. O. No. 9, early on the morning of the 24th Instant.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

18 h., June 18 to 18 h., June 19, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The concentration of our troops having been completed this date, the American Third Army is prepared to advance eastward in case GERMANY does not, before 7 p. m., June 23, indicate her acceptance of the terms of the Treaty of Peace offered her by the Allies and Associated Powers.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: No changes in 4th or 5th Divisions.

3d Division: The 5th Brigade was concentrated June 19, in ENGERS and KALTENENGERS, preparatory to moving forward on D day into present II Corps area.

The 3d Artillery Brigade is continuing its practice march and moved June 19, to the PINTESFELD-MATZERATH area.

III Corps: The concentration of the III Corps was completed.

1st Division: The 1st Division completed its concentration in two columns, the left column consisting of the 1st Infantry Brigade reinforced, forming in the area OBER-SAYN---BODEN---MONTABAUR---MEUDT; and the right column, consisting of the 2d Infantry Brigade reinforced, forming in the area GORGESHAUSEN---PUTCHBACH---NENTERSHAUSEN. The 15th F. A. Regiment moved to the vicinity of GROSS-HOLBACH and the 6th and 7th F. A. Regiments moved to OBER-AHR and NENTERSHAUSEN respectively.

2d Division: Regiments of the 2d Division moved June 19, to areas in the close vicinity of towns as follows:

9th Inf.	WOLFERLINGEN
23d Inf.	RUCKEROTH
5th Marines	- HARTENFEIS
6th Marines	- HERSCHBACH
12th F. A.	- MARIENHAUSEN
15th F. A.	- SELTERS
17th F. A.	- remained at ELLINGHAUSEN

Completing the concentration of the division.

French 2d Cavalry Division: The 2d Light Cavalry Brigade moved to and was assembled at ROSSBACH; the 12th Brigade of Dragoons moved to and was assembled at PUDERBACH.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS:

British Army of the Rhine: The forward divisions of the British Army of the Rhine completed their concentration June 19, 1919, and now occupy areas from north to south near towns as follows:

Lowland Div.	OHLIGS and GRAFRATH
Northern Div.	WERMELSKIRCHEN, KURTEN and BURSCHELD
London Div.	ENGELSKIRCHEN and VOLBERG
Eastern Div.	WINTERSCHIED and GEISTINGEN; and in support the
Southern Div.	BERG, Gladbach and the
Western and Lancestershire Divs.	- BONN and SIEGBURG

French Tenth Army: On our left the French Tenth Army has completed its concentrations and is prepared for further movement in conjunction with the American Third Army.

The two divisions of the French IX Corps were assembled near the perimeter of the French sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead at KATZENELNBOGEN and HOLZHAUSEN respectively; near the perimeter of the MAINZ bridgehead, the French XV Corps (hq. HOSTEIN [HOSTEN ?]); French XIII Corps (hq. WIESBADEN); and the French I Corps (hq. GROSS-GERAU) completed their

concentration with the XXX Army Corps (hq. MAINZ) and the III Army Corps (hq. NIERSTEIN) in support on the north bank of the RHINE.

VI. THE DAYS OPERATIONS: The concentration of troops begun June 18, was completed June 19. F. O. No. 11, Third Army issued June 18, directs that after concentration is completed, all units remain in place until further orders.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Third Army: 193-33.1: Fldr. A: Operations Report

No. 48

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 20, 1919--18 h.

18 h., June 19 to 18 h., June 20, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Pending the receipt of the answer of the German Government to the peace proposals, the Allied Armies maintain their positions in readiness to advance eastward.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY:

4th Division: Minor changes were made within the divisional area.

3d Division: The 3d Field Artillery Brigade continued its practice march and on June 20, reached the DAHNEN-SEVENIG area.

III. Corps: Minor local changes.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: British Army of the Rhine:

Corps headquarters reports as follows:

II Corps - WIESDORF

IV Corps - DOREN [DUREN ?]

VI Corps - LINDENTHAL

IX Corps - EUSKIRCHEN

X Corps - BONN

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: The 47th Infantry (less 3 companies) was returned to the control of the C. G., 4th Division, June 20, 1919.

Camions for the forward movement of the 1st Division have been assigned in sufficient numbers to all units and have reported at designated entrucking points.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

18 h., June 20 to 18 h., June 21, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Allied Armies remain concentrated within the limits of their bridgeheads and are ready to resume the advance toward the east.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY:

3d Division: The 3d Field Artillery Brigade continued its practice march and on June 21, reached the vicinity of BITBURG.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Marshal Foch's Headquarters was transferred June 21, 1919, from LUXEMBOURG to KREUZNACH, Germany.

Headquarters of the Belgian XXXIII Army Corps is located at NEUSS.

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: Units of the Third Army, having completed the concentrations prescribed in Field Orders Nos. 8 and 9, Third Army Headquarters, remain in place awaiting orders to continue the advance.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

18 h., June 21 to 18 h., June 22, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The American Third Army is awaiting orders for forward movement.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY:

3d Division: The 3d Field Artillery Brigade continued its practice march and on June 22, 1919, reached the vicinity of WITTLICH.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Nothing to report.

VI. THE DAY'S OPERATIONS: Troops of the 3d Division are relieving railroad and bridge guards formerly maintained by division and corps troops of the III Corps.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, Third Army, Fldr. 279: Letter

Preliminary Operations Suspended

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
* June 23, 1919 - 10 h.

From: Chief of Staff, Third Army

To: Commanding General, III Corps

1. The preliminary operations directed by letter June 19, to begin at 19 h., June 23, are suspended until further orders.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-33.1: Fldr. A: Operations Report
No. 54

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 26, 1919 - 18 h.

18 h., June 25 to 18 h., June 26, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The German Government having indicated its intention of signing the Treaty of Peace, the units of the Allied Armies, while maintaining the alert, are being so disposed as to increase the comfort of men and animals; the divisional areas being extended and certain units withdrawing somewhat from the advance line pending the actual signing.

* For strength on this date, see page 100.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY:

3d Division: The 3d Division was assigned to the III Corps, effective at 18 h., June 25.

The area of the 3d Division was extended June 26, to include that part of the Kreis of COBLENZ north of the MOSELLE River and south of the RHINE River.

The 5th Brigade (less railroad and bridge guards) returned by marching to former station.

III. Corps: The concentration areas of the 1st and 2d Divisions were extended and minor readjustments were made in the division areas.

The French 2d Cavalry Division moved from the AHREN---MUNDERSBACH---URBACH area to the GLADBACH---SAYN---ENGERS area, and established headquarters at ENGERS.

VI. THE DAYS OPERATIONS: The outpost and railroad guard maintained by the French 2d Cavalry Division were taken over by troops of the 2d Division.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Third Army: 193-33.1: Fldr. A: Operations Report

No. 55

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 27, 1919--18 h.

18 h., June 26 to 18 h., June 27, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The Allied Armies are maintaining the alert. Re-adjustments are being made in concentration areas to increase the comfort of the men and animals.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

German Government signs Peace Treaty

FIELD ORDERS
No. 13

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 28, 1919--17:30 h

Maps: Operations Map No. 6

1. The German Government has signed the Treaty of Peace.
2. The concentration of the Third Army will terminate.
3. (a) III Corps: The 1st and 2d Divisions will be returned by marching and available motor transportation to the areas assigned by Field Orders No. 5, Hq. Third Army, 1919.

The French 2d Cavalry Division will be returned by marching to the areas occupied by it before the concentration. Upon leaving the American area this division will stand relieved from duty with the Third Army and III Corps.

The two companies of the 3d Division now guarding the LAHN Valley railroad will be moved to their proper stations by rail.

(b) The 4th Division will continue to perform its present duties.

(x) The distribution of troops provided for in Paragraph 3-B, Field Orders No. 10, Hq. Third Army, 1919, will be discontinued except that outpost troops on the perimeter of the bridgehead will remain in position.

4. Administrative details: As before the concentration.

5. Headquarters:

Third Army - COBLENZ

III Corps - NEUWIED

4th Division - NIEDER-BREISIG

French 2d Cav. Div. - NIEDER-LAHNSTEIN

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-33.1: Fldr. A: Operations Report

No. 56

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 28, 1919--18 h

18 h., June 27 to 18 h., June 28, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The signing of the Treaty of Peace terminates the necessity for our concentration in readiness for forward movement.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY:

4th Division: The 4th Division (less 39th Infantry) and attached units were relieved from further duty with the Third Army, June 28, 1919, and placed at the disposal of the C. G., S. O. S., for return to the United States.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Nothing to report.

* * * * *

VII. RESULTS OF OUR OPERATIONS: Field Orders No. 13, issued at 17:50 h., June 28, 1919, provides for the termination of the concentration and the return of troops to normal areas.

The plan of defence, and appropriate distribution of troops are discontinued, except for the sentry posts maintained along the perimeter of the bridgehead.

The French 2d Cavalry Division is ordered to return to the control of the French army and stands relieved from duty with the Third Army upon departure from the American area.

Movements of troops in compliance with Field Orders No. 13 will commence June 29, 1919.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-33.1: Fldr. A: Operations Report

No. 57

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
June 29, 1919--18 h.

18 h., June 28 to 18 h., June 19, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Troops of the Third Army are being returned to normal areas, defensive organizations are being abandoned and arrangements are being made to facilitate preparation for return to UNITED STATES.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY: In compliance with Field Orders No. 13, Third Army Headquarters, troops of the Third Army commenced their movement to normal areas.

III Corps: The 1st Division completed its movements.

The 2d Division completed its movements except the 6th Marine Regiment which reached the vicinity of GLADBACH.

The 3d Division completed movement to normal areas.

The French 2d Cavalry Division cleared Third Army area and returned to control of French Tenth Army, except the 17th Chasseurs which reached the vicinity of ARZBACH.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French Tenth Army on our right will begin June 30, the movements necessary to return all troops to the areas occupied previous to the concentration.

* * * * *

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

18 h., June 29 to 18 h., June 30, 1919

[Extract]

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: All troops having reached their normal areas, the necessary measures may now be taken to begin preparation for return of various units to the UNITED STATES.

II. OWN MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES DURING DAY:

III Corps: The 2d Division completed its movement to normal areas, the 6th Marine Regiment reaching the vicinity of RHEINBROHL.

The 17th Chasseurs (French 2d Cavalry Division) cleared the American area.

III. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: The French Tenth Army on our right started the movements necessary to return all troops to the areas occupied previous to the concentration. The movements are to be completed July 3, 1919.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

193-10.5: Strength Report

Statistical Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
July 2, 1919.

RECAPITULATION THIRD ARMY			ARMY TROOPS		
ORGANIZATION	O.	MEN	ORGANIZATION	O.	MEN
Total Hq.	415	2,336	Hq.	163	779
" Inf.	1,466	38,439	Inf.	110	2,700
" Arty.	549	12,102	Arty.		
" Engrs.	153	4,427	Engrs.	4	110
" Trains	325	8,547	Trains	54	1,050
" M. G.	275	7,042	Machine Gun		
" Misc.	955	14,742	Misc.	732	10,766
Grand Total	4,138	87,635	Total	1,063	15,405
Eff. Rifles		42,769	Eff. Rifles		4,497
Animals		14,111	Animals		222

III CORPS

ORGANIZATION	CORPS TRPS		1st DIV.		2d DIV.		3d DIV.		TOT. III CORPS	
	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN	O.	MEN
Headquarters	90	511	55	421	54	368	53	257	252	1,557
Infantry			367	11,266	476	12,565	513	11,908	1,356	35,739
Artillery			168	3,876	194	4,145	187	4,081	549	12,102
Engineers			41	1,435	53	1,547	55	1,335	149	4,317
Trains	1	33	64	2,144	98	2,568	108	2,752	271	7,497
Machine Gun			70	2,322	95	2,412	110	2,308	275	7,042
Miscellaneous	22	562	139	1,675	29	848	33	891	223	3,976
Total	113	1,106	904	23,139	999	24,453	1,059	23,532	3,075	72,230
Eff. Rifles		175		12,546		13,204		12,347		38,272
Animals		38		5,399		5,116		3,336		13,889

Changes in Stations:

Headquarters Third Army

COBLENZ

Army Troops

55th Pioneer Infantry Band, reported as Third Army troops
December 25, 1918

COBLENZ
COBLENZ

Following organizations relieved from duty with III Corps and
assigned to Third Army troops for duty:

Field Remount Squadron No. 306

KRIPP

Corps Mobile Vet. Hosp. No. 1

KRIPP

Det. Group No. 1, Prov. Unit B Graves Registration Service (S. O. S.)

LUXEMBOURG

Following units relieved from duty with Third Army and placed at
disposal of Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to U. S.:

I Corps Artillery Park

299th M. P. Co.

55th Pioneer Infantry Band

Evacuation Hosp. No. 30

Bakery Co. No. 302 (S. O. S.)

Laundry Cos. Nos. 503, 523, 525 (S. O. S.)

Clothing and Bath Units Nos. 322 and 327 (S. O. S.)

NEUWIED

III Corps

Following organizations relieved from duty with III Corps and Third
Army disposal of Commanding Gen., S. O. S., for return to U. S.:

III Corps Hq.

III Corps Hq. Troops

III Corps M. P. Co.

308th Field Signal Bn.

Sales Commissary No. 33 (S. O. S.)

Service Park Unit No. 405 (S. O. S.)

A. P. O. No. 754

1st Division	
2d Machine Gun Bn.	MONTABAUR
Hq. Motor Bn., 1st Amm. Train	DEESEN
Hq. Horse Bn., 1st Amm. Train	HILGERT
2d Division	BREITENAU
3d Division	HEDESODORF
1st Bn., 7th Inf. Regt.	ANDERNACH
Bakery Co. No. 321 relieved from duty with 3d Div. and Third Army and placed at disposal of Commanding Gen., S. O. S., for return to U. S.	EICH
S. O. S. Units in Third Army area:	
Army Troops	
Det. Group No. 1, Prov. Unit B Graves	
Registration Service	LUXEMBOURG
Following organizations relieved from duty with Third Army and placed at disposal of Commanding Gen., S. O. S. for return to U. S.:	
Bakery Co. No. 302	
Laundry Cos. Nos. 503, 523, 525	
Clothing and Bath Units Nos. 322 and 327	
III Corps	
Following organizations relieved from duty with III Corps and Third Army placed at disposal of Commanding General, S. O. S., for return to U. S.:	
Sales Commissary No. 33	
Service Park Unit No. 405	
3d Division	
Bakery Co. No. 321 relieved from duty with 3d Div. and Third Army and placed at disposal of Commanding Gen., S. O. S., for return to U. S.:	
Additional units in Third Army area awaiting transportation to U. S.:	
I Corps Artillery Park	PFAFFENDORF
299th M. P. Co.	TRIER
55th Pioneer Infantry Band	COBLENZ
Evacuation Hosp. No. 30	MAYEN
Bakery Co. No. 302 (S. O. S.)	TRIER
Laundry Co. No. 503 (S. O. S.)	COBLENZ-LUTZEL
Laundry Co. No. 523 (S. O. S.)	COBLENZ
Laundry Co. No. 525 (S. O. S.)	COBLENZ-LUTZEL
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 322 (S. O. S.)	COBLENZ-LUTZEL
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 327 (S. O. S.)	COBLENZ-LUTZEL
III Corps Hq.	NEUWIED
III Corps Hq. Troop	NEUWIED
III Corps M. P. Co.	NEUWIED
308th Field Signal Bn.	ARENBERG
Sales Commissary No. 33 (S. O. S.)	NEUWIED
Service Park Unit No. 405 (S. O. S.)	NEUWIED
A. P. O. No. 754	NEUWIED
Bakery Co. No. 321	MAYEN

All stations in GERMANY, unless otherwise noted.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

HENRY WOLFSON,
 Capt., A. G. D.,
 Actg. Personnel Adjutant.

Annex No. 1, Report of Activities

Operations Section

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
July 2, 1919.LIST OF ARMY TROOPS
November 15, 1918 to July 2, 1919

	Assigned	Relieved
Army Corps:		
III Army Corps	Nov. 15, 1918	July 2, 1919
IV Army Corps	Nov. 15, 1918	May 11, 1919
VII Army Corps	Nov. 15, 1918	May 11, 1919
VI Army Corps	Apr. 1, 1919	Apr. 10, 1919
Divisions:		
1st Division	Nov. 15, 1918	
2d Division	Nov. 15, 1918	
3d Division	Nov. 15, 1918	
4th Division	Nov. 15, 1918	May 11, 1919
4th Division (reassigned)	May 20, 1919	June 28, 1919
5th Division	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 12, 1918
5th Division (reassigned)	Apr. 1, 1919	May 11, 1919
* 5th Division (reassigned)	June 7, 1919	June 1919
6th Division	May 3, 1919	May 8, 1919
7th Division	Never reported	May 5, 1919
32d Division	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 8, 1919
33d Division	Dec. 12, 1918	Dec. 17, 1918
33d Division (reassigned)	Apr. 1, 1919	Apr. 8, 1919
42d Division	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 1, 1919
89th Division	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 25, 1919
90th Division	Nov. 15, 1918	May 6, 1919
French 2d Cavalry Division	June 17, 1919	June 30, 1919
Air Service:		
Third Army Air Service Hq.	Dec. 18, 1918	July 2, 1919
Hq. Pursuit Group	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
17th Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
27th Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
94th Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 8, 1919
103d Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
Hq. Bombardment Group	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
96th Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
166th Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 8, 1919
Hq. Observation Group	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
91st Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 8, 1919
24th Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
Branch Intelligence Office	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
9th Aero Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 27, 1919

* 5th Division reassigned June 7 for administration purposes only.

	Assigned	Relieved
Air Service: (Continued)		
5th Pursuit Group	Apr. 21, 1919	May 12, 1919
41st Aero Squadron	Apr. 21, 1919	May 12, 1919
138th Aero Squadron	Apr. 21, 1919	July 1, 1919
141st Aero Squadron	Apr. 21, 1919	May 12, 1919
638th Aero Squadron	Apr. 21, 1919	May 12, 1919
Balloon Group Hq.	Apr. 10, 1919	Apr. 30, 1919
13th Balloon Co.	Apr. 10, 1919	Apr. 30, 1919
14th Balloon Co.	Apr. 10, 1919	Apr. 12, 1919
15th Balloon Co.	Apr. 10, 1919	Apr. 30, 1919
44th Balloon Co.	Apr. 10, 1919	Apr. 12, 1919
2d Photo Section	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 8, 1919
10th Photo Section	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 27, 1919
11th Photo Section	Mar. 13, 1919	Apr. 27, 1919
1st Air Park	Apr. 19, 1919	
2d Air Park	Mar. 22, 1919	May 12, 1919
3d Air Park	Apr. 29, 1919	May 12, 1919
4th Air Park	Nov. 15, 1918	May 12, 1919
6th Air Park	Apr. 22, 1919	May 12, 1919
462d Aero Construction Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	June 1, 1919
463d Aero Construction Squadron	Nov. 15, 1918	May 12, 1919
Artillery:		
66th Field Artillery Brigade	Nov. 15, 1918	Jan. 4, 1919
1st Bn., 10th Field Artillery	Jan. 15, 1919	May 8, 1919
I Corps Artillery Park	May 13, 1919	July 2, 1919
IV Corps Artillery Park	Apr. 8, 1919	May 22, 1919
Cavalry:		
Regimental Hq., 2d Cavalry	Nov. 15, 1918	Jan. 16, 1919
1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry	Nov. 15, 1918	
Hq. 1st Squadron, 2d Cav.		Apr. 22, 1919
Troop A		Apr. 22, 1919
Troop B		Apr. 21, 1919
Troop C		Apr. 10, 1919
Troop D		Apr. 21, 1919
Troop K, 3d Cavalry	Apr. 21, 1919	May 11, 1919
Engineers:		
Hq. Provisional Engineers	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
Co. C, 24th Engineers	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 16, 1918
Co. E, 24th Engineers	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 16, 1918
Co. C, 26th Engineers	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
Co. F, 26th Engineers	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
Co. A, 37th Engineers	Nov. 15, 1918	Jan. 7, 1919
Co. B, 37th Engineers	Nov. 15, 1918	Jan. 7, 1919
Co. C, 37th Engineers	Dec. 14, 1918	Jan. 7, 1919
Co. D, 37th Engineers	Dec. 14, 1918	Jan. 7, 1919
Co. E, 37th Engineers	Dec. 14, 1918	Jan. 7, 1919
Co. F, 37th Engineers	Dec. 14, 1918	Jan. 7, 1919
Hq. 37th Engineers	Dec. 14, 1918	Jan. 7, 1919
301st Water Train	Dec. 20, 1918	Jan. 6, 1919
Co. D, 310th Engineers	Jan. 8, 1919	Apr. 12, 1919

	Assigned	Relieved
Engineers: (Continued)		
Co. E, 301st Engineers	Jan. 7, 1919	Apr. 12, 1919
Co. A, 301st Engineers	Feb. 28, 1919	Apr. 12, 1919
115th Engineers	Apr. 10, 1919	May 16, 1919
115th Engineer Train	Apr. 10, 1919	May 16, 1919
6th Engineers	May 16, 1919	May 21, 1919
6th Engineer Train	May 16, 1919	May 21, 1919
4th Engineers	May 21, 1919	June 18, 1919
4th Engineer Train	May 21, 1919	June 18, 1919
Co. M, 29th Engineers (G-2-C)	May 12, 1919	

Infantry:

56th Pioneer Infantry	Nov. 15, 1918	May 20, 1919
54th Pioneer Infantry	Dec. 24, 1918	May 20, 1919
1st Pioneer Infantry	Feb. 1, 1919	May 20, 1919
51st Pioneer Infantry	May 10, 1919	May 20, 1919
Garrison of Coblenz		
2d Bn., 39th Infantry	Jan. 2, 1919	May 1, 1919
2d Bn., 58th Infantry	Jan. 2, 1919	June 28, 1919
Regt. Hq., 1st Bn., 58th Infantry	May 1, 1919	June 28, 1919
3d Bn., 58th Infantry	May 20, 1919	June 28, 1919
39th Infantry	May 20, 1919	
47th Infantry	May 20, 1919	June 18, 1919
58th Infantry (entire regt.)	May 20, 1919	June 28, 1919
59th Infantry	May 20, 1919	June 1, 1919
11th Machine Gun Bn.	May 24, 1919	June 5, 1919
Third Army Composite Regiment	Apr. 21, 1919	

Medical Corps:

Evacuation Hospital No. 2	Dec. 14, 1918	Mar. 4, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 3	Dec. 3, 1918	Mar. 21, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 4	Dec. 14, 1918	Mar. 4, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 6	Dec. 18, 1918	Mar. 8, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 7	Dec. 14, 1918	Mar. 21, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 8	Dec. 17, 1918	Mar. 9, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 9	Dec. 14, 1918	May 14, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 13	Mar. 28, 1919	May 11, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 14	Dec. 14, 1918	Mar. 28, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 12	Dec. 7, 1918	May 11, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 16	Feb. 15, 1919	
Evacuation Hospital No. 18	Nov. 15, 1918	Dec. 18, 1918
Evacuation Hospital No. 19	Feb. 1, 1919	July 2, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 22	Feb. 10, 1919	May 14, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 26	Feb. 1, 1919	July 1, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 27	Feb. 17, 1919	
Evacuation Hospital No. 29	Feb. 1, 1919	May 14, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 30	Feb. 1, 1919	July 2, 1919
Evacuation Hospital No. 49	Feb. 12, 1919	
Third Army Field Hospital (No. 343)	Jan. 18, 1919	
Third Army Sanitary Train		
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 542	Nov. 15, 1918	Mar. 15, 1919
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 590	Nov. 15, 1918	Mar. 15, 1919
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 601	Nov. 15, 1918	Mar. 15, 1919

	Assigned	Relieved
Medical Corps:		
Third Army Sanitary Train (Continued)		
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 603	Nov. 15, 1918	Mar. 15, 1919
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 26	Feb. 28, 1919	
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 29	Feb. 28, 1919	July 1, 1919
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 30	Feb. 28, 1919	May 11, 1919
Ambulance Sv. Sec. No. 31	Feb. 28, 1919	
Mobile Surgical Unit No. 1	Jan. 31, 1919	Mar. 31, 1919
Mobile Surgical Unit No. 12	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Evacuation Ambulance Co. No. 33	Mar. 28, 1919	May 14, 1919
Evacuation Ambulance Co. No. 5	Jan. 28, 1919	May 14, 1919
Third Army Mobile Laboratory	Dec. 15, 1918	
315th Mobile Field Laboratory	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Army Veterinary Evac. Sec. No. 1	Dec. 8, 1918	
Army Veterinary Evac. Sec. No. 2	Dec. 8, 1918	
Army Veterinary Evac. Sec. No. 3	Dec. 8, 1918	
Mobile Veterinary Sec. No. 110	Apr. 9, 1919	Apr. 15, 1919
Mobile Vet. Sec. No. 117 (S. O. S.)	Mar. 15, 1919	May 16, 1919
Mobile Veterinary Sec. No. 301	Apr. 10, 1919	Apr. 12, 1919
Mobile Veterinary Sec. No. 308	May 11, 1919	
315th Mobile Vet. Hospital	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Corps Mob. Vet. Hosp. No. 7	May 11, 1919	
VII Corps Field Vet. Unit	May 11, 1919	June 19, 1919
Veterinary Unit No. 12 (S. O. S.)	Dec. 31, 1918	May 16, 1919
Medical Supply Depot No. 1	Dec. 12, 1918	
Consolidated with Med. Sup. Depot No. 2		Feb. 21, 1919
Medical Supply Depot No. 2	Dec. 12, 1918	
Advance Med. Sup. Depot No. 2	Dec. 12, 1918	
Med. Sup. Depot, Walferdange	Mar. 28, 1919	May 15, 1919
Military Police:		
Third Army Military Police Bn.	Nov. 15, 1918	July 1, 1919
216th Military Police Co.	Mar. 23, 1919	May 27, 1919
VI Corps Military Police Co.	Apr. 10, 1919	Apr. 29, 1919
139th Military Police Bn.	May 11, 1919	
277th Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	
278th Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	
286th Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	
IV Corps Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	July 1, 1919
141st Military Police Bn.	May 11, 1919	
281st Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	
282d Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	
VI Corps Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	July 1, 1919
VII Corps Military Police Co.	May 11, 1919	July 1, 1919
299th Military Police Co.	May 27, 1919	June 4, 1919
299th Military Police Co. (reasgd.)	June 25, 1919	July 2, 1919
Miscellaneous:		
Third Army Hq. Troop	Nov. 15, 1918	
Hq. Garage Detachment	May 8, 1919	
A. P. O. 927	Nov. 15, 1918	
Third Army Region. Repl. Depot	Dec. 8, 1918	
Third Army Schools	Mar. 31, 1919	

	Assigned	Relieved
Miscellaneous: (Continued)		
School in Care of Animals	Jan. 21, 1919	May 24, 1919
Group 1, Prov. Unit B, Graves Registration Service	Jan. 11, 1919	
Motor Transport Corps:		
Third Army Prov. Sup. Train		
Truck Co. No. 441	Nov. 30, 1918	Mar. 1, 1919
Truck Co. No. 463	Nov. 15, 1918	
Truck Co. No. 464	Feb. 20, 1919	
Truck Co. No. 465	Mar. 1, 1919	
Truck Co. No. 466	Nov. 15, 1918	
Truck Co. No. 467	Nov. 15, 1918	
Truck Co. No. 468	Nov. 20, 1918	
Truck Co. No. 469	Nov. 30, 1918	Mar. 28, 1919
Truck Co. C, 314th Sup. Tn.	Nov. 15, 1918	Apr. 21, 1919
Truck Co. F, 315th Sup. Tn.	Nov. 15, 1918	Mar. 28, 1919
19th Provisional Motor Command Consisting of M. T. Cos. 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819	Dec. 16, 1918	
Hq. 417th Supply Train	Feb. 20, 1919	
413th Motor Supply Train Composed of Truck Cos. 431 432, 433, 434, 435, 436	May 11, 1919	May 23, 1919
4th Ammunition Train	May 21, 1919	June 28, 1919
Repair Unit 310, M. T. C.	Jan. 4, 1919	
Motor Transport Co. 428	May 7, 1919	
Motor Transport Co. 831	June 5, 1919	
Truck Co. 450	June 5, 1919	
Truck Co. 517	June 5, 1919	
Ordnance:		
Ammunition Depot No. 351	Dec. 27, 1918	
Ammunition Depot No. 400	May 20, 1919	
Ordnance Depot No. 303	Dec. 11, 1918	
Third Army M. G. and S. A. C.	Jan. 4, 1919	
501st Mob. Ord. Repair Shop	May 24, 1919	
1st Heavy Arty. Mob. Ord. Repair Shop	Feb. 17, 1919	
Quartermaster Corps:		
Third Army Q. M. Depot	Mar. 31, 1919	
Third Army Depot Det. 334th Supply Co.	Dec. 26, 1918 Jan. 11, 1919	
Quartermaster Depot, Sinzig	May 31, 1919	
Third Army Remount Depot, Kripp	May 31, 1919	
Wengerohr Dept (Remount)	May 31, 1919	
Remount Squadron No. 301	May 1, 1919	
Remount Squadron No. 302	May 13, 1919	
Remount Squadron No. 303	Nov. 28, 1918	
Remount Squadron No. 304	Apr. 29, 1919	
Remount Squadron No. 306	May 11, 1919	May 15, 1919
Remount Squadron No. 310	May 1, 1919	
Remount Squadron No. 311	Jan. 15, 1919	

Quartermaster Corps: (Continued)

	Assigned	Relieved
Remount Squadron No. 312	May 11, 1919	
Remount Squadron No. 314	Nov. 15, 1918	
Remount Squadron No. 322	Feb. 4, 1919	
Remount Squadron No. 344	May 1, 1919	

Signal Corps:

322 Field Signal Bn.	Nov. 15, 1918	
51st Telegraph Bn.	Nov. 15, 1918	
417th Telegraph Bn.	Nov. 15, 1918	July 1, 1919
Third Army Radio Section	Dec. 23, 1918	
Meteorological Section	Mar. 8, 1919	Apr. 25, 1919

S. O. S. Units under Army Control:

Advance Embarkation Section	Apr. 8, 1919	
Bakery Co. No. 1	Jan. 12, 1919	
Bakery Co. No. 7	May 23, 1919	
Bakery Co. No. 10	Apr. 9, 1919	May 10, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 11	May 9, 1919	
Bakery Co. No. 301	May 5, 1919	May 16, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 302	June 3, 1919	July 2, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 307	May 5, 1919	May 16, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 310	Apr. 2, 1919	May 9, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 319	May 10, 1919	May 12, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 339	Apr. 12, 1919	May 12, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 349	Apr. 25, 1919	May 16, 1919
Bakery Co. No. 365	Apr. 10, 1919	May 16, 1919
Butchery Co. No. 351	Feb. 14, 1919	Apr. 29, 1919
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 320	May 22, 1919	May 31, 1919
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 322	May 22, 1919	July 2, 1919
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 324	Apr. 9, 1919	
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 325	Apr. 2, 1919	Apr. 8, 1919
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 326	Apr. 25, 1919	May 5, 1919
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 327	May 5, 1919	July 2, 1919
Clothing and Bath Unit No. 330	Apr. 12, 1919	May 7, 1919
Demonstrating Parties 1, 2, 3, Chemical Warfare Service	May 9, 1919	June 29, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 303	Apr. 10, 1919	May 16, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 312	May 11, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 313	Apr. 12, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 315	June 3, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 317	Apr. 2, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 318	Apr. 2, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 323	Mar. 5, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 326	June 28, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 328	Apr. 9, 1919	
Laundry Co. No. 354	Apr. 25, 1919	May 16, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 356	May 5, 1919	May 16, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 503	Apr. 12, 1919	July 2, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 516	Mar. 29, 1919	May 16, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 523	Mar. 8, 1919	July 2, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 525	Dec. 12, 1919	July 2, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 526	Mar. 8, 1919	May 26, 1919
Laundry Co. No. 528	Mar. 12, 1919	May 16, 1919

S. O. S. Units Under Army Control: (Continued)

	Assigned	Relieved
Mobile Bath Unit No. 11	Apr. 12, 1919	May 16, 1919
Mobile Bath Unit No. 13	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Mobile Bath Unit No. 14	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Port Commander Detachment	Apr. 1, 1919	
Butchery Co. No. 306	Apr. 2, 1919	
Butchery Co. No. 316	May 7, 1919	
Sales Commissary No. 49	June 6, 1919	
Hq. 24th Grand Division, Transport. Corps	Apr. 3, 1919	
Sales Commissary No. 12	Mar. 17, 1919	
Sales Commissary No. 39	Mar. 21, 1919	
Sales Commissary No. 47	Dec. 14, 1918	
Sales Commissary No. 59	Mar. 28, 1919	May 16, 1919
Sales Commissary No. 311	Apr. 12, 1919	May 1, 1919
Third Army Leave Area Commissary	Apr. 8, 1919	
Salvage Squad No. 1	Apr. 25, 1919	
Salvage Squad No. 3	Apr. 2, 1919	May 9, 1919
Salvage Squad No. 12	Jan. 20, 1919	
Salvage Squad No. 16	Apr. 9, 1919	
Salvage Squad No. 303	Apr. 9, 1919	May 22, 1919
Salvage Squad No. 309	Apr. 10, 1919	July 2, 1919
Salvage Squad No. 310	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Sanitary Squad No. 40	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Service Park Unit No. 302	Apr. 2, 1919	June 26, 1919
Service Park Unit No. 305	Apr. 12, 1919	
Service Park Unit No. 307	Apr. 9, 1919	Apr. 17, 1919
Service Park Unit No. 361	Apr. 2, 1919	June 26, 1919
Service Park Unit No. 390	Apr. 25, 1919	May 13, 1919
Service Park Unit No. 391	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Service Park Unit No. 394	Apr. 12, 1919	
Service Park Unit No. 396	May 11, 1919	
Service Park Unit No. 397	Apr. 25, 1919	
Service Park Unit No. 398	May 5, 1919	May 11, 1919
Service Park Unit No. 399	June 5, 1919	
Service Park Unit No. 696	Mar. 11, 1919	
Section 14, Repair Unit 320	Apr. 26, 1919	
Section 15, Repair Unit 320	Apr. 26, 1919	
Third Army Water Transport Service	Jan. 29, 1919	
Third Army Regulating Station	May 1, 1919	
14th Co., 1st Air Sv. Mech. Regt.	Mar. 15, 1919	

Note: Under the column headed Relieved where no date appears unit was transferred on July 2, 1919, from the Third Army to the American Forces in GERMANY.

Occupation of Coblenz Bridgehead

2d Section, G. S.

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
July 2, 1919.

HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN THIRD ARMY
November 14, 1918 to July 2, 1919

[Extract]

* * * * *

CROSSING THE RHINE

On December 12, Field Order No. 11 issued, directed the Third Army to occupy the northern sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead, with the advance elements to cross the RHINE at seven o'clock, December 13. The northern (left) boundary remained unchanged. The southern (right) boundary was as has been previously mentioned.

Before the advance the 1st Division passed to the command of the III Corps. With three divisions, the 1st, 2d, and 32d, the III Corps occupied the American sector of the COBLENZ bridgehead, the movement of the troops into position beginning at the scheduled hour, December 13. The four bridges available for crossing the river within the COBLENZ bridgehead were the pontoon bridge and railroad bridge at COBLENZ, the railroad bridges at ENGERS and REMAGEN. December 13 the advance began with the American khaki crossing the RHINE into advanced positions. On the same day the 42d Division passes to the command of the IV Corps, which, in support of the III Corps, continued its march to occupy the Kreise of MAYEN, AHRWEILER, ADENAU, and COCHEM.

The VII Corps occupied under the same order that portion of the Regierungsbezirk of TRIER within army limits.

On December 15 Third Army Headquarters at MAYEN opened at COBLENZ: III Corps Headquarters at POLCH opened at NEUWIED and IV Corps Headquarters remained at COCHEM, with the VII Corps at GREVENMACHER. In crossing the RHINE on the shortened front - from ROLANDSECK to RHENS on the west bank - the Third Army encountered no hostile act of any sort. In the occupied area both food and coal supplies were sufficient.

By the night of December 14, Third Army troops had occupied their positions on the perimeter of the COBLENZ bridgehead. * * *

* * * * *

**Activities of Army of Occupation during the Period
December 19, 1918 to July 2, 1919**

ORDER OF BATTLE
OF THE
UNITED STATES LAND FORCES
IN THE WORLD WAR
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES,
ARMY CORPS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
AND SEPARATE FORCES

[Extract]

*** Dec. 19, bridgehead occupation completed; liaison with French army maintained by means of patrols along the road, NIEDER-ERBACH---EMS. Dec. 23, Marshal Foch and Gen. Pershing, in LUXEMBURG, confer about size of American army UNITED STATES proposes to maintain in BERMANY.* Dec. 27, guard posts are established along LUXEMBURG-GERMAN frontier to prevent unauthorized traffic. ***

1919

During Jan. the Third Army is engaged in training and preparing the troops under its command for any contingency that may arise. Letter of instruction is circulated to lower commanders prescribing plan of action in case hostilities are resumed. Installations are set up throughout the army area to facilitate command.

In Feb. new four-week training period begins, military schools are opened throughout the area; readjustments of billets and billeting areas are being made; a quartermaster depot is organized at COBLENZ-LUTZEL, eliminating necessity of direct shipments to divisions of Third Army from S. O. S. depots; nearly 2,000 officers and enlisted men leave to take courses in British and French universities; better leave facilities are created; plans for sending American divisions to the United States are being made. Feb. 4, military control of the Stadtkreis of TRIER is transferred from G. H. Q. to the Third Army. Feb. 26, boundary, within the neutral zone, between the British Second Army and the American Third Army is announced to be the administrative boundary of the Kreis of SIEGBURG.

In March routine duties of occupation and training are carried on; army, corps, and divisional educational centers are established in the Third Army zone; army horse show is held; Port Commander, COBLENZ, takes over duties of Regulating Officer, COBLENZ; 42d Div. released from IV Corps and placed in army reserve.

In April exodus of American divisions from Third Army to the United States begins and during the month the Hq. of the VI Corps (assigned to the Third Army April 1 - 11) and the 32d, 33d, 42d, and 89th Divisions are released from Third Army control to S. O. S. for return to UNITED STATES.

April 1, Grand Duchy of LUXEMBURG included in Third Army zone, together with Military Area No. 2, when boundary between the Second and Third Armies is changed back to the FRANCO-LUXEMBURG frontier along general line: VILLERUPT (incl.)---HUSSIGNY (excl.)---FRANCO-LUXEMBURG frontier northeast of LONGWY---FRANCO-BELGIAN frontier to GEROUVILLE.

* Gen. Pershing desires repatriation of Americans as speedily as possible, but Marshal Foch wants twenty-five American combat divisions maintained in the theatre of operations until the peace treaty is signed and several conferences ensue because of this difference of opinion. Dec. 31, 1918, Marshal Foch is informed that commencing Mar. 1, 1919, there will be a monthly reduction of five American divisions in the occupied area.

April 6, 4th Div. ordered to replace 42d Div. in Kreis of AHRWEILER; established therein April 13. April 8, Base Section No. 9 is organized around ANTWERP, BELGIUM, and ROTTERDAM, HOLLAND, to receive supplies from UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, and from other base ports in FRANCE and to forward them to the Third Army by rail and water. April 14, Port Commander, COBLENCE, reports directly to Commanding General, Third Army, instead of to G-4, G. H. Q., as heretofore; Regulating Station at CONFLANS discontinued and Regulating Station at TRIER passes to control of the port commander. During the month five remount squadrons ordered from S. O. S. to care for newly established remount depot near WENGEROHR accommodating 8,000 horses; motor transport reception parks are established at COBLENZ, NEUENDORF, SINZIG, BITBURG and DIEKIRCH; army motor show is held; army area reorganized; military property is being centralized with view to returning it to UNITED STATES; Gen. Dickman informs lower commanders of plan for future occupation; 6th Div. begins to arrive in the army zone.

In May division commanders are held directly responsible for training. May 6, the 90th Div. is released to S. O. S. and on May 8 those units of 6th Div. in Third Army area are also released. May 11, the IV and VII Corps are discontinued and the 4th and 5th Divs. released to the S. O. S.; the 3d Div. is transferred from IV to III Corps. May 14, plans of operations submitted by Marshal Foch to Third Army commander in event that GERMANY should refuse to sign the peace treaty. May 17, military police units, operating under civil affairs officers, take over control of such areas as divisions evacuate. May 20, Marshal Foch directs Allied commanders to dispatch troops toward WEIMAR and BERLIN from MAYENCE, COBLENZ, and COLOGNE, if peace treaty is not signed. May 22, Third Army issues its plan of advance, effective May 30, in view of the impending emergency. May 26, Operations Section, G. H. Q., A. E. F., recommends that one regiment with necessary auxiliaries, totaling in all about 7,000 troops, be the American contribution to any further occupation of German territory by the Allies. May 27, Marshal Foch informs Gen. Pershing that Supreme War Council desires Allied Armies be made ready immediately to resume active operations against the Germans.

June 1, Advance G. H. Q., A. E. F., discontinued at TRIER. June 7, Composite Regiment, Third Army, ordered to JOINVILLE-le-PONT for temporary duty at Pershing Stadium. June 16, Marshal Foch notifies Gen. Pershing that Allied Armies must be ready after June 20 to resume offensive operations and that preliminary movements with that object in view are to begin June 17. Third Army notified. June 17, French 2d Cav. Div. assigned to III Corps; 3d Div. detached from III Corps to operate directly under the Third Army. June 18, the concentration of the Third Army in contemplation of further advance into GERMANY progresses. June 19, Gen. Pershing notifies Marshal Foch that beginning June 23 the Third Army will occupy the towns of LIMBURG, WESTERBURG, HACHENBURG, and ALTENKIRCHEN. III Corps to take up advance and seize railroad connecting these towns. June 23, the Germans signify intention to sign peace treaty and contemplated operations are suspended. June 25, 3d Div. reassigned to III Corps. June 28, Treaty of Versailles is signed; 4th Div. (less one regt.) and 5th Div. released to S. O. S. for return to U. S. June 30, Marshal Foch and Gen. Pershing confer regarding American troops to be left on RHINE. July 1, Gen. Pershing notified War Department that 2d Div. will follow the 4th and 5th Divs. to ports of embarkation July 15, the 3d Div. Aug. 15, and the 1st Div. later; and that, upon GERMANY'S compliance with military conditions imposed upon her (probably within three months after German ratification of the treaty), the American forces in EUROPE will be reduced to a single regiment of infantry supplemented by necessary auxiliaries. III Corps is discontinued, its hq. and corps troops pass to S. O. S., and remaining organizations to the American Forces in Germany. July 2, Third Army is discontinued, its hq. and all personnel and units under it hereafter designated American Forces in Germany.

AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY

Preface

The following selected documentary material, extracted from the Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, is presented to show American Military Government of the Rhineland.

Various contingencies of civil government are considered - relations between civil population and troops, administration of public works and utilities, fiscal affairs, sanitation and public health, schools and charitable institutions, courts and legal procedure, and the like.

In considering the Third Army as a unit of civil control, it should be kept in mind that its authority as such was subsidiary to Advance General Headquarters, A. E. F., from December 9, 1918 to June 1, 1919. During the two weeks prior to December 9, 1918 and after June 1, 1919 it exercised complete civil authority, Advance General Headquarters having been dissolved on the latter date.

Library, AWC: Report

AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY

1918 - 1920.

REPORT OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

THIRD ARMY

AND

AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY.

[Extract]

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY
Office of Civil Affairs,
Coblenz, Germany.

March 4, 1920.

From: Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, A. F. G.

To: Chief of Staff, A. F. G.

Subject: Report on Military Government.

1. I herewith submit to the Commanding General, A. F. G., a report on the activities of the Office of Civil Affairs, from December 1, 1918 to January 10, 1920.

2. While principally treating the activities of the Staff section, which during this period has been under my direction, I have nevertheless endeavored to give the report a somewhat more ambitious scope, and to discuss therein the entire subject of the American Military Government in Germany. It is hoped thereby, that a complete record of our administration in the Rhineland may be preserved, as a basis for technical study of Military Government by the General Staff of our Army as well as for future historians.

3. Volume I contains a narrative account of the Military Government, while the remaining volumes are devoted to collections of the more important documents. These documents are arranged by subjects, chronologically, in such a way that it is hoped they may be readily accessible to lay student or historian. A number of treatises on various phases of the German body politic, together with essays on the organization for Military Government in the French, Belgian, British and German armies, have also been incorporated into this portion of the report.

4. It is requested, that if the approval of the Commanding General is secured for this report, it be forwarded to the War Department, for either publication or record, as the Secretary of War may desire.

I. L. HUNT,
Colonel, Infantry,
Office in Charge Civil Affairs.

CHAPTER NO. 1

GERMANY ON THE EVE OF OCCUPATION

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[Material omitted as not being pertinent to this topic.]

CHAPTER NO. 2

MILITARY GOVERNMENT DURING THE MARCH TO THE RHINE

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THE THIRD ARMY IN LUXEMBURG.

The American army entered Luxemburg on November 20, 1918. The Commander-in-Chief took this occasion to issue the following proclamation, which sought to make clear what the attitude of the occupying army would be to the civil population of this neutral country.

PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF LUXEMBURG

After four years of invasion Luxemburg is now happily liberated. Your freedom from German occupation was exacted of the invaders by the American and Allied armies as a condition of the present Armistice. It now becomes necessary for American troops to pass through Luxemburg and to establish and maintain for a time their communications upon your territory.

The American troops have come to Luxemburg as friends and will conduct themselves here strictly in accordance with international law. No hardships need be expected from their presence, which will not extend beyond what is deemed strictly necessary. Your government and institutions will nowhere be interfered with. You will be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of your lives and occupations. Your persons and your property will be fully respected. It will be necessary for the American army to utilize certain buildings, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, and possible other public works, for shelter, transportation or communication; but beyond that, whatever supplies may be required, will be paid for at a just valuation.

It is assumed that you will commit no aggressions upon the American army and will not give any information, aid or comfort to the enemies. You are expected cheerfully to observe such rules as the American military commanders may find it necessary to make for the safety of their troops and your own protection.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Commander in Chief of the American
Expeditionary Forces.

As Luxemburg was a disarmed neutral and had sharply protested against Germany's invasion of her rights in the first days of the war, there was no intention on the part of the American army of treating her as an enemy country. All relations with the civil population, and particularly dealings with the Luxemburg civil authorities, required, as may be imagined, constant tact on the part of the military authorities responsible for carrying

on the occupation. The invasion and occupation of any country by a foreign army, even if it comes as a liberator, is apt to give rise to constant source of friction. During the stay of the Third Army in Luxemburg, the deep appreciation of the Luxemburgers for their liberation, together with the just policy of the American authorities in all civil matters, prevented any unfortunate incidents. The stay of the army in Luxemburg was very brief, a fortunate matter, as the billeting of 200,000 men within the frontier taxed the accommodations of the tiny Duchy to the utmost. Although Luxemburg continued to be occupied by American troops until the Summer of 1919, it never, except for a few weeks in the Spring of 1919, was attached to the territory under the jurisdiction of the Third Army. The powers of Military Government exercised by the American army in Luxemburg will therefore not be treated in this report.

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PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDERS ISSUED BY THE ARMIES DURING THE ADVANCE FROM THE LUXEMBURG FRONTIER TO THE RHINE.

While the Headquarters of the Third Army was still in Hollerich, a suburb of Luxemburg City, Brigadier General H. A. Smith, formerly director of the military schools at Langres, arrived from G. H. Q. to consult with the army commander on questions of civil policy in occupied territory. General Smith had been designated as deputy chief of staff for civil affairs at G. H. Q. His title was changed a few days later to that of Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, which designation became permanent. (The Commander-in-Chief had by this time decided that as soon as practicable an Advance General Headquarters should be established at Treves, and that the Office of Civil Affairs should form a part of that organization which was to operate directly under him). In the meantime, Colonel I. L. Hunt arrived at Luxemburg for duty in connection with Civil Affairs of the military government. In view of the desirability of the Office of Civil Affairs having a representative with the Third Army, General Smith directed Col. Hunt to accompany that body as an advisor to the Commanding General in civil matters.

In order to aid the personnel which would be eventually designated to administer German territory, a pamphlet entitled "Notes on German Local Government," was prepared by the Second Section of the General Staff at G. H. Q. This pamphlet contained important notes on the organization of the German governmental system and in addition devoted several pages to German laws on billeting and requisitions. It further contained notes on the German administration of justice. This pamphlet was at that time the only source of information distributed among officers of the army on the organization, government and laws of the country which they were called upon to govern.

During the advance to the Rhine, three important documents were published by the Headquarters of the Third Army. Two were proclamations for the guidance of the civil population, which the Army Commander had received from higher authority; the other, a set of instructions for officers and men, which later appeared as an army memorandum. One of the proclamations originated with Marshal Foch and was published simultaneously by all the Allied armies.

Marshal Foch's proclamation follows:

PROCLAMATION

of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to the Inhabitants of Occupied Territory.

The Allied military authorities herewith assume command of the country.
It demands strictest obedience from all.

The laws and regulations in force at the moment of occupation will be continued inasfar as they do not affect our rights or our safety.

Public services will continue to operate under the direction and control of the military authorities.

Public officials will be held responsible for the conscientious and honest discharge of the duties with which they are entrusted. The courts will continue to dispense justice.

The inhabitants must abstain in word and deed from any act of hostility, direct or indirect toward the Allied authorities. They must obey the requisitions which may be made of them in conformity with law.

Every person guilty of a crime or a misdemeanor, whether as a principal or an accomplice, will be immediately arrested and brought before a court martial.

Every infraction of the regulations issued, as well as every refusal of obedience to orders will be severely punished.

The present proclamation declares the occupation of the country by the Allied Armies. It points out to each one his duty which is to aid in the reestablishment of civil life by work, calm and discipline. Let all persons diligently discharge such duty.

FOCH, MARSHAL OF FRANCE,
Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies.

As may be inferred from a casual perusal of this proclamation, it was essentially a formal document whose phrases permitted a wide interpretation by each of several Allied commanders. While bringing home to the civil population the essential truth that the Allies were a unit in occupation as well as war, it very wisely permitted each nation to treat the defeated enemy according to the dictates of its natural policy and characteristics.

General Pershing's proclamation follows:

The American proclamation, signed by General Pershing, was issued by the American army alone.

PROCLAMATION TO THE INHABITANTS

The army of the United States, in conjunction with the Allied military authorities, has taken possession of and garrisoned with troops in the district of Treves (Rhenish Prussia), the entire localities of Dauen, Pruem, Bitburg, Wittlich, Berncastel, Treves (City) and Treves (Suburbs); in the district of Coblenz (Rhenish Prussia), the entire localities of Adenau, Ahrweiler, Coblenz (City,) Coblenz (Suburbs), Cochem, Mayen, Neuwied, St-Goar, Simmern and Zell, and the entire district of Altkirchen, with the exception of those parts lying further to the east than thirty kilometers from the eastern end of the bridge over the Rhine at Coblenz; in the district of Wiesbaden (Province of Hesse-Nassau), the entire localities of St-Goarshausen, Unterlahn, Unterwesterwald, with the exception of those parts that are more than thirty kilometers distant from the eastern end of the bridge over the Rhine at Coblenz.

The above mentioned areas and their inhabitants are under the regulations and authority of the American army. These orders are succinct, and strict observance is expected of all. Those who observe these regulations have nothing to fear. The American army is not bringing war against the civilian population. All that lawfully and peacefully abide by the regulations laid down by the military authorities may count on protection for their persons, homes, property and belief. The others will be arrested at once and brought strictly to account.

The American army on their part will adhere strictly to the laws of nations as well as the laws of civilized warfare. The population, on their part, must offer no signs of enmity towards the American troops nor place obstruction in their path, either by word or deed.

It is the duty of the population to regain their normal mode of life and to re-establish the schools, churches, hospitals and charitable institutions, and to continue in their regular local activities. Therein they will not be disturbed, but rather assisted and protected. In so far as their scope and bearing permit, the courts, city departments and civil establishments will be continued under the supervision of the American army. The existing laws and regulations, in so far as they do not interfere with the duty and security of the American troops, shall remain in force.

All violations of the regulations, inimical conduct overt hostility against the orders of the military authorities will be severely punished.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Commander-in-Chief of the American
Expeditionary Forces.

The first paragraph of the proclamation concerns itself with geographically delimiting the area of American control. The boundaries therein established for the Third Army did not prove to be permanent. Even while the Allies were still advancing to the Rhine, a modification of this area was found to be essential, and the Kreise (termed "localities" in the proclamation) of Simmern, Zell and St-Goar, St-Goarshausen, and Unterlahn, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the French Tenth Army on our right. The other paragraphs of the proclamation are notable for the repeated declarations that the occupation would be conducted in accord with the laws of nations and of civilized warfare. While warning the civil population that any word or act inimical to the occupying army would be severely punished, the proclamation breathes throughout a spirit of humanity and justice, in marked contrast to the proclamations of the German army in France and Belgium.

Memorandum No. 4, Third Army, was published November 28, 1918. It is notable as the first act of specific regulations issued by the American army for observance by the German civil population. The authorities realized that regulations issued without first-hand information of actual political and economic conditions, must naturally be temporary in nature, and subject to either revision or complete revocation, as the occupation progressed. In a force of over 200,000 men, it is inevitable that some individuals, even officers, will have a false conception of the proper treatment to be accorded the defeated enemy. If regulations for their guidance are lacking, they will follow the dictates of their personal feelings, and will either err in undue severity or go to the other extreme and, by marked leniency, weaken the respect due the occupying troops. Definite regulation by the high command was therefore necessary, in order to impress on the civil population the fact that they were dealing with a disciplined, united army.

The opening sentence of the second paragraph of Memorandum No. 4 strikes the keynote of the whole American occupation.

In stopping in a town where a halt for the night or a longer period has been ordered, the commanding officer will send for the Burgomaster, chief of police and other prominent officials.

This sentence informed all officers that the civil population was to be at the start impressed with the power and authority in the hands of the occupying army, and that respect and courtesy must be accorded its representatives on every occasion. Civil officials were to be made to realize at once that they were subordinate to the American commander of their city or town, and were to obey, promptly and cheerfully, the slightest order given. The sentence implies further that American officers when dealing with civil officials in territory under their control, should order and never request.

The subparagraphs of Memorandum No. 4, which follow, are designated to serve as an outline of the proper directions which town commanders should give to civil officials. Only those subparagraphs of the memorandum are quoted which pertain to purely civil matters.

He will hand them copies of the proclamation of Marshal Foch and the Commander-in-Chief. He will inform them that military government has been established in the town and surrounding district; that the principal object of his government is to provide for the security and efficiency of the United States Army; that so long as the inhabitants conduct themselves peacefully and quietly, the ordinary civil and criminal laws will be continued in force, and will be administered by the local officials, and the private property and personal rights will be respected. Should an official decline to serve, the commanding officer will direct the Burgomaster to name his successor. Should the Burgomaster be absent, the commanding officer will direct the official next in rank or a suitable civilian to act as such.

The commanding officer will obtain from the Burgomaster a map of the town showing the locations of all banks, hospitals, railroad stations, libraries and all public buildings. He will inquire if added police protection is needed. If in his judgment such added protection is needed, extra guards will be posted.

The commanding officer will direct the Burgomaster to inform his people to avoid assembling in crowds and to go quietly about their ordinary affairs of life.

He will direct the Burgomaster to prohibit the sale of liquors, except beer and light wines. The sale of beer and light wines will be prohibited between the hours of 9 a. m. and 5 p. m.

He will direct the Burgomaster to forbid the sale of or carrying of deadly weapons.

Although under the terms of the Armistice, civil officials might very properly have been required to remain in office, there was no intention on the part of the American authorities to compel them to serve. As a matter of fact, no case of an official declining to continue his duties was brought to the attention of the Third Army Headquarters. In many cases, our arrival was welcomed by the officials, who regarded our coming as being of great assistance in enforcing their authority, which had been weakened by the revolution. During the month of November, Soldiers and Workmen's Councils had been created in many cities, and these organizations had usurped much of the power of former officials. Our coming therefore was a matter of prime importance to them, as it restored their authority and power.

In the concluding paragraphs quoted above, three restrictions are imposed on the civil population. These were believed necessary in order to prevent friction between the civil population and the troops.

The first of these restrictions, forbidding the gathering of assemblies or crowds, had ample precedents in history and was undoubtedly necessary under the circumstances. It is gratifying to note that no infractions of this order occurred during the march to the Rhine. The restriction on alcohol, also proved to be a wise measure, in the best interests of both the army and the civil population. With large numbers of demobilized German soldiers already in the area to be occupied by the army, the possibility of brawls with our troops, which might well assume serious proportions could not be lightly dismissed. It seemed probable that the chance of such disorder would be reduced by entirely forbidding the sale of strong alcoholic drinks and by limiting the hours in which wine and beer might be sold in inns and cafes. Arms and deadly weapons were definitely forbidden to be sold or carried by civilians, this being the third restrictive measure.

The final paragraphs of Memorandum No. 4 read as follows:

He will direct the Burgomaster to furnish billets for so many officers, so many men, and so many animals and such supplies (fuel, forage, straw, etc.) as may be needed for the troops under his command. Food will not be requisitioned.

(The attention of all officers is called to the fact that requisitions shall only be demanded on the authority of the commanding officer in the locality occupied.)

He will inform the Burgomaster that these requisitions will not be paid in cash but that receipts for all billets and supplies furnished will be given. Requisitions should generally be made upon the municipal authorities, but may be made upon individuals, if necessary. The receipts given should be filed with the Burgomaster.

All receipts should be signed in duplicate by a supply officer and approved by the commanding officer. One copy will be given to the municipal officer or individual furnishing the supplies and one will be forwarded to the Military Secretary, Army of Occupation, through military channels.

The right of the occupying armies to billet and requisition was specifically provided for in the Armistice terms. The declaration that food would under no circumstances be requisitioned, is a striking commentary on the policy of humanity which actuated the army. So many stories had come to the notice of the army commander of starvation and misery within the German territory already occupied, that he believed it wise to abstain from requisitioning foodstuffs until the true food-situation could be ascertained by investigations conducted on the spot.

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DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLICIES DURING THE ADVANCE FROM THE LUXEMBURG FRONTIER TO THE RHINE.

Army Headquarters were moved on December 3 from Hollerich to Bitburg, chief town of the Kreis of the same name. Investigations of the local situation were begun at Bitburg by the Office of Civil Affairs, in order to frame intelligently an American policy in many pressing matters.

Arms and Ammunition.

The German people are accustomed to having among their population a much larger proportion of firearms than ordinarily is the case in an average American community. This is particularly true of sporting weapons, hunting retaining many of its ancient feudal characteristics in the Rhineland. The hunting privileges for a district are let out in public auction by the town or village in whose territory it lies, to the highest bidder, provided the purchaser holds a hunting license. Hunting by other than persons so authorized is rigorously forbidden. The government employs a large corps of foresters, in addition to the regular police, to prevent poaching.

Carrying of arms by all German citizens had been strictly forbidden in Memorandum No. 4. In the first conference held with any civil official by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, the Landrat of Kreis Bitburg, Count Adelmann von Adelmansfelden, took occasion to inform the representative of the Commanding General of the disposition and strength of the police under his direction and of their unquestioned reliability. He emphasized that it would be to our interests to permit them to carry fire-arms. This request was carefully considered and finally granted, as it was believed proper to permit the German police a certain measure of authority over their own citizens. Directions were therefore given the Landrat, permitting the police to retain their pistols and bayonets, but at the same time requiring their carbines to be turned in to the Burgomasters. Although the Landrat further begged that foresters might retain their arms to check the depredations of wild boars, this requested was not granted at this time. However, on December 8, the matter having been investigated in the meantime, the Commanding General authorized foresters to temporarily retain their hunting weapons. The question of carrying of arms by police and others again arose when Headquarters of the Third Army were moved to Mayen. It appeared from the statement of the Landrat of that Kreis, Herr Wilhelm von Loeser, that all units of the army had not strictly abided by the requirements of Memorandum No. 4, and that certain commanding officers had even issued instructions of their own on the subject of fire-arms. This had naturally produced considerable confusion in the minds of German officials. However, while the Army authorities were still considering how far the privilege of carrying of arms might be extended to civil officials, without endangering the safety of the army, General Pershing issued his Anordnungen governing the subject.

Rate of Exchange.

Germany had during the war established and enforced an official rate of exchange in both Belgium and Luxemburg. The value of her currency at home had been maintained by the diminution of imports. This had been caused largely by the British blockade, but also by government restrictions on such goods as still found their way into Germany through neutral countries. Imports were restricted to food, clothing and raw materials for manufacture of military equipment. In consequence, there had been little demand in Germany for foreign money and the value of the mark had not fallen in neutral countries as much as might have been expected. With the signing of the Armistice, restrictions on German trade with neutral countries were practically removed. However, as the political and economic fabric of the nation was already badly shaken and the temper of the Allies indicated that a demand would be made in the peace treaty for huge indemnity, the value of the mark began to fall rapidly. After the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg in November 1918, a vast amount of German marks still remained in circulation. When the army entered Luxemburg, the soldiers with their French currency found that the natives demanded a franc and a quarter for the German mark. This was manifestly far more than it was worth in neutral countries and was, in fact, the official rate formerly enforced in the German armies. As soon as the army entered Germany, the value of the mark began to fall, at first being rated on a par with the franc and gradually going lower. The people seemed perfectly willing to accept francs at this rate, as they evidently anticipated a still further decline in the value of the mark. Much dissatisfaction was however felt by the troops who found themselves the prey of tradespeople and speculators who took every opportunity to obtain a favorable rate for themselves at the expense of the army. An observer with the 32d Division during the advance, reports that nearly every officer and enlisted man in that unit made a considerable personal sacrifice in changing his francs to marks. This officer's statement is substantiated from other sources in the 1st and 2d Divisions, and may be regarded as applying generally in the whole army. No attempt was made by the military authorities during the advance at setting a definite rate of exchange. Such action was impossible, largely owing to the lack of information as to the commercial rates in neutral countries. As soon, however, as troops settled in the permanent areas, Advance General Headquarters in Orders No. 1, announced an official rate of exchange of 142.85 marks for one hundred francs, or, one mark equals seventy centimes.

Alcohol.

The provisions of Memorandum No. 4, forbidding the sale of alcoholic drinks and restricting the hours in which light wines and beer might be sold, were not modified during the march to the Rhine. Although elements of the civil population resented the American standpoint in the matter and looked askance at a measure which they believed an attempt to transfer American ideas to Europe, the better element soon appreciated the fact that it operated to reduce friction between soldiers and civilians. The order was very generally obeyed by the civil population, although secret traffic in Cognac and Schnaps could never be wholly prevented. When the attention of the military authorities was called to the continued sale of illegal liquor, strict measures were taken to punish all offenders, including not only fine and imprisonment by Provost Courts, but confiscation of liquor and closing of the places of business of the offender on orders of the Commanding Officer.

Billets.

The provisions of Memorandum No. 4 were so explicit in the directions given commanding officers as to billeting, that very little trouble was encountered in obtaining satisfactory accommodations for officers and men. The German people were accustomed to having troops of their own army quartered on them, and as billeting is provided for in their own laws, they accepted the demands of a foreign army as a matter of course.

Two German attempts, however, to take advantage of our American good nature were speedily recognized and checked. Observers in the 4th and 89th Divisions reported that during the advance, well-to-do families generally attempted to conceal the number of rooms

at their disposal. Such action naturally threw the burden of billeting the occupying army on to the poorer people. So general did the practice become in some districts, that the billeting officers of the 89th Division found it necessary to assign definite rooms to the civil population and take the rest of dwellings for the troops. In districts occupied by the 1st Division, Burgomasters occasionally demurred at furnishing the amount of billeting-space demanded. However, a slight show of firmness by the billeting officer was generally amply sufficient to bring local officials to terms. The 42d Division reported that even less difficulty was encountered in Germany in billeting their troops than in friendly countries. The 32d and 90th Divisions procured necessary billeting facilities without special trouble and their reports state that Burgomasters apparently did all in their power to satisfy the wishes of the occupying army.

Requisitions.

As Memorandum No. 4 absolutely forbade units to requisition food, demands on the civil population were limited to fuel and forage alone. During the enemy's retreat, his high command had utilized its requisitioning power to the fullest extent. The German lines of supply had completely gone to pieces and the army, stranded as it was, had either to live on the country or starve. In consequence, many parts of the occupied portion of Germany had literally been swept bare and offered little in the way of food to an invading army, even if it had desired to exercise its undoubted rights. The farmers were not slow in expressing their fears that we would act in a similar manner to their own troops, and hurriedly concealed their few remaining supplies, in order to avoid starvation. Demands by the army for forage were met on every hand by deceit and subterfuges, and it required prolonged effort to make necessary quantities for animal transport available. It was soon apparent, however, that the available supplies were very short and that chief dependence in future would have to be put on our forage dumps in France. As the army had a long line of difficult communications, it was impossible during the first few weeks of occupation to more than maintain the current army rations. Forage had to be requisitioned, and our demands, coming as they did on the heels of those of the retreating German army, worked considerable hardship on the rural population. Horses and cattle without forage for the winter, had to be sold, thus reducing the number available for draft purposes and ultimately resulting in a diminution of the meat and milk supply. On the other hand, fuel was readily forthcoming, and no division reported any difficulty in securing the necessary quantities for their commands. The American system of receipts and the repeated assurances that requisitions would be promptly settled by cash payments, evidently made a good impression on the German population, because as the advance progressed, less and less difficulty was encountered in procuring what was needed. In one town, the Burgomaster even offered to supply more fuel than was asked for.

The policies inaugurated by the army in dealing with these problems were recognized at the time as merely temporary expedients. It was known that with the publication of General Pershing's Anordnungen, all orders previously issued would be ordered null and void. It was nevertheless believed necessary to attempt some solution of each problem as it arose, rather than give the German population an impression that the American army was adopting a lenient and feeble attitude.

Relations Between Army and Civil Population.

Nearly all American divisions in commenting on their impressions of the first few days on German soil, emphasize the apparent indifference shown by the civil population toward the occupying troops. Such comment would be surprising if we did not bear in mind that the army had just been the recipient of enthusiastic welcome in liberated France and Luxemburg. It is probable that the surprise universally expressed by officers and men was but a natural reaction to the continuous scenes of joy and welcome which had been the lot of the army in liberated France and Belgium. However friendly disposed the German people might feel toward them, it was but natural that they should remove the arches and other decorations which had been erected for their retreating troops and should attempt to

appear as oblivious as possible to their conquerors. Burgomasters and officials had apparently been carefully instructed to receive us with due courtesy and to do all in their power to make us comfortable, but nevertheless warned not to make any demonstrations of friendship. Unquestionably, however, there existed a considerable fear of us among all classes, partly a result of war propaganda, but largely, more dread of the unknown. We had been consistently painted in German periodicals as a nation of barbarians, and while such stories never gained wide credence among the German people, they had attained a certain amount of success. The men, nearly all of whom had seen at some time or other the suffering of civil populations in countries occupied by the Germans, now looked forward to the possibility that their homes and families might be burned and violated, in retaliation for the acts of their armies in France and Belgium. That other nations should have a conception of military government, higher and more humanitarian than their own, seemed to many of these men incredible. The feeling, unquestionably widely prevalent, that America was really a friend of Germany, did not assert itself until all fear had disappeared that we would ravage their country and treat them as their armies had treated invaded countries.

Within a few days, however, these fears were dispelled. Stories of the correct and disciplined conduct of the American army and the kindnesses of individual soldiers spread to all corners of the American zone and paved the way for a striking change of sentiment. The attitude of indifference and dignity which had been so marked on the Sunday we entered Treves, swung rapidly to the other extreme. On all sides we were greeted with the smiles of women and the cheers of children, and if the men kept out of sight, they apparently, seemed only too anxious to show no sign of hostility. * * *

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No act of hostility was committed against us during the first week in Germany, and the opinion grew very general, that the civil population was anxious to create a favorable impression. While many Americans undoubtedly reacted to this friendly attitude of the people, and appreciated the efforts of the women to make them comfortable in their billets, others looked upon all expressions of friendship as mere propaganda. * * *

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On the other hand, German opinion was apparently unanimous that our troops were conducting themselves as well as could be desired. The "Bittburger Zeitung," one of the largest rural papers in Bezirk Treves, in its edition of December 7, 1918, wrote:

The occupation of the city and Kreis by the American troops has been accomplished so far with no restriction of the liberty or circulation. The officials and business men work in quiet and are undisturbed, and life goes on as usual. The mails and railway traffic have necessarily been disturbed. It is just to acknowledge that the American military authorities are efficient without harshness, and the behavior of the American troops is wonderfully good. Not only officers but soldiers are considerate and seem obliging. The Americans take pains not to make the occupation appear vexatious. On their part, the Americans must have observed that it is far from the intention of the local population to create any discord.

Gradually, however, as the troops approached the Rhine, a change of attitude was observed. In Kreis Mayen, there were indications that less satisfaction was felt by the inhabitants towards our occupation than in the districts nearer the Luxemburg frontier. In many places in Kreis Mayen, the 32d Division found the people surly and gruff, although such an attitude was almost entirely confined to the male members of families. It was in the territory nearer the Rhine, that the attempts mentioned previously of German officials to billet our officers in poor houses, were most often made. On the whole, though, even here, the general attitude of the people was amiable, and all classes seemed anxious to please.

Bolshevism had appeared to Germany as the most ruthless of enemies, and our coming, a shield to the homes and property of the people of the Rhineland. This point of view largely accounted for the surprisingly friendly attitude of the people. The Allied armies, enemies as they were, were far preferable to the anarchy of a Spartacist. The "Coblenzer Zeitung" in its editorial column of December 12, 1918, even urged the German government to move the Reichstag to Coblenz. It wrote:

Examining all possibilities, one will find that Coblenz as a meeting place for the Reichstag, is least accessible to outside influence, under present conditions. We have no groups of Bolshevist-Terrorist party; we are among the quiet order-loving populace. The American occupation would assure sufficient protection against the eruption of terrorist elements from neighboring German territory. Any attempt at influence on the part of our outside opponents is hardly to be expected, as the American troops, where they have hitherto appeared, have not interfered with the political life of the occupied territory.

The most laudatory newspaper comment of all on our occupation was, however, the article in the "Trierische Zeitung" of December 12, 1918. Its tone is so surprisingly friendly that it must either be regarded as rational propaganda, or as a local attempt to lighten the burden of occupation. In part, it reads as follows:

The American soldiers are distinguished from one another, apart from the almost invisible insignia of rank, only by their facial expression and general appearance. All are clean-shaven and their uniforms are alike. The horses of the higher officers are no more gorgeously harnessed than those of ordinary troopers. The rations are also the same, save the officers are served a little better. Recently, as we have been informed, soup, beefsteak and trimmings and pudding were served for dinner. We should like to add that when the American soldier is not provided with rations, he draws an allowance of six marks daily. This proves that he lives fairly well. Our musketeers would have indeed been overjoyed at such an allowance. But we must take into consideration that the United States is the richest country in the world and that \$1.00, or four marks, must be expended there for articles that can be obtained for one mark here. What is most conspicuous in the Americans is the assurance and the peaceful manner in which they perform their duties. We hear no strident sounds or insolence; we see no dissatisfaction, much less a haughty mien, but always a friendly smile when intercourse with citizens is necessary. There are no disagreeable relations between the soldier and his superior. We should draw a lesson for the citizens of our new republic from this. We cannot afford the pay of the American soldiers, but we can give our people the same position which they take in life. The great differences between the lower officers and the men do not exist with them, nevertheless, everything runs smoothly and this is a particular advantage which we should take to heart.

If more evidence is needed of the good conduct and humanity of the occupying American army during the advance, we have only to turn to the report of General C. D. Rhodes, American representative on the Permanent Armistice Commission. This report, dated December 7, 1918, after giving the writer's personal observation of the conduct of the American troops, concludes as follows:

It is most gratifying to me to be able to report that during the entire period of the existence of the International Armistice Commission, not a single complaint has reached the Commission through the German High Command or otherwise, of misbehavior or irregularities on the part of American officers or troops.

CHAPTER NO.3

INTER-ALLIED CONTROL

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[Omitted. Appears under "The Armistice."]

CHAPTER NO. 4

ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

IN AMERICAN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

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FORMATIVE PERIOD OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT: DECEMBER 1ST - 13TH, 1918.

The preparation for military government undertaken by General Headquarters, prior to the crossing of the Luxemburg-German frontier by the Third Army, was limited to the following:

(a) The publication and distribution among the Third Army of the pamphlet referred to above, on German governmental organization.

(b) The appointment of Brig. Gen. H. A. Smith, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs in occupied territory. This officer was later given the title of Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory and placed at the head of a separate office of the Advance General Headquarters when they were set up at Treves.

(c) The appointment of Colonel I. L. Hunt, Infantry, as General Smith's assistant. When Third Army Headquarters was moved forward to the Rhine, it was deemed advisable by General Smith to have an officer to represent the civil administration with that body. Colonel Hunt was therefore attached to the staff of the Commanding General, Third Army, as an advisor in civil matters, and was shortly thereafter appointed its Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs.

Work had also been begun by G. H. Q. on proclamation called "Anordnungen" (ordinances), containing regulations for the guidance of the civil population of the occupied territory. This, however, had not been completed on December 1, 1918, the day on which the Army began its forward movement from Luxemburg on to enemy soil.

The officers appointed by G. H. Q. to organize military government in occupied territory, were therefore placed in a difficult position. Without information, either in regard to the local situation or the future code of laws being drawn up at Headquarters, they yet had to devise temporary expedients, which might continue to tide over the situation until the army eventually settled down in what were to be its permanent billeting areas. It is not proposed to repeat the story of military government during the march to the Rhine, in this chapter. The provisional policy adopted by the army towards the civil population was outlined in Memorandum No. 4, Third Army, November 30, 1918, and was issued by the Army Commander after consultation with General Smith. The method of enforcing the rules therein laid down was purposely left vague, as it was desired to leave as much authority as possible to Corps and Division Commanders and it was believed unwise to anticipate action by G. H. Q. This memorandum further made no attempt to organize or outline any procedure of military government. This task was left to the future, when the local situation could be studied, and a system outlined on the basis of local investigations and the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief.

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION ADOPTED TO PERMIT EXERCISE OF CIVIL POWERS BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

Orders No. 1, Advance General Headquarters, Treves, December 13, 1918, became, together with General Pershing's Anordnungen, the two fundamental charters of the military government. The Anordnungen announced the regulations which were to govern the relations of the civil population to the occupying army. Orders No. 1, on the other hand, announced the organization of the military government which was to make these regulations effective. The system of military government therein established, together with its later modifications, are the subject of this chapter.

Two fundamental principles which profoundly affected the whole course of military government were announced by G. H. Q. in Orders No. 1.

1. Establishment of an authority in occupied territory, directly representing the Commander-in-Chief, and with full power, subject to his wishes, to promulgate the orders of the military government and to supervise their execution. This office was entirely independent of Third Army Headquarters of Coblenz, and therefore in a very real sense, limited the authority of the Commanding General of the latter force. That discord did not arise from such an awkward division of authority, must be ascribed largely to the spirit in which the several headquarters subordinated personal matters to the public welfare.

2. Use of tactical formations of the Third Army as units of military government. In this connection, looking at it purely from a historical standpoint, the American army committed its first grave mistake, and one which it found impossible to rectify until June of the following year. The mistake was due entirely to inability, in the time at our disposal, to thoroughly grasp the importance of the German governmental system and the facility with which our military government could be adapted to it. German government is more minutely and carefully organized than any country in the world. The Provinces, Regierungsbezirke and Kreise all offered a civil hierarchy to which foreign military government could easily be adapted. Each German political sub-division was therefore provided with its civil commander and its quota of officials. The advantages of organizing the military government along already established civil lines was, however, recognized too late. The decision to use tactical formations as units of control had already then been adopted, and the system so clearly established, that the resulting confusion would not have justified the change.

Both the French and British armies, possibly due to their better knowledge of German local government, never committed our mistake, and modelled their military government from the outset along lines paralleling the civil system.

OFFICE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS AT ADVANCED G. H. Q.

The Office of Civil Affairs at advance G. H. Q. was designated by the Commander-in-Chief as the fountain-head of civil authority within the American zone. Its chief, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, stood within American boundaries, in relation to the temporary sovereign powers of America, as the direct representative of the Commander-in-Chief. His authority and duty was of a three-fold nature. In a legislative capacity, and after approval of his decision by the Commander-in-Chief, he drew up the ordinances, which were to govern the civil population during the occupation. These were issued, in first instances as a part of the Anordnungen, later, as "Orders, Advance G. H. Q." These ordinances outline the methods by which the American army was to make the military government effective.

Another primary duty of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs was that of supervising the execution of orders already issued. It should be borne in mind that the officers charged with the execution of these orders, were the unit commanders of the Third Army, who in all other matters were directly responsible to the Commanding General. Such supervisory powers as G. H. Q. cared to assert, has to be exercised through the medium of the Army Commander. The alternative was considered, but discarded, of having G. H. Q. directly

supervise subordinate commanders of the Third Army in their conduct of civil affairs. It was, however, not believed feasible to place officers in the embarrassing situation of serving two masters. Advance G. H. Q. therefore decided that it was impracticable for it to assert its supervisory power below the Army Commander. As that officer was directly charged with the security of troops, it ought to be exercised in his case only with the utmost discretion. The opportunity to have the same authority issue and execute the ordinances was lost, when it was decided to utilize the tactical formations of the army as units of civil control. Thereafter, supervision of the control of civil affairs in lesser units was exercised by the army commander, through his Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs.

A third field of activity of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, though of less importance lay in the actual administration of the city of Treves, which was placed directly under Advanced G. H. Q.

The powers of legislation and promulgation still residing in G. H. Q. were sufficiently important and numerous to require an extensive organization. Its office organization and, to a certain extent, the whole machinery of civil administration, was outlined in Orders No. 1, Advance G. H. Q., December 13, 1918,

Five main departments were thereby established:

1. Public works and utilities
2. Fiscal affairs
3. Sanitation and public health
4. Schools and charitable institutions
5. Legal Department

This organization was essentially theoretical, destined to meet any situation which might in future confront the American army in its government of occupied territory. Its comprehensiveness hinted at a definite reversal from the theory of noninterference which had existed prior to actual occupation. In fact, the veer was more pronounced than actual circumstances warranted, and several of the departments never came to function in a more than nominal sense. Nor was it found possible to lay down hard and fast limits of competence for the other departments. Problems arose of which the army had never dreamed, or, if it had, believed could be shunted on the shoulders of the civil officials. The above outline of office organization can therefore be better understood if considered as a temporary expedient, to be tested and altered in the light of practical experience.

The Department of Public Works and Utilities was expected to supervise the municipal light and gas plants, street-railways and telephone lines with the American zone. American jurisdiction over the railways was limited by the superior authority of the Inter-allied Railway Commission, of which, representatives of all the Allied nations taking part in the occupation were members. American control of other public utilities was also limited by the lack of coal, and by Interallied Commission, with sole authority over the production and distribution of coal.

When the Department of Fiscal Affairs was created, it was believed that supervision would be necessary over banks, financial institutions and German taxation. Such supervision was found to be advisable only to a very limited degree in the case of banks, and never in that of civil taxation. This department, however, was charged at a somewhat later date, with the receipt of the fines imposed by our provost courts, and with the accounting for them to the Treasury of the United States. This proved to be a considerable task, as the amount of fines often ran over 100,000 marks weekly.

The officers of the Department of Sanitation and Public Health were selected from the Medical Corps. This department of the office of Civil Affairs was charged almost immediately with an extensive and vital work, particularly necessary in view of the conditions of German villages, crowded often to double their normal capacity, with an uninvited occupying army, thus facilitating the spread of disease. The results of the work of the department, which was duplicated in the civil sanitary sections of Army Division Officers of Civil Affairs, has been made the subject of a special chapter. To the other duties of the de-

partment, were later added the many problems concerning civilian food supply. The very critical situation in Germany during the winter of 1918 - 1919 rendered American relief action advisable, especially as the army was charged with the maintenance of public order and the security of troops.

The functions of the Legal Department covered two separate fields. In the first instance, it exercised general supervision over all provost courts, and served as a repository for the very numerous court-records. In the second instance, the Legal Officer served as a technical advisor to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, particularly in drafting the rules governing the operation of provost courts. Later in the occupation when a certain amount of supervision was found to be necessary over the German civil courts, this, too, became a duty of the Legal Department. The department was duplicated in the Office of Civil Affairs of the army.

An additional department was shortly afterwards added, termed the Economic Section. This grew out of the decision of the Luxemburg Commission, mentioned elsewhere, which required licenses for the export of all merchandise from occupied territory. This necessitated considerable personnel and regulating machinery, and a separate department was deemed necessary to deal with the volume of business. It never, however, attained the importance of the corresponding offices in the armies of our Allies. The Luxemburg Commission imposed many restrictions on the German dye industry, but as the American zone contained no dye factory, the Economic Section was relieved of its heaviest responsibility.

It would be expected that the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, considering the far-reaching powers accorded him, would have retained the exclusive right to give directions to the chief civil official of occupied territories, viz., the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province. Such procedure was, however, prevented by geographical reasons. Treves, which was the seat of Advanced G. H. Q., was a relatively important governmental town, but in no sense comparable to Coblenz, which was not only the capital of the Rhine Province, but also of the Regierungsbezirk Coblenz. Coblenz was the Headquarters of the Third Army, and it seemed entirely proper for the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, to transmit to the civil hierarchy the orders and decisions promulgated by the American authorities. It therefore was inevitable that this office, more closely in contact with the high civil bureaucracy than any other, would, in German minds at least, come to occupy a predominant position.

THIRD ARMY AS A UNIT OF CIVIL CONTROL

It would be well to emphasize here that in speaking of the Third Army as a unit of civil control, reference is alone made to its position during the period December 9, 1918, to June 1, 1919, when it served in a subsidiary capacity to Advance G. H. Q. During the two weeks prior to December 9, 1918, on which day both the Anordnungen and Orders No. 1, were published, the army maintained an entirely independent position, with full powers of military government. After June 1, 1919, it resumed complete civil authority, Advance G. H. Q. having been on that date dissolved.

Inasmuch as Orders No. 1 failed to outline duties for the Army Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, contenting itself with his appointment, the growth of the office became in large measure a question of expediency. That it perforce assumed the important position which it did in the American military government of Germany, was due to circumstances outside the scope of knowledge of the authors of Orders No. 1.

There were, at the outset, four fields of activity which the Army Office of Civil Affairs was compelled to devote its energies:

1. In an advisory capacity to the Commanding General, in relation to his powers of military government. These were at first presumed to be of small importance, since with the exception of the Commanding General's power to appoint military commissions, the initiation of measures was to be reserved for Advance G. H. Q.

2. In a capacity similar to that of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs of a Division, in regard to territory occupied by Third Army troops. With the appointment of a Garrison Commander for the area, the control of Civil Affairs therein was removed from the direct jurisdiction of the army and from its Office of Civil Affairs.

3. In an advisory capacity to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, presenting to him the practical problems confronting the army and suggesting solutions.

4. As a pure and simple office of transmission between smaller tactical units and the Office in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory.

These were in no sense activities which foreshadowed its evolution into the important office which it later became. New responsibilities, however, defined themselves almost as soon as Headquarters were fairly established in Coblenz.

Actual supervision over the execution of American orders was performed, in the first instance by the commanders of towns and villages. These officers were in no sense members of any separate hierarchy of military government. They were primarily unit commanders, to whom their civil duties were incidental. For the security of their troops, and in all but civil matters, their channels of responsibilities converged in the person of the Army Commander. In practice, the Office of Civil Affairs at Advanced G. H. Q. found that it could supervise the execution of its orders only through the Army Commander. This officer, therefore, having been made responsible to the representative of the Commander-in-Chief for the execution of orders, had perforce to supervise the control of Civil Affairs by his own subordinates. It seemed therefore only natural for the Army Commander to utilize his Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs as his representative in such matters.

It is to be noted, however, that in apportioning the supervisory powers of the military government, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs did not exercise control over civilian circulation, which was turned over to the Second Section of the General Staff, as was censorship of post, telegraph and telephone. Other matters were assigned to G-1 and G-4. While the Office of Civil Affairs at Advanced G. H. Q. thus had legislative powers on all subjects, the supervisory powers of the Office of Civil Affairs in the Army were by no means analogous thereto.

The distance and lack of contact between Advanced G. H. Q. and town and village commanders also tended to place responsibilities on the shoulders of the Army Commander. Orders were seldom free from misinterpretation, and in view of the general ignorance at first displayed by the majority of officers of military government, it was not unnatural that enquiries and requests for explanations constantly reached the Army Commander. Assumption by the Army of the responsibility of interpreting the orders of Advanced G. H. Q. was the logical consequence of this situation. These interpretations appeared as Letters of Instructions, Third Army, and although prepared by the Office of Civil Affairs, were issued over the signature of the Chief of Staff. They embraced a wide variety of subjects - rate of exchange, public health, provost court procedure, traffic regulations, etc. While principally confined to the interpretation of regulations promulgated by Advanced G. H. Q. they occasionally made use of the authority vested in the General to provide for the security of his troops, to promulgate new regulations. Thus, in Letters of Instructions No. 19, April 12, 1919, the Army published a series of traffic rules, which was a matter covered by none of the orders of Advanced G. H. Q. In Letters of Instructions No. 7, it adopted a similar policy, by forbidding the sale by civilians to soldiers of habit-forming drugs. Both these matters were of such a nature that orders were necessary to protect the troops.

Had a strict interpretation of Orders No. 1 been adopted, the Army Office of Civil Affairs would have confined its actions in provost court procedure to the forwarding of records to Advanced G. H. Q. The power to approve, disapprove or mitigate sentences imposed by such courts was exercised in first instance by the officer appointing the courts - Division commanders in the case of all superior provost courts and town commanders in the case of inferior courts. It was contemplated that ultimate approval or disapproval of

the findings would be expressed at Advanced G. H. Q. Because, however, of the time which would elapse before cases were finally settled, the O. C. C. A. in Occupied Territory delegated this power of ultimate review (Orders No. 14, Advanced G. H. Q., March 5, 1919) to the Third Army. It should be mentioned in this connection that the records of military commissions were handled in a very different matter, and did not come under this ruling.

Possibly the most influential reason for the increase of the authority of the Army in military government, was the decision of Advanced G. H. Q. to leave all matters pertaining to the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province to the Army Commander. All correspondence with this high official was thenceforth carried on by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army. This proved to be a factor of vital importance. The Oberpraesident was by far the most important civil official in any part of occupied territory. His authority extended over the entire area occupied by the American army, with the exception of Kreis Montaubaur, while not long after American troops had occupied the bridghead, this district too, was placed within his jurisdiction. The German government had been quick to realize that Kreise detached by artificial boundaries from their normal superiors, could not be left entirely on their own responsibilities. The authority of the Oberpraesident among civil officials was also supreme throughout the entire British and Belgian zones and a large part of the French zone. An order transmitted to him would reach every Buergermeister and Gemeindevorsteher in the American area, and offered the surest and quickest method of disseminating information. This method of transmitting orders was therefore adopted, both in regard to the "Orders, Advanced G. H. Q." and the "Letters of Instructions." On his part, the Oberpraesident always had a large number of queries, petitions and suggestions to submit to the Army Commander. He was required to submit these direct to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, as the channel of communication for reaching the Army Commander. As a result of this procedure, the Office of Civil Affairs of the Army came to be looked upon by the civil population as the real source of American authority. The duties and responsibilities of the office, by a natural process of evolution, had become both numerous and important, and the Chief of Staff kept it under his own personal direction.

Organization of the Office of Civil Affairs developed as its duties expanded. An organization for the Office of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, had been outlined in Orders No. 1, which, when modified in accordance with the less numerous duties of the Army office, might serve as a model as these duties expanded. Experience had already taught, however, that there was no need, even at Advanced G. H. Q., for Department 4 (Schools and Charitable Institutions). With a few exceptions, all questions pertaining to the Department of Fiscal Affairs (Accountability for fines, bank inspections, etc.), were entirely handled by G. H. Q., and the few matters on this subject which came within the jurisdiction of the Army did not warrant the creation of a special department. The many problems affecting Public Utilities, which at Advanced G. H. Q. were handled in the Office of Civil Affairs were in the Army turned over to the Office of the Chief Engineer, functioning under G-4.

The internal machinery of the Office of Civil Affairs, Third Army, was therefore neither so large nor so complicated as that of its prototype at Treves. There were, under the section chief, an adjutant (at first designated as "Secretary" later as "Executive Officer"), and a number of departments.

These departments were but two in number in December 1918 but were eventually increased to four. The original departments - Legal, and Sanitation and Public Health - were created to perform duties within their spheres along the same lines as those performed in the analogous departments at Advanced G. H. Q., Lt. Col. Hugh L. Ogden was transferred from the Judge Advocate's Office of the 42d Division, to head the newly created Legal Department of the Office of Civil Affairs. Lt. Col. Walter Bensel, a medical reserve officer with long experience in the Department of Health of New York City, was placed in charge of the Department of Sanitation and Public Health. The third department created corresponded in no way with any section of Advanced G. H. Q. Correspondence between the Office of Civil Affairs and the higher civil functionaries increasing in volume week by week, it became absolutely

necessary, not only to the American army to keep in close contact with the work of the Oberpraesident and the Regierung, but to investigate and supervise the execution of American orders by those bodies. The officer placed at the head of the department charged with this, was in reality a liaison agent, but in view of the authority vested in him over civil officials, this term was not used, and he was given the title of "American Representative with the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province." The fourth department added at the end of March was termed the Historical Section.

Although the several departments are treated at length in other parts of the report, a brief outline of the duties performed by each during the period of December 1918, to June 1919, is not out of place at this point.

Legal Department. Review of the records of all cases tried by the provost courts, had, as has previously been mentioned, been made the duty of the Army by Advanced G. H. Q. These duties were not delegated to the Legal Department of the Office of Civil Affairs, its decision, in case of reversal of findings, being promulgated by the Commanding General.

Even more important were the functions of the Department in advising the Commanding General and the O. C. C. A. in regard to legal aspects of the occupation. There were always a large number of questions referred to the Office of Civil Affairs for solution, which demanded a legal study of the provisions of International law and of the Armistice agreement. Mistakes could not be made, since Germany after the ratification of peace would have legal means of seeking redress. Among the more knotty of these questions were those of abandoned enemy war material and the method of paying requisitions and claims. In view of the constant allegations on both sides during the war of violations of International law (thus showing a great advance in international public opinion), great care was exercised to see that all our acts were justified either in International law, or by the terms of the Armistice, and it is not believed that a single official act can be alleged which can be construed as in contravention of either.

Department of Sanitation and Public Health. As the health of American troops would be affected by any epidemic or disease among the civil population, the army could not divest itself of responsibility in what was primarily a civil matter. Supervision of the civil sanitary affairs was found to be essential. The problem was too large and too important to be dealt with by a single office, such as that of the Chief Surgeon, and all matters pertaining to public health were therefore referred to this Civil Affairs department. This brought the subject of prostitution under the jurisdiction of the Office of Civil Affairs, which was a matter requiring serious study before even an attempt could be made to lessen its evil effects.

A hardly less important duty of this department was the investigation of civilian food conditions. This finally brought to light such overwhelming evidence of the crisis confronting the population, that the Army undertook to supply a certain percentage of their needs. Later, when deliveries actually took place, we undertook to assure both a fair system of distribution and to prevent profiteering. Necessary supervision over both these matters was exercised by this department, acting in cooperation with the supply departments of the army.

Liaison Department. The duties of this department were so inextricably confused with the supervision of the entire German civil administration, that they will be treated in the chapter dealing with that phase of the occupation.

It must be noted that the organization here outlined continued only until June 1919. With the dissolution of the Office of Civil Affairs, Advanced G. H. Q. about June 15, a complete reorganization of the conduct of Civil Affairs within the Army took place. This reorganization will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

THE CORPS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

In an administrative capacity, and in a strictly military sense, the Corps does not play so important a role as either the Army or the Division. Its field of activity lies

largely in strategy and tactics, for in administrative matters pertaining to its divisions, it merely transmits the correspondence of higher and lower units. Orders No. 1, Advanced G. H. Q., directed the appointment by each Corps Commander of an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, but outlined no duties for him to perform. The ability of the Corps to supervise the administration of military government among the divisions was limited usually by the distance separating Corps headquarters from Division headquarters. Corps Commanders therefore contented themselves with appointing an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and permitting the army to supervise the work of their Divisions, either directly or through them. The officers appointed were in two instances Corps Judge Advocates, who were expected to conduct matters pertaining to civil affairs in addition to their other duties.

There were within the Corps a certain number of units unattached to Divisions and serving directly under the Corps Commander. These units, in all cases, were billeted in compact areas - the III Corps troops, in that part of Landkreis Coblenz lying on the right bank of the Rhine; the IV Corps troops around Cochem, and the VII Corps troops in Kreis Wittlich. It was in the administration of these areas that the activities of Corps Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs principally centered, and their authority and duties in connection therewith were similar to the authority and duties of the Division O. C. C. A. in respect to the Division area.

Aside from the administration of the Corps troops area, the O. C. C. A. of the Corps played another important role in our administration of military government, merely serving to delay matters by forcing both Army and Division to transmit communications through his office.

ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS BY THE DIVISION

Although the influence of the Corps on American military government of occupied Germany never assumed important proportions, the Division Commander, through his O. C. C. A. became the real administrator of local affairs under the Armistice. The provisions of Orders No. 1 not only charged the Division Commander with responsibility for the enforcement of military orders in his area, but endowed him with very extensive control of the judicial organization set up to enforce them.

In respect to Military Commissions, his authority was paramount, subject only to that of the Commander-in-Chief. If he deemed an offense by a civilian to be sufficiently grave, he could convene a Military Commission, approve its sentence and forward it to G. H. Q., without subjecting it to review in either Corps or Army Headquarters. This, however, was a mistake, as the trial of civil officials frequently involved questions of policy regarding which the Army Commander should have been consulted. He also was given the power to appoint Superior Provost Courts, and to approve, disapprove or mitigate the findings of such court, though the records in all Provost Court cases were forwarded to the Army Commander, who has the right to express a final opinion.

The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for the Division became a very important member of the Division Staff, occupying a position equivalent to that of the Chief of a General Staff Section. Unfortunately, however, Orders No. 1 did not prescribe that the O. C. C. A. should be an additional member of the Division Staff, and when he was not so assigned by the Division Commander, the results were far less satisfactory than when these important duties were assigned to an officer who could give his exclusive attention to them. His duties required him in first instance to supervise the work of the various Civil Affairs officers of the towns and villages, and to sit as an advisor to the General in all Civil matters. Advance G. H. Q. had never contemplated Division Commander deciding questions of policy on their own initiative, or even asserting an "interpretive" power analogous to that of the Army. It was perhaps to be expected, that a Division Commander, being charged with the security of the officers and soldiers of his Division, should at times attempt to exercise such authority. In one instance, a Division Commander, being confronted with a particularly unruly civilian element within his district, instituted an earlier closing

hour for public houses than that announced by the Army. Although, from a local view point, this action may have appeared justifiable, it could not in a broad sense but have wrought havoc on the Army's attempt to maintain that unity of policy so desirable in a military government. The order of the Division Commander was subsequently revoked at the wish of the Army Commander. In all cases thereafter, Division Commanders were expected to obtain the consent of the Army before issuing orders to the civil population.

By his almost complete control over the Provost Courts, the Division Commander wielded immense authority within the area occupied by the Division. His regime could be either strict or lenient, as his personal feelings dictated. He could have either enforced the regulations of higher authority, in a manner harsher than intended, or erred on the side of leniency and thereby weakened the prestige of the American army. That in every case, Division Commanders grasped the spirit which the Commander-in-Chief intended to infuse into the occupation, is greatly to their credit, and accounts in no small degree for the feeling which grew up among the civil population, that the American army was just, humane and disinterested.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE DIVISION

Orders No. 1, Advance G. H. Q., prescribed that, for the conduct of the administration of civil affairs within Divisions, the Commanding General should detail officers, preferably the commanding officer of the troops therein billeted, to be in charge of each occupied town. Towns not garrisoned were to be inspected and regulated by officers appointed for that special duty.

These provisions of Orders No. 1 were of such a broad nature, that they gave opportunity to the Division Commander to constitute either an elaborate or simple system of military government. Advanced G. H. Q., made no provision for any intermediate Office of Civil Affairs between the Division and the town garrison. In a number of Divisions, such an intermediate organ was, however, organized. The 89th Division, garrisoning the Treves region, which included Kreise Pruem, Bitburg, Saarburg and Treves (Land), occupied a very extensive area. It proved impracticable for the Division Office of Civil Affairs to make its influence felt directly in each town and village. The three brigades of the Division were billeted in areas roughly corresponding to German Kreise. It therefore was only natural to appoint an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in each Brigade, who, by reason of his location, could more closely observe the work of the town commanders. These Brigade Headquarters, being at Kreis capitals, the Brigade O. C. C. A. could also supervise the work of the Landraete and their officials, whose jurisdiction was approximately the same as the area under control of the Brigade. In the 3d Division area, which corresponded with the borders of Kreis Mayen, the Division Commander divided his area into districts which corresponded with the boundaries of the rural townships (Landbuergermeistereien). These district O. C. C. A.'s served on the staff of the Regimental or Brigade Commander, whose troops were garrisoned in the vicinity. The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs was in no sense independent of the tactical units, and his relations with the Division O. C. C. A. were carried on only through military channels.

In no Division was an attempt made to set up a special Civil Affairs organization, independent of military channels of responsibility. To the officers of the army as a whole, the occupation came as a relief from the activities of the western front, and as an opportunity to train the thousands of replacements which had been put into their battle-scarred units. There was little or no interest in military government in its strict sense. Very few anticipated a lengthy stay on the Rhine, and all seemed willing to allow Civil Affairs to get along as best they could, on condition billets were provided and requisitions complied with.

The Office of Civil Affairs in the towns and villages was usually made an appendage of some staff officer of the Battalion or Regiment. In case a special officer was selected

for these duties, he could seldom devote the greater part of his time to them. A knowledge of German was usually considered the only requirement for the office, and except for occasional conferences, the Division O. C. C. A., overloaded with work himself, had no opportunity to give such an officer the special training so necessary for his civil duties. By far the larger number of injustices committed by the American army can be traced to the ignorance of inexperienced O. C. C. A.'s and Provost Court officers, who suddenly found themselves in responsible and unaccustomed positions. Punishments, totally out of proportion to the crimes involved, were meted out by the courts, and could be reversed only at a later date, after an impression of undue harshness had already been created among the civil population.

Another serious handicap to efficient administration arose from the constant transfer of troops from town to town within the Division area. As the O. C. C. A. and the Provost Court were primarily troop officers, even transfer of a unit resulted in the organization of an entirely new regime. This method proved as inefficient in the long run for the military government, as it was distressing to the civil population. O. C. C. A.'s had no sooner left their community than they found themselves set down in entirely new surroundings, with all the knowledge of the local situation, gained by weeks of investigations, to be learned again. It must be admitted, that due to lack of previous preparation and appreciation of the problems facing a Military Government, the structure reared by the American Army at this state was far from homogeneous, and violated a number of fundamental principles which were later realized to be sound.

ANALYSIS OF POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION THUS ESTABLISHED

It is at best difficult to define and bring into harmony the functions of the various Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs. So intermingled did the military government become with the ordinary administration of the army, that the duties and powers of an O. C. C. A. in any unit were seldom analogous to the duties and powers of the O. C. C. A. in the unit immediately superior or inferior. Some of the discrepancies, however, ought to be carefully pointed out, if a clear understanding of the American military government in Germany is to be obtained. This is particularly necessary if America is to avoid the same mistakes in a future military government.

The legislative powers of military government withheld from the Army Commander who was charged with maintaining public order and with the security of troops. During an actual state of war, or in the expectation of a renewed state of war, the first duties of any military government must be, to protect the occupying army. Peace was not so certain in the winter of 1918-1919, that we could afford to neglect precautions against either renewed attacks or an uprising of the population in our midst. It has been contemplated that legislative power should be lodged in the Office of Civil Affairs at Advanced G. H. Q. The Commanding General was on the other hand to be responsible direct to General Pershing for the maintenance of public order within the American zone. Separation of executive and legislative functions, while a dogma of our government, is wholly unsuited to a military occupation. One outbreak of violence by the civil population, and the structure so carefully erected will collapse, legislative power passing automatically to the commander responsible for public order.

The difficulties of securing adequate liaison between the Commanding General, Third Army at Coblenz and O. C. C. A. in Occupied Territory at Treves, separated by two hundred kilometers, was also found to be a handicap. These factors are sufficient to account for the decision of G. H. Q. to permit a limited legislative power to Third Army Headquarters. This has been referred to in these pages as "interpretive power."

Advanced G. H. Q. without authority over rail and water communications. It was unquestionably necessary to make the control of communications of occupied territory an Inter-allied matter. The Rhineland was economically a unit, and the creation of independent railway systems in each Allied zone would have been disastrous to the revival of its indus-

try, as well as injurious from the viewpoint of Allied strategy. The supervision of rail-ways and waterways was exercised by Interallied Commissions, serving directly under Marshal Foch, on which, each of the occupying armies was represented. These Commissions served as a personal link between the Interallied Commander-in-Chief and occupied territory, permitting the Marshal to make his influence felt in any of the occupied zones. Advanced G. H. Q. maintained liaison with the American members of these Commissions, informing them of the views held by General Pershing, which they were expected to present to the Commissions.

While these Commissions limited the powers of military government ordinarily possessed by an invading army, their creation was yet an unavoidable necessity. Their work throughout the occupation, despite the difficulties incident to their international character, provided entirely satisfactory from the viewpoint of the American military government. In any future military government, separation of control of railways from the authorities charged with maintaining order, might well prove disastrous.

All other O. C. C. A.'s were merely advisors of unit commanders, without direct channels of communication with the O. C. C. A. in Occupied Territory. Precaution should be taken to avoid the inference, that because of similarity of titles, the various O. C. C. A.'s were all part and parcel of an administrative system apart from the Army. The O. C. C. A. in Occupied Territory alone maintained a position independent of the Army, without the means, however, of making his regulations effective. All other O. C. C. A.'s served merely as advisors in civil affairs to their respective commanders, who possessed in their own person such powers of military government as were vested in them by Advanced G. H. Q.

The Commander of a tactical unit might, as a matter of convenience, lodge as much or as little responsibility in his O. C. C. A. as he felt advisable. In the Army, the position of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs was coordinate with the General Staff Sections. In several Divisions, though not in a majority, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs was regarded as of minor importance and placed under a Staff Section, thus interposing two links in the chain of responsibility between the Commander and the officer upon whom depended the reputation which the unit would require in matters of military government.

Next to the principle of undivided and centralized control of the military commander over both military and civil matters within his jurisdiction, there is no principle of military government so clear as this: (a) that the military staff should not have its efficiency impaired by the assignment of civil duties; (b) that the civil administration must be conducted by a separate staff; (c) that this staff should be coordinate with the general staff sections on the staff of each commander, so important is this principle that, in the French and Belgian armies, this staff organization was made an additional section of the General Staff, and in the British, it was made coordinate with their existing three staff systems, viz: General Staff (G), Supply (Q), and Administration (A).

REORGANIZATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

It must not be supposed that the difficulties inherent in the organization described above, of military government, were not perceived by those in authority. As early as February 1919, it existed, and steps were taken to gradually remedy it. The organization of the military government in its eventual shape as of December 1919, was the result of long investigation, changes being adopted as the military situation cleared. These changes in organization were introduced very gradually, and took their final form only when the great Army of 1918 had evacuated the territory, leaving the normal garrison provided for in the terms of peace. The gradual evolution of the military government will be treated chronologically in the following pages.

March, 1919. The first Divisional unit of the Third Army left occupied territory for the United States in March. This was the 42d Division, which had been billeted in Kreis Ahrweiler. It was not the intention at this time to leave any district in the American zone

without a garrison, and the 4th Division was moved from the Adenau-Cochem area to Ahrweiler. It was intended to replace the 4th Division by the 6th, one of the units of the Second Army. Certain regiments of this Division (about a Brigade) actually did reach the Adenau-Cochem area and Division Headquarters were established at Bad Bertrich. However, orders for the Division to return to the United States were received before its Headquarters had had a chance to become familiar with the requirements of military government. The disadvantages involved in having the personnel for military government, attached to tactical formations, was plainly shown during these changes. Not only had the Office of Civil Affairs of the 4th Division to begin work in an entirely new field of activity, but a complete Civil Affairs organization had to be formed within the 6th Division, among officers without previous experience in military government. No actual change in the organization of Civil Affairs took place during the period, but the advisability of such a reorganization became recognized as a necessity of the near future.

April 1 to July 2, 1919. During these three months, the return of the 89th, 90th, 32d and 6th Divisions to the United States, left a large portion of the American zone ungarrisoned, including nine Kreise in the Treves region. The departure of the 32d Division from the bridgehead was less important from the standpoint of military government, as the 2d and 1st Divisions merely spread out and placed garrisons of their own troops in the evacuated territory. In the western Kreise, however, it was an entirely different problem, since the area evacuated was so large, and the Divisions remaining in the Third Army so few, that further spreading out was not feasible. The Third Army, with the approval of Advanced G. H. Q., therefore, undertook the task of maintaining American military government in these unoccupied districts. It was decided to base the reorganization on two major principles, which the experience of five months had shown to be essential. These were:

(a) Removal of the personnel for military government, from the control of the commanders of tactical formations and their subordination to the Office of Civil Affairs of the Third Army.

(b) Coordination of military government with German governmental bodies, particularly the Kreise.

The first Civil Affairs Bulletin, May 7, 1919, published the outline of the new reorganization. In Kreise Adenau, Ahrweiler, Cochem, Daun, Pruem, Wittlich, Berncastel and Saarburg, Offices of Civil Affairs were directed to be installed and to take over military governmental powers at once from the Division returning to the United States. It was contemplated that eventually all territory within the American zone would receive this new form of government. At the head of these territorial units was placed a field officer with the title of Kreis Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. He was given several assistants to assist him in conducting provost courts, sanitation, etc., among them being a medical officer. O. C. C. A.'s were charged primarily with supervising the execution of regulations promulgated by higher authority. In exceptional cases only were they authorized to issue regulations of their own to the civil population and, in such cases, a copy of the order was to be forwarded to the Army. Although in most matters, the Kreis Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs received his orders directly from the O. C. C. A. of the Army, he was also charged with carrying on the business of other sections of the Army Staff in his district. For instance, matters pertaining to censorship of the press and to circulation, which in the Army were handled by G-2, were in the Kreise, where territorial governments had been set up, performed by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. The large volume of business in every Kreis, pertaining to the recording and investigation of claims, was in some instances handled by zone majors appointed by G-1, but by far the larger number of cases was also performed by an assistant to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs.

The problem of garrisoning the Kreise was solved by the assignment to the Third Army of a number of military police companies, which had been set free in France by the departure of Divisions for the United States. Paragraph 290 of the Rule of Land Warfare states that occupation of an occupied territory must be actual and effective if the enemy citizens

are to be expected to recognize the temporary sovereignty of the invading army. It was not deemed wise in May 1919, to leave such a large proportion of the American zone bare of troops, as it was not known even at this time whether Germany would assent to the peace terms then being prepared in Paris. The arrival of the military police companies from France was therefore very opportune, and they were assigned to the vacated Kreise as follows:

		Date of termination of service in the Rhineland.
Saarburg	286th M. P. Company	August 4, 1919
Bitburg	278th M. P. Company	September 12, 1919
Pruem	277th M. P. Company	August 25, 1919
Daun	282d M. P. Company	August 25, 1919
Wittlich	VII Corps M. P. Company	July 22, 1919
Berncastel	VI Corps M. P. Company	July 22, 1919
Cochem	IV Corps M. P. Company	July 23, 1919
Adenau	281st M. P. Company	September 3, 1919

The signing of peace at Versailles on June 28, 1919, rendering the presence of these units in the Kreise no longer necessary, the Army permitted them to return to the United States. During the period, however, in which they served under the direction of the O. C. C. A., they performed the duties assigned them in a very efficient manner. The caliber of their personnel and their previous experience in police work, made them particularly valuable for the duties which they were called upon to perform. Garrisoned in the capitals of the Kreise, they patrolled the surrounding countryside daily in motor cars, thereby bringing home to the civilians the fact that despite the departure of the Divisions, American military orders could not be violated with impunity. Instructions as to the duties of these M. P. Companies were given by the local Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. Their internal administration was entirely handled by their own officers.

A separate Kreis administration had been set up on May 7 in Kreis Ahrweiler, in the expectation that the 4th Division would follow the 89th and 90th to the United States. When its departure, due to the uncertainty of the advent of peace, was put off from week to week, the Kreis Office of Civil Affairs was again placed under the authority of the Division Commander.

On June 1, 1919, the Office of Civil Affairs, Advanced G. H. Q., was abolished, and all powers incident to military government until then resident in the Office, were transferred to the Commanding General, Third Army. The change of authority, however, brought only minor changes of organization in its train. The Stadt and Landkreis Treves, formerly administered by the garrison commander of Treves, who functioned directly under Advanced G. H. Q., was transferred to the Third Army's jurisdiction. The Treves Office of Civil Affairs was then organized along lines similar to the Offices in other Kreise.

The Civil Affairs Bulletins which had begun to appear on May 7, and which had replaced the Letters of Instructions, now took over, in addition, the functions of "Orders, Advanced G. H. Q.," serving as the mouthpiece of the Commanding General in all matters pertaining to military government.

The only departments of Advanced G. H. Q. which did not already exist in the Army, and which it was believed necessary to retain, were the Finance and Economic Sections. The first of these sections had been accountable for all fines turned in by the Provost Courts, the latter department granted export and import licenses for merchandise to and from the American area. These departments, now that Advanced G. H. Q. had been abolished, were transferred to the Office of Civil Affairs, Third Army, where they continued to perform their former functions.

No attempt was made at this time to institute territorial officers in any part of the area still occupied by combat Divisions. Their departure from Germany was expected in the near future, and it was not believed wise to complicate their last days by setting up new

authority in their areas, independent of the Division Commander. On July 2, 1919, the Third Army ended its existence, the troops remaining in Germany taking the names of "American Forces in Germany."

CHAPTER NO. 5

MILITARY TRIBUNALS

THE BASIS OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

On December 10, General Pershing issued at General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces, General Orders No. 225, setting forth and defining the organization, the means and the manner by which the mandates of his proclamation issued on the previous day, and all subsequent orders properly issued to the inhabitants, should be executed. Under this order, there was appointed an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for the entire occupied area, with Headquarters at Advance General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, Treves, Germany. This officer became the personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief with respect to all matters affecting the government of the civil population. He was authorized to issue, and did in fact issue, special orders and instructions for the control and management of the civil population and, when experience had shown its necessity modified to some extent the mandates of the original proclamation and of the organizational order of December 10.

The latter order provided that the Division Commander should be responsible for the administration of Civil Affairs in his district. By this provision, the principle of decentralization was announced. As originally occupied, the American zone in Germany was divided into nine areas. Seven of these were occupied by Divisions, one was occupied by Third Army troops and the other by III Corps troops. In addition, the IV Corps controlled the city of Cochem, and the VII Corps, the city of Wittlich. The Commanding General of the Army and the Commanding General of each Corps were granted the powers and jurisdiction as to civil affairs in their respective areas that were specifically granted to Division Commanders as aforesaid.

JURISDICTION OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS

1. Provost Courts. Under the organizational provisions of G. O. 225, Superior and Inferior Provost Courts were established in each area. The jurisdiction of the Superior Provost Courts, under the terms of the order, was limited to the imposition of imprisonment for six months or a fine of 5,000 marks, or both such fine and imprisonment. The jurisdiction of the Inferior Provost Courts was limited by the said order to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for three months or a fine of 1,000 marks, or both such fine and imprisonment. The Superior Provost Courts were appointed by the Commanding Generals of the various Divisions, and in the case of the areas occupied by Army and Corps troops, by the Commanding General of the Army and the Commanding General of the Corps, respectively. The Superior Provost Court sat only at the Headquarters of the Commanding General. The respective Commanding Officers of each garrisoned city, town or other occupied place, appointed Inferior Provost Courts for the trial of offenses within their respective jurisdictions. The action of the Superior Provost Courts went to the Commanding General for approval or disapproval. The action of the Inferior Provost Courts went to the appointing

officer for approval or disapproval. By the terms of the order, the various courts were to make weekly reports and to forward them through channels to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs at Advance G. H. Q.

It is apparent from the foregoing that the Commanding Officer in each area was the final authority in all matters connected with Provost Court prosecutions, except, of course, that the Commander-in-Chief, either directly or through his personal representative at Treves, might approve or disapprove the judgments rendered. Strictly speaking, under the organization originally set up, the Commanding General of the Army was without jurisdiction to act in review upon cases tried within a Division of Corps area. By a subsequent order (March 5, 1919), issued at Advance G. H. Q., the Commanding General of the Army was given the power to revoke, mitigate or commute any sentence adjudged by a Provost Court which, in his opinion, was irregular or excessive. In the practical working of the system, the power thus lodged in the Commanding General of the Army has been, with slight exception, the only revisory power exercised (after that of the authorities appointing the courts), with respect to judgments of the provost courts; for the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs at Advance G. H. Q. limited his supervision over Provost Courts, after the first few weeks of the occupation, to verifying the fines imposed and collected, and making certain that these fines were turned over to the Officer in Charge of Fiscal Affairs.

Under the decentralized plan of G. O. 225, orders for the guidance of the civil population were issued by the Commanding Officers in each of the various areas. The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs at Advance G. H. Q. also supplemented the original proclamation by various orders issued in the name of the Commander-in-Chief. These latter, of course, constituted the fundamental law for the occupied territory, and no Commanding General of an area might issue orders contrary to these or to the proclamation. With respect to all matters, however, which were not covered either by orders at Advance G. H. Q. or by the original proclamation, the Commanding Generals of the various areas were free, under G. O. 225 (making them responsible for the administration of civil affairs), to issue such orders as to them seemed advisable or necessary to meet existing local conditions. Thus the law for the guidance of the civil population was to be found in the original proclamation, in subsequent orders issued at Advance G. H. Q. and in the Special Orders issued in the eleven separate areas of occupied territory, with the result of more or less confusion to the final reviewing authority and large confusion to the civil inhabitants, who were never in a position to know what was and what was not prohibited.

2. Military Commissions. G. O. 225 provided that Army, Corps and Division Commanders should convene Military Commissions for the trial of inhabitants for offenses against the laws of war or the military government. This provision was interpreted to mean that for an offense committed within a particular area, the Commanding General of that area should appoint the Military Commission. No limitation was placed upon the Military Commission as to the penalty which might be imposed. It could properly act in accordance with the laws of war, and was thus empowered to impose any penalty that to it should seem proper. The order did provide, however, that no death-sentence should be carried into execution until approved by the Commander-in-Chief. It was readily apparent from the whole order that for any offense for which the maximum penalty imposable by a Superior Provost Court was deemed insufficient, the procedure to be adopted was to appoint a Military Commission for the trial of such offense.

REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF PROVOST COURTS

It is observable that under the judicial scheme promulgated for the occupied area, there was no central authority provided, except that naturally inherent in the Commander-in-Chief, and therefore in the personal representative at Treves, but which, as has been observed, was exercised only to a limited extent. No order was ever issued to remedy this situation beyond such as was contained in the order of March 5, 1919, above referred to.

In order that there might be harmony in procedure and an approach at uniformity in the imposition of sentences, it was necessary that some central authority be created. This was assumed by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, acting for and on behalf of the Commanding General. Technically, under the organization promulgated, the jurisdiction of this officer was confined to the Third Army area. In spite, however, of the specific provision that Division Commanders should be responsible for the administration of Civil Affairs in their respective districts, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, acting for the Commanding General under authority of the order of March 5, 1919, assumed jurisdiction over the court procedure for the entire occupied area. All Provost Court reports made to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs at Treves were sent through the office of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, and were there inspected and reviewed, as far as this could be done upon the face of the record. Where technical errors appeared, the record was sent back for correction or explanation. When it appeared certain that conviction was erroneous, such conviction was set aside by the Commanding General of the Army.

The procedure of the Provost Courts, was of course, summary, and by the provisions of the order, it was intended that it should be summary. The limitation placed upon punishment was undoubtedly in view of the fact that proceedings would necessarily be summary. Because of this summary nature of the proceedings, some errors were bound to be made, some convictions were certain to be unjust. To meet this situation, a very liberal policy was devised for investigating all complaints in which it was claimed that there had been a failure of justice. Whenever such a complaint was filed, it received careful consideration. If it first reached the office of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, it was sent for investigation to the court where the case was tried, through the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in that jurisdiction, with instructions that the matter be thoroughly investigated and such action taken as the result of that investigation should seem to warrant, and that a full and complete report of the investigation be made to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army. Ordinarily, the action taken as a result of the new investigation was approved by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, however, to act contrary to the judgment of the investigating authority, and in many instances, sentences were set aside or modified, contrary to the recommendations of the local authorities.

REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Under the provisions of G. O. 48, W. D., 1918, the records of trial before Military Commissions were sent to the Acting Judge Advocate General for the American Expeditionary Forces and these reviewed by him in the same manner as General Court Martial cases. Regardless of this fact, however, the Commanding General of the Army claimed the right of control over the judgments of Military Commissions, and through his Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, investigated all charges of miscarriage of justice. In only two cases, however, did he issue orders in mitigation of the sentence imposed.

PROCEDURE IN PROVOST COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Procedure in Provost Courts, both Superior and Inferior, was required to be uniform. Written charges were filed. They were not required to be formal, but to state only the substance of the offense, the name of the offender, and the place where and time when the offense was said to have occurred. It was required that every person tried by a Provost Court should be informed of the charges upon which he was to be tried, that he should be present in person at the trial, and that he should be confronted with the witnesses against him. It was further required that he should be permitted to be heard either in person or by counsel. Bail was denied the accused, but a speedy hearing was guaranteed him. All

evidence was required to be under oath. Sentences were put into immediate execution without awaiting action of the reviewing authority.

No particular form of procedure was required, by order, for trial before Military Commissions. In practice, however, a definite and specific form of procedure was followed - namely, that of a General Court Martial, in as far as the requirements of such procedure was applicable to trials by Military Commissions.

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METHOD BY WHICH UNIFORMITY OF COURT ACTION WAS ESTABLISHED

It has been observed that the Commanding General of each area appointed a Superior Provost Court and thereby became the functionary to approve or disapprove its judgments, and that the Commanding Officer in each town or village occupied by troops likewise appointed an Inferior Provost Court and thereby became the proper officer for approval or disapproval of its judgments. During the full occupation of the territory, this system produced upwards of 200 Provost Courts. The tenure of detail of the Provost Court was uncertain. Sometimes an officer held such a detail for a week only. Sometimes for several months. No means seemed to exist for bringing about uniformity of action by the various courts. The judgments of the courts showed clearly that there was a wide divergence of viewpoint. In one jurisdiction, for a particular offense, a 100-mark fine would be imposed, while in another jurisdiction for the same offense, an imprisonment of three months would be imposed. The Inferior Provost Courts were entirely independent of the Superior Provost Courts. It was clear that all which these courts needed was, to come in personal contact and to discuss the problems rising before them, so that an approach to the same viewpoint could be attained and reasonable harmony of action would prevail. The constant changing of personnel of the courts, however, coupled with the fact that the majority of this personnel was performing other duties as well, rendered it well-nigh impossible to solve the difficulty involved.

After the troops had evacuated the Treves district, the only military occupation of this area consisted of a company of Military Police at each Kreis center. Civil Affairs was then entirely divorced from the tactical organization and a territorial organization was set up. An Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, who was made directly responsible to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, was appointed for each Kreis. The Military Police reported to this officer. A Superior Provost Court was also appointed in the Kreis by each Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. In this manner there were ultimately set up nine Superior Provost Courts whose tenure of office was reasonably permanent. The Superior Provost Courts in the remaining tactical divisions were also reasonably permanent, as they had been in the past. With this situation existing, orders were issued for weekly meetings of the Provost Courts of Regiernungsbezirk Treves, in the city of Wittlich, and of the Provost Courts in the rest of the area, also weekly, in the city of Coblenz. With these courts met also the legal officer of the Office of Civil Affairs of the Third Army, who thus formed a connecting link between the courts of the two areas. This officer sought to exercise no control over the courts. He made it entirely clear that the courts were in fact courts and that their decisions should in no way be interfered with, except as the reviewing authority should approve or disapprove their judgments. Full and free discussions were had of cases coming before the various courts and of conditions in the various communities which were likely to find their way into the courts. Difference of opinion were thrashed out. The total result was, the bringing about of a great unanimity of opinion as to the best way of handling the various situations coming before the courts and a reasonable harmonious view with respect to the punishment which ought to be imposed. In this was proof that, with courts reasonably permanent, a very harmonious system of judicial procedure could be arrived at, even while operating under orders stated in very general terms.

VAGRANCY AND JUVENILE COURTS

As American troops in increasing numbers returned to America in the Spring of 1919, prostitutes, who had been plying their trade in France, began to enter the American zone in large numbers. The Office of Civil Affairs had recommended on several occasions that prostitution be declared a crime punishable by military tribunals. When the venereal rate rose to an enormous figure, * * * as a result of the combined influence of the increased number of prostitutes and the lessened moral sense caused by replacing the men of the Third Army with volunteer recruits, the Army Commander decided to establish a Vagrancy Court. (The Order referred to is quoted in full in the Chapter on "Sanitation and Public Health.") The term "vagrancy" was broadly defined so as to enable us to try Bolshevist agitators and other similar persons found in the area without visible means of support, as well as prostitutes. The chart above referred to shows the effect of this court in removing risks of infection from diseased women, and shows conclusively that a military government, vested as it is with absolute power, can limit the dangers arising from prostitution if it is determined to do so.

The first object in trying these unfortunate women was to remove them as possible points of contact for venereal infection. But the broader grounds of humanity were also considered, and after conviction, they were physically examined and if found diseased, confined in a venereal hospital which the city of Coblenz was required to establish for this purpose. German philanthropic women were encouraged to work among them and many were paroled in their custody. Those from outside the area were always deported, ordinarily after serving at least a portion of their sentences. Those residing within the area constituted much the larger class and were more difficult to deal with, as it would have been a great hardship on them to banish them from their homes. This type was usually paroled after a short period, in order to hold some sort of authority over them to insure that they would not have to be again arrested. From its establishment down to January 10, 1920, 401 women and male vagrants had been convicted by the courts thus established.

Juveniles, the early days of the occupation, were a source of constant annoyance, as that committed many petty thefts of clothing or food, often, no doubt, at the instigation of their parents who were suffering from a lack of these necessities. With the establishment of a Juvenile Court, an effort was made to conform its practice to the best modern thought along this line, and where confinement was imposed, it was served in German reformatories.

Considered in the light of experience, the establishment of these courts marks a distinct advance in our system of administering justice with war tribunals. Where suitable officers are selected for these courts, they may be of great value to an occupying army.

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SUPERIORITY OF TERRITORIAL OVER TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF COURTS

A comparison of the operation of courts operating under tactical organization, and of those operating under territorial organization, shows conclusively the superiority of the latter system over the former. Probably it would, however, always be practicable to separate the Superior Provost Courts from tactical organizations and give them a territorial jurisdiction. It should be provided that the officer designated as Superior Provost Court should be attached to the Staff of the Commanding Officer whose jurisdiction included the particular territory involved, thus leaving to the Commanding Officer of that territory, the power to approve or disapprove the judgments of these courts. With this situation, cooperation and unity of action by the Superior Provost Courts could be arrived at in the manner outlined above. The same results could be obtained from Inferior Provost Courts by giving to the Superior Provost Courts a certain supervisory power over the Inferior Provost Courts, such as would allow them to bring the Inferior Provost Courts into

meetings similar to those suggested for the Superior. In this way the entire court system, both Superior and Inferior, would be bound into a composite whole. To bring about this situation, the order defining the jurisdiction of Superior Provost Courts should, among other things, give to those courts the power to verify the records of Inferior Provost Courts and return them for the correction of any apparent irregularities; to advise the authority appointing them to set aside the judgments of Inferior Provost Courts and return the cases for new trial or for the dismissal of the accused, or to mitigate the sentence imposed by the Inferior Provost Court.

IN WHAT AUTHORITY FINAL CONTROL OVER JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE REPOSED

The fact has heretofore been adverted to, that the ultimate power in Civil Affairs in occupied territory was reposed in the personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief at Advance G. H. Q. at Treves. Experience developed the fact that this form of organization was not well suited to the existing situation, as far as military courts were concerned. By it, final authority was placed too far away from the seat of activities at the Headquarters of the Third Army at Coblenz, at the opposite end of the occupied area. There is where the business of the Army was transacted. There is where reports were received of the activities in all portions of the occupied zone. There is where the Commanding General and members of his staff received reports and discussed situations existing throughout the entire area. There is where policies outside of civil affairs were formulated and promulgated. And there is where final control over the judgments of military courts ought to have resided; for such control should be where the fullest knowledge is had of the affairs of the entire area. Whether, theoretically, it is good or bad organization that the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for the occupied area should function under the Commander-in-Chief of the forces, or as a member of the staff of the Commanding General of the Army, practice has demonstrated that in as far as his functions have to do with the military courts, these could not be properly performed at a distance far removed from the central activities of the Army of Occupation. So fully was this demonstrated that, as heretofore pointed out, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory issued, on March 5, 1919, an order which gave to the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation the authority to revoke, mitigate or commute sentences adjudged by Provost Courts. This recognition of the practical requirements of the situation may well be accepted as a final determination of where the final power of review of the judgments of military courts should be, namely, in the Commanding General of the occupying forces.

ACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE PUNISHABLE OFFENSES SHOULD BE CLEARLY SPECIFIED

The proclamation to the inhabitants of Germany issued by General Pershing on December 9, 1918, attempted within a short space to regulate the entire relations between the inhabitants and the army. This was largely added to from time to time by the issuance of additional orders at Advance G. H. Q., at Headquarters of the Third Army and by Commanding Generals of each of the Divisions and Corps, within the limitations pointed out above. These additions may largely be regarded as having been made necessary by special situations which could hardly have been foreseen, and most of which would probably not arise in military occupation of other or different areas. It is probably true that by process of construction, the original proclamation could be made to reach most offenses against which the army needs to protect itself. Could the courts be made permanent, and could it be depended upon that men of keen sense and sound judgment would always be detailed as Provost Courts, it would be entirely safe, from the standpoint of the army, to rely upon definitions of offenses couched in general language rather than in a long series of specifications. The fact remains, however, that in practice, courts cannot always be composed of men of the characteristics mentioned; and furthermore, as it is desirable that offenses

should not be committed, wisdom, on the one hand, and fairness to the civil population on the other, require that acts that are to constitute punishable offenses should be specified so clearly that the civilian inhabitants would certainly know what conduct is expected from them. Special Rule (g) of the proclamation of December 9 provides that whosoever "commits any act whatsoever injurious to the American army or the obstruction of the military government, will be punished as a military court may direct." To the civilian population, this language meant little in particular. To the various courts it has meant everything in general. Under it, men have been convicted for filing a claim against the army based on the destruction of property, because they asserted that the property destroyed was worth 300 marks, whereas the court found it to be worth only 200 marks. Under it, civilians have been convicted for disrespect towards American officers, noncommissioned officers and privates. In some instances, a conviction was undoubtedly warranted, but in other instances, there is no question that this broad language was so interpreted as to result in injustice. Examples of convictions under this section for offenses which were petty (if offenses at all), could be given in considerable number. But probably enough has been said to clearly demonstrate that it is unsafe to put an order couched in such general terms as the one in question into the hands of a great number of Provost Courts, whose members are unlearned in the law, and whose experience in such matters is most limited. Ultimately, justice can be, and in this zone has been, done through the power of the Commanding General of the Army to set aside judgments erroneously made; but in the meantime, an injustice has been done and the admission of that injustice which comes with the reversal of judgments does not fail to have the effect of lessening respect for our courts upon the part of the civilian population.

In this connection, the view is oftentimes expressed and seriously argued, that we are dealing with a defeated enemy and that we need not over-trouble ourselves as to the treatment accorded. A mature reflection, however, must convince even the most radical that the question involved is really not what is due the inhabitants of the defeated country, but what is owed to the victorious country by the army which represents it. An occupying army in a defeated country is making history which is bound to be written. As that army conducts itself, so is the world largely to regard the country which it represents. If its army is dishonorable in its relations with a fallen foe and treats the population with injustice and subjects the people to a rule more harsh than is necessary for the preservation of order and the establishment of proper decorum and respect, that army and the country it represents are bound to stand in disrepute before the civilized world. The proper viewpoint of the soldier within an occupied area is beautifully and forcibly expressed in General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General's Office, 1863. Every officer and soldier entering an enemy's country as part of an occupying force should have its words indelibly impressed upon his memory:

Military government simply is military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not military government; it is an abuse of the power which the law of war confers. As military government is carried on by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice and humanity--virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.

* * * * *

ORDERS DEFINING OFFENSES SHOULD EMANATE FROM ONE AUTHORITY ONLY

Closely allied to the question just discussed, is that of determining the source from which orders for the control of the civilian population should emanate. It has heretofore been pointed out that the civil government of this area was, by G. O. 225, very largely decentralized, and that orders for the government of the civil population of American oc-

cupied territory emanated from ten different sources. Experience has shown that such a system constitutes a large impediment to the following-out of a general policy by central authority. Probably without legal right, yet with recognized authority, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation has in fact scrutinized orders issued by the Commanding Officers of the various Divisions and Corps and has not hesitated to order their revocation when he has considered them to be in derogation of orders issued by the central authorities, or in contravention of his policies with respect to the government of the area.

The government of the people of an occupied territory must be a strong government. The respect of the people for the authority of the army must be acquired. If that authority wavers, such respect will not be acquired. The issuing of an order today and the revocation thereof tomorrow, can produce but one result, namely, a lack of respect for the issuing authority. That the government of the civil population may be strong, that it may be unwavering, that it may produce respect for its own authority, it is absolutely essential that it shall emanate from one source, and from one source only. Whether that source shall be the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation, or other higher authority not otherwise participating in the occupation, is a subject about which there may well be difference of opinion. But experience has shown that there is no basis for differences of opinion as to whether that authority should be centralized or decentralized. The greatest efficiency will be acquired through centralization of policy and decentralization of execution.

CHAPTER NO. 6

THE "ANORDNUNGEN" (ORDINANCES) OF DECEMBER 9, 1918,

AND THEIR INTERPRETATIONS AND LATER MODIFICATIONS

ANORDNUNGEN

The following rules and regulations are published for the guidance of the inhabitants of the district of Germany occupied by the American forces and will be strictly observed:

.....

Every person must familiarize himself with these regulations and all others hereafter made by the American military authorities. Ignorance of these regulations will not be accepted as an excuse for their violation. In case of doubt as to the requirements of the regulations, inquire at the Rathaus.

By Command of GENERAL PERSHING:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

9 December, 1918.

In past occupations, the orders of the invading forces have usually been published to the civil population as proclamations, posted conspicuously in all the towns and villages

of the territory falling under the temporary dominion of the conqueror. This was the case in Mexico in 1848, in the South during and just after the Civil War, and in later American occupations of Cuba and the Philippine Islands.

Marshal Foch in the late autumn of 1918, when the invasion of enemy territory appeared a distinct possibility, began the preparation of a proclamation which should serve as a model to the commanders of the Allied armies in case occupation of Western Germany actually should occur. This proclamation was distributed among the armies shortly after the Armistice, when it became known that the entire German civil administration would be placed at the disposal of the Allied armies.

The "model proclamation," while outlining a general conception of the occupation as desired by the Allied General Staff, left ample opportunity for each nation to carry out details in accordance with its national characteristics and feelings. Such a policy proved wise in the long run, for in many matters, such as the payment of claims and the recognition of the Rhenish Republic, the attitude of England and America on the one hand, and France on the other, were so contrasting that any single authority would have met with insuperable difficulties in enforcing a uniform compliance throughout. The "model proclamation," however, was never meant to be more than a guide, and in such a light was it considered by American G. H. Q.

As has been mentioned in a preceding chapter, while the proclamation was intended to be issued simultaneously with the entrance of our troops into Germany, its preparation was so delayed that it was not until Army Headquarters were installed at Coblenz, that it was made known to the Civil population through the press or by posters. In the meantime, the army had governed the population without publication of any definite code of law, relying solely on the authority granted by the laws of war.

However much the proclamation of December 9, 1918, may be criticised on the score of impracticability, it is scarcely feasible, in the seclusion of a headquarters on friendly soil, to compose a code of laws for the government of a hostile people. Knowledge of the customs of the country is vital to such a task, even acknowledging the right of the conqueror to make what ordinances he will. Two-thirds of the trouble which the army experienced and half of the prosecutions before its provost courts were in regard to offenses which constituted a departure, for the Germans, from the customs of centuries. Little or no difficulty was encountered with the civil population in enforcing purely military regulations. The reason for this is to be found in the readiness of the average German to understand the necessity of war-measures, and his innate discipline in accepting them. The American regulations, under their German title, the "Anordnungen," which will be discussed in detail in the course of this chapter, cover a wide variety of subjects and circumscribed the daily life of the civilian with so many restrictions and inconveniences that it is not surprising that violations continually occurred. Considering that the German peasant is hardly as intelligent as the average American, it is also not to be wondered at that he could not grasp the continued state of war, which obtained despite his homecoming. It seemed impossible for him to comprehend why, when to all appearances peace had come, he was not permitted to travel to a neighboring town without an array of passports, or why the American military authorities were interested in preventing his enjoyment of a glass of wine with his supper at eight o'clock in the evening. However necessary these restrictive regulations may have seemed to the security and welfare of the American army, they struck deeply at the customs of the people and stored up trouble immeasurable for the troop commanders, provost marshals and army courts. Desirable as law may have been from an idealistic viewpoint, it was bound to be modified, if prepared without a thorough knowledge of the psychology of the population which the army was expected to govern. We have only to point to the failure of the German laws in Belgium to attain even a measure of success as an example of the truth of this statement. Their very harshness, their failure to appreciate the patriotism and the habits of life of the Belgians, reacted in the end against them and brought together a far from homogeneous race into a united and defiant nation.

Were we to consider the Anordnungen as a hard and fast finality, the results of more than a year of occupation would have to proclaim them a failure. Their provisional character was, however, always realized. The Anordnungen, the basis of all orders of the American military government, soon ceased to be recognizable, so many were the modifications which proved to be necessary, but, in a large sense, they still obtained as the law of the American portions of occupied Germany.

The various regulations of this proclamation will be taken up one by one in the following pages, and their modifications, as made necessary in the light of practical experience, pointed out separately. It is hoped in this way to emphasize the importance in the future of having a thorough knowledge before hand of the customs of countries to be occupied.

IDENTIFICATION AND CIRCULATION

Identification. Every person above the age of twelve must carry at all times identity card bearing his signature and address. Such card will be issued and stamped by the appropriate civil authority.

A change of address must be immediately notified to the appropriate civil official and indorsed by him on the identity card.

The head of each household must keep posted on the inside of the outer door of the building a list showing the name, nationality, sex, age and occupation of each person of his household residing in the building.

Circulation. Circulation will be controlled by the American authorities. Burgomasters, under the direction of the American authorities, will regulate travel within the American zone, and will be held responsible for a strict compliance with all regulations: Authority to leave the zone will be granted only by a division or higher commander.

These regulations were promulgated to assure the safety of the army. In the months following the Armistice, one could never feel quite certain that hostilities might not recommence. Spies were therefore to be reckoned with, and incidentally, the many radical agitators who travelled from one city of Germany to another. A strict control of circulation was therefore believed to be necessary.

Contrary to expectations, however, disorders did not arise, and the people of occupied territories eagerly turned from four years of war to the all-absorbing task of revivifying their decayed industrial life. The American army was therefore confronted with a situation to which the Anordnungen were never meant to apply. However necessary restrictions of circulation may be in war, they hardly contribute to restore communities to their ordinary existence. Each week of the occupation, requests of business men to travel from zone to zone and from occupied to unoccupied territories became more and more numerous. They finally became so numerous that the American circulation personnel was not nearly sufficient to investigate the thousands of individual requests for passes. The stamping of passes became a perfunctory performance, irritating to the Germans, who were compelled to wait in line for hours in all sorts of weather, and without corresponding benefit to the United States. While fully alive to such conditions, the American army felt bound to proceed in this matter in accordance with the desires of its Allies. A different set of rules for circulation in each of the Allied zones would have been even more disastrous to the economic unification of the Anordnungen. Alteration of the circulation regulations was therefore primarily a subject for conference and mutual agreement among the Allies. Such conferences were held monthly at General Payot's headquarters at Wiesbaden, and formed a part of the regular proceedings of the Direction Generale de Cheminade Fer du Ravitaillement en Allemagne (Direction of Railways for Food Supply in Germany). The severer restrictions were gradually removed, first by modifying the requirements for travel by a civilian between zones, and later to a very considerable extent between occupied and unoccupied

Germany. The adoption of a tri-lingual circulation pass, valid in all the occupied zones, greatly simplified matters.

The demands on the American circulation personnel, however, were diminished only slightly by these modifications. By August 1919, and with the return of the majority of army to the United States, it became necessary to employ Germans under American supervision. It is to be clearly emphasized, however, that the employment of German civilians in the American pass-office did not place the control of civil circulation in German hands. The army circulation rules remained in effect as long as American military government continued in undisputed control.

With the publication of the ordinances of the High Commission as military orders of the Commanding General, American Forces in Germany, on January 10, 1920, the provisions of the Commission in regard to circulation naturally supplanted previous military regulations. Germans were thereafter permitted to circulate freely in occupied territory, subject only to their possession of an identity card and compliance with the rules of their own government.

Up to January 10, 1920, 2,317 German civilians were convicted of violations of the American circulation regulations.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION

The carrying of arms or deadly weapons is forbidden except by the local police.

Every person in possession of arms and ammunition of any kind must deliver them to the American authorities at such time or place as may be appointed. A receipt for each weapon will be given at the time of delivery and the weapon tagged with the name of the owner.

Precedents for forbidding the civil population to carry arms and ammunition during a military occupation are so numerous that the publication of such regulations by the American army in this instance cannot be considered a severe restriction. During the march to the Rhine, the Commanding General of the Third Army had recognized the necessity of a regulation of this nature, and in Memorandum No. 4, had instructed unit commanders to forbid civilians to carry deadly weapons. This regulation was acknowledged to be a temporary expedient, but its immediate application was considered none the less desirable. General Pershing's proclamation, when received, definitely excluded the civil police from the necessity of turning in their arms, which was a measure that practical experience during the advance had already shown to be advisable. The army, in fact, had gone further and had temporarily permitted duly-appointed government foresters to carry light hunting weapons. This permission was revoked by General Pershing in the Anordnungen, the police alone being authorized to carry arms.

While the proclamation was definite enough in designating the class of people excepted from its operation, the manner of depositing arms was not sufficiently clear and further explanatory instructions seemed advisable to the army. The primary purpose of the order was to make sure that arms and ammunition were under proper guard and not at the disposal of a revolutionary or enemy group. At the same time, although it was realized that the owners of arms should receive proper receipts for their property, the army did not wish to accept responsibility for their return. Memorandum No. 5, Third Army, January 5, 1919, therefore ordered that arms and ammunition should be turned in to the German Burgomasters of towns specifically designated in every Kreis. These officials would be required to issue receipts to the owners and would thereafter be held responsible for their safe keeping. Guards over the arms, however, were to be furnished by the American army. This procedure relieved local officials of a large amount of "paper-work," and incidentally placed the responsibility upon the Germans for the numerous losses which took place. When, in June 1919, claims against the United States for losses of firearms began to reach Headquarters Third Army, in large numbers, the Office of Civil Affairs specifically informed the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province that we had never accepted responsibility for the safekeeping of arms, and that the owners must seek reimbursement from their own government.

Modifications of this paragraph of the Anordnungen during 1919 were fairly numerous, due to the army policy of placing more and more responsibility on local officials. Another reason for the many modifications was our recognition of the inadvisability of restricting hunting indefinitely, which sport was, in fact, rendered impossible by the Anordnungen. The army, as has been pointed out, had in December temporarily authorized foresters to carry hunting arms. Foresters are in fact "rural police," whose duties require them to protect the forests and fields and particularly to prevent poaching. This privilege was restored to them in May, under the provisions of General Orders No. 42, Third Army, which specified our classes of officials who were to be entitled to carry arms:

- (a) National gendarmes
- (b) Municipal police
- (c) National forestry officials
- (d) Municipal forestry officials

In July 1919, following the signing of peace at Versailles, permission was granted to other groups of government officials to carry arms while on duty. These were the personnel of the railway and customs services. The reduction of the American Forces from seven to two divisions had rendered it impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to spare the former number of men for guard purposes. The German government showed no evidence at this time of renewing hostilities, and danger was to be feared only from Spartacists or fanatics. Against men of these classes, the German railway guards appeared to offer sufficient protection. The American army had also by this time come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to permit Germany to reestablish customs-posts on her western frontier. Without a customs service, fully operating, there appeared to be small chance to restore the economic life of Germany, which was absolutely necessary if she was to pay even a part of her indemnities to France and Belgium.

Customs guards in American occupied territory were therefore on July 28, 1919, accorded the right to carry arms while on duty. It is interesting to note that when the western Kreise bordering Luxemburg and Lorraine were ceded to the French in August 1919, this privilege was revoked, and the German Customs frontier thereafter remained inoperative until reestablished by order of the Interallied Rhineland Commission on November 15, 1919.

In regard to hunting, the Office of Civil Affairs fully appreciated the burden of the restrictions placed on that sport. Hunting privileges are in Germany a source of income to the individual or community owning the land in question. Hunting rights are auctioned by the village or by the property owner once a year to the highest bidder. Our regulations on arms and ammunition therefore deprived many towns of a considerable proportion of their annual income. As early as March 1919, letters reached the Office of Civil Affairs from many different sources, begging that hunting weapons be returned and that orders forbidding the sport be revoked. In not a few localities, these orders really seem to have resulted in real hardship on the farmers, as wild boars had multiplied and were ruining fields and crops. The Commanding General had for a short time in January permitted civilians to draw their arms from repositories on receipt, but the results had been unsatisfactory and had led to general abuse of the privilege.

In August, however, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs instituted a thorough investigation of German hunting laws and customs, with a view to restoring hunting privileges to duly-authorized persons under their own laws. This investigation disclosed the suspected fact that unnecessary financial hardships had been placed on many communities by the American regulations. Paragraph 14 of Civil Affairs Bulletin No. 14, August 16, 1919, accordingly authorized the return of sporting arms and ammunition to their owners and authorized hunting in accordance with German laws.

Violations of our regulations pertaining to arms and ammunition were fairly frequent during the whole occupation, and were severely punished when brought to the attention of provost courts. Up to January 10, 1920, there had been 302 convictions for such violations, in a large number of which cases, imprisonment was awarded.

Our policies, both in regard to arms and ammunition and hunting, were very similar to those pursued by all Allied armies. Both England and France authorized hunting at the the same time and in the same manner as did the American army. They, however, at all times permitted officers and soldiers to hunt, which privilege for a long time was denied to Americans. When it was finally authorized, in the Autumn of 1919, a provision of the order required officers and men to comply with the German civil regulations.

During the latter part of 1919, the only material change in our policy as to arms and ammunition was to permit members of the civilian police reserves, which had been organized under American supervision, to carry pistols.

The Ordinances of the High Commission, issued on January 10, 1920, as orders of the Commanding General, A. F. G., made very few changes necessary in established principles. Though a few more restrictions were placed on hunting, they were unimportant.

ALCOHOLIC DRINKS

The sale or gift of all alcoholic drink, except light wines and beer, is forbidden. Alcohol for medicinal or industrial purposes is not within this prohibition. The sale or gift of light wines or beer is prohibited except from 11 a. m. to 2 p. m., and 5 p. m. to 7 p. m. A violation of these orders respecting drink will render the offender liable, in addition to other punishment, to confiscation of his stock and the closing of his business.

The Moselle Valley, long celebrated as the center of Germany's wine industry, lay in the heart of American occupied territory. The civilian population had been accustomed to regard wine much as Americans regard water. They were of course entirely ignorant of the strong feeling against alcohol and wines which had come into prominence in the United States since the commencement of the war. They would never have understood any order prohibiting the sale of wine, and it is inconceivable that any military force could have stamped out the traffic in either wine or beer. On the other hand, it was realized that a double set of regulations for soldiers and civilians would have been equally impracticable for the time being. Illicit sales to soldiers could hardly have been prevented under such conditions, and it is quite possible that much ill-feeling would have been stirred up among the soldiers at the sight of the conquered enemy enjoying privileges that were denied the conqueror. The solution of the problem, reached by General Headquarters and published in the Anordnungen, attempted to find a medium between the desire of the army and the necessity of recognizing the use of wine and beer by the civil population. Two general principles were laid down and thereafter served as a guide to future commanding officers in promulgating further regulations on the same subject. These were:

1. An absolute prohibition of the sale or gift of strong alcoholic drinks, sale of beer and light wines alone being permitted.
2. Police hours for public hotels and cafes, in order that the consumption of wines and beers might always be supervised by the American military authorities.

The first principle required further interpretations as to the phrase "light wines."

Letter of Instructions No. 9, Third Army, January 30, 1919, directed that sherries, ports or maderias were not to be considered as "light wines" within the meaning of this order, and on February 24, the same distinction was extended to include German and French champagnes.

It is needless to remark that these regulations, lenient though they were, were not looked upon kindly by the civil population. The German pointed to the fact that his armies in Belgium had never issued any such regulations, and realization of the fact that Americans held different views in regard to alcohol than his own gradually made itself felt. Experience has shown that military regulations in an occupied territory are extremely difficult to enforce if they run counter to long-established customs. Our experience in the Rhineland in enforcing the regulations, both as to circulation and alcohol, amply confirm this statement. Up to January 17, 1920, there had been 863 convictions of German civilians

for violations of regulations on alcohol - 524 for selling cognac, champagne, etc., and 339 for sales out of legal hours. The number of civilians convicted was exceeded only by the number of two other offenses, viz: violation of circulation orders and sale of United States property. A large majority of the trials for violation of this regulation, however, was for sales to members of the military forces. The civilian was never wholly to blame for sales of this character, as the soldier in his eagerness for cognac offered such high prices that the profit to liquor dealers was large enough to risk imprisonment.

However, as the occupation wore on, it became more and more clear that the regulation should conform more nearly to local customs. In February 1919, army orders directed that the evening closing-hour of restaurants and cafes be extended to 10 p.m. The change was largely due to the fact that the German evening meal was not usually before 8 p.m. The former regulation had therefore made it impossible to serve wine with meals in hotels, clubs, private houses, etc. The new regulation, while pleasing the civil population, was not agreeable to some organization commanders. Drunkenness among the soldiers promptly increased, and commanders on their own initiative, reestablished the former police-hours, or, in some cases, set new hours, in order to cope with their particular situations. However desirable such a course may have been from the organization commanders' viewpoint, the result was disastrous to uniformity as to military government. In one town, for instance, cafes were not allowed to sell even wine or beer; in the neighboring village, the local commander permitted them to remain open until 7 p. m., while in a third village the army closing hour of 10 p. m. remained in effect. The Army Commander, appreciating the impossibility of permitting each commander to make his own regulations, directed commanding officers in Letter of Instructions No. 15, March 13, 1919, not to extend nor restrict the police-hour as established by the army.

When peace had been signed at Versailles, it became desirable to take an even further step, and, by removing unnecessary restriction, restore the normal life of occupied territory to the largest extent compatible with the security of the army. The Regierungspraesident of Coblenz was requested to submit such recommendations as he desired, with a view to modifying the standing army regulations on alcohol. Much to the surprise of the military authorities, he informed them that he did not favor removal of the restrictions on cognac and strong liquor, because he feared friction between soldiers and civilians as a consequence. His letter merely asked that cafes be permitted to remain open an hour longer on week days and until midnight on Sundays and holidays. The Commanding General decided that this request was both moderate and wise and accordingly authorized the hours requested in a letter to the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province, dated August 22. The police-hours thus established remained in effect as far as civilians were concerned, until the close of the military government.

The return of the regular divisions to the States in the Summer of 1919 and the arrival of untrained replacements from America, rendered the success of the new closing hours, from the military point of view, very questionable. It had been a cardinal American principle from the first days of the occupation, that soldiers and civilians, as far as service in public houses was concerned, should be treated alike. As the court-martial statistics rose constantly, without corresponding increase in offenses by civilians, it was realized that a departure from former principles must be made and one set of hours fixed for soldiers and another for civilians. To have punished civilians for the misdeeds of American soldiers, would have been an act unworthy of the ideals with which the army entered the war. Sales of wine and beer by cafes, restaurants, etc., to soldiers were therefore restricted to the hours from 5 p. m. to 9:30 p. m. The Civil population was however warned, that as the sale of forbidden cognac and other strong liquor to soldiers showed no signs of diminishing, the punishment in every case would in future include confiscation of the owner's stock of liquor of the brand illegally sold. (Civil Affairs Bulletin No. 38, November 4, 1919.)

On December 23, 1919, a new regulation of the Army Commander (Civil Affairs Bulletin No. 47), interpreted the term "light wines" to include sparkling wines, such as champagne, sparkling Burgundy and "Schaumwein." Sherry, Port and Maderia were still left under the ban. This was the last order issued on the subject prior to the publication of the Ordinances of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission on January 10, 1920. In the meantime, however, a letter had been sent the Commanding General by the Deputy French Commissioner of the Interallied Rhineland Commission, requesting that the American authorities permit the sale of cognac, etc., to civilians. The Commissioner stated that his government viewed our regulations as a serious detriment to French Foreign trade, and requested that fines collected by our provost courts from civilians for offenses involving purchases of French cognac be revoked. The Commanding General felt that the sale of cognac was a subject in which the German officials were primarily interested and that it was entirely proper in this case to consult them. Both the Oberpraesident and the Regierungspraesident maintained their previous position, that the unrestricted sale of alcohol for the time being was clearly inadvisable. The request of the French Deputy Commissioner was therefore refused.

The Ordinances of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission went into effect January 10. By the provision of Article 28 of the Ordinance regarding criminal and civil law, traffic in cognac, etc., among civilians was no longer forbidden, although sales to soldiers were made punishable offenses.

ASSEMBLIES AND MEETINGS

All gathering of crowds is forbidden.

No meeting or assembly of persons shall take place without authority of the local military commander. Sessions of courts and councils, schools and religious services may be held as usual.

The restriction and supervision of the right of public assembly in the Rhineland was a military measure which had many precedents in previous occupations. In the Autumn of 1918, Germany's expressed desires for peace were viewed with considerable suspicion, and rigid regulations were believed necessary to assure the safety of the invading army. The advisability of promulgating some such regulation had been foreseen as early as December 1, and Memorandum No. 4, Third Army, had directed unit commanders to forbid crowds and meetings in towns along the projected line of march where troops might billet over night.

A resume of the later modifications of this provision of the Anordnungen may be said to be similar to the trend of modifications of many other ordinances. The continuation of a rigid military government, with hard and fast restrictions, becomes in the end as burdensome to the army as it is oppressive to the civil population. Severest measures were proper while hostilities were in progress, but there existed no justification for retaining them when once the occupied territory had become peaceful and orderly.

The right of assembly was therefore gradually restored to the civil population of the American area. When restriction was removed, however, it was so safeguarded that no increased danger was feared in consequence for the troops from riots or hostile demonstrations.

Every facility was given to the people, even in January 1919, to discuss the platforms of the political parties which were engaged at that time in the campaign for supremacy in the national elections. As a matter of fact, requests for permission to hold meetings were granted at once under ordinary circumstances. If the meeting appeared suspicious, an American representative was directed to be present and report or check, as the case warranted, inflammatory speeches or disorder. The moderation with which regulations were enforced, may be judged from the fact that street parades and celebrations were permitted on May 1 in honor of the German revolution. The many religious processions on church holidays, so common in the Rhineland, were always permitted, although display of the national colors was stringently forbidden.

The return of the German prisoners of war from English and American captivity towards the close of summer was a factor which gave rise to apprehensions by the military authorities of possible public disorder. It was practically certain that the families of the prisoners would congregate at railway stations to greet them, especially as many prisoners had been absent from their homes for more than four years. The American authorities did not intend to forbid legitimate welcome of relatives, but they feared that the legitimate welcome of a family might easily be turned by agitators into a hostile demonstration against the occupying forces. Orders were therefore drafted by the Office of Civil Affairs rigorously forbidding processions or celebrations in honor of returning prisoners of war and incidentally prohibiting the display of the German national colors. However, on the special plea of the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province, this order was never published in the local press. His request was based on the fact that the publication of such an order might be interpreted as forbidding the legitimate welcome by the prisoners' families, and if such were the case, would be certain to give rise to ill-feeling. He begged that he himself be permitted to transmit our instructions to subordinate officials, and said that if this were allowed, the civil officials would accept responsibility in case of disorders. Although the danger of leaving matters of such importance to the discretion of the civil authorities was realized, the request was granted, largely in view of the Oberpraesident's correct attitude carrying out all previous demands of the army. However, although the same cooperation from the Oberpraesident was received in this matter as in others, an official in the Regierung of Coblenz failed to transmit the instructions of the Oberpraesident to the Landrat of Mayen, and there was an unnecessary delay in informing the Landrate of the other Kreise. It was therefore not unnatural that, during the last week in September, our orders should have been violated in the city of Mayen (Kreis Mayen), at that time without an American garrison. The national German colors were flown from a number of homes in the city, and a celebration seems to have been held by the populace generally in honor of the returning prisoners of war. No effort was made by the civil authorities to check the celebration. While, in this instance, the Regierung of Coblenz seems mainly to have been at fault, the American policy in regard to the display of the German flag had been so repeatedly announced at the time that permits for religious processions were granted, that the local Mayen officials could not escape a share of the guilt. Both the Burgomaster of Mayen and his chief of police were accordingly suspended from office for thirty days. The responsible official in the Regierung was also suspended from office for a similar period.

Reference has been made in these pages to the fact that supervision of public meeting placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the American personnel detailed to that work. In Coblenz particularly, there were hundreds of meetings weekly, and the 2d Section of the General Staff, whose duties included supervision of such meetings, could cover only those of a political and industrial character. In the course of the year 1919, it became evident that no attempt was being made by the German government to stimulate disorder in our area. There was nevertheless a certain danger from radical and revolutionary agitators, which, however, the Oberpraesidium and the Regierung had an even more lively interest than ourselves in checking. Accordingly, on August 26, control of meetings was turned over to the civil authorities with the following reservations: That notice of meetings of an industrial or political nature should be given by the civil authorities to the 2d Section of the General Staff forty-eight hours in advance. This enabled intelligence agents of the army to cover any meeting likely to arouse suspicion.

It must be recorded that the Oberpraesidium, the Regierung and the Landraete entered into the new arrangements in an entirely proper spirit, and referred all doubtful cases to the American authorities.

PUBLICATIONS

A copy of each newspaper or other periodical publication will be delivered to the local military commander immediately on issue. The appearance of any matter reflecting on or injurious to the American military government will render the publication liable to suspension or suppression. Excepting in the periodical press, no printed matter will be published without permission from the local American military authority.

The moderation of the restrictions imposed by the American military government on the press proved in the end to be a wise course. Not only did the United States desire a free discussion of the political issues, which, in December 1918, were agitating Germany, but it desired in particular that the Rhenish people should have a share in the foundation of the new national government. Criticism in the German press of the Allied military governments was of course objectionable, in view of the danger that such criticism might incite disorder. This fundamental principle governed all actions in regard to censorship, and though criticism of the military government was later so defined as to include criticism of the policies of the Allied peace delegates at Paris, it was aimed solely at constituting a safeguard for public order. Newspapers were at all times permitted to discuss the domestic issues before Germany, without interference or pressure on our part. Not once did the American authorities instigate the publication in a German paper of an article of a propagandist nature. Within the limits set by the Anordnungen, the right of free speech was safeguarded to the population of occupied territory.

Coblence was not a center of the printing trades, and the authorities were never forced to censor books or periodicals other than the local press. The importation of magazines, etc., from unoccupied Germany was an entirely different matter, and one which called for military action. Censorship of periodicals originating elsewhere was, for a while, very irregular. Several magazines were forbidden sale in the American zone, "Kladderadatsch" for instance, which printed matter derogatory to the United States. It was felt, however, that to entirely exclude German periodicals published on the other side of the Rhine was to impose unnecessary hardships on the civil population, the weekly and monthly press on the left bank being unimportant in quantity and quality.

Finally on September 27, 1919, booksellers were made responsible that no publications on sale in their shops contained matter offensive to the military government. This proved a satisfactory solution of the problem, and thereafter but very few complaints on violation of orders reached the Office of Civil Affairs. A certain number of suspensions of the local press for short periods are on record, but in no greater number than one would expect, in view of the prevailing disturbed state of public feeling. No periodical was ever permanently suspended.

Publication of all rules in regard to censorship was decided to be, as early as January 1919, a function of the Office of Civil Affairs at Advance G. H. Q. Enforcement of the rules so laid down was the duty of the 2d Section of the General Staff, and at all times exercised by it.

POST, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE

The mail is subject to the censorship of the American military authorities.

The use of the telegraph or long distance telephone is forbidden except by permission of the local military commander.

The use of aerial wireless apparatus is forbidden. All private telephones or telegraph apparatuses, ground or aerial wireless apparatus, must be reported to military commander at once.

No person may, without authority of the local military commander, transmit any message or communication to any person outside the territory occupied by American troops except through the post office.

The above regulations certainly placed severe restrictions on the civil population, but as they were prepared to govern any enemy country in a state of war, the necessity for a tight rein on all channels of communication must be recognized.

On January 10, 1919, the probabilities of further war having been dissipated by the rapid demobilization of the enemy's army, Advance G. H. Q. authorized resumption of telegraphic and telephonic communication, both within occupied territories and with unoccupied Germany. Provision, however, was still made for a rigid censorship. Messages in regard to private affairs were permitted only in urgent cases. Telephonic or telegraphic messages of a trivial or unimportant nature were still forbidden.

On April 5, Orders No. 24, Advance G. H. Q., still further modified our instructions by permitting nearly all kinds of commercial messages to be exchanged with unoccupied Germany. It also announced the resumption of mail service between occupied territories and Allied countries. On May 9, the German parcels-post system was even authorized to resume operation between the Rhineland and the rest of Germany. All packages were, however, rendered liable to censorship.

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PIGEONS

The use of carrier-pigeons is forbidden. Owners of carrier-pigeons will make an immediate report of their pigeon-cotes to the military commander, with a list of the marks of their pigeons. Pigeon-houses must be kept open day and night.

The above regulation was applicable primarily and solely to a state of war. As soon as civilians were permitted to circulate between occupied and unoccupied Germany, any use of pigeons to transmit information concerning the Allied armies was, in comparison, cumbersome and superfluous. Such circulation was never prohibited, and in consequence, almost as soon as the proclamation was posted throughout the American area, the prohibition became a matter of no importance. Attempts by the Provost Marshal and the military police to strictly enforce the order, would have been merely so much wasted effort, and were consequently abstained from. Throughout the whole period of military occupation, not a single prosecution was conducted for violation of this ordinance. It may be stated, however, that the pigeon-cotes in the American area were almost empty, the vast majority of carrier-pigeons throughout Germany having been requisitioned during the war for the use of the armies in the field. So slight was the interest of the civil population in this restrictive regulation that no appeal ever reached the Office of Civil Affairs from German sources for its modification or revocation, even when the military authorities were perfectly willing to have taken such a step.

PHOTOGRAPHS

The taking of photographs out of doors, except by permission of the local military authority, is forbidden.

This was another instance in which the proclamation took steps to guarantee the safety of the army, foreseeing the possibility of resumption of the war. The civil population of course obeyed this order, but as the country returned gradually to an appearance, at least, of peace, they deemed it an unnecessary hardship. No particular efforts were ever made by the military police to enforce this paragraph, and it gradually lapsed. There is not even a single record of trial of a civilian for its violation. The use of cameras finally became so common that a formal revocation of the order would have only called attention to the previous unchecked violations of it, and it was believed best to let it remain a dead letter.

SPECIAL RULES.

Whosoever:

(a) Attacks, disturbs or impedes any American troops or officer thereof . . . will be punished as a military court may direct.

Such a regulation was of course absolutely necessary to the occupying forces. Brawls, fights and assaults constantly occurred between soldiers and civilians as a result of over-drinking, and in at least half of these, civilians were the aggressors. Whoever the offender in the matter, however, physical violence by a civilian towards a soldier, would have gone a long way towards weakening the army if permitted to go unpunished. This regulation did not of course make it an offense for a civilian to defend himself from unprovoked attack by a soldier, but it did protect the soldier from assaults by civilians, and our military policeman, from any physical attempt by a wrong-doer to escape the consequences of his offense. As will be noted in a succeeding chapter, dealing with relations of the army with the people, physical encounters in which soldiers and civilians took part were by no means uncommon occurrences during the occupation. Soldiers were constantly being brought to trial by the military courts, and civilians by the provost courts. Most of the cases, however, were mere brawls, whose origin could be traced to excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than to defiance of the authority of the military government. Up to November 11, 1919, 315 civilians had been convicted for violations of this regulation. The subject of the punishments accorded soldiers so involved is treated in the chapter of this report entitled "Relations between Army and Civil Population in Occupied Territory."

Whosoever, . . .

(b) Destroys, damages, or disturbs any railway, telegraph or telephone installation, lighting, water or power system, or any part thereof, . . .

.....

will be punished as a military court may direct.

This was still another instance in which the proclamation provided suitable ordinances to protect the security of the army. As Germany every day showed a more and more evident intention of abiding by the terms of the Armistice, self-destruction of public works became more harmful to her own interests than to those of the armies of occupation. This paragraph therefore became superfluous and no violation of the regulations was ever recorded.

Whosoever, . . .

(c) Destroys, damages, steals or secretes any property of or in possession of, the American army, . . .

.....

will be punished as a military court may direct.

Up to November 11, 1919, twenty-six civilians were convicted by provost courts for destroying government property, and 724 for stealing the same. The great number of Germans who appear to have stooped to theft during the occupation, would at first sight give cause for reflection, and possibly furnish grounds for the statement that the Rhinelander is not honest. There can be no question, however, that, in view of the dearth of many articles of food and clothing, a certain amount of theft from government stores had to be accepted as normal under prevailing conditions. The morale of the nation had been shaken by four years of suffering and want, and the vast stores of army provisions, blankets, etc., offered a tempting prize to people who lacked these very articles. The protection of these supplies was usually insufficient, and arrests were ordinarily made only when the stolen goods were found in possession of the thief. Thefts appeared therefore a

simple matter to the lower class German, and as one incurring slight risk of detection. It should be noted, in connection herewith, that many civilians were employed in army depots and repair establishments, which rendered them peculiarly liable to temptation. 781 convictions of German civilians are on record for these offenses up to January 19, 1920.

Whosoever, . . .

(d) Purchases, receives in pawn or has in his possession, articles of clothing, equipment or rations furnished to American soldiers or belonging to the American armies, . . .

.....

will be punished as a military court may direct.

This regulation was at all times difficult to enforce. More than 1,500 convictions of German civilians for violations thereof are recorded. Despite these convictions, army property still continued to find its way into unauthorized hands, affording ample evidence that our preventative measures were not effective. Lack of food and clothing, which the army possessed in abundance, is, of course, sufficient explanation of the illegal traffic. Clothes, soap, cigarettes, and many articles of foodstuffs could be procured by the Germans from their own sources only in limited quantities. Added to this fact, it must be borne in mind that the prices which had to be paid by a civilian for shoes, clothing, meat, etc., were enormous, particularly in the winter of 1918. Even the most necessary articles become prohibitive luxuries to the laboring man. It is therefore not surprising the soldiers were often approached by business men of the "Schieber" variety and offered tempting bribes to transfer these luxuries sub-rosa to civilian ownership. While exorbitant bribes were no doubt in many cases to blame, the soldier cannot but be accorded a share in the guilt. As long as government property was not authorized to be disposed of in the civil population, offenses could be readily detected and the civilians concerned, punished; but in the spring and summer of 1919, the situation became more complicated, and even thefts more difficult to detect. The Liquidation Commission proceeded about this time to dispose of much of the salvaged clothing and surplus horses and motor transport belonging to the army. The army itself and, to some extent, the Hoover Commission also, undertook at the same time to supply large quantities of food and tobacco to the Rhine Province. Such sales increased the chances for the average German to escape detection when he bought sales commissary articles from soldiers. Purchases of cigarettes by soldiers at the sales commissary indeed increased so phenomenally that the army finally found it necessary to ration such purchases. This measure to some extent checked the transfer of food stuffs and cigarettes to German hands. The problems of preventing the illegal disposal of United States property to enemy civilians proved so difficult during the occupation of Germany, that it warrants close attention, in view of the possibility of a future occupation of the territory of an enemy.

Whosoever, . . .

(e) Destroys, damages, pollutes or secretes any fodder, water or other thing useful to the American army, or

(f) Acts as a spy or commits war-treason against the American army, . . .

.....

will be punished as a military court may direct.

No necessity ever arose to prosecute civilians under either of these statutes. The comparative peace which the Rhineland enjoyed during the occupation, is contrast to the anarchy in unoccupied Germany, accounts in no small measure for the absence of a feeling of hostility by the civil population towards the American forces. The Rhinelander was heartily sick of the war. He had not only done his share of the fighting but had been

called upon in addition to see the armies of Germany and the Allies march across his territory. He was in no mood to bring further burdens upon himself by useless friction with the occupying troops.

Whosoever, . . .

(g) Commits any act whatever injurious to the American army or in obstruction to the military government, or in violation of these regulations or any regulations or orders hereafter made by the American military authorities, or refuses to comply with a requisition; or

(h) Attempts to do any of the above things, or advises or assists anyone else to do or attempt to do any of them;

will be punished as a military court may direct.

This regulation naturally demanded explanation from time to time, as offenses against the military government took place. The Army Command and the Office of Civil Affairs did not believe it wise to create punishable offenses under the terms of this article without informing the population of their action. Additional orders were therefore issued from time to time on a wide variety of subjects. The list of acts thus made punishable offenses was very numerous, and there were consequently a great number of persons tried by provost courts.

* * * * *

MISCELLANEOUS

The term civil authority, as used in these regulations, means the Burgomaster of Gemeindevorsteher or the head of the local community.

Every person must familiarize himself with these regulations and all others hereafter made by the American military authorities. Ignorance of the regulations will not be accepted as an excuse for their violation. In case of doubt as to the requirements of the regulations, inquiry should be made at the Rathaus.

No comment is necessary on the concluding paragraphs of this proclamation. The Anordnungen must be regarded as a remarkable document, particularly for the comparatively moderate restrictions therein imposed on the civil population. Coming, as the occupation of the Rhineland did, on the heels of a struggle distinguished for bitterness and hatred, one must recognize the judicial quality of the proclamation, and the complete absence of harshness and pettiness. Any other policy would have been unworthy of the ideals for which America had struggled. A careful reading of the proclamation must lead the reader to a clearer appreciation of the spirit with which the army of occupation carried out the task imposed on it.

CHAPTER NO. 7

SANITATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH

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[Material omitted as it pertains only to the German Health System]

CHAPTER NO. 8

FOOD SUPPLY OF CIVIL POPULATION IN AMERICAN

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

MILITARY ACTION REGARDING GERMAN FOOD SUPPLY

Early in the occupation, regulations were promulgated by the armies prohibiting officers and soldiers from eating in German restaurants. When it was later found that the food scarcity was somewhat less pronounced than had been believed, and when it was realized that in any case the amount consumed in this way was negligible, the prohibition was removed. Later, all army messes were forbidden to buy anything except fresh vegetables (not including potatoes), from German sources. Late in 1919, all American military persons and employes and American personnel of the Interallied Rhineland Commission were prohibited from buying any article of the German ration from German sources. This was done only when the larger cities were feeling a potato shortage and had been obliged to seriously curtail the potato ration.

The Lebensmitteleinfuhr, G. m. b. H. in order to allay the social unrest due to scarcity or impending scarcity of food, and to the nondistribution of allotted supplies, the United States Army, early in April 1919, began the sale of flour from army stocks, at cost price, to the civil population.

On account of the unstable condition of the German government, no credit could be given, and payment was required, - at first, when the request for certain quantities of supplies was submitted, and, later, an advance payment at the time of the request, followed by payment in full upon delivery. As each one of the sixteen Kreise in American-occupied territory had to estimate its own needs and to finance its own request for supplies, it became immediately evident that some central purchasing agency must be established. At the instance of the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province, a company was formed by public-spirited citizens, and incorporated early in April 1919, known as the Lebensmitteleinfuhr, G. m. b. H. or, in English, "Food Distribution Company, Limited."

This Company was an undertaking in the public interest. Its employees were paid a fixed salary without any share in profits that might be obtained. According to Paragraph 2 of the Articles of Incorporation, the object of the Company was "the purchase and distribution, in the public interest of foodstuffs and other commodities of daily use."

Article 9 ran as follows:

The Company pursues a public aim exclusively, and its endeavors will tend to improve the food situation in general. Its capital stock bears no interest. The yearly net profits, after writing off an appropriate sum, will be used for the public interest, according to a plan to be agreed upon by the shareholders, with consent of the President of the Board. The shareholders expressly waive repayment of their shares. No part of the profits is turned over to any private interest, of any nature whatever.

The President of the Board, referred to above, was the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province, who by virtue of his official status, was the head of the Food Administration of the Province.

The first methods of the Lebensmitteleinfuhr were slow, laborious, and ineffective. On being informed that flour was available from army stocks for sale to the civil population, and being requested to state how much it desired to buy, the Company attempted, before submitting its request, to obtain by letter or telegram from each Landrat and the

Oberbuergermeisterei of Treves and of Coblenz, a definite statement of the amounts required. Each one of the chief officials named, felt that he must consult his sub-officials, and each sub-official "felt the pulse" of his constituents before making an answer. When the answers finally came to the Lebensmitteleinfuhr, they were generally qualified by stipulations as to prices to be paid. As these prices had been previously fixed at the cost of the supplies to the American army, and by the official rate of exchange of dollars and marks, there was, of course, no possibility of bargaining. On the other hand, there was frequently so great a lapse of time between the offer of the supplies and its acceptance, either in part or in whole, that either the supplies are no longer available for sale, or the rate of exchange had dropped so materially as to make the Company undecided what to do. Although this indisposition on the part of the Company to assume responsibility without wasting valuable time, interfered greatly with the purchase and distribution of food, nevertheless, during the whole of 1919, the difficulty remained. As late as November 1919, the Company stated officially that it had made many requests for supplies which had not been granted, for reasons unknown. As a matter of fact, supplies which had time and again been offered, which the Company had failed to purchase within a reasonable time, and which were then disposed of elsewhere.

Practically speaking, the duty of the Lebensmitteleinfuehr was to finance the transfer of foodstuffs from various sources to the civil population. It received requests from food officials, transferred these requests to the army or other source of supply, sometimes making an advance payment, received the deliveries and made payment for them, and transferred the deliveries, charging to, and collecting from the various Kreise, the cost of the supplies, according to the distribution of the food administration. On the whole, the system worked very well. The inability to grasp opportunities quickly, however, accompanied by complaints that the Company was often unable to obtain the supplies it desired, caused much irritation on both sides.

CIRCULATION OF FOOD

The method of distribution was, that the Oberpraesidium, as the central food administration of the Rhine Provinces, forwarded all supplies to a central or convenient point in each Kreis, putting them in custody of the Landraete or the Oberbuergermeister of the cities of Coblenz and Treves.

From that point, distribution was left entirely to those officials. The policy and method of distribution, therefore, often materially differed in different localities. In Adenau, for example, the channels of distribution were well laid out, the Landrat displayed initiative in obtaining the aid of American motor lorries for transportation, and the food was on sale within a few hours after delivery. In Ahrweiler, on the other hand, some of the first supplies of American food were not distributed to the shops until three weeks after delivery, because there was not enough delivered to redeem all the food tickets which had been issued. The delay might have been still greater, had not the matter, quite by accident, come to the attention of the Office of Civil Affairs, and orders been issued to proceed at once with distribution. In one Kreis was the plan of distribution itself bad, viz., in Landkreis Treves. In all other cases, difficulties were in the main temporary, and due to two causes, first, the disposition to hoard supplies, second, inability of the food officials to quickly alter the plan of food distribution or of food allotments, when a change had been made in the quantity or kind of food.

Sale of American foodstuffs was by the ticket system. The following is a quotation from a letter of the Oberpraesident, which indicates how some of the difficulties were met:

The distribution of American foodstuffs has been operated on the ticket system, which is in general use here, and no difficulties worth speaking of have been encountered. Unfortunately, the prices of these commodities are very high, owing to the unfavorable rate of exchange of German currency, and the poorer civil population experienced great hardship in providing money for their purchase. To quote an in-

stance of these unusually high prices, a four-pound loaf of bread of German flour costs between M. 1.05 and M. 1.15, whereas a one-pound loaf of bread of American flour costs M. 1.25.

A similar difference of price obtains in various other commodities. It should not be forgotten in this connection that it was due only to the very welcome complaisance of the American authorities that the prices were maintained at the April rate of exchange. If we had been obliged to pay the June rate, - equivalent to an additional 17% - there is no doubt that a great majority of the population would have been unable to pay the price. A proposal is now on foot for the Kreise and cities to grant facilities, according to their financial capacities, to the poorer classes when making their purchases. The city of Treves was the first to distribute special bonus tickets to a limited circle of poorer people to be used in part payment for foodstuffs; thus, the bonus tickets for bacon represent a value of M. 2.80, so that the purchaser gets it at five marks a pound. In the case of flour, the bonus tickets are worth 55 pfennigs, reducing the cost of this commodity to one mark per pound; in the case of rice, they represent 60 pfennigs, reducing the price to M. 1.22.

The whole system is somewhat intricate; whether it will be of permanent use, experience must prove. As it has been introduced only in Treves, no conclusive opinion can be given. Of course, the number of people enjoying such advantages must be limited, as otherwise the expenditure would be too great, considering the sums that are turned over.

The method of using the food tickets, was, in brief, as follows: Each person or head of family was issued the number of coupons to which he was entitled, each coupon authorizing him to buy a certain quantity of a certain food, within a certain period of time. There were also coupons, not bearing the name of any particular food, but numbered to be used for foods not regularly issued. The coupons entitled the holder to register with some merchant of his own choice, who in turn registered his total requirements with the local Food Office. When the food arrived, each merchant was allotted the amount necessary to provide for the persons registered with him. Announcements of distribution were made in the daily papers. The merchant kept the coupons to indicate the amounts and regularity of his sales. Any allotment not entirely sold, might be returned to the food authorities or debited against the next allotment. The system seemed simple enough, but there was considerable traffic in tickets. Well-to-do people seldom suffered for lack of food, though they may often not have been able to get the variety they wanted.

AMERICAN FOODSTUFFS SOLD TO CIVIL POPULATION

The amounts, in round figures, of the more important foodstuffs of American origin distributed and sold in American occupied territory during the year 1919 are as follows:

Flour	---	17,000 tons
Bacon	---	930 "
Sugar	---	1,660 "
Rice	---	790 "
Lard	---	200 "
Canned Beef	---	550 "
Salmon	---	795,000 cans
Milk	---	652,140 "

It is an interesting fact that although less than 22,000 cans of milk had been sold to the population for the whole American occupied territory since August 1, 1919, and although complaints had been made of the insufficiency of the supply, there were still on hand in the City of Coblenz alone, in the middle of December 1919, 162,000 undistributed cans of milk. A protest from the Office of Civil Affairs prevented a wasteful, sentimental, and extravagant distribution of a large part of this supply on Christmas Day without regard to age or state of health.

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CHAPTER NO. 9

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

FORMATION AND SCOPE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES DEPARTMENT OF AMERICAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION

When the advance from Luxemburg into Germany was begun, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs was directed by G. H. Q., to assume charge of all public utilities such as gas works, electric plants, etc., in order that the proper operation of such plants should be coordinated and the interests of the American army as well as those of the civilian population of the occupied areas, protected. Up to the time that Army Headquarters were established in Coblenz, the actual operation of the Department was of necessity more or less restricted; but once this establishment was effected, immediate steps were taken to exercise supervision over all public utilities in the area. As supervision of the various public utilities called for a certain amount of technical knowledge, it was agreed between the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and the Chief Engineer, that the latter should take over their actual operation and supervision, referring matters of general policy to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, to be decided in accordance with the spirit of the broad policy adopted toward the inhabitants of occupied Germany.

The most important duties of the department were confined to the city of Coblenz and its environs, as the largest and most important city in the American area, as well as the seat of Army Headquarters. Supervision in the Headquarters area of the army was exercised directly by the Public Utilities of the Third Army. A Divisional Public Utilities Officer administered utilities in each Divisional area, referring to the Army Public Utilities in matters of policy and for any necessary liaison with other Divisions or points outside the occupied area. Advance G. H. Q. being at Treves, all public utilities there were administered by an officer attached to that organization, and no control was exercised by the army.

The utilities in which the army chiefly interested itself were: Gas plants, electric plants and water works. While several others, such as public baths, slaughter houses, etc., received some attention, they were of so little importance that they may be neglected in this report.

As has been said before, the utilities of Coblenz were the most important in the whole army area, therefore, this report is based on the operations at that point, but it may be assumed that the outlying towns experienced similar difficulties which were met by local action in most cases. Wherever any feature of especial interest occurred in outlying districts, it is mentioned in the report.

GENERAL POLICY OF SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION

It was at once apparent in establishing the policy of the department, that two distinct methods of administration were possible, either direct control of all public utilities, or administration thereof through the German civil authorities already in charge. The latter method adopted for several reasons, and proved to be an entire success Its advantages were:

- (a) Saving of military personnel
- (b) Placing of operating responsibility on officials accountable to their own government
- (c) Facilities and benefits derived from established organization

In addition to the above, there were other small advantages of position in regard to the civil population.

Directors of public utilities were informed that they would be held responsible for the efficient operation of their plants, but that they would be given reasonable aid by the army in procuring coal, oil, etc., also in adjusting difficulties which might arise from the extra burden placed on their plants. A fair idea of this extra burden may be

obtained from the fact that Coblenz, with a normal population of 60,000 was at one time housing over 80,000 troops and civilians.

The proof of the wisdom of the adopted policy is shown by the fact that every effort was made by the directors of public utilities to please the military authorities, and that no insurmountable difficulty was ever encountered.

OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

In general, title to public utilities in Germany is vested in the city or town in which they operate, but in several cases, notably electric light and power, large private corporations serve several towns or cities. This is the case with the power company supplying Coblenz, a description of whose activities is given in a later section.

In larger cities, the directors of gas and water works are appointed by the municipal authorities under certain fixed rules and requirements. The same is true of light and power plants, if they are publicly owned. In smaller towns and communes, the Buergermeister is director of all public services.

A survey was made of all public utilities plants in the American area, soon after the Office of Public Utilities was placed in operation. They were found to be in a deplorable condition. All repairs that could possibly be avoided had been put off during the war. Plants which were not even in a condition to properly meet their ordinary deliveries, were now called upon to supply not only these demands, but those of the Army of Occupation as well. It was at once decided that a system would be established whereby American troops and all industries on which they were dependent should be favored. It became necessary at times to use the regulations issued to that end, as a means of spurring on directors to further efforts to meet all demands.

A description of the public utilities in Coblenz, their plants, their difficulties of operation and of the steps taken to meet these difficulties, will be found in the following pages. Technical details are purposely omitted.

GAS WORKS

The gas supply of the city of Coblenz is derived from two sources, --- three benches of eighteen retorts each and further equipment described later in this chapter. These are owned by the city and are situated on the Moselle river near its junction with the Rhine. A supplementary supply is obtained from the Concordia-Huette, or Smelting Works, at Bendorf, a town not far below Coblenz on the right bank of the Rhine. This plant also supplies the city of Neuwied and the towns of Engers, Bendorf, Vailendar and Ehrenbreitstein, all on the right bank. There are forty-one retort groups at the Concordia works; but a large amount of the gas generated is consumed industrially at the plant.

There is very little commercial consumption of gas in Coblenz, practically one-quarter of the total amount being utilized in the operation of the city water works, a description of which will be found later in this chapter. The system of distribution has the great weakness that the water works are connected with the mains used for household supply in such a way that in case of a shortage, the domestic supply can be rationed or cut off only by shutting off individual districts or houses, as well. If any attempt is made to close the mains, the pumps at the water works are also deprived of fuel, there being no container there.

History of Operation during Occupation: This history actually begins with the year 1919 and finds the city of Coblenz with two of its three benches in operation, one being held in reserve to meet emergencies. About two-thirds of the 30,000 cubic meters of gas consumed daily was furnished by them, while the Concordia-Huette of Bendorf furnished about one-third, under a contract already in force when the Third Army reached the Rhine. This contract calls for a delivery of two-thirds of the gas used in Coblenz, and had it been

supplied, would have permitted the city to make some badly needed repairs in its own retorts. It appeared on investigation that the exact terms of this contract had never been carried out. It was therefore determined to force the Concordia Works to deliver more gas, and the directors were informed of this determination. The directors proving that their retorts were in such a condition that repairs must be immediately made, their schedule of repairs was approved, with the understanding that they might reduce the quantity furnished the city, until April 15, when the full amount called for in the contract was to be delivered. It was necessary to aid the Works in procuring the necessary material for these repairs.

From the first survey made of public utilities, it was at once apparent that the coal supply was a matter of difficulty, as the production of German mines had been greatly reduced. In the case of gas plants, the deterioration in the quality of the coal and the fact that a mixture of the gases generated was employed with a view to economizing coal, reduced the thermal value from 5,200 normal to an actual 4,000.

In order to enable the Concordia Works to make payments for coal and other supplies, it was decided, after a survey of their financial condition, that it would be necessary to allow them to export part of the finished product on hand to unoccupied Germany. This plan was recommended to, and approved by, the Economic Section of the Advance G. H. Q. at Treves, and the Works were thus relieved of a situation that threatened to become serious.

During the month of April 1919, the Huette again took over the furnishing of a major portion of the gas used by the city, and the latter immediately retired two of its three benches of retorts from use for repairs, and reconstruction and excavations for the foundation of a new and fourth bench, were commenced. From this time on, the city furnished approximately one-third of the gas consumed, the rest being furnished by the Huette. This arrangement was on the whole satisfactory, except during a period covering the last half of May and the first half of June, when lack of coal, combined with the poor quality obtained, caused a falling off in the supply furnished by the Huette. It became necessary to put the other towns supplied by this company on a ration. The ration system was not feasible in Coblenz, as has been explained earlier. After the plan of rationing the smaller towns had been placed in effect, there was still a deficiency in the quantity delivered to Coblenz. As it was felt that this was partly due to lack of interest and cooperation on the part of the directors of the Huette, it was decided to apply a stimulus to their efforts, and their press works, where car wheels are manufactured, was therefore closed for several days. The directors at once made every move to produce more gas, and as soon as they reached the required quantity, the press works were reopened. A further difficulty was experienced with the Huette during the month of June, owing to friction between the directors and the Wirtschaftsstelle, the latter being a board for coal distribution whose function is explained in another section of this chapter. The result of this friction was, that the reserve coal supply at the Huette was reduced to the danger point. The directors were summoned to Coblenz and informed that if the city suffered through their negligence, they would be prosecuted before the Military Commission. They took immediate steps to obtain a supply of coal, and the threatened gas crisis was averted. Numerous petty difficulties, which naturally arose from time to time, were disposed of, usually without action, by the Public Utilities Officer. It is worthy of remark that every effort to please was made throughout, by the officials of the gas works, and that their service was remarkably efficient when the extra load placed on their plant is considered.

In order to facilitate supervision of the gas plant, daily reports were required of coal consumed, coal received, coal on hand, gas generated, gas delivered from the Concordia-Huette and other minor details. These reports were represented graphically in the office.

WATER WORKS

The water works of the city of Coblenz are on an island in the Rhine just above the main part of the city and derive their supply from wells. It might be supposed that the

water in these wells would come from the river, but such is not the case, as the river-bed has an impervious layer not far below the ground-line. The water for the wells comes from the hills southwest of the city.

The pumping plant, in December 1918, consisted of the following units:

Pump House No. 1; built in 1886: Three gas engines of an old design, where ignition is caused by a flame similar to a Bunsen burner, and three plunger pumps, of 120 cubic meters per hour capacity each. It has been the practice to hold one unit in reserve.

Pump House No. 2; built in 1904: Three gas engines of a modern type and three plunger pumps of 150 cubic meters per hour capacity. All units in this plant are operated continuously.

Pump House No. 3: Two Diesel oil engines and two centrifugal pumps, of 250 cubic meters per hour capacity, each. One of these units is held in reserve.

A survey made of the water works revealed the fact that as the weather grew warmer, the existing plant would prove inadequate to meet the additional demand caused by the Army of Occupation. An electrical pumping unit was therefore ordered by the army and this was installed as Pump House No. 4. This consisted of a motor and a centrifugal pump of 250 cubic meters per hour capacity. This unit was held in reserve and was operated only when demand for water justified.

There are no facilities for water storage, aside from a tank on a hill overlooking the city, which contains only enough to supply the needs of a barracks on the same hill. All the large units at the plant pump direct to the mains and are assisted by two electrical pumping units near the Moselle, which are used as boosters, and by two gas units which pump to the tanks at the barracks.

The town of Metternich, near Coblenz and on the left bank of the Moselle, is also connected with the mains of the Coblenz system. In case of a shortage of its own water supply, Metternich can call on Coblenz for assistance, but this procedure cannot be reversed.

History of Operation during Occupation: As the original survey of the water works disclosed the fact that the system was inadequate to meet the increased demands caused by the occupation and that new machinery was necessary, it was decided to do all that was possible to decrease consumption until such time as the new pumping unit, by which the capacity of the plant was increased thirty percent, should be ready. An investigation was made of the requirements of the principal consumers and certain restrictions were imposed. An interesting fact in connection with the consumption of American troops is, that there was an increase at the several barracks occupied by them, ranging from 100% to 1,000% over the amount consumed by German garrisons in the same buildings. During the month of June a continued drought made drastic measures necessary. The civil population was warned through the Buergermeister to reduce consumption, and similar orders were issued to troops by the Army Commander, forbidding the washing of motor vehicles at the river, also, that special care be exercised in regard to running taps, etc. By this means, consumption, which at one time had reached 48,000 cubic meters daily, was reduced to an average of 36,000 cubic meters.

The town of Metternich suffered from an inadequate water supply during the month of June, and aid was extended by means of the connection with the Coblenz mains, already mentioned. Considerable anxiety was felt in this matter because of a lack of sufficient head for proper fire protection at the Ordnance Depot, but the reduction of consumption relieved this situation. This deficiency in supply also extended to the fortress at Ehrenbreitstein, which has a semi-private source of supply. Steps were therefore taken to connect another spring to the system, fed entirely from natural springs.

The gas engines described in previous paragraphs of this chapter, use illuminating gas for fuel and are connected direct with the city mains which supply gas for household consumption. The difficulties experienced in maintaining a requisite gas supply were all reflected at the water works and, in fact, most of the steps taken at the gas works were

rendered imperative by their connection with the water supply. It was difficult to obtain fuel for the oil engines, during the months of January and February, but no great trouble was experienced in later months.

When it is taken into consideration that the machinery at the pumping plant had undergone, during the war, only such repairs as were absolutely essential to operation, it is surprising that few breakdowns occurred during the period from January to July 1919. The greatest source of trouble was the motors of the booster plant on the Moselle. When these had been repaired in Cologne, they worked perfectly.

The extreme high water in December 1919, and January 1920, was a partial cause of the interruption of the water service. In each instance the army sent engineer troops to help salvage electrical equipment and maintain some of the pumps in operation during the floods. The Office of the Chief Engineer is at the present time looking into the question of extending the present system in order to provide for the increased population of Coblenz, due to the various civil commissions now residing there.

The water works were required to furnish daily reports to the Office of Public Utilities, showing amount of gas and oil consumed, amount of oil on hand and amount of water pumped. A graphical record of these reports was kept.

POWER AND LIGHT

Power and light for the city of Coblenz are supplied by the Coblenzer Strassenbahn Gesellschaft, or Coblenz Street Railway Company, a privately owned corporation which not only furnishes light, power and transportation in Coblenz but in the nearby towns of Bendorf, Sayn, Ehrenbreitstein, Arenberg and Lahnbruecke. The larger part of the power is supplied by a modern up-to-date generating plant at Hoehn, a town in the neutral area not far from Marienburg, in which the company holds a half interest.

Power at Hoehn is generated by steam, which, in turn, is produced by boilers with an automatic overhead feed of lignite. This is obtained from a nearby mine owned by the company, and is delivered direct to the fires by a conveyor. The power is delivered to a substation at Horchheim, across the river from Coblenz, at 50,000 volts, and there reduced to 10,000 volts for local distribution.

The company also operates a steam power plant in Coblenz, whose installation is described further on in this chapter.

History of Operation during Occupation: More trouble was experienced in the administration of power and light than in any other branch of public utilities. This arose from two principal causes; first, the fact that the Street Railway Company is privately owned and the owners objected to American intervention; secondly, the fact that the power plant to Hoehn lies in the neutral zone, and direct intervention at that point was impossible. This fact will be alluded to later.

When the Third Army entered Coblenz in December 1918, a survey of the electric plant seemed to indicate that the machinery was in good condition. This later proved to be a mistake, and, while a superficial inspection did not disclose the fact, the boilers and electrical machinery were nearly all on the point of breaking. These breakdowns did, in fact, commence at once, the first trouble being with the boilers. Several of the boilers failing at the same time, early in January, a system of power and light rationing was at once placed in force, not only in Coblenz, but also in other towns supplied by the company. An effort to make necessary repairs to the boilers by using the acetylene welding plants at the American Motor Repair Shops, met with no success. Workmen were subsequently obtained from Duesseldorf and by the end of February, the boilers had been repaired to such an extent that the system of rationing was relaxed. While numerous boiler breakdowns occurred from time to time after February, no serious difficulties were met with.

Much the same condition prevailed with electrical equipment, not only at Coblenz but also at Hoehn. It was constantly necessary to submit machinery to extensive repairs, one 4,200 k. w. generator from Hoehn having been sent to Berlin for that purpose. It at first

appeared that there was no material for effecting minor repairs in the occupied territory, but a search disclosed the fact that a sufficient supply of such material existed, although in some cases the owners objected to parting from it.

The occupation of Coblenz by troops necessitated a large number of extra installations for lights, power, moving-picture machines, etc. In order to expedite matters, these installations were usually made with American material by American troops. The Office of Public Utilities insisted that authority for such installations be obtained there, in order that transformers serving certain districts of the city should not be overloaded. In spite of an order issued to this effect, numerous unauthorized installations were made, until rigorous punishment of the offenders stopped the practice. This order applied not only to troops but also to civilians, and several of the latter were prosecuted for unwarranted consumption of power.

As the Street Railway Company had no extra meters to care for the increase of installations, an arrangement was made for flat rates until 250 meters were obtained from Strassburg, and every effort expended to limit consumption in order to satisfy the just claims of the company.

While there was no actual shortage of coal at Hoehn, the mine being at the plant, the question of supply for the Coblenz plant was a grave one, as it was equipped to burn only coal, or, in case of necessity, briquettes mixed with steam coal, this mixture, however, being injurious to the plant. Serious trouble was threatened during the month of March, when the Interallied Coal Commission cut the allowance for the Coblenz plant from 1,000 to 400 tons. Following a complaint from the Office of Public Utilities, an allowance of 900 tons was agreed upon.

Administration at Hoehn, as has been stated before, was a point calling for considerable diplomacy. This plant was handicapped by two technical difficulties. The first was that one generator, the one sent to Berlin was already bad, and another was in such condition that no continued load could be placed on it. The second was, that the copper wire of the transmission line to Horchheim had been taken out and replaced with iron wire, with a subsequent loss of power in transmission. An economic difficulty further lay in the unrest of the miners, partly due to lack of food and clothing, partly to the social upheaval in Germany. The company appealed to the army for help and officers were sent to Hoehn to interview representatives of the miners. The employees were told that if they remained at work, the question of wages and hours would be adjusted between them and their employers and food would be sold to them from the supplies of the army at cost, but that if they persisted in striking, it might mean the extension of the American bridgehead to embrace Hoehn, in which case they would be forced to work. The former alternative was accepted and an arrangement made, whereby the miners received a 90% increase in wages and a seven hour day in the pit; food was also sold them as promised. The demands of the laborers being considered just, the directors of the company were told that they would be held personally responsible if the increase in wages and the change in hours were not accorded, and if, as a result thereof, the miners struck. The directors were also informed that in case of a strike and subsequent lack of power in the army area, tramway service would be suspended and only those houses supplied with light in which Americans were billeted.

The Street Railway Company was required to furnish such daily reports as were necessary to keep the Office of Public Utilities fully informed as to its activities. These reports were kept in a graphical form.

COAL

Although coal supply as a whole was not a function of the Office of Public Utilities, yet a brief sketch will be given of it here. Responsibility for coal, as far as the army was concerned, lay with Advance G. H. Q., a representative also being attached to the Interallied Coal Commission at Cologne. This Commission met once a month and passed on

the coal requirements of the various industries and public utilities in Alsace - Lorraine, the Palatinate and the Rhine Province. With this organization, the Public Utilities Officer had little or no direct contact, as the requirements of his area were presented through the American member.

The supply of coal for all uses in American occupied territory was looked after by the Wirtschaftsstelle, or Industrial Board at Coblenz. All large consumers and wholesalers were required to obtain their coal through this board, which operated very efficiently, having extensive powers of confiscation, etc. It often became necessary to take up the matter of lack of coal for some special utility with the Wirtschaftsstelle, and in every case utmost efforts were made to supply the need. In some cases, the necessary coal was taken from other utilities in which a surplus existed, and in other cases, from private industries. The utility to which the coal was delivered was in all cases called upon to make regular payment to the party from whom it was taken.

The strike which occurred in the Ruhr district during March and April 1919, was not felt in American occupied territory until May and June; but it then became very difficult to obtain sufficient coal to meet demands.

Almost the whole question of administration and supervision of public utilities in American occupied territory between August 10, 1919 and January 10, 1920, on which date peace was declared and the Interallied Rhineland High Commission assumed control, resolved itself into one of procuring sufficient coal to operate them. It was apparent as early as February 1919, that it would be difficult to obtain a sufficient supply, and with this fact in mind, the Public Utilities Department suggested that coal be sent from America to cover the requirements of the utilities in the American area. This proposition was not complied with owing to the cost of transportation and to the depreciation of the Mark.

The first serious coal shortage occurred at the Coblenz Power Station about August 15, 1919. On September 1, the Plaidt Station, whose transmission system includes Kreise Mayen and Ahrweiler, was extremely short of coal. The allotment of the Plaidt plant was 900 tons per month, but in view of the fact that the Silesian forces were to occupy Kreis Mayen, thereby increasing the population by approximately 10,000, it was necessary to attempt to procure an increase in the allotment. This, however, proved very difficult.

Several gas works were shut down during the winter months for varying lengths of time, ranging from one to five days as a maximum. In cases in which the water supply was dependent upon proper operation of the gas plant, these utilities were supplied with coal from army stocks, thereby preventing water scarcity. In order to make certain the delivery of the allotted coal to the Coblenz Power Plant and the Plaidt Power Plant, a system of shuttle-trains was organized. A shuttle-train of eleven cars was operated and convoyed from Coblenz to Hombert, (Ruhr Basin, unoccupied Germany), to haul nut-coal. The capacity of this train was about equal to the daily consumption. In like manner, a shuttle-train was convoyed to Wiesling for raw-brown coal, also for the benefit of the Coblenz Power Station. A shuttle-train of fifteen cars was operated and convoyed to Frechen for the Plaidt plant. Operation of these shuttle-trains guaranteed continual supply to the important electrical utilities in the area, but did not meet the immediate demands which these plants faced. For that reason, the Public Utilities Department loaded the barge "Karl Wilhelm" with 585 tons of raw-brown coal and a similar quantity of generating briquettes, the idea being to tide over the critical condition and build up a small reserve.

An attempt was made to have the local branch of the Reichskohlen Kommissar increase the allotment to the utilities in the occupied area in order to provide for the increased consumption attendant upon the increased population. The Reichskohlen-Kommissar, however, absolutely refused to increase these allotments so that it was necessary for the army to requisition the coal needed, which was delivered by the shuttle-trains mentioned in the previous paragraph.

The average allotment to utilities was 66 2/3% of that of the year 1918. Had this quantity been delivered, it would not have been necessary for the army authorities to step

in; but the deliveries by the German Distribution Board was actually in most cases about 30% of those of 1918.

The next serious coal shortage occurred during the first flood, during which time, it was necessary to resort to the requisitioning of barges on the Rhine river. Barges were requisitioned at three separate times, - once during the first flood (December 1919), again during the second flood (January 1920), and, finally, during the Spartacist uprising in the Ruhr coalfields (March/April 1920). In all, about three month's coal supply was commandeered for public utilities by means of requisitioning barges. In every case, the original consignee was in unoccupied Germany. The question of the grade, quality and suitability of the coal was determined by an analysis made at the laboratory of the municipal gas works.

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CHAPTER NO. 10

INDUSTRY AND LABOR

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[Omitted. Appears under "The Armistice."]

CHAPTER NO. 11

RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMY AND CIVIL POPULATION

ORDERS REGULATING PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMY AND CIVIL POPULATION

The attitude which it was desired should be adopted by the American army in regard to relations with the civil population of occupied Germany, was announced by General Pershing in an order issued three days before the Allied armies entered Germany. This order, in part, is given below:

G. H. Q.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GENERAL ORDERS)
NO. 218.)

France, November 28, 1918.

In view of the extraordinary conditions under which that part of the American Expeditionary Forces which constitutes the Army of Occupation of German territory is serving, the Commander-in-Chief desires to acquaint the officers and men composing it with the expectations which he entertains as to their conduct. You have come not as despoilers or oppressors, but simply as the instruments of a strong, free government whose purposes towards the people of Germany are beneficent. During our occupation the civil population is under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.

It is, therefore, the intention of this order to appeal directly to your pride in your position as representatives of a powerful but righteous nation, with the firm conviction that you will so conduct yourself in your relations with the inhabitants of Germany as will cause them to respect you and the country you have the honor to represent. While you appear among them as a conquering army, you will exhibit no ill-will towards the inhabitants.

On the other hand, you are warned against conduct unbecoming your position as instruments of military rule. So long as a state of war continues, Germany remains enemy territory, and there must be no intimate personal associations with its inhabitants. A dignified and reserved attitude will be maintained on your part at all times.

It is not believed that any acts of pillage or violence will be committed by members of the American forces, but, should any persons prove themselves unworthy of this confidence, their acts will be considered not only as crimes against the sufferers, but as dishonoring the American army and as a direct insult to the flag of the United States. Such transgressions, should they occur, will be punished with the severest penalties known to our military law.

G. O. 281, G. H. Q., was shortly followed by an order from the Third Army, which prescribed that members of the forces of occupation should confine themselves to official relations with the Germans and should limit their personal relations to an attitude of "courteous tolerance." This order popularly known as the "anti-fraternization order," became probably the most discussed regulation ever issued by the army of occupation, and affected the private life of practically every member of the army.

At the time it was issued, however, its full effect was not appreciated by the army in general, as they had not yet recovered from the emotions produced on the field of battle, which tended to make them distrust and hate all things German. The idea that perhaps as time went on, other feelings might come to the fore, was still undreamt of, and the anti-fraternization order awoke neither resentment nor surprise. During the first days of the occupation, feeling on both sides was in fact so intense, so distrustful and so bitter, that it is surprising that no serious consequences occurred. A vast majority of Americans undoubtedly believed at the time, that the Germans respected no agreement or moral law, that they took pleasure in evil for evil's sake and sought, above all, revenge for their defeat. The inhabitants had also received their full share of propaganda, by which the American army had been conjured up as an undisciplined mob of semisavages. Knowing themselves in its power, a not unnatural sense of fear became prevalent. In consequence, the whole attitude of the civil population became so extreme conciliatory that both officers and men of the occupying army looked upon their obsequiousness with contempt.

The American soldiers were, of course, beginning with their first night on German soil, billeted in the houses of the civil population, who, inspired partly by fear and partly by orders they had received from the Buergermeister and other officials, did everything in their power to placate them. The soldiers, for the first time in months, slept in beds. The peasant women prepared a supper on the family stoves, probably believing that they were required to furnish food to the invading soldiers, as they had been to their own. After supper, the soldiers probably sat in the warm kitchen surrounded by the family, which is a luxury which can be appreciated only by those who have spent long, cold nights in the field. Soldiers and children almost always strike up a strong friendship, and the American soldier and the German boy or girl were no exception to the rule. Soldiers of German extraction who could understand the language, of course got promptly on friendly terms with the civilians with whom they were billeted, despite the rigors of the anti-fraternization order. By the time the troops reached their permanent stations, their mental attitude towards the inhabitants had entirely changed. Though by no means friendly to them, they no longer regarded them with the nervous hatred engendered by fear of sudden treachery. Furthermore, they saw that a great deal of what they had read about the innate viciousness of all Germans was not true, and their war memories in consequence began to fade. A soldier was even occasionally heard to grudgingly admit that the Germans were "pretty good fighters," which remark foreshadowed the eventual revolution of sentiment.

The arrival of the various organizations at their permanent stations produced an even greater change in the relations of the troops towards the inhabitants. No soldier had until this time spent more than one or two nights in the same house and had thus gained no personal acquaintance with individuals. In making his billet in a German home, the soldier found that he could not avoid such acquaintance with his host, and both parties made offers of friendship. The shortage of fuel and the fact that the kitchen was as a rule the only heated room in the house, practically forced the soldier to spend his evenings with the family, and he became friendly or hostile according to how their temperaments coincided with his own.

The military authorities soon realized that it was impossible to enforce the anti-fraternization order in billets, particularly in the small villages, where the people were poor and the houses had a single living room, which, by force of circumstances, had to be used by soldier and civilian in common. Moreover, it was impracticable to prevent the soldier from visiting his company comrades who were billeted in other houses of the town. Consequently, in a relatively short time, the average soldier personally knew most

of the inhabitants of his village. The result was inevitable. At the end of a few months, the only effect of the anti-fraternization order on the average soldier was, that it prevented him from appearing in public with his German acquaintances.

The theory on which the order had been promulgated was entirely in accord with the fundamental principles of military government. If the Americans succeeded in maintaining an attitude of dignified aloofness from the Germans and did not mingle with them at all on a basis of equality, the military authorities would be better able to enforce their orders to the civil population and, incidentally, maintain discipline. It was based on the identical theory which prevents an officer from mingling on terms of equality with soldiers, - the fear that familiarity will breed contempt, to the detriment of discipline. The anti-fraternization order was sound in theory and undoubtedly succeeded in achieving its purpose as far as officers of the army were concerned; but its failure to achieve practical results among the soldiers soon became notorious. The officers, being billeted in the better class of houses, had rooms to themselves, were furnished with coal to heat their rooms and were in fact isolated from the population in general. Soldiers, on the other hand, were thrown into the most intimate contact with the inhabitants, shared their lamp and fireside and enjoyed the same comforts and the same amusements as they during the long winter evenings. The average soldier found that he could no more maintain an attitude of dignified aloofness from the people than could a lieutenant bivouacking for a long time with a detachment of three or four men in the field.

The order, as might naturally be supposed, irritated the German population considerably, largely because they misinterpreted its purpose, and believed it due to a feeling of personal superiority on the part of the occupying army. The imagined contempt therefore wounded their pride. However, at least as far as it affected officers, the order probably had an excellent effect, inasmuch as by requiring them to remain aloof from the population, it thereby lent them a halo of superiority similar to that which had formally been accorded to German officers. On the other hand, by preventing open association with the civil population, it precluded their acquirement of the broadening influences which usually are obtained from residence in a foreign land. The officers, finding it practically impossible to learn the language, also found it difficult to study the institutions and customs, the history, laws, methods of manufacture and the commerce of the country. But the government took the viewpoint that the forces had been sent into Germany to insure the fruits of a hard earned victory, and not for their personal pleasure or profit.

The anti-fraternization order continued in force during the entire existence of the Third Army. With the return of the combat divisions to the United States, during the Summer of 1919, leaving only a small garrison for permanent duty after the signing of peace, a situation arose which necessitated its rescission. The troops were in barracks instead of in billets. Under these conditions, they no longer had an opportunity to mingle with German families and thereby see a softer side of life than their routine duties permitted. German women of better families would not associate with soldiers on account of the army order, and their feminine companionship, if they sought such, had to be found among such types of prostitutes, - usually the lowest ones - as would risk arrest for the chance of a few marks. The venereal rate among the troops in consequence increased with great rapidity. As a preventive measure and in order to allow the soldiers associate with a better class of women, the anti-fraternization order was, on September 27, 1919, more than nine months after its publication, at last rescinded.

Curiously enough, there was almost immediately a striking increase in the venereal rate among the troops. This, however, was believed to be due less to the revocation of the order than to a large influx of prostitutes from France, who had come to Germany upon the departure of the American troops from the former country. The establishment of a vagrancy court, which is described in Chapter No. 7, and other drastic measures, soon rid the American zone of these unwelcome visitors. The venereal rate thereafter began to decline rapidly.

During the year 1919, it must be admitted that the relations between the American soldiers and the civil population were, on the whole, all that could be expected. The good feeling of friendship on both sides increased, slowly but steadily, from the day on which the troops settled in their permanent billets. There were of course certain minor lapses from this general tendency. About April 15, rumors of the severity of the coming peace terms began to be noised through the American zone. Coupled with the critical food and fuel situation and the shadow of Bolshevism hovering over unoccupied Germany, these rumors brought home to the people, as nought else had, the fullness of the defeat they had suffered. A general spirit of discontent was not long in making itself felt, and the people in the American zone no longer tried to hide their dislike of the Allies. The soldiers' attitude towards the Germans had never been in a true sense one of friendship. Like most Americans towards a foreign race, they got along with them, tolerated them, but kept their feeling of superiority the whole time. The moment, however, that the Germans showed an insubordinate spirit, the troops reacted violently and their once-forgotten dislike flared up anew. Numerous fights occurred between disorderly elements of the army and similar elements among the young demobilized German soldiers, most of which, however, originated in drunken brawls or jealousy over German girls. This era of ill feeling reached its height about the middle of May, when the belief became prevalent that the Germans would reject the peace terms. Though it is believed that the ultimate source of ill feeling was the peace terms, there were other apparent causes, which probably grew out of this primary discontent. Among these causes were: discrimination in prices against Americans; increase of drunkenness among Germans; incivility toward officers and soldiers; insulting remarks to women welfare workers. Incidents such as these were quick to inflame the anger of the American soldiers, and their sleeping resentment consequently awoke. In a number of instances, jealousy also arose among the young men because the soldiers had captured the hearts of their former sweethearts. Several priests took occasion to use their pulpits to warn their congregation against permitting German girls to become friendly with American soldiers, and in some cases went so far as to post lists of girls known to have associated with soldiers, on the doors of the churches. Some of the girls who had been on friendly terms with Americans were even subjected to insults from German men. Friction under these circumstances was inevitable.

The German civil authorities, quick to realize the fact that things could not go on as they were, issued a proclamation cautioning their citizens against the practises which had irritated the occupying army, and urging them to keep relations with the soldiers on as friendly a basis as possible. The American army on its part, issued orders enjoining the soldiers to be more orderly and to maintain the attitude insisted on from the beginning, of treating the defeated enemy both justly and firmly. A Rhine steamer which had been used by the army during the spring as an excursion boat for soldiers, was loaned to the German Red Cross, in order that the organization might take maimed soldiers in the hospitals of Coblenz on an excursion. The result of these conciliatory measures on both sides, together with the signing of peace was, to reestablish peaceful if not friendly relations at the beginning of July.

MARRIAGES

It was to be expected that some of the 250,000 members of the Third Army would, in the six months they lived in the occupied area, fall in love with and desire to marry German girls. The orders against fraternization of course tended to check such marriages, but due to its practical nonenforcement outside of Coblenz, there were many cases in which soldiers fell in love with German girls and in the course of time became engaged to them. It is the custom among lower-class Germans to consider an engagement as the equivalent of a marriage. In the Spring of 1919, a number of soldiers came forward, announced that they were engaged to German girls, and admitted that they were responsible that these girls were about to become mothers. They requested permission from the army to marry, stating that they were perfectly willing to stand trial for disobedience of the

anti-fraternization order, but were bound in honor to marry the girls. This situation which had not been foreseen when the order was promulgated. The object of the anti-fraternization order had been primarily to increase the honor and respect in which the German should hold the United States and its soldiers. If the soldiers were now not permitted to marry and were forced by the army to leave their prospective brides to bear illegitimate children, the dignity of the United States would certainly not be raised. On the other hand, if the soldiers were not punished for violating the anti-fraternization order, discipline would suffer. If they were merely punished for violation of the order against fraternization and still not permitted to marry, the government would be placed in the position of forcing the soldiers to commit the crime of seduction. Again, if they were punished and permitted to marry, the government would be in the position of encouraging the soldiers not to marry the girls whom they had seduced, inasmuch as it had placed a premium on their non-acknowledgement of their guilt.

After considerable hesitation, the Army Commander decided to permit soldiers who had seduced girls on promise of marriage, to marry, if their victims had through them become pregnant. The soldier was required to submit a written statement acknowledging this responsibility and declaring that he wished to marry the girl, while the girl was required to submit a certificate of an American army doctor or a reliable German physician to the effect that she was pregnant. The soldier was, under these circumstances, not punished.

Approximately one hundred marriages of American soldiers with German girls were performed under the provisions of this regulation. This is a surprisingly small number when one considers the fact that the army of occupation consisted of more than 250,000 men, most of whom had just spent months of hardship at the front, without any relation with women.

Unfortunately, many soldiers desired to marry who did not come under the new regulation. Some of these were transferred from the Divisions going home, to the organizations which were to remain as the permanent garrison, while it is to be feared that others deliberately attempted to place the girls, to whom they were engaged, in a condition which would permit them to marry. At any rate, so many soldiers of the permanent American forces in Germany applied for permission to marry, alleging the pregnancy of their betrothed, that the Commanding General very naturally became suspicious. Married soldiers in any military unit reduced its efficiency, and are also a constant source of trouble, inasmuch as they sleep out of barracks. Furthermore, an organization with a large proportion of married men, is difficult to transfer from one station to another.

Consequently, on October 9, the Commanding General published a circular letter to organization commanders, directing that all soldiers desiring to marry, even those whose prospective brides were of Allied nationality, must apply through military channels for permission. A supplementary letter shortly thereafter directed commanding officers to refer all such applications to the first section of the General Staff at Headquarters for final approval. These measures effectually checked the growing number of marriages, although they undoubtedly worked a great hardship on many German women who, with a view to complying with the previous regulation, had permitted themselves to become pregnant in order that they might be allowed to marry. Whenever a case appeared particularly distressing, the Commanding General of course authorized the marriage, provided an investigation proved the former good character of the girl.

SALUTING

The American authorities at no time insisted on any outward manifestation of respect or friendliness from the civil population, nor did they require German men to uncover in the presence of American officers or of the national colors. The only courtesy on which the American authorities insisted, was that demanded by the common usages of society.

All uniformed officials were however required to salute all Allied officers. There are a great number of German officials who wear uniform when on duty - police, gendarmes,

railway guards, trainmen, tram employees, postmen, customs officials, state and city foresters, etc. Under the former regime, these officials had always been required to salute German officers, and there was little trouble in forcing them to recognize our own. Such failures to salute as happened, were generally due more to carelessness than to defiance, though a few cases were unquestionably due to the latter. These were severely punished.

CRIMES COMMITTED BY MEMBERS OF AMERICAN FORCES

Crimes have been committed to a greater or less extent by every military force occupying a hostile country in time of war. The reader of history knows that crimes by the military are an inseparable, though regrettable, accompaniment of such an occupation. Always appreciating that fact, it became the earnest desire of the American authorities to decrease the number of crimes committed by members of our forces, to the lowest possible minimum, and strict orders were issued to soldiers to uphold the dignity of their country. Crimes nevertheless did occur and during April and May, became a matter of considerable concern to the Commanding General.

It was learned about this time that German officials were keeping a record of all crimes and offenses alleged to have been committed by the Allied forces or members thereof. It was probably their purpose to later publish the statistics thus amassed, as a proof to the world that the Allies had also committed iniquities, and that the German misdeeds in Belgium were by no means unique. While it is quite probable that they did this to exculpate themselves from the odium felt by the world because of their conduct in Belgium, it is also probable that they hoped by its publication to prevent, or at least mitigate, the punishment of those Germans who were charged by the Allies with responsibility for the Belgium atrocities. The average German to this day disbelieves the stories of the Belgium atrocities which have been so widely spread through Allied countries, and feels that they were simply a means of propaganda for the Allied press. He bitterly resents their imputation of national savagery and is anxious to rid his country of their stigma by narrating tales of similar Allied brutalities at every opportunity.

The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, brought this matter to the attention of the Army Commander in a memorandum, dated June 10, 1919, and made a recommendation that in order to protect the army against false accusations, every complaint against soldiers, however trivial, should be carefully investigated and recorded. This recommendation was approved and shortly thereafter, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs directed all German officials in American occupied territory to submit all accusations of misconduct on the part of troops, however trivial, in order that the American authorities might take suitable action. This order was published in Paragraphs 33 and 36, Civil Affairs Bulletins, June 9 and 10, 1919, respectively:

33. REPORTS OF ALLEGED OFFENSES AGAINST CIVILIANS BY THE MILITARY

All Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs will immediately call upon their respective Landraete and Oberbuergermeister for a complete report of all cases on file in their respective offices of crimes or offenses alleged to have been committed by American soldiers against civilians. This report will be submitted in English and forwarded to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, so as to be received not later than June 15. In case there are no such records on hand, a statement to that effect by the proper official will be forwarded. (See G. O. No. 8, these Headquarters, 29 May 1919.)

36. ACTION OF COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS

All formal complaints made by civilians against the military and all applications for clemency by civilians convicted by military courts will, upon being brought to the attention of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, be reduced to written form and will be promptly acted upon by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, or by him presented to such authority as is authorized to act

on the matter, and in every case, whether the matter complained of is or is not remedied, or whether the application for clemency is or is not granted, the complaint or application, together with a full report upon the facts and circumstances involved, will be forwarded to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army.

Following the memorandum of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, the Commanding General published an order requiring that every complaint submitted by a German should be investigated by a commissioned officer. The report submitted was to include the name of the complainant, the name of the accused, if known, the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, and a statement of any disciplinary action taken or, in default of this, the officer's recommendation in the matter. This report was to be submitted through channels to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army.

Claims for damages, when placed with the military, were forwarded to the Rents, Requisitions and Claims Service. If a claim for damages involved an accusation of misconduct on the part of American troops, a copy was forwarded to the Office of Civil Affairs. Records were also kept of these complaints, which included the name of the complainant, the name of the accused, if known, the name of the investigating officer, the findings of facts, and the action taken or recommended to be taken. The mass of information thus acquired was kept carefully indexed and tabulated. At the same time, the Judge Advocate was required to furnish the Office of Civil Affairs with copies of all General Court Martial orders, so that a complete record might be obtained of all cases, including evidence of punishment awarded. The result of these various methods proved entirely satisfactory and within two months, a record was on file of almost all crimes alleged to have been committed by American troops against German civilians, which included a report of the facts, a statement of the action taken, the punishment inflicted, or the reason why the latter was impossible. Disciplinary action was not taken in some cases because the charge made was found to be either frivolous or untrue, while in many others it was impossible because there was no means of identifying the malefactor.

Altogether, some 800 complaints were received up to October 1, 1919, ranging from murder to accidental destruction of property. Two hundred and fifty-six of these complaints were accusations of felonies, divided into the following classes: Homicide 25; rape 17; attempted rape 17; misconduct toward German women (not legally felonies but, because of their seriousness, tried by General Court Martial) 14; inducing children to commit sodomy 2; burglary 13; robbery 79; larceny 53; assault with deadly weapons 36.

It is believed that in nearly all cases, the officers in command of troops endeavored to prosecute their soldiers for crimes against German citizens with as much energy as they would have shown had the crimes been committed against American citizens, and that the cases in which officers tried to shield offenses committed by soldiers (if there were any such at all), were negligible.

Records of trials by General Court Martial up to October 1, 1919, of American soldiers charged with committing offenses against civilians, discloses the following facts:

Of twenty-five homicides laid by the Germans at the door of the American army, eleven soldiers were tried and six convicted. Three of the acquittals were based on the fact that the manslaughters were accidental and two on lack of proof. The average of these sentences of the six convicted American murders of Germans was greater than that of the two Germans convicted of murdering Americans. There were seventeen complaints of rape, resulting in eight trials. As a result of these trials, five soldiers were convicted and three acquitted. There were seventeen complaints of attempted rape, with five convictions and four acquittals. In both the foregoing classes of offenses, the acquittals were the result of failure to prove the crime and not of failure to identify, and probably most of the complaints which did not result in trial were dismissed for similar reasons. There were fourteen alleged cases of misconduct toward German women, i. e., cases of non-sexual assault, resulting in nine trials and six convictions. There were eight convictions

and one acquittal for burglary, out of a total of thirteen complaints. There were seventy-nine complaints of robbery, sixteen soldiers being tried, and eight convicted. The reason for the small number of trials and convictions for this offense is probably due to the fact that the soldiers who were said to have committed the robberies, were generally masked and therefore could not be identified. Fifty-three complaints of larceny by soldiers are of record, forty-two soldiers having been brought to trial. Twenty were convicted and twenty-two acquitted. From thirty-five complaints of assaults with deadly weapons, twenty-three convictions and one acquittal resulted. There were therefore altogether 118 trials of felonies as against 256 complaints. There were, in addition, seven complaints of mistreatment of German prisoners, two soldiers having been convicted for such offenses by General Court Martial. The reason why there were no trials in the other five cases or in three somewhat similar cases in which Germans complained that they had been robbed in prison, was because the complaints were not submitted to the army until after the organizations to which the accused belonged, had returned to the United States, identification being therefore impossible.

In the above figures, only the General Courts Martial records of the army of occupation have been considered. A great many American soldiers were tried by special and summary courts as a result of complaints by German civilians. Since there was no central office of records for these cases, it is now impossible to compile statistics based on them. However, as practically all the cases in which felonies were charged against soldiers were tried by General Courts Martial, these statistics offer ample evidence of the army's desire to deal justly with the civil population.

Of the 250,000 men who formed part of the Third Army for six months, only 256 were accused of felonies, - a rate of two per thousand per annum. It is of course by no means certain that all these felonies attributed by the Germans to the American forces were indeed committed by them, but even assuming that the complaints were in every case true, the total is very small when one considers that the bulk of all crime, - in fact almost all crime - is committed by youths and men between fifteen and thirty years of age, and that the army was composed almost entirely of men of these ages. Most of these men had been away from the restraints of good women and home life for nearly a year, and during the four months preceding the occupation, had been subjected to the demoralizing influence of continual campaigning in the presence of the enemy, where neither the sacredness of human life nor the rights of property was given a second thought. Furthermore, as investigation later disclosed, nearly 4% of the American soldiers were illiterate, and illiterates are exceptionally dangerous during the occupation of a foreign country, inasmuch as they are incapable of amusing themselves in a better way during their leisure hours and are apt to give way to self-indulgence and dissipation. The majority of American soldiers were also not used to alcoholic stimulants, and the result of their stay in the Rhineland, - the heart of the German wine country, - in no sense taught them temperance. Almost all the acts of violence committed by American soldiers can be definitely traced to overindulgence in alcohol.

In addition to the alleged felonies which have been discussed above, there were 367 complaints of common assault on civilians by soldiers. There is no record of trial of soldiers for this, by far the most common offense, since soldiers who may have been brought to trial were turned over to inferior military tribunals and to special and summary courts.

It must be admitted that the number of trials of Americans for alleged offenses against German civilians appear few in comparison with the number of complaints lodged. This was probably due to the fact that the civilian could seldom bring any more substantial clue to identify the malefactor than that he was an American soldier. It was therefore extremely difficult for the American authorities to apprehend the offenders, most especially since a good many of the crimes were undoubtedly perpetrated by soldiers absent without leave from their organization and whom the American authorities were themselves seeking to apprehend. The difficulties confronting the military authorities

in apprehending soldier criminals was further increased by that fact that the Germans generally seemed to be afraid to make a complaint direct to American officers, but delayed their complaint until they could transmit it through their Buergermeister. The result of this timidity was very unfortunate, inasmuch as the American authorities usually did not learn of the misdeed until several days after it had been committed. It was by that time of course difficult to find the offender. The bare figures by themselves appear discreditable, but it was in fact only by the most vigilant efforts that the army could bring to trial the proportion which it actually succeeded in doing.

LACK OF EDUCATION AND ITS RELATION TO CRIME-- STATISTICS OF THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION

With regard to the lack of education in the army of occupation, it is advisable to call attention here to the report of the Director of Education of the Third Army, Dr. Benton. His criterion for judging literacy was the ability to read and understand a newspaper, and write a letter which could be censored by an ordinary literate man. As a result of his investigation, 9,929 illiterates were discovered in the American army of occupation. This investigation, it should be added, was in no sense complete. Even this number, however, is discreditable to the army of a nation which boasts that it has the finest system of public education in the world, and has long prided itself on the fact that its citizens are more intelligent and better educated than those of other nations. Post schools were started by orders of the Army Commander in every little hamlet in the area, and placed in charge of regimental chaplains or enlisted men who had been teachers in civil life. As a result of these efforts, the number of illiterates was gradually reduced to 1,311 in June 1919.

OFFENSES COMMITTED BY GERMAN CIVILIANS AGAINST MEMBERS OF AMERICAN ARMY

A careful record was kept of the trials of civilians before Provost Courts of the American army. Up to January 10, 1920 the offenses and number of convictions were as follows:

Sale of prohibited alcoholic drinks	517
Unauthorized sale of light wine and beer	335
Sale of unlawful possession of U. S. property	1,580
False statements of U. S. officers	68
Unauthorized assembly	314
Larceny of U. S. property	781
Violation of circulation orders	2,317
Failure to obey lawful orders of military authorities	556
Drunkenness and disorderliness	177
Unlawful possession of deadly weapons	302
Insulting language concerning the U. S. Army	143
Violation of sanitary regulations	918
Disrespect to American officers	81
Practising prostitution while diseased	91
Discrimination in prices	16
Interfering with U. S. troops (assault of American soldiers)	357
Damage to, or destruction of, U. S. property	36
Vagrancy	401
Miscellaneous	712
	9,702

In addition to the above, three Germans were tried for murder by military commissions.

In order to correctly understand the apparently large number, one should take into consideration the list of similar offenses by civilians against United States troops, which offenses number 357. Practically all assaults, whether committed by Germans on Americans or by Americans on Germans, were the result of drunken brawls. In most cases, both parties were about equally to blame, and the figures are consequently as discreditable to one side as to the other.

Certain facts which may be of value in event of a future occupation, may be deduced

from the figures of classified offenses kept by Provost Courts. The most numerous class of offenses was violation of circulation orders, that is, infractions of the Allied orders regarding identification cards and passes for travel. Of this class, 2,317 offenders were tried by American Provost Courts, that is, about one quarter of the entire number of trials. The circulation orders referred to, required every German to provide himself with an identification card, and to obtain permission from the military authorities for all trips. These requirements were a constant burden on German civilians, who often were forced to stand in line for hours, in all kinds of weather, in order to get a pass for a journey of a few miles. It must also be confessed that the regulation was of little value to the Allied authorities. Any German who had a mission so important as to induce him to take the risk, could travel wherever he wished by forging a pass or borrowing that of a friend. The only result obtained by the circulation orders was unnecessary irritation of the civil population. On one occasion, certain German criminals actually had duplicate passes printed and identical rubber stamps made, and for several weeks carried on a thriving business by selling forged passes to such civilians as preferred to pay for a duplicate pass, rather than wait in line for one regularly issued. Such Germans as were tried were usually more careless than defiant, and practically no one was caught trying to elude observation.

The next most numerous class of offense on record was of sale or unlawful possession of U. S. property, for which 1,580 civilians were convicted up to January 10, 1920. Most of these were cases either of larceny of American goods or of receiving stolen American property. The civilians implicated were however not tried for larceny, inasmuch as that offense is a difficult matter to prove, but should be considered in connection with the 181 cases of actual larceny tried.

The third most numerous class of offense consisted of the 918 violations of sanitary regulations. Most of these cases arose directly from the policy of the army to inculcate American ideas of sanitation among the Germans. In the small country village of the Rhineland, the majority of the houses are built around a central court, which is apt to be unsanitary from the American viewpoint. When the American army arrived in Germany, an order aimed at reducing the danger of influenza and insisting that the inhabitants keep their windows open at night, was quick to arouse a great deal of resentment, so utterly opposed were the German ideas of sanitation to American ones. Many a soldier had his outraged landlord say to him during the first days of American occupation: "What is the use of my heating your room for you all day if you let all the heat out at night?". Summer had come before the people had got used to the idea of opening windows at night, and the American authorities had by that time issued new orders to the civil population.

The manure pile is one of the German peasant's most prized possession, usually being kept in close proximity to the family kitchen. Inasmuch as manure piles are breeding places for flies, the Commanding General directed that they be scattered over the fields, and that none in future be permitted to accumulate. This order caused no end of annoyance, and really worked a distinct hardship on the people, inasmuch as it compelled them to alter their carefully arranged system for fertilizing their fields. Most of the 918 cases for violation of sanitary regulations arose from infractions of this order. Enforcement of a change of customs on any people, no matter how insignificant the change may be, is more provocative of dissension than is anything else.

There were 335 trials of civilians for selling wine outside of legal hours, and 517 cases in which distilled liquor and champagne were sold in violation of orders. These 850 cases should be considered as a unit, and they make together the next most numerous class of offenses committed. Here again it will be seen that it is extremely difficult to change long established customs by a sudden order. The German had always taken alcohol where and when he pleased, naturally could not understand the purpose of the order, and resented what he considered as an interference with his proper habits of life. No other class of offenses compares numerically with those already discussed.

Disregarding larceny and unlawful possession of U. S. property, we find that the three most numerous classes of offenses arose over matters in which the American orders directly interfered with national customs and traditions.

The orders published by the army were on the whole faithfully complied with, if we except those dealing with alcohol, circulation and sanitation. Probably in the case of the army, at least two of these three were absolutely necessary for the well being of the army. Yet it is instructive to note that these three rules, inasmuch as they upset the peoples' scheme of life, caused us more trouble and resulted in more irritation, than did the enforcement of all other American orders put together. This is evidence that it is wise to study the national habits and customs of an occupied country before issuing orders, and that when issued, those orders should be so framed as to avoid interference with national habits and customs as far as possible.

Sentences of the American Provost Courts, it must be confessed, were severe, particularly in the assessment of fines. The Commanding Generals naturally felt that fines under the courts of a military government should be more severe than in civilian courts. However, as most Provost Court officers computed the fines in dollars and mentally converted the amount into marks, and as the value of mark had shrunk at one period to a twenty-fifth of its former value, it will be readily understood why the fines were often unreasonably high.

A military occupation which accomplishes its purpose with the least possible friction with the inhabitants, is, in the end, the most successful. The Rhinelander today feels that although we were severe, we were preeminently fair in our dealings. He also realizes that we did not indulge in petty spite and meannesses, that we told the truth and pursued our objectives openly and directly, without chicanery or double dealing.

CHAPTER NO. 12

FINANCE AND REQUISITIONS

PAYMENT FOR MAINTENANCE OF ARMIES OF OCCUPATION

Article IX of the Armistice states:

The upkeep of the troops of occupation of the countries of the Rhine (not including Alsace-Lorraine) will be charged to the German government.

From this it is clear that the German government was under obligation to pay for the maintenance of the American Army of Occupation, excepting as part of that army was stationed in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

No means of payment being laid down in the Armistice, it was necessary that the intricate question as to how Germany should fulfill this obligation be taken up by the Armistice Commission. The cost of the occupation included far more than the pay of the troops, for the cost of food, clothing, supplies, billets and requisitions all had to be settled. It was clear from the first that Germany would be unable to provide food and other supplies, since she had none to spare. It was equally clear that as far as the troops were paid in cash, Germany would have to fulfill this obligation at once, since, inasmuch as they occupied Germany, it was essential that they be paid in marks, and Germany alone had the necessary currency. Even, however, in the matter of pay, Germany of necessity could furnish only about half the required sum to the United States, for approximately half the pay of the Army of Occupation was not given to the men direct, but was disbursed for them in the United States in the form of allotments, war risk insurance, etc. Nevertheless, the Army of Occupation was certain to need many millions of marks, not only for the troops, but also for the payment of requisitions, claims, etc. It was further

soon realized that the Commanding General of the Third Army would have large amounts of funds received from Germany to disburse and account for, and this brought up the important administrative question as to exactly how these funds should be handled.

THE COMPTROLLER'S DECISION

It was impossible to consider the monies paid by the Germans to the Third Army as paid to the United States government, in which case, in accordance with Section 2617 of the Revised Statutes, 1904, they would have to be turned over to the U. S. Treasury. This Section reads:

The gross amount of all money received from whatever source for the use of the United States, except as otherwise provided in the next section, shall be paid by the officer or agent receiving the same into the Treasury at as early a day as practicable, without any statement or deduction on account of salary, fees, courts, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever.

Once in the Treasury, money could of course be disbursed only in accordance with Clause 7, Section 9, Article 1, of the United States Constitution, which provides that:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public monies shall be published from time to time.

On the other hand, it was equally possible to consider the money to be turned over by Germany, as a military contribution levied on the German government by the American army. If this latter view prevailed, the Commanding General could disburse the funds received, whenever and wherever he deemed necessary, since the money could then be considered as a war levy. Obviously, it was greatly to the advantage of the army that the latter view prevail, since, if the funds acquired from Germany were turned into the Treasury, they could be disbursed only in accordance with the laws laid down by Congress. It was believed certain that many situations, never provided for by Congress, would arise during the occupation, since such an occupation had of course never been foreseen.

Shortly after army headquarters had been established in Coblenz, the Army Commander submitted a request to the Commander-in-Chief, asking that he be permitted to treat the funds collected from the German government as a war levy, and disburse them as a part of the internal economic administration of the army. The Commander-in-Chief concurred entirely in this request and recommended its approval, but since the matter involved points of law which were not directly within the province of the military, he submitted the request, together with his recommendation and a supporting brief prepared by the Judge Advocate, A. E. F., to the Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury, who was at that time representing the Treasury Department in Paris.

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* * * Relying on the brief of the Judge Advocate, the Commander-in-Chief asked that the monies paid over by Germany be considered as a war levy and therefore be handled exclusively by the army.

The Assistant Comptroller replied to the Commander-in-Chief in a letter in which he waived these points as academic, and held that, in his opinion, the above quoted clauses of the Constitution, together with Sections 3617, 3618 and 3619 of the Revised Statutes of 1904, settled that the monies paid over by the Germans should be turned into the Treasury of the United States. This decision of the Assistant Comptroller became a constant source of embarrassment to the military authorities in their administration, as will be pointed out in this report hereafter.

METHOD BY WHICH PARTIAL PAYMENT WAS OBTAINED

As early as December 1918, the Commanding General of the Third Army made his first requisition on the Berlin government for money with which to pay the troops. The money

was deposited by the German government in the Coblenz branch of the Reichsbank. That part of it not used was immediately stored in the vaults of the headquarters building. Other requisitions were made from time to time until, by April 1919, 308,000,000 marks had been paid over by the German government to the American army.

In accordance with the decision of the Assistant Comptroller, the money so paid by the Germans was transferred by a voucher to the United States Treasury as miscellaneous receipts and immediately invoiced back to the army under special appropriations. For purposes of accounting, the value of the mark was computed in dollars, and the amounts were thereafter carried in dollars on the books.

As explained later in this chapter, the rate of exchange was in a constant state of fluctuation, the mark generally falling in value each month. As the army kept its books in dollars and its funds in mark notes, this variation in the rate of exchange made book-keeping very difficult. As a practical measure, the books were balanced each month and the loss or gain caused by the decrease or increase in the value of the marks on hand was debited or credited to the German account for the cost of the occupation.

In the month of March, the United States commenced to sell its war material, and also the abandoned German war material seized during the occupation, to civilian purchasers. The proceeds of these sales were of course received in marks and turned into the United States Treasury. Inasmuch as the Treasury had practically no use for marks at home, the money was returned to the army for necessary disbursements, such as the pay of troops. So much money was actually obtained from these sources and from the funds of Provost Courts, that it was no longer necessary for the army to requisition marks from the German government, and all such requisitions ceased after April 1919. The great bulk of sales of property took place in the Spring of 1919, and a great store of marks accumulated in the army vaults during the subsequent Summer and Autumn. However, the value of the mark decreased rapidly during these months, and a heavy loss to the United States resulted as a consequence. The army continued to keep its books in dollars, balancing them at the end of each month and charging off the loss each month against the German government as a part of the cost of the occupation.

The expenses of the occupation will undoubtedly be a very difficult item for the United States to collect from Germany. It is very apparent today that the country is practically bankrupt, as its entire gold reserves are estimated in January 1920, not to exceed 300,000,000 marks. It will probably be many years before the United States government will be able to collect the cost of the occupation which Germany agreed to pay under the terms of the Armistice. Whether, in the light of history, this was a wise policy, only time can tell, but one thing is certain, and that is, that for the time being, Germany was enabled to escape one of the just consequences of waging an indefensible war and was permitted to violate one of the most vital terms of the Armistice through the decision of a Treasury official.

REQUISITION OF BILLETS AND SUPPLIES

Before the advancing army had set foot on German soil, the Army Commander published as orders the regulations which should govern requisitions. In brief, they required that requisitions should be made only on authority of the officer commanding a locality or by his direct representative, and then only on the local Burgomaster or some other civil official. They also required that receipts be given whenever property was requisitioned. This placed the burden on German officials of collecting material requisitioned by the army, as well as responsibility for an equal distribution among the people of such requisitions.

From the very day it entered Germany, requisition of foodstuffs by the American army was prohibited. This was because of the clause in the Armistice which stated that the Allies would consider the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice to the extent recognized as necessary. The Americans realized that, under this clause, they would later be obliged to restore in kind the food requisitioned and that, by requisitioning food, they would give the German government grounds for claiming that the food

shortage was due partly to the fact that the Allied armies had greatly depleted the available stores. The Americans realized further that any food which in future should be supplied to Germany would have to come from the United States, as the supplies available in Allied countries for this purpose could be considered as practically negligible. Requisitioning of food, by the American army, was therefore prohibited, except in especially urgent cases. On the other hand, requisitioning of fodder was allowed, provided of course that it was made by the local commanding officer or his representative and on the proper German civil authority. Requisitioning of forage was continued until the lines of communication were able to supply the army's needs, but as such requisitioning so depleted available supplies that farmers had to kill off their cattle, thereby producing for the time being a surplus of meat, but ultimately reducing the vital milk and butter supply, such requisitioning was discontinued at the earliest possible date. This order also established that billets should be requisitioned through the Burgomaster or other responsible civil official, in accordance with the French billeting law. That law did not require householders to prepare food for troops billeted upon them. Little or no difficulty was experienced at any time in billeting the army, inasmuch as the local officials simply utilized the billeting lists which had been prepared for the German troops. Billeting actually proceeded more smoothly in Germany than in either France or Luxemburg.

During the advance to the Rhine, the troops were billeted in houses or wherever shelter was available. Accommodations were not all that could be desired, but since the army was concentrated along a few roads, it was impossible to provide quarters for all. During the march, however, such hardships as had to be endured made very little difference to the individual soldiers, inasmuch as most of them had become so inured to privation during the summer campaigns that even a hayloft seemed an ideal sleeping quarter. As soon as the units were settled in their permanent stations, the Germans were required to furnish them with proper sleeping accommodations. This, however, became possible, because the troops were then spread out all over the country and were occupying practically every town, village and hamlet in the area. (At one time there were nearly 250,000 soldiers billeted on less than 800,000 citizens. Such close billeting was not required in any other area than that occupied by American troops.) The Commanding General also directed that every male German between the ages of fifteen and sixty, who was not in ill health, should give up his bed if American soldiers billeted in his house lacked them.

PAYMENT FOR BILLETS AND SUPPLIES

The American orders, following the instructions received from Marshal Foch, at first forbade the armies to pay for billets and requisitions, and provided merely that the civil official on whom the requisition was drawn should be given a receipt for all supplies, services or accommodations furnished. Copy of the receipt was to be kept by the officer making the requisition. In the early part of the occupation, the receipts were merely an informal acknowledgment of the transaction, and were turned over by the commanding officer to the Burgomaster as he was leaving the locality. As conditions became stabilized, however, an efficient administrative system was gradually developed. Town Majors were appointed for every city or village; forms for requisitions and receipts were printed and distributed; a central office of rents, requisitions and claims was established and the procurement of billets handled in as simple a manner as if they were provided by one of the supply departments of the army, instead of by the German civil authorities. Under this system, one printed voucher was given to the Burgomaster or Vorsteher, one was kept in the Town Major's office and one forwarded to the Rents, Requisitions and Claims Officer. It was realized that payment for billets would have to be made promptly if friction with the civil population was to be avoided. The Commanding General consequently directed the Disbursing Quartermaster to pay for billeting, both out of the funds received from the German government and from such other funds as had accumulated from the sale of enemy war material and from that of our own supplies.

Payment for requisitions of other supplies, such as fodder, fuel, rent for land used as drill grounds and target ranges, was made in the same manner as for billets.

CLAIMS

The Army of Occupation could not avoid damaging or injuring the property of the civil population. Some damage was merely the result of fair wear and tear incident to the occupation, and was not considered as a basis for claims, inasmuch as payment was supposed to be included in the billeting fee. Other damage arose as a necessary incident to the occupation, but was of such a character that it fell with undue weight on particular individuals; for instance, a case in which a stone road was laid across a field in order to bring supplies to a supply dump, or in which fields were cut to pieces by artillery parks. Many claims also arose as the result of accidents or from wilful or negligent acts of individuals belonging to the military forces.

In order to protect the United States from unlawful claims, the American authorities made it an offense to bring a false claim against the United States. An order was soon afterward issued requiring all claims alleging damages by the troops, to be submitted to the military authorities within forty-eight hours after the damage had been committed. This order also provided that unless the claims were filed within the time specified, or unless there were a good reason for delay, the claim would be disallowed. This provision was inserted in order to prevent Germans from making a claim months after the damage was committed, when it would have been difficult for the military authorities to secure evidence as to whether or not the damage had actually been committed by American troops.

Claims against the government were eventually divided into three classes: Class A - those incident to the occupation and to the necessary functioning of the army of occupation, and not a result of unlawful acts or negligence on the part of individuals of the American army; Class B - those which were a result of unlawful acts or negligence on the part of individuals of the American army, and in which the circumstances were such that the 105th Article of War could not be applied; Class C - those which were a result of unlawful acts or negligence on the part of individuals of the American army, and in which the circumstances were such that the 105th Article of War could be applied.

A system similar to that used in France for the investigation and filing of claims, for the preparation and submission of vouchers and for the payment of claims, was instituted by the Bureau of Rents, Requisitions and Claims at Headquarters of the Third Army in Coblenz. In the settling of Class A claims, after the amount due had been determined and vouchers had been prepared, one voucher was given to the claimant and duplicate vouchers were forwarded to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs presented these vouchers to the proper officials representing the German government, and directed these officials to pay the claims out of funds at their disposal for that purpose. This roundabout method of payment was necessary to avoid turning in the funds to the United States Treasury under the decision of the Assistant Comptroller, above referred to, for had they been turned into the Treasury, there would have been no way authorized by existing law, to secure them again in order to pay claims against the government by enemy national. In order to make certain that the German officials actually made the payment, it was directed that the turning over of the money to the German claimant take place in the presence of an American officer, who signed the original voucher as witness and returned it to the American archives for file.

Class B claims were not disposed of so easily. They were certainly not a legitimate cost of the occupation, chargeable to the German government, since they arose from criminal acts of members of the American forces. There was no congressional provision for payment of this class of claims from money in the Treasury of the United States. No way existed for the time being of settling them. Several authorities on international law argued that the United States was legally financially liable only for such crimes of soldiers as could have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of a superior authority. This argument was based on the theory that an employer was not responsible for damage committed by criminal acts of his employes, unless such acts were brought to his attention in time for him to prevent them. Other authorities argued that the government was responsible for all criminal acts of its soldiers, on the theory that

as military discipline gave it complete control over their conduct, it was responsible for crimes resulting from relaxation of that control. At any rate, in order to be on the safe side, the Bureau of Rents, Requisitions and Claims instituted a complete investigation of all claims resulting from criminal acts of soldiers and filed a report of the investigating officer, together with the testimony of witnesses in that office, for adjustment after the ratification of peace.

Class C claims were somewhat easier to settle. The 105th Article of War provides that:

Whenever complaint is made to any commanding officer that damage has been done to the property of any person, or that his property has been wrongfully taken by persons subject to military law, such complaint shall be investigated by a board consisting of any number of officers from one to three, which board shall be convened by the commanding officer and shall have, for the purpose of such investigation, power to summon witnesses and examine them upon oath or affirmation, to receive depositions or other documentary evidence, and to assess the damage sustained against the responsible parties. The assessment of damages made by such board shall be subject to the approval of the commanding officer, and in the amount approved by him shall be stopped against the pay of the offenders. And the order of such commanding officer directing stoppages herein authorized shall be conclusive on any disbursing officer for the payment by him to the injured parties of the stoppages so ordered. Where the offenders cannot be ascertained, but the organization or detachment to which they belong is known, stoppages to the amount of damages inflicted may be made and assessed in such proportion as may be deemed just upon the individual members thereof who are shown to have been present with such organization or detachment at the time the damages complained of were inflicted, as determined by the approved findings of the board.

When claims arose under provisions of the above Article, they were promptly settled in accordance therewith, but, in actual practice, this Article of War could rarely be invoked. When an offense had been committed it was usually very difficult for the Germans to identify the offender, or even his organization. Such claims had therefore to be settled in other ways. Furthermore, if the offense was against the person of a German (homicide, rape, etc.), the 105th Article of War could not be invoked, but in such cases disciplinary punishment only could be imposed when the offender could be identified. It is known that claims for damages in practically all such cases (especially those resulting in death) have been submitted to the German authorities, and these will probably be presented as an offset to the cost of occupation, chargeable to Germany. The claim for damages resulting from homicide has usually been made in pounds sterling, the amount being 5,000 pounds.

RATE OF EXCHANGE

The Great War radically affected the value of currency throughout the world. The general decrease in money values which resulted therefrom was due largely to the fact that although the world's currency increased somewhat during the five years of hostilities, the commodities which money is used to purchase, had decreased not only by the destruction of war, but also because of vast amount of labor and energy that was turned from the creation of wealth and supplies to the unproductive work of war and of creating supplies of war. Furthermore, all the great commercial and banking countries of the world had become more or less involved in the war and had inflated their currency in conformity to their needs. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, and Italy had also sent abroad a considerable percentage of their gold reserve, in order to purchase additional war material. The result was that the paper currency in circulation in these countries had very little actual gold behind it. The enormous reserve wealth of the British Empire enabled it to finance the war without a radical fall in the value of the pound sterling, although it, too, fell to the lowest point in modern times. On the other hand, the currency of the United States, as well as of the commercial neutral nations, rose sharply, resulting in a

decrease in the purchasing power of money in the belligerent countries.

Under ordinary circumstances, the above mentioned inflation of currency and great exportation of gold by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, and Italy would have caused the value of their respective monetary units to sink in relation to those of the countries still on sound bases. However, for various reasons, this was not the case. The Allied and Associated Powers pooled their credit and England and America were thereby able to keep up the value of the Belgian and French franc and of the Italian lira. The Central European Powers, on the other hand, maintained the value of the mark by doing most of their purchasing at home and by paying for outside purchases with their normal gold reserves and with the special reserve which Germany had levied from France in 1870 and had stored away against the contingency of another war. This policy of Germany of course diminished her reserves, but as she was completely segregated commercially from most of the rest of the world, it made no particular difference in the value of the mark as long as the blockade continued, the value of the mark being the unit of measure and its value being artificially sustained by law. With no other standard against which to measure it, no one in Germany realized how much it had shrunk. Germany's intention was of course to replenish her gold supply from the indemnities to be paid by her defeated foes.

Hardly had the economic blockade caused by the fighting armies been lifted by the withdrawal of the German army, than economic laws began to reassert themselves. During the period of occupation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, Germany had prescribed the rate of exchange between the Luxemburg franc and the mark, at the pre-war rate of 1.25 francs for every mark. This caused a feeling of resentment among the American troops, who were sufficiently good economists to realize that the mark could hardly be relatively worth its pre-war value. However, the banks in Luxemburg soon began to exchange francs for marks at par.

It may be parenthetically stated that there was at this time a tremendous number of marks in circulation in Luxemburg, due of course to the 4 1/2 years of German occupation. The Luxemburg government ultimately got rid of this unstable currency by buying it back on a certain fixed date at the rate of one mark for 1.25 francs and declaring that after the fixed date, marks would cease to be legal tender. The result of this altruistic action on the part of the government in behalf of its citizens and as a compensation for the ruinous rate at which the marks were purchased, was to greatly injure the national credit. In fact, the Luxemburg franc, which would not normally have been affected by the war any more than the Swiss franc, fell as a result of this measure to less than the value of the French franc. The measure was necessary, however, to protect the citizens of the Grand Duchy from great loss, and its people expect the support of the Allied governments in requiring Germany to make good this loss. A similar expedient was resorted to by the French to demonetize the mark in Alsace-Lorraine.

During the advance into Germany, a majority of the American soldiers having only francs, they exchanged or spent them at whatever rate they could obtain. On December 13, pursuant to order from the Interallied High Command, the Army Commander issued a Letter of Instructions directing all Corps and Division Commanders to require the proper local government officials in their areas to publish the official rate of exchange, as fixed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, at the rate of 100 francs equals 70 centimes, and to further require announcement that to demand or accept a rate more favorable than that prescribed would subject the offenders to trial by military tribunal.

The idea of establishing a rate of exchange was intended to apply to official transactions only. It was not the intention to compel banks or private individuals to exchange marks for francs when they did not wish to do so, but it was the intention to compel them to exchange at the prescribed rate if they elected to exchange at all. There is no doubt that the occupying forces had a legal right to establish an official rate of exchange. The German army itself had always done so, not only in Belgium, France and Luxemburg in the present war, but also in France in the war of 1870. Unfortunately, certain Division Commanders misinterpreted the policy of the Commanding General and the order of December 13.

This order in part read:

You will also require the said local officials to include in their proclamation announcing the rate of exchange, a statement to the effect that the rate applies to all civilians as well as to the military and to all classes of currency in circulation within the area of the American occupation.

While this was a correct statement of the policy at the time, it was misconstrued to mean that every person would be compelled to exchange money at the official rate, whereas the intention was merely to regulate the rate in commercial transactions. It was not, as has been remarked, intended to make any bank or individual a bureau of exchange against his will.

This course of action gave rise to a great many complaints from banks and other commercial organizations, for, according to a decree enforced since the beginning of 1916, German banks and bankers were prohibited from doing business with neutral banks at their own discretion, in foreign notes, foreign bills, checks, cable transfers or other foreign negotiable instruments, but had to transact all business of this sort through a few central banking institutions in whose hands the whole management of foreign exchange was concentrated. Banks which had exchanged money at the rate set by the Allies had, for that reason, to accept a lower rate in order to transform their francs back into marks. In their complaint, they stated that inasmuch as they had been subjected to considerable financial loss in these transactions, they desired to submit claim for damages against the United States.

These claims caused the American authorities no little embarrassment, because there was no way of determining the amounts that the banks had actually exchanged, except by their unsupported statements, which could not very well be accepted. The American authorities in such cases decided to stand on their undoubted right of imposing a standard rate of exchange on everyone. Fortunately, for this matter, the fall in the value of the mark continued, so that drafts which the German banks had in some instances been compelled to cash at 142 (though usually they cashed them voluntarily), when the current commercial rate was from 135 to 130, were eventually sold at a much higher rate than that at which they had been bought. This somewhat tempered the sting of their loss the the accidental injustice seemed less harsh.

On December 13, 1918, the mark was worth 70 centimes; on December 27 its value had decreased to 60 centimes, and on this date it had also sunk in interior Germany to about 70 centimes. Bankers continued to object and to file protests. Finally, on December 30, a telegram was received from Advance G. H. Q., stating in substance that it was impossible to fix a rate of exchange for commercial transactions in occupied territory, and that the official rate would apply only to Army disbursing officers. Administrative Bulletin No. 4, January 4, 1919, stated in Par. 2:

All officers and men will be instructed that they should not exchange their money with trades-people or banks, but must apply to the Office of the appointed Disbursing Quartermaster.

On January 1, 1919, the official rate of the mark rose to 67 centimes; on February 11 it sank to 62 centimes; on March 5, to 60 centimes; on May 1, to 50 centimes. From then on, it kept sinking until in January 1920, seven hundred marks were necessary to purchase one hundred francs.

Inasmuch as the official and the commercial value of the mark were usually at variance, considerable speculation on exchange constantly went on among the members of the army. The Disbursing Quartermaster adopted certain measures to prevent this. Among these was the refusal to change marks into francs unless the person was under orders to enter France, and the refusal to cash officers' personal checks on French banks. Such stringent measures worked a great hardship on many of the officers, who had accumulated their pay checks during the last summer of the war. Shortly after arriving in Germany, an order was issued requiring all officers to cash their pay checks before December 30. They were given an

option of cashing them in francs or marks, and as the mark was so unstable, nearly everyone requested francs. During the early months of the occupation, a great many officers went to France on leave and, fearing to lose their surplus francs, deposited them there in Franco-American banks, like the Guaranty Trust Company, the Farmers Loan & Trust Company, Morgan-Harjes & Company, etc. Upon returning to Germany, they found that neither the Disbursing Quartermaster nor any private banks would cash their checks, so that their money was practically bound up in France. In the early part of the summer, the Allies decided to separate their pooled credit, with the result that the franc promptly dropped from about 5.43 to about 9.53. Many officers thus saw several months' pay melt away while they were earning that for one month, but were able to do nothing about it, on account of the regulations imposed by the army. Thousands of soldiers had likewise attempted to save their surplus cash for use on discharge, and they saw their savings swept away in the same manner. The difficulty was obviated to some extent by the fact that the Post Office Department sold money orders in dollars; but this did not help those who had opened deposits in Paris banks.

The reason for the adoption of this policy was probably to help the French franc by preventing American money from reaching German banks; but the lesson which ought to be learned from this unfortunate procedure is, that the pay of the American army is expressed dollars by statute, and that the American soldier has a legal right to demand his pay in dollars wherever he is called upon to serve. If any inconvenience or loss is thereby incurred, such inconvenience or loss should be borne by the Government and not by members of the army.

ALLIED AND NEUTRAL SECURITIES IN ENEMY HANDS

The terms of the Armistice provided that while it lasted, no public securities which could serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of, or reparation for, their losses, should be removed by the enemy. This of course referred solely to securities belonging to the German government and in no way affected those of German nationals.

Food conditions in Germany became so desperate at the approach of the Spring of 1919, that it was found necessary to purchase food from outside sources to feed the population. This brought up the question of payment, which was a factor of great importance, since both the German gold reserve and foreign credits were limited. A conference was held in Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919, to determine the conditions under which Germany might purchase foodstuffs. It was agreed by all parties at this conference, that Germany's payment should be made in foreign securities, either by their outright sale or by an arrangement through which advances could be made, using the foreign securities as collateral.

In regard to the sale and use of foreign securities as collateral, the Allied and associated delegates requested the German government to take immediate steps to requisition all foreign bonds, stocks and securities of every description held by its nationals, with the exception of those of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria and Russia. The German delegates replied that necessary measures would be taken immediately as to bonds, but that the question of the extent to which stocks would be requisitioned would have to be considered. They pointed out that there must be some few exceptions to the rule that all securities would be requisitioned whether in Germany or not, provided that they were the property of a German resident within Germany.

The Allied and associated delegates agreed to appoint a technical committee for the purpose of dealing generally with the requisitioned securities and to make arrangements for their sale or their use as collateral. This committee was also to receive information as to the progress made by Germany in the collection of securities.

As a result of this conference, the German government issued an edict on March 26, 1919, ordering all foreign securities, except those of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, and Turkey to be immediately placed at the disposal of the state for purchase. This edict, published in full in Appendix No. 18 of this report, was of considerable

length and intricacy. Its substance was that all securities as above mentioned must be turned into a bank or banking firm between April 2 and April 12 and would be then paid for by the government. If not turned in and if later discovered, they would be confiscated. A penalty clause was attached, making failure to declare the securities, punishable by a fine of 10,000 marks or by imprisonment for six months.

Excellent as was the idea underlying this order, it proved practically impossible to enforce, since securities can easily be concealed. The Germans realized very quickly the practical difficulties involved, and, as their interests required it, apparently did their best to enforce the edict. Customs officials on frontiers were directed to prevent the prohibited exportation of securities, cooperation of the banks was obtained and postal censors were required to search registered mail. An "aerial police" was in fact inaugurated, to prevent smuggling the papers out by airplanes. The government was by these means able to collect sufficient securities from its nationals to pay for the cost of the imported food.

The Allied High Command was not satisfied with the German law, because no distinction was made in the treatment of occupied and unoccupied territories. The Allies were selling considerable additional amounts of food to occupied Germany, where the population was being fed in accordance with the ration agreed to at the Lamorlay Conference. This ration was considerably more nourishing than that issued in Unoccupied Germany. The Ebert Government declined to guarantee these excess purchases of food made by the Rhineland. Marshal Foch, knowing that the Rhineland was well able to pay for the excess out of its own resources, attempted to settle the whole matter by his order issued April 19, 1919. He declined by this order to admit the German interpretation of the decisions of the Brussels Conference, and directed that securities in occupied territories should be centralized under control of the Allied military authorities in German banks on the left Rhine bank, and be used under Allied control for the payment of food supplies, or "for any other purpose which the Allies may decide upon." Orders were at once issued by the various occupying armies prohibiting the export of such securities from occupied territories.

The American order on this subject forbade the removal from occupied territory of specie, allied securities, or allied bills of exchange, and forbade banks to pay, give or return to anyone, gold coin or bullion, regardless of how held. In order to check the enforcement of this order, banking institutions were required on specified dates to furnish statistics of their financial condition, including lists of foreign securities held by them. The banks at once vigorously protested, but without avail. One private bank, which maintained its protest and refused to furnish the statistics required, was closed by the military authorities until the order had been complied with.

Marshal Foch modified his orders on May 7, by another, which provided as follows:

1. Returns from the sale of securities will be used for the payment of foodstuffs in the proportion and according to the conditions laid down by the Brussels Conference. These returns may not be used for any other purchase except by common agreement.
2. Returns from requisitions on the left bank of the Rhine will not be used for provisioning the local population; but the local population may be provisioned in conformity with the Brussels Agreement.
3. Securities on the left bank of the Rhine will be centralized and preserved in local banks to be named by the German government in agreement with the Allied governments; for example, at Cologne and Mayence. Necessary instructions will be given, that the decree of the German government, dated March 26, may be applied immediately in the different zones of occupation, under the understanding that requisitioning will be made on both banks of the Rhine according to the same principles and methods.

BANKING INSTITUTIONS

A complaint was raised by financiers of the various Allied and Associated Powers, immediately after signing of the Armistice, that the financial clauses and restrictions of that document were not sufficiently strict. They said that, under the terms laid down, it would be possible for the Germans to smuggle bullion and securities from their country and thus reduce their wealth to such a point that they could never pay the costs of reparation. The French, since they were most concerned with preventing the bankruptcy of Germany, were particularly nervous about this. They made very elaborate rules for supervision of banking institutions in the territory occupied by them, believing that if they could control the activities of these banks, they would have a good grip on the financial resources of the country. The Americans at first followed the lead of the French in this matter and thoroughly investigated the banks in their own area. The most important of these were:

- (1) Deutsche Reichsbank (Branch of the Imperial Bank; headquarters in Berlin. Branches at Coblenze and Treves.)
- (2) Deutsche Bank (Main office at Berlin; branches at Coblenze, Treves, Bernkastel-Cues.)
- (3) Disconto Gesellschaft (Main office at Berlin; branches at Coblenze, Treves.)
- (4) Dresdner Bank (Main office at Berlin; branches at Coblenze and Neuwied.)
- (5) Bank fuer Handel und Industrie (Darmstadter Bank. Main offices at Berlin and Darmstadt; branch at Treves.)
- (6) Darlehenskasse fuer Deutschland (Branch at Coblenze.)
- (7) Landwirtschaftliche Centralderlekenskasse fuer Deutschland (Branch at Coblenze.)

It was found that the banking laws of Germany were like the corporation laws, far less strict than in America. With exception of the Reichsbank, all the above were joint-stock companies doing a large general banking business, each with a special clientele among various industries and trades. The Reichsbank is the chief bank of Germany and is very closely allied with the Treasury. It was organized on January 1, 1876, as the successor of the Prussische Bank. Founded exclusively on private capital, divided into shares, it is according to the German law, a public institution of the government, and not subject to rules governing stock companies. It is, however, placed under direction of the government, as represented by the Chancellor and the directorate of the Reichsbank, the latter consisting of a representative of the Chancellor and four other members. Its functions are to regulate circulation, facilitate exchange and payments and make possible the use of available capital. It has the right to issue notes and script, as have a number of other individual state banks, such as those of Bavaria and Saxony. It also stands in close relation to private banks, every important one of which maintains a checking account with it. It has also the right to issue loans, using gold, consols and state municipal securities, known as Lombards, as collateral.

Prior to the war, the Reichsbank and the state banks alone had the right to issue notes and script, but when the war began, this privilege was extended to a great number of cities, districts, provinces, chambers of commerce and private firms. The Reichsbank at the same time opened at Darlehenskasse or loan bureau, which lent money on gold, bills of exchange, merchandise and stocks and bonds which were listed in the Berlin Stock Exchange. It was permitted also to issue notes for general circulation, marked "Darlehenskassenscheine," which had deposits of merchandise, including copper, zinc and silver, as security. A vast amount of these latter notes were issued up to December 1918.

The following facts are interesting as showing the great inflation of the Reichsbank's credit during the war. On December 31, 1918, the statement of the Reichsbank showed: Capital 180,000,000 marks; surplus 99,496,423 marks; bank notes outstanding 24,855,257,180, of which about 17,500,000,000 had been issued since August 1, 1914, and against which there were 1,858,577,256 marks in gold bullion and gold coins. Prior to the war, all Reichsbank notes were secured by precious metals to the extent of 30% and

the balance of bills of exchange, checks and Treasury notes. On January 1, 1919, the gold reserve behind Reichsbank notes had shrunk to 7 1/2% of the issue. The credit of the Reichsbank is represented principally by the balance of the outstanding notes.

Under the law, the German banks were required to balance their books on December 31 of each year, but the American authorities required them to be balanced at the end of every month in order to furnish the monthly report demanded from each bank in the area. Most of the banks protested against this, but were reassured when the authorities agreed to keep secret the data disclosed by these reports. One banker, the dean of the Rhineland bankers, who had been a supervisor of French banks during the occupation of 1870, persisted in his refusal to render the required accounts. His bank was closed and permitted to reopen only when he agreed to fulfill the American orders.

This monthly report required a statement of the total assets of banks, the amount of the total deposits under three headings: (1) the money actually on hand; loans due to be returned within seven days; (2) loans due within three months, and (3) loans not due until three months. A report was also required on the specie, German paper, gold, French paper, French specie and other foreign monies in the banks. Saving banks were required to state the total number of their accounts. All were required to give a list of securities owned and a statement as to where they were held, and, finally, all changes of securities during the month had to be specially noted. These reports were required with a view, as has been said, of keeping check on German finances, especially in the matter of securities. After three months, at the end of April 1919, when it was discovered that, as they were of no value to the American army, and caused endless difficulties besides, they were discontinued.

Curiously enough, instead of injuring the commercial prosperity of the Rhineland, the American occupation greatly benefited it. The American soldier nominally received his pay in dollars, but as it was given him in the equivalent value in marks, and as the marks had greatly depreciated, the pay even of privates was prodigious. For instance, in the month of October 1919, the rate of exchange being about 28 marks to \$1.00, the private, who normally received \$30.00 per month, was paid 840 marks, or about 50% more than the best paid skilled German laborer. From the point of view of the Germans, the American army seemed an army of millionaires. Soldiers proverbially spend money like water, and the American soldiers in Germany were no exception. A good 70% of their pay must have found its way into the pockets of eager German merchants and tavern keepers.

As a matter of curiosity, the American authorities caused the German banks to state the amount of their deposits on June 30, 1918, and again on June 30, 1919. The increase of deposits was figured on a per cent basis. The average increase in the deposits of ten banks picked out at random throughout the area, was 41.9%. It is curious to note that, although the increase was general, as no bank showed a decrease, yet the city banks' deposits increased at a ratio far greater than that of country banks. This was probably due to the fact that it was to the cities that the soldier went for his cherished "souvenirs."

TAXATION AND BUDGETS

Although under the usages of war, the United States had the undoubted right to control both the budgets and the money collected by taxation within so much of occupied Germany as was under its control, it was decided not to make use of this right. The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs at Advance G. H. Q., both demanded and received from the German authorities in December 1918, a list of taxes previously collected, together with a statement of the amounts actually received from each tax.

GERMAN WINE AND LUXURY TAXES

The members of the occupying forces were of course not required to pay direct German

taxes. In December 1918, however, the question arose whether the luxury taxes imposed as a war measure by the German government could be avoided. These taxes were collected by the government from all merchants who sold luxuries, and the latter of course included them in the prices for their merchandise. It was consequently very difficult to prevent their collecting the tax from members of the occupying forces who desired to purchase the articles in question. The tax amounted in most cases to 15% of the selling price. An order was issued from Advance G. H. Q., on December 28, which provided that no luxury tax should be charged to any member of the American or Allied forces in the territory occupied by the American army. This order caused considerable difficulty to the German Hauptzollamt, or Chief Tax Office, since there was no way to determine which taxable article had been purchased by Germans and which by members of the occupying forces. Wine was probably the principal article purchased by Americans which was subject to taxation. Hotel and tavern keepers early began to avoid payment of their wine taxes by claiming that their sales had been to Americans. The German authorities inquired, in the latter part of January whether or not Americans were to be required to pay the wine tax. The American authorities replied by merely sending a copy of the order relating to luxury taxes which has been mentioned above as being the only order until then issued on the subject. From the manner of this reply, the Germans assumed that the Americans regarded the wine tax as a luxury tax, and the matter was dropped.

On April 25, 1919, an order was issued from the headquarters of Marshal Foch, which provided that the purchase of wine for military or officers' messes should be exempt from taxation, but that wine purchased by individual members of the Allied forces was liable to it. This was in order to assist the German Chief Tax Office. Purchases made for messes, canteens, etc., were to be accompanied by a stamped statement to the effect that they were not liable for the tax, which statement would be accepted by the German authorities in lieu of payment of the tax. Nothing was at first done about this order in the American area, but the Germans learned of its existence and brought it to the attention of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, with a request for information as to how the matter was to be treated.

This compelled the American authorities to decide upon a definite policy. It was very desirable that the German government should collect its wine tax unhampered, as the tax is a very considerable source of income, and the German income was to be used largely to pay indemnities. It was well known that the German wine merchants and tavern-keepers were using the American order regarding luxury taxes, as a ground on which to refuse to pay their own taxes. It seemed, however, impracticable to print tax coupons similar to those used in France, and to distribute them throughout the army, for it was felt that the army of occupation was not likely to continue to exist long enough to justify such trouble and expense. The American authorities were well aware that tavern-keepers were generally charging the wine tax to soldiers on the same basis as to civilians. Members of the army generally paid what the merchant said the wine had cost, tax included, so that the order of December 28 did not, as a matter of fact, protect them at all, but served merely as an excuse to German wine dealers to avoid their just taxes. No prosecution of dealers for attempting to collect the luxury or wine tax from members of the army of occupation ever took place. When the request was received from the German authorities for information as to how the Americans proposed to treat the wine tax in view of Marshal Foch's order of April 25, the whole matter was carefully considered again, and it was decided that it would be better to let things continue as they were, - the soldiers actually paying the tax, - than to change the order and lay down a new policy at so late a date. On July 22, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs wrote to the Oberzolldirektion at Cologne, saying that since the wine tax was not a luxury tax, the whole matter was thereby settled, because the American authorities had issued no order prohibiting the tax on wine. He went on to point out again that the American authorities had never insisted that a wine tax should not be collected from members of their army. The Germans answered with a request to be allowed to publish a notice in the papers to the effect that the American army was

no longer exempt from paying the wine tax. This request was granted on August 20, 1919, after considerable correspondence. The effect of the announcement was, that all tavern-keepers, who had been previously including the wine tax in the price of their wine, immediately took occasion to raise their prices 20%, that is, to the amount of the tax. This caused great discontent among the troops and it was therefore decided definitely to exempt the military from payment of the wine tax. All restaurants were at the same time required to post their bills of fare and wine lists, together with prices in a conspicuous place, and it was further required that the prices on the wine list should be indicated both with and without the addition of the wine tax. The difficulty which the German tax officials had had in collecting the just wine and luxury taxes from the merchants, was met by a German order, which provided that upon sale of wine or of an article of luxury to a member of the American army, a coupon was to be presented to the purchaser, on which he should sign his name, state the article purchased, the price paid and the date of purchase. This coupon was to be accepted by the Chief Tax Office in lieu of payment of the tax. This order of September 15, 1919, effectually disposed of the question of taxing members of the American forces.

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CHAPTER NO. 13

ARMISTICE INTERPRETATIONS AFFECTING AMERICAN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

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[Omitted. Appears under "The Armistice."]

CHAPTER NO. 14

AMERICAN SUPERVISION OF GERMAN CIVIL GOVERNMENT

Paragraph V of the Armistice agreement of November 11, 1918, states:

The countries of the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the troops of occupation of the Allies and the United States.

This paragraph exercised an immense and far reaching influence over the character of the succeeding military government of the Rhineland. History records very few instances of an invading army stabilizing its control under conditions so favorable to the task in hand. The surrender to the Allies by the German government of the whole administrative, legislative and judicial machinery of the territories to be occupied, rendered the problems of civil control which confronted the Allied armies comparatively easy of solution. Supervision requires tact and judgment rather than the display of constructive genius. One is spared the necessity of erecting courts, appointing officials or providing intricate systems of education or finances. The most critical problem that can confront an occupying army was solved when Germany's representatives

placed their signatures on the Armistice in the forest of Compiègne. In Cuba and the Philippines we had striven to revise native methods, and with results which fully justified the amount of labor expended. During the whole occupation of Germany, legislatures, executives, judges, customs officials, - the most complicated and reputedly most effective civil organization in the world - were placed under the direction of American military government.

The contrast with earlier occupations becomes most striking if we compare the various causes which led to our presence on foreign soil. The military occupations of Cuba and the Philippines had been begun with the definite purpose of rehabilitating the corrupt and decadent governments of those lands. Whether the magnitude of the task undertaken was realized at the time is perhaps doubtful, but once begun, we did realize that we could not be content with reorganizing the government, but would have to revivify the whole civilization. Compared to these difficulties, our task in Germany was simple and direct. We had no intention of attempting to influence Germany to accept our form of government. Our enemy was a nation as highly organized in many ways as were we in others. Her people, finally awake to the danger of delegating power to a small group of autocratic noblemen, were far more capable of erecting a new government, suitable to their temperament and development, than were officers of a foreign army. The troops of occupation had but to maintain themselves on foreign soil, and their task - that of constituting a weapon to prevent renewal of hostilities and to force compliance with the peace terms - would be accomplished. Our supervision of the civil administration need only suffice to insure the maximum security of troops. America coveted no Rhenish Territory. It has never been an American policy to stoop to maneuvering to obtain commercial or political advantages, nor to carry on propaganda. Supervision of the civil government might be either strict or loose, in accordance with the docility or hostility of the population, but there was no intention to interfere with German customs or institutions. As a practical proposition, the American army found it impossible to avoid interference in matters not strictly within this definition of "security." Army Headquarters found much difficulty in restraining subordinate officers from interfering too much in civil affairs, and in accepting responsibility which properly should have fallen on German shoulders.

There was another factor in the wording of Paragraph V which rendered the task of military government comparatively simple. In December 1918, unoccupied Germany was still suffering from the effects of the revolution of November 9. The overthrow of a regime, so long established and so well recognized as that of Germany, cannot be accomplished without the dislocation of the machinery of government. In revolutions in the past, there has usually resulted a complete change of administrative personnel. In unoccupied Germany, many officials either resigned or were displaced, a step which inevitably affected the efficiency of the governmental services. Paragraph V of the Armistice, however, was so interpreted by both Germany and the Allies that "local authorities" meant the officials of the old regime. As a result, the armies of occupation had a thoroughly capable group of officials to carry out their orders and wishes, and were spared recognizing and dealing with the chance appointees of Workmen's Councils whose selections were made during the hysteria of revolution.

This chapter, dealing with American supervision of the German organs of civil government, may logically be divided under three headings:

1. Supervision of legislative organs of government
2. Of the executive administration
3. Of the judiciary

The American policy towards each of these governmental functions will be treated chronologically and in some detail. The political events and life of Western Germany during the occupation will be treated only incidentally, and then, with a view of emphasizing those events which influenced the decisions of the army of occupation.

I. SUPERVISION OF CIVIL LEGISLATIVE ORGANS

NATIONAL AND PRUSSIAN ELECTIONS

The revolution of November 9 naturally had its effect on the political and administrative systems of Germany. Prussia in particular had been governed for centuries by a King and a Council of Ministers, whose decrees had the force of law. A well organized administrative system subordinate to the council secured the enforcement of the royal laws and regulations. Local government was still in an embryonic stage of development. The Diets, from the Prussian Landtag to the Village Council, were chosen by an elective system which granted two-thirds of all delegates to the propertied and governing classes. A somewhat more liberal system of elections prevailed in the states of South Germany, but even there, Kings and Councils had managed to retain decisive authority in their own hands.

The revolution of November 9 was essentially a protest against an outworn system. Its leaders, having overthrown the old regime, appreciated the necessity of obtaining immediate reorganization of the form of both Prussian and local governments. Ebert and Scheidemann were no hair-brained fanatics, aiming to secure the Socialist party in power at the expense of Germany. A counterrevolution by the monarchic elements seemed a distinct probability and its success possible, if a combination of Socialist and Bourgeois parties was not promptly effected to defend the republic. The adhesion of the latter parties to the government could be secured at that time only by a promise from the Socialist leader to proceed to election of the German and Prussian Assemblies. It was promised that these assemblies, when chosen, should have the power to formulate constitutions for the respective states, and in the meantime, to organize governments of a representative and democratic character. It was accordingly decided to hold elections for the National Assembly on January 19, 1919, and for the Prussian Assembly on January 26, 1919. No provision was made to exclude those portions of the country occupied by foreign armies from participation in these elections. Alsace-Lorraine was however, excluded, as it was a foregone conclusion that those provinces would be ceded to France.

The decision, whether to authorize or to refuse permission in occupied territory for these elections, was a matter properly pertaining to Allied G. H. Q. In view of the necessity of permitting Germany and Prussia to reorganize their governments sufficiently to sign and abide by the peace terms, Marshal Foch decided to accord the German authorities the necessary authority to hold the elections. This decision was thoroughly in accord with French sentiment at the time, there being no expressed desire to annex the Rhineland to France.

The American army particularly desired a free and fair expression of the will of the German people. The war which had just ended, had, on our side, been a struggle against an autocratic government. These elections therefore constituted the symbol of our victory and, it was hoped, the dawn of a better day for Germany.

Instructions to Corps Commanders defining the attitude of the American army during the elections were sent out in telegraphic form by Army Headquarters on January 15. This telegram laid the responsibility for proper conduct of the elections squarely on the shoulders of the duly constituted civil authorities. Members of the American army were prohibited from expressing any preference for, or opposition against, any German political principle. The last sentence of this telegram was:

They (the civil authorities) will take such steps as may be necessary to secure a full, free and fair expression of the will of the voters of Germany in order that the constitution now about to be written and the government now about to be established may be founded upon the immovable foundation of the will of the people.

Advance G. H. Q. informed the army on January 6 that similar facilities should be given the German civil government for the elections of January 26 for the Prussian Assembly.

It is worthy of record that no communication was ever received at the Office of Civil Affairs, Third Army, complaining of interference in these elections by any individual of the American forces.

Despite intense popular interest, the elections passed off without disorder. The results for the American area are noted below, as they indicate the comparative strength of the various political parties in American occupied territory.

NATIONAL ELECTIONS

January 19, 1919

Centrum (Catholic Party)	277,811
National Peoples Party (Reactionary)	2,831
Democratic (Bourgeois)	46,243
Social Democrats (Workingmen)	58,361
Miscellaneous	3,223
Total	388,469

PRUSSIAN ELECTIONS

January 26, 1919

Centrum (Catholic Party)	267,840
National Peoples Party (Reactionary)	4,152
Democratic (Bourgeois)	36,852
Social Democrats (Workingmen)	51,561
Miscellaneous	<u>2,895</u>
Total	363,300

INTERDICTION OF LOCAL ELECTIONS

The National and Prussian Assemblies, having met at Weimar and Berlin, respectively, proceeded to the organization of representative governments for Germany and Prussia. Both governments, when organized, developed radical tendencies, the Majority-Socialist party having polled nearly half the voting strength of the nation.

The local diets, assemblies and councils throughout the country had been chosen by the then prevailing three class franchise. Most of them had not been renewed since 1914. During the five-year interim, great changes in public sentiment had developed and these bodies no longer represented the wishes of their constituents. Among the first acts of the new Prussian government was the passage of laws dissolving the old Kreistage and councils and directing new elections by universal suffrage. These laws, published on January 24 and February 18, required the elections for municipal councils to be completed by March 2, and those for the Kreistage by May 4.

When the American authorities learned that the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province had received instructions from Berlin to hold these elections, they believed it good policy to withhold their consent until knowledge of the wishes of the High Command could be obtained, as uniformity of policy on such a vital matter was imperative. It was known that the advisability of permitting these elections was then under consideration at Allied G. H. Q.

A telegram from Marshal Foch on February 17 announced that it had been decided to forbid execution of the decrees of the Prussian government pertaining to elections for municipal councils. The telegram stated in explanation that it seemed clearly unwise for the time being to overturn existing local authorities. Billeting and local requisition

of the armies had been effected by order on the German civil authorities. A wholesale replacement of these experienced officials by new and untried men - a step which would logically have followed the choosing of new councils - could only prove harmful to the interests of the armies. It also seemed inadvisable to begin another series of elections and subject the temper of the people to the partisan issues of politics. Third Army Headquarters transmitted the instructions of Allied G. H. Q. to all Corps and Division Commanders. Each of these generals was directed to take such steps as he deemed necessary to secure the enforcement of the Marshal's orders.

It will be noted that this decision of Allied G. H. Q. contained no reference to the Prussian law of February 18, 1919, directing new elections for the Kreistag. On March 21 the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 3d Division, informed the Army Command that the Landrat of Mayen had received orders from the German government to hold elections for a new Kreistag. This official begged that we prohibit the election, stating that inasmuch as the members of the Kreistag were chosen by the communal councils, and as the old councils were still in existence, the new diet would be no mere representative of the will of the people than was the old. The army authorities did not feel themselves competent to decide questions of policy of this nature, and referred the matter to Advanced G. H. Q. A reply was received on March 21 from the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied territory, which stated that the interdiction of municipal elections had been considered as including Kreistag elections. The Landrat of Kreis Mayen was therefore so informed.

On April 19, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, informed the commanders of various Allied armies that local elections might take place in the neutral zone. The German authorities, however, were warned that if disorder resulted, the Allied Command would entertain no request from German sources for reinforcement of their garrisons in the neutral zone. This was a matter of very little importance to the American army as they at no time attempted to exercise any jurisdiction in unoccupied territory.

The Landrat of Berncastel informed the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs on May 26 that elections for the local Kreistag had been held in his Kreis on May 3. He further stated that he had since learned that the American army had prohibited these elections, and now requested an American decision as to which of the Kreistag, the old or the new, should be recognized by him as legal. The mere fact that such elections had taken place appeared on its face a gross violation of orders. It was not surprising, however, that elections had taken place without knowledge of the American forces. Members of the Kreistag are chosen by the various Buergermeistereiversammlungen of the Kreis. The meetings of these assemblies, in view of their local character and because of the small importance of the matters therein discussed, were not attended by army representatives. The army, like Advanced G. H. Q., had taken the point of view, that the directions conveyed to the local civil authorities and unit commanders, in Letters of Instruction No. 13, February 19, 1919, (prohibition of municipal elections) was a sufficient statement of American policy to prevent holding of elections without previous authorization. In this case, however, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, decided that a careful investigation should be made before instituting disciplinary proceedings. This investigation disclosed the fact that, through an oversight, neither the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province nor the Regierungspraesidenten of Coblenz or Treves had been informed of a specific American policy in respect to Kreistag elections. All idea of disciplining the officials was at once dismissed, but at the same time it was felt that the higher officials had taken an improper stand in not consulting the American authorities beforehand in regard to such elections. The elections which had already been held in the Kreis were declared null and void and the Oberpraesident notified on June 4 that elections of any character must thenceforth be officially authorized by the American army.

The signing of peace at Versailles on June 28 and its subsequent ratification by Germany rendered it desirable for the army to relax some of the restrictions which had been imposed on the civil population.

Marshal Foch had granted the armies permission on August 10 to hold such elections

as they deemed proper. The American army believed the moment opportune to grant the German government permission to renew the local councils and assemblies. The previous interdiction of these elections had been wholly due to the military situation, and, while appreciating the difficulties placed in the way of the growth of local democracy, it was not thought advisable to depart in this instance from an Interallied policy. Now that the factors which had worked for the prohibition no longer existed, the Oberpraesident was informed on August 28 that Kreis, municipal and communal elections might be held. In order to avoid disorder and to provide necessary police safeguards, the German authorities were directed to inform the Office of Civil Affairs at least five days in advance of the dates and places of the various elections.

The elections took place during October and November, and their orderliness and quietness reflected credit on the local population. A marked diminution of popular interest was noted in comparison with the National and Prussian elections earlier in the year. The results, however, indicated decided losses for the Centrum party, with corresponding gains to the Majority Socialists. In some cities, as in Andernach, the Independent Socialist party (an organization with Spartacist tendencies), placed candidates in the field and polled a considerable vote, although the results did not endanger the position of the more conservative parties.

PROHIBITION OF ATTENDANCE OF DEPUTIES FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY AT THE PROVINZIALLANDTAG.

The self-governing organ of the Prussian province is the Landtag. This body ordinarily meets every year, the session lasting about a month. The seat of the Landtag of the Rhine Province is at Duesseldorf, lying in unoccupied Germany, while the offices of the government appointed functionaries are at Coblenz. The annual session of the Landtag was summoned by its President to meet in March 1919, and notices to that effect were sent to the deputies on both banks of the Rhine. In order to obtain the consent of the occupying armies, the German government, at the same time, approached a request that permission be granted deputies within the area under Allied control to attend the session of the Landtag.

Marshal Foch resolved not to grant this request. An examination of the business to come before the Landtag had disclosed little of importance, and it was found that much of it could be dealt with elsewhere. Furthermore, the meeting of the representative body of the Landtag in a city outside Allied jurisdiction might easily have led to acts of subversion of the military governments by members of that body. The decision of Marshal Foch appeared wise and was approved by the American command. In consequence, the G-2 section of the General Staff, Third Army, refused to issue circulation passes for Duesseldorf to deputies living in American territory.

SUMMARY OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS GERMAN LEGISLATIVE BODIES

The supervision of German legislative bodies in occupied territory was a matter which good policy dictated should be regulated alike in all Allied zones. If permission had been granted Germany to hold elections in one zone and withheld in another, an appearance of weakness would have been created and a weapon placed in the hands of our enemies to use in future dealings with the Allies; and Berlin was already aware of minor differences of policy among the armies on the Rhine. Reconstruction of the German government was a matter of such prime importance that it was necessary for the Allies, in this case at least, to act as a unit.

The interdiction of local elections by the American army was, as has been shown, due directly to instructions of the Allied High Command. The refusal to issue passports to Landtag deputies residing in the American area, also originated in the same source. Action in both cases was dictated by military necessity. It was nevertheless felt to be

regrettable that the United States Army should be placed in a position in which it was forced to prevent the orderly growth of German democracy. The legislatures and assemblies which had been found in occupied territory were wholly out of touch with the new republican sentiments of the people. Only the requirements of order and the welfare of the army could have forced us to take the decided stand which we temporarily did take against the renewal of these bodies.

The American army never supervised the sessions of a local legislative body, nor took steps to influence the passage of laws. Many German and Prussian laws and regulations were forbidden in American territory, and local communities often permitted to work out their salvation as best they could. Matters within the jurisdiction of local assemblies were so limited and of such slight importance, that the very existence of these bodies could ordinarily be disregarded. In one instance, however, attention was drawn to the privileges of the Kreistage. Kreis Mayen had been without a Landrat from January 1919, until October of the same year. In September, the attention of the Office of Civil Affairs was directed to the matter, as the temporary appointee showed a lack of energy in solving food and fuel problems. The American military authorities believed that the official's timidity was primarily due to his not holding a regular appointment. It was therefore to military interests to insist that the German government immediately fill the post. However, on further investigation, it was ascertained that the temporary incumbent had already been appointed by Berlin, but was awaiting confirmation by the Kreistag. This body had the right to express approval or disapproval of the government appointee, although it might not select a man of its own choice. No steps were therefore taken by the Office of Civil Affairs to fill the post, prior to an expression of local sentiment.

II. SUPERVISION OF EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS

Military government inevitably tends to concentrate its energy on the supervision of civil executives. The wishes of the civil population, as exemplified by the laws and decrees of their legislative bodies, are usually held in abeyance whenever they run contrary to the wishes of the occupying forces, and the orders of the military commander become temporarily the law of the land. The enforcement of these orders therefore is the foremost function of military government.

The Armistice had required Germany to surrender her entire administrative machinery of government in Rhenish territory to the Allies. This machinery offered an efficient and easy procedure of transmitting military orders to the civil population. Paragraph V of the Armistice even stipulated that the exercise of control by the occupying armies should be effected in this manner. As a practical proposition, the German civil administration would have had either to be utilized as it was, or provision made for the erection of an entirely new one. The latter course was never for a moment considered.

Once having accepted the German official as a representative of American military government, there remained but to organize an effective system of supervision. We could not be content with issuing orders and leaving their contents to become known automatically to every civilian within the territory. The official had to be controlled at every step. Measures had also to be taken to learn of all laws and regulations issued by the imperial and Prussian governments, for the Rhineland was still a province of Prussia. Publication of such of these laws and regulations as would adversely affect the occupying armies, had to be forbidden in the territory. Finally, we had to observe each official, his efficiency and his willingness to cooperate with the American army. If recalcitrant or lazy, he was disciplined or removed from office. Inefficiency of officials in executing their own laws was not a matter for our concern, but slackness and carelessness in the transmission of American orders could not be tolerated, and the responsible officials usually suffered.

Reference was made in the introductory chapter of this report to the facility with which German civil administration could be adapted to a military government. This is a

factor which should be emphasized at this point. The average German official has served his allotted time in the army. During this service, he has learned to recognize that implicit obedience to military orders is expected as a matter of course. Many of the officials had served in Belgium and had experienced first hand the strict discipline demanded by the German regime in that country. They now realized that failure to render implicit obedience to the conqueror would only bring punishment on their heads. Being essentially soldiers themselves, they fully recognized the authority and power of the occupying forces.

The German conception of civil government, however, is itself a military one. All officials are primarily concerned with transmitting the orders of the central government, and such supervision as is necessary to assure their execution. Important officials are appointed by Berlin and their tenure of office does not in any way depend on local popularity. In consequence, the transfer of supreme authority from Berlin to the Allied Commands did not alter their fundamental position.

SUPERVISION OF OBERPRASIDIUM AND REGIERUNG

Supervision of civil officials began with the Office of Civil Affairs of the army and extended down to regiments and lesser units. We were very fortunate in having Army Headquarters in the political capitol of the Rhine Province. The jurisdiction of the Oberpraesident extended over the entire American area, with the exception of Kreis Montabaur. The German government, however, early in the occupation, with a view to obviate administrative difficulties, gave the Oberpraesident authority to transmit communications of the American army to the Landrat of that Kreis. This put that Kreis under our control as a compact political unit, and made it unnecessary for the Army Command to transmit communications to Regierungspraesidenten or Landraete. An order to the Oberpraesident accomplished identical results and placed the burden of responsibility for its transmittal on the shoulders of the civil authorities. In comparison with our Allies, whose territories included a number of political units without a central control, the advantages of the compact American area are obvious. It greatly simplified correspondence, as well as the necessity for close supervision of the Regierung. In certain matters, however, it was still necessary to inquire into the business of these latter bodies. The Regierung received many laws and regulations directly from Berlin, not by way of the Oberpraesidium. The Office of Civil Affairs believed it necessary to examine this correspondence to ascertain that no orders went into effect which were inimical to the Armies of Occupation.

The quantity of correspondence between the Office of Civil Affairs and the Oberpraesidium was so large that it was found necessary to appoint an American officer as a representative with the latter. This officer's duties included, in addition, such supervision of the Regierung of Coblenz as appeared necessary. The higher German officials were still granted the privilege of appealing to or personally interviewing the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, but routine matters were invariably left to his subordinate. The Oberpraesidium and the Regierung in their turn appointed officials possessing a knowledge of the English language to attend to correspondence with the American army. The arrangement proving satisfactory, the O. C. C. A. was thus relieved of the necessity of constantly interviewing civil officials, and could devote himself to questions of policy.

The duties of the American representative with the Oberpraesident were fairly numerous.

I. He transmitted and received all communications passing between the military and civil governments.

II. He was expected to thoroughly familiarize himself with the workings of provincial and local government.

III. He was to study the personalities of the various German officials and report any failures to comply with American orders.

IV. He was to inspect the correspondence of the German government offices daily and ascertain that no propaganda was being made against the occupying forces.

V. He was to carefully examine all new imperial and Prussian laws, copies of which were furnished him weekly by the Regierung, in order to discover possible interference with the rights of the American army. Circulation thereof was accordingly either authorized or forbidden.

A large amount of correspondence between the French Tenth Army and the Regierung of Coblenz also passed through the hands of this officer. This was due to the fact that a number of Kreise of Regierungsbezirk Coblenz were under French control. This method of transmission was a necessity, as the American military authorities alone had power to discipline civil officials in its area. French requests, when submitted by the Office of Civil Affairs to Regierung (and thereby receiving the face of orders), infractions of the same, could be legitimately punished by American provost courts. An American representative with the Regierung of Treves was also appointed by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in American occupied territory. Matters handled by this officer, however, were largely local in nature, as army orders were transmitted to the Oberpraesident and by him to the Regierungspraesident.

Normal communications between the German and the military authorities were written and formal. The terseness so striking in American military letters was for a long time commented on adversely by the Germans, who deemed it either a want of courtesy or an attempt to wound their pride. This was due to ignorance of American character and customs, for German officials were uniformly treated by the Office of Civil Affairs with the utmost consideration. On occasion, when attempting to formulate policies affecting the life of the community, written communications failed to effect a satisfactory interchange of views. In food and fuel matters, in particular, the personal expressions of the officials were desired, rather than official statements in writing. Conferences were therefore held, and facilities given the Germans to state their practical difficulties. These were considered and, when possible, smoothed over. Such conferences were not held at regular intervals, but only when the purpose of the Army Command could be served in no other way. During the session, both sides maintained a formal and dignified attitude, but as long as the civil authorities did not adopt an antagonistic tone, they were permitted and frequently invited to criticize military regulations, either those already in effect or proposed ones.

In the first conference with higher German officials in Coblenz on January 11, 1919, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs warned them, in view of Germany's methods in initiating and carrying on the war, they must not expect a sympathetic attitude on our part. They were further informed that they should never forget that we came among them as a conquering army and therefore as unwelcome guests; we proposed to deal with them strictly but impartially and their future peace of mind depended wholly on whether they were willing to accept the fact of military occupation and the obligations it laid upon all Germans. They were also advised that infractions of, or any failure to exactly and promptly carry out, military orders would be punished. In later conferences in the autumn of 1919, when the coal question had become critical, both sides met in a less formal manner to seek a solution of the difficult situation in which the local population found itself. In the light of fifteen months experience and in all fairness, it must be recorded that German officials with few exceptions fully performed their duties toward the American forces of occupation.

SUPERVISION OF INFERIOR GERMAN OFFICIALS

This varied greatly during the occupation. While tactical units still controlled civil matters, such supervision as took place was loosely organized, and often indifferently carried out. This was perhaps unavoidable, in view of the fact that the boundaries of divisional areas and German political subdivisions were not correlated.

In Regierungsbezirk Treves, the 90th Division occupied Kreise Daun, Wittlich and Berncastel, while the 89th Division was billeted in Kreise Pruem, Bitburg, Trier-Land and Saarburg. It was manifestly impossible for a single divisional civil affairs officer to supervise, as in case of the 89th Division, four separate civil administrative bodies, separated by many kilometers of territory. The ordinary solution adopted was, for civil affairs officers to appoint subordinates to supervise the execution of American orders in each Kreis. This was never entirely successful, and the very essential supervision of German officials was sometimes entirely lacking. Another failure of control by tactical units to meet the exigencies of the situation arose from the location chosen for Divisional Headquarters. The city usually selected was the largest town in the area or, in some instances, the town with the most ample hotel accommodations, rather than the political capital. In consequence, the activities of the O. C. C. A. were handicapped by the necessity of traveling to another town when he desired to interview the Landrat, as the latter could seldom travel except by rail on account of lack of German transportation facilities. Actual supervision of the duties of the Landrat's office was thus out of the question.

With the introduction of territorial control in May 1919, the advantages of the new system soon made themselves apparent. The Kreis O. C. C. A. ordinarily had his offices in the Kreishaus adjoining the office of the Landrat. He could inspect daily the latter's correspondence, verify his receipt of army orders from the Oberpraesident, and generally study problems confronting the local administration. It was natural in these circumstances that a spirit of cooperation should develop between the O. C. C. A.'s and the Landraete. Both were concerned with the solution of identical problems and both felt a sense of responsibility to the population they were governing. It was very shortly apparent under this system that American orders were receiving more attention at the hands of the German officials, and at the same time the O. C. C. A.'s found many opportunities to assist the Landraete in food and fuel difficulties. In order that the Army representatives should thoroughly inform themselves as to the operations of Prussian local government, each O. C. C. A. was required to submit an essay on the organization of his Kreis to the Office of Civil Affairs. These reports were of only incidental value in themselves, but stimulated the O. C. C. A.'s to a thorough investigation of the laws and customs of the country which they were administering.

SUPERVISION OF GERMAN POLICE

The methods employed by the army to control the activities of the German civil police varied considerably during the course of the occupation. Police were authorized to carry arms by the provisions of the "Anordnungen" of Dec. 9, 1918, and, from then on, came to be recognized as an adjunct to the military forces for the preservation of public order. Their authority, however, was limited strictly to the civilian population, and under no circumstances were they permitted to arrest or even touch a member of the Allied forces. Supervision over local police and gendarmes was exercised during the first five months of 1919 by the troop commander having jurisdiction over the town or district to which the police belonged. In most cases, this officer delegated the actual responsibility to one of his staff officers, preferably the assistant Provost Marshal. No very effective results were obtained by this arrangement, and the civil police whose morale had already seriously deteriorated during the war and revolution, sank to an even lower level of efficiency. It must be admitted that their position was not one to carry prestige with the civil population, as the actual maintenance of public order was the duty, pure and simple, of the military police of the army. In a great number of cases, the army found it necessary to overrule their actions, and in some cases to bring policemen before provost courts. Disciplinary punishment was entirely necessary under the circumstances, but it nevertheless tended to weaken the prestige and *esprit de corps* of the Police.

The transformation in organization of the military government which followed the return of most combat divisions of the United States, brought with it a change in attitude

on the part of the army towards the civil police. In the larger part of the American area, troop garrisons were confined to Kreise capitals, and maintenance of order in the outlying sections of the Kreise thereby devolved on the civil police. The Kreis Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs, while mainly depending on the military police companies assigned to them for the preservation of public order, nevertheless began to take an interest in the German police and to place more responsibility in them. The withdrawal of the military police companies toward the end of summer of 1919 from the outlying Kreise, forced the Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs to go ever further, and after the concentration of the American garrison in Coblenz, the civil police remained in the Kreise as the sole surety for the maintenance of public order.

A much closer supervision of the city police had always been exercised by the army than in the outlying districts. The Assistant Provost Marshal of the City, who was directly responsible to the Garrison Commander, maintained a close liaison with the civil officials who directed the police forces, and in many instances directed the activities of the civil police himself. With the abolition of the office of Garrison Commander, in August 1919, the Provost Marshal's Department was placed under the G-1 section of the Army, which, appreciating the service that the civil police, if under proper direction, could render to the army, at once took steps to improve their morale and efficiency. A supervisor of German police was appointed for the American area, whose duties were to control their activities and at the same time bring about a close liaison with the American military police. The results of this arrangement were astonishingly good, and by December 1919, a great change, both in efficiency and appearance, had taken place in the Coblenz force. German police took over almost exclusive direction of traffic, using the methods and signals which they had learned from the Americans. At the same time, there was an undeniable improvement of morale, which fully justified the action of the army in what was, properly a strictly German internal matter.

However satisfactory the results which the appointment of a German police supervisor may have achieved in Coblenz, it nevertheless somewhat complicated the situation in the outlying districts. Until then, responsibility for the maintenance of public order in a Kreis had rested on the shoulder of the local Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. Extension of the authority of the new office into the Kreise, now created a dual responsibility, which at times gave rise to friction. Trouble which arose in Ahrweiler over arms permit for police reserves brought the matter to a head. On December 6, 1919, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and G-1 section came to an agreement, that the authority of the German Police Supervisor should be confined to the Coblenz area, and that responsibility for the preservation of order in the Kreise should be placed on the Civil Affairs officer. The Provost Marshal's Department was, however, to be permitted to make such inspections of the police in these districts as were deemed necessary, in order that the Commanding General might be informed as to their reliability. Such inspections were to be made in the company of the local Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs.

POLICE RESERVES

As early as the middle of July 1919, the American authorities commenced work on a scheme by which they hoped to make the maintenance of public order a duty of each town and village. In Germany, before the war, police activity was centralized at Berlin, much to the detriment of democracy. This prevented the growth of a feeling that the preservation of public order was the duty of each individual city and town. The army desired, as far as was possible, to avoid interfering in the strikes and industrial disputes which became so common. The German regular police forces, however, were very small and it was impossible to increase them, because of the financial burden which such an act would place on the community. The military authorities therefore turned to the idea of a police reserve, as exemplified in New York City, for a solution of the difficulty. Every care was to be taken to prevent such police reserves from assuming a military character, and

so conflicting with the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, the army did not desire to be forced into a position in which it would be constantly forced to side with either capital or labor, and believed that, whenever possible, public order in such disputes ought to be maintained by the Germans themselves.

On November 24, therefore, the Army Commander authorized the creation of police reserves. Units were to be established in every community, at the rate of ten reserves to every active policeman. Supervision of these units was to be exercised by the Kreis Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs, who were to carefully inquire into the character of the personnel selected by the Burgomaster. The police reserves were to be armed with pistols, but were under no conditions to perform any military drill.

The creation of these police reserves resulted at once in proof of the wisdom of the plan. A food riot in November at Ahrweiler was quelled by the civil authorities without resort to the American authorities, largely by the prompt response of the police reserves to the call of the Burgomaster. Reserves in other Kreise also did good service in assisting the regular police to enforce the food laws in 1920. It is, however, too early to determine clearly whether the theory of local responsibility will take a firm hold on the German people, or whether they will revert to their conception that police activity is a matter strictly pertaining to the central government.

POLICY REGARDING CHANGES OF OFFICIALS BY LEGAL AND REVOLUTIONARY MEANS

The importance of the American policy regarding changes of officials can not be emphasized too much. Its effect on German politics has been dealt with at length in another chapter of this report, that on the Rhenish movement.

When American troops entered Germany in December 1918, they found a considerable number of Workmen's and Soldier's Councils in existence. These organizations had displaced the duly-constituted civil authorities, and were performing all ordinary governmental duties. The Allied forces were therefore called upon to decide who were the "local authorities" referred to in Paragraph V of the Armistice. It was unanimously agreed that these self-appointed committees could not be recognized without serious complications. The councils were, as their title indicated, composed of workmen and soldiers. They contained very few individuals who had had any experience in civil government, and the majority were poorly educated and drafted from the lowest stratas of society. It would have been a difficult matter to attempt to billet our army or to requisition supplies, using such committees as agents. It was therefore decided to accept the officials of the old regime as "local authorities," whether those antedating the revolution or those duly appointed thereafter by Berlin. This policy as then adopted was adhered to by the American army during the whole occupation. Even when the position of the old officials was threatened by Dr. Dorten's revolutionary propaganda, the American army adhered to its earlier policy and refused to recognize the Wiesbaden "government." Meetings whose announced purpose was to discuss the overthrow of Prussian rule, were absolutely forbidden. The fate of Germany was a question which, we felt, the peace conference was alone called upon to solve. Ill-advised solution of the Rhenish problem in the meantime by military men could never have assisted President Wilson to solve the many tangles of European politics.

When the Rhenish agitation was at its height, the Prussian government made an attempt to relieve the existing officials and appoint new men, who were conspicuous for their popularity in the Rhineland, but at the same time loyal to Prussia. As is noted in Chapter XV, the American army could not accept these appointments of the Prussian government as binding in occupied territory any more than the self-constituted Soldiers and Workmens' Councils. The Oberpraesident was consequently so advised by the Office of Civil Affairs in a letter announcing that we could recognize neither these spurious appointments of Berlin nor any further important appointments without previous consultation.

In part, this letter read:

I wish to call your attention to the fact that the American authorities will not permit any important official to be removed from office or anyone to be installed in office, whether by yourself, any of your subordinates or by the order of the Central Prussian government, without first bringing the matter to the attention of the American authorities and obtaining consent to the change.

This policy necessitated a considerable amount of work for the Office of Civil Affairs. It was nearly impossible to exactly interpret what was meant by "Important Officials." The provincial government decided to be on the safe side, and thereafter submitted the appointment of many minor officials to the army for approval. The Office of Civil Affairs agreed, though this practice had never been contemplated, and took no steps to alter it. Changes of minor officials were approved by the American representatives with the Oberpraesident. Appointments of Landraete were transmitted to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, A. F. in G. Submission by the German government of the appointments of new officials in American territory was in most cases merely formal. The American authorities desired to interfere as little as possible in German government and had no intention under ordinary conditions of refusing recognition to duly-appointed officials. The cases of Herr von Groote, Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province, and Dr. Momm, Regierungspraesident of Treves, were exceptional ones, and our action was due to the desirability of quelling a political agitation which might well have assumed the greatest consequence. In case of transfer of officials from French or Belgian territory to ours, the German request was sent by the army to the Ally concerned, for an expression of approval or disapproval. Only two such transfers were made.

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICIALS

A number of important policies were involved in awarding suitable punishments to negligent or recalcitrant officials. This was an important matter, and one which, it was realized, would have to be carefully considered from all viewpoints. Offenses by officials are bound to occur under any military government and must be promptly punished if the latter is to maintain a firm hand. The choice of suitable penalties in Germany, however, was felt to be a difficult matter. Officials ought not to be placed in positions which would cause them to lose the respect of their subordinates or the people at large. If punishments of such nature had been awarded, the dignity of the civil service would have suffered and the individual concerned rendered useless thereafter as servant of the military government. Imprisonment was the particular punishment which the Office of Civil Affairs felt should be avoided. Fines, suspension from office or deportation from occupied territory appeared the only logical penalties which we could inflict without injuring ourselves. Deportation appeared such a severe punishment, depriving the official, as it did, of his home as well as his office, that it was decided to reserve it for very grave offenses only, particularly for acts which threatened the security of the army. Notwithstanding the efficacy of this form of punishment on the individual, it was realized that its constant use would cripple the civil machinery and eventually react on the army. It is gratifying to note that on no single occasion was an offense of an official judged serious enough to warrant such punishment.

In striking contrast to our actions was the French policy in regard to deportations. The French Command evidently believed that officials who adopted a hostile attitude should be rigorously punished and that deportation alone could accomplish that purpose. In one Kreis of the Saar district alone, orders of banishment were issued up to October 15, 1919, against twenty-three officials. In the Rhine Province, instances of its use are not so numerous, but are still sufficient to warrant the belief that it was the normal French method of punishing officials. The British policy was to banish only in extreme

cases. Fines and suspension from officer were the normal disciplinary measures resorted to by their army as well as ours.

Disciplinary punishments inflicted on officials in American occupied territory were for the following offenses:

Failure to report sales of German war material	2
Disobedience or inefficiency in execution of American orders	34
Failure to prevent German patriotic demonstrations	3
Smuggling	6
Negligence in carrying out American sanitary regulations	7
Offensive remarks about American Army	2
Homicide	1
	<hr/>
Total	55

Imprisonment was awarded only in those cases in which the offense was strictly criminal, such as the killing of an American soldier by a German policeman. In many cases, the sentences imposed by the court were afterward suspended during good behavior. Of the higher officials, records only show four instances in which punishment or reprimand was necessary. Two of these were for offenses of a minor nature, the officials concerned being the Landraete of Mayen and Wittlich. The former, Herr Walter Theodor Losen, had attempted to alter an American order, but as there were mitigating circumstances, he was merely given a reprimand. In the second case, in which Dr. Simmons, Landrat of Wittlich, was the accused, he was sentenced by a provost court to pay a fine of 500 marks for failing to publish an American order in due time. This fine, however, was later remitted. A more serious case centered around the Landrat of Mayen, Herr von Lettow-Vorbeck, who was tried by a military commission and fined 5,000 marks for failing to report the sale of foodstuffs, which had belonged to the German army, to the people of his Kreis. The fourth instance occurred on October 6, 1919, when the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, A. F. in G., suspended Regierungarat Herr Braun, an official of the Regierung of Coblenz, for one month from office for gross carelessness in transmitting American orders.

The Acting Regierungspraesident of Coblenz, Herr Juergenson narrowly escaped punishment by the American authorities in March 1919. He had been duly served with a requisition for 200 laborers, who were to report to an officer of the American army on the morning of the 17th. At the appointed hour, only a very few of the required 200 appeared. An investigation revealed the fact that there had been a striking lack of attention to the order, if not a wilful defiance, in the Regierungspraesident's office. Herr Juergenson was placed in arrest and charges against him were drawn up, which ordinarily would have resulted in trial by a military commission. He shortly afterward, however, became seriously ill, and as he was not expected to recover, the charges were withheld. On April 16, he was released from arrest and the case dropped, but he was soon thereafter retired by the German government.

CHARACTER OF GERMAN BUREAUCRACY

The efficiency of the American military government, for reasons explained in preceding pages, depended to a large extent on the capabilities and cooperation of the civil officials. Like most bureaucracies, the German civil service is cumbersome and slow moving. There are innumerable departments, in some instances entirely independent of the local authorities and serving directly under Berlin. The railways and customs services are instances of such independent services. This somewhat compromised the desire of the Office of Civil Affairs to utilize the Oberpraesidium as a medium for the transmission of communications. Prussian officialdom has in many respects, however,

decided advantages over governmental services in other countries. The service has always been a profession, membership to which was attained by long study, followed by a series of severe examinations. When once admittance had been gained, the official was certain of life service unless found guilty of misdemeanor or misuse of office. While pay was never high, the service was recruited among the sons of the wealthy, and membership in it assured the individual a standing in society. In consequence, corruption and bribery were so rare before the war as to be almost unknown. With the coming of the revolution, the morale of officials was much shaken, and their sense of responsibility to the republican regime became more nominal than real. Still, the American army found no evidence of misdemeanors of this sort among the higher officials. A few cases of bribery, smuggling, etc., came to light among custom guards, railway employes, etc., but it must be borne in mind that there had been a complete change of these minor employes during the period of demobilization.

The local government, however, was in a difficult position as a result of the occupation. The officials were largely of Prussian extraction and were looked upon as foreigners by the Rhinelanders. Their authority before and during the war had been maintained by the police power of Germany and Prussia. With the crumbling of the old regime in November 1918, the German army could no longer be looked to as a prop of their authority. The Rhineland passed into enemy hands, and foreign bayonets and rifles effectually secured the old officials in office. As far as Rhenish officialdom was concerned, a hundred revolutions might have come and gone at Berlin, so few were the changes of personnel that occurred. The people, however, were alive to the new feelings of democracy, and looked askance on the old officials, Germans though they were, who continued to govern them, by the grace of the enemy. The officials themselves who no longer look to Berlin for advice or comfort, for Social Democracy there sat enthroned, just as anxious to please the Rhenish population, as the people themselves desired to select governors of their own choosing. These representatives of old Germany saw in the future, when Allied troops would have departed, when they would have to render an account to the people. Either they would have to then swim with the tide, or abandon their life-long profession. So, inevitably, they turned to political intrigue as a solution for their difficulties. Government law and regulations, which displeased the local population, were carried out half-heartedly. This was particularly evident in the case of food laws unavailing, but so also was their attempt to check profiteering by the so-called "Schieber." In the last case, the officials were undoubtedly willing enough to act, but felt that they did not have sufficient means at hand to enforce the laws. Under the emperor they had had a well organized police force at the beck and call. This force had been somewhat impaired during the war, and to a much greater extent in the period following the revolution, when gendarmes and policemen had been recruited among returning soldiers. The force thus newly organized, was very much inferior to the police of the empire. Discipline had been shaken and the government took no steps to check slackness. Profiteers flourished everywhere, and flaunted the efforts of the police to arrest them. Eventually, the American authorities, in the interest of public order, had to themselves take the matter in hand. They assured the population in a proclamation that they would try by provost courts any one guilty of offering violence to a policeman or food official in the execution of his official duties.

Notwithstanding this lack of energy, it must be admitted that the local officials were in a trying position. Their attitude to the occupying authorities was generally correct. Orders of the American Command were punctiliously obeyed, and if disciplinary action was occasionally necessary, the fault generally could be ascribed to ordinary carelessness. No instance has come to light of a clear-cut defiance of American regulations by a German official.

The services of the Oberpraesidium to the American military government are especially worthy of comment in this regard. His Excellency Herr von Groote, Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province, and his subordinate officials in the Oberpraesidium, accepted the occupation

in a quiet and dignified manner and spared no effort to meet the wishes of the military government. The army did not have to deliver a single reprimand to an official of the Oberpraesidium, and our orders, with a few minor exceptions, were punctiliously and exactly complied with. Oberpraesident von Groote, the Oberpraesidialrat Dr. Brandt, Regierungspraesidenten von Groening of Coblenz and Dr. Momm of Treves, were all men of character and ability. Their path was difficult, the demands of the Army of Occupation were often a heavy burden to their communities, but they put their shoulders to the task, in an effort to smooth difficulties aside, and to solve the many problems brought about by occupation by a foreign army. The office of Oberbuergermeister of Coblenz was a particularly trying one. Dr. Klostermann, the first incumbent, died during the first few days of the American occupation. After a long interval, during which the city, according to the German system, was seeking a new official, Dr. Jansen carried on the exacting work of the office; finally Dr. Russell, an exceptionally able and tactful official, formerly Burgomaster of Buer (Westphalia), was chosen to manage the affairs of the city, which he succeeded in accomplishing in an entirely satisfactory manner.

III. SUPERVISION OF GERMAN JUDICIARY

While the American authorities did not intend to limit the jurisdiction of German courts over German civilians, a certain amount of supervision was nevertheless found necessary. During the first few months of occupation, such supervision as took place was spasmodic and unsatisfactory. The personnel of the Divisional Staffs of Civil Affairs was not numerous enough to provide experienced officers for all duties. Examination of the activities of German courts was hence entirely lacking. A change for the better was noted when territorial control was instituted. The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, required weekly statements from each Kreis Officer of the number and nature of all criminal trials held before civil courts. These reports enabled the army authorities to gain a comprehensive view of civil judicial activities and emphasized any failure of the German officials to enforce their own food laws.

It was found necessary to deny jurisdiction to civil courts in a number of instances. The proclamation on May 28, 1919, of the German government, declared that the leaders of the Rhenish movement were traitors to their country, and should be tried as such. This proclamation was forbidden in the American area, but knowledge of its contents became generally known through news dispatches from unoccupied Germany. On June 15, the German police of Coblenz arrested one Phillip Hedwig, of Wiesbaden, discovered in the act of distributing propaganda in favor of a Rhenish Republic. The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Coblenz, did not, at the time, receive information of the arrest, but a few days later learned that the civil courts were about to try Hedwig for treason. Such procedure could not be tolerated by the American authorities under any conditions. Coblenz was under American jurisdiction and therefore we could not recognize treason against an enemy nation as a crime in our own country. The right of the German courts to try cases under the German and Prussian acts forbidding treason was therefore denied. Hedwig was removed from civil custody and tried before American provost courts for violation of American regulations.

Another somewhat similar case arose in January 1919, in Kreis Ahrweiler. A civilian by name of Metzler was arrested by the local police on the warrant of a court in Duesseldorf. This warrant charged Metzler with high treason to Germany, the specific acts alleged being that he conveyed military information during the war to the Allied governments. The army could not in this case recognize the right of the German government to extradite Metzler to unoccupied territory, and therefore ordered him released.

An attempt was made in May by the German government to enforce the penalties, imposed by its military courts, on civilians living in occupied territory. In neither France nor Germany is it the custom to require the presence of the defendant in court. Fines and imprisonments may be imposed in his absence, and the civil authorities ordered

by the court to carry out the punishment. As many German deserters had fled to occupied territory, their military commanders were at a loss to find a way to enforce the penalties decreed by their courts. They therefore approached the American military authorities with the request that they be permitted to carry out punishments in our zone. Such procedure was repugnant to the American sense of justice. The German military commission was therefore informed that as the United States was still technically at war, it could not permit the punishment of an enemy military court to be carried out in its zone.

A rather more knotty question arose from the requests of civil courts that American officers and soldiers should appear before them as witnesses. American testimony was in many cases declared by the court to be essential to justice. There did not seem to be good reason why the American army should deny the German courts the right to hear all possible testimony. The question was raised, however, that American soldiers, in appearing before a court as witnesses, placed themselves within its jurisdiction and could be compelled to answer all questions put to them. After considering the question, it was finally decided that the right of a court to summon an American soldier before it could be agreed to, only subject to reservations. The summons of the civil court was to be forwarded to the Office of Civil Affairs, accompanied by a statement of the testimony expected. The officer or soldier in every case was to be accompanied by a counsel, and was under no conditions to be compelled by the court to incriminate himself. This procedure was adopted, and on several instances American soldiers appeared as witnesses before German Courts. Only a very few of the German requests for witnesses, however, were granted and then, only because the expected testimony appeared indispensable to the course of justice.

CHAPTER NO. 15

THE RHENISH SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

POLICY OF AMERICAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES REGARDING CHANGES OF CIVIL OFFICIALS

On May 22, 1919, the Commanding General, Third Army, received information from French sources that a Rhenish republic would shortly be proclaimed in Wiesbaden. General Mangin was interested in its success and begged for the assistance of the American army in furthering it. The new republic was to be of an essentially conservative character, with Catholic and agricultural interests predominating. Although it was contemplated that for the present it would remain a sovereign state within the German confederation, later it would be entirely independent. About fifty backers of the movement were to come to Coblenz the next day and begin an active propaganda throughout the American territory.

The request of the Commanding General of the French Tenth Army, and the arrival in Coblenz the next day of supporters of the "Republic," obliged the American military authorities to come to a prompt decision as to the policy to be adopted towards the movement.

Paragraph V of the Armistice provided in part as follows:

The countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the troops of occupation of the Allies and of the United States.

When the Allies entered Germany in December 1918, they found that the duly constituted local authorities had, in many places, been Soldiers and Workingmens' Councils,

which had sprung up during the revolution. It was then and there decided by the military authorities that the "local authorities" referred to in the Armistice were the officials chosen under the then existing German law. The Soldiers and Workingmens' Councils were therefore not recognized.

Under authority of Marshal Foch, elections were permitted to be held throughout occupied territory on January 19, 1919, for the German National Assembly. Similar elections were permitted on January 26 for the Prussian National Assembly. This permission was granted in order to enable Prussia and Germany to organize their governments on a constitutional basis, the Reichstag having been swept out of existence during the revolution. By the end of May, both assemblies had been constituted. That of Prussia was sitting at Berlin, framing a new constitution, while the National Assembly was at Weimar performing the same task for the nation. The Prussian government, on January 24, issued a proclamation directing the holding of municipal election in all Prussian territory, including the Rhine Province. The attention of the American military authorities having been drawn to this proclamation, the Oberpraesident was notified that the elections would not be permitted without approval of the competent Allied authorities. The matter was referred to Marshal Foch, who, in due course of time, notified the American Commander-in-Chief as follows of his decision:

Upon proposal of the Allied authorities of occupied territory, I have decided not to grant the order of the Prussian Government calling an election for the entire renewal of the municipal councils of Rhenish Prussia.

The local authorities were accordingly notified that these elections would not be permitted.

In searching for precedents which should govern American policy in regard to the Rhenish republic, it was apparent that, although granting Germany sufficient authority to hold elections to reorganize her government, we had consistently refused to permit her to hold local elections to change existing officials. As a revolution which would proclaim a state independent of Prussia and yet permit Prussian officials to remain in office, would be an absurdity, any official recognition of the movement would require a drastic change of American policy. Since, under the Armistice conditions, we were charged with the responsibility of administering the government through local officials, it was decided that the trained Prussian officials, who had satisfactorily performed their duties, would be preferable to a group of untrained political adventurers. Having refused the German people the right to change their officials by orderly elections, there was still more reason to prevent such change by revolutionary means.

Pursuant to this policy and having requested the officials to remain in office, General Mangin's representative was informed that we must refuse to recognize revolutionary movements of any character, and that if agitators for a Rhenish republic entered the American area, no matter whether of French or German nationality, they would be treated on the same basis as other agitators. The Army Commander added that he had no authority to deviate from these instructions, which had been laid down for him by higher authority.

This action of the Commanding General, Third Army, was sustained by the Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F., who, on May 22, telegraphed as follows:

C. G. Third Army,

HAEF May 22, 1919.

With reference to telephone conversation re possible political agitation by outsiders in territory occupied by the Army of Occupation, the Commander-in-Chief approves the action already taken by you and he further directs that you refuse to allow French or any other political agitators to operate in the territory controlled by you no matter by whose orders they may claim to be operating or desire to be permitted to operate.

McANDREW
Chief of Staff.

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CHAPTER NO. 16
PROPOSED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN CASE OF A
FURTHER ADVANCE

[Material omitted as not being pertinent to this topic.]

CHAPTER NO. 17
COMPARISON OF THE ALLIED STAFF ORGANIZATION
FOR CONDUCT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Material omitted as not being pertinent to this topic.]

CHAPTER NO. 18
THE CLOSING PERIOD OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Material omitted as not being pertinent to this topic.]

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GERMAN CAMPAIGN PLANS October 29, 1918-November 11, 1918

Preface

Following are translations of selected German documents by which it is hoped will be shown the decline of German war might, following the entry of the United States into the World War. Insofar as is possible, selection has been confined to high level material. Exceptions to this standard will justify themselves.

In order to understand the character of German warfare at the time the United States entered the conflict, a resume of battle conditions in late 1916 and early 1917 is set forth here.

In August, 1916, General Field Marshal von Hindenburg and General von Ludendorff took over German command in the field. They both felt that the Allies would make a tremendous effort on the western front in the first half of 1917. For this, the German army could count on but 154 divisions as opposed to 195 for the Allies. Therefore, to gain time, the Germans assumed the defensive on both eastern and western fronts, shortened their lines, and in the winter of 1916, began construction of the famous HINDENBURG Line (SIEGFRIED Position). In March, 1917, they retired to this line which stretched from VIMY Ridge through SAINT-QUENTIN and La FERRE to VAILLY.

By mid-summer of 1917, German morale had risen considerably. During the first six months, German submarines had destroyed more than three and a quarter million tons of Allied shipping. On land, German arms had stopped the British offensive around ARRAS with but slight loss to themselves; on the AISNE, the shock of the French attack launched near REIMS by General Nivelle in April had spent itself without decision against the German entrenched positions. Thus, Germany had gained a rather advantageous military position by July 1917. However, her statesmen had started fashioning the weapon which was to turn the balance away from German success to ultimate defeat. Moving to force the United States out of her neutral position, German diplomats had created a situation which forced President Wilson to break off diplomatic relations with the Imperial German Government on February 3, 1917. By a continuation of the ruthless German submarine warfare, the United States was compelled to forsake its neutral position and declare war against Germany on April 6, 1917. By mid-June, General Pershing had arrived in PARIS and before the end of that month, American troops were on French soil. By November 1917, there were 65,000 American soldiers training in France. Germany was to feel American might in increasing might from this time forward.

American Troops in France

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
October 29, 1917.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE REPORT

[Extract]

7. Americans in France: Yesterday the Americans published their first army report, according to which some of their battalions are in line on the French front.

The exact place of employment is not yet entirely clear. According to prisoners' statements of the middle of August, 2 bns. are supposed to have been inserted at DOMEVRE. Since then Americans are mentioned - in proportion to the propaganda made with them - almost on the entire west front. According to the latest credible reports, Americans must be expected primarily in the region of TAHURE (October 10) * * * furthermore, according to statements made by officers and to the belief existing at the front, in the LORRAINE sector MONCEL-ARRACOURT, and finally in SUNDGAU, which so long has remained unclarified.

In France there are at the most 40,000 Americans so far. About 20,000 of these are combat troops, most of which are trained behind the front in CHAMPAGNE (CHALONS) and LORRAINE (BAR-le-DUC---GONDRECOURT) as well as at BESANCON (in total, 1 infantry division).

The remainder consists of work details occupied with the construction of landing ports (particularly BORDEAUX, St-NAZAIRE, BREST) and railroads, and with preparations for the quartering of the troops which will arrive later. They are distributed over wide territories in France. This year only two more divisions can be expected to arrive.

Americans in Lorraine

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
November 3, 1917.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE REPORT

[Extract]

2. LORRAINE: Northwest of PARROY the first Americans were captured in a German operation.

They belong to the American 16th Inf., which together with the American 18th and

26th Inf. Regiments - whose whereabouts are not yet clear - are supposed to constitute the American 1st Division.

Apparently we are dealing here with the unit trained by the French 47th Division at GONDRECOURT. Apparently only a few battalions of this unit have been inserted in the area of the French 59th Division since end of October.

The bn. is organized into 3 companies and 1 M. G. co. and has a company strength of 200 men.

No data are available that would indicate the presence of another American division in CHAMPAGNE.

HS Ger, File: 803-33.5: Fldr. IV: Report

Offensive to be Launched from Front of Second Army

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8273

GERMAN FIFTH ARMY,
November 20, 1917.

PROPOSAL FOR AN ATTACK IN THE ZONE OF THE GROUP OF ARMIES

CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT

[Extract]

Two points on the front of the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht may be considered for an offensive employing large forces. It is assumed that the following units are available for this action: 40 attack divisions and the divisions in line in the attack sector which will be released.

It is undoubtedly true that it would be highly effective to launch an offensive from the front of our Second Army with the objective of separating the French and British from each other, using the SOMME to accomplish this purpose and bottling up the British army against the coast and then defeating it. Favorable terrain conditions make it possible to carry on operations throughout the entire winter so that we could hope to gain the upper hand in the year 1918. Since our main thrust will be directed against the boundary between the armies of the enemy Allies, we would in this way subject the French as well as the British to our will and thereby secure ourselves against attacks on any considerable scale on the western front. For the same reason we must expect the major part of the British and French reserves to be employed during the operations. Success is dependent on our being able to ward off the French in the SOMME sector of ABBEVILLE---AMIENS---HAM until we have finished off the British army. The defense of the extensive SOMME sector will gobble up considerable forces. Consequently, after careful examination I do not believe 40 attack divisions sufficient for the execution of these operations which unquestionably promise most decisive results. If insufficient forces are put in line, the danger will arise that we shall ourselves be struck by superior enemy forces from two directions and be defeated.

Hence, it is necessary to be satisfied with a lesser objective which we can be more sure of obtaining with the forces available.

The capture of our U-Boat base on the Belgian coast will continue to be the primary objective of the British conduct of war. If the weather is favorable we must expect the British to continue their attacks near YPRES next year using all their reserves. Instead

of fighting a purely defensive battle on a terrain of attack selected by the enemy, the forces available to us enable us to choose an offensive, which will rob the enemy of any advantage he may have gained, inflict considerable losses on him, especially in artillery and stores, and finally open the prospect of advancing the right wing of the west front and thus more permanently safeguarding the Belgian coast.

* * * * *

The time of the proposed attack depends on the weather. At all events the operations would still be launched in ample time if they could take place just before, or at the same time as, the British offensive in the vicinity of YPRES. The fact that by that time the British will have increased their forces and stores to the greatest possible strength promises - in the event that the operations are successful - just that much more booty which will be difficult for them to replace. As a factor particularly favorable to our artillery action, we must stress that the enemy's defensive installations consist in structures built on made ground on account of the high level of the water at many points. From my knowledge of the terrain, I believe that if the weather is normal, we shall be able to open the attack at the end of February.

* * * * *

von PAWELSG, (sic)
Colonel, Chief of Staff.

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Report

United States to Send 450,000 Men to France.

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section
No. 629

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
December 11, 1917--12 a. m. [noon?].

To Intelligence Officer, Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht

REPORT NO. 7 CONCERNING THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Only the 1st Regular Division has been ascertained to be in France. Some of its elements are standing on the front for training. It has not yet been put in line as a unit. It is possible that it will participate in an attack during the winter.

According to new reports it can be assumed that the 26th and 42d (National Guard) Divisions have begun to land in France recently. American troops are also reported to be in England for training. All in all, the entire strength of the forces of the United States of America sent to Europe may have increased to about 75,000 men.

The 26th and 42d Divisions are not to be expected at the front for the time being. They require additional training.

The United States of America are reported to have pledged themselves to send an army of 450,000 men to France until spring 1918. It is possible that in the PARIS Conference the Entente has repeated its urgent request for America's assistance. The extensive preparations (construction of quarters and railroads, improvement of harbors, erection of factories) made by the Americans in France indicate that numerous American reinforcements are expected.

The transportation and supply of the troops from the United States depend on the shipping space available. A larger number of men than 450,000 can hardly be expected owing to the lack of shipping space. The mass of this army cannot yet be ready to attack by spring 1918. Consequently, the value of the Americans will consist for the present in releasing British-French divisions on quiet fronts.

[The above document gives a surprisingly accurate statement of American strength and possibilities of shipments.]

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. IV: Order

Attacks to be Prepared by March 10, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 5905

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
December 27, 1917.

To the Group of Armies of the West

[Extract]

1. The relative strength of the forces on the west front will have shifted in our favor by the end of February.
We can attack in March, but must be prepared for an enemy attack at any time.
2. Special preparations will be made for operations at the following points:
In the zone of the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht:
 - (a) Attack against the YPRES Salient (St-George 2) combined with a breakthrough in the region of of ARMENTIERES (St-George 1)
 - (b) LORETTO Hill-ARRAS attack (Mars).
 - (c) Attack on the front of the Second and Eighteenth Armies (Michael)
Direction of BULLECOURT-BAUPAUME (Michael 1)
" north of St-QUENTIN---PERONNE (Michael 2)
" south of St-QUENTIN and near La FERRE (Michael 3).In the zone of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince:
Withdrawal of the Third Army - ARGONNE (Hektor) and the counterattack of the First Army - CHAMPAGNE (Achilles). * * *
In the zone of the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht:
Attack from BREUSCH valley (STRASSBURG),
Defense in SUNDGAU (BELFORT).
3. The following operations will be worked out in rough draft:
In the zone of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince and Duke Albrecht:
Attack west and south past VERDUN on CLERMONT and TROYON (CASTOR and POLLUX).
4. The preparations will begin immediately and will be pushed so that they will be finished March 10.

* * * * *

LUDENDORFF.

Proposed Attack over Flanders Terrain

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 5050

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
January 9, 1918.

To Hq. Fourth Army

Ref. Operations Western Front 1918

[Extract]

I approve of the strategic plans of the army.

In the Group of Armies Instruction No. 5002, Operations Section, of January 3, 1918, the attack "St-George"* is regarded as main attack and "St-George 2"* as secondary attack in connection with the former.

A situation can develop however in which St-George 1" must be dispensed with altogether or fall into the role of a secondary attack.

"St-George 2" would then attain greater importance. More than 3 to 6 divisions could perhaps be placed at the disposal of the Fourth Army so that the attack "St-George 2" could then be carried by both wings. Furthermore, the question whether "St-George 2" can be considered as main attack must be studied. Its objectives should be: cutting off the English in the YPRES salient and breaking through in the direction of CASSEL.

The attack would have to be executed swiftly. Still it would lead over the completely torn up terrain of the FLANDERS battlefield. It remains therefore to be considered whether this is advisable and possible.

* * * * *

RUPPRECHT.
Crown Prince of Bavaria.

* George: An attack planned in the Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group of Armies to be executed on either side of ARMENTIERES, with objectives: a tactical breakthrough by Sixth Army between ARMENTIERES and LENS (George I) in conjunction with an attack (George II) by the Fourth Army to capture KEMMEL and the heights of WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES. Exploitation toward HAZEBROUCK, striking British, Belgians, and Portuguese in flank and rear and annihilating them. Operation abandoned March 23, furnished the basis of "Georgette."

Methods of Accomplishing Surprise Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 5063

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
January 10, 1918.

To Supreme Headquarters

[Extract]

* * * * *

We cannot allow ourselves to undertake a battle of material such as the British fought at the SOMME, around ARRAS and in FLANDERS. A month-long struggle is out of the question for us. We must effect a breakthrough suddenly. Surprise is the sole means of accomplishing this. For this purpose we must seek out a point which is favorable in respect to terrain, enemy positions, and distribution of enemy forces.

Surprise will be attained by the following methods:

1. **Secrecy:** * * * Our main object is to keep the operations secret from our own troops. Each army must believe that the attack prepared by it is the one which will actually be executed.

2. **Maneuverability:** We should not decide on any one definite attack even if one of the drafts looks best from the outset. The various attacks will be prepared; the decision to execute them will be withheld as long as possible according to the situation.

Therefore on the entire army front the preparations will initially embrace the completion of arrangements for handling traffic (roads, railroads, railroad stations, and communications net), quarters, airfields, etc. The later concentration of troops will take place outside of the zone of attack in several large groups, capable of deployment at a given moment in different directions quickly and suddenly. This development by rail, truck and night marching will be prepared with the utmost care.

3. **Deception of the Enemy:** It will be achieved by harassing the enemy before the attack along the entire front of the armies (registration, etc.), by local attacks with limited objective, by large-scale feints at other points (for example "Michael" if "St-George" is to be executed).

4. **Most Rapid Speed in the Attack Possible:** For this purpose it will be necessary to develop the divisions concentrated outside the zone of attack and the artillery as soon as possible so that the attack can begin about the sixth day of development. Artillery preparations must be inconspicuous so that the fire will open suddenly and without warning. Unobserved concentration of air forces. Constant check of all preparations from the ground as well as the air with regard to concealment.

By preparing the operation in such a manner we cannot help but succeed in deceiving the enemy and finally in attacking one of his weak points by surprise. If the direction of attack selected proves to be unfavorable either before or at the beginning of the attack we must be in a position to change and if necessary to combine some of the features of attacks we have prepared. Consequently, many possibilities will arise which a skillful command will promptly exploit. "St-George" is still the best and most effective attack. It strikes weak points, Portuguese in part. Unusually wet weather, however, can prevent the attack. It must surmount the obstacle of the LYS. If strong enemy forces are in readiness here in a prepared position, the attack will hold no chance of success. Then we shall be forced to attack at another point. In relation to "St-George".

"St-George 2" is initially only important as a secondary attack. However, it can very well acquire a considerably greater significance.

It is indeed questionable whether in the spring the enemy will have the same dispositions in the YPRES salient in which his attack came to a standstill. It is extremely unfavorable for a defense. The flanks are in great danger, especially if the Belgian position extends to HOUTLOULSTER Wald as is now the case. Therefore, it is likely that the British will prepare for evacuation to withdraw in case of attack at the proper time to a prepared position at the base of the salient. However, it is not impossible that he will not give up the advantages gained in the battle of FLANDERS.

If the situation is still the same in the spring as it is now and if our other offensive projects permit the forces to be made available it would in any case be advantageous to employ stronger forces for "St-George 2" than formerly anticipated. A strong surprise attack from HOUTLOULSTER Wald as well as from the line GELUVELT-HOLLEBEKE could lead to a great success even if the enemy had prepared for the evacuation of the YPRES salient. Whether it will be possible, however, to develop such a success to the point of a breakthrough and thus make "St-George 2" the main attack is yet to be shown. The fact that we shall get in the terrain devastated in the battle of FLANDERS speaks against this. Rapidity of advance and the functioning of supply will be adversely affected.

The "Mars" attack appears profitable if the enemy has moved his reserves to both flanks and we succeed in tying them down there. Otherwise the attack is difficult in view of the terrain.

The "Michael" attack would be especially profitable if we can succeed in drawing the main forces of the British toward YPRES and ARMENTIERES and if the French were tied down elsewhere. The British standing opposite CAMBRAI could be enveloped from BULLECOURT and north of ST-QUENTIN.

The situation would have to show whether the principal stress should be put on "Michael 1" or "2" and where the main reserves would be engaged.

RUPPRECHT.
Crown Prince of Bavaria.
Fieldmarshal General.

HS Ger. File: 802-10.6: Fldr. I, Pt 1: Report

American Troops in Italy

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
January 14, 1918.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE REPORT

ITALY

C. Americans:

Concerning the presence of American troops we have received the following agents' reports:

1. In MILAN 1 infantry brigade and 2 airplane depots were located during the month of December.
2. In the area of VICENZA 3 (?) [sic] American brigades were located on December 18.

3. In GENOA American troops landed beginning of January.

4. In BRINDISI and TARENT American troops are expected.

There are no fighting troops involved. Therefore the commitment of American troops at the front is not to be expected.

[It is evident that, in the above document, the Germans were trying to provoke a denial of the "facts" presented in order to gain information.]

HS Ger. File: 802-10.6: Fldr. I, Pt. 1: Report

British Weary of War.

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section
No. 5490

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
January 16, 1918.

REPORT NO. 7

Concerning the British Army

Morale in the Army and the Interior

The morale of the English army has undergone a considerable change at the end of 1917. Confident hope for victory and the feeling of superiority in military matters have given way to a definite weariness of war, owing to the events of the past year of war.

Until summer 1917 the British soldier still believed in the decisive victory of his arms. Reverses in the confident hope for victory were always quickly followed by an uplift in the morale. The result of the SOMME offensive at first was a disappointment. But after the German Siegfried movement the fight was considered to have ended in a great strategic success for the British. The war of 1917 therefore justified the hope for a decision.

The easy initial success in the battle of ARNES strengthened the general belief in the superiority of the British arms and the exhaustion of the German army. The checking of the offensive resulted only in a temporary sinking of the morale. The victory at WYTSCHAETE on June 7 was considered to be fresh proof that Germany could be beaten decisively.

Everybody believed that the offensive in FLANDERS, which was favored by purely British interests, would soon result in a decisive battle. No previous battle was entered by the British army with such confident hope for victory. The liberation of Belgium, capture of the troublesome U-boat strong points formed objectives that were comprehensible and desirable for everyone. The preparations for the battle assumed such alarming proportions that serious German resistance seemed impossible.

The initial success in FLANDERS satisfied them despite the heavy losses. However, as the battle progressed, there was a serious reverse.

The British soldier learned anew that the enemy front could not be broken through despite the superiority in infantry, guns and ammunition. The obstinate German resistance came as a surprise. The statement that the German troops were demoralized and exhausted

was given the lie. The former underrating of the enemy gave way to a certain respect. The enemy command abandoned the idea of a strategic breakthrough and was satisfied with an insignificant gain in ground in frontal fighting.

The knowledge that no decision can be obtained in a major offensive that has been recognized by the enemy, led to the attempt to breakthrough the German front by a surprise attack. The successful tank attack at CAMBRAI again resulted in a temporary strengthening of the hope for victory which was also animated by the successes in the Orient.

The defeat of the British on November 30, the breakdown of Russia and Italy then caused the morale to sink deeper than ever before.

Weariness of war and lack of hope are quite openly revealed in prisoner statements. The British soldier no longer believes in a conquest of Germany by arms. Nevertheless he is ready to hold out, as a British victory is still believed to be assured even without a decision by arms. Shortage of rations and war material has not yet been noticeable. The English do not believe a German victory to be possible. The superiority of the Entente still exists in his opinion despite the fact that Russia withdrew. The intervention of the United States evokes new hopes. The expectation that Germany will be forced to give in for economic and inner-political reasons is still widespread. Therefore the belief exists in the army that a peace compromise will be established. That this will mean a victory of the English and will result in advantages for Great Britain is considered selfunderstood.

Prisoners' statements and conversations of English officers show a more conciliatory note. Our achievements are admired. It is admitted that the German soldier is capable and that the command and organization are superior. The opinion expressed of England's Allies, however, is usually unfavorable and contemptuous. Gradually it is being realized that a false opinion of Germany has prevailed. It can be seen that firmness and self-confidence are making a good impression on the English.

The expectations of the interior as well as those of the army, that the year 1917 will bring a decision have not been fulfilled. This has caused an increase of the weariness of war of the great masses. Interior difficulties, the Irish question, discontent of the workers, and the effects of the U-boat warfare are depressing the morale.

The English population is beginning to feel the effects of the war. The general increase of prices, shortage of food, stagnation in business, fear of air attacks, and the heavy losses of the army have strengthened the desire for peace, particularly of the lower classes of the population. However, so far, peace movements have been suppressed successfully. The belief of victory and fulfillment of the English claims is still widespread owing to the assurance of the British Government and the confidence with which it pursues its aim as well as competent influence exercised through the press. Hope for Germany's economic distress and political discord offers the most effective means of propoganda to urge the people on to hold out and suffer further hardships.

[The above document is an excellent example of propaganda material. It could be read with interest by either side.]

Attack Preparations

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Sections
No. 6213

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
January 24, 1918.

Reference G. H. Q. No. 5905

To Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and
Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

1. The following attacks will be prepared:

Mars left flank and Michael I (direction of attack northeast of BAPAUME) by the Seventeenth Army.

Michael II (attack north of the OMIGNON Brook) by the Second Army on the part of the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht.

Michael III (attack south of the OMIGNON Brook on both sides of St-QUENTIN) by the Eighteenth Army and Erzengel (attack south of the OISE on the front of the CREPY Group) by the Seventh Army on the part of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince in such a way that the Michael attack can take place about March 20 and the Mars left flank attack and Erzengel a few days later after the regrouping of the artillery used in the Michael attack.

The Michael attack is to break through the enemy front to the line La FERRE (left flank)---HAM---PERONNE and then in conjunction with the Mars left flank push forward via PERONNE-ARRAS.

The Erzengel attack will be a mere diversion and will attempt to gain the heights east of the OISE-AISNE Canal. * * *

2. The Mars attack right flank will be dropped.

3. Preparations for George I and II attacks will be continued so as to conclude them by the beginning of April. Approximately only 30 G. H. Q. divisions are expected to be used in George I. The draft of attack will be submitted in the near future.

4. Preparations for the Hektor-Achilles* operations will be prosecuted. At this time we are still unable to designate the exact time when the counterattack will be executed. In addition we can not predict what forces can be assembled for that purpose. Preliminary work will have to be limited to preparing the battlefield and its communications. Measures will be taken for the rapid employment of reinforcements.

5. If the Michael attack comes to a standstill, an attack on the front of the Third Army (Roland)** will be considered. * * *

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LUDENDORFF.

* Hektor-Achilles operations: Planned withdrawal (Hektor) of Third Army in case of expected largescale French attack and counterattack (Achilles) of reinforced First Army, and right flank of Third Army.

** Roland I: Proposed attack by Third Army between the SUIPPES and the AISNE, with limited objective.

Value of the Element of Surprise

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
February 4, 1918.

CONFERENCE OF THE FIRST GENERAL QUARTERMASTER IN MAUBEUGE

On February 3, 1918

[Extract]

Present: The Chief of Staff of the Groups of Armies and of the Armies of the Western front.

1. Surprise: It is the impression of Supreme Headquarters that in the preparation of the attacks too much emphasis is placed on the element of surprise and too little on tactical effect.

The English and French expect our attack at all points. The extensive commitment of enemy aviation in the last few days is an indication thereof. We cannot expect to surprise them strategically and tactically as we did in CAMBRAI. There the English were not looking for a German attack and it hit them like a bolt from the blue. The surprise succeeded.

Even now we will be able to attain surprise to the degree that in our preparations as a whole we will keep one jump ahead of the enemy's limping preparations. We have seen ourselves in the last few years how difficult it is to meet an offensive at the exact time. We too have limped along after the other fellow at times. If we are ready with our preparations while the enemy is still working against time for several days, the strategic surprise can be described as successful. But we can not count on complete surprise in the tactical sense also. Careful preparation and good tactical effect must be absolutely guaranteed.

* * * * *

THILO.

Some Attacks Cancelled. Michael 1 is Further Improved

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
February 4, 1918.

CONFERENCE IN MONS FEBRUARY 3, 1918, OPERATIONS 1918

[Extract]

Purpose: To determine requirements in troops.

Result: * * *

1. Diversion attacks Klein George 1* and George 2 are cancelled. They will be replaced by feints.
2. Because of an expansion of the general plan, Michael 1 will be elaborated on. Designation Mars is discontinued. The attack between the SCARPE and MOEUVRES is called Michael 1.

However a draft will also be worked out at the same time for a Michael 1 on a reduced scale, in case forces (artillery) cannot be made available.

Michael 2 remains unchanged.

* * * * *

PRAGER.

Deception of the Enemy

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 6620

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
February 18, 1918.

[Extract]

Before our offensive opens, offensive operations must be planned and carried out on several portions of the front for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.

* Attack by Sixth Army planned as a diversion to George on both sides of ARMENTIERES to the LYS on a front of 10 km. By envelopment on north and south, assisted by the Fourth Army, ARMENTIERES to be taken and line reached be organized for defense. Replaced by Georgette April 9, 1918.

The following strategic concept must underlie these operations:

Defense on the British front. Attack against the French:

1. Main attack at the beginning of the second half of March on the front of the First and Third Armies between REIMS and VARENNES, using the work done for "Roland,"* and against the northeast front of VERDUN.

2. Secondary operations on the AISNE (south front of the Seventh Army), in east LORRAINE and in ALSACE (Composite Army A - using the work done for "STRASSBURG"**).

3. Demonstrations by means of increased combat activity on the British front, especially in the sectors of the Fourth and Sixth Armies.

* * * * *

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. IV-c: Order

General Instructions for the Conduct of the Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
Annex to No. 728

GERMAN SEVENTEENTH ARMY,
February 27, 1918.

[Extract]

1. After 3 1/2 years of defense we will attack.

The Fourth and Sixth Armies are preparing major attacks in the YPRES Salient and in the vicinity of ARMENTIERES. It has not yet been determined how extensive the actual attack there will be.

The Seventeenth and Second Armies will cut off the CAMBRAI Salient. For this purpose the Seventeenth Army will debouch from the line REINCOURT-INCHY with its left directed on YTRES (Michael I Attack).

At the same time the Second Army, with its right wing, will drive through from VILLERS-GUISLAIN on EQUANCOURT (Michael II attack). In the CAMBRAI Salient the Second Army will execute feint attacks only. (Further details about this will be announced later.). The junction of the wings of the two armies in the region of YTRES-EQUANCOURT will be effected in one operation, which will be continued day and night.

If the Michael attacks are successful, the Seventeenth Army will attack the portion of the front north of the point of penetration. (Mars attack.)

The first overwhelming blow must annihilate as many British divisions (including reserves) as possible in order thus to create the situation favoring the launching of later operations. Supreme Headquarters has not yet announced the nature of these later operations.

2. The Michael Attack of the Seventeenth Army: In order to attain the maximum artillery effect the penetration will be concentrated on a stretch of terrain 9 km. wide between RIENCOURT and INCHY.

* Roland I, attack planned for Third Army between the SUIPPES and the AISNE with limited objective.

** STRASSBURG, diversion planned in the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht from the valley of the BREUSCH (STRASSBURG), combined with defense in the SONDGAU (BELFORT). Not executed.

The VI and XIV Res. Corps and the XI Corps with 12 divisions will execute the main effort in the direction of SAPIGNIES---BAPAUME---YTRES. The army will be responsible for protecting its left flank until juncture with the Second Army is made.

The XVIII Corps with 5 divisions will cover the flank of the main attack by means of an attack via MORY and at the same time will begin the envelopment of the enemy front on the line CROISILLES---St-LEGER.

3. Main Principles to be Observed in the Conduct of the Battle:

(a) The army commander is not for a certainty in a position, as the attack develops, to transmit his desires through orders to the troops. Furthermore, there will be frequent occasions when division and corps will not gain knowledge of events demanding the bringing up of fresh forces from the rear until it is too late. If the command holds reserves back for too long a time and the troops have to wait for orders, the most favorable opportunity could be allowed to pass unused.

Therefore, I order the following: The instructions of the corps and divisions must be worded in such manner that every unit - even one initially in the second line - will be in a position to act properly - even without orders - and utilize each moment to the full until the line MUHLENBERG---BAPAUME---YTRES is reached.

(b) Our own artillery action in the initial position of attack will extend to the enemy second position, which follows the general line St-LEGER---VAULX---MORCHIES---BEAUMETZ---south limit of HERMIES---Wald von HAVRINCOURT. Thus the infantry, supported by the entire attacking artillery, will be able to breakthrough the forward positions, capture the enemy artillery and penetrate the enemy second position.

The thought of being deprived of coordinated artillery action from then on need not under any circumstances deter the infantry from advancing steadily. It is not a question of daily objectives but only of the execution of set missions. No enemy resistance worth mentioning is to be expected in the hours immediately following a successful penetration. The numerous machine guns accompanying the infantry and its light trench mortars and the accompanying batteries provide it with sufficient fire power for the missions to be performed during this time. The high command must risk everything in pushing forward the field and heavy artillery as soon as possible in the trace of the divisions fighting in the front line. This will be possible provided the preparation is made very thorough to overcome the difficulties offered by the shell-crater area and if batteries are withdrawn early in the fight from their rolling barrage missions and begin to displace forward.

4. Special corps missions in the Michael I Attack:

(a) The VIMY group, the Bavarian III Army Corps, and the IX Res. Corps will deceive the enemy on D day as to the extent of the attack by appropriate fire action and by gassing the hostile artillery.

* * * * *

5. The Mars Attack:

(a) The Mars attack is to cover the flank of the Michael attack and create a starting point for the continuation of the operations as a whole.

The success of the Michael attacks is the preliminary condition for this.

The manner of execution depends on the development of the situation and on the forces, especially artillery, that can be gotten into the battle.

* * * * *

von BELOW,
General of Infantry.

American Divisions Assumed to be in France.

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Intelligence Officer
AT: German Seventeenth Army
DATE: Sent: February 27, 1918: 10:30 a. m. No. 516 (8129)
TO: Foreign Armies Section, Supreme Headquarters

I request report as to how many American divisions are assumed to be in France or England at present.

FROM: Foreign Armies Section
AT: Supreme Headquarters
DATE: Sent: March 1, 1918: 10:41. No. 7245
TO: Intelligence Officer, German Seventeenth Army
Reference: No. 516

In France 1 division in front, 4 in reserve; in England, none.

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Report

Estimate of Total Strength of American Troops in France

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section
No. 7469

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
March 3, 1918--8:55 p. m.

To Captain von Ilsemann [His Majesty's Aide]

Reference: Wire March 9.

The declaration made by General Pershing is considered to be correct. Statements made by British and French statesmen concerning the American troop support are very much exaggerated and must be considered an attempt to raise the morale.

The American Expeditionary Corps is gradually increasing. At present 5 divisions are assumed to be in France, 2 of which (91st and 26th Divisions) have been ascertained on the front by prisoners. The others are still in training behind the front. The total

strength of the American troops including the technical and labor units is estimated to be about 150,000 men.

[At this time we had 6 divisions in France - 1st, 2d, 26th, 32d, 41st, 42d. Later in the month, 2 others arrived the 3d and the 5th. By March 21, total strength of the AEF was 304,111 which makes this present German estimate far too low.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. III: Order

Preparation for "George" and Regrouping from "Michael" into "George"

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 6039

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 5, 1918.

To: Fourth and Sixth Armies

[Extract]

1. The George operations will depend on the course of the Michael-Mars operations. Therefore there is as yet no reliable basis for determining the time for the beginning of operation George, the forces which will be available and the time, manner, and sequence of the movements of these forces.

Nevertheless in the following lines a few principles will be given on which to base the continuation of the preparations.

2. It is not yet possible to set the time for launching the George operations.

The George operation has then the best prospects if it follows the Michael operation as closely as possible and takes the enemy by surprise.

On the other hand it will not be possible to launch the attack before the middle of April on account of ground conditions.

Therefore we must study the best way of furthering the preparations so that the attack can be launched by the middle of April. In that connection it must be assumed that with the beginning of the Michael operations a substantial increase in ammunition and ration supplies for George can take place.

3. Concentration of Forces:

The forces necessary for the George operations will be concentrated from the following sources:

(a) Troops now with the armies * * *

(b) Troops participating in the Michael-Mars operations that are released after the initial penetration before the operations are continued. These will probably be only a few organizations. Indications will be furnished as soon as it is possible to reach any conclusions on this point.

(c) Troops released if the Michael-Mars operations should terminate early.

(d) Forces received from G. H. Q. It can be assumed that the greater part of these will be derived from "Michael 3," as soon as that operation has reached its objective or is broken off sooner.

4. Execution of the Regrouping: The thing is to regroup the forces swiftly and unobserved by the enemy and to begin the George operation by surprise.

It cannot be expected that organizations will be brought up as methodically as to time, as is provided * * * for in concentrating the troops for "Michael-Mars." On the contrary, troops will be shifted at once as they are released in the Michael-Mars operations. Only if a large number of units are released simultaneously for movement by rail or marching will it be possible to determine the sequence on the basis of the requirements for "George" similarly to the manner in which it was done * * * for the Seventeenth and Second Armies.

It is planned to move the mass of the forces released from "Mars" and "Michael 1 and 2" * * * for the most part by marching, some elements of "Michael 2" being shifted by rail.

To a considerable degree the Fourth Army is to be furnished with troops that will be brought up to it by G. H. Q. by rail.

* * * * *

5. Preparation for George:

* * * * *

As it will require considerable time to regroup many of the units to be shifted from "Michael" to "George," the elements first arriving in the Fourth and Sixth Armies will have to stay a rather long time in their assembly areas. These latter should therefore not be selected too closely together, otherwise the danger would arise that the enemy would take note of the concentration too soon.

The development for attack from the concentration areas will be substantially by marching and should take no more than 4 days' marching generally speaking. * * *

* * * * *

6. I request that the purpose of the regrouping from "Michael" to "George," together with the forgoing remarks be treated as secret for the time being as respects the Seventeenth and Second Armies.

* * * * *

RUPPRECHT,
Crown Prince of Bavaria,
Field Marshal General,
Commanding.

Possible Forms of French Counteraction

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2364

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
March 6, 1918.

To Supreme Headquarters

[Extract]

We may expect French counteraction to begin very soon after the opening of the German offensive. Dependent on the progress of Michael this action will take the form of an offensive to relieve pressure or, in case of decisive successes by our forces, of direct support of the British.

If Michael continues to be an attack with limited objective (SOMME-CROZAT Canal), even an attack executed in heavy force towards the west via TERGNIER will come to a standstill very soon. Even if it is supported from the direction of JUSSY, French reserves on the terrain north of CHAUNY, which is hilly and covered with dense woods, will be in a position to block the attack. After the attack in the SIEGFRIED zone our troops, with the CROZAT Canal and the OISE in their rear, would presumably have to be moved behind the canal again, if counterattacked in any considerable force. The sole advantage would be the fact that the secondary operation Erzengel* would doubtless be facilitated by an attack approximately as far as CHAUNY.

The situation will be entirely different if Michael results in such great success that the French are compelled to give immediate support to the British army. If Michael leads us beyond the SOMME and if the French advance to the counterattack, in a northerly direction, possibly across the line ROYE-NOYON, a strong attack from the line JUSSY-TERGNIER could do considerable harm to the French counterattack. Such a blow can gain genuine significance if the French are forced to cover the withdrawal of the British defeated at the SOMME and the CROZAT Canal.

Hence, it is desirable to preserve the possibility of an attack and quickly seize bridgeheads west of the canal in the vicinity of JUSSY and TERGNIER insofar as the course of the attacks offers an opportunity to do so. * * *

* * * If Michael makes such progress as to remove any fear that the French will deliver major attacks on the south front of the group of armies, the commitment of these divisions near JUSSY-TERGNIER can attain decisive importance.

The only remaining problem is to ensure that these divisions are moved into a position in readiness in ample time. If trains are held behind the First and Third Armies for the three attack divisions, the movement of troops to the front would be substantially facilitated.

The Eighteenth Army will have to make provisions for numerous crossings of the OISE between MOY and Le FERRE.

* Attack by right of Seventh Army in the direction of NOYON to round off the AILLETTE angle near COUCY-le-CHATEAU.

As this operation is executed, Erzengel also must be conducted to cover the left flank and perhaps be extended as far as the OISE-AISNE Canal.

Count SCHULENBERG.
Chief of Staff.

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Report

American Troops in France.

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE OF HIS MAJESTY'S AIDE,
March 9, 1918--1:55 p. m.

To Foreign Armies Section

His Majesty requests your reaction to the following article:

Berlin, March 7, 1918.

General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France has made the following statement according to the PARIS radio message of 5 p. m., March 5:

"We have intensified our efforts. Our troops participate in the battle. Our supplies are not yet very considerable. The American assistance is still in its beginnings stages." (Marginal note by His Majesty: (A ruse?) These declarations made by the American Commander-in-Chief form a very pronounced contrast to the boastful official reports made by British and French statesmen concerning the considerable number of American troops already supporting the Entente.

By order of His Majesty

von ILSEMANN.

Missions of Groups of Armies During the Michael Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7070

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
March 10, 1918.

[Extract]

His Majesty orders the following:

1. The Michael attack will take place on March 21. A penetration will be effected in the enemy first position at 9:40 a. m.

2. In this attack the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht will cut off the British in the CAMBRAI salient as the first major tactical objective and will gain the line CROISILLES---BAPAUME---PERONNE---the OMIGNON---north of the OMIGNON to its confluence with the SOMME. In the event that the attack of the right wing [Seventeenth Army] progresses favorably, this attack will be pushed beyond CROISILLES.

The group of armies will have the further mission of driving in the direction of ARRAS-ALBERT, holding the SOMME at PERONNE with the left, while the main effort by its right, shakes the British front opposite the Sixth Army, and liberates further German forces from position warfare for the advance. If the situation should develop thus, all divisions situated behind the Fourth and Sixth Armies will be moved up immediately for this purpose.

3. First of all the Group of Armies German Crown Prince will gain the SOMME and the CROZAT Canal south of the OMIGNON. In a rapid advance the Eighteenth Army will seize the SOMME and canal crossings. In addition, the Eighteenth Army will have to be prepared to extend its right as far as PERONNE. The group of armies is considering the reinforcement of the left of the Eighteenth Army by the divisions of the Seventh, First, and Third Armies.

5. Supreme Headquarters reserves decision as to "Mars" and "Erzengel" under a later date, dependent upon the status of the operations. ***

6. ***

In case the operations are ordered, the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht will cover the right flank of the Mars-Michael operations against a British counterattack.

In the event that the French launch an attack on a large scale against the Seventh (excl. of Erzengel front), the First and Third Armies, the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, will fall back initially according to plan.

von HINDENBURG.

Time of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7069

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
March 12, 1918.

To the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and the

Group of Armies German Crown Prince.

[Extract]

1. March 21 is designated as D day. * * *
2. H hour: 9:40 a. m. Beginning of the fire preparation: 6:40 a. m. * * *
3. Unforeseeable circumstances can necessitate a postponement of D day. Hence, the group of armies - insofar as has not been done already - will take the necessary and suitable measures so that the armies can suspend the development at any time. Possible orders on this score will be issued by Supreme Headquarters to the groups of armies and the armies not later than 12 noon, March 20. All preparations for rapid transmission of orders by telephone will be completed by that time.

LUDENDORFF.

Missions for the Michael Operations

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 6263

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 16, 1918.

[Extract]

For the Michael Operations, which are soon to start, I consider it necessary briefly to summarize once more the most important principles in regard to the Second and Seventeenth Armies and also instruct the Fourth and Sixth Armies concerning the Michael attack as well as the missions devolving upon them within the framework of the over-all operation.

I. Michael Armies (Seventeenth and Second Armies):

* * *[CF. No. 6072, March 6, 1918, Same Hq.] The Seventeenth and Second Armies will initially gain the line CROISILLES---BAPAUME---PERONNE---confluence of the OMIGNON. * * *

It will then be the further mission of the Seventeenth and Second Armies to push forward in the direction of ARRAS-ALBERT and also deal the British front facing the Sixth Army a staggering blow. * * *

I expressly stress the fact that the main effort of the attack of the Seventeenth Army should be directed in the direction: east of BAPAUME-YTRES. Only if in cooperation

with the Second Army a major tactical success is scored, will the continuation of the attack in the direction of ARRAS be possible.

* * * * *

II. The Group of Armies German Crown Prince is charged with the mission of gaining the SOMME and the CROZAT Canal south of the OMIGNON (Michael 3). At the same time the Eighteenth Army will hold itself in readiness to extend its right as far as PERONNE.

In the event that the Second Army encounters stiff resistance and the Eighteenth Army, on the other hand, advances more quickly, the Eighteenth Army will commit strong forces via BEAUVOIS-TERTRY in the direction of PERONNE so that it can, in cooperation with the left wing of the Seventeenth Army, cut off the hostile forces situated in front of the Second Army.

If this situation arises the Seventeenth Army will have to continue its attack in a southerly direction via YTRES, covering its left.

III. Front North of the SCARPE:

* * * * *

2. If the Michael-Mars attack results in the success expected, the thing to do is to deal the adjacent front north of the SCARPE a stiff blow and release more German forces from position warfare for the advance.

If it should so happen, the divisions situation behind the Fourth and Sixth Armies and the artillery, trench mortars, etc., released during "Michael 2" will be brought up at once for this purpose and more reserves will be gained by reducing the number of divisions on the front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies.

(a) Seventeenth Army, North Wing: The VIMY Group of the Seventeenth Army must hold itself in readiness to broaden the scope of the success by quickly gaining a foothold north of the SCARPE if the British front in front of the group is also shaken by the Michael-Mars attack. * * * Furthermore, the group must be prepared to end the Mars attack after the artillery has been reinforced.

* * * * *

An effort will be made to envelop the VIMY Heights along the ridge from the southeast.

(b) Sixth Army: In proportion to the forces available the left wing of the Sixth Army south of the La BASSEE Canal must be prepared to join the advance of the VIMY Group or to exploit any other favorable opportunity which presents itself.

Divisions coming from the north wing of the Sixth Army and from the Fourth Army and the artillery and trench mortars released during the Michael-Mars will be considered as reinforcements for this action. * * *

On the front north of the La BASSEE Canal the Sixth Army must hold itself in readiness to pursue the enemy and prevent the removal of his forces in the event that he should fall back under the pressure of the Michael operation.

It is possible that the enemy might withdraw at the outset behind the LYS and LAWE sector. Rapid pursuit inflicting the greatest possible harm on the enemy is ordered as far as the LYS. The situation will determine the extent to which it will be possible to seize the LYS crossings.

* * * * *

(c) Fourth Army: It is possible that the enemy under the pressure of the Michael operation - if this has progressed sufficiently - will also withdraw in front of

the Fourth Army. The evacuation of the YPRES Salient can enter into the considerations earlier than expected, if the British are forced to provide further reserves for employment against the Michael operation.

The Fourth Army must prepare to pursue the enemy and prevent the removal of enemy forces.

* * * * *

(d) The Fourth and Sixth Armies will make preparations for the purpose of quickly increasing the mobility of their troops if the need arises. In this connection, the allotment of any great number of horses and vehicles can not be counted upon. * * *

* * * * *

RUPPRECHT,
Crown Prince of Bavaria,
Field Marshal General.

[Germany now makes ready for a mammoth effort for which every condition favored her; Russia had collapsed; Italy still lay stricken from the CAPORETTO disaster of October, 1917; the Americans were still an undetermined factor.]

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. III: Telegram

Direction of Battle at Front Assumed by Kaiser and von Hindenburg

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Ludendorff

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: March 20, 1918

SENT BY: Telegraph

No.: 7240

TO: Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and

Group of Armies Crown Prince, Seventh, Second

and Eighteenth Armies

His Majesty, the Kaiser, along with the Field Marshal von Hindenburg, has arrived at the front of attack for the purpose of assuming direction of the battle. This order will be published to the troops.

Situation at Noon, March 21, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 21, 1918.

Early this morning the German attack was launched in the Seventeenth, Second, and Eighteenth Armies. After a very heavy artillery preparation the infantry of all three armies advanced to the assault. According to reports submitted up to now (11:30 a. m.) the enemy's forward position has been captured everywhere. The attack is progressing.

Fourth Army: The activity of the reconnoitering detachments probing to the front was extremely vigorous on both sides.

Enemy aviation maintained active surveillance last night. We bombed the CALAIS and DUNKERQUE railroad stations.

We shelled railroad stations, railroad installations and localities with flat-trajectory fire of heavy and heaviest calibers.

Sixth Army: Our artillery continued the destruction of enemy positions from the north flank to the La BASSEE Canal.

Reconnaissance detachments working forward found the enemy everywhere offering strong resistance, partly in his 1st, partly in his 2d line.

According to a conservative estimate an increase of at least 15 batteries has been established in front of the left flank of Group Lille.

Machine Guns Used by Troops from U. S. A.

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section
No. 7884

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
March 23, 1918.

The troops of the United States are using Maxim, Colt, Vickers, Hotchkiss and St-Etienne machine guns. The troops on the west front are reported to be equipped with Hotchkiss and St-Etienne machine guns.

It has been decided to introduce the Browning (light and heavy model) machine guns. According to the statements made by the chief of the ordnance department, the first Browning machine guns will be ready in April, but a considerable quantity cannot be expected before July.

For airplanes the Lewis machine gun will be used.

General Instructions for Continuation of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Ludendorff

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: March 23, 1918 HOUR: 9:30 a. m. SENT BY: Telegraph No. 7288

TO: Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and German Crown Prince

General instructions for the continuation of the operations after reaching the line BAPAUME---PERONNE---HAM.

Seventeenth Army will attack with strong pressure in the direction of ARRAS---St-POL; left wing, direction of MIRAUMONT.

Second Army will advance in the direction of MIRAUMONT-LIHONS.

Eighteenth Army, echeloned left, will advance in the direction of CHAULNES-NOYON and move strong forces forward via HAM.

Situation at Noon, March 24, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 24, 1918.

[Extract]

Attack Fronts

(Seventeenth, Second, and Eighteenth Armies):

The situation is unchanged on the north flank of the Seventeenth Army.

The enemy opposes very strong resistance in the first BAPAUME switch; he has reinforced his front by committing new divisions. * * * On the left flank of the army, BEUGNY, LEBUCQUIERE, VELU, and BERTINCOURT are captured; contact has been made with the Second Army * * *

Last night the Second Army reached the line NEUVILLE---LECHELLE---west of ETRICOURT ---Bois St-MARTIN (west of MANANCOURT)---Bois VAUX---east of BOUCHAVESNES---east of CLERY---PERONNE (incl.) and the low ground east of the SOMME from FLAMICOURT to south of BRIE.

According to the last reports, Le TRANSLOY, LESBOEUF, MORVAL, BOUCHAVESNES, and CLERY have been left behind in our advance.

The Eighteenth Army has crossed the SOMME at several points as, for instance, in BETHENCOURT, VOYENNES, and south of HAM. Farther south GUGNY and VILLEQUIER-AUMONT have been reached. Yesterday strong enemy attacks in which French and Americans participated were repulsed near VIRY.

Very little combat activity in the Fourth and Sixth Armies. Result of the Group of Armies' distant reconnaissance on March 23:

In the forenoon railroad traffic heavier than usual on the line ETAPLES---St-POL going east; heavy traffic from HAZEBROUCK-BETHUNE, mostly going south.

From 12 noon until 2 p. m. all the main transport lines from the coast to MONTDIDIER ---ROY---CHAULNES were reconnoitered. At 1 p. m. heavy traffic in both directions was observed between CALAIS and ETAPLES and considerable movement from LONGPRE to ABBEVILLE. Otherwise only limited activity.

* * * * *

British reserves are now estimated as follows:

In front of the Fourth Army:	3 divisions; 2 other divisions already withdrawn
" " " Sixth Army:	3 to 5 divisions
" " " Seventeenth:	2 divisions
" " " Second Army:	None
" " " Eighteenth:	2 cavalry divisions

In VIRY, in front of the Eighteenth Army, the French 9th, and 125th Divs. have been identified through prisoners. Americans also, probably the 26th Div., have taken part in the fighting.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Situation at Noon, March 25, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 25, 1918.

[Extract]

Front of Attack

Seventeenth Army: The situation remains the same on both sides of the SCARPE.

The left flank of the army experienced heavy fighting yesterday and gained ground after overcoming stubborn resistance. BAPAUME was captured; we are pushing forward beyond that point on BIEFVILLERS via SAPIGNIES. The BAPAUME-WARLENCOURT Road has been crossed.

Second Army: Since early this morning the army has been pushing forward beyond the line east of GUENDENCOURT---east of FLERS---west edge of FOUREAUWALD---west of LONGUEVAL ---west of HARDECOURT-aux-Bois---west of HAM. We have passed through CONTALMAISON and MONTAUBAN. Advance guards have crossed the SOMME at 3 points between PERONNE and St-CHRIST.

Eighteenth Army: The SOMME has been crossed at numerous points south of St-CHRIST. The army is beyond the line west of NESLE---east of GUISCARD---west of ABBECOURT (west of CHAUNY) and is continuing the attack against the line ROYE-NOYON.

No report has yet been received from the Seventeenth and Second Armies concerning prisoners and captured materiel. Up to last night the Eighteenth Army had counted over 20,000 prisoners, more than 400 guns, and 2,000 machine guns.

Fourth and Sixth Armies: No important combat activity.

On the lines EPERNAY-CHALONS and ROMILLY---TROYES---VENDEUVRE---BAR-sur-AUBE---CHAUMONT---LANGRES as well as on the CHALINDRAY track triangle increased traffic was observed; the greatest density of train traffic was on the line EPERNAY---CHALONS---VIEL; rolling stock was also in the railroad yard 20 km. south of ROUILLY.

Enemy Situation:

* * * * *

Up to now the French forces identified in front of the Eighteenth Army are the V Army Corps with 2 divisions in line and 2 divisions in reserve, in addition to the 1st Dismounted Cuirassier Div. in line. The French 64th and 65th Divs. are said to have arrived from Italy.

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. III: Order

Instructions for the Continuation of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7341

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
March 26, 1918.

To the Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and German Crown Prince

[Extract]

In its zone of advance the Eighteenth Army will pivot against the AVRE and seize the crossings for the purpose of continuing the advance, its right in the vicinity of La NEUVILLE SIRE [?] BERNARD. Axes of advance extended as follows: left flank on COMPIEGNE, right on TARTIGNY east of BRETEUIL. The advance beyond the AVRE will not begin until ordered by Supreme Headquarters.

The Group of Armies German Crown Prince, with its left well disposed in depth, will be prepared to advance across the OISE in the direction of COMPIEGNE-FONTENAY.

With its left wing strong the Second Army will move south of the SOMME across the AVRE, take AMIENS, and wheel across the SOMME into the line AIRAINES-MOREUIL, prepared to continue the advance of its left via SOURDON-BRETEUIL.

The Seventeenth Army will continue its advance in a due westerly direction, the left wing north of the NIEVRE, and pivoting on ARRAS, will push its right on St-POL.

Mars South appears unessential. Preparations for Mars North and WALKURENRITT are stopped.

* * * * *

The Sixth Army will continue its preparations for GEORGETTE.

The Fourth Army will concentrate forces for pressure against the Belgians.

LUDENDORFF.

Situation at Noon, March 26, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 26, 1918.

[Extract]

Attack Fronts:

Seventh Army: The situation remains the same on both sides of the SCARPE. The enemy evacuated his positions south of COJEUL Creek; we pursued on BOIRY-BEQUERELLE and BOYELLE. Farther south stubborn English counterattacks were repulsed. According to the last reports received we were gaining the approximate line GOMMECOURT---ACHIET-le-PETIT ---west of PUISIEUX-au-MONT---west of SERRE in heavy fighting.

Second Army: The hills west of MIRAUMONT have been stormed.

Farther south the approximate line west of COURCELETTE---east of POZIERES---east of MAMETZ---west of VAUX has been reached.

South of PERONNE we succeeded in broadening the existing bridgeheads over the SOMME and in crossing the river on the entire front of the army. We are standing west of FLAUCOURT and west of HORGNY.

Eighteenth Army: Yesterday the Eighteenth Army also advanced farther to the west in heavy fighting during which more and more French troops appeared on the field. The army is now nearing ROYE; NOYON has been captured.

Seventh Army: The Seventh Army has joined the forward movement with its north flank and stood before AMIGNY last night.

Fourth and Sixth Armies: No important action.

Enemy situation: A total of 6 reserve divisions has arrived since March 21 in front of the Fourth Army.

Of these 4 have been shifted elsewhere

1 is not definitely located in sector

1 left

In front of the Sixth Army there were 4 divisions, of which 1 has been shifted elsewhere, leaving 3.

In front of the Eighteenth Army, in addition to the already identified French units (V Army Corps with 4 infantry divisions and the 1st Dismounted Cav. Div.), the independent 62d Div. and the 22d Div., XI Army Corps, have appeared on the front.

Distant reconnaissance: Increased railroad traffic from YPRES to HAZEBROUCK via POPERINGEN was observed early this morning.

Around ESTREES---St-DENIS (west of COMPIEGNE) large bodies of troops were observed unloading yesterday as well as considerable troop movements from there and from COMPIEGNE in a northeastern direction. Doubtlessly French reserves arriving.

[By this date, the German southern attack had succeeded to the point that it had changed the orderly British retirement to a rout. On the 26th the Germans forced a gap west of ROYE between the British and French armies. However, the existence of this gap was not exploited by the Germans so that Haig, by throwing in tired divisions, and Petain, by putting in new divisions to the north, were able to stiffen and hold the line.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Situation at Noon, March 27, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 27, 1918.

[Extract]

Fronts of Attack

Seventeenth Army: The situation is unchanged on both sides of the SCARPE. From west of CROISILLES to the left flank the army, yesterday, gained additional ground in fighting which was especially heavy in the interior flank. According to the latest reports the front line is approximately west of BOIRY---BECQUERELLE---west of MOYENNEVILLE---east of HEBUTERNE---northwest of BEAUMONT---HAMEL.

Second Army: Yesterday the army practically crossed the 1916 SOMME battlefield. The enemy was still offering stubborn resistance especially at the ANCRE north of ALBERT. The front line runs approximately from east of AUCHONVILLERS past HAMEL to the ANCRE which is crossed at ALBERT: the town is in our hands. Farther on the line runs west of MEAULTE ---west of MORLANCOURT---SOMME bend west of ETINEHEM---CHUIGNOLLES---FRAMERVILLE---LIHONS.

Eighteenth Army: Its front line makes contact with Second Army near LIHONS and runs via Le QUESNOY-en-SATERRE---ANDECHY---west of ROYE---hills west of NOYON and farther on along the OISE.

Fourth and Sixth Armies: No important engagements.

Information of the Enemy:

In front of the Eighteenth Army additional French units have been put in line; the 1st Div., I Army Corps, is new, also the 5th Cav. Div., so that now we can count on the presence of units of the I, V, XI, and XVIII Army Corps.

The estimate of the available English divisions is as follows:

In France: 62 to 63 divisions

Identified at the front: 53 divisions

Therefore 9 to 10 divisions remain in reserve.

Whether divisions have been withdrawn from the quiet portion of the front and if so, which ones, remains to be clarified.

Situation at Noon, March 28, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 28, 1918.

[Extract]

Fronts of Attack:

Seventeenth Army: Early today the attack opened on both sides of the SCARPE.

After heavy artillery preparation, particularly north of the SCARPE, the infantry advanced to the assault at 7:30 a. m.; according to the reports received up to now the attack is progressing satisfactorily. We were advancing east of BAILLEUL, are standing east of FAMPOUX, are approaching FENCHY, and the hills southeast of MERCATEL are in our possession.

Farther south the attack of the left wing of the army met extraordinarily tough resistance yesterday from fresh divisions that had just been brought up. Stubborn fighting took place around BOIRY-St-MARTIN, BUCQUOY and HEBUTERNE.

Second Army: No important changes to report on the right flank. South of the ANCRE the hills east and southeast of MERICOURT-l'ABBE, and south of the SOMME the hills south-east of HAMEL were captured. There was heavy fighting the entire day around ROZIERES.

Eighteenth Army: The army took part in the fighting around ROZIERES also. It captured PIERREPONT (on the AVRE), MONTDIDIER, and LASSIGNY. It is standing on the OISE east of NOYON.

Fourth Army: Patrolling on the entire army front during the night of March 26/27 drew enemy fire, and it was thereby ascertained that a decrease of enemy artillery can be expected with certainty in front of the STADEN, YPRES, and WYTSCHAETE Groups.

Sixth Army: With regard to the weakening of the British front, see under enemy situation.

Since early this morning, the left wing of the army has been supporting the attack of the Seventeenth Army north of the SCARPE.

Enemy Situation:

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The British have withdrawn a number of divisions from the front opposite the Fourth and Sixth Armies and north wing of the Seventeenth Army.

* * * * *

There now remains no reserve division in front of the Fourth Army and probably only one in reserve in front of the Sixth Army. * * *

In front of the Seventeenth Army: * * * Six divisions are assumed to be in reserve.
* * *

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By the Second Army * * * there remains probably only 1 cavalry division in reserve.
In the Eighteenth Army presumably 1 infantry (69th?) and 1 cavalry division in reserve.

* * * * *

All indications point to the fact that the British have thrown the mass of their reserves in front of the Seventeenth Army including the divisions withdrawn from other fronts.

Of all the divisions located in France (including the 5 earmarked for Italy), 8 to 9 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions have not yet been located at the front and can be considered as reserved to be moved at will.

The French 56th Div., VI Army Corps, has been recently identified. Accordingly we have to reckon on 5 army corps and 1 cavalry corps. The commitment of 9 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division (dismounted) and 1 cavalry division at the front is confirmed. 5 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions are presumed in reserve. As further French reserves there are 12 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions; information concerning these is still lacking.

Results of Reconnaissance:

Brisk traffic could be heard last night in the ARMENTIERES area.

According to air observation strong columns of all arms were moving yesterday between 11 a. m. and 11:30 a. m. from the line COUCY-le-CHATEAU---VEZAPONIN---COMPIEGNE in the direction of the OISE near and east of NOYON.

Group of Armies von Gallwitz observed rather heavy traffic apparently in a westerly direction on the CLERMONT---St-MENEHOULD track, and traffic in both direction on the BAR-le-DUC---GONDRECOURT track.

[March 28 marks the end of the first phase of the battle of the SOMME. At the end of eight days of fighting, German forces had bent the French and British line back about 39 miles from its original position. However, German forces had failed to reach AMIENS, still a full twelve miles to the east. The great planned German offensive had failed.]

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. III: Telegram

Guide for Further Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Ludendorff

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: March 29, 1918 HOUR: 11:25 a. m. SENT BY: Telegram No: 7386

TO: Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and German Crown Prince

The following can serve as a guide for further operations: the attack south of the SOMME in the direction of AMIENS and via MONTDIDIER---NOYON---CHAUNY will be continued by the left wing of the Second Army, the Eighteenth Army, and the right of the Seventh Army.

The Second Army and later the left wing of the Seventeenth Army must join the attack south of the SOMME. Furthermore, the Second Army must exert sharp pressure on AMIENS.

The center and right of the Seventeenth Army can only contain the enemy.

The Sixth and Fourth Armies will make preparations for GEORGETTE and FLANDERS.

An especially strong grouping is necessary behind the Eighteenth and Second Armies. Supreme Headquarters will move its reserves to that point.

Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht must shift still more forces from the Seventeenth to the Second Army, particularly such divisions as are equipped for mobile warfare.

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. III: Telegram

Necessity of Continuing the Attack until the Noye has been Crossed

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Ludendorff

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: March 29, 1918 HOUR: 6 p. m. SENT BY: Telegraph No: 7389

TO: Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and German Crown Prince

Notwithstanding the efforts which have already been demanded of the interior flanks of the Second and Eighteenth Armies, the attack must continue until the NOYE has been crossed.

The left wing of the Second Army will employ all the resources at its command and push forward as far as the Road AMIENS---St-FUSCIEN---JEMEL---AILLY-sur-NOYE, the right wing of the Eighteenth Army on La FALOISE. It will not make any change of direction in advancing into its zone of action until later.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Situation at Noon, March 29, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 29, 1918.

[Extract]

Front of Attack:

Seventeenth Army: The attack on both sides of the SCARPE yesterday was carried north of the river to the line west edge of GAVRELLE---east of PAMPOUX. ARLEUX was evacuated by the enemy and occupied by us. South of the river our front line runs east of TILLOY---west of NEUVILLE---VITASSE and merges into the old line east of BOISLEUX---St-MARC. Approximately 2,000 prisoners were brought in. On the south wing of the army we are now lying east of HEBUTERNE.

Second Army: On the north flank the situation is not materially changed. South of ALBERT we evacuated DERNANCOURT and Hill 108 east of MERICOURT-I'ABBE. Farther south we pushed forward in conjunction with the right of the Eighteenth Army as far as the line WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT---MARCELCAVE (incl.)---west of CAIX.

Eighteenth Army: The army, in contact with the Second Army has reached the line Le QUESNEL---FRESNOY-en-CHAUSEE---PLESSIER---hills west of HERGICOURT---west of MONTDIDIER.

From MONTDIDIER to NOYON and beyond on the OISE the front is practically unchanged.

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Enemy Situation:

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The following new French forces have appeared on the front of the Eighteenth Army: 133d Div. (XXXVI A. C.); 53d Div. (XXXV A. C.), and the 38th Div. The entire XXXVI A. C. (heretofore in FLANDERS) can be counted on as present; the 38th is an independent division.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Order

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 82373

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
March 30, 1918.

1. Heretofore in the course of our offensive the enemy artillery, whether because of its weakness or because of gassing, has played a comparatively unimportant role. The main resistance lay in the machine-gun nests disposed in depth. Their complete destruction through the softening-up preparation of the artillery was not obtained even when the fire was rather prolonged. Moreover it was not to be expected. We must be content with the elimination of as large a number of these nests as possible by heavy fire and sneezing gas.

To reduce the machine-gun nests still left in action, single pieces (or light trench mortars) will be used; they will be attached to the leading waves of infantry, and will follow as closely as possible, employing direct fire at close range (1,000 meters). It is recommended that the same batteries be always assigned to the different battalions. Under the protection of these guns (trench mortars) the infantry will advance by bounds in very small groups among which the light machine guns will be divided. As a rule the heavy machine guns will be used to neutralize the objective of the attack during the infantry attack and will follow the latter in rather large bounds. Moreover they will furnish support in case of enemy counterattacks.

Apparently the procedure depicted here was only applied partially, but with success and small losses. I request that measures be taken to make it common practice as soon as possible. But the idea of wresting a successful issue by employment of masses of troops must be absolutely abandoned. This only leads to unnecessary losses. The deciding factor is fire effect and not numbers.

2. Fresh demonstration of the extraordinary effect of the burst of medium and heavy trench mortars and its influence on morale has been afforded by the attack of the 21st instant. Provision must be made for attaching the trench mortar companies in the advance so that as soon as the fighting becomes stationary, the medium trench mortars can be used against organized villages, farms, etc. Heavy mortars and Fluegelminenwerfer* do not come into consideration in warfare of movement but will be used extensively in position warfare.

* A heavy mortar firing a shell equipped with vanes (Fluegel).

Besides their softening-up fire before the actual attack, their main mission at all times is the destruction of the enemy infantry. Villages located within range are especially suitable targets because they are heavily occupied.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Situation at Noon, March 30, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
March 30, 1918.

[Extract]

Front of Attack:

Seventeenth Army: Captured: FAMPOUX north of the SCARPE; north of BUCQUOY.

Second Army: No change on the north flank.

South of the SOMME the line IGNAUCOURT-MEZIERES was crossed in attack. The attack is being continued there today. According to the latest reports the DEMAIN-MOREUIL Roads has been reached.

Eighteenth Army: The attack is being continued today from the right wing to the vicinity of LASSIGNY. On the hills west of the line bend in the AVRE near PIERREPONT-MONTDIDIER, the villages MALPART and MESNIL---St-GEORGES have been captured.

* * * * *

Enemy Situation:

In front of the Fourth Army the Belgians have taken over the sector of the northernmost English divisions. The Americans seem to be in line near DIXMUDE according to front line reports.

* * * * *

The French have now taken over the front opposite the Eighteenth Army. Up to now there have been identified: 13 infantry divisions, 1 cuirassier division (dismounted) and 1 cavalry division. 8 infantry divisions, 1 cuirassier division (dismounted), and 2 cavalry divisions are presumed to be in reserve.

MARTEMER---north of ORVILLERS---south of BIERMONT---south of THIESCOURT---south of EVRICOURT---south of PONT-l'EVEQUE. East of NOYON the Seventh Army has taken command of the former wing of the Eighteenth Army.

Fourth Army: No special events.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Order

Situation on the Evening of March 31

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7434

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
April 1, 1918.

To Chiefs of Staffs of Groups of Armies and Armies of the West Front.

The first thrust of the Seventeenth, Second, and Eighteenth Armies has met with great success. We have overrun the great British defensive position from southeast of ARRAS to La FERRE and have beaten, or at least considerably weakened approximately 41 English divisions and about 18 French divisions. From the English we have taken an enormous quantity of military stores and many prisoners. The English army is at the moment not capable of further fighting. The French can manage a coordinated attack with some 20 to 30 divisions. If they do attack they would direct it against the south wing of the Eighteenth Army.

The attack has lost its initial momentum. We must improve our rearward communications behind the attack front in order to supply the armies with ammunition. This will be possible in a few days. The attack will then continue, particularly in the direction of AMIENS.

Attacks will be undertaken by the Sixth and Seventh Armies.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Order

Continuation of Georgette Operation

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7438

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
April 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Georgette* will be carried out on April 7 or 8.

* Code name for the operation between ARMENTIERES and La BASSEE.

2. On April 5 the left wing of the Seventeenth Army and the Second Army will attack north of the SOMME; main effort: direction AMIENS.
3. On April 4 the Second Army and the right wing of the Eighteenth Army will attack south of the SOMME to reach the approximate line south of BLANGY---TRONVILLE---wood west of GENTELLES---hills east of AILLY-sur-NOYE---GRIVESNES. * * * A continuation of the attack in the direction of AMIENS will be considered. * * *
4. The south front of the Eighteenth Army will organize for the defensive. * * *
5. On April 5 the Seventh Army will capture the salient near AMIGNY as a preliminary operation for "Erzengel."*

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Report

[Editorial Translation]

Intelligence Section
No. 6598

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
April 1, 1918.

STATEMENTS OF LT. GENERAL ZIETHEN

Concerning the Effect of Our Artillery

During the Attacks of March 21 and 28

[Extract]

I. March 21

1. The result of our artillery fire against the enemy artillery was satisfactory everywhere. Enemy counteraction was almost eliminated. Our infantry suffered only insignificant losses in the assembly area.

2. Against the Enemy Infantry Positions: The destruction of the enemy infantry positions in 3 hours is not possible. One can expect, however, that the obstacles will be demolished and that the enemy infantry will be so held down in its shelters by sudden bursts of fire that our infantry will penetrate the enemy trenches by surprise. The procedure gains complete surprise and has proved itself on March 21. To be sure the fog was a good ally. The trench mortars had demolished the first 2 lines but this result was not accomplished in the same degree in the rearward positions. The barrage must rest on these lines for a longer period.

It cannot be said that the new procedure will always be successful, but in the main it will be so, particularly if it is possible to neutralize the enemy artillery.

3. Concerning the effect of gas: hardly any dead are found in the enemy artillery positions. The enemy seems to be greatly afraid of our Yellow Cross (mustard) gas and apparently ran away from it in time.

4. It is impossible to use too many batteries for gassing the enemy artillery; therefore employ the entire artillery if it can be done.

5. The barrage rolled too fast; the infantry advanced too slowly at times, perhaps because of the fog. 4 minutes between bounds is too short an interval; 6 minutes at least or better 6 to 8 minutes are necessary.

* Code name for the attack by the right wing of the Seventh Army in the direction of NOYON on April 6, 7, and 8.

6. The accompanying batteries of the infantry have stood the test splendidly, but only the guns may be brought up to the advanced infantry positions, not the teams, otherwise considerable losses will result, as indeed was the case.

II. March 28

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4. The allotment of more than 1 accompanying battery per infantry regiment is not possible; neither is it necessary. Infantry accompanying batteries may not be employed as complete units but will be used by platoons, or the guns will be used singly.

Infantry accompanying batteries alone cannot subdue the enemy machine-gun nests; the help of the trench mortars and machine guns is necessary.

LINDENBORN.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II-b: Order

Discontinuance of the Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7515

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
April 5, 1918.

To Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The supply situation does not permit continuation of the attack in the Second and Eighteenth Armies. Therefore the attack will be discontinued for the time being. The same applies to the Seventeenth Army. The Second Army south of the SOMME and the Eighteenth will have to reckon with enemy counterattacks.

The armies will report when they are able to continue the attack.

The general situation demands that we be able to open a powerful artillery action the morning of April 8, and that the attack preparations be noticed by the enemy. Local operations are desired.

The shelling of AMIENS is of special importance.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

[Herein Ludendorff finally admits that the offensive has been stopped. In the attack, German troop demonstrated meticulous cooperation among infantry, machine gunners, and artillery. This ability had made it possible for them to overrun a triangle whose base measured 45 miles and whose median line, extending nearly to AMIENS, measured 37 miles. However, taking of this large territory inflicted no vital injury to the Allies and the Germans did not get AMIENS. On the side of the Allies the British had used and exhausted forty-six divisions; the French had used 40 divisions but had saved their reserves. In order to free French divisions from quiet sectors to serve in battle. Petain asked for and secured the American 1st, 2d, 26th and 42d Divisions for quiet sector duty. America was beginning to enter the picture.]

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7745

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
April 17, 1918.

ATTACK EXPERIENCES

[Extract]

The experiences of the present fighting have taught that training must be pushed with all our might. The following compilation will be distributed without delay down to the regiment.

General:

Attack Procedure.

1. The bases of our procedure of attack from the point of view of position warfare were:

Surprise

Concentration of the fire action (including gas) for a comparatively short time.

Speed in carrying out the attack.

From an artillery point of view the aim was not so much to effect the enemy's complete annihilation and destruction as his demoralization suddenly and at one time, to the greatest depth possible. The effect was to be exploited at once by the infantry.

These principles have proved themselves; they must remain in force in the future, but the artillery effect must be increased.

A distinction will be made between:

(a) The planned attack in a situation involving position warfare against an enemy who has succeeded in consolidating a new and strong defensive position.

This kind of attack demands careful preparation similar to those executed before March 21 and are launched in a coordinated manner by higher authority.

(b) The continuation of the attack against an enemy who has not yet organized his entire line.

In this case the essential thing is to give up careful, long drawn out preparations to prevent the enemy from gaining time for countermeasures. Except for the reinforcements from higher authorities, success depends mostly on the skill and determination of the subordinate commanders who must anticipate the enemy by swift action. Energetic, aggressive action on the part of the infantry under the protective fire of its own weapons and with a few accompanying guns can bring great success. Circumstances hardly ever warrant waiting for orders from above. Commanders up to and including division commanders belong well up in front.

It is especially important here also to get artillery and trench mortars (including heavy) on the spot quickly with plenty of ammunition (see Par. 11).

(c) There exists, of course, a great number of other tactical possibilities which a skillful commander will know how to utilize and exploit.

Issuance of Orders:

2. The proper issuance of orders is a difficult problem. Insufficient means of communication and lack of skill on the part of many a headquarters are responsible. We must more than heretofore take into consideration time and space requirements for the issuance of orders as well as for troop leading and troop movements.

The higher commander must preserve his influence through personal contact and orders; leaving detailed orders to subordinate commanders.

Orders will be brief, thereby relieving telephone congestion.

Preparations:

3. The more extensive attack preparations are, the more time they require, especially for the artillery. Higher authority must allow the troops this time. It is the duty of subordinates to report at the proper time and without regard for individuals when they consider an attack that has been ordered is in danger of failing on account of insufficient preparations or overhaste. The decision then lies with higher authority.

Zones of Action:

4. Zones of action must not be too narrow and not fall below 2 1/2 km. for the division. In attacks that continue to move forward, they will be broadened. Too narrow zones hinder command and supply and lead to useless massing. Here lies the answer to the problem of moving divisions from the rear toward the front. Frequent changing of zones of action leads to disorder

Conduct of the Attack. Envelopment of Points of Resistance. Reserves. Relief:

5. It will be stressed repeatedly that success is not to be sought in mass employment of infantry, but in fire effect, in timely, proper cooperation, in skillful leadership of subordinates, and in rapidity of action. The often necessitated skirting of points of resistance (villages, for instance) will be protected against flanking fire by combined artillery and trench mortar fire (possibly artificial smoke) against such points.

If an attack on a rather broad frontage is checked after an initial success, it then behoves the command to concentrate its ammunition in ample amounts and in time to deliver later attacks on narrower points of penetration. Dispersion of ammunition in such cases causes loss of time. Fire against targets having no direct connection at the time with an infantry attack, is therefore permissible only when it is necessary for the repulse of counterattacks.

Reserves will be put in line where the enemy is yielding, not where he is holding. Here also they will be used more as flanking protection than to advance the attack. A unit which has been successful is easily kept advancing and does not need any great amount of reinforcement.

On the basis of ostensible experience in maneuvers, reserves following an attack and awaiting entry into action are held too close in rear of the front. Too strong rear waves are often pushed forward too soon, leading to massing at and behind the front, a situation in which the enemy fliers and the searching fire of machine guns and artillery find many targets. Moreover the bringing up and ammunitioning of the artillery is impeded because of the road congestion.

Troop reliefs which are not absolutely necessary cause a loss of precious time and of favorable opportunities, especially when the troops learn too early that they are to be relieved. Relief immediately after a successful attack will be avoided. In the last offensive any number of divisions fought successfully 10 days and longer at the front in spite of heavy losses.

If relief is taking place the relieving unit will be inserted gradually, the commanders of the relieved elements initially retaining control and orienting the new troops. The division commander and the artillery commander in particular will move to the rear only when all lower units have transferred command.

Local Operations:

6. Where the enemy has established himself and a continuation of the attack is not contemplated for the time being, local operations, to improve positions for instance, are admissible only when absolutely essential, i. e. to avoid continuous heavy losses. Moreover defense will be organized at once according to our tried principles (disposition in depth, distribution of machine guns on the terrain, in rifle pits, and in natural strong points concealed from aerial observation, etc.).

ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY TACTICS

Artillery Preparations:

7. In all attacks prepared beforehand it has been possible generally to place artillery fire accurately, though registration was mostly impossible and a check by rolling salvos and air observation was as a rule not feasible because of the fog.

On any front where the attack is temporarily checked, artillery preparations will therefore be made immediately (fire control maps, transmission of weather reports, surveys, etc.), in order to be ready for a new attack as rapidly as possible according to the same methods.

On the other hand, where these auxiliary means cannot be applied, the artillery will carry out its missions with rapid orientation on the ground and terrain sensing. Training is necessary for this.

Artillery Action:

8. Where the enemy artillery was sufficiently gassed, its power was as good as completely neutralized during the decisive period. On the other hand, where only high explosive was fired, the enemy artillery always revived. Gas must be used as near to the time of the infantry attack as possible to avoid weakening in potency before the decisive time. As observation on any considerable scale is either impossible or only very limited while engaging the enemy artillery, attention to meteorological factors is therefore especially necessary.

Action Against the Infantry Positions:

9. Even with extensive artillery preparations against enemy infantry it must be expected that there will still remain some machine-gun nests, etc., which the infantry must overcome rapidly with its own means (see Pars. 1 and 12). The artillery can attempt to get at them with gas (high explosive sneezing gas) at close range. In this connection the intricacies of gas firing must become more generally known.

Barrage:

10. The barrage must become more of a slow, concentrated, protracted fire for effect against the different enemy lines of resistance which are to be engaged one after the other. The intermediate terrain can be passed over faster with artillery fire.

For the first penetration it is possible to regulate the rolling of artillery fire according to a certain time fixed by higher authorities, but a slower progress, for example 100 meters in 4 to 5 minutes including a halt on the main lines of resistance, is necessary.

In further advances a systematic decrease of fire regulated by the clock is no longer suited to the vicissitudes of battle. It must be accelerated or stopped or brought back by orders or signals according to the combat situation. It is less harmful if the coordination of the various sectors of the barrage is disrupted than if the artillery fires for hours to no purpose. The lower units of the infantry, up to the regiment and battalion, must be brought into direct liaison with the batteries firing the barrage.

Displacing the Artillery:

11. It is generally recognized that the timely forward displacement of powerful artillery, including a considerable quantity of heavy artillery (also mortars) is a prerequisite to far-reaching results. Despite this fact artillery support often was lacking because the roads were blocked by too much infantry with their vehicles. By the same token an excess of artillery is also an evil, particularly when ammunition supply is no longer commensurate with the number of guns.

Liaison between infantry and artillery must be improved. Artillery headquarters belong with infantry headquarters, or at least so far forward that they can contact the infantry personally.

At least 1 battery and in certain circumstances 1 field artillery battalion will be attached to the attacking infantry regiment as accompanying artillery. Additional

artillery, especially heavy artillery, will be placed under the direct control of the regimental commanders as circumstances require. The rest of the artillery will be brought up by the division (artillery commander) and will go into action as a unit under single command against the enemy artillery, at new points of penetration, etc.

The Infantry Attack:

12. In the infantry attack, as far as the English are concerned, the machine gun was always the main obstacle. The artillery barrage was totally ineffective. Wherever the infantry vigorously exploited the artillery effect while the enemy was still under the demoralizing shock of the shelling, it went forward smoothly. But where the enemy machine guns succeeded in coming into action our infantry was often brought to a standstill.

Hence it follows once more that:

(a) The infantry must carry out its attack in the keenest aggressive spirit with the utmost speed, in the closest possible contact with the artillery preparation or with the barrage, to prevent as much as possible the machine guns from firing.

(b) As in spite of this a number of enemy machine guns will still survive, the infantry must learn much better than heretofore to work with its own fire support (guns, light and heavy machine guns, trench mortars, accompanying guns). Rifle grenades and grenade throwers are also valuable in the fight against machine guns.

Therefore it will be stressed to the utmost during training that the infantry must learn to use and appreciate its firearms and exploit its own fire effect through determined daring and high mobility.

(c) In systematically prepared attacks the infantry can advance to the assault in considerable density and adopt disposition in depth later. In general the principle that mass employment of infantry does not lead to the objective holds good. Our leading attack elements are still too dense. Light machine gun groups will follow a real thin first wave of skirmishers which determines where the enemy is. The fight then moves forward by bounds of machine gun groups in open formations reinforced by riflemen. Their advance is covered by heavy machine guns, light trench mortars, and accompanying guns which also follow by bounds. For that purpose machine gun companies and sharpshooters belong well toward the front early in the fight. The object is to so overpower the enemy by fire from all sides and by swift action that there is no time left for him to make deliberate use of his weapons.

Instruction in attack against machine guns is now one of the most important missions of training. That we still have something to learn about it is the chief lesson of our first offensive. The principle that the undaunted aggressive spirit of the infantry is the basis of success even in difficult combat situations remains the rule.

(d) Cooperation between Infantry and rearward artillery also needs perfecting. (see Pars. 9-11.)

TANKS

13. Present day tanks are easily put out of action by attacks from the rear or from above, by accompanying guns, trench mortars, machine guns, and under favorable circumstances by a few hand grenades, tied in bundles if possible, thrown under the taut caterpillar track.

ENEMY FLIERS

14. Low-flying enemy aviators are making themselves most objectionable to the troops. Our own fliers can help against these suddenly appearing antagonists only to a limited extent. The troops therefore on the one hand must protect themselves with their own machine guns against these fliers, and on the other hand must avoid making good targets of themselves.

MISCELLANEOUS

Officer Reserves:

15. The high casualty rate among officers forces the constitution of strong leader reserves. Care is enjoined however in the manner in which this is ordered, as the authority of the officer and therefore the basis of our success rests upon the fact that he exposes himself to danger more than the ordinary private.

Communications:

16. Despite all the sacrifices of the signal troops, wire communications as well as radio often failed. Nevertheless they must always be put in. Mounted messengers, runners, and pigeons operated dependably as a rule.

Artillery liaison officers without means of reporting are useless. Headquarters must have officer patrols at their disposal and send them forward to clarify the situation. The white light signal "We are here" must be changed oftener, as it attracts enemy artillery fire.

In spite of the best intentions a surprising percentage of the reports coming from the front is false. Special care must be taken with reports from infantry planes or from observers located far in the rear, as it is very difficult for them to differentiate between friend and foe.

17. As direction is easily lost in fog or on close terrain, it is important that compasses be widely issued.

Ammunition:

18. A knowledge of the ammunition situation at the front must be available at all headquarters, so that requirements can be anticipated. Reports of ammunition expenditures must be submitted absolutely on time and be complete for all batteries, even if they are not accurate to the last round. Ammunition requests of the armies must take into account not only troop expenditures but also the supply potentialities. Excessive requests lead to congestion on the railroads and to spoilage of ammunition that it has been necessary to unload but which cannot be moved nearer the front.

A knowledge of artillery ammunition and its effectiveness is of decided tactical importance and absolutely necessary not only for the artillery but also for the infantry commanders and for the officers of the general staff. Timely supply of ammunition appropriate to the occasion is one of the most important mission of the general staff. Artillery commanders and artillery advisers will be listened to on the subject and will also give advice on their own initiative. * * *

Supplies:

19. Where other articles are concerned, everything that can be dispensed with will be eliminated. If too many troops, trains, and columns are put on one road, traffic jams are sure to arise with serious results.

When trains and columns are brought up by the corps and sufficient roads are not available, it is necessary to surmount the problems of crossing the shell-crater terrain. Then the combat train must be returned as soon as possible to the division, otherwise the troops will suffer.

Rest and Rations:

20. It is absolutely necessary to provide for rest and adequate rations for man and horse. Reserves and columns in particular must be saved the necessity of standing around too long in full march readiness by suitable march orders.

Wounded:

21. It is important that the evacuation of the wounded be well organized. The lightly wounded will march as a group as much as possible. It is recommended that the supervisory personnel be detailed with them.

Police Duty:

22. It is necessary to have a large number of M. P.'s or cavalry ready to handle stragglers or skulkers. Men caught robbing the dead will be shot.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 10: Order

Bluecher I and II Movements

April 20, 1918.

1. By the Seventh Army: Attack across the CHEMIN des DAMES between MALVAL Ferme and HURTEBISE Ferme to the OISE-AISNE Canal and to the AISNE.

2. By the First Army: (After agreement with the Seventh Army) - Simultaneous capture of the VILLER Hill and continuing the attack in support of the attack of the Seventh Army. Code word of the attack of the Seventh Army: "Bluecher I," of the First Army: "Bluecher II."

Basis for the attack is the momentary weak occupation of the hostile front. Therefore both attacks have to be made in nature of surprise and all preparations therefore must be kept strictly secret. Considering the weak occupation of the hostile front line, the armies must confine their forces to the lowest possible amount necessary.

It is requested that recommendations for the attack and for desirable changes in the demarkation line between the armies be submitted as soon as possible.

It is desirable that that corps headquarters which will be charged with the preparations for and execution of the attack be inserted in the attack sector at once.

Army Group German Crown Prince
Ia 2444

Addition to orders for Seventh and First Armies of April 18

To: Hq First and Seventh Armies, to be decoded by general staff officers.

Reference: Army Group 2444, of April 17.

General Headquarters again points out that the success of the operations depends on surprise. The officers charged with working out advance details should be informed of the intentions only so far as absolutely necessary and not any sooner than required.

The front and the demarkation line must show no changes in the start. Any corps or other headquarters required for the preparatory work, will be finished by group headquarters and sent to MITRAY as far as possible. These units will not be inserted for the present. Great caution will be exercised in all reconnaissances and in surveying and fortifying by rocks the artillery positions.

Army Group German Crown Prince

Recommendations of the Army Group to General Headquarters

Ia 2444

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
April 20, 1918.

To: General Headquarters - Section for Operations - Mob

[Extract]

The Army group recommends:

1. By surprise attack the Seventh Army throws the enemy across the CHEM des DAMES and takes possession of the general line Fort MALMAISON---plateau northeast of VAILLY---AISNE as far as BERRY au BAC. The right wing division of the First Army is tactically placed under the orders of the Seventh Army for the attack. Demarkation line between armies remains as heretofore.

2. Simultaneously with the attack of the Seventh Army, the First Army throws the enemy between SAPIGNEUL and the BRIMONT by surprise attack across the Canal. The army prepares the subsequent attack between the AISNE and COURCY in order, after reaching the AISNE (Seventh Army) and the Canal (First Army), to take possession of the hill between AISNE and VESLE by an enveloping attack in conjunction with the Seventh Army. Orders will be issued later concerning the demarkation line between armies and detail for the preparations for this attack.

3. The Eighteenth Army will immediately take over the right wing sector of the Seventh Army as far as ABBECOURT inclusive. Details will be regulated by the army group and reported later.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 10: Approval of Recommendation

Preparations for Surprise Attack

April 20, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

Reference Ia No. 2444

I approve the recommendations of the army group. I request you prepare the attack "Bluecher" and "Goerz" emphatically; request you submit recommendations and inform me as soon as you can of the probable hour and day of the attack. The final decision as to its execution I reserve for myself according to the entire situation. I also request you send me copies of your orders and of the army orders and to keep me permanently informed of all measures taken I again point out the necessity of secrecy in all reconnaissances and strictest supervision of all our movements. Also aerial, as only in surprise can we seek the prerequisite for success.

LUDENDORFF.
Ia 7792.

Combat Value of American Troops

Doc. No. 6

Tactics

Intelligence Officer of G. H. Q.

April 23, 1918.

with Army Headquarters C

J. - No. 1819/18

Sect. for Foreign Armies No. 25/4 IV.

As to the combat value of American troops on the defensive, the following statements of noncommissioned officers and grenadiers, who as members of the 24th Shock Battalion participated in the attack against SEICHEPREY on 20 April 1918, are submitted:

(1) Under-officer Hummel and Grenadiers Karasiewicz and Baier:

American resistance in front of the main line of resistance, in the main line of resistance, and in the supporting positions in front of the village of SEICHEPREY, was stubborn. Every man had to be overpowered individually. The light machine guns of the Americans fired up to the last moment. Since the troops occupying the village did not want to come out of their dugouts, but defended the entrances, individual combats, man against man, took place. Strong points had to be neutralized by pioneers with explosives.

Our men believe that the desperate resistance of the Americans is due to the fact that they have been told that the Germans kill all prisoners.

(2) Grenadier Ratey:

On the defensive the American is an opponent who must in no way be underestimated. He does not defend himself in trenches, but in groups and individually in machine-gun nests, in nests of riflemen, and in dugouts. In dugouts he defends himself to the last moment.

For instance, into a small dugout two hand grenades were thrown, machine guns and rifles were fired into it, and still the men did not come out. They surrendered only after the dugout was fired. In spite of violent artillery fire, a man with a machine gun remained in his nest in a tree. He did not surrender, but had to be shot down.

Prisoners had to be handled with great caution. It happened repeatedly that they escaped in an unguarded moment, or that they tried to free themselves by force. During one of such attempts a German officer was shot down by an American. One American, completely surrounded, still tried to defend himself. He had to be knocked down. The American makes frequent use of his trench knife.

Although we know from experience that troops participating in a battle are apt to overestimate the combat value of their opponents, there can be no doubt that the 1st Battalion of the 102d American Infantry Regiment defended itself stubbornly in close combat at SEICHEPREY.

KAUFFMANN.

Second Plan for the Attack Bluecher

SEVENTH ARMY,
April 26, 1918.

[Extract]

1. GENERAL REMARKS: The primary objective of the attack is to beat the enemy on the heights of the CHEMIN des DAMES from OSTEL to the WINTERBURG, to capture his artillery on the south slopes and to take possession of the hostile positions between the ALETTE and AISNE.

If the attack succeeds as planned it must be immediately continued, rolling the hostile positions up towards the right against Fort MALMAISEN, towards the south across the AISNE with the additional objective of capturing the hills between the AISNE and VESLE.

* * * * *

4. DIVERSION:

- a. Eighteenth Army by artillery fire and infantry operations west of NOYON.
- b. Group CREPY by artillery fire on the canal front facing northwest and by an attack against the hills between VAUXAILLON and PINON.
- c. First Army by its offensive operation GOERZ and by artillery fire within its Group PROSNES.

5. TIME TABLE: Recommend that the X day be fixed for May 23.

* * * * *

v. BOEHN,
The Commander-in-Chief.

Extension of Attack

Ia No. 2474

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
May 2, 1918.

1. If, in the utilization of the success of the first day, we succeed in carrying the shock rapidly across the AISNE, then the Seventh Army will have the task to throw with its frontally attacking divisions the enemy across the VESLE and, by attacking the rear of the hostile position between CORMICY and VESLE, carry forward the right wing of the First Army. The First Army, gathering its forces together, will join this attack and will also with its artillery support the attack of the Seventh Army. Intended demarkation line between the two armies: (7th Reserve Division with Seventh Army) bridge south of BERRY-au-BAC (7.)--CORMICY (1.)--St-JOSEPH Fme (1.)--PROUILLY (1.). Close conjunction is necessary for both armies on their interior wings, as the attack direction of the left wing of the Seventh Army will be governed by the situation.

There is no artillery available besides what has so far been assigned and promised the armies. Therefore, the Seventh Army must, after the first phase of attack preparations, place strong artillery from its left wing at the disposal of the First Army for developing effect against the enemy between AISNE and VESLE. During the first location of the artillery positions the army should consider this point insofar as the tasks of first day will permit.

The First Army will regulate the insertion and employment of the artillery joining it, so that it can produce its effect as rapidly as possible.

The Seventh Army will report how it intends to continue the attack across the AISNE, what artillery support it demands from the First Army, and what batteries it can place at the disposal of the First Army and at what time this can be done. After this matter has been arranged, the First Army will submit recommendations for participation in the attack "Bluecher."

If the enemy should succeed in inserting, and timely, strong forces south of the AISNE for a well organized resistance, then we do not intend to carry out operations across the AISNE.

2. The Seventh Army will immediately make all necessary preparations to take full advantage of the success north of the AISNE, westward. When the first attack objective of the right wing (VAUXAILLON---MOULIN de LAFFAUX---plateau west of JOUY) has been reached, any possibility of an enveloping attack against the enemy locked in between OISE and the AISNE, must be quickly taken advantage of. For what eventuality preparations should be made for rapid change of position of strong artillery to in rear of the general line COUCY-JOUY and later on still farther westward. (Surveying ammunition) A plan must also be worked out and preparations made for rapidly shifting forces that become disengaged in front.

Here also success is dependent on rapid action and attack. Subsequent utilization of the success on the right wing of the army may result that also the left wing of the Eighteenth Army, in conjunction with the Seventh Army, will have to start enveloping attack against the enemy between OISE and AISNE.

Count SCHULENBURG,
The Chief of Staff,
Army Group German Crown Prince.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 10: Order

Day for Attack

May 8, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

[Extract]

1. May 27 is hereby designated as the X day.

* * * * *

J. A. LUDENDORFF,
Ia.8064.

Adjustment of Goerz and Bluecher Attacks

Ia No. 8060
Ia 2474

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
May 9, 1918.

Chief of Staff of the Field Army

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

[Extract]

General Headquarters has approved the execution of the GOERZ attack to be made simultaneously with the BLUECHER attack. The task of the First Army was increased insofar that that army should, if the left wing of the BLUECHER attack progressed victoriously across the AISNE, join that wing, with its right wing. General Headquarters did not approve the recommendation of the Chief of Staff of the First Army in regard to the very difficult frontal attack against the hills northwest of REIMS, for the reason that that position is naturally very strong and its strength greatly increased by the different position systems and also for the reason that the French will at all times hold that front in great numbers, because they always count on a German attack against REIMS. Our recent measures have strengthened the belief of the French in that respect.

For the above reasons I do not consider it well to enlarge GOERZ as recommended by the First Army. If the BLUECHER attack succeeds in its entirety, it will quickly reach the AISNE. In that case then it would be correct to bring all available reserves to the left wing to carry it forward and not to insert these forces in a frontal attack at the First Army which promises little hope of success. * * *

Should the BLUECHER attack encounter strong hostile resistance at or on the other side of the AISNE, the attack must be discontinued. The attack GNEISENAU recommended by the First Army to relieve the BLUECHER attack demands strong artillery. That artillery can be sent from the Seventh to the First Army only after BLUECHER has executed. It would take at least 5 to 6 days and would arrive too late.

I request therefore that this attack be not made and that you inform the First Army to confine itself to its task set so far. Of course, it will be necessary to send as much artillery as becomes disengaged at the Seventh Army to the right wing of the First Army (33d Division, 213th Division), and that as rapidly as possible.

* * * * *

I request you submit report of the measures now taken and request that in future copies of all attack plans of the armies are submitted to General Headquarters before the armies issue any orders to their units, so as to avoid misunderstanding and additional useless work.

J. A. LUDENDORFF.

Bluecher Attack Details

DIRECTIONS OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY GROUP
OF THE ARMIES - BASED ON CONFERENCE OF MAY 16

To: Hq. First, Seventh and Eighteenth Armies

[Extract]

1. The Seventh Army will conduct BLUECHER so that the right attack wing will early at least on the first day of the attack - gain at least the line plateau northwest of NEVILLE---Hills of BASULE---plateau west of JOUY. Proper care to be taken for sufficient security of the wing attacking via ANTIOCHE Ferme. It will be the task of the right attack wing to gain ground westward, and without stopping, between the AILETTE and the AISNE and beyond the line ordered towards the west.

In the subsequent course of the BLUECHER attack the center of gravity remains on the right wing so as to drive the enemy out of his positions between the OISE, AISNE and AILETTE with the help of enveloping artillery effect. For the support of the attack from the newly gained BLUECHER position westward, the Seventh Army will prepare the attack from the present front of the 241st Division, then also the attack of the 211th Division. * * * The troops designated for this attack must be in readiness so that the attack can be started from the X plus 3 day on in the morning. General Headquarters has been asked to furnish therefor the VII Army Corps and 2 divisions. Two additional divisions have been asked for so as to give the necessary pressure and force to the attack from the new BLUECHER position. When it will become necessary to insert them, will depend on the situation. The Seventh Army will report if and what additional forces will be required to carry out the new tasks.

* * * * *

4. The Eighteenth Army will make preparations for an attack across the OISE between PONT L'EVEQUE and the left wing of the army * * *. Purpose of the attack is to support the attack of the Seventh Army. The principal point is to gain bridgeheads along an extensive front to split up the hostile countereffect and to facilitate the accomplishment of the task set the Seventh Army by a gradually increasing pressure.

* * * * *

The attack will be prepared so that it can be started on the 30th. Orders for the attack will be issued as soon as the situation of the Seventh Army demands. * * *

* * * * *

Army Group German Crown Prince,
Ia No. 2505.

Instructions Contingent Upon Success of Attack

Ia No. 8153

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
May 16, 1918.

Chief of Staff of the Armies in the Field

DIRECTIONS BASED ON TODAY'S CONFERENCE

1. GOERTZ: If the left wing of BLUECHER makes good progress and if the First Army succeeds in rapidly capturing Hill 83 southwest of SAPIGNEUIL, then it will be necessary to bring an additional division (86th) of the First Army as soon as possible there so as to enlarge the success by an attack via CORMICY southward.

2. BLUECHER: I approve the recommendation to start the right wing of the 21st Division towards the east portion of the hill at ANTIOCH Ferme; also the intention to capture as soon as possible the plateau north of NEUVILLE.

The attack of the 12th Division (CHAVIGNON attack) must not be started at noon, but must be brought into timely consonance with the entire Bluecher attack. The artillery reinforcements, necessary therefor, will be taken as far as required from the artillery designated for Gneisenau.

3. YORCK: The necessary preparations therefor will be made, according to the directions of the army group, on the OISE front, by the Eighteenth Army; on the AILETTE front, by the Seventh Army.

Hq. XXXVIII Reserve Corps is placed at the disposal of the Eighteenth Army; Hq. VII Corps at the disposal of the Seventh Army.

The center of gravity of the Yorck attack lies on the AILETTE front in the vicinity of GUNY. It must be brought into close tactical connection with the attack on the right Bluecher wing across the plateau north of TARNY-SORNY. Prerequisite for the success of these two attacks lies in mutual flanking effect of the two artilleries from the east (Bluecher) and from the north (Yorck) so as to overcome the hostile artillery effect.

The artillery reinforcement for Yorck will also be taken from the artillery designated for Gneisenau insofar as it cannot be taken, for the AILETTE front, from the artillery that will become disengaged in the Bluecher attack.

4. GNEISENAU: Gneisenau will be prepared, but for the present only with the limited objective, recommended by the army group, as far as the approximate line CUVILLY---RESSONS ---MATZ Brook. Executions will be possible only after June 1.

5. To reinforce Yorck and the right wing of Bluecher, three additional divisions will be placed at the disposal of the army group. Numbers will be published later.

The 34th Division is placed at the disposal for employment of the OISE front.

6. I consider the demand entirely sufficient to attach to the right wing divisions of the Bluecher attack one field artillery regiment, 1 heavy howitzer and 1 mortar battery each * * *

I request that these be inserted only where road conditions permit the bringing up of ammunition.

J. A. LUDENDORFF.

[The German viewpoint has now changed. In April, German General Headquarters evidently considered the AISNE offensive of secondary importance. If, as a diversion attack, it drew French reserves from the British area, it would be possible to take advantage of the weakened French front in the CHAMPAGNE region. However, when the AISNE offensive plan was finally complete, an operation was contemplated on a front of 50 miles, a concentration in three attack zones; the center zone extending from BERRY-au-BAC to the FORET de MORTIER, just west of ANIZY-le-CHATEAU. On each flank of the center zone lay a secondary zone extending on the west to ABBECOURT and on the east to the vicinity of REIMS.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 11: Order

Revised Objective

CONFERENCE IN MARLE ON MAY 21

Excellency Ludendorff: As the Bluecher-Goerz front has been reinforced in artillery and reserves, it is permissible to set the objective farther to the front. The Seventh and First Armies will push forward as far as the hills south of the VESLE so as to reach the general line SOISSONS-REIMS. It is necessary to cross the VESLE, to force the enemy to insert strong forces for defense. The objective of the right wing of the attack remains unchanged.

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Report

Combat Methods and Combat Value of Americans

Doc. No. 7

Army Unit C May 19, 1918.

Headquarters May 21, 1918.

Ia No. 1579

[Extract]

After the experiences during the battles of April against American troops some supplements to the report of this headquarters, Ia No. 806 of 5 March 1918, are necessary.

The submission of this supplementary report was delayed by judicial investigations which were necessitated by allegations that Americans conducted themselves contrary to international rules of land warfare in these combats. Nothing, however, could be proven incontestably.

As to American combat methods certain quite definite principles may be deduced, especially from the Operation "Kirschblute" carried out by the 78th Reserve Division on 20 April.

The organization of the defense corresponds to that of the French. The ground in front of the position is of great depth and held lightly. In estimating the troops occupying the outpost area, the great combat strengths of the American companies (about 210 men) must be taken into consideration. * * *

* * * * *

At the beginning of our attack on 20 April, at 5:50 a. m., only two small outposts were observed in the forward enemy trenches. These outposts withdrew hurriedly after firing pyrotechnics from pistols. The other outposts apparently had already withdrawn during the artillery preparation to the centers of resistance of their respective platoons, located farther to the rear. The forward enemy trenches were, therefore, crossed without resistance. After that, however, the attack was met by Americans stubbornly defending themselves in dugout groups of a section to a platoon.

Not one American surrendered without a fight.

During the capture of the trenches northwest of SEICHEPREY a counterattack, attempted from a center of resistance at point along the road SEICHEPREY---St-BAUSSANT, was repulsed.

In the southwest corner of the REMIERES Forest, in a trench leading in the direction of the road SEICHEPREY---St-BAUSSANT, an American nest held out until the afternoon in spite of a double envelopment. We were able to overpower it only after a strong bombardment with artillery.

In the village of SEICHEPREY fierce fights developed around houses and dugouts. These ended in most cases only after annihilation of the Americans who simply refused to surrender.

In the REMIERES Forest, the Americans defended themselves in several instances from tree tops with pistols and light machine guns.

With the exception of the one attempted counterattack mentioned above, the enemy did not take offensive action during the attack.

The two companies of the attacked battalion, which were located as reserves on the BEAUMONT-RUCKEN, did not put into appearance.

The moving up of troops which were farther to the rear did not succeed because of the gassed terrain. (Statements of prisoners who were brought in later.) The French, however, located east of the American 28th Division, attempted during the afternoon a counterattack from the direction of JURY Forest. This attack was promptly noticed and repulsed.

The hostile artillery was held down almost entirely during the attack by the heavy gassing that had preceded. It was 10:15 a. m. before a number of reinforcing batteries started firing from rear positions. In the course of the afternoon, however, we succeeded in weakening considerably the fire power of these batteries too.

From then on, the enemy acted very cautiously. He in no way interfered with our withdrawal to the positions of departure which began at 9:30.

It seems that the enemy did not reoccupy his old positions until between 5 and 6 a. m. on April 21. He did this under the protection of heavy artillery fire.

Summing up, it may be said in regards to the combat value of the Americans that the individual man has fought very well. The men made physically a very good impression. The soldierly bearing is according to German standards very lax.

The American leadership in the combats up to now has been found wanting. In the fighting around SEICHEPREY no influence of the command on artillery or infantry action was noticed. There was no planned employment of reserves for counterattacks or coordinated artillery fire on the points of penetration.

Frh. von LEDEBUR,
Colonel,
The Chief of the General Staff.

Strong French Reserves Expected Behind the Aisne

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
May 27, 1918.

1. Reserves: The French have at present 41 infantry divisions (including 2 American) in reserve. Among these 9 rested divisions, completely fit for action, can with certainty be assumed behind the present battle front (FLANDERS---SOMME---OISE). Fifteen additional divisions had already been inserted on the battle front. Some of these presumably have received replacements and have again become fit for action, others have probably been moved to quiet fronts. Behind the remaining front from the AISNE as far as SUNDGAU, 17 divisions (including 2 American) are being conducted, the greatest portion of which has been replaced by worn-out troops. Of these 17 divisions a large part can assumed to be already behind the battle front or in transit to that location.

Consequently we must expect strong French reserves to appear behind the AISNE in the next few days.

[On this date the German attack opened. By night, they had driven forward 12 miles to achieve striking success. To attempt to stem the German advance, the Allies had frantically thrown four reserve divisions into the combat.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Objectives for Army Group

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
May 28, 1918.

Received May 28, 1918, 2:36 p. m.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

The army group must gain the approximate line: hills southwest of SOISSONS---FERE-en-TARDENOIS---hills south of COULONGES---south front (line of forts) of REIMS.

It is particularly important for us to be as strong as possible south of SOISSONS, so as to thereby force the enemy to evacuate the terrain between the AISNE and OISE. If necessary, the Eighteenth Army must throw forces to the south bank of the OISE, say by way of NOYON, and there gain terrain in the direction of COMPIEGNE.

"Gneisenau" would in that case be executed in an entirely different manner.

Whether a further advance will be possible against the line COMPIEGNE---DORMANS---EPERNAY, cannot at this time be seen. But we may reckon upon that if we are successful.

It is very likely that German Headquarters will send three additional divisions to the army group.

Copies of this have been sent to the First, Seventh, and Eighteenth Armies.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
rm. Ia No. 8408.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Keep Railroads under Fire

May 28, 1918--5:20 p. m.

To: Army Group Rupprecht

Following orders sent to Eighteenth Army: Enemy is transporting reserves from FLANDERS to the Bluecher front.

The railroads leading south from AMIENS will be kept under strong fire. The railroad station at BEAUVAIS is to be attacked with concentrated air forces.

The army group thanks you for taking corresponding measures in your district, especially as to bombing BLARGIES.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
rm. Ia/Ib 2547.

[By the end of the day, the Germans had accomplished their original intention, having gained the high ground south of the VESLE from just east of SOISSONS almost to REIMS. They decided to exploit their success and go on to the MARNE.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Postponement of Yorck

May 29, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

Reference G. H. Q., Ia 8419

Attack Yorck will be postponed for twenty-four hours to the morning of May 31.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
Ia 8431.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Date for Operations Yorck 1 and 2

May 29, 1918--12:45 a. m.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

Yorck 1 and 2 must be ready to carry out on May 30. The Seventh and Eighteenth Armies have copies of this.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
Ia 8418.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Defining Pressure Lines for Attack

May 29, 1918--11 p. m.

To: Seventh and Eighteenth Armies

With the concurrence of General Headquarters, the following is ordered: The main pressure of the attack of the Seventh Army lines between SOISSONS and FERE-en-TARDENOIS in the general direction of VERBERIE---CREPY-en-VALOIS---CHATEAU-THIERRY. This should be made known today to Corps Larisch, Wichura, and Winckler. On the south front the attack will not be continued across the MARNE, only the bridges will be taken possession of. Corps Francois must be in readiness to attack tomorrow, should the situation require that. The corps must furnish strong artillery support for the right of Corps Larisch which must not be stopped but must continue the attack. The Eighteenth Army will join with its left in the attack of Corps Francois as reported and must, as required, here also attack on May 30.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
Ia 2557.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Orders for Attack Continuation

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
May 29, 1918--12:35 p. m.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

After reaching the line prescribed in Orders rm. No. 8408, the attack will be continued on the left of the Eighteenth, the Seventh and First Armies south of the OISE in

the direction of COMPIEGNE---DORMANS---EPERNAY and the block of hills between the VESLE and the MARNE south of the REIMS must be taken for security against CHALONS.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
rm Ia No. 8424.

[This date marked the low point in Allied defense. When the German advance had passed FERE-en-TARDENOIS, Allied troops were retreating with scarcely a show of resistance. In this crisis, the French High Command asked that the American 3d Division be made available to hold the crossings of the MARNE. General Pershing agreed. On the same day, Petain selected the American 2d Division to stop the German advance west of CHATEAU-THIERRY. Allied morale responded immediately to the insertion of the Americans.]

HS Ger. File: 802-10.6: Fldr. I, Pt. 1: Report

American Combat Troops Expected in Italy

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
May 30, 1918.

C. Americans in Italy: So far only medical and aviation units have been in Italy and, apparently, a few technical troops. The presence of combat troops has not yet been ascertained, despite the reports from different agents.

However, according to a speech of the American Secretary of War, Baker, it is now likely that combat troops will arrive in Italy. But in view of the situation on the west front, probably only a weak force can be expected. It can be assumed that these troops will merely be used for a demonstration, in order to influence the morale of the population, as was done in France last year.

[No American troops were sent to Italy until July 25, 1918]

Plans to Envelop Reims

May 30, 1918--10:10 a. m.

To: First Army

General Headquarters directs: "The First Army must reinforce its right south of the VESLE still more from the center so as to be able to extend its combat zone south and southeast, and thereby facilitate the envelopment of REIMS and not delay the progress of the left of the Seventh Army. Request you consider also whether REIMS can be cut off more from the east."

You will have to hasten the withdrawal of the 203d Division.

Submit brief views of intended attack to cut off REIMS from the east.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
Ia 2559.

[NOTE: The copy of this foregoing message received is dated 10:10 a. m., while the copy of the message from G. H. Q. quoted is dated 9:30 p. m. in copy of the latter message received from Berlin.

The latter hour appears to be correct, and the foregoing was probably sent at 10:10 p. m. - C. H. L. Research Officer.]

[On this date the Germans reached the MARNE near MONT St-PERE.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Fight for Hills South of Reims

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
Charleville, May 31, 1918--11 p. m.

To: Seventh and First Armies

1. Corps Schmettow with all its units will join the First Army. Boundary between the two armies: Right of 50th Division in vicinity of TRELOUP---previous right boundary of Corps Schmettow---AMIFONTAINE (to 1)---La MALMAISSON (to 1) then to original boundary between Seventh and First Armies east of La SELVE---east of DIZY le GROS, etc.

The two armies will agree on time of transfer. The First Army will report transfer of command and the units transferred with Corps Schmettow and Bavarian 7th Reserve and 12th Divisions will join the First Army. The 22d Division will be left in army group reserve at ARCIS-PONSART. Official channel through First Army.

2. It remains the task of the First Army to push forward with a strong right north of the MARNE, and capture the wooded hills south of REIMS. The attack of the VI Reserve Corps will be along the ridge of extending southeast and the battle zones will be arranged correspondingly. If the battle resumes in sectors the form of regular attack,

then it will be well to have the command of the attack artillery of the corps in one hand.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
Ia No. 2567.

[The Germans now have reached the outskirts of CHATEAU-THIERRY. However, even though they had achieved a great tactical success, exhaustion of their manpower, through the rapidity of the attack, was in sight. They had used up their reserves. On the side of the Allies, numerous divisions had been drawn in from the VOSGES and from north of AMIENS to give Foch numerical superiority on the front of attack on this date.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Continued Pressure to Cut off Reims

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
June 1, 1918--5:33 p. m.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

It appears that the attack of the First Army is coming to a standstill. To get it underway again a crossing of the MARNE possibly at JAULGONNE and DORMANS and an advance in the direction of EPERNAY should be considered. Forces therefore should first of all be placed in readiness. The Saxon 87th and 23d Divisions should be brought there, the 22d Division not to be inserted for the present, and the 28th Division not to be moved farther west. We might consider withdrawal of the Bavarian 12th Division. The attack in the previous front between the MARNE and REIMS must be regularly continued by concentrating a strong artillery and so more and more cut off REIMS. The 123d Division should relieve the Saxon 23d Division. Corps Headquarters of the 23d Reserve Corps (Kathen) will be brought to the army group at RETHEL. Request your view.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
rm. Ia No. 8485

[Beginning with this date, the American 3d Division, in line with the French, threw back the German forces which sought to force a MARNE crossing. West of CHATEAU-THIERRY, the American 2d Division, moving by bus, took position on the road from CHATEAU-THIERRY to PARIS, and for most of the month of June fought a series of sharp local actions with the Germans. The most bitter fighting here resulted in the American capture of BELLEAU Wood, BOURESCHES and VAUX.]

Orders to Avoid Splitting Forces

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
Charleville, June 3, 1918--10:40 a. m.

To: General Headquarters, Operations Section

Please transmit at once to Ia.

The army group is of the opinion concerning the Seventh Army north of the AISNE, that the hills between VIC-sur-AISNE and FORTENOY will have to be taken, that the left of Larisch and the right of Wichura must continue to attack to push the enemy back across the VIC-sur-AISNE---COUEVRES---LONGPONT Road and thus gain a firm hold on the crossing at SOISSONS. And in consideration of "Gneisenau" the continuation of the attack is at least necessary at this point. Steady enveloping effect of strong artillery will make the attack possible. North of AISNE, fresh forces are necessary to carry out the task. The 34th Division will have to be placed at the disposal of the Seventh Army. The First Army must have its entire center of gravity on the front between the MARNE and REIMS to continue the attack there after reforming forces and after securing sufficient ammunition. Any splitting of forces by minor attacks east of REIMS must be avoided by the army for the present.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
Ia No. 2575.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

Approval of Attack Plan

June 3, 1918--6:50 p. m.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

Reference Ia No. 2575 Op.

Concerning recommendation as to employment of the 34th Division, I shall reserve my decision until discussion tomorrow at Group Francois.

Concerning the First Army, new directions are not necessary as I convinced myself during yesterday's discussion with the Commander-in-Chief of the army. The attack will be continued there as you recommend, concentrating the artillery and trench mortars by sectors. The renewal of the operations against La POMPELLE will be made dependent upon the results of that attack; preparations may be made, but General Headquarters reserves to itself the right to decide.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
rm. Ia No. 8507.

[By the night of June 3/4, the German offensive had been definitely stopped all along the line. For the third time since the beginning of the year, the Germans had achieved marked tactical success. In the first five days of the AISNE Operation they had advanced 30 miles and yet they found themselves in dangerous position. Their position was subject to Allied artillery fire from two flanks, FORET de la MONTAGNE de REIMS and FORET de VILLERS-COTTERETS; the length of their front to defend had stretched from 59 to 94 miles; and their supply situation was awkward. However, Allied position was none too good. To meet the March offensive they had extended their front nearly 37 miles from the OISE to AMIENS. Now to meet the enemy in the MARNE pocket made by the AISNE offensive they had to lengthen their lines another 30 miles.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Order

New North and South Objectives

Ia No. 670

SEVENTH ARMY,
June 5, 1918.

ARMY ORDERS

[Extract]

1. The army will for the present continue the attack on its north half to obtain possession of the line VIC-sur-AISNE---COUEVRES Village---St-PIERRE AIGLE---VERTE FEUILLE Farm. The first points of penetration to be on hill spurs west of AMBLENY, around LAVERSINE, around CUTRY and between DOMMIERS and TRANSLON Farm.

2. South of the AISNE the attack will be made simultaneously by Corps Staabs and Wichura; the left of Staabs will, for the attack, prolong its left to the PARIS position inclusive and extend its left on the north edge of St-PIERRE AIGLE. The 6th and 34th Divisions are assigned to Corps Staabs. The 5th Division will be withdrawn. It can help to prepare the attack as position division, and then pass to corps reserve. The Bavarian 6th Division will have to push forward in the AISNE with a small portion of its command, its main body in corps reserve. Corps Wichura will attack with the 45th Reserve Division.

3. North of the AISNE, Corps Francois will attack directly after the south attack, after the batteries that support the south attack become disengaged. The corps will disengage the 14th Division for the attack extending its three north divisions. The 241st Division will be withdrawn to corps reserve.

5. The attack must be very carefully prepared. The day of execution will be announced later; the situation makes it necessary that that day be June 8, and at the latest June 9.

6. Strictest secrecy to be maintained in all, even the shortest preparations. Code word for the attack north of the AISNE is "Baumfallen," for south of the AISNE "Hammer-schlag."

v. BOEHN,
Colonel General,
The Commander-in-Chief.

Difficulties Faced in Attacking Reims

FIRST ARMY,
June 5, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

Based on a discussion with the 1st Quartermaster General of Group Ilse, this army issues orders: Capture of REIMS by strong artillery and trench mortar fire and attack with the concentration 242d Division against the suburbs of EPERNAY and VESLE.

Plenty of artillery and trench mortars are available. On the other hand, the fighting power of the 242d Division for the assault is negligible. The division came out of a very large battle at the end of April, was immediately placed back in line sparsely filled up with reserves, and from the 27th to today has participated with great bravery in the partial attacks. Its fighting value has in consequence greatly decreased. During the discussion of June 2, it was explained that the division was too weak for the task set. After completion of the reconnaissance the division commander reported that his infantry was probably able to enter the west portion of the city, but that it would not be able to take full possession of the city. That it would even be less possible to take POMMERY Hill dominating the city, and Division A, only 5 battalions strong and distributed on almost 7 km. front, is just as little in a position to do this.

Army headquarters and the corps commander, are of the same opinion. REIMS must be taken. But considering the great masses of houses and deep cellars, even the enormous artillery, and trench mortars and gas throwers at our disposal will not succeed in hammering the city so that a bitter house-to-house fight will be avoided. If the infantry is too weak for this it will fight itself to a standstill within the city without the artillery being able to support it properly because of the dense masses of houses. But, we must avoid failure through use of insufficient forces which would raise the courage of the enemy, and because a new attack would cause new losses.

Thorough work can be accomplished only if * * * the POMMERY Hill is taken from the east simultaneously with the advance of the 242d Division from the west, and where the assault troops meet south of the city, protected from the south by the artillery barrages. By this plan it will be possible to push into the city from all sides in sufficient force. If we intend only to neutralize POMMERY Hill with enormous artillery fire, this would not suffice for holding the city. The hills must actually be taken, and infantry required therefor cannot be found within the army at the present stage. The army is still fighting in its original battle zone (i. e., less the portions taken over by the Seventh Army) and with the same number of divisions which it had at its disposal during the quiet position warfare.

Army headquarters therefore requests that the 203d Division be placed at its disposal for the attack against POMMERY Hill. The commander and two battalions of Division A are already parts of the 203d Division. As a matter of fact therefore the army merely requests a reinforcement of 7 battalions.

The 203 Division could be replaced in reserve by the 19th Reserve Division, which is fit for fighting, and its tranquil position could be taken over by a battle worn division from some other front.

KLEUBER,
Lieut. Colonel,
The Chief of Staff.

Delay of Gneisenau Attack

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
June 5, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

Gneisenau cannot be started until June 9. The further conduct of operations of the Seventh Army will depend on the success of Gneisenau.

The Seventh Army will up to then push forward on both sides of the AISNE. Its left must gradually and permanently assume a more pronounced defensive attitude; local operations for bettering the position without using too much force are permissible.

The right of the First Army will advance only so far that Corps Schmettow may gain a good defensive position. Whether it will be necessary to take CHATILLON for that purpose must be especially examined into. Otherwise, the army will continue the attack until it reaches a good defensive position about the line CHAMPLAT or La NEUVILLE-aux-LARRIS, south front of REIMS, line of forts.

Preparations for ROLAND increase in importance; you may commence to arrange ammunition supply.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
Ia 8536.

[Here Ludendorff is planning to loose his MONTDIDIER-NOYON offensive to enlarge the west face of the pocket the Germans had made in the Allied line. He placed 11 German divisions in line (by June 9) and had ten in reserve on a 23-mile front from MONTDIDIER to the OISE at NOYON. To meet this, the French Third Army had seven divisions in line west of the OISE, five in immediate reserve, and five more in reserve in its rear area.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Order

Attack against Vrigny

Ia No. 2459

FIRST ARMY,
June 7, 1918--6:30 p. m.

1. The attack against the heights of VRIGNY will take place June 9.
2. The attacks of Groups Schmettow and Borne on a broad front and the attack against REIMS will start June 13. Army headquarters will regulate hours. Recommendations therefor to be submitted to these headquarters. The attack objective in case of Groups Schmettow and Borne will not be limited. The farther the divisions press to the front, the better.

The least that must be accomplished is reaching the line CHATILLON---Bois de RODEMAT
---CHARMOISE---NAPPES---BLIGNY.

From the start of the attack, Group Borne must arrange by a heavy fire that to prevent the enemy at La NEUVILLE at the Bois de COURTON from flanking the attack of Corps Schmettow and of the Bavarian 12th Division through the BASLIEUX bottom.

On the day prior to the attack the hostile artillery on the other side of the MARNE and in the Bois de REIMS should be thoroughly gassed; Yellow Cross to be used.

3. From the evening of June 6 on, the 22d Division will be at the disposal of Group Schmettow, to relieve the 7th Reserve Division.

Code word for REIMS attack: Erntebier

Code word for CHATILLON-BLIGNY attack: Waldfest

v. BELOW,
General of Infantry,
The Commander-in-Chief.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 12: Message

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
June 8, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

[Extract]

* * * * *

I consider the attack of the 14th Division north of the AISNE into the trench system of the NOUVRON Plateau as very difficult and unnecessary. It would be far more to the point to neutralize the enemy in his salient with strong enveloping artillery and trench mortar fire to place the center of gravity of the entire attack on the south bank of the AISNE and to have the 14th and 6th Divisions follow there in second line.

I request you examine again, from this point of view, your attack recommendations and then report to these headquarters your respective orders.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
Ia 8588.

Attack Across the Marne

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
Charleville, June 8, 1918--7:05 p. m.

To: Seventh Army Mob.

The Seventh Army will, after reconnaissance, submit a brief recommendation, with calculation of forces required, for an attack across the MARNE between JUALGONNE and VERNEUIL. The objective of the attack is to rapidly and by surprise advance south of the MARNE against EPERNAY to deprive the enemy of his most important route of communications in the REIMS Hills and to force him to abandon the hills. The attack will have to be protected in flank and rear by an advance to about the SURMELIN Brook. General Headquarters places the highest value on haste. A start should be made immediately for reconnaissance, selecting battery positions and locating hostile batteries. Headquarters of the XXIII Reserve Corps and of the 3d Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment are placed at your disposal for preparatory work. If you desire to bring forward the entire corps headquarters, submit recommendations therefore to these headquarters.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
Ia 2593.

Hasten Attack Against Reims

June 9, 1918--7:10 p. m.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

Groups Schmettow and Borne will not attack for the present. Preparations for the attack against REIMS will be hastened as much as possible.

The army must be prepared to release strong artillery for other purposes.

By order:

LUDENDORFF,
Ia 8613.

Hammerschlag Attack

Ia No. 710

SEVENTH ARMY,
June 9, 1918.

[Extract]

1. "Hammerschlag" will be executed on June 11. After reaching the first objective, i. e., hills south of VIC-sur-AISNE, hills around COEUVRES, north of St-PIERRE AIGLE, VERTE FEUILLE Farm, the attack will be carried forward without limitation.

* * * * *

"Baumfallen" will for the present not be executed. Corps Francois will place its entire artillery fire at the service of "Hammerschlag."

* * * * *

v. BOEHN,
The Commander-in-Chief.

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Report

Front Propaganda for American Troops

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF,

To All Groups of Armies and Armies of the West.

June [11], 1918.

Prisoner statements reveal that there exists among the American troops a very pronounced weariness of war and indifference as to the aims of this war. Their morale makes it seem likely that a front propaganda will be successful. We shall therefore begin to disseminate such propaganda on quiet fronts (starting with the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht and Composite Army C).

For the present, the propaganda will abstain from every agitation against the Entente or President Wilson and will follow no political direction. Its aim for the time being will only be to increase weariness of war and to refute the belief spread among the American troops that prisoners are mistreated.

The propaganda will be carried out by the signal officers of Supreme Headquarters, who will submit the measures proposed to their commanders for approval.

To provide propaganda material and a uniform direction of the propaganda against the American troops, the secret intelligence division will establish a special propaganda center, attached to the signal officer of the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht, who will receive its instructions from Supreme Headquarters (via the secret intelligence division).

Other details concerning the manner in which to carry out the propaganda will be arranged by the secret intelligence division in agreement with the operations section and foreign armies section of my staff.

The results obtained will be dealt with by the foreign armies section.

Submitted to operations section, personnel section and secret intelligence division for their reaction.

June 11, 1918.

No objections.

von BARTENWERFFER.

June 12, 1918.

I do not believe the prisoner statements to be sufficient reason for assuming that the American army is warweary and consider a propaganda at present to be entirely premature. In our present situation it is likely to do more harm than good.

WETZELL.

The Attacks of Americans

Doc. No. 8

Tactics

Telegram of 12 June 1918

To G. H. Q., Operations Section Ia

So far the attacks of the Americans were enterprises carried out with a maximum strength up to two battalions. They took place after a short and sudden artillery preparation similar to French raids carried out by patrols. Our infantry was held down by the artillery, but in many instances the hostile infantry attack did not follow immediately and was then repulsed with heavy losses by our rifle and machine-gun fire. In the last attack the cooperation with the artillery was better and more effective. Initial successes, even when they had placed our infantry in a disagreeable situation, were not exploited.

The American infantry attacked in dense skirmishers, usually in two waves. Close up followed massed units of varying strengths. The American goes ahead recklessly; casualties are disregarded; in close combat, often with trench knives, numerical superiority and agility asserted themselves. Leadership was nowhere noticeable.

The artillery acts like the French. It has not been determined whether it is American artillery.* To date statements of prisoners have given no information about it. If it is American, or partly American artillery, then most likely French officers are still with it.

In broken terrain American troops show themselves, in undertakings of small and smallest detachments, clever and enterprising. In this kind of minor fighting they are inventive in tricks and deceptions. In an attack covered by smoke, during which they succeeded in getting into the rear of our troops, they deceived our men by calls in German, like "here come men of the Fortieth, don't shoot."

In conclusion, it may be stated, that the American soldier is courageous, strong, and clever. He is at his best in guerilla warfare. The manner in which larger units attack is not up-to-date and leadership is poor. Neither the command nor the troops are afraid of suffering losses when desirable terrain is to be gained.

In warfare of movement the Americans should be considered for the time being as inferior to us. In most cooperation with artillery the right thing is strived after, but not always attained.

KLEWITZ,
Major.

* Probably not, the French want to make the Americans like it.

Plans for Propaganda Campaign

Foreign Armies
Section III b

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
June 12, 1918.

In my opinion we must start early.* If we wait too long, the American divisions now at the front will be battletried and still less susceptible to propaganda. It is important to undermine the moral of exactly those divisions which appear at the front for training and which then are to form the nucleus for the American army which is to be created.

At any rate, it would be advantage, in order not to organize the entire machine for nothing, first to ask the person considered for the direction of propaganda, whether he believes that propaganda would offer any promise of success, in view of his knowledge of the American mentality.

von RAUCH,
Chief of Section.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 13: Order

Ia No. 8685

GENERAL HEADQUARTER,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY,
June 14, 1918.

1. The Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht will execute "Hagen." The start of the attack will be about July 20.

Preparations for the attack will be continued to the Wilhelm front and also on the left of the Second Army.

These headquarters reserves the right to designate the diversion attack "Echenbrecher" from the front of the Seventeenth Army.

2. Army Group German Crown Prince. The Eighteenth and Seventh Armies will start the attack along large lines. MERY must be taken, but these headquarters reserve the right to decide as to local operations. Both armies will make all necessary preparations for the attack along the front from MOREUIL to the MARNE.

* On the assumption that statements of American prisoners indicated indifference towards the war aims, German G. H. Q. in June 1918, circulated a staff memorandum, proposing that a propaganda campaign be launched against American troops on quiet fronts to undermine their enthusiasm in support of the war and to overcome the belief widely held by them in the bad treatment accorded prisoners. The memorandum drew the comment from the operations and foreign countries sections that there was no evidence to support the proposition that the American army was war-weary, but that such a campaign on the contrary was premature and capable of doing more harm than good in the existing situation.

The present document is in reply.

The Seventh Army will especially support the front between the forest of VILLERS-COTTERETS and the MARNE.. Hill 204 West of CHATEAU-THIERRY must be held by us.

The Seventh Army will make all preparations under "Marne Defense."

The First Army will make all preparations for the attack east of REIMS (in the PROSNES sector) under "REIMS."

Both armies will submit to these headquarters attack plans for "MARNE Defense" and REIMS", which will indicate the missions and composition of units as well as necessary requirements in infantry and artillery, etc. The attack will be about July 10.

3. All army groups will restrict active operations to that absolutely necessary.

The artillery and the trench mortar action along the heretofore attack front MONT-DIDIER-MARNE, and along the CHAMBRECY-REIMS front will be continued. It is desirable that the Entente believe that we intend to continue our offensive operations towards PARIS.

Army Group Gallwitz and Prince Albrecht will execute their operations against the Americans as ordered heretofore.

J. A. LUDENDORFF.

To Army Group German Crown Prince.

[Insofar as the Americans are concerned the MONTDIDIER-NOYON operation ends on June 13. By that time General Fayolle's counterattack against the western face of the salient formed by the German advance had succeeded. For the first time in 1918, a German offensive had been stopped at the height of its success, before its momentum had begun to fall off. Interest now veers to the MARNE Operations.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 13: Letter

Attack Centered toward the Marne

Ia No. 2510 Ia No. 2608

FIRST ARMY,
June 16, 1918.

TO: Army Group German Crown Prince

[Extract]

The objective of the attack to be made by the First Army requires a junction with the Seventh Army in the area between EPERNAY and BOUZY. For this purpose your army must direct the center of its attack toward the MARNE.

During the Bluecher attack, the center of the Seventh Army pushed forward across the CHEMINS-des-DAMES Ridge, passing the AISNE and the VESLE at their deepest points on the 1st day and covered some 18 kilometers. A similar advance by our army on the first day would bring us to the vicinity of Les GRANDES LOGES-VADENAY. But in this case the terrain is far more favorable than it was in the case of the Bluecher attack, so that it is entirely probable that we will reach the MARNE the very first day, in case of success. Therefore we can and must demand this of our troops.

As in the case of the Bluecher movement, the prerequisite for success is surprise to the enemy. This we shall try to accomplish by all means at our command. As the enemy

holds commanding hills and has a good view into our terrain of approach, special measures must be taken in the matter of caution. On the other hand, the wooded terrain favors our artillery in locating positions.

In addition to the surprise for such a heavy attack we will require some extension of front, so that there will be no danger of having our flanks interfered with during the attack.

The terrain, and considerations of roads, for the purpose of bringing up supplies, force us to take at the very beginning of the attack at least the dominating hills of GIVET, while farther west, at PRUNAY, we must reach the VESLE.

Consequently, the extent of our penetration must be at least 23 kilometers.

* * * * *

The Commander-in-Chief:

J. V.,
General of Infantry.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 18: Order

Need for Secrecy

la/Is No. 2532

FIRST ARMY,
June 18, 1918.

ARMY ORDERS

[Extract]

1. The entire success of attack "REIMS" will depend principally on the degree of surprise caused the enemy. Therefore, the first and principal duty during the period of preparations is secrecy. We must not only keep our plan hidden from the enemy, but we must avoid everything that might cause our own troops to get an inkling of what is intended.

2. Only those persons should receive information of our offensive intentions who must know in order to enable them to supervise our preparations. However, excessive secrecy is dangerous; it only leads to assumptions and talk that frequently are even more dangerous than knowledge of intentions. The time and the degree of information to be imparted must be carefully considered in each instance. Chiefs of staffs of the different groups and line of communications headquarters will arrange this. Every individual who has received information of our offensive intentions must be expressly bound to secrecy. Written orders governing attack preparations will not be issued to headquarters lower than divisions. Use of telephone is permitted only provided code is used. Any preparatory work that may cause suspicion on the part of individuals who do not know our intentions should be explained as being necessary for defense against hostile attacks.

3. The latest attacks made by the Seventh and First Armies have again shown that the greatest danger of secrecy lies in apparent innocent talks among officers. Partly through carelessness and inattention, and partly through an effort to be "newsy" and "knowing it all" the men have often given rise to "rumors" among the troops and even among the population. The hostile information ("espionage") service in rear of our front gathers

these rumors and finally furnishes the enemy with a complete picture of our intentions. In no other way can be explained the fact that in the middle of May the BRUSSELS paper contained notices of the impending German attack at the end of May against the CHEMIN des DAMES, or that a French carrier pigeon was captured carrying the notice "The German attack starts on the 27th of May early in the morning between LAON and REIMS."

I request all commanding officers to instruct their officers and men as to the importance of secrecy. And it is immaterial whether the respective front is a tranquil front or a fighting front. Anyone disobeying orders on secrecy, no matter who or what rank he holds, will be proceeded against with the utmost severity. Spreading false reports is just as dangerous as spreading true reports.

* * * * *

The Commander-in-Chief:

J. V.,
v. MUDRA,
General of Infantry.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 13: Telephone Message

Enlargement of Attack

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
June 18, 1918.

Based on today's discussion, attack REIMS will be enlarged on the east as far as the WETTERECKE. Army Group German Crown Prince will take command of attack REIMS of the First and Third Armies.

Request early information as to additional forces needed on account of extending the east wing.

J. A. LUDENDORFF,
Ia 8777, op.mob.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 13: Instructions

General Instructions for the Reims Attack

ARMY HEADQUARTERS I (Staff)
Nr. Ia N 2573

ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
June 20, 1918.

[Extract]

(1) The First Army will break through the enemy position between PRUNAY and the SUIPPES, reach the MARNE by a continuous advance as early as the first day, and, in

cooperation with the Seventh Army strike the enemy in REIMS and in the REIMS mountains a blow which will destroy him. The right wing of the Third Army will at the same time make a thrust between the SUIPPES and the WETTERECKE (Wetter Corner) southeast of TAHURE and reach the general line St-ETIENNES---MONT des VIGNES---SUIPPES---PERTHES.

* * * * *

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

GENERAL OF THE INFANTRY.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 13: Order

Attack in Direction of Amiens and Paris

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY
Ia No. 8895

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
June 22, 1918.

[Extract]

After completion of the offensive operations directed in Ia. No. 8685, secret, of June 14, an attack between the SOMME and the MARNE comes into consideration. It will probably have to be made on a broad front, with all available forces in the direction of AMIENS and PARIS.

Preparations therefor will be started at once and continued. The defense of the same front must not however suffer thereby.

* * * * *

These preparations should proceed so that a start can be made transporting artillery, trench mortars and divisions about the second half of July.

J. A. LUDENDORFF.

To Army Group German Crown Prince.

American Troops for Italy

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
June 23, 1918.

Italy

I. Entente Aid:

3. According to reliable reports, 2 steamboats with the first American troop contingent for Italy are to leave America in the near future.

[Actually, American troops did not go to Italy until July 25, 1918]

HS Ger. File: 890-23.3: Fldr. I: Order

Doctrine of Attack rather than Defense

Operations Section
No. 8950

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
June 25, 1918.

[Extract]

The fact that the war will not be won by stubborn defense but only by more attacks in great force must be generally understood by all commanders, including the lowest, as well as by the troops. However, in the future these attacks will lead to success only if we adhere to the type of combat employed in the latest offensives and develop it further.

* * * * *

In the event that the enemy penetrates our lines, higher as well as the lower commanders must make a careful check to see whether a local or general counterattack is really necessary. Often, in the final analysis, the troops get along without a piece of ground or the part of a position for whose recapture a not exactly judicious commander might think it necessary to risk numerous human lives.

Therefore, for our further conduct of war the essential thing at every point continues to be the preservation of fighting power and the idea of attack which alone will insure us success in the end.

LUDENDORFF.

Preparations for Attack

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
June 26, 1918.

Ia No. 2629

[Extract]

By orders from General Headquarters, this group will prepare the attack of the Eighteenth, Ninth, and Seventh Armies. * * *

To be prepared by:

(a) The Eighteenth Army: Attack beyond the line St-JUST-en-CHAUSSEE---VERBERIE (inclusive) protecting the right flank of the attack against the west to the general line CLERMONT-CREIL.

(b) Ninth Army: Attack in connection with the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies beyond the line VERBERIE (exclusive)---NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOUIN (exclusive) to the line CREIL (exclusive)---SENLIS---FORET d'ERMENONVILLE (southwest edge.) The attack will have its center of gravity south of the AISNE between the FORET de COMPIEGNE and the SOISSONS ---VILLERS-COTERETS---NANTEUIL Road.

(c) Seventh Army: Attack in conjunction with the Ninth Army with right wing beyond NANTEUIL to the line VER-le-PLESSIS---BELLEVILLE---LIZY on the OURCQ---GRAND CHAMPS---St-AULDE---MARNE.

Depth and extension of the entire attack will depend on the situation in July and on the available forces.

Code word for the attack: for the Eighteenth Army "Elector I"; for the Ninth Army: "Elector II"; for the Seventh Army: "Elector III."

General Headquarters desires to be able to start the attack suddenly about the end of July on the entire, or portions, of the elector front.

* * * * *

Count SCHULENBURG,
Major General,
Army Group Headquarters,
The Chief of Staff.

[This with the definite objective PARIS-AMIENS]

Attack Instructions

Ia No. 2740

FIRST ARMY,
June 28, 1918.

ARMY ORDERS

[Extract]

A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. After the concentration of our attack troops, we will be greatly superior to the enemy, especially in artillery. If we are successful in maintaining secrecy and achieving consequent surprise, the battle is half won. I expect of all headquarters that not only all orders for screening and secrecy are carried out in detail, but that they of themselves will avoid everything which might betray our offensive intentions, might place success in question, and might cost the lives of thousands of German comrades.

2. Every commander down to the company commander must be clear in his own mind that it is of the utmost importance to push forward relentlessly, especially on the first day, and to gain ground as much as possible. Therefore no daily objective has been set. But I nevertheless expect that the center of the army will reach and cross the MARNE on the first day. I request that all regimental commanders be verbally informed of this - but only in the last days prior to the attack.

3. No division, no regiment, no battalion must allow itself to be delayed from pushing forward because a neighbor has been held up. It is the duty of good leadership to secure the flanks of units that have pushed far to the front.

B. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. It is of special importance that the hostile position on the line VERZENAY SEPT SAULT---BACONNES---Fort St-HILAIRE be taken as soon as practicable.

If, against our expectations, we should not succeed in completely surprising the enemy on X day, then we have to count on hostile resistance in this position, which must be quickly broken by concentrated fire of our artillery on the points of entry selected by divisions; our artillery being then still materially superior. Preparations must be made for a new artillery concentration (survey squads) necessary for this attack. But this must not lead to our missing a possibility of taking that position by quickly overrunning it.

von MUDRA,
The Commander-in-Chief,
General of Infantry.

Knowledge of Allied Attack Plans

Ia No. 893

SEVENTH ARMY,
June 30, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

[Extract]

By his conduct during the last two days the enemy has shown that he has no intention of letting the situation become quiet as we have endeavored to accomplish, but that he does his best to damage us in limited attacks. A general consideration of these limited attacks indicates cooperation and regulation.

Since our offensive operations ceased on June 13, the enemy has improved his positions toward the front, that is, north and south of the AISNE. North of the AISNE so far that our medium artillery has no longer any material effect from the north against the hostile positions on the hills on the south bank; south of the AISNE principally with the mission of regaining a firm foothold on the east bank of the LAVERSINE Valley. Farther south, between the large forest and the MARNE, his endeavor was mainly directed to push us back onto the north bank of the CLIGNON Brook and to drive off the threatening southern envelopment of the forest of VILLERS-COTTERETS. The hostile artillery has been materially increased, especially opposite Corps Staabs. June 29, we noted 91 positions from which the artillery fired. North of the AISNE, east of VIC-sur-AISNE, where the hostile field artillery had almost disappeared, there appeared 12 new platoons of batteries.

Statements of prisoners indicate that the attacks will be continued, and on even a larger scale.

* * * * *

v. BOEHN,
The Commander-in-Chief.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 14: Memorandum

Defines Priority of Attack

Chief of Staff of the Field Army
Ia/II No. 9038

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
July 1, 1918.

Reference: Ia/Ic No. 6002 of June 29, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

[Extract]

The attack preparations directed in orders from these headquarters Ia No. 8895, * * * of June 22, 1918, have the right of way during the next few days. However, by our

preparations for defense, the idea that we will attack must not be crowded into the background, as far as either friend or enemy is concerned. With this reservation I approve the July defensive fronts, the execution of the intended measures, and also the basic creation and location of the zones in rear.

In case of hostile attacks on a large scale we will have to reckon with numerous tank squadrons. Their defeat requires special careful selection of the line of main resistance, wherever possible by selecting stream lines and similar obstacles.

J. A. LUDENDORFF.

[On July 2, the Prime Minister of France, Great Britain, and Italy cabled the President of the United States for infantrymen and machine gunners. With the foreknowledge of a renewed German attack in July, the Allied Governments were desperate for men to replace those lost during the Aisne offensive of the Germans.]

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Report

American Troops in British Divisions

G. H. Q. Signal Officer
No. 3563

GERMAN SEVENTEENTH ARMY,
July 5, 1918.

To Foreign Armies Section, via Signal Officer, Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht.

Number 336 of the Belgic "Kurier" Edition A of July 4, page 2, reproduces an article of the Daily Chronicle, according to which Lloyd George has made some statements concerning the insertion of American troops in British divisions. The text reads as follows: "England has promised America that Americans will be put into the British Army until the British losses have been replaced by freshly drafted Britons. Then the Americans will again be able to organize divisions and independent groups of armies."

This leads to the assumption that smaller American troop elements are not attached to British units for training but to replace existing gaps. This assumption is in contradiction to the fact that as far as I know no Americans have been captured who belonged to a British battalion in that sense. I request that I be informed as to how the Foreign Armies Section reacts in this matter.

LOWENSTEIN,
Captain.

G. H. Q. Signal Officer
No. 1817

Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht.
July 7, 1918.

To Foreign Armies Section, Supreme Headquarters

Above document submitted herewith. In the Lyon report of June 5, 1918, mention was made of an "embrigadement" concerning the Americans.

W.,
Captain and Signal Officer.

[This situation worried General Pershing far more than it could have concerned Ludendorff's command.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 13: Order

Capture of Reims

Ia No. 2925
Reference yours Ia No. 5308

GERMAN FIRST ARMY,
July 6, 1918.

To: Group Ilse

[Extract]

I approve in general the measures intended to be taken by the group for taking REIMS and for the continuation of the operation.

I again expressly emphasize that the city must be taken without fighting. The question will be merely to occupy the city gates with Landsturm sentries and to have special detachments, composed specially of pioneers, enter the city, with instructions to remove all hostile arrangements for destruction and to take charge of any supplies there. The group will detail a local commander. He should at once work out a plan of occupation according to instructions from General Command Headquarters.

As soon as the enemy has decided to give up the city and depart south, the group probably will receive orders to push after him with the 213th and 242d Divisions - going around REIMS on both sides - between Groups Borne and Group Lindequist toward the line SERMIERS---LUDES. * * *

* * * * *

von MUDRA,
The Commander-in-Chief,
General of Infantry.

Copy to Army Group German Crown Prince,
and Group Lindequist

[This document shows how the Germans, intent on PARIS-AMIENS, had to reckon with a smaller project which lay immediately before them, an operation around REIMS. The second paragraph of the above document seems to presage the capture of REIMS with amazing ease.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

Modification of Attack Plans

Operations Section
No. 9135

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
July 6, 1918.

The principles laid down in Order No. 8950 of June 25, 1918 must be further supplemented as regards defensive combat.

The enemy's repeated incursions of the last few days and the large number of prisoners which was unfortunately taken in them continue to show that we are too dense up front in the defense and do not allow enough depth for the outpost zone.

The enemy is imitating our surprise artillery fire and is having quite as much success with it as we did. We must effect a drastic change in our tactical thinking.

In the first place the defense requires extreme vigilance, and vigorous reconnaissance on our part, and above all, correct tactical principles.

Outpost zones of 100 to 200 meters are not sufficient. They are only possible in a well-organized position and when our artillery is very strong. They must be deeper, for example, 500-1,000 meters and more, especially at those points where positions are yet non-existent and only comparatively weak artillery is available.

The connection between the depth of the outpost on the one hand and the organization of the positions and the strength of the artillery on the other is not yet recognized generally. The weaker the artillery and the poorer the organization of the position, the deeper the outpost.

The outpost garrison itself need not be disposed in too great depth. It can take the form of patrols, sentries, and pickets in small assault detachments.

In the main line of resistance the real distribution in depth of the front line garrison begins.

The term "main line of resistance" is not peculiar to the organized position system but can be applied to any systematic defense. The only thing is that it must be definitely marked on the terrain. It is certain that this is more easily done in an organized position than while an attack is in full swing. Commanders of all ranks have the special mission of overcoming these problems.

The outposts will be supported by fire from the main line of resistance. To this end, there must be a definite plan for the employment of rifles, light and heavy machine guns, light trench mortars and batteries in observation of the outpost zone. Furthermore, assault detachments can be placed out in front of the main line of resistance for local counterattack. Mobile outpost fighting as warfare will be possible in this way. There is no form of combat more closely connected with temporary withdrawal than the attack against enemy groups, supported by fire from the main line of resistance and by whatever artillery is involved.

In case of defense against attacks by patrols of some size, the fire support from the main line of resistance will become stronger; more and more artillery will go into action as it takes the enemy who has penetrated into the outpost under annihilation fire.

Barrage fire will always fail under such circumstances, with greater certainty in proportion as our artillery is weaker. The artillery must deliver annihilation fire on the point where the fighting is in progress, must follow the fluctuations of the fight and be just as elastic in its fire as the infantry that is fighting in front. Naturally, a defense such as this makes the greatest demands on the training of the troops, especially of the infantry and the artillery.

In the event of an attack systematically prepared by artillery fire we will just as deliberately give up any idea of a fight for the outpost. It must be given up. A new main line of resistance will possibly have to be selected later if our annihilation fire fails to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold in the outpost zone and if we are unable to eject him with our assault detachments. We lose ground. However, the fear that in this manner the Entente could push us back many kilometers further is completely unjustified; it has just as few men for this purpose as we would have for such attacks. We should be glad when the Entente attacks; such attacks are generally delivered in dense lines. We could not wish for a more favorable opportunity to inflict losses on it. However commander and troops must be prepared for this and must strike the enemy, while at the same time avoiding losses to ourselves. Clear, tactical thinking will be as decisive in this situation as in any others. Then, uncertainty will disappear and commanders and troops will know what they are to do. If, judging from the manner of the enemy attack, it is doubtful whether it is better for the outpost to withdraw or hold its ground, it will decide to withdraw. This solution is preferable to losses incurred in a needless outpost defense.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam 3: Summary of Intelligence

Section: Foreign Armies

Ger. G. H. Q. - *Monday, July 8, 1918.*

BASED ON REPORTS RECEIVED UP TO 5 p. m.

[Extract]

From mail advices we must count on the presence of the American 30th Division in France. The number of American divisions, known to be or probably in France, is now 20. [Actually there were 25] Of these there is no doubt 11 have been in line. It is out of the question that more than 20 have arrived in France so far, as we have nothing to indicate a great number.

* * * * *

German Estimate of American Value

Doc. No. 1

Section for Foreign Armies
No. 12761

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
July 8, 1918.

To IIIb

In the German press the reports about transports of American troops to France are still being branded as exaggerations and bluff. This may be good for the maintenance of morale in Germany, but there are also serious objections to it. As a matter of fact, great masses of American troops have been landed in Europe. The time will come, when this will be known in Germany too. Then the assertion can be made - and not wholly without justification - that the public has been misinformed and even intentionally misled.

I estimate that at present there are 20 divisions in France. 11 divisions have already been identified by capture of prisoners from their units at the front. The ration strength of a division, according to American documents, is 23,000 men. Accordingly, 20 divisions makes a total of 460,000 men. In addition to the combat troops with their trains, etc., there are numerous troops of other kinds. In regards to organization the Americans are proceeding on an even larger scale than the English. Money is no object. They are enlarging French ports, building factories in France, extending the railroad nets, etc. We may assume, therefore that the number of troops in France in the lines of communications, in the railway service and labor organizations is about equal to that of combat troops; that is about 460,000 men. This makes a grand total of 920,000 men.

The American report, that one million men have been shipped to Europe, may therefore be correct and should not be simply characterized as intentionally misleading.

Nevertheless, the assistance of the Americans is in some respects a bluff. In their conceit they image that with the masses of men brought over, they can bring about at once a decision in favor of the Entente. For that purpose, they want to organize an army of one million men in still less time than the English did. They do not take into consideration that the English had in peace time a nucleus of excellent professional soldiers from which 12 divisions were formed. The American peace time army had not in the slightest degree the value of the English army which had had experience in numerous colonial wars.

The individual American has proven himself a courageous and estimable opponent. Whether the troops consisting of draftees only will prove as good in combat, remains to be seen.

The Americans in their delusions of grandeur do not seem to have taken into account that an army of millions does not become merely through human masses and machines a useful instrument of war, but that a thoroughly trained corps of officers and noncommissioned officers, a good training of troops, especially of the artillery and technical troops, is essential.

They expect perhaps, to make us disposed for peace merely by the fact of the presence in France of their numerous divisions.

I ask to consider whether it would not be advisable to influence the public opinion in Germany in the above sense. Then, should the American masses really participate in major operations, the German people will be prepared for it and not become frightened by their great numbers, but will know that our war-experienced troops will get the better of Americans too.

In my estimation, it would be well to continue to characterize the reports about the number of Americans as bluff and to disparage their achievements in neutral countries: it is my opinion anyway that propaganda in foreign countries must often be different from that at home.

In addition, I should like to remark that the War Press Bureau as well as the Military Bureau of the Foreign Office are receiving regularly the "Reports about the Army of the United States," which keep them currently well informed as to the achievements of Americans, especially of the transportation of their army to France.

v. RAUCH,
Chief of Section.

HS Ger, File: 811-33.5: Fldr. IV: Order

Shortage of Personnel Replacement Material

Operations Section
No. 91,311

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
July 9, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The question of troop replacements and the economic situation in the homeland make it imperative to get every physically fit man to the combat troops and to use personnel fit only for garrison employment and labor in the most economical manner. All requests of an official or personal nature must be subordinated to this urgent necessity.

The data submitted to Supreme Headquarters show that physically fit noncommissioned officers and men are still being used in positions which beyond any question of doubt, could and should be occupied by noncommissioned officers and men fit only for limited service for example as cooks, orderlies, in moving-picture showhouses, as clerks in bookshops and offices, etc.

2. For positions behind the front requiring personnel physically fit men will primarily be selected, who are not to be used in the front line, in conformity with Order No. 2240/9, October 3, 1916, of the War Ministry (families which have suffered severe losses in killed and wounded) and Order No. 6695/10, November 18, 1917, (persons born 1875 or earlier, who have been in the front line for six months and over).

* * * * *

LUDENDORFF.

Amiens - Paris Attack

Army Group German Crown Prince

Ia No. 2629

July 10, 1918.

Subject: Elector

To General Headquarters (Operations Section)

According to the view of these headquarters a simultaneous attack against AMIENS and PARIS would be difficult and hard to keep in flow, as the directions of the main attacks northwest and southwest diverge and the battle zones correspondingly increase in width towards the enemy. We would therefore have to count on the attack coming to an early halt unless sufficient forces are available constantly broader. These headquarters cannot now ascertain if after the conclusion of the present battles there will be sufficient forces left for a new operation on such a large scale. If such forces are not available, the attack front will have to be limited. Then the question would be whether to attack down the SOMME or to attack in the direction of PARIS.

The attack down the SOMME could be best executed by Army Group Rupprecht. The Eighteenth Army would accompany that attack only as necessary to protect the south flank of the operation. The portions of the Eighteenth Army that participate in the attack had best be placed under orders of Army Group Rupprecht.

The attack in the direction of PARIS would be the task of Army Group Crown Prince.

Task of Armies: The Eighteenth Army attacks with a strong left wing between MONT-DIDIER and the OISE, and at once takes possession of the general line Hills of BAILLEUL; VERBERIE. The Seventh Army attacks from CORCY to CHATEAU-THIERRY. Direction of main attack CREPY-en-VALOIS---NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOUIN. To protect the left of the attack, the enemy must be driven across the MARNE between the mouth of the OURCQ and CHATEAU-THIERRY. The Ninth Army attacks between the Foret de LAIGUE and the woods of VILLERS-COTTERETS. Along the forest fronts the enemy will be neutralized by strong artillery and attacked with weak infantry only. These headquarters considers an attack south of the AISNE as also necessary, if the enemy is not attacked there, we will have to count on his succeeding in preventing the Ninth Army from crossing by using his local reserves and that he will throw forces against the right of the Seventh Army. But this wing is together with the left of the Eighteenth Army, to execute the decisive attack.

The total requirement of the attack is estimated at 50 divisions.

These headquarters request instructions as to whether the attack is to be prepared. General attack preparations, such as reconnaissance, surveys and preparation of battery positions, construction of telephone have not been ordered by the Eighteenth, Ninth and west front of the Seventh Armies. These fronts, being minor fronts, are at the present time poorly equipped with labor troops. The troops are much worn out by fighting and by the necessity of having to construct their own positions and cover, so that but little progress is being made in construction work so far.

Count SCHULENBURG,
Major General,
Army Group Headquarters,
The Chief of Staff.

Contingent Objectives

Army Group German Crown Prince

Ia No. 2666

July 10, 1918.

[Extract]

If the operations run a rapid course we will have to reckon with the fact that units will become mixed in the interior flanks of the Seventh and First Armies. It will at the start be impossible for higher headquarters (army and army group) to interfere in this matter. It is therefore the duty of commanders on the battle field (division commanders and corps commanders) to create order and to withdraw strong units as reserves.

If, at the attainment of the first attack objective, the Seventh and First Armies have effected a junction on the MARNE, then the interior flanks of the armies will have to turn south in their battle zones, and thus both armies will have to gain ground to the south, in order that hostile attempts at relief can be defeated, and complete annihilation of the enemy in the REIMS wooded hills be assured. * * *

As soon as the situation permits, entire divisions should be withdrawn in reserve.

Details can be ordered only during the course of the fighting and according to the situation.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of Germany and Prussia,
The Commander-in-Chief.

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Report

Number of Americans Sent to France

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
July 13, 1918--5:10 p. m.

To Chief of Staff

According to an announcement by Secretary of War Baker, over 1 million men have been sent to France until July 1. From May 1917 until June 1918 the following monthly transport figures were mentioned:

May	1917	1,710 men	January	1918	46,776 men
June	1917	12,261 "	February	1918	48,227 "
July	1917	12,968 "	March	1918	83,811 "
August	1917	18,323 "	April	1918	117,212 "
September	1917	32,523 "	May	1918	244,345 "
October	1917	38,259 "	June	1918	276,372 "
November	1917	23,016 "			
December	1917	48,340 "			
					<hr/>
					1,004,143 men

The transport figures may be correct. However, they refer not only to soldiers, but to Americans in general who have been transported. The American government itself admits that the 1st million contains only about 60% (600,000) combat troops. The concept "combat troops" is debatable. Undoubtedly columns, trains, medical and labor units of the area of operations are included. The ration strength of a division with attached corps troops is 23,000 men, according to a captured order. This amounts to 506,000 men for 22 divisions. To this may perhaps be added several other divisions the number of which is still unknown, as well as corps troops and replacements. It is possible that this will total 600,000. The strength of the men not counted among the combat troops then remains still very considerable. (400,000 men). This probably includes, in addition to technical and labor units, also factory and dock hands, personnel for the administration of camps and harbors, schools, etc. The high number can be explained by the large amount of work being done by the Americans on harbors, camps, railroads and in factories.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE

JULY 15 (MONDAY)

Two hours of July 15 had passed when the first rounds started the artillery battle on a large scale along the entire front from SOISSONS to TAHURE. The conduct of the artillery fight was regulated by army orders issued under direction of the army group. At 4:50 a. m. the assault infantry started on the front from CHARTEVES, east of CHATEAU-THIERRY, to VRIGNY; and from PRUNAY to TAHURE. During the artillery preparation the right attack flank of the Seventh Army had commenced erecting bridges and crossing detachments of infantry. Here the hostile counter-reaction was material, and it stopped troops crossing the river, particularly the artillery during its advance. With heavy fighting against the enemy who was stubbornly defending himself on the south bank, the divisions of Corps Kathen, Wichura, and Conta pushed forward to the hills, but here, in the wooded and close terrain, they met a strong, well-organized resistance, which made it impossible to advance except step by step. North of the MARNE, Corps Schmettow gained ground slowly, encountering much resistance from especially well-constructed machine-gun nests.

The chances of success appeared more favorable at the start along the attack front of the First and Third Armies. Here the assault troops - closely following the rolling barrage - had penetrated into the hostile lines, had overrun them and were hotly engaged during their advance against the hostile second position with numerous centers of resistance in the intermediate terrain. The forward movement proceeded, accompanying batteries, other artillery and ammunition columns followed through the terrain which was cut up by shell craters and through the position terrain, although with great difficulty and under stronger hostile resistance than had been met with in previous battles. In front of this position the attack came to a standstill along the entire front during the later forenoon hours. It appeared that it would be impossible to continue the advance without a new artillery preparation on account of the strongly constructed positions having strong and deep obstacles in their front. The effect of the barrage was no longer concentrated and was not sufficient to open a road for our infantry.

It was seen during the course of the day as the result of reconnaissances and from the reaction of the enemy which became stronger and stronger, that any attack without most intense artillery preparation - for which a new artillery concentration requiring a whole day would be necessary - could be carried out only with very heavy losses, and then only with but slight hope of success.

We had to count on the attack south of the MARNE affording a material increase in the success so far attained. This was necessary, if a permanent position south of the river was to be held. North of the MARNE, our reaching the ridge about between COULOMMESS, SERMIERS might cause the enemy to evacuate the REIMS basin. To reach that objective it would be necessary to take the hill west of FLEURY. It was now clear that the object of the operation - to cut off the enemy in the REIMS Valley through a junction of the Seventh and First Armies in the vicinity east of EPERNAY - could not be attained. We had to be satisfied with minor successes.

This view of the situation caused the army group to arrive at the decision expressed in orders dated 12:30 a. m.

The reason that the First Army and the right of the Third Army were directed to continue the attack was the belief that the enemy had to be held on this front in order to certainly prevent him from noticing that the attack had stopped, from sending his reserves against the Seventh Army.

The conduct of the enemy was an excellent example for the "giving way" tactics that we had been more or less directed to pursue since the battle of the SOMME; the result of this first day of battle had again shown that decisive, apt leadership can readily evade any superior hostile attack by a "mobile" defense. The leader must decide when to fall back in time to positions in rear, and how to create a deep foreground, and to abandon some terrain to the enemy, as thereby he will force the enemy to bring up a superior attack artillery, whose fire will fall harmlessly on abandoned trenches; subsequently requiring the enemy to a new artillery concentration, and thus procuring sufficient time for his own troops to organize resistance in a new defensive system.

[From the American point of view, the fighting herein described is known as the "CHAMPAGNE-MARNE Operation." In preparation to receive the German assault, which had been recognized as planned as early as July 7, Petain had planned a new method of receiving the attack. This method, tried successfully in the MONTDIDIER-NOYON operation of June 9, provided a first, or outpost, line, thinly held to delay, disorganize, and confuse the first German attack waves. Thus the main fight would occur in the second position which would be held at all costs and regained whenever and wherever lost. In the forces disposed by Petain to meet the German attack were the American 42d Division, 3d Division, 28th Division and the 369th Infantry Regiment of the 93d Division.]

[The fighting on the 15th earned for the American 38th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division the name of "Rock of the MARNE" for their stubborn and successful defense of their river position.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE

JULY 16 (Tuesday)

The battles of July 16 confirmed the view gained from the battles on the 15th, except that on this day it became clear that we could no longer count on any material progress of the attack south of the MARNE. The offensive attacks on July 16 had gained ground on a large scale only in the battle district north of the MARNE.

The enemy had his defense exceedingly well organized in front of the First and Third Armies and thereby made it impossible for the attacker to carry out the attack without

most minute preparations. The same circumstance was observed in front of the Seventh Army south of the MARNE where, it is true, there were not so many positions prepared in advance, but there the enemy had the advantages of the terrain.

In front of the Seventh Army south of the MARNE and in front of the First and Third Armies it appeared that the sacrifice in men and materiel, that would result were the attack continued, would not correspond to the probable gain. However, on the east front of the Seventh Army there was some hope for the progress of the attack - even if only step by step - and it was believed that the line there could be pushed farther east. It was to be expected that by a continuation of the attack the ridge between SERMIERES and VRIGNY could be taken and that the French would thereby be compelled to evacuate the REIMS basin.

The orders issued to the three armies - Seventh, First and Third at 7:45 p. m. were based on this estimate of the situation.

[Ludendorff realized on this date that his First and Third Armies had failed. However, on the 16th, he ordered the Seventh Army to bear the brunt of the attack alone to capture REIMS. It gained ground in the direction of EPERNAY on both sides of the MARNE.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 14: Order

Attack Principles in Reims Arc

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
July 17, 1918.

To: Army Group German Crown Prince

1. As the enemy holds his positions in the REIMS arc, the army group will have to execute the attack against this arc prior to a continuation of the attack by the First Army against MOURMELON-le-PETIT AND Le-GRAND; main pressure of attack along the boundary between Seventh and First Armies, less pressure on both sides of POMPELLE. Artillery of longest range to be employed.

2. As the attack against MOURMELON is thereby postponed, and as it is questionable if stronger forces must be brought up at REIMS, the withdrawal of divisions from the front of the First and Third Armies should be hastened as much as possible. Regular heavy destruction fire will be directed continually on the main hostile line of resistance on the former attack front of both armies, and all artillery measures should be continued so that the enemy will believe that we are continuing our attacks.

J. A. LUDENDORFF,
rm Ia No. 9325.

[This order reflects the realization on the part of the German High Command that the attack had failed.]

WAR DIARY ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE

JULY 17 (Wednesday)

The battles on July 17 were exceedingly heavy along the entire fighting front of the Seventh Army. The attacks had been discontinued by the First and Third Armies and only heavy artillery fire was kept up by them. According to statements of prisoners the French divisions were to again take up their old positions again on July 17.

After the front lines of Corps Kathen and Wichura has been attacked, the attacks were continued also against the front of the Corps Conta with strong forces. Fighting raged with bitterness around supporting points, villages, and hills. In general, the line was held at evening which the divisions had that day gained by fighting. On the south bank, the villages of LOUVRIGNY and OEUILLY were the burning points of a changeable battle.

North of the MARNE, the 2d Guard Division succeeded in penetrating with the 195th Division and in pushing its line to the east edge of the Bois du ROI; the 22d Division pushed forward to beyond NANTEUIL. The 123d Division fought around POURCY and the 103d Division entered the forest of ECUEIL. Connecting with it northward the 86th Division fought its way farther into the hills and broke a stubborn resistance.

The army group fully approved the following estimate of the situation south of the MARNE by the Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army:

The French attack still continues with artillery; it appears as if the infantry fight is over. The hostile artillery effect was, and still is, very strong, especially also against the communications to the rear (MARNE Valley). Corps Wichura has defeated the attack, the enemy has gained a foothold at some points north of the brook. The penetration into Corps Conta was very material; at times almost all the terrain that had been gained on the 16th and 17th was lost. We are now again in possession of the hills at OEUILLY. The enemy holds the terrain in front thereof.

The hostile artillery fire on the MARNE Bridges is so strong that at the present moment the destruction is greater than the new construction, the bridge trains have lost 70% of all materiel by artillery fire.

Repairs - in case the south bank is to be held - are possible only if the attack is continued.

For this, we will need very much ammunition, which meets with difficulties. Losses in horses are very material, the same holds good of all artillery material.

From an infantry point of view the attack with the infantry forces we have available at the present time, opposed to fresh, numerically equal hostile forces, promises no success. The reports received of the condition of our infantry are alarming, as not only the infantry in the first line, but also reserves, have suffered much by artillery fire and aerial bombardment. The Seventh Army has no interest in holding the south bank of the river so far as its own situation is concerned; therefore the question is what is to be done in consideration of the entire situation. If the decision should be to evacuate the south bank, then Seventh Army Headquarters will appreciate early orders so that preparations may be commenced without delay (this night), as the retreat will be most difficult.

The army group also held the view that holding the south bank along the present line was not only costly but would even become dangerous should the enemy attack with fresh troops the German divisions worn out by losses and fighting. However, in connection with the still intended advance along the north bank, the position had for the present to be held so as to prevent any flanking of the attack on the hills of FLEURY from the south bank.

General Headquarters approved the view of the group and directed that preparations be at once started for the change from the south bank; but retained the privilege of ordering when the change should be started.

The course of events, however, soon demanded a new decision.

[With July 17 the American CHAMPAGNE-MARNE comes to an end and the AISNE-MARNE Operation begins. In this, Foch planned to attack on the western face of the MARNE Salient planning to attack on July 18 against the German lines between the MARNE on the south and the AISNE on the north.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: Order

Orders to Hold Soissons

[Undated Probably late on July 18, 1918]

Telegram to Colonel v. Rottberg

[Extract]

1. I request that the Ninth Army be left in, no doubt whatever that the holding of SOISSONS and heights of BELLEU is of the utmost importance for the outcome of the battle. The task of the army, to hold the city of SOISSONS and the plateau of BELLEU, is not so very difficult. There are sufficient forces in the 211th portions of the 46th Reserve Divisions, and troops withdrawn. I consider you have means for holding the position, so that first of all the defense of the city lies in a firm hand. The edges of the city and the interior should be occupied in great depth by machine guns.

I especially desire to point out that deep formation of artillery and machine guns is necessary.

Count SCHULENBURG.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 18, [1918].

French General Headquarters quickly and correctly perceived the unfavorable situation of a large portion of the German army. While the attack divisions of the Seventh, First, and Third Armies were still hotly engaged or were at least still closely held down by the enemy, General Foch had assembled a strong force, from the rest sector in the vicinity northeast of PARIS, against the west front of the Seventh Army, and this was done with the greatest rapidity and under absolute secrecy, and Foch now, on July 18, attacked the

German operation in flank and rear on front of 50 km. He brought strong forces against the southeast and the east fronts of the Seventh Army, to hold the German divisions engaged in battle and if possible to drive them west. It was evident that the operation was based on the intention to cut off, by an advance toward the SOISSONS and toward FISMES, respectively, the German divisions located in the large arc and annihilate them.

During the earliest morning hours of July 18, 2 deserters arrived in the vicinity of CUTRY, who stated that between 5 and 6 a. m., a French attack on a large scale would be started against the German front between the AISNE and MARNE. Noise of motors reported from the same direction during the night seemed to indicate that tanks were going into a position of readiness. These were the only signs which indicated that an attack on a large scale was imminent.

About 5:30 a. m. a heavy drum fire started along the front from the AISNE to the MARNE, followed immediately by the infantry attack, supported by numerous low-flying planes and tanks in masses up to then unknown.

After heavy fighting the enemy pushed back the front of Corps Staabs, Watter, Winckler and Schoeler to the general line: MERCIN-et-VAUX---MISSY---CHAUDUN---VIERZY---BLANCY---CHOUY---NEUILLY---COURCHAMPS---MONTHIERS.

Strong infantry attacks were also made against the south front - south of the MARNE - also accompanied by numerous tanks. These were defeated by Corps Wichura. The enemy succeeded in materially pushing back the line of Corps Conta.

The enemy also attacked north of the MARNE. Here he had no success. The attack of the French against the west front of the Ninth and Seventh Armies front of approximately 50 kilometers had not been expected on such an extended front nor in such force. We calculated that the enemy would continue his local attacks in the same manner and to the same extent as prior to our offensive, and we did not believe that he had so far recuperated that he could conduct an offensive on such a large scale.

Prisoners had stated that the assembly of tanks and troops in the forest of VILLERS-COTTERETS was connected only with a continuation of local attacks, and it was not believed that it was for the purpose of a large scale attack.

To reinforce the German offensive, started on July 15, most of the divisions in position on the west front had been deprived of a part of their artillery, the divisions themselves had for the most part been in line for a long time, they had not yet received full replacements to offset losses sustained during earlier battles, and they had a large number of men suffering from grippe. Hardly any of these divisions was fit to meet an attack on a large scale. In consideration of the operations about to start, General Headquarters could not approve the numerous requests for relief by divisions fit for fighting, nor allow the divisions to proceed to the rear to fill up their losses. When after the first reports arrived in the forenoon it was seen that these attacks really were on an extensive scale, the army group found itself without reserves on this flank to stop the steadily increasing penetration.

The situation in which the Seventh Army found itself was briefly as follows: On its own attack front strong forces of the army were hotly engaged with an enemy who brought up everything to drive the divisions that had crossed back over the MARNE. This resulted in the battlefield having but little depth and the troops had to rely for supplies on the very few river crossings which were under continuous and heavy hostile artillery fire. Our own attack between the MARNE and the left boundary of the army was still in progress, but it gained ground only slowly and step by step, in the face of a tenacious hostile resistance.

The French offensive took these main fighting forces of the army in flank and rear.

The situation of the Seventh Army was according to our own experiences gained during the surprise offensives of the past spring, and in view of the initial successes of the French during the forenoon a precarious one. The situation of the army could become very critical should the French succeed in keeping the same rate of advance as they had made during the forenoon. The most dangerous direction of penetration was that towards SOISSONS.

If the enemy succeeded in taking that city and advancing as far as the hills east thereof, not only the communications to the rear of the army would be cut off, but the divisions themselves would be in danger of being cut off.

The importance attached by the army group to holding that city and hills, is shown by the letter to Lieut-Colonel von Rothberg, liaison officer of the army group at Ninth Army Headquarters. The principal point was to support the attacked flank, and the farther north the attack struck, the farther north would it have to be supported and also to disconnect as soon as possible the forces south of the MARNE from the enemy by withdrawing them to the north bank. Therefore the army group issued orders to carry out as soon as possible the transfer to the north bank. The army group directed that the main forces were to be taken back during the night of July 18/19, the remainder during the night of the 19/20 and it took all possible measures to support in the shortest possible time with all its available forces the flank which was wavering.

[During the 18th, the Allied counteroffensive had taken the Germans in flank and rear which accounts for the German Crown Prince's pessimistic viewpoint as set forth above.]

[From the 18th of July to the 6th of August, fighting in which American units were engaged was reorganized under the term "AISNE-MARNE Offensive."]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 3: Intelligence Summary

Section: Foreign Armies

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
July 19, 1918.

INTELLIGENCE NOTES - WEST

BASED ON REPORTS RECEIVED UP TO 5 p. m.

[Extract]

According to newspaper accounts the American 34th Division has arrived in France. The number of American divisions now in France, confirmed or supposed, is increased to 26.

* * * * *

Preparations for Withdrawal

Operations Section
No. 9373

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
July 19, 1918.

Large-scale attacks involving surprise such as the enemy has made against the Ninth and Seventh Armies can be repeated, especially at those points where we are still without an organized front.

Therefore, I request that the armies take the question under consideration without delay and determine by thorough study the extent to which withdrawal could be made in case of such an attack. I request the groups of armies to check the recommendations and see to it that the necessary liaison, switch positions, etc., are made to conform to them.

It is useless to give any thought to creating a new system of positions with trenches, etc.; this is not possible with the labor forces we have available. As already stated, we are mainly concerned here with studies to discover just what is to be done in conformity with the principles of the distribution in depth of the resistance. A decision will be made in specific cases whether, especially important work must be carried out.

However, preparations for a rapid development of artillery are essential. Therefore, numerous battery positions will be, and their observation posts, revetted, and artillery fire-control maps, range charts, etc., will be kept ready. This work must be begun at once where it is at all possible and be constantly developed as time is available. I desire to point out that the batteries which are working in close contact with the infantry, as long as the enemy has not yet moved up his artillery to any great extent, must deliver fire whenever possible with direct observation from the vicinity of the battery position. Only when the enemy artillery is further reinforced will the necessity of the greatest possible cover against observation force a change in this respect. Therefore, the preparations will be made with both situations in mind.

Extensive written preparation will be dispensed with. Naturally it is necessary to give a cursory description of the infantry and artillery forces, ammunition supply, functioning of communications, etc.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 19, [1918].

July 19 the battle continued on a large scale. After the artillery fire, that had kept up throughout the night was increased to its great strength, the attack again started along the entire attack front of July 18. Strong hostile masses of infantry, supported by many tanks, made attack after attack against the German lines. These fights lasted throughout the day with variable success; attack against counterattack. Every village, every clump of woods, every hill formed supporting points for the defender retreating step by step, and where he could again reorganize his resistance and from where he could start his counterattacks. In spite of several hostile penetrations the brave

divisions succeeded in firmly holding out and meeting the enemy's attack and to finally hold the line MERCIN-et-VAUX---east of BERZY---west of VILLEMONTAIRE---PARCY---TIGNY---BILLY-sur-OURC---SAMMELANS---MONTHIERS. South of the MARNE, almost the entire artillery, and everything not absolutely required for the impending defensive fight, had been withdrawn during the past night. And though but a minor portion of our forces was left on the south bank the enemy was driven off, suffering much loss by his limited attacks.

The advance of the enemy yesterday cost the divisions many men, horses and materiel, and today has been just as costly. By inserting divisions from the rear - partly by battle groups - into line, support has been brought to the burning points of the battle, but the mixing of organizations and units caused thereby has caused much trouble to the leadership. After the army had disposed of the support divisions on the west front of the army, a certain crisis arose in so far as the army group had no army reserves left. Reserves had to be created and brought to the battlefield in all haste. All divisions which had participated in the attack with the First and Third Armies and which had been withdrawn after the offensive stopped, were ordered to the battlefield.

Considering the insufficiency of the railroad, and the difficult situation as to supply in which the Seventh Army found itself, transportation by rail of troops was not considered, while by marching the divisions of the First and Third Armies would have arrived to late. Thus the army group saw itself in the bad situation of having to bring at least the infantry of these divisions to the battlefield by motor truck columns. It is true that the infantry arrived in time, but tired out by long marches and without its artillery - it proved no reliable means to stop the penetration of the enemy. Relief for the much exhausted artillery came up but slowly, although there was plenty of artillery in the army, as it had to be relieved from active battle fronts and brought up by several days marches.

These facts, the rapid progress of the hostile attack, and the will of the leadership to overcome the fatal situation without too great loss, caused the leadership to face decisions which were expressed in orders.

The army group could not deceive itself that the possibility might arise that the front of the Seventh Army, under pressure of the flank attack, had to be taken back from the MARNE, if that attack should gain more ground. The moment at which this would become necessary might arrive at any time. Therefore, considering the difficulty of such an operation, all preparations had to be taken so that the withdrawal could proceed without friction on receipt of orders therefor and upon definite lines.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 20, [1918].

During the night of the 19th the remainder of the divisions were withdrawn from the south bank of the MARNE, the enemy again not pursuing. In the forenoon the enemy even started an attack with strong infantry accompanied by masses of tanks against the abandoned positions, in which he suffered great loss by the enfilade fire from the north bank.

On the west front of the Ninth, and Seventh Armies the battle, having lasted till deep into the night of the 19th with undiminished force, broke out again early in the morning of July 20 at Corps Etzel, Winckler and Schoeler. During the course of the forenoon Corps Watter was also drawn into the battle and Corps Staabs in the early afternoon hours.

During the variable fighting, in which the divisions only gave ground step by step,

in the face of the often repeated hostile attacks, and in which they even started counter-attacks, the enemy succeeded in gaining ground only at a few points. The line was in general held.

On the front between the MARNE and the left boundary of the army and on the right of the First Army attacks of the enemy along a broad front had also to be defended. After a short fire preparation French and British divisions attacked the left of Corps Conta, and Corps Schmettow and Borne, and renewed their attacks throughout the afternoon. They were defeated except for minor hostile gains in ground.

The battles of this day caused the impression that - though we still had to count on limited successes by the enemy and some loss of terrain - the penetration and its probable objective - cutting off the divisions fighting in the salient had for the present been defeated. If the flanks could be further supported, we could expect that the front could now be held. But for that it was necessary that the disrupted mixed and exhausted divisions - especially those of Corps Staabs, Watter and Etzel - be relieved by fresh troops and sent to the rear for rest.

[This ends the first phase of the AISNE-MARNE Operation.]

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 21, [1918].

At 5 a. m. July 21 the enemy opened the strongest possible artillery fire on our lines, which, however, was not followed by any infantry attack. Only after the lapse of several hours tank attacks, accompanied by heavy artillery fire, started against all the corps front, which broke down, however, under our concentrated fire. Strong columns were seen marching to the battlefield. These, as well as observed positions in readiness were taken under an annihilating fire. Under exceedingly heavy losses strong infantry and tank attacks directed against the front south of the AISNE, were defeated; cavalry was kept ready by the enemy to take up an expected pursuit.

During the late evening hours of July 20, and during the early hours of the night the enemy continued his strong attacks against all corps of the west front extending to the MARNE and after the strongest possible artillery preparation. These attacks resulted in no lasting success. Most of them were defeated by fire; where a penetration succeeded, our counterattack drove the enemy out again, and our divisions were partly able to push their lines to beyond our old positions. The enemy suffered heavy loss. The left of Corps Winckler, Corps Schoeler and portions of Corps Kathen shifted their main line of resistance during the night to the line; OULCHY la VILLE---west of BRENY---west of ROCOURT---west edge BOIS du CHATELET---east of EPIEDS---east of TRUGNY to MONT St-PERE. This movement succeeded without being interfered with by the enemy.

Early in the morning, the XXI Corps Watter received heavy drum fire. Under strong artillery support and with the use of numerous tanks, the enemy drove his infantry against Corps Watter, in which operation he succeeded in getting a foothold on the plateau of BUSANCY. By a counterattack by the 5th Division he was driven off again. Defensive fights were waged throughout the day by Corps Etzel, Winckler and Schoeler. Often repeated attacks, always accompanied by tanks, were in the main defeated and only separate portions of our front were pushed in. Attempts by the enemy to cross the MARNE were defeated.

Corps Schmettow defeated several attacks made in force. British and French charges were defeated with heavy loss.

Today's fighting confirms anew the impression gained yesterday of the situation.

The hostile attacks by strong masses of infantry and tanks went to pieces on our now fortified front. Penetrations that succeeded during the course of today's fights were driven out again by strong counterattacks; points where the enemy remained are of little importance to the entire situation.

In spite of the favorable situation - considering all conditions - there are a few important factors that influenced on the decisions of the army group and its recommendations to General Headquarters, concerning the holding of the arc.

In consequence of the battles more and more new divisions had been inserted in the arc south of the AISNE, while the transportation to the rear of worn out divisions could proceed but slowly, as the withdrawal of those troops, especially of divisions, from the front could be made only gradually. Requirements of rations, ammunitions and other supplies had materially increased.

In addition the situation of the railroad had been precarious. Because of the advance of the enemy to immediately west of SOISSONS, this railroad junction for bringing trains into the arc had been made useless, and the newly constructed connection at MISSY - the connecting line between the AISNE and VESLE Valley Road - was already within effective hostile fire zone. We had to count on its loss very soon. If these two points could no longer be considered for bringing up all necessary supplies, then the Seventh Army must fall back or bring up its supplies by columns from the detraining points in rear. This latter method was not at all sufficient for the requirements of a battle on a large scale.

Here came into consideration the further fact, and a fact of special importance; - by bringing up divisions, the front of the army was momentarily well supported, but was hardly made sufficiently strong to defeat all attacks. New divisions must be brought up if we desired to hold the arc with certainty against all further attacks which must be expected.

The railroads leading into the arc had been hastily constructed during the short time of the last offensive, but their capacity was insufficient to also transport troops and absolutely necessary supplies besides. The divisions sent by General Headquarters, which were required for relief of worn out divisions had to be detrained far in rear - about opposite CHAUNY---CREPY---LAON and brought up by several days march. Thus it took days before the army group had the disposal of these fresh divisions. Up to the arrival of these divisions, the front had to be held by the troops in line weakened by battle, and by few divisions that had been brought up by motor truck columns from adjacent armies. Whether we would succeed in holding the front should the French insert their masses of infantry and artillery was doubtful.

Further surprises were to be expected from the variability of the French leadership. It had become clear that the French had planned a counteroffensive - giving way and then attacking - for some time back and prepared therefore down to the smallest detail. Foch had brought up a large portion of the available reserves of the Entente army, French, British, Americans and Italians, to conduct a decisive battle for which he could not be strong enough. When he now saw that his offensive came to a standstill, then - considering the enormous means of transportation at his command - he was able to shift material forces in a very short time to other sectors along the front to keep up a demonstration on the present offensive front, and to conduct a new surprise offensive.

If he should do this to the same extent at some other point of the front of the army group, this might easily result in penetration on a large scale, as these fronts are now bare of reserves, as all available troops were sent to support the Seventh Army. The front around REIMS appeared to be especially endangered and weak, and its support and reinforcement was made the duty of the First Army.

These considerations, as well as the knowledge of the insufficient replenishment available, and the renewed wish of the army group to withdraw from the Seventh Army

strong forces as soon as possible so as to be able to resume the attack and take up the initiative caused the army group to decide to shorten the front by withdrawing to lines farther in rear and thereby save forces. It agreed with the Seventh Army which under the existing conditions thought it best to solve the precarious situation by slowly falling back.

The orders of the army group were based on this view, and directed the reconnaissance and survey of lines in rear to which the front of the army was to be gradually withdrawn.

HS Ger. File: 803-32.1: Fldr. I: Order

Operations Section
No. 9444

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
July 22, 1918.

The experiences of the last few days give rise to the following statements:

I. Attack: In the instances where the enemy does not elude us in time our attack procedure is good. But we must become more skillful in our approach. Our procedure must match the enemy's behavior.

One-sided settlement of all details in advance for a matter of many hours easily leads to failure. At some point things happen differently than was expected. If the attack is wound up like a clockwork a large part of the barrage will be needlessly wasted. Here the lower command from the division up should act independently. But if everything is ordered in advance from the top freedom of movement and the joy of responsibility will be missing from the lower grades.

The enemy will conduct the defense with infantry and artillery deeply echeloned and under certain circumstances abandon an outpost zone from 1 to several kilometers wide.

Against this, an extensive, protracted artillery preparation against enemy infantry and a still stronger gassing of the enemy artillery is useless. The long preparation (on July 15, including fire barrage, over 9 hours) gives the enemy time for alert and for organization while the artillery located at the rear is anyway beyond the range of ours.

An improvement of our methods will in such cases extend to the following important points:

1. Artillery fighting: The fewer targets are available the shorter the time of the artillery engagement can be before the infantry is committed. We must not be deceived any longer by guns in ambush or roving guns. On July 15 gassing time could have been considerably shortened. The constant holding under fire of batteries that had moved from their former positions had no value.

On the other hand artillery action after the beginning of the attack must be heightened.

Individual batteries from far advanced positions will be designated for the purpose. Other especially long-range flat trajectory fire batteries will be moved immediately after the beginning of the attack into prepared positions on a line with the infantry jumping-off position.

In addition to boundary observation, all other means of long-range observation will be utilized for artillery fighting. With the presumed strong artillery and air superiority of the attacker it is unthinkable to stretch forward the flash and sound ranging system at once, to advance the balloons until close behind the front line and to allow low altitude observation by numerous fliers. Batteries and observers must be brought into close liaison.

The artillery subcommanders will then take up independently, in their target

area, the artillery fight with observed fire or with gas or high explosive. It is to be hoped that the enemy artillery can be essentially neutralized in this manner to a depth of about 7 to 10 kilometers with comparatively weak means, at least enough to offer no decided obstacle to the advance of the infantry and especially to the following of the accompanying weapons.

In further progress, observers and batteries will be brought forward by echelon beyond their own positions so that the artillery of the attacker reaches far into the enemy rear area at all times. When a halt is made the foundation will be laid immediately for new artillery assemblies.

2. Infantry fighting through the artillery: Extensive shelling of weakly defended outpost positions is purposeless. Long drawn-out shelling of probable main lines of resistance is also without much value. Complete destruction of trenches and obstacles cannot be expected. Experience has shown that this cannot be accomplished even with days of firing.

Therefore, altogether in conformity with our former interpretation, it can be a question only of striving for a comparatively weak partial demolition and in addition to hold the enemy down and exploit this success by immediate commitment of the infantry.

Against the improved combat methods of the enemy the following is necessary for the artillery:

a. The entire zone of attack especially the rearward resistance lines and strong point will be held under gas and high explosive fire as constantly as possible. By moving to and fro and increasing and decreasing the fire the time of penetration against the individual lines will be concealed from the enemy. The batteries of the previous rolling barrage as well as the heavy batteries (mortars) not belonging to the barrage will be committed.

b. The fire preparation before the beginning of the rolling barrage against the front lines and zones the least defended will be shortened. Strong trench mortar effect - fire is mostly sufficient to gain the result looked for in a short time. Under certain circumstances the attack will start immediately at the beginning of the fire preparation. The shortening of time will add to the element of surprise.

c. On the other hand the shelling of the strongly defended rearward lines and zones will be lengthened. This shelling will precede immediately the infantry attack; it is best, therefore, that it should constitute a period falling within the barrage schedule; it will be prepared by the fire discussed in Par. a.

d. The screened fire barrage (Par. a.) will jump less regularly than has been customary heretofore and will be directed more than formerly toward ground and lines of resistance.

At the beginning the tempo will be comparatively quick. Later the rolling barrage will become more like a fire preparation (see Par. c) and will therefore lie longer on certain zones; it will moreover allow more time to the infantry for the cleaning up of the remaining resistance and for difficult terrain.

It is difficult to set a time limit for this. At a distance beyond 2 to 4 kilometers a rolling barrage regulated only by the clock usually runs away from the infantry or holds it up, thereby missing its main purpose.

The only remedy for this consists in making the barrage at least partly dependent upon the infantry. This is undoubtedly difficult and in spite of agreements, signals, relay reports, the artillery's own observation (observers must be sent toward the front in ample season) will frequently fail, disrupting the continuity of the barrage, and lead to misunderstanding. But in such cases the drawback will not be greater than when the barrage needlessly runs ahead or holds up the infantry. A nice, continuous barrage is almost useless if it loses connection with the infantry. Therefore constant effort must be made to control the barrage or at least part of the barrage fire batteries according to the actual situation of the infantry. The infantry must use signals, etc., more than

before to give the artillery better indication for its fire. Even if only an occasional result is obtained thereby the attempt is worth it. The possibility of retarding or accelerating the advance of the barrage through signals or orders must consequently be in no way excluded; it is rather to be considered the rule along with the current instructions.

e. In remote distances the barrage becomes weak and unreliable because of great dispersion. Effort will be made therefore to reinforce and rectify it through early advanced batteries. Firing at the longest range is often pure waste of ammunition because the wide dispersion prevents the infantry from remaining near enough to the effective core of the barrage.

f. The barrage will seldom neutralize the enemy to the extent of totally sparing our infantry any kind of fighting. To make this fighting lighter for the infantry is in the first place the mission of the accompanying artillery, the accompanying trench mortars and of the tanks. The more of them can be put in position the more certain it is that the attack will go forward. A slow advance of the barrage, where needed, will facilitate its advance. The basis of its effectiveness however is the successful conduct of the artillery fighting (see Par. 1), as the enemy increasingly recognizes the value of accompanying weapons and directs his main effort to the prevention of their advance.

3. Fighting: The improvement in our methods of artillery attack alone will never be sufficient to insure success. Infantry fighting is even more important. The infantry must know how, by its own power and in liaison with artillery, to overcome the enemy machine guns echeloned in depth without too considerable losses but also without sparing itself. For this the infantryman must be bodily able to stand exertion and enter into action in firm cooperation with his commander; he must be conscious of the fact that, after overcoming the first enemy lines, he will face many kilometers of long, difficult fighting, the success of which depends on the proper use of our weapons, on good liaison with the artillery and on the rapidity of our movements.

Anyhow there can be no doubt about the infantry success in fighting. It will be attained by the fresh eagerness for attack and the daring of officers and noncommissioned officers and the independent activity of the private soldier. To awake and foster these qualities, to promote discipline, self confidence, initiative and skill in minor action and thereby maintain the intrinsic value of the infantry will be in future also the principal mission of all commanders.

II. Defense:

1. In the defense, disposition in depth and flanking fire are the most important aspects.

Artillery disposed in depth is hard to neutralize; in adverse cases infantry disposed in depth will at least fight for time, in favorable circumstances it will place the attacker in difficult positions, a fact to be taken advantage of by mobile defender for a counterattack.

Flanking fire effect is morally and materially extraordinarily effective and easy to prepare as flanking machine guns and guns are difficult to identify and engage from the front. Flanking effect therefore is increased by the element of surprise.

Allowances for both points of view must be made more than heretofore in individual circumstances. Where an attack is expected, the infantry will be disposed in depth for several kilometers. In certain cases the artillery will be partially withdrawn so that it just reaches the front line. Where a deep outpost zone is available batteries can be placed in position still farther to the rear.

2. Next to this, concealment, mobility, and behavior in attack, where possible, come under consideration.

When the defender is well concealed and often changes his position so that the attacker does not know where he is located, the attacker will not meet with much success. The attacker, met by the fire of the artillery in position far to the rear and that of the flanking machine guns, will not be able to withstand energetic counterattacks.

The artillery also will fight offensively in the defense. It will look for targets in close and far combat areas and not limit itself to static defense activity and retaliating fire.

Of course we know that this procedure means foregoing the maximum power of the barrage fire, for a simultaneous organization of barrage fire with the greatest possible achievement, along with the fulfilling of other offensive fire activities would mean for the artillery an overburdening, conducive to a weakening of the general effect.

In the defensive, artillery fire can and will be prepared for a variety of cases. It is a question however, whether the former usual way of preparation on numerous sketches was sufficiently suitable for practical purposes. In this sphere also we must refrain from too much paper schedule; it leads to overwhelming increase and burdening of staffs without arriving at a satisfactory result.

3. In the modern mobile conduct of defense with its inherent space occupation, penetrations into the front lines cannot always be avoided, especially when the enemy exploits a moment of surprise as on July 18.

Where we are not fighting for ground, penetrations are unimportant if they can be intercepted farther to the rear with elasticity.

More than heretofore in such cases a timely abandonment of outposts and outpost zones will be decided upon and no attempt at recapture will be made. The commitment of counterattack troops under unfavorable circumstances leads only to unnecessary losses.

Faced by major attacks a large scale yielding under certain conditions will be effected broad-mindedly, the same as the French did on July 15, evacuating without serious resistance positions several kilometers deep, though important military and moral considerations were against it. No harm will be done to the morale of the troops when such a procedure is the result of orders, for the troops will recognize the purpose of it.

But at other points and in other circumstances, of course the enemy must be fought.

The decision for fighting or for withdrawing rests with the command. It must be impressed upon the troops, now as before, that the combat area intrusted to them will be held or recaptured in a counterattack until they receive orders to the contrary.

It must be common knowledge of the army that it is not a question of 100 meters more or less, that we are not holding dead trenches, but that we want to inflict losses on the enemy and that the defensive fighting will not be conducted rigidly with commitment of masses of troops but in a mobile manner and with minor actions using the firing power of machine guns, rifles, guns, trench mortars.

4. The improvement of position has been underrated lately to such an extent that in some places it was said that an enemy in an unimproved position was more difficult to attack than one fighting behind obstacles and trenches; but the value of dugouts was still recognized.

This view is to be opposed strongly. Of course dugouts are the most important, but we can never have enough of trenches and obstacles in defensive warfare.

Trenches are indispensable for the supply of forces, arms and ammunition and rations. Where trenches are deficient, the combat value of the troops in line is quickly lowered, especially in bad weather.

Obstacles are now, as ever, the best protection against surprise and make it very difficult for an enemy who has broken through to remain and move about freely as he does not know the connecting passages as well as the defender. Skillfully placed wiring, with or without trenches, facilitates tremendously the organization of the flanking and can bring infiltrated enemy batteries or assault detachments into a very precarious situation.

If trenches and obstacles draw enemy fire they need not be occupied as long as they lie under fire. Our defensive principles give the troops at all times the right to move in combat, in and out, as the fighting necessitates. There is no doubt that terrain

with trenches and obstacles is easier to defend than without them and it has been proved anew in the recent fighting.

The foregoing interpretation on improvement of position will be given its full value again. The aversion of troops and command for the work will be met with all expedients.

5. Increased attention will be directed to antitank defense. Our previous successes against them have led to a certain underestimation of this means of combat. Now we have to reckon with stronger, armored, smaller and more mobile tanks which are more dangerous. They also will be overcome. But renewed care and instruction are necessary so that the usual defensive means (yielding in limited area, attack against vulnerable points with armor piercing ammunition, mines, concentrated charges, long and close-range gun fire) can be employed timely and appropriately.

6. The other principles of defense, the conduct of air forces, signal corps supplies, etc., need no explanation in these instructions. They are known.

But the best principles are no avail if the watchfulness and the fighting strength of the troops are insufficient. An attack must be recognized quickly, and swiftly followed by the alerting of all weapons and the firing without delay, especially by the artillery, against important targets. Where the enemy could attack by surprise as on July 18 and effect a broad and deep penetration, this must have been lacking. I request the commanders of all arms to turn their entire attention to this disagreeable experience and especially on the apparently quiet and thinly occupied fronts.

Finally the watchfulness and fighting strength of the infantry are the most important factors in turning the scale for a successful defense. The highest performance is required of it. Its training and recuperation is therefore to be given the greatest care by all parties.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 24, [1918].

During the night of July 24 the first change of the front to the rear commenced; the fronts of Corps Schoeler, Kathen, Wichura, and the right of Conta were withdrawn to the line; COINZY---BEAUVARDES---le-CHARMEL---l'HERELLE---VINCELLES. The defensive successes of the preceding day made the execution of the movement possible without interruption on the part of the enemy. Hot, local attacks by the enemy against the Corps Winckler and Schoeler, made in great force and with the heaviest possible artillery fire, brought some success to the enemy but not at all commensurate with the forces used. At the First Army the day passed without material fighting.

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 26, [1918].

Ninth Army: The strong harassing fire directed on all the 3 corps during the night was followed at 5 a. m. by heavier fire on Corps Hofman and Staabs for a short time. No infantry attacks amounting to anything followed. Our artillery fired on the usual battle objectives, using a large amount of ammunition.

Seventh Army: Very lively artillery activity during the night; increasing in volume at daybreak. An attack on a large scale, expected along the entire front, did not materialize; on the other hand, the enemy executed partial attacks against Corps Schoeler, Wichura and Conta, which were defeated by artillery fire and counterattacks. Strong infantry attacks, accompanied by tanks, were directed against the divisions of Corps Schmettow, which were bloodily defeated in hand to hand fighting and a counter attack.

First Army: Nothing special.

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. V: Order

Summary of the Situation on the Battlefield

Operations Section
No. 9540

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
July 27, 1918.

[Extract]

Our offensive on both sides of REIMS, which was to secure better railroad connections for us in addition to a tactical success failed. The enemy was prepared for our attack in every respect and was informed about the place and time. We expected counterattacks on various parts of the front. The enemy very skillfully evaded the attack east of REIMS. We discontinued our attack there at noon, July 16, and began to withdraw the attack divisions immediately. Southwest of REIMS and across the MARNE the attack was more successful at the beginning, but also came to a standstill later. Here too the attack was stopped the evening of July 16, and the withdrawal of the units that had crossed the MARNE was ordered and executed during the night of July 18/19, after the crossings had been restored.

In this situation we were struck by the counterattack southwest of SOISSONS. The front line divisions were driven back with unexpected swiftness, but the divisions in reserve checked every further advance of the enemy, and the reinforcements arriving the evening of July 19 made the combat situation safe for us. Since that time the enemy has not gained any more tactical successes, although he continued to attack violently between SOISSONS and CHATEAU-THIERRY and also southwest of REIMS, suffering very heavy losses.

By his advance on SOISSONS the enemy had approached the railroad leading from the valley of the AISNE into the valley of the VESLE, which supplied the Seventh Army, to such an extent that his artillery was able to take this railroad under effective harassing fire.

Until July 25, after the enemy attacks were repulsed, we were faced with the alternatives of continuing the defensive battle in this bend, or of regaining strategic

freedom of action by withdrawing from the bend. The decision was made in the latter sense.

The Seventh Army and the right wing of the First Army will gradually be withdrawn behind the VESLE. Perhaps an opportunity will thereby present itself to inflict new heavy and bloody losses on the enemy.

The thing at present is important to fortify the fighting efficiency of the divisions for further operations. The decrease in grippe cases will of itself tend to increase it. By rest and replacements the fighting efficiency of the divisions which suffered a great deal will be restored. To be sure, the replacements can only be gained by dissolving a few divisions.

To save the so-called counterattack divisions, they will be kept outside of range of any enemy fire if possible.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. V: Report

Request to Consent to Position North of the Vesle

Operations Section
No. 9541

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
July 28, 1918.

To Captain von Ilsemann, for His Majesty

May I be permitted to report most respectfully to His Majesty that the Seventh and First Armies have taken up a position in a smaller salient south of the VESLE, without interference from the enemy. The enemy has not attacked anymore; we have held the battlefield at the decisive points. If the enemy renews his attack, we shall continue to master the situation. But there is a possibility that we lose our strategic freedom of action by holding strong forces in the line we have taken up and that fighting will develop similar to that on the SOMME in the summer of 1916 or in FLANDERS in the fall of 1917. In view of the replacement situation, such losses would be very hard for us to stand. We would lose our freedom of action.

We have gained the purpose of every operation, to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. If that had not been the case, he would not have permitted a lull to intervene in the fighting. A mere gain in territory is never the objective of an operation. Remaining south of the VESLE confines us too much to one place and ties up too strong a force.

May I therefore be permitted most respectfully to request His Majesty's consent to a permanent position directly north of the VESLE instead south thereof.

von HINDENBURG.

Operations Section

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
[OFFICE OF HIS MAJESTY'S AIDE],
July 28, 1918.

Before His Majesty gives his consent to the recommendation submitted under No. 9541, His Majesty desires that a map be submitted showing the new line of defense. Particularly does His Majesty desire to know what is to become of SOISSONS and the hilly country occupied by us west of REIMS. His Majesty has stated: "Before I make a decision which is so weighty in its political consequences, it is important for me to know how the new defense is to be conducted."

von ILSEMANN.

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. V: Report

Advantages of the Bluecher Position

Operations Section
No. 9541

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
July 28, 1918.

[Extract]

If His Majesty approves of the movement, the permanent (Bluecher) Position will be occupied on D plus 1 day, using the intermediate position as a covering position. The withdrawal movement would be planned for the night of August 1/2. The movement will be ordered 2 days in advance. Preparations are in full progress, particularly the evacuation of the wounded, and of every kind of our equipment and of captured material, etc.

In the Bluecher Position we shall receive all the enemy's attacks. Low-lying SOISSONS cannot be held in view of the necessary economy of forces, and the attack on REIMS cannot be executed for the same reason.

Moving into the Bluecher Position will have the following apparent advantages:

1. The difficulty of our rear communications will be eliminated (railroad curve at MISSY, which is under enemy fire)
2. Our troops will be withdrawn from the pocket where they are exposed to enemy pressure from all sides, into the shortest line which is sufficiently organized for defense.
3. The shortening of the front will effect considerable economy in forces and gain for us strategic freedom of action to employ these forces.

The position itself is favorable owing to the fact that on the right flank the hilly terrain at PASLY---CROUY---MISSY---CONDE and on the left flank the hilly terrain of PROUILLY---TRIGNY and MERFY form solid bastions and afford favorable flanking possibilities into the valleys of the AISNE and VESLE.

The AISNE adds great natural strength to the position between SOISSONS and the SERMOISE. The VESLE with its swampy banks interspersed with stagnant pools, particularly east of FISMES, also constitutes an obstacle which can be turned to very good advantage. The wide valley of the AISNE, covered east of VIALLY, toward the south by a projecting block of hills favors the posting and shifting of reserves.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

[It is now apparent that the success of the Allies has thrown the Germans from the middle of what had seemed to be a successful offensive to a defensive position. Contributing very definitely to ultimate success in the AISNE-MARNE Operation were the following American units: I and II Corps, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, and 42d Divisions. This period, from the close of fighting on July 20 to midnight on July 28, constitutes the 2d phase of the AISNE-MARNE Operation wherein the German is withdrawing and the Allied force is pursuing to the line of OURCQ.]

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Report

Rumor about Employment of Americans

Military Attache
Diary No. 4388

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY,
July 29, 1918.

To Foreign Armies Section

America: I have had the rumor spread in the circles of the American Embassy that the American troops, because of their low level of training, could not have been put in line except in masses, and since the French have done just that in most reckless and irresponsible manner, the American troops have suffered irreparable losses.

I should appreciate receiving additional material enabling me to continue working in this direction. The Americans are very accessible to something of this sort.

von SCHWEINITZ.

[This officers' high opinion of his propaganda is substantiated neither by the course of battle then in progress nor by the French High Command's estimate of the worth of American troops in battle. It must be remembered that it was during the AISNE-MARNE Operation that Marshal Foch acquiesced in the plan to form an American army in the region of the VESLE.]

Approval of Movement into Bluecher Position

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
OFFICE OF HIS MAJESTY'S AIDE,
July 29, 1918.

To: Operations Section, Supreme Headquarters

His Majesty approves the recommendation submitted yesterday under No. 9541, operations section.

von ILSEMANN.

Agreement Concerning Bluecher Position

FROM: Operations Section

AT: German Supreme Headquarters

DATE: Sent: July 29, 1918 12 midnight No. 9566

BY: Telegram

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

I concur in the recommendations made.

After the Bluecher Position has been occupied, it will be necessary to shift the right wing of the Ninth Army again. I request that appropriate recommendations be made.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 29, [1918].

Ninth Army: Only artillery fighting, in changeable volume, along the front of the army.

Seventh Army: The enemy directed strong attacks against Corps Etzel, Schoeler, Wichura and right of Conta. The fighting at Corps Etzel was specially heavy, the enemy whose divisions by counterattack deprived of initial successes. In this fighting the enemy suffered heavy loss, our losses were very material also. The enemy was defeated at all other points of attack.

First Army: The night was in general quiet. At about 11 a. m. after a short artillery preparation, the enemy attacked Corps Borne. Supported by all available batteries of Corps Gontard, the repeated attacks were defeated with the exception of a small portion of the position which remained in the hands of the enemy. In the afternoon the enemy renewed his attacks, which also ended without success.

Positions after Bluecher Movement

July 31, 1918.

Telephone message to Ninth Army

After the Bluecher movement will have been completed, the right of the Ninth Army will have an increased importance. It is very probable that the enemy will change his units around, so as to envelop the Bluecher Position from the flanks. It has been ascertained that there is strong hostile artillery in front of the left of the Eighteenth Army. It will be well to gain a clear picture of the enemy, by watching hostile artillery positions and activity, and by systematic observation of the railroads, roads, bridges and camps by day and night and by thorough patrol service. It is further important to find out how the hostile infantry is organized, and where the enemy proposes to make his main resistance in case we attack. Please submit all observations, your estimate of the situation, and of the troops, to these headquarters.

For the rest, the army will form for defense as ordered. It should be again pointed out to corps that the artillery should be formed in great depth. Regular bombardment against paying targets by artillery from frequently changing positions is essential. Hostile locations of readiness and observed battery nests should be gassed.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
Ia. No. 2753.

Training of the Americans

No. 14317
Section for Foreign Armies

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
July 31, 1918.

Reference: War Department, Army Section 5090/18 g A 1 of Dec. 12, 1918.

Aside from their limited combat experience, the combat value of the Americans suffers from faulty and too brief training.

Apparently little stress is laid on marksmanship. Of the prisoners captured so far, many had fired only twice on the range before being put into the front line; some had not fired on the range at all.

In the 33d and 77th Divisions nothing at all is known about training in throwing hand grenades.

Instruction concerning gas protection is in general more than inadequate. In consequence, the 42d Division in May, and the 77th Division in June, had heavy losses caused by shelling with gas.

Exercises involving the combined arms and employing units larger than battalion have not been conducted in any division. In most divisions the exercises were only in company strength.

In the battles so far, little was noticeable of the influence of the command, of systematic employment of reserves for counterattack or of coordinated action of infantry and artillery.

The heavy losses which American units have suffered when put in line in a full-scale battle (American 1st Division, July 20, south of SOISSONS, about 75%, 26th Division north of BOURESCHES up to 40%), can be traced back to a large extent to faulty and hasty training of the troops.

Concerning the performance of American Artillery, no special experiences are reported so far.

To: The Royal War Department, Berlin

(Extract of Telegram of June 12, 1918, to Gen. Hq., Operations Sect.)

During the French counterattacks the French infantry employed very thin, cohesive skirmish lines, usually in two waves. These were followed at close distance (about 200 meters) by complete units, of platoon to company strength, in squad columns, with officers leading. Attack formations of assault troops were not observed. Attacks were carried out under the cover of very heavy artillery fire from skillfully selected positions in readiness near our front line. The infantry fire fight, predominantly with light machine guns, did not begin until the attack was repulsed or had come to a standstill.

Cooperation with the artillery was good. Artillery protection for the infantry, as in the manner of a rolling barrage, was not used when the advance continued.

Weak points in our lines (salients, open flanks) usually were quickly recognized.

KLEWITZ,
Major.

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. VI: Memorandum

Troop Movements

Operations Section
No. 2755

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 1, 1918.

Reference: No. 9566

To: Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section

[Extract]

With reference to No. 9566, July 29, 1918, the attached report of the Ninth Army is submitted. This headquarters concurs in the estimate of the situation of the Ninth Army and does not recommend a weakening of the front between the OISE and AISNE at this time. * * *

By order:

Baron von ERLenburg,
Major General, Chief of Staff.

Operations Section
No. 1147

GERMAN NINTH ARMY,
July 31, 1918.

Reference: Par. 3, No. 2748, Operations Section

To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

As a result of the shifting of the German front behind the AISNE and VESLE, the enemy is confronted with the question whether he should continue his attacks against the AISNE-VESLE front or somewhere else. The following points speak against the first alternative: The strength of the new German position with a natural obstacle to its front, the distance from the old French rearward communications and the certainty after a possibly successful penetration across the VESLE of again standing before a naturally strong sector which can only be reduced with heavy losses, - the AISNE sector upstream from CONDE. It is quite obvious that under these circumstances the enemy command will examine the question of an envelopment of the AISNE-VESLE position. At REIMS and east

thereof our positions run approximately in extension of the AISNE-VESLE front. Between the OISE and AISNE it is refused. The enemy already has a large bridgehead here on the north bank of the AISNE. Therefore, an enemy penetration between the OISE and AISNE will offer a better opportunity for rolling up the AISNE-VESLE front than a penetration in CHAMPAGNE.

The territory between OISE and VESLE favors a surprise attack by the enemy. No airplane and no balloon can discern what is going on in the great FORET de LAIGUE. In the numerous ravines densely covered with bushes and trees, the enemy artillery can deploy without being observed. The confusion of trenches of the old positions dating from former years of the war allows the unobserved assembly of the leading assault waves of infantry.

Indications that an enemy attack is being planned on this front have been noticed for some time. They are enumerated in detail in the annex. Of course they do not give a definite clue. Since the enemy too has recognized the value of surprise, warfare has become more than ever the realm of the uncertain. The army considers it risky not to pay any attention to these indications.

The right flank of the army must continue to organize and prepare for the defensive battle for the present. Therefore I must counsel against a withdrawal of the reinforcement divisions which have only just been put in line. This question can only be decided after the new situation created by our shifting of the front has quieted down and one can then, perhaps, see a little more clearly. Furthermore, the army would like to point out again that a front which is a four-day march away from PARIS will probably never be a quiet battlefield. It requires the greatest vigilance.

If it becomes necessary to withdraw divisions from the line and place them at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters, the army requests that this withdrawal be effected on another front and not between the OISE and AISNE. The front of the Ninth Army is a good 10 km. wider than the future front of the Seventh Army. Only on the left flank does it have a natural obstacle to its front. According to a map sent to us by the Seventh Army, the Seventh Army is counting on 11 sector divisions for the VESLE front, while in the Ninth Army only 10 divisions are in line.

In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the question of the construction of the position and its organization for defense also speaks against a decrease in the number of the divisions. The constant disturbance for command and troops caused by shifting divisions to and fro injures the progress in the organization of the defense extremely.

Preparations for the defensive battle can only make progress if we are working with proportionately equal forces.

* * * * *

von EBEN,
General of Infantry, Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

General Principles for the Conduct of Defense

Operations Section
No. 2752

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 1, 1918.

I. The following general principles will govern for the conduct of the defense:

1. A sudden large-scale attack or one that has been recognized in advance as being such can be checked only disposed in depth.

2. Explicit orders are necessary as to how the troops will act in a sudden or recognized full-scale attack and where a decisive stand will be made.

If a large-scale surprise attack takes place, the sector divisions will in principle fight a decisive action for the main line of resistance of the combat zone occupied by them. Only this one main line of resistance will be ordered for the troops.

If a full-scale attack is made that has been recognized in advance as being such, the higher command (Supreme Headquarters, Group of Armies, Army) will determine where a decisive stand will be made (for example whether the main line of resistance will be shifted to the rear or whether our troops will withdraw from the attack to a rear zone).

3. Weak points of the front which would favor an enemy penetration, will be especially reinforced by active forces prepared to offer strong resistance, and by improvements. Unified command at anticipated focal points must be assured.

In detail, the following points demand special attention:

Distribution of Infantry:

(a) The outpost detachment (forward of the main line of resistance) is to provide time for the detachments occupying the main line of resistance, the supports, security detachments and reserves as well as the artillery, to take up the fight for the main line of resistance at the right moment. In conformity with their missions they will be organized in the manner of outposts into posts, outguards and, if necessary, into special groups with artillery and machine guns. The outpost detachment will employ all means available to prevent the enemy from penetrating the outpost and approaching the main line of resistance. If the outpost detachment can no longer hold its position, it will withdraw from enemy pressure to the main line of resistance, provided the command does not previously order the outpost zone to be evacuated systematically.

For the organization of the front line, support and reserve battalions it is important that strong forces for resistance and counterattack be available in the main line of resistance quickly and on time. To the extent to which the combat situation at all permits, the requirement must be adhered to that 1 bn. of every regiment in the sector be withdrawn for rest and training. In this connection exercises in attacking will be given primary consideration, in addition to establishing discipline and training commanders.

Boundary and security detachments (for example in the artillery protective position) are indispensable.

Liaison and lateral contact of all adjacent companies, battalions and regiments, including security detachments, must be established at all times by telephone, blinkers, runners, and wherever practicable, also by mounted orderlies.

The machine guns (in groups of 2 or more heavy machine guns) will dominate the terrain in front of the main line of resistance and will prevent the enemy from advancing between the latter and the artillery protective position. Steps will be taken to assure the steady surveillance and regular relief of the machine guns.

(b) Distribution of Artillery: Disposed in depth with its mass, including all unlimbered batteries, far enough withdrawn, so that it will still be possible to fire effective annihilation and barrage fire in front of the outpost zone. Under all circumstances a rapidly opening fire, including concentrations from the adjacent sectors, in front of and into the outpost zone and in front of the main line of resistance must be prepared, checked and assured at all times. Likewise the requirement must be complied with that the artillery be able quickly to concentrate its fire on the enemy that effected a penetration. Accordingly, observation disposed in depth and direct observation with several secure connections to the artillery units must be provided. In front of the

artillery protective position antitank guns or platoons will be placed (if circumstances require, also a few guns in the outpost zone), furthermore for every division sector some roving batteries and guns for counterbattery action and long-rang targets (active batteries for daily missions). If possible, a 2d echelon of the artillery will be organized from all withdrawn batteries in prepared and ammunitioned positions. A few batteries and platoons can be placed there at all times for security purposes.

Furthermore, a constantly mobile artillery reserve in the hands of every higher command is indispensable.

(c) Antitank defense, exercised by all arms (artillery, machine guns, anti-tank guns, trench mortars) beginning in front of the main line of resistance, occupying the entire combat zone of the sector division in depth.

(c) Organization of the position: Establishment of observation posts, machine-gun nests, obstacles, dug-outs and communications has priority over any other construction work.

* * * * *

5. Flanking of the artillery and machine guns on our own and the adjacent front must be prepared everywhere in such manner that the fire protection of every portion of the front from the adjacent sectors can be increased instantly.

6. Very accurate observation of the enemy in addition to aerial reconnaissance by all infantry, artillery and tank observers as well as special close- and long-range observation posts must be assured. There can never be too much attention given to the preparation and surveillance of an immediate combat readiness and alert, even at night and in foggy weather, a quick introduction of the frequently changing reserves into their missions in the terrain, speedy march readiness of the reserves on receipt of the code word, and the rapid movement of local reserves from other sectors.

The entering into action of the reserves of the higher headquarters must be arranged on the terrain and is the mission of the corps. An effort must always be made to employ the reserves in active defense.

II. 1. The withdrawal on orders into a rear combat zone must be prepared, a plan of occupation and the roads leading into the terrain must be established.

* * * * *

Data: Ninth Army: Two main directions of enemy attacks are possible: On both sides or east of the OISE with the objective to fall into the flank and rear of the south front of the Eighteenth Army by gaining the hills of NOYON.

In the direction of the plateaus of JUVIGNY and LAFFAUX, in order to roll up the Bluecher Position of the Seventh Army to the east past them. In this connection it is of particular importance that the plateau of TARTIERS-JUVIGNY be disposed in depth considerably.

Suggestions for attacks will be based on the assumption that the army has been forced back on its entire front, or on its right or left wing.

Seventh Army: The defense of the army is especially strengthened by the VESLE, AISNE and AILETTE sectors. An enemy full-scale attack will attempt to envelop these sectors. A switch position from REVILLON to JONCHERY seems important. Suggestions for an attack will consider an advance from this switch position toward southwest, furthermore the event that the left wing of the Ninth Army or the right wing of the First Army has been forced back.

First Army: The objectives of attacks will be to capture the hill mass between VESLE and AISNE, then the BERRU and HOCHBERG fronts.

It must be possible to meet an attack from REIMS by a counterattack from two directions. The same holds true for attacks against the center and left wing of the army. Recommendations with this end in view are in order.

The plateau of THIERRY and the hill mass of BERRU as well as the MORONVILLERS hills will be held if at all possible.

Third Army: A full-scale attack against the front of the army will probably at the same time or previously be directed against the MORONVILLERS Hills.

Suggestions for attacks will be based on the supposition that in one instance the Third Army and the left wing of the First Army have withdrawn or have been forced back and in another instance that only the Third Army has withdrawn or been forced back, while the First Army is still in possession of the hills.

The recommendations will be submitted by August 20, accompanied by maps, whereby the most important switch positions for the limits of the withdrawal movement and the position in readiness for flank attacks will be shown particularly, and any existing doubts and requests will be mentioned.

2. The GUDRUN preparations will be maintained in their present state; no changes will be made. The Seventh Army will continue to be in charge of the preparations in the area of the Ninth and Seventh Armies. The rear strategic positions will be maintained as before.

* * * * *

WILHELM.
Crown Prince of the German
Empire and Prussia,
Commanding.

HS Ger. File: Gen. Hq. Pamphlet File: Pam. 8: War Diary

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 1, [1918].

Ninth Army: Lively artillery fire on both sides. Our artillery participated by enfilade fire in defeating the attack against the Corps Endres.

Seventh Army: Artillery fire, changeable volume against Corps Endres and Conta introduced a battle on a large scale. Using masses of tanks and airplanes the enemy repeatedly attacked in several waves. Specially heavy attacks were directed against the front between ROSIERS and VILLEMONTAIRE and between GRAND ROZOY and FERRE en TARDENOIS. North of GRAND ROZOY---CRAMOISELLE the enemy was successful in penetrating, and captured the hills north of these villages. Counterattacks started immediately met the attack, but were unable to regain the lost ground. Corps Endres and Schoeler drove off attacking enemy under heavy loss. The fighting died down towards evening and partial attacks were made only against Corps Conta and Schmettow, which were defeated.

First Army: Nothing of importance except artillery fighting on both sides, west of REIMS and continuation of foreground fighting at the HEXENBERG.

[By nightfall of this day, the German forces begin their retrograde movement to the VESLE. The third phase of the AISNE-MARNE Operation is now in progress, to extend to August 6 and to be marked by the withdrawal and pursuit to the AISNE-VESLE line, and by the unsuccessful Allied attempts to establish bridgeheads. Thus the area eventually stabilizes.]

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 2, [1918].

Ninth Army: No events of any importance north of the AISNE. During the night Corps Staabs was according to orders withdrawn to behind the AISNE, leaving a strong garrison in SOISSONS. The movement was completed without interruption by the enemy and without being perceived by him. After the enemy had directed a heavy fire in the early morning hours on our old positions, he felt his way forward during the afternoon cautiously and hesitatingly. His forward movements were fired on with strong harassing fire. During the course of the afternoon the garrison of SOISSONS was also taken back to the north bank, the city being held only by patrols and light machine guns.

Seventh Army: After the defeat of the very heavy attacks the day before, our front was taken back during the night to behind the VESLE. Breaking away from the enemy - also on battle fronts - was made without interruption by the enemy, and all movements were made according to orders. Here also our abandoned positions were heavily fired on by the enemy in the morning hours. Strong scout detachments, left in the foreground, are doing some damage to the cautiously advancing enemy. Contact (fighting) occurred only during the afternoon between our outposts and the foremost hostile detachments. Attacks against the outposts of the minor bridgehead position south of the VESLE were made only at Corps Etzel.

First Army: In conjunction with the Seventh Army, the right of the First Army also fell back to behind the VESLE, leaving strong rearguards on the south bank of the VESLE. Here also the enemy felt forward only hesitatingly and did not interfere with the movements.

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 3, [1918].

Ninth Army: After the enemy had felt cautiously forward during the evening hours last night towards SOISSONS, he succeeded during the night in entering the weakly-occupied city and pushing back our detachments to the north and northeast edge of the city. West of SOISSONS several attacks of hostile patrols were driven off. West of SOISSONS the enemy followed up only hesitatingly. Weak detachments reached the AISNE, our artillery fired on movements of hostile columns and detachments south of the AISNE.

Seventh Army: During the past night the Bluecher movement was continued according to orders and without material interference by the enemy. Fighting contact was kept up with Corps Etzel only by strong hostile forces which, pushing forward to the hills south of the VESLE, pushed back our outposts to across the VESLE. The enemy made only slow progress opposite the other corps; rearguards of those corps remaining throughout the forenoon on the south bank of the VESLE. They were pushed back across the VESLE west of BRAINE in the course of the forenoon. The banks of the river east of that village were held.

The VESLE bridges have been blown up. Routes of approach and advancing hostile columns and detachments were taken under strong artillery fire.

First Army: In conjunction with the Seventh Army, the right of the First Army continued the Bluecher movement according to orders. The intermediate position was evacuated

without interference by the enemy. Scouting detachments remained close to the enemy south of the VESLE. The enemy was prevented from close pursuit by heavy artillery fire.

[The great German MARNE Salient is now eliminated and the Allied armies are massed along the VESLE and the AISNE. Allied concepts pass from defense to offense. The German CHAMPAGNE-MARNE offensive had been abruptly ended and the German capture of REIMS had been prevented.]

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. VI: Message

FROM: Operations Section, Supreme Headquarters, Office Chief of Staff

AT: Spa

DATE: Sent: August 4, 1918: 3 p. m. BY: Teletype

TO: Chief of the Military Cabinet No. 9668

The Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht at present commands five armies, and the Group of Armies German Crown Prince four. For the future operations on the west front it is desired to insert a new group of armies between the two previously mentioned groups, which would have to assume command over the Second, Eighteenth, and Ninth Armies.

I request to obtain the prior authority of His Majesty for the organization of a new group of armies by dissolving the XXIII Res. Corps. Supreme Headquarters desires to recommend to the military cabinet as commander of the group of armies General von Boehn and as chief of staff General von Lossberg.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

[On this date, the American III Corps, under General Bullard enters the battle as a unit of command and General Pershing comes a step closer to his project for the formation of an American Army. However, because of stabilization of the AISNE-MARNE front, he decides against its formation in this area.]

Attacks Expected

Operations Section
No. 2756

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 5, 1918.

To: Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section

This headquarters expects that the enemy will continue his attacks against the Seventh Army, principally in order to determine the location of our main position of resistance, and perhaps also in order to drive the Seventh Army across the AISNE. He knows that in a frontal attack his offensive will in the long end come to a standstill at the AISNE. If he does not want to lose the initiative he has just gained, he will pass to another attack with further objectives as soon as possible. A thrust against the Ninth Army offers him these objectives. He would be exerting pressure against the flank of the AISNE Position, and would threaten the salient of the Eighteenth Army at the same time. Some indications of such an attack exist and they have been reported to Supreme Headquarters. Although lately prisoners' statements mention the fact that the enemy on his part expects an attack by the Ninth Army, nevertheless in view of the importance of the front of the Ninth Army, complete alertness cannot be relaxed here for the present.

The other possibility of enveloping the front of the Seventh Army lies in an attack against the First Army. According to agents' reports, an enemy attack is planned via REIMS, in the direction of BERRY-au-BAC. This attack would seriously threaten the communications of the Seventh Army. But the deployment of the enemy for the attack in the region of REIMS will have to take place under the well-observed fire of our guns. An attack across the VESLE or with the VESLE just in back of the attacker, with artillery fire enveloping it from both sides, would be difficult. The attack itself runs into a double envelopment and would result in heavy reverses if opposed by an active defender. No indications of this attack have been observed. Nevertheless, a mobile and active resistance against such an attack must be prepared in all details. In the hills of MORONVILLERS and on the front of the Third Army the enemy does not show any indications of attack intentions at present. The attack here is difficult in view of the terrain. If the defense is distributed in depth and the main line of resistance is sufficiently withdrawn, the enemy will not succeed in reaching a remunerative objective.

The events on the battle front are still in flux. A fully clarified picture of the situation can probably not be obtained until later.

By order:

[Signature illegible],
Major General, Chief of Staff.

Imperative Need to hold Bluecher Position

FROM: Ludendorff
AT: Operations Section, Supreme Headquarters
DATE: August 7, 1918: 11:50 p. m. No. 9704
To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince
Reference: No. 6276, August 7, 1918

TELETYPE TELEGRAM 59

The Bluecher Position with the VESLE must be held. The position in rear of the AISNE recommended by the Seventh Army and the ROMAIN switch position cannot be considered at present; however, their improvement must be pushed with all means available.

It is primarily the responsibility of the group of armies to provide the fresh forces necessary for this work. I refer to my Telegram No. 9705 of August 7.

As far as the repulse of possible local attacks or attacks on any considerable scale is concerned, the defense must be conducted as an active defense. The high plateau-like terrain is especially adapted to this.

Therefore, if the enemy should succeed in gaining ground on our west flank, despite our best efforts, in gaining both positions, then an offensive thrust in heavy force from the east, based on the line LONGUEVAL-BLANZY, would be appropriate.

[August 6 officially marks termination of the AISNE-MARNE Operation. It does not however mark the end of fighting in the valley of the VESLE. For the succeeding five days, under gas and machine-gun fire, and heavy artillery, American troops tried vainly to establish a bridgehead on the high bluffs north of the VESLE. The German capture of REIMS had been prevented; the Allies had passed from defense to offense - these were the important results of the AISNE-MARNE Operation.]

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. VI: Telegram

Defense Measures

FROM: Ludendorff
AT: Operations Section, Supreme Headquarters
DATE: August 7, 1918: 5:30 p. m. No. 9705
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

TELETYPE TELEGRAM NO. 6

If the enemy continues his attacks against the Seventh Army with vigor - a possibility which we must take into account, although it is not very probable - then the Seventh Army will need to have fresh forces brought up.

I request that a report be made as to what measures the group of armies will take in this respect.

HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. VI: Memorandum

Means of Conducting Defense Operations

Operations Section
No. 6276

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 7, 1918.

Reference: Order No. 9704, August 7, 1918

To: Supreme Headquarters

[Marginal Note:] The Vesle must be held.

To an inquiry from the group, how the Seventh Army intends to conduct the defense if operations against its front are recognized as being a systematically prepared attack on a large scale, the army replied as follows:

In the sectors of Etzel's [XVII Army] Corps, Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps and Wichura's [VIII Res.] Corps the Bluecher Position lacks the depth necessary for the conduct of major operations. The rear boundary of the AISNE not only limits the distribution in depth required, but also hinders supply and transportation.

The west portion of the Bluecher Position in the sector of the Seventh Army is unsuited to be held against a systematic large-scale attack prepared by an artillery action lasting for some time. If an attack is recognized as such during the preparation, it is recommended that the defense be shifted to the north bank of the AISNE from the right flank of the army as far as REVILLON, and that contact be established with the Bluecher Position from REVILLON via the ROMAIN switch position.

On the other hand it is considered possible and in accomplishment of our purpose to hold the Bluecher Position against surprise attacks also in its west portion, as the topography south of the VESLE will hardly permit overwhelmingly heavy enemy forces to be committed by surprise. However, the enemy must be prevented from establishing a bridgehead of any great width and depth north of the VESLE that would enable him to bring attack forces of any considerable size across the VESLE and allow him to use tanks. Therefore, until the combat situation becomes less tense than at present and until we succeed in barring the VESLE bottom lands with fields of obstacles, the front of Etzel's, Schoeler's, and Wichura's Corps must be maintained in a state of complete fitness, and strong reserves must remain at the disposal of the army. With them it will hold the VESLE line by an active defense that will drive off the enemy.

The group concurs in these plans. Approval requested.

Approval of Defense Measures

FROM: Ludendorff

AT: Operations Section, Supreme Headquarters

DATE: August 8, 1918: 6:45 p. m. No. 9705 II [Addendum No. 1]

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

TELETYPE TELEGRAM NO. 18

I concur in the recommendations of the group of armies. However, since the combat situation in the Second Army requires the commitment of fresh G. H. Q. reserves, formerly held in readiness in the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, it will be necessary to expedite the execution of the recommendations of the group of armies. I especially request that the withdrawal of the 7th Res. Div. be hastened and that the guard cav. div. (dismounted) be moved west as promptly as possible. In the case of the Bav. 1st Div. preparations for its early withdrawal on short notice must also be made. I request that a report be made concerning the measures taken in accordance with the above.

[The AISNE-MARNE Operation had cost Ludendorff heavy losses, so great that he had to break up ten divisions for replacements. His plan to end the war by a major offensive against PARIS was now a dead issue. Furthermore, his effort to break the Allies before the Americans could put an effective force into the field had failed. From now on, the Germans were forced to abandon the initiative and assume the defensive.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Necessity for Constant Patrolling

Operations Section
No. 9718

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
August 8, 1918.

To the Group of Armies German Crown Prince

It has happened twice today that troops have allowed themselves to be surprised by an enemy attack.

It is absolutely necessary to impress everyone with the fact that the greatest possible vigilance is enjoined on all. We must gain a clear picture of the enemy's intentions by constant patrolling and other measures.

LUDENDORFF.

Precautions Against Surprise Attacks

Operations Section
No. 9601, Addendum I

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
August 8, 1918.

Reference your 6200, dated August 5, 1918

Subject: Defense

To the Group of Armies German Crown Prince

1. A definitely anticipated attack will be the exception in the future; a surprise attack, the rule. This makes it all the more important that the positions on which the forces are to fight have sufficient depth. The outpost must be so deep that surprise tank attacks can not reach the main line of resistance before this line is systematically occupied, troops alerted and reserves placed behind it for counterattacks. An outpost of a few hundred meters is not adequate for this purpose except when special conditions such as obstacles along the front are present. This principle must be borne in mind.

LUDENDORFF.

Defensive Measures Against Tanks

Operations Section
No. 145/Aug. 18

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 12, 1918.

The Group of Armies German Crown Prince wires under Operations Section No. 6343: As reported by Supreme Headquarters, during the recent fighting in Second and Eighteenth Armies great numbers of enemy tanks broke through at points of the front and, proceeding by the shortest way, immediately attacked the artillery positions and division headquarters.

The defense apparently did not set in at the right time, mostly because of the fact that the batteries with their guns dug in were too immobile and too late in getting ready to fire to be able to defend themselves quickly against the tanks which were attacking from all sides. These incidents make it imperative that antitank defense be organized on a broader basis. Especially for the artillery, measures must be taken in advance such as are in order for a defense against cavalry.

These comprise the following:

1. Direct close-range tank observation maintained day and night and in all kinds of weather in the vicinity of every battery.
2. Avoidance of digging in guns too deep. It is sufficient if the men are under cover.

3. Provisions enabling all guns, at least those of the light and medium artillery, to be taken out of their positions in a matter of seconds, in such a manner that they can employ direct fire in any direction, even toward the rear. The guns must be constantly ready to fire. Special measures are necessary for the protection of heavy and very heavy batteries (for example, by prescribing protection for light and medium-heavy batteries located in the vicinity of other troops - designation of special antitank platoons).

4. Increase of the mobile antitank platoons. Use of mobile artillery reserves for antitank defense: rapid advance, movement into positions in the open and opening fire quickly. Provision must be made to bring up the trains for all batteries quickly.

5. Supplying the machine guns of all batteries with armor-piercing ammunition.

6. Concentration of antitank rifles in groups under officers.

The corps will report the completion of these measures by August 18, enumerating the details under the heading of the different paragraphs of the above order.

Wherever for special reasons the requirements of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince cannot be complied with to the full extent, a report to that effect must be made in advance, stating the reasons.

It is of the utmost importance that mobile antitank platoons be constituted and held in readiness and that combat groups with antitank rifles be organized.

This order will be transmitted to the troops only in the form of extracts and in such manner that no unnecessary alarm will be caused to the batteries, for example, the heavy and very heavy batteries, which are to be supported in the antitank defense.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. V: Order

Antitank Defense

Operations Section
No. 200

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 15, 1918.

[Extract]

In view of the necessity of meeting the increased use of tanks on the part of the enemy with an intensified defense, it is directed that in every corps and in every division a qualified officer of the headquarters concerned be designated, who will constantly supervise and promote the organization of antitank defense. Close cooperation with the troop commanders, particularly on the terrain itself, is indispensable.

Special attention must be directed to the antitank defense on divisional, corps, and army boundaries. When divisions are relieved, the tank officer of the army corps will engage the detailed transfer of all measures for antitank defense.

It can be expected that during the next few months our doctrine of the defense will be strongly influenced by the requirements of antitank defense. This applies particularly to the use of artillery. It is necessary to limit combat artillery in its heretofore accepted sense, considerably in favor of a more mobile employment, more widely distributed in breadth and depth, better adapted to antitank defense.

By order:

REINHARDT,
Colonel.

HS Ger. File: 803-32.1: Fldr. I: Order

Comments on Attack of August 8, 1918

Operations Section
No. 9846

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
August 16, 1918.

I spoke today with 2 division commanders and combat officers who had participated in the battle of August 8 with the Second Army. I am reporting the result of the conversation briefly; it coincides in part with former experiences; in part it complements them, and in connection with the recent orders it will help to clear up the concepts of defense, especially for those troops who did not themselves participate.

1. The attack succeeded only because the tanks surprised our infantry, broke through on a broad front and the infantry then thought itself surrounded.

Tanks possess no inherent fighting power. Their fire is aimless. The problem is to convince our troops of the fact that tanks are comparatively harmless if proper defensive means are employed. It has been proved feasible to allow tanks that reach our lines to pass through and to turn our attention to the enemy infantry which, on most parts of the front, attacked only hesitatingly.

Frequently tanks dropped men and machine guns in our rear. Destroyed tanks formed a rallying point for enemy resistance.

2. With reference to my directive of August 8, 1918 Operations Section No. 9635, Par. c:

Local and general counterattacks were carried out too unsystematically. The infantry was thrown in, completely in the dark as to the situation; without any kind of artillery support, and all to no purpose. It would have been better to block the enemy penetration by refusing the flanks, and after clarification of the situation, to gather our forces together in greater strength and launch a local or general counter-attack.

The decision for this can often be made only by the commander present on the spot. However, units holding out up front in expectation of a counterattack must not be left in the lurch.

The foregoing does not apply to the immediate counterattack of the front line elements and supports in minor actions. Yet in this type of action also the powerful effect of the aimed fire of machine guns, mortars, etc., at close range must be emphasized.

3. The necessarily few separated batteries and guns located in the zone of the front-line battalions must be placed under the tactical control of the latter. It is potent that command must necessarily be organized in this manner since the direction of the artillery action by the artillery group or subgroup breaks down under enemy fire. Therefore such a mixed unit had to be formed in the front line, as was done by Order No. 9757, August 11, 1918, Par. 4 a, prescribing reinforcement of support or rest battalions by artillery.

4. There is nothing new to say about artillery employment. Correct deductions can be drawn from the orders issued.

It must be stressed however that the missions of the artillery should be simple and will be concentrated on defense.

The urge to engage the enemy artillery (Par. 24 a of directive No. 9635, August 8, 1918) must be deferred as long as we have to reckon with surprise attacks. For this artillery action and the harassing fire in the enemy rear area, only elements firing from alternate positions will be temporarily employed (roving pieces). If these batteries or guns are especially well supplied with ammunition, extraordinarily severe damage can be caused the enemy in this manner.

In addition the indications are that our artillery should, be held in the background to avoid detection of our battery positions and gassing.

5. Boundary detachments allowed themselves to be drawn into the front-line action and then ceased to be. Divisions and regiments must provide for their own flank protection.

6. The artillery needs the protection of machine guns, either in an artillery protective line or battery positions must be protected by machine-gun nest, with which they are grouped.

7. The demolition of roads and blocking of draws had not been carried out. Armored cars on rubber-tired wheels and tanks drove deep into the terrain. The necessity of making roads impassable in the combat zone and of establishing obstacles has been pointed out often enough already. Anything more on the subject would be superfluous.

8. The infantry often exhausted its ammunition. A mere increase of ammunition is not recommended, but the infantry regimental commander must have at his disposal a special ammunition dump in his vicinity and the infantry must know where it can get ammunition.

In addition, economy in the expenditure of ammunition must be practiced. Firing at long range indicates nervousness and warns the enemy. Only aimed fire at close range can cause the enemy prohibitive losses.

9. The rest battalions must have a small reserve of close-support weapons.

10. All officers declare themselves very much in favor of using mine fields.

In addition I quote the following sentences from the report of a general staff officer which I consider worth noting:

The enemy builds up his attack on surprise the same as we do. A few days before the attack only weak artillery fire is delivered, or almost none at all.

1. To reduce the activity of our artillery so as to be free to carry out his final preparations, reliefs, reconnaissances, etc., undisturbed.

2. To induce our troops to move more freely during the time when things are quiet. As a result, his reconnaissance for the direction of his fire is obviously made easier. He can ascertain the location of reserves. The increased freedom of movements of orderlies, runners, etc., disclose our C. P.'s, etc., to him.

Single heavy machine guns pushed forward in front of the infantry line under the command of an energetic officer have proved very satisfactory in the recent fighting. The machine guns were protected from the view of planes and from ground observation by bushes. No man was allowed to show himself by daylight. Loud talking was forbidden. All firing was strictly prohibited. It was observed that the enemy preparing for the attack had crawled forward individually until close up to the machine guns. The reinforcements also crawled forward as far as their advanced lines. Our machine guns were not detected. The fire sectors of the

machine guns were carefully allotted, the machine guns loaded and laid. When the enemy advanced to the attack he was mowed down by excellent fire.

Even though the concept of annihilation fire has gained in favor, its execution in most instances does not produce the highest results. For broad fronts, before a probable attack the order is often given: 'At 4 a. m. annihilation barrage on the entire front?' The expression "barrage" alone can lead to an altogether false and superficial interpretation of the execution of such fire. Annihilation fire at night (i.e., annihilation fire without direct observation) must not rest on a prepared schedule but on a combination of circumstances such as reconnaissance of the terrain, knowledge of the enemy behavior and prisoners' statements. Annihilation fire, beginning at the proper time, must in its various forms either accompany a relief or the approach march of the enemy in preparing for attack from way back in his rear area to his assembly areas. If the various annihilation concentrations constantly lie fixed in the draws, the enemy will lead his troops at night, unseen and unharmed, over the high ground. In the daily planning of annihilation fire, thought must be given to the possible evading movements of the enemy if he happens to be hit by some of it and how therefore the sequence of the annihilation must be worked out.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. IV: Field Message

Withdrawal into the Chemin-des-Dames Position

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Received for transmission: August 20, 1918: 9 p. m.

TO: Seventh Army SENT BY: Teletype No. 2765

Since the developments in the situation in the Ninth Army are not yet entirely clear, the army will make all necessary preparations irrespective of today's Teletype No. 2765, so that a second withdrawal into the line CHEMIN-des-DAMES Position - third position can be executed next. Contact with the First Army at BERRY-au-BAC. The latter would withdraw its right flank behind the AISNE-MARNE Canal.

A second withdrawal should also be studied: initially into the approximate line Ft. de MALMAISON---canal tunnel northwest of BRAYE---BOURG---BEAURIEUX---REVILLON switch position or HERMONVILLE---LOIVRE as a first phase, followed soon thereafter by a withdrawal of left flank into the line CHEMIN-des-DAMES---BERRY-au-BAC---AISNE-MARNE Canal as permanent position.

I request your reaction to this plan after consulting with the First Army, furthermore your estimate as to what would be the minimum time required to execute the second withdrawal in one and in two phases.

Withdrawal into Aisne Position and Revillon Switch Position

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Sent: August 20, 1918: 4:25 p. m. No. 2765

TO: Seventh Army Sent By: Teletype

Supreme Headquarters wires as follows:

The group of armies will make the necessary provisions to ensure that it can withdraw its right flank and center into the AISNE position and REVILLON switch position within 48 hours.

If the situation in the Ninth Army should take a more favorable turn, a non-execution of the movement must be anticipated.

The army will issue detailed orders to this effect.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

Early Divisional Reliefs not Practicable

Operations Section
No. 9896

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
August 20, 1918.

Statements from the troops and reports from various sources cause me to take the following stand:

The present situation on the western front has entailed such an expenditure of forces as to make it impossible to relieve divisions in need of rest to the same extent as formerly or to enable those which are tired to receive a longer period of training before going back into line.

Supreme Headquarters by no means fails to recognize the problems which arise as a result of the slow flow of replacements and the reduced strengths occasioned thereby, as well as the lack of training facilities behind the front.

On the other hand, it must be emphasized that during the battle of the SOMME when considerable forces were still tied up in the east, the divisions, as a rule came out of the big battle with a great many losses, and had to be employed on a quiet front only to be recommitted in large-scale fighting, often after a few weeks without one day of training behind the front.

The French and British leave their divisions on the front for a longer period of time and have, nevertheless, attacked with such sector divisions between the AISNE and the MARNE and between the SOMME and the AVRE. They also show less reluctance toward recommittting tired divisions. Divisions which had been withdrawn from large-scale fighting were repeatedly employed again on the main battle front with a rest of only a few days.

Furthermore, in the future Supreme Headquarters will strive at all times to make matters even and by regular rotation, to give all divisions the desired opportunity for rest and recuperation.

However, the over-all situation can always be the deciding factor in this connection.

I ask all higher commanders, in particular the division commanders, to act intelligently in conformity with the foregoing and drawing attention to the seriousness of the situation, to oppose requests which are incapable of fulfillment.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. IV: Field Message

Preparations for Withdrawal to Rear of Aisne

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Accepted for transmission: August 22, 1918: 1:05 a. m.

Sent by Teletype No. 2765, Addendum No. 2

TO: Seventh Army

The probability of an attack against the Seventh Army increases, the more the enemy succeeds against the Ninth Army.

This headquarters assumes that the army will pay such close attention to the increase in artillery registration with aerial observation and to the signs indicating a possible artillery reinforcement opposite its front, that any large-scale attack that is imminent will be recognized as such in ample time.

Because of the fact that the AISNE sector is located close behind the front, the group of armies does not concur in the recommendation of the army (Opns. Sect. No. 258/August) to withdraw only as far as the artillery protective position, before a full-scale attack that has been recognized in advance as being such. Space in depth for the development of a counter-attack from the artillery protective position is lacking. The space for development from the ROMAIN switch position is too narrow in this case.

Therefore, we must continue to push to the utmost the preparations for a withdrawal behind the AISNE and the ROMAIN switch position.

Nothing is to remain forward of the AISNE and the ROMAIN switch position which the troops do not need for the battle.

To avoid a premature withdrawal of the army, there must be assurance that the movement can be executed quickly or, if possible, in one night. The group of armies requests that this be checked again and that the results be reported.

Until the order for "Flusschiffahrt" ["River Navigation," code word] is received, the army must be in a position to repulse surprise attacks in its present position.

Section for Foreign Armies
No. 15477
To IIIb (for War Press Bureau)

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
August 22, 1918.

The article in the first morning edition of the *Koelnische Zeitung* of August 20 about the American peril presents a false picture.

American achievements are being greatly underestimated. In the estimate of tonnage only American tonnage available in September 1917 has been taken into account.

In the meantime, the fleet of the United States has been considerably enlarged by new construction, confiscation of neutral ships, and purchase of Japanese steamers. According to the admiralty staff, the United States had available in May about 100 ships, of which 35 were large steamers. The number is still increasing. The transport of 300,000 men per month is, therefore, technically possible.

It is stated that the strength of the Army of the United States on April 1, 1917 was 200,000 men and that 687,000 men were drafted into the National army. That is correct. However, the number of voluntary enlistments is underestimated. Actually, about 632,000 volunteers were enlisted. Accordingly, the total strength on April 1, 1917 was 1,527,000 men. The enlistment of additional 700,000 is correct. This, however, did not take place in June, but much earlier. Already in April and May, 423,000 men had been drafted. Added to that number must be 292,000 in June and 360,000 in July. The total strength of the army at present must, therefore, be 2,602,000 men. For August the enlistment of 300,000 men is provided for.

The statement that on June 5 a second increment has been called to arms is probably due to a mix-up. According to a change in the draft laws, all men who between June 3, 1917 and June 5, 1918 became 21 years of age, are to be drafted. However, a draft of men of this class has not yet taken place. Thus the number of the many conscripts not yet called to colors is increased by another 700,000 men.

The expeditionary force is composed only to small extent of old servicemen. The majority are volunteers and draftees. As a whole in value they are not inferior to the old regular army soldiers. The training in America is deficient and incomplete. It is, however, completed in France under English and French supervision.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Complaint Against Front Line Conditions

Personnel Section
No. 95064

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
August 25, 1918.

To all Groups of Armies and Armies (for distribution down to and including corps and Inspector General, Communications Zone),

Operations, Intelligence Sections, and Central Division.

Enclosed is an extract of a very noteworthy report made by the German Foremen's Union of Duesseldorf, for your information.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

German Foremen's Union

Duesseldorf, August 12, 1918.

In the daily press the excellent deportment of our troops, the comradeship between officers and men is always emphasized. The relations maintained by the German Foremen's Union with its 13,000 members of mature age now in the field, who back in peace time occupied responsible positions, are the reason for our addressing Your Excellency to report the rather bad morale prevailing on the west front, which in our opinion is traceable in part to the faulty and improper handling of the men by some officers. We have talked with men of all types of troops and have found confirmation on every hand that there exists great bitterness and vexation, an indifference concerning future events, which leads us to fear the worst.

Thus the men complain that the older officers are not to be seen at all in the front line trenches. For the most part there are first sergeants, first sergeant-lieutenants, acting officers or rather young lieutenants, who feel their importance and are impressing this also on the older men. Particularly the teachers, professional educators, are said to make themselves conspicuous in this respect. There is almost never a word spoken of comradeship between the two groups. It is emphasized, however, that wherever comradeship does exist and where the officer sets a good example for the men, superiors always have their troops firmly in hand. But it seems as if some officers do not feel satisfied unless they can make the men feel that they are the superiors. The men however stress the faultless behavior of the majority of the regular officers in this particular. We consider it our duty to mention this here especially.

Furthermore the men complain that the front line positions are not occupied in sufficient force. A company often consists of only 80 to 90 men. The same is true of batteries. If the men go on furlough, then they are very much amazed to see that the line of communications zone is swarming with men, that officers of all ranks are to be seen there, whereas there is a lack of officers at the front, even where the better and more important posts are concerned. (Note: The men are not quite able to judge this situation.) [Marginal]

Another complaint made by the men is the unfair treatment of the men in the matter of rationing. The men are angry because the officers receive white bread, while the men are given black bread or the usual army bread, which often is not baked sufficiently. The moment officers and men would be compelled to eat from the same rolling kitchen, some of the dissatisfaction would disappear at one stroke.

Another complaint coming to our ears is the different treatment of officers and men in the distribution of cigars, cigarettes, butter, etc. The officer always receives the better deal in this respect, despite his higher pay as compared to the men. The men cannot help feeling bitter when they see that they have to pay 3 or 4 times as much as the officers pay for a cigarette of the same quality. Similar conditions exist in regard to butter and lard. Officers are sending butter and lard home in large quantities. They pay about 2 1/2 marks a pound. The ordinary soldier has to pay 8 marks, in the Ukraine, even 16 to 18 marks. (Note: How can this be explained?) [Marginal]

Much complaint is also made about the poor quality and insufficient amount of rations at the front. The men compare it with the food in the line-of-communications zone, where

a great deal of buying and trading is done. Everybody lives well. On the other hand, the men at the front often suffer want, which is understandable, but which could be stopped in the majority of cases if an effort was made. No doubt, these and similar grievances, particularly the bad treatment, are to blame for the number of desertions of otherwise reliable people increasing daily.

Similar conditions exist in the exemptions. The situation has improved somewhat. At any rate one still hears of cases of individuals that can be spared but are exempted, especially in the higher positions. On the other hand, there are at the front heads of families with several children, whose gradual replacement by single men from home that are fit for front line service would be possible and would have a quieting effect. We are told that exemptions of dispensable men suitable for garrison duty in the interior would often cause inexplicable difficulties, although these men have not the least idea what they are supposed to be doing and are often employed at unproductive tasks, in order to kill time. But aside from this, there are too many men on detail in many places.

All this tends to increase still further the exasperation of the men which is already unbelievably high. We see in this situation a threat to the further development and existence of Germany. Whether the cause lies in the fact that the officials in charge often lack the proper touch with the lower strata of the population on whose continued resistance the existence of the country depends, we are unable to judge from here. Therefore, we desire to ask Your Excellency to consider our letter not as a complaint or anything of that sort, but merely as a purely confidential expression of opinion motivated by patriotism.

Very respectfully,

A. LEONHARDT,
Chairman of the German Foremen's Union.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Withdrawal of Fourth and Sixth Armies

Operations Section
No. 10000

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
August 26, 1918.

To: Group of Armies Gallwitz
Group of Armies German Crown Prince
Group of Armies Duke Albrecht

In view of the great expenditure of troops in the defensive battle of July of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince and the defensive battle still in progress in the sectors of the Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and Boehn, the Fourth and Sixth Armies for the sake of economy of force will be withdrawn by the 30th of this month approximately into the general line: WYTSCHAETE---in front of ARMENTIERES---west of La BASSEE, and the Second and Eighteenth Armies, in order to utilize the SOMME sector, into

the line: MONTAUBAN---FEUILLERES---FLAUCOURT---St-CHRIST---VOYENNES---LIBERMONT
---NOYON (winter position).

The movement of the last two armies will begin August 26, at first with the occupation of an intermediate position on the general line FOUCAUCOURT---ETALON---AMY.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Report

Suggestions for the Conduct of Defense

Operations Section
No. 2768

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 26, 1918---noon.

To the First Quartermaster General

I request that Your Excellency permit me to express my estimate of the situation on the west front in the following:

The unified command of the French---English---American offensive since July 18 and the rapid succession of enemy attacks warrant the conclusion that the enemy is seeking to gain a decision to end the war. Achieving a remarkable economy in forces and relentlessly using even mediocre and tired sector divisions, Marshal Foch has succeeded in maintaining until this day a powerful and fresh reserve of good divisions, enabling him to continue carrying out his grandiose plan of campaign involving distant objectives. Up to the present the conduct of operations indicates that these reserves are intended for employment in new large-scale surprise blows rather than in the immediate exploitation of a success. At any rate we can expect that the offensive will continue for some time and that new powerful attacks will be made against strategically or politically important sectors of the front.

It is necessary that we counteract the boldly outlined attack plan of the enemy with anticipatory measures of defense. What the enemy succeeded in achieving, it behooves us also to do, that is, to have an army at hand that is capable of striking a blow after the enemy's offensive has ended. If that can be achieved, the attack of the Entente has failed, and a basis for negotiations will perhaps be gained.

Steadily pursuing his aim, the enemy seeks to shatter our reserves. We can escape this threat only if we accept battle only where there is a favorable basis for the defense. If this prerequisite does not exist, a withdrawal will be effected by sector, according to a prepared plan, until the opportunity for a counterattack or for taking up the defense under favorable conditions offers itself, for example behind strong sectors. The enemy initiative forces us to resort to this method of conducting the defense. Its disadvantages cannot be ignored. A withdrawal is not without influence on the morale and will to resist of the troops. Therefore, wherever possible, every opportunity will be used to strike a blow at the recklessly pursuing enemy. Thus the troops will realize that the operation has been well planned, they will retain their feeling of confidence and superiority and transmit it to the people back home. There will be fewer losses than in a rigid defense. The proposed method of fighting imposes heavy demands, especially on the command. I am convinced that these demands will be met when the nature of a mobile

defense has been recognized everywhere and when we have again learned to seek and find the vulnerable spots of the enemy and exploit them rapidly.

The systematic withdrawal will continue to be an emergency expedient. Its preferred alternative, which must eventually be adopted, is a strong permanent position which provides favorable conditions for a lasting defense and offers an opportunity to constitute strong reserves while shortening the front considerably. This permanent position must be so far removed from the present battlefield that there will be sufficient space for a systematic withdrawal, even if the indecisive fighting continues for weeks.

The old line of departure of March 1918 will comply with these demands in general, after making a few local improvements. It also has the advantage that the destroyed terrain will be shifted to the enemy. An early decision must be made in the selection of the position, so that the mass of the labor forces can be put to work there without further delay, and the battle position and rear area can be organized to the greatest possible degree before winter sets in. Whether, to what extent, and when the permanent position will be occupied, will depend on the events.

In the First and Third Armies the opportunity for a withdrawal on a large scale is afforded by a deep organization of the combat zone all the way back to the H. B. A. [HUNDING---BRUNHILD---ARGONNE] Position.

Everything in the realm of the possible must be done to keep the morale and vigor of the troops on a high level (furlough, good and liberal rations, good shelters). Divisions that are really tired must be removed from the battlefield to rest areas as soon as units have been brought up to replace them. To employ them, after having been in battle, in organizing the position, with bad shelters and food, without any chance of physical and mental relaxation, lowers the ability to fight and enthusiasm, not to mention the fact

that time usually is also lost as far as the reconditioning of arms and equipment is concerned. In order to obtain reserves quickly, it often cannot be avoided that tired divisions are inserted on quiet fronts without any rest period to speak of. The depth of the disposition of the defense and the necessity - again pressing for attention - of expediting the organization of the position impose heavy demands upon the troops, in contrast to the past, even on quiet fronts. Therefore, in view of the present effective strengths, a rest for the troops even in a quiet position will only be possible, if the division sectors are of limited dimensions.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of the German
Empire and Prussia,
Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

Preservation of Fighting Strength of Primary Importance

Operations Section
No. 10008

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
August 27, 1918.

Reference: No. 2768, Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

I am grateful to the group of armies for the estimate of the situation submitted to me, in which I concur in general completely. In our operative and tactical methods of fighting, to be applied in all defensive battles, preservation of the fighting strength of the army must be given primary consideration. To be sure, I consider a withdrawal into the line of departure of last March - the SIEGFRIED Position - as the most extreme measure to which we may resort, considering our unfavorable replacement situation. In every withdrawal conserving our forces, we always must consider that the enemy will achieve at least a similar economy in forces, and that in view of his numerical superiority he will always be able to renew his attacks somewhere else. Furthermore it must be considered that our labor forces will not even suffice to restore our former position and that much will be left to be done by our troops even there. In my letter No. 10016 I also asked the Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and Boehn for an estimate of the organization of operative rear positions and will decide definitely on the large-scale plan of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince after receiving these estimates.

* * * * *

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

Necessity for Change in Defense Tactics

Operations Section
No. 6487

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 28, 1918.

G. H. Q. has issued the following communication:

In view of the mass tactics being employed by the French as well as the British during the present fighting, a comparatively weak force occupying the front line with strong reserves maintained close in rear has proved to be the most suitable procedure.

I consider it probable that if the French contemplate an attack against the First Army, they will execute this attack in combination with a similar one against the Seventh Army. Then, however, there is every indication that opposite the First Army he will execute the main attack from REIMS in a northern and northeastern directions. Needless to say, in this connection we must expect him to attack the southern front of the First Army as well. Thus at the present time the main effort of the defense in the sector of the First Army must be center in the REIMS Salient.

The following factors lead us to expect the enemy to attack the Seventh and First Armies:

1. Present situation
2. Several reports made by agents which speak of attacks east of SOISSONS, on the VESLE, near REIMS and in the CHAMPAGNE.

3. Strength and attitude of the enemy in front of the Seventh Army.

4. Transportation observed moving from the west in the direction of EPERNAY and CHALONS and concentrations of troops noted in the FORET de la MONTAGNE de REIMS.

In addition to agents' reports and deserters' statements the unusual slackening in our combat activity, officers reconnoitering, the increase in the noise of wagons at night and the prolongation of the nightly movements into the early morning hours enabled the enemy to have knowledge of the German July attack. The importance of observation of the enemy has already been pointed out. An increased amount of night reconnaissance by means of airplanes, balloons and patrols will be necessary in order to find out whether and on which front the enemy is concentrating.

The attack can be delivered along the entire front of the group of armies. However, we shall not be able to provide every portion of the front with sufficient power for defense. In addition to prompt recognition of the enemy development it is necessary that measures for the defense be determined upon everywhere and checked down to the last detail. We shall reap the full value of our deep outpost in the First and Third Armies, if the enemy does not know the location of the main line of resistance and if by being cautious in our preparations and reconnaissance we insure that after capture of the outpost the enemy, in his development for the main attack, is taken under fire by the mass of our artillery in such a manner that he is unable rapidly to continue the attack against the main line of resistance.

I request that particular attention be given to the organization of antitank defense of all arms in great depth.

A close check of the defensive measures taken by the artillery has disclosed that the artillery defense of boundaries does not always function properly. This fact must be thoroughly understood on all boundaries. Army commanders must satisfy themselves on the ground that the orders issued in this connection have been carried out.

With the situation as critical as it is, the counterattack divisions must as a general rule be quartered in mixed counterattack groups and instructed in such a manner that they can be depended upon to act swiftly and effectively.

I request that the possibility of rapidly shifting reserves, divisions, artillery and machine guns within the armies and from one army to another (also from the Third to the Fifth) receive thorough consideration and that suitable preparations to such effect be made.

In the event of movements of infantry troops by truck, the machine guns and antitank guns together with sufficient ammunition will, as a rule, be sent along on the trucks with the troops. Since the troops must give up their field kitchens for days at a time in such movements, they will receive an adequate issue of iron rations.

Orders have been issued for the construction of airdromes for the reception of reinforcements. I request that care also be taken that newly arriving aviation units find sufficient maps and airplane photographs on their arrival so that they may be able to enter combat at once.

I request a brief reaction to the opening sentence of this communication from Supreme Headquarters, especially as to whether trench systems organized in depth as in the First and Third Armies have any material influence on the proposed conduct of battle.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of the German
Empire and of Prussia.

Reference Your No. 6487

To the Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The question directed to the army by the group of armies as to whether trench systems organized in depth have any material influence on the conduct of battle proposed by Supreme Headquarters should be answered in the affirmative.

Even if the enemy has succeeded at any point in breaking through the zone of organized positions, in the same moment as we have done, the value of deep positions for the defense has not been lost on that account. On the contrary, the purely passive capacity of the defense for resistance is even now considerably increased by these positions in depth. It can be expected that even if the enemy succeeds in effecting a penetration, his advance will be substantially slower than in open terrain, especially when it is possible, by full utilization of the field fortifications, to involve the enemy in continuous fighting and to fall upon him immediately with powerful counterattacks. Occupation in heavy force is not necessary for this purpose, but distribution in depth of the troops designated to meet the first attack is essential. The rather narrow frontages of units in the front line take this into consideration.

Strong reserves (counterattack divisions) have lost none of their value but it is to be observed that coordination of their action is easily hampered by the trench system. The task of throwing back an enemy who has consolidated his position in a maze of trenches is more difficult than counterattack on open terrain. Therefore, it is most desirable not to permit the enemy to effect a penetration of any depth in the first place and for the front line divisions to drive him off before he can do so.

von MUDRA,
General of Infantry.

HS Ger. File: 803-32.13: Fldr. II: Army Order

Measures for Defense

Operations Section
No. 422

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The disposition in depth of our defense with its isolated machine guns and anti-tank centers as well as security detachments of rear positions entails the fact that smaller combat groups are repeatedly left to themselves. In order to keep these forces under strict control and supervision, they will be placed under the immediate charge of the commanders of the combat areas concerned, who will thus become responsible for their thorough instruction for combat and continuous functioning of routine operations.

Detached guns (antitank guns, close combat guns) will be attached to a battery located in the vicinity. It will be the duty of the battery commander to check these guns at least one daily or have someone else check them, in order to satisfy himself on the spot that the gun crews have proper orders and that the measures being taken by them are appropriate.

I direct that higher commanders in their inspections concern themselves particularly with these isolated combat groups and personally check the matter of their attachment and control.

2. If an attack is made by the enemy, all forces must be made available so that any enemy force which may have penetrated the position may be checked in rearward positions and strong points. The framework of this defense will be formed by the permanent security detachments. In order to reinforce them and to deepen the defensive zone, the personnel of the rolling kitchens, trains, and headquarters, which are indispensable in daily position warfare but are not included in the trench strength, will be assembled in groups prepared to take part in the defensive. In the moment of danger there is no time to do this. The men must be assigned previously their arms must be in order, and energetic commanders must be designated. To every one of these defense groups a definite mission will be assigned which will be practiced repeatedly. Such missions will primarily be: Defense of sections of trenches in the vicinity of the quarters, defense of edges of woods, villages, and creek crossings. As the experiences of recent battles have shown, villages are especially suitable to check tanks that have broken through. Accordingly, obstacles must be prepared and men designated to install them. Passages must be provided for our own troops and vehicles. It will increase the resistance and the confidence of these defensive groups considerably if they are equipped with a few light trench mortars. On alerting groups in the rear, they will go into action without further orders.

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von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

HS Ger. File. 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Report

Measures Taken by the Group of Armies

Operations Section
No. 2768 II [Addendum No. 1]

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 29, 1918--a.m.

Reference No. 10008, August 27, and No. 10016 of Supreme Headquarters

To Supreme Headquarters

[Extract]

The following plans have been made for the zone of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince:

1. The systematic GUDRUN movement, by sector or in one bound, from the combat zone occupied at present into the HUNDING-BRUNHILD Position and the ARGONNE switch position (H. B. A. Position). As far as the new combat front of the Seventh Army and the right

wing of the First Army as well as the change in the division of the groups of armies and armies require the former preparations to be altered, these alterations have been initiated.

2. The systematic GUDRUN I movement in one bound or by sector into the HUNDING Position, the SISSONNE-FAFNIR switch position and the ARGONNE switch position, and in conjunction with it the systematic GUDRUN II movement into the H. B. A. Position. Concerning the alteration of the preparations the statement made in Paragraph 1 also holds true.

3. The withdrawal by sector from one combat zone into the other as far as the last available tactical combat zone, thence as far as the H. B. A. Position (the latter based on the GUDRUN movement) in conformity with Report No. 2770 submitted to Supreme Headquarters. The withdrawal will be prepared by armies and will be limited laterally and in depth by order of this headquarters, in accordance with the width of the imminent enemy attack and the switch position available.

The combat front on the west wing of the group of armies, different from the way it was before, admits of more withdrawal movement than formerly contemplated. It is no longer necessary to adhere to the formerly necessary immediate withdrawal of the Seventh Army into the HUNDING Position by sector, unless the situation in the army adjacent on the west makes it imperative.

In order to complete the organization in depth of the sector of the First Army and particularly that of the Third Army, the organization of a new combat zone behind the RETOURNE sector from BRIENNE as far as VILLE-sur-RETOURNE, thence via VOUZIERS, establishing contact with the BRUNHILD Position, is desired. However, the organization cannot be carried out at present with the limited labor forces available.

On December 5, 1917 the Group of Armies German Crown Prince submitted to Supreme Headquarters under No. 2224 a plan for a new operative position in conjunction with the 4th SIEGFRIED Position and the reinforcement of the H. B. A. Position by a tactical combat zone in the rear. * * *. In Order No. 5618, December 12, 1917, Supreme Headquarters dismissed the plan of further organization behind the H. B. A. Position on account of the situation at that time. Whether and to what extent this earlier plan can be resumed in view of the present situation, the construction work necessary in other groups of armies, and the available labor forces, cannot be estimated by this headquarters.

By order:

Count SCHULENBURG,
Chief of Staff.

Continuation of Attacks Expected

Operations Foreign Armies Section
No. 10120

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMIES,
September 1, 1918.

THE SITUATION ON THE WEST FRONT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1918

1. General Data: The British have renewed their large-scale attacks daily, using a large amount of materiel and imposing heavy demands on the divisions in line. Nevertheless their forces are not yet exhausted. As has been ascertained so far, of the 61 divisions standing on the west front only 30 have been put in line in the full-scale battles since August 8. Consequently the British still have sufficient forces available to continue their attacks on a large scale.

Of the 105 divisions located in France the French have already had 87 divisions in battle between the SOMME and TAHURE since July 15. Of these divisions 13 participated in attacks in July as well as in August. The divisions standing on the active fronts are strained to the utmost. On the other hand, however, the French are economizing now in the employment of their reserves; numbers of their combat divisions have been resting for several weeks. Thus, while exploiting some of their forces to the greatest possible extent, they are apparently making an effort to constitute numerous fresh reserves from the rest. Consequently the French also have sufficient forces at their disposal to open new full-scale attacks.

Rumors of imminent attacks are being circulated on almost all fronts. According to the reports the enemy does not intend to allow the German front to become quiet. In addition to continuing the offensive in the former sectors, attacks are most likely to be made at present in the area LENS-SCARPE, on the AILETTE front and on the VESLE front as far as east of REIMS.

The nonparticipation of the Americans in the August battles is surprising. Although an explanation of this fact may be found in the great losses of the divisions engaged in July and in the necessity of training replacements, nevertheless it is not impossible that the American divisions are now held back in order to undertake an attack independently in the near future, under American command. The expected entry into line of the American army headquarters will indicate the sector of the front concerned. At this moment 13 divisions in reserve, trained at the front, are available, 6 of which have already participated in large-scale fighting. 9 additional divisions have been identified at the front at this time. Concerning 11 divisions assumed to be in France, we have no evidence.

The transportation of American troops to France has apparently diminished lately.

2. Details: Anglo-Belgian Front: The British attack front has extended northward as far as the SCARPE, as expected. Lately the main effort of the attacks was no longer made in the area of BAPAUME, but southeast of ARRAS. A continuation of the full-scale attacks with the main pressure on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, and possibly also north of the SOMME, can be expected. We must also reckon with the extension of the offensive to the sector north of the SCARPE as far as LENS.

Enemy attack intentions between YPRES and La BASSEE Canal are being confirmed by new reports. To what extent they will be affected by the withdrawal of the German front, remains to be seen.

The number of reserves has increased considerably by the taking over of a portion of the British front by the French, as well as by the release of divisions on the BAILLEUL-BETHUNE front.

The fact that no tired divisions have so far appeared on the quiet front indicates that attacks are intended here too.

The question of replacements to fill up units seems to have caused no difficulty so far.

According to agents' reports, an attack by British, Belgians, and Americans is also planned on the north half of the Belgian front. There are no indications pointing to such an attack. The reports may be based on false information circulated by the enemy.

French Front: By the transfer of an additional portion of the British front the French north flank has been extended as far as the AMIENS---St-QUENTIN Road.

Between this road and the OISE the enemy followed our withdrawal in general quickly and attempted to break through our canal position in powerful local attacks. These attacks can be expected to continue. Owing to the shortening of the front several French divisions have been released. On the OISE front the enemy made several attempts to cross. Major attacks do not seem to be planned there for the time being.

Between the AILETTE and the AISNE the enemy continued his full-scale attacks, employing masses of troops and numerous tanks. At the same time he succeeded in forcing back our divisions standing on the AILETTE. It is possible that he intends to gain positions of departure for the large-scale attack in the direction of CREPY reported by agents. Insertion of a division between SOISSONS and VAILLY indicates attack intentions also on the AISNE front.

Consequently further full-scale attacks must be expected on the entire front of the Ninth Army.

On the VESLE front an attack seems to be in preparation, which will probably be directed mainly against the FISMES-REIMS sector. There have been no definite indications so far pointing to an extension of this attack into the western part of CHAMPAGNE as far as the region of SUIPPES, as reported by agents. However it is still possible.

In the area of VERDUN the situation is still unclarified. Heavy traffic and changes in the troops garrisoning the front on the east bank of the MAAS demand special attention. Likewise the front between the MAAS and MOSELLE requires constant surveillance.

In LORRAINE the situation is unchanged.

The departure for the active fronts of all fresh French divisions which recently were released between the ARGONNEN and the VOSGES (the 34th, 35th, 59th, 64th, 65th and probably also the 31st and 32d) does not betoken attack intentions of the French in this area for the time being.

In the VOSGES the French divisions have been relieved by two divisions brought up from the fighting front after a rest of several weeks, and the American troops have been replaced upon completion of their training by new American divisions.

In the SUNDGAU the situation is unchanged. The reports concerning an intended American offensive on MUHLHAUSEN are increasing. Although the possibility of such an operation is not to be denied, nevertheless in view of the mass of reports received and their discussion even in the French press, and on the basis of previous experiences, the idea is not to be rejected that we are dealing here with deliberate misinformation.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

Instructions for Defense

Operations Section
No. 27

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 3, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The enemy continued his attacks against the Seventeenth Army and the Group of Armies Boehn during the last few days and is exerting pressure particularly against the Ninth army in vastly superior force.

Numerous splendid local successes were obtained in repulsing the enemy attacks. At other points we suffered reverses with losses, so that under the pressure of the enemy further withdrawals had to be executed and planned, to shorten the front and obtain troops.

Speaking from a general standpoint, the battle has not yet come to a standstill. Momentary lulls in the fighting must be looked upon as periods for the preparation of new attacks by the enemy and must be utilized by us with the greatest energy to strengthen defenses and to constitute reserves and fill them up with replacements.

2. In compliance with the difficult over-all situation of the German west army, the mission of the Seventh Army will continue to be to fight a defensive battle. This mission is more beset with trials than our majestic offensives, but nevertheless it must be assumed with all our energy and must be executed in such a manner that we not only ward off the enemy but inflict such losses upon him that his strength is broken and we come out victors. This guiding principle of the defense must permeate all measures. I request the generals by all their tactical leadership and orders, as well as by their influence on the troops, to use every opportunity, particularly in the immediate future, to harm and annihilate the enemy forces and his means, even if we have to be on the defensive and are forced to withdraw. To accomplish this result, attacks, surprise, and stratagem on any scale whatsoever, will have to supplement the defense still more than before.

3. In the withdrawal of the right half of the army to the rear of the AISNE the procedure used with success during the July battles will again be used to make the enemy recoil with bloody losses at the forward edge of the new defensive zone and initially to keep the artillery and infantry at the front strong for this purpose. This line is the AISNE Canal from the right flank of the army as far as north of REVILLON, then the (outpost) line REVILLON---woods east of COURLANDON---VESLE. On the other hand the back areas of the divisions must be disencumbered energetically by moving everything that can be spared further to the rear.

4. The distribution of our infantry must be moulded more and more fit the pattern of the enemy's new deployment. In so doing more and more artillery in particular will have to be placed behind the CHEMIN des DAMES, in order to facilitate the supply of the artillery remaining in front. The effectiveness of the artillery between the AILETTE and the CHEMIN des DAMES must be sought in batteries, which must be well munitioned, well served and very active, even though they may scarcely be sufficient in number. They must frequently be relieved or replaced. The rest of the artillery will go into positions in readiness near and on the hills north of the AILETTE for rest.

5. The enemy pressure must be expected first against the right flank of the army and against the ROMAIN switch position. Accordingly Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps and Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps must concentrate their reserves and artillery for effect on the right, Wichura's [VIII Reserve] Corps and Schmettow's [65th Army] Corps for effect against the front BARBONVAL-MAGNEUX.

* * * * *

7. Petersdorff's Corps must reckon with the necessity of establishing contact with the Ninth Army in the region east of MENNE-JEAN Farm by withdrawing its right wing considerably, thereby creating a defensive flank. The distribution of the artillery must take this into account. Looking into the future, Petersdorff's, Schoeler's, and Wichura's Corps must prepare for the contingency in later phases of the battle of establishing additional switch positions to the east between the CHEMIN des DAMES and AISNE. The right switch positions * * * will then have to be considered. They must be reconnoitered. The Group of Armies also wants to keep open the possibility of establishing a switch position from the AILETTE down to the REVILLON Switch Position. For this contingency only the line of the OISE-AISNE Canal and the edges of the hills east thereof can be considered.

8. Once the elements of the 50th Res. Div. and the 19th Inf. Div. are committed, the army has no further fresh counterattack troops and field artillery reserves at its disposal. Therefore when these divisions are engaged, 1/3 of each division will remain in army reserve. (Separate order to this effect will follow.) Furthermore the Corps will constitute corps reserves, particularly of field artillery, from their front line divisions. Finally the rest divisions of the army, now in the process of refitting, must at all times be ready to get orders smoothly and quickly to all their troops, alerting them for marching. * * *

9. The Corps will regulate the change of location of headquarters in such a manner that no two echelons in the chain of command will move at the same time. During the withdrawal movements commanders must be up front at their C. P.'s and with the troops. The new C. P.'s will be occupied by assistants. The higher headquarters will prepare their new quarters as far in advance and as carefully as possible, especially their communications, but they will not move into them until the last moment.

I recommend to the generals that during retrograde movements they appear rather frequently on horseback at important points of the road and control the movement.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

[The reference herein to the German Ninth Army deals with what was known to the Allies as the OISE-AISNE Operation. In the course of this operation, Ludendorff said, "Again we suffered heavy and irreplaceable losses - August 20 was another black day."]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

Definition of Combat Procedure

Operations Section
No. 10162

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 4, 1918.

According to communications I have received the following points in our combat procedure have not yet thoroughly permeated all ranks:

1. The infantry fights in close liaison with the artillery. Each infantry regiment must have its accompanying artillery.
2. The main line of resistance will be definitely held and not the outpost. If it is not possible for a great deal of terrain to be given up, one must be content with an outpost of little depth.

3. The troops garrisoning the line of resistance of the outpost will conduct themselves according to the principles governing the outguards. If the troops in the outpost are required to fight to the last, in view of our reduced combat strength and particularly in those cases where the outpost is deep, too many units will be scattered about in the outpost zone and strong resistance will not be offered at any point. [Marginal note "Well now!"]

4. The troops must hold their ground in and behind the main line of resistance. Here it is a matter of firing at a definite target without wasting ammunition and of determination to meet the enemy in close combat.

5. Local counterattacks will be executed only when there is a prospect of success. Frequently it will be better to limit the penetration and counterattack by fire only. The high command can seldom issue detailed orders for what should be done; in most cases on the contrary, this can only be determined at the actual scene.

6. Penetrations in the adjacent sector are still no reason for refusing a flank. Shoulders of breaches in the position will be held and flanks supported. The enveloping enemy is himself enveloped.

7. Intervention in details on the part of higher authorities does more harm than good. Higher authorities will assign combat missions in the same manner we learned in peacetimes; they will not command.

8. The report is of no consequence. Success in battle is what counts. Therefore, all means must be employed in the action. In their properly justifiable efforts to be well oriented, higher authorities must restrain themselves and have patience. They cannot know all details immediately. On the other hand, the reports must be absolutely reliable.

9. It must be emphasized again and again that good troops in full control of their commanders have, even despite the new weapons, proved themselves absolutely superior to the enemy. Therefore, rigid discipline and determination must be required of all troops.

LUDENDORFF.

[While Ludendorff has been canvassing his group and army commanders as to the best method of continuing the combat, General Pershing had gone ahead steadily with forming the American First Army and, in a conference at BOMBON on September 2, 1918, with Marshal Foch and General Petain, had definitely decided on the St-MIHIEL attack to be launched by the American First Army.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

FROM: Operations Section

AT: General Headquarters

DATE: September 8, 1918: 6:58 p. m.

TO: Group of Armies von Gallwitz

[Extract]

It has come to light that the results of an enemy attack with tanks, cavalry, or with combat planes are too startling to the men recently put in line. Neither are they accustomed to the overhead firing of their own artillery or to the bursting of hand grenades or artillery shells. I request therefore that it be made possible for the field recruit depots to practice with artillery and aviators. The recruits will be given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the explosion of hand grenades, mines and artillery projectiles from nearby located shelters; and depots will have dummy tanks and teach antitank defense; cavalry and tank attacks with captured materiel or with our own tanks will be demonstrated.

* * * * *

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. II: Order

Regulation of the Annihilation Fire, Etc.

Operations Section
No. 98/Sept.

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 8, 1918.

[Extract]

Supreme Headquarters has ordered the abolition of the former "barrage fire" as protective fire for the infantry in ordinary position warfare. This limits artillery defense to annihilation fire. Omission of the barrage, which is usually thin, full of gaps, and often not starting on time, does not represent an actual decrease in the defensive power of our infantry. The infantry must realize that it must repulse enemy attacks primarily by its own power and that in this task other arms can only lend their support. This support is provided by the artillery principally by the delivery of annihilation fire.

The regulation of annihilation fire requires careful instructions by the artillery commander and his subordinate commanders in close cooperation with the infantry. The zone of fire should not and cannot be free from gaps like that of the former barrage; rather it must be adapted to the customary actions and preparations of the enemy, based on our observations and reconnaissances of his approach and assembly, in conformity with the terrain features opposite our front; it must be concentrated at one point and thinned out at another, must cease entirely over some areas; it must be disposed in depth at some points and in width at other points and often it will fall in several lines one behind the other. It cannot be a rapid fire that has been set for weeks and always falls on the same areas.

In principle all batteries having observation will fire on the enemy forces they can see; furthermore, target areas must be established in front of the individual sectors for the batteries which have no observation into the suspected assembly areas, and for all batteries at night and in fog. All batteries will change from this unobserved fire to direct fire as soon as they are provided with observation. The distribution of fire along the entire front must remain an exception and will be opened only after it has been established that the attack involves the entire front. As a rule, annihilation fire will be a concentration on local points.

In depth the annihilation fire will be disposed in three zones in accordance with our tactical scheme of defense, as follows:

- (a) Assembly area of the enemy in front of our outpost zone.

* * * * *

- (b) Area immediately facing our outpost zone.

* * * * *

- (c) Area immediately facing our main line of resistance.

* * * * *

As to lateral direction of fire, the annihilation fire is divided into division and regimental sectors in such a manner that until the observed fire is opened, the division under attack will be supported by the adjacent divisions, but within the division, if the situation has been sufficiently clarified, the annihilation fire will be concentrated in front of the regimental sector under attack.

* * * * *

By order;

REINHARDT,
Colonel, Chief of Staff.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

Organizing Strong Defensive Position

Operations Section
No. 6574

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
September 8, 1918.

To the Ninth Army

The fighting and movements of the last few weeks have imposed especially heavy demands on commanders and troops. Now after fresh forces have been brought up to the army, it is primarily a matter of tightly organizing the defense in the strong positions of the army and of getting it well in hand. My permission is necessary for systematic withdrawal movements or shortenings of the front. Commanders who lose their positions will be held to account.

According to prisoners' statements, in the most recent fighting the enemy losses were slight. This shows that the artillery and machine guns was not adequately effective everywhere. Therefore, I request that the artillery defense be organized and observation in depth be provided without delay and checked on the ground in every detail by officers of the higher headquarters. Every opportunity for delivery of flanking fires will be utilized. Complete control of the numerous draws to the front by means of artillery and machine guns

is necessary in order to catch the enemy attack while it is still in the stage of development.

Known assembly areas, particularly the draws to our front, and known battery positions will be systematically and generously gassed.

I request that anticipatory measures be adopted to ensure a regular flow of ammunition to the troops. A few fresh batteries with ample amounts of ammunition, good observation and close liaison with the infantry will accomplish far more than a large number of tired batteries lacking men and horses to fulfill their missions.

Therefore, I request that tired units be withdrawn from the front and placed in rest billets. If relief and exchange can not take place, with the forces at the disposal of the army, I request that appropriate recommendations be directed to the Group of Armies.

If troops are to measure up to the rigorous demands made on them, they must go into battle fresh. I request everything possible be done to avoid unnecessary shifting of reserves. It is the responsibility of higher command to place the reserves in readiness behind the threatened fronts in such manner that they can enter action promptly without becoming prematurely tired. Urgent warning should be given against any splitting up of units. Finally, I refer to my Telegram No. 6138 of July 22, in which I have expressed myself in detail concerning the employment of the reserves:

Corps commanders, in particular must keep building up strong reserves for themselves and assemble them in deeply disposed counter-attack groups with artillery. I emphatically caution against too hasty employment of reserves. Determination and coolness at every headquarters is, above all, the basic condition in defense. Experience has taught that in defensive battle reports require doubly careful checking. If, on the basis of unconfirmed reports, whole divisions are put in march and thrown into battle, our reserves will not last long. Commitment of army reserves should not be considered until the corps report that their reserves are engaged and they are incapable of parrying the blow. It is entirely inadmissible to shift or commit reserves of higher authority or of Supreme Command without prior request. Furthermore, I still invite attention to the necessity for the strict organization traffic control and caution in radio communication.

I request that the foregoing be communicated to the corps commanders.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of the German
Empire and of Prussia.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Report

Situation on the West Front on September 8, 1918

Operations Foreign Armies Section

No. 10225

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
September 8, 1918.

In FLANDERS, south of YPRES, 2 British divisions have been relieved by Americans. In the area east of BAILLEUL a reinforcement of the enemy front was noted, which apparently did not take place until it became known that our front had moved back.

The number of fresh divisions in reserve was decreased by 4 divisions which were moved to the main battlefield. There are no new clues pointing to the presence of French forces. A systematic large-scale attack in FLANDERS and on the Belgian front is little likely at present, although agents' reports again indicate such an attack. On the other hand local fighting developed owing to the withdrawal of our front; this can be expected to continue.

Between the SCARPE and the OISE the British and French advanced on the whole only slowly after the withdrawal of our front and were checked by our rearguards. Only on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI and BAPAUME-CAMBRAI Roads are the British already standing in heavy force opposite our new position.

The distribution of forces and further intentions of the enemy still need clarification. It can be expected that the British will continue the offensive in the direction of CAMBRAI and also south of the SOMME after bringing up their artillery and replacing the tanks, and that farther south as far as the OISE, the British and French will try to contain our forces by strong local attacks.

Several reports have been received indicating the extension of the British attacks to the front north of the SCARPE as far as the La BASSEE Canal. We must continue to reckon with attacks here.

Very heavy demands are still being made upon the British forces on the fighting front. Of the divisions engaged between the SCARPE and the south flank since August 8 none was moved away. Divisions in need of rest are being pulled back into the 2d line for a short time, filled up with replacements and put into line again. The men are told that they must remain in front line until the SIEGFRIED Position has been reached.

Between the OISE and the AISNE the French continued their heavy attacks supported by numerous tanks. Against our new front further attacks on a large-scale are also possible, the main effort of which will probably be made north of the AISNE and on both sides of the AILETTE in the direction of LAON.

On the AISNE front the enemy pursued cautiously. There are no clues so far as to what the enemy will do next. On the other hand various reports and identifications point to an attack in the area on both sides of REIMS and in western CHAMPAGNE.

The occupation of the front in the VERDUN Salient has been clarified. No reinforcement of the front has taken place here. Increased railroad traffic and a more vigorous traffic on the roads, gradual enlargement of the ammunition dumps, construction of new airdromes west of the MEUSE in connection with special indications opposite the front on both sides of the MOSELLE (see below) demand very special attention on the WOEVRE front on the east bank of the MEUSE.

In the VOSGES the front has been occupied rather heavily by French divisions in some force. On the other hand the number of Americans located at the front has diminished.

Concerning the intentions of the Americans we have no clear picture at present. The reports concerning American attacks planned on both sides of the MOSELLE and in the SUNDGAU are on the increase. We also have several other clues concerning the former. Preparations are probably being made at both points. Which plan is carried out will probably depend on circumstances. It is quite probable that the Entente, in view of the successes it has won, will make an effort to carry the war into German territory. Therefore it is also necessary to watch the LORRAINE front constantly, although there is nothing pointing to any intention to attack in that territory so far.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

Estimate of Situation just Preceding St-Mihiel Attack

Operations Section
No. 226

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
September 11, 1918.

To: General Headquarters

I desire to submit the following estimate of the situation:

From numerous indications and reports it is apparent that an enemy attack, mainly American, is imminent against the south front of Composite Army C; lately such an attack also appears to be shaping against its west front. Such an operation seems highly probable in view of the general situation.

After the withdrawal and restabilizing of our main battle fronts the enemy high command may very well say that we are using every effort to rebuild and increase our strength and there still is considerable work ahead of them on our west front, for which the remainder of the season would hardly be sufficient. But even if there were enough time, the way via the front LILLE---CAMBRAI---St-QUENTIN---LAON and across the different rivers and lines of fortifications of Belgium would decidedly be a rather long one, before the Entente could get the war out of its own country and would be able to do any great damage to us. This way would have to be fought by the Entente with fighting over devastated French territory and a Belgium in ruins. Therefore it is obvious that the enemy will attempt to find a vulnerable point, not only of our front but of our country, which can be reached more easily and quickly. Such an opportunity would be offered by invading LORRAINE against the Nineteenth Army. The enemy would be on coveted soil which he wants to liberate, he would threaten one of our most important lines of communication, as well as the SAAR coal and industrial region. Moreover a sally from the region of VERDUN offers the prospect of paralyzing our utilization of the BRIEY Basin and would likewise endanger one of our most important lines of communication. The two operations combined, enveloping METZ, would drive a wedge into our country which would not only be effective, but which also would seriously influence the conduct of the fighting on the northwest front, in a manner that would prove to be less expensive to the enemy than an attack on that front. Marshal Foch can make available the forces needed for this operation by using the ever-increasing number of Americans and by employing his reserves in such a manner that the English front would continue to be supported by him, but only weakly and more as a diversion.

Regardless of whether the enemy chooses one front or the other for the breakthrough, or both of them, in any event our triangular St-MIHIEL front would represent the first inconvenience to be gotten out of the way and it also would represent the first object of attack promising success. To speak bluntly, the defects inherent in the triangular salient of Composite Army C invite attack. Its evacuation before a large-scale attack is necessary and has been initiated. This triangle having been eliminated, with or without a fight, the enemy would find himself in front of a line more in our favor, but he would have greater freedom of movement than before. He would be in a position to carry out his attacks.

On the left flank the Michel Position is of a nature lending itself to defense but here too it presents a salient. In the center the situation is passable. The right flank, approaching the heights of the MEUSE and at times uncomfortably close to them, represents a weakness, the same as the left flank of the Fifth Army. To hold the position at that particular point for any length of time will be possible only by making

considerable sacrifices. A suitable rearward position for Composite Army C is lacking. It must be expected that the enemy will effect a breakthrough in the region of ETAIN. Here the defense cannot be conducted in a rigid manner but must be active in the fullest sense of the word. As I see it, the defense should be organized by holding in readiness in rear of the left flank of the Fifth Army and the right flank of Composite Army C, powerful attack elements; these would not execute any frontal counterattacks but would fall upon the flanks of the hostile penetration, which should even be led into the trap. This would not only assist the defense but would also result in a rather considerable tactical and moral success.

Therefore I consider it a probability to be deduced from the general situation that the large-scale battles on the west will soon be followed by events of equal, perhaps decisive, importance on the fields of LORRAINE. Now, it may be objected that the gates of invasion have been open to the enemy for a long time, without his using them. But heretofore the enemy had no forces available for this purpose. Now he can afford such a large-scale assault, without inadmissibly stripping the English-French front; neither the channel coast nor PARIS is being threatened at present. Furthermore Marshal Foch seems to me to be skillful enough to turn away from an objective that is growing more difficult to gain, before it is too late, and to attack the enemy at a weaker spot.

I desire to submit these remarks with the request that they be examined from the standpoint of your better-informed judgement, and if they are found to contain any material meriting consideration, that they be taken into account at the proper time in the assignment of troops. In this connection may I invite attention to the fact that among the front line divisions of this Group of Armies, there is a rather large number of divisions not completely fit for front line employment, and that those recently attached were entirely exhausted.

von GALLWITZ.

[The coming St-MIHIEL and MEUSE-ARGONNE attacks begin to take shape in the German military minds.]

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Fldr. II: Inquiry and Reply

Number of American Troops Identified on West Front

GERMAN SECRETARY OF WAR,
September [12?], 1918.

No. 10096/18

To Chief of Staff of the Field Army

[Extract]

Is it permissible to use the report of the Foreign Armies Section of September 8, 1918, concerning the number of American divisions identified in and behind the west front, when dealing with the Reichstag? * * *

Foreign Armies Section
No. 16792

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 12, 1918.

I have no objections.

von RAUCH.

No. 10290

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 12, 1918.

To Secretary of War

Reference: No. 10096/18

In reference to the inquiry whether in dealing with the Reichstag, use may be made of the report concerning the number of the American divisions identified on the west front, no objection is made. (Foreign Armies Section, September 8, 1918).

Foreign Armies Section
No. 16792

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 15, 1918---4:30 p. m.

To Secretary of War

Reference: No. 10096/18

According to the status of September 15, there are 35 American divisions in Europe, 13 of them inserted in the front and 22 in reserve. In the report of the Foreign Armies Section of September 8 only the reserves standing behind the front on that day were contained.

Results of Defensive Battles

Operations Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
September 14, 1918.

No. 9960

Report No. 107

(Reports from August 8 until September 11, 1918)

[Extract]

I. The West

A. The defensive battles between ARRAS and SOISSONS

1. Until the Withdrawal of the Eighteenth Army (August 8 to morning of August 10):

The second big offensive of the Entente on the western front beginning the morning of August 8 had a similar objective as the operation between the AISNE and the MARNE. This time the object was to envelop from two sides and to cut off the salient driven forward by the German troops last March toward MONTDIDIER. For this purpose the Generalissimo opened his attack on the west side between the AVRE and the ANCRE, which was to be followed two days later by an attack from the southwest between MONTDIDIER and the OISE. As the battle developed, the operation was extended beyond the exterior flanks to the fronts of our Ninth and Seventeenth Armies.

The chief mission was assigned to the tank arm, which seemed to have proved its value in the earlier fighting. The industries of the Allied countries had been taxed to the utmost to perfect and increase production of this weapon. The tactics of the tank battalions had been further improved. They were employed by concentrating tank forces opposite especially selected stretches of front and forcing a breakthrough of our positions there. If the maneuver was successful, the tanks fanned out to the right and left and took our batteries and reserves in flank. The result for us was to be a quick elimination of our communications and means for the transmittal of orders.

The tanks communicated with each other by flag signals and with the higher command by carrier pigeons. Closely behind the tank battalions followed strong mounted cavalry, which gained ground to the front with the greatest speed after a breakthrough of our positions had been effected. The enemy infantry followed them and got into the action more slowly.

The very fact of the employment of cavalry and the distant objectives assigned to it made it apparent that the entire August offensive of the Entente had a distant objective from the beginning. In addition to this, the best attack divisions, Canadians and Australians, were employed. And finally prisoners' statements and captured documents showed that the attacks of the Allies were to reach at least the south-north course of the SOMME between HAM and PERONNE in one bound, that is, they apparently were designed to annihilate our Eighteenth and Second Armies.

The attack on the west, launched after a heavy burst of fire at about 5:15 a. m., August 8, met initial success. Since the artillery preparation was brief and the tanks were able to orient themselves according to the compass, the heavy fog which was artificial to some extent, favored the attacker. The disadvantage of the tanks, their large

target surface, disappeared under those circumstances, and the tanks popped up suddenly within very close range of our infantry, then in the flank and rear of our batteries.

The chief points of penetration apparently were on the AMIENS---St-QUENTIN---ROMAIN Road and farther south in the direction of HARBONNIERES. British cavalry gained ground here at a fast gait and penetrated FOUCAUCOURT where it was either overwhelmed or repulsed.

Farther south the enemy pushed forward almost in one bound as far as VAUVILLERS-ROSIERES. Tank squadrons wheeling south across the LUCE cut off our troops fighting at DEMUIN and south thereof. Only some elements, particularly on the left wing of the Second Army, were able to hold their positions to some extent until evening.

However in the early afternoon our first counterattack opened from the direction of VRELY, which threw the British back to within 1 km. southeast of CAIX. North of the SOMME, MORLANCOURT was recaptured by German battalions.

In the evening our troops were fighting on the line MORLANCOURT---CHIPILLY---west edge of VAUVILLERS---west edge of ROSIERES---HANGEST. The British-French blow had struck our Second Army and the right wing of the Eighteenth Army; adjacent elements of the Eighteenth Army conforming were forced to withdraw.

In the morning of August 9 the Allies stopped their advance opposite the greatest part of the front of our Second Army. Only local fighting took place. However they launched a rather heavy attack against the interior flanks of our 51st and III Corps, in the course of which they succeeded in penetrating Le QUESNEL and HANGEST.

At the same time, following a barrage directed against our IX and I Res. Corps, an attack was made southwest of ASSAIN-VILLERS, which forced our outpost troops back to that place.

In the afternoon the British continued their attack with tanks, infantry and low-flying planes against the entire front of the Second Army from MORLANCOURT as far as the AVRE. Our troops were forced back as far as the region east of MORLANCOURT---west edge of PROYART---east of MEHARICOURT---east of ROUVROY---east of SAULCHOY.

During the night August 9/10 we withdrew our divisions north of the SOMME into the line MEAULTE-ETINEHEM.

At the same time the measures were carried out which were to counteract the effect of the large-scale attack imminent against the front of the Eighteenth Army.

The Bavarian I Corps, which assumed the command in the zone of action of the III Corps, placed its main forces in a position of readiness on the line FONCHETTE---FRESNOY---VILLERS-les-ROYE behind the troops fighting in front. At the same time the other corps of the Eighteenth Army withdrew with the mass of their divisions into the line VILLERS-les-ROYE---POPINCOURT---GURY---DRESLINCOURT, while rearguards remained in the line ETELFAY---ORVILLERS---MAREST. The sector lying in front of this line was evacuated completely. * * *

2. The Enemy Pursuit (August 10 to August 15): Opposite the Second Army again on August 10 the picture disclosed was characteristic of an offensive, which has come to a standstill after a temporary initial success and is now making an effort to gain additional ground in bitter fighting accompanied by heavy losses in killed and wounded. North of the SOMME a whole series of enemy attacks collapsed, until the British succeeded in forcing us back as far as the west edge of BRAY in the evening.

South of the SOMME fighting was in progress throughout the day between RAINECOURT and LIHONS. RAINECOURT fell into the hands of the enemy but was retaken by our troops. Northeast of MEHARICOURT all British efforts were frustrated, however, south thereof the enemy succeeded in advancing with his tanks as far as HALLU and capturing the town of HALLU itself. But his attempt, in accordance with his tactics, to fan out with his tanks from the narrow breach to the north and south in order to get in rear of our firmly holding fronts, as on August 8, was thwarted. One tank squadron after the other was destroyed by our gun fire, and our counter-attack launched from the northeast from the direction of CHAULNES against the flank of the penetration drove the British back to CHILLY.

In the morning of August 10, after a powerful artillery preparation, the enemy attacked the Eighteenth Army between ANTHEUIL and MONTDIDIER. With tanks and infantry he penetrated our positions and found them abandoned. The immense expenditure in men and machines proved to be a thrust into the air which disintegrated in our artillery fire. Only a few elements reached our line ETELFAY---ORVILLERS---MAREST and were shattered by our rearguards.

The withdrawal of the Eighteenth Army was a complete success.

Not before the afternoon was the enemy able to concentrate his forces for fresh attacks. But they too did not strike a continuous organized position but our rearguards which gave way slowly after a stiff resistance.

The Bavarian I Corps withdrew on Le QUESNOY---GUERBIGNY. Several enemy attacks at PARVILLIERS remained unsuccessful. In conjunction with the Bavarian I Corps the other rearguards of the Eighteenth Army were standing in the evening of the 10th west of l'ECHELLE, at the west edge of MARQUIVILLERS, at GRIVILLERS, BUS, La BERLIERE and RICQUEBOURG.

The following days, from August 11 to 15, brought only local actions north of the SOMME, most of which ended successfully for us. South of the SOMME the Second Army fought actions at PROYART and LIHONS on August 11 in which the final issue remained uncertain. The enemy took RAINECOURT and advanced beyond LIHONS, but a counterattack drove him back. The following days, until August 15, no important actions took place, including the forces of the Second Army standing south of the SOMME.

In the course of August 11 the enemy exerted sharp pressure against the Eighteenth Army and executed heavy attacks throughout the day until late at night, the focal points of which were l'ECHELLE and TILLOLOY. The right wing of the army together with the Second Army recaptured HALLU. The enemy's success was purely insignificant; in the evening the Eighteenth Army had the line FOUQUESCOURT---VILLERS-les-ROYE---TILLOLOY---DRESLINCOURT firmly in its possession.

On August 12 there were no special events in the Bavarian I and the IX Corps, with the exception of local actions which ended in our favor. The other corps were engaged in more violent fighting, but the enemy was unable to report anything but temporary local successes.

In the evening of August 12 General von Boehn assumed command of the Second, Eighteenth, and Ninth Armies.

On August 13 we withdrew the interior flanks of the XXVI and XVIII Res. Corps into a position at the base of the salient on the line south edge of CANNY---south edge of BELVAL---south of l'ECOUVILLON. Within the next few days, until August 15, the enemy repeated his attacks with great tenacity but with no success at PARVILLERS, DAMERY, DAMCOURT, POPINCOURT, PLESSIS de ROYE, BELVAL and l'ECOUVILLON.

3. The Defensive Battle of the Eighteenth Army. (August 16 to noon, August 18): While the combat activity opposite the front of the Second Army decreased from day to day, the enemy had assembled his forces for a systematic, coordinated, full-scale attack against the new line of the Eighteenth Army. This attack, which was launched August 16 and the main pressure of which was directed against the entire fronts of the Bavarian I, and the IX and I Res. Corps on both sides of ROYE, was a failure. The defensive battle this day ended with a complete success for German arms.

Attacking again and again until the late evening hours, following a very powerful artillery preparation in each instance, the enemy attempted to break through our lines, employing infantry disposed in depth, swept on by tanks and low-flying planes. Despite the reckless use of men these attempts came to naught. In bitter fighting the main line of resistance was held or regained everywhere. FRESNOY and GOYENCOURT, which were lost temporarily, were regained by a counterattack, only a small portion of GOYENCOURT remaining in the hands of the enemy.

The fighting continued into the night, but all efforts of the enemy were shattered against our determined resistance.

On August 17 the great battle broke up into local actions as usual, the attacker refused to comprehend that he had failed, but insisted on driving his decimated battalions again and again against the German front. By a tank attack the left flank of the Bavarian I Corps was forced back slightly in the direction of ROYE. In the face of our counter-attacks the enemy was unable to maintain a small penetration at BEUVRAIGNES. From that day on the ruins of the village of TILLOLOY were called upon again and again to witness the successful German resistance.

The two left flank corps of the Eighteenth Army also fought successfully throughout the day. Enemy forces merely succeeded in penetrating CANNY.

On August 18 the attacks of the enemy continued to break up into sporadic thrusts. The Second Army repulsed an attack at HERLEVILLE; the troops of the Eighteenth Army fought courageously and successfully at St-MARD, BEUVRAIGNES and CANNY.

4. Extension of the Attacks to the Ninth Army (August 18 noon to August 20): While local actions were still raging in the Eighteenth Army, heavy enemy artillery fire opened in the afternoon of August 18 on the front of the Ninth Army between the OISE and the AISNE. When the infantry attack was made at 7 p. m., large portions of our combat zone lay under artificial fog. The enemy penetrated our outpost zone and established a foothold in front of our main line of resistance and at some points even in that line.

During the course of August 19 the French nests of resistance which had sprung up in our main line of resistance were mopped up. However, at the same time the enemy succeeded in assembling in our former outpost zone for a fresh attack. In the afternoon, after an artillery preparation, he attacked between CARLEPONT and NOUVRON. He was repulsed south of CARLEPONT, but a portion of NAMPEL and all of MORSAIN fell into his hands.

On August 20 the French executed their main attack. After an increase in the fire to the greatest intensity, their infantry advanced about 7 a. m. behind their tank battalions between the OISE and AISNE. The right flank and center of the VII Corps withstood the assault, the left flank of the Bavarian III Corps yielded. The enemy forces advanced on the hills of LOMBRAY and via BLERANCOURDELLE, where reserves checked them. Farther east the enemy pushed forward via AUDIGINCOURT and TARTIERS; tanks reached BIEUXY. A boldly executed counterattack drove him out of BIEUXY and VEZAPONIN. In the evening our troops in the line CAMELIN---BLERANCOURDELLE---Road Junction 160 south of St-AUBIN---VEZAPONIN---LAVAL. The left flank of the VII Corps had been refused appropriately in order to maintain contact at CAMELIN.

In the Second Army only insignificant fighting took place on August 19 and 20, however the Eighteenth Army as well as the Ninth Army had been heavily engaged. On August 19 there were some bitter struggles between CRAPEAUMESNIL and the OISE from early morning until late in the evening. By nightfall the enemy had been forced to give up the few advantages he had been able to wrest locally throughout the day. On August 20 the French resumed their attacks with remarkable tenacity. The battle raged from the AVRE to the OISE. Again the attacker remained unsuccessful.

However, in view of the events in the Ninth Army the decision had been made to withdraw the left of the Eighteenth Army and the right of the Ninth Army. The movements were carried out during the night August 20/21. The line occupied by us in the morning of August 21, north of LASSIGNY---south of NOYON---north of VARESNES---east of CUTS, passing through VEZAPONIN toward POMMIERS * * *

5. Extension of the Attacks to the Seventeenth Army and the Action until Occupation of the SOMME-NOYON Position Was Effected. (August 21 to August 29): In the morning of August 21 a sudden artillery attack opened against our outpost troops of the Seventeenth Army located between MOYENNEVILLE and HAMEL. Infantry and tank attacks followed on the entire front, before which our front line battalions withdrew to a rear position, as ordered. 10 British divisions, 4 tank battalions and 1 co. of light tanks (whippets) penetrated the terrain abandoned by us, and under the fire of our batteries, pushed forward through the evacuated zone and hurled themselves against our machine guns on the MOYENNEVILLE-COURCELLES Railroad and on the ANCRE. Weak elements gaining ground

via COURCELLES and ACHIET-le-PETIT were annihilated, some remnants being driven back. Attempts of the British to effect further progress by local attacks continued until evening. They remained without result.

The first assault had been checked without the necessity for any of our reserves to intervene. August 21 was a successful day for the command and troops of the Seventeenth Army.

In the Second Army quiet prevailed on August 21. In the Eighteenth Army the enemy followed our withdrawn divisions only cautiously, but in the Ninth Army the battle continued, particularly on the fronts of the Bavarian III and the XXXVIII Res. Corps.

Between CAMELIN and BLERANCOURT the French broke through our lines in the direction of BESME; at MORSAIN, TARTIERS, and VAUXREZIS the indecisive fighting finally ended in our favor in the evening. During the night August 21/22 our troops withdrew to the line of the OISE as far as the confluence of the AILETTE---AILETTE as far as PONT-St-MARD---BAGNEUX---PASLY---the AISNE.

On August 22 the Seventeenth Army met the continuation of the British attack by a counterattack executed on a broad front. The result was that the enemy's thrust was made ineffectual after violent fighting, which centered around ACHIET-le-PETIT.

On the same day the enemy also resumed his operations against our Second Army. His advance north of the SOMME was checked in the line ALBERT---BECOURT---RECORDEL---BRAY. The enemy pressed against the south corps of the Eighteenth Army and took EVICOURT and PASSEL. Counterattacks threw him out of both villages. The enemy also exerted pressure against the Ninth Army; local attacks collapsed before and in our lines.

August 23 and 24 brought heavy attacks of fresh superior forces against our Seventeenth and Second Armies.

After a very powerful barrage in the early afternoon of August 23 infantry forces, tanks and low-flying planes debouched against our XVIII Corps and XIV Res. Corps. Our front lines were driven back to the east edge of ERVILLERS, beyond BIHUCOURT and to MIRAUMONT. On August 24 the British renewed their attack. We held the villages of MORY, BEHAGNIES and SAPIGNIES, but lost BIEFVILLERS and GREVILLERS. Farther south our troops were pressed back to the line WARLENCOURT---COUCELETTE---POZIERES.

In the Second Army the enemy established a foothold on August 23 east of ALBERT. South of the SOMME the XI Corps withdrew on CHUIGNES-HERLEVILLE. On the ROMAIN Road and at HERLEVILLE the violent fighting continued until night. The enemy had only insignificant local successes. On August 24 the 54th Corps repulsed 6 attacks, then in conjunction with the Seventeenth Army, shifted its defense into the line CONTALMAISON-FRICOURT. When the enemy advanced to a new attack in the afternoon against BAZENTIN and CONTALMAISON, a German division, whose strength had been severely weakened by the earlier fighting, threw itself against the enemy forces in a bold assault, repulsed them and captured the ruins of POZIERES.

On the front of the Eighteenth Army August 23 and 24 passed with outpost fighting. The Ninth Army had to withstand rather heavy attacks, but succeeded in repulsing all.

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Beginning at 6 a. m., August 25, a new full-scale attack was launched against the Seventeenth Army. Our lines west of FAVREUIL, west of BAPAUME and west of LIGNY-THILLOY were held against all assault, however our own counterattack at FAVREUIL had only temporary success. On the boundary of the Seventeenth and Second Armies MARTINPUICH was retaken by us in a counter-attack. Enemy attacks on both sides of the SOMME were only partially successful. In the Eighteenth Army August 25 passed without special event. In the Ninth Army elements of the XXXVIII Res. Corps moved to the attack via PONT-St-MARD and CRECY-au-MONT. At some points the attack collided with an enemy thrust which was broken up by it. Fighting on PASLY KOPF ended successfully for us.

On August 26 the enemy began to exert his main pressure against the north half of the Seventeenth Army; he was able to gain some successes here during the next few days, employing considerable forces of tanks and infantry. The new attacks, which were executed with extraordinary stubbornness astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road but also extended to the north bank of the SCARPE, at first led to a violent struggle on August 26 for MONCHY and GUEMAPPE. The east edge of both towns was held by us. At BAPAUME attacks of the British were shattered.

The 54th Corps of the Second Army also was heavily engaged on August 26. MONTAUBAN was lost and regained. In the Eighteenth Army, attacks collapsed opposite the Bavarian I Corps; only in FRESNOY did the enemy effect a penetration. On the front of the Ninth Army only minor fighting took place.

A few days earlier General von Boehn had ordered a further withdrawal of his Second and Eighteenth Armies to economize in forces and provide a more favorable terrain for the defense. This withdrawal was to be effected in two bounds: During the night August 26/27 a line running from FOUCAUCOURT via HYENCOURT---RETHONVILLERS---CHAMPIEN---east of CRAPEAUMESNIL was to be occupied as intermediate position and one of the following nights the withdrawal to the SOMME-NOYON Position was to be effected.

On August 27 the enemy renewed his attacks against the Seventeenth Army and the north corps of the Second Army. Again the main effort struck on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, where our troops were pressed back by superior forces beyond PELVES and CHERISY. North of the SCARPE, on both sides of BAPAUME and north of the SOMME we held our line.

South of the SOMME and in the Eighteenth Army the withdrawal into the intermediate position was successful; the enemy pursued only cautiously. The movement was ordered to be continued the following night into the line HARDECOURT---FEUILLERES---FLAUCOURT---St-CHRIST---line of the SOMME---NOYON. The bridgehead thus formed southwest of PERONNE was to be held for the time being. On August 27 no special events took place on the front of the Ninth Army.

On August 28 the British continued their offensive southeast of ARRAS with great violence. Despite the heavy fighting, continued into the night, the results obtained by the enemy were out of proportion to the cost to him. The Seventeenth Army was forced back slightly at BOIRY NOTRE DAME and REMY; the Second Army lost HARDECOURT. For the night August 28/29 the withdrawal of the interior flanks of the Seventeenth and Second Armies was ordered to the line: region east of BAPAUME---Le TRANSLOY---bridgehead southwest of PERONNE. The remaining elements of the Second Army and the Eighteenth Army were able to move into the new position without interference from the enemy. The two east corps of the Ninth Army repulsed several heavy attacks on August 28. Particularly at CHAVIGNY and PASLY the enemy suffered heavy losses in his futile assaults.

On August 29 the enemy launched his next full-scale attack astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, continuing without interruption the offensive initiated here August 26. RIENCOURT was lost but was regained in a counter-attack advancing beyond BULLECOURT. The enemy pressed forward against the south wing of the Seventeenth Army and against the Second Army and penetrated the bridgehead southwest of PERONNE. Our troops effected an orderly evacuation of the bridgehead.

Opposite the Eighteenth Army violent outpost fighting took place, in which we were generally able to keep the upper hand.

August 29 was extremely hard for the divisions of the Ninth Army. The attacks repeated by the enemy throughout the day collapsed after a bitter struggle. Prisoners of a great number of French and American divisions attested to the extraordinarily high losses of the defeated enemy.

The line held by us in the morning of August 30 is shown in the annex. [not available]

6. The Battle between ARRAS and SOISSONS until the Withdrawal into the SIEGFRIED position (August 30 to September 2, 1918): In the four days from August 30 until September 2 the enemy attacked on the entire almost 150 km. broad front between ARRAS and SOISSONS in uninterrupted assaults. Again and again he threw new divisions and tank

battalions into the gigantic battle, which he turned into an attempt to effect a breakthrough of the greatest possible dimensions. He was unable to accomplish his purpose. When our front, which had been affected unfavorably by several local penetrations, could no longer be held without severe losses, it was withdrawn by Supreme Headquarters into a shorter and better position which was well organized to a great extent.

Marshal Foch made his main effort on the flanks of the attack, against our Seventeenth and Ninth Armies. On August 30 the British, French and Americans attacked from the SCARPE as far as BAPAUME, on both sides of COMBLES, from St-CHRIST as far as the OISE, and from FOLEMBRAY as far as PASLY. Northeast and east of BAPAUME they succeeded in the evening, after very heavy indecisive fighting, in gaining a foothold in the ruins of RIENCOURT, FREMINCOURT and RANCOURT. At COMBLES and farther south as far as the OISE, they were repulsed; at FOLEMBRAY they were able to gain a local success after a bitter struggle; northeast of PASLY they suffered a severe defeat from our stubborn resistance.

The battle continued on August 31 without a pause. Between the SCARPE and COMBLES the enemy made only little progress. The village site of ECOUST was fought for with unparalleled tenacity. Southeast of COMBLES the town of BOUCHAVESNES, famous from the battle of the SOMME now recognizable only by a few cellar openings amidst the desolate waste of shell-craters, was lost and regained by us. Between the SOMME and the OISE the enemy offensive collapsed on a broad front. On the AILETTE the enemy succeeded only at COUCY-le-CHATEAU and CREPY-au-MONT in holding captured terrain. During the night we withdrew behind the BETHANCOURT---TERNY-SORNY Road.

On September 1 the British battalions attacking between the SCARPE and south of BAPAUME were chased back or annihilated on the entire front, unable to retain any of their gains. North of the SOMME we had to abandon MORVAL and BOUCHAVESNES, and enemy forces also penetrated MONT-St-QUENTIN and PERONNE. Opposite the Eighteenth Army quiet prevailed in the morning. In the afternoon the battle continued with undiminished intensity, but the attacker made no progress. In the region of COUCY-le-CHATEAU the enemy was able to extend his local success of yesterday; he also made some insignificant progress north of SOISSONS.

On September 2 the British brought up fresh forces against the front of the Seventeenth Army. Between ETAING and ECOUST alone they put 10 divisions in line. Here they broke through as far as DURY-CAGNICOURT. North of the SOMME we were forced back as far as SAILLY and MOISLAINS. Along the SOMME and south as far as the OISE the enemy was unsuccessful, but a large-scale attack debouching between PIERREMANDE and the AISNE penetrated our lines in several places. At COUCY-le-CHATEAU we withdrew to the line AUFFRIQUE-JUMENCOURT Canal Bridge northeast of BETHANCOURT. TERNY-SORNY was evacuated by us.

At noon September 2, Supreme Headquarters issued the order that the Seventeenth Army was to be withdrawn the following night into the line SAILLY---ARLEUX---MARQUION---HAVRINCOURT, and that the Second Army was to refuse its right north of PERONNE correspondingly. During the night September 3/4 the Second and Eighteenth Armies were to occupy the line NURLU---HAM---CHAUNY, in order to withdraw into the SIEGFRIED Position a few nights later. The Ninth Army was to arrange its movement accordingly, while the Seventh Army was to withdraw its right wing behind the AISNE.

7. The Withdrawal into the SIEGFRIED Position (September 3 to 11, 1918): The withdrawal of the Seventeenth Army and the right of the Second Army into the line ARLEUX---MARQUION---HAVRINCOURT---PERONNE was effected by morning of September 3 without interference from the enemy. On September 3 the enemy artillery fire continued to fall on our old positions for a long time, then the British began to advance cautiously, often caught in our fire. With these days DOUAI began to lie under heavy enemy fire, apparently also sealing the doom of this French town.

In the Eighteenth and Ninth Armies there was only local fighting without special results on September 3.

During the night September 3/4 the Second and Eighteenth Armies withdrew as prescribed into the line NURLU---HAM---CHAUNY. The enemy did not notice the movement and advanced slowly in the course of September 4 against our rear guards, who had remained opposite him.

During the night September 3/4 the right wing of the Seventh Army also withdrew behind the AISNE, without pursuit from the enemy.

Opposite the Seventeenth Army the enemy also advanced only slowly against our new positions on September 4; the portion of our front which was facing south between SAILLY and ARLEUX had frequent opportunity for flanking fire. British detachments of some force were annihilated north of BARALLE; outpost fighting resulted in no successes for the enemy.

Opposite the Ninth Army only local fights took place in the morning of September 4. In the afternoon a heavy attack carried forward between the AILETTE and the AISNE against the XXXIX Res. Corps was completely repulsed. The new positions of the Seventh Army were not reached by the enemy on September 4.

During the night September 4/5 the rearguards of the Eighteenth Army were withdrawn to the outpost of the NURLU---HAM---CHAUNY Position, the Ninth Army into the CHAUNY---BARISIS---VAUXAILLON Position east of CONDE.

September 5 resulted only in outpost fighting for the Seventeenth, Second, Eighteenth, Ninth and Seventh Armies.

During the night September 5/6 the Second Army withdrew into the SIEGFRIED Position: HAVRINCOURT---northwest of St-QUENTIN, as planned, and the Eighteenth Army initially into the line EAULAINCOURT---FLUQUIERES---CROZAT Canal. Rearguards remained behind everywhere.

The following days, September 6 to 10, the Seventeenth Army reported only fighting by patrols and outposts. In the afternoon of September 11 an enemy attack was repulsed between SAINS-les-MARQUION and TRESCAULT.

During these days the rearguards of the Second Army withdrew slowly before the pressure of the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him wherever possible. In the evening of September 6 they were standing in the line METZ-en-COUTURE---HEUDICOURT---GUYENCOURT---ROISEL---BERNES---POEUILLY---east of GUALAINCOURT; in the evening of September 7, in the line HEUDICOURT hills---St-EMILIE---TEMPLEUX---VENDELLES---VERMAND. On September 8, 9, 10 and 11 they fought in the outpost of the SIEGFRIED Position.

The Eighteenth Army occupied the SIEGFRIED Position HOLNON---La FERRE by the morning of September 7, while rearguards remained behind on the CROZAT Canal and north thereof. On the evening of September 7 the enemy advanced across the canal at TUGNY and St-SIMON. After offering resistance on September 8, our rear guards withdrew during the night September 8/9 to the line ATTILLY---SAVY---FONTAINE-les-CLERCS---hills west of ESSIGNY-le-GRAND---east edge of Ly FONTAINE---south edge of VENDEUIL. From September 9 to 11 they fought mostly in the outpost of the SIEGFRIED Position.

During the night September 6/7 the Ninth Army refused its right to the SIEGFRIED Position at La FERRE. On September 7 and 8 it repulsed violent local attacks by the French. On September 9 the right flank corps, the command of which had been assumed by the XIV Corps, was transferred to the Eighteenth Army, the remainder of the Ninth Army to the Group of Armies German Crown Prince. On September 9, 10 and 11 the army, particularly the XXXIX Res. Corps, repulsed heavy local attacks.

From September 6 on, the enemy gradually worked his way forward against the new fronts of the Seventh Army. On September 7, 8 and 9 he executed heavy attacks against the right wing of the army; these were shattered against the resistance of the brave defenders.

This terminated the phase of an operation in which our troops, resisting tenaciously and defending every step of ground, had frustrated the big aim of an enemy offense mounted on a very broad scale. Even if we did have to abandon the territory gained in March, thereby suffering losses in prisoners and equipment, particularly during the first few days, nevertheless when the operation was terminated, we found ourselves in a favorable

position, while the enemy was forced to assemble his troops for new battles in an area that had been devastated beyond recognition.

B. Other Events on the Western Front

1. The Fourth and Sixth Armies: Combat activity on the front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was vigorous during all the past weeks. To economize in forces and improve the positions, we ordered and executed in the course of time the systematic evacuation of all salients and angles.

On August 18 the enemy attacked the interior flanks of the Fourth and Sixth Armies on a rather broad front between BAILLEUL and VIEUX BERQUIN, gaining only insignificant local successes. The evacuation of the salient at MERVILLE was effected by us, as planned.

On August 19 the Fourth Army repulsed an enemy attack east of MERCKEM, and in the evening local attacks against the left wing of the army. At MERVILLE the British shelled on our abandoned positions and slowly forced back our rearguards, who were causing losses to them, back to the new outpost.

On August 20 unnoticed by the enemy we withdrew our lines on the interior flanks of the Fourth and Sixth Armies slightly. On August 21 the enemy felt his way forward and ran into the fire of our rearguards. On the same day a British attack on both sides of KEMMEL collapsed.

On August 22 and 23 the Sixth Army repulsed enemy thrusts, and on August 24 the Fourth Army an attack at BAILLEUL. On August 27 the British attempted to advance astride the BOESINGHE-STADEN Road; they were driven back.

From the evening of August 28 until the morning of August 30 the southern divisions of the Fourth Army and the northern divisions of the Sixth Army withdrew in two bounds to the straight line: region east of VOORMEZELE---WYTSCHAETE---LYSBOGEN---west of ARMENTIERES---VIOLAINES. The movement which had been prepared long in advance and very carefully, was completely successful and was not noticed by the enemy.

Not until a few days had elapsed did the enemy gradually follow up our rearguards which had remained behind. He was checked everywhere and had to resort to costly attacks. In the afternoon of August 31 he succeeded in occupying KEMMEL; until September 6 some elements of our rearguards were still fighting forward of the new outpost. Violent fighting was still taking place in our new outpost as late as Sept. 11. It all ended without success but with heavy losses for the enemy and yielded us a considerable number of prisoners.

2. Group of Armies German Crown Prince: In the evening of August 10 the enemy succeeded opposite the Seventh Army in crossing the VESLE west of FISMES, after many futile attempts. A further advance was checked on August 11. The enemy lay in a narrow bridgehead under our annihilation fire until August 12 and was driven back across the river on that date.

In the Third and First Armies outpost fighting took place on those days, which ended successfully for us.

On August 14 the Seventh Army fought successful patrol actions and was able to effect an advance on August 22 between BAZOCHES and FISMES. Several hundred Americans were taken prisoner. On August 25 and 27 the Seventh Army repulsed enemy reconnaissance patrols, and on August 27 the Third Army did likewise.

From August 28 until September 3 numerous other patrol actions were reported by the Seventh Army; during the night September 3/4 the right wing of the army withdrew behind the AISNE.

During the first week of September the successfully executed patrol fights increased also in the sector of the First Army.

3. Groups of Armies von Gallwitz and Duke Albrecht: On August 9 Landwehr troops of Army Detachment C brought in prisoners.

The Group of Armies Duke Albrecht was extremely successful in minor actions, as usual. Enemy attacks were repulsed or ran into territory that had been intentionally

evacuated by us. Our raids yielded the desired prisoners. The elastic conduct of defense resulted in numerous successes in minor actions.

* * * * *

[The date given above show that pressure is being put on German forces by two attacks the OISE-AISNE Operation in which the American 28th, 32d, and 77th Divisions and the 370th Infantry Regiment were engaged along with French units, and the SOMME Offensive, under British command, in which the American 27th and 30th Divisions were engaged.]

HS Ger. File: 803-32.13: Fldr. II: Order

Proposal to Enter Peace Negotiations

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
September 15, 1918.

No. 10296

The Austro-Hungarian Government has proposed to all belligerents to dispatch delegates to conferences to be held in a neutral country, where nonbinding negotiations to bring about peace may be held. No interruption will take place in the conduct of the war as a result thereof.

Our readiness for peace is not inconsistent with the spirit in which we are conducting the war for our country.

As early as December, 1916, the Kaiser, our Supreme War Lord, with his Allies, made a peace offer to our enemies. Since then the German Government repeatedly has manifested readiness to make peace. The reply from the enemy camp was sneers and scorn. The enemy governments continued to whip up their peoples and their armies to carry on their war of extermination against Germany, and so we continued our defensive battle.

Now our ally has made a new proposal to enter into negotiations: but the war is not to be interrupted by them.

Consequently, for our armies it is imperative to keep fighting.

The German army, which after 4 victorious war years, is vigorously shielding our country, must prove to the enemy that we are not to be conquered. Only in this manner can we help to break the enemy's will to annihilate. As we fight we must wait and see whether the enemy's intentions are honorable, in case he is ready to engage in peace negotiations this time, or whether he will again reject peace with us, or we are to purchase this peace on terms which will destroy the future of our people.

Steps will be taken to assure that these thoughts become the common property of the army and that they stay with all.

von HINDENBURG.

[von Hindenburg is careful to omit any mention of President Wilson's fourteen points of open covenants openly arrived at, submitted on January 8, 1918.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Report

Situation on the West Front on September 15, 1918

Operations Foreign Armies Section

No. 10316

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
September 15, 1918.

1. British-Belgian Front: On the former battle front south of the SCARPE the British resumed their attacks. Their objective may have been improvement of their positions of departure for further attacks, as the preparations for a new large-scale battle had not been completed, according to reports received.

We have to reckon with a new general offensive between the SCARPE and the OMIGNON as the most likely operation of the British. The front has been strengthened by reliefs. A considerable number of divisions has been withdrawn after the recent large-scale attacks. Their whereabouts is still undetermined. But it must be assumed that they are resting in the rear area and are receiving replacements. Nothing is known about the appearance of fresh divisions.

It can be expected that the British Third Army will continue to make the main effort in a fresh enemy attack. The situation in the rearward communications of the enemy will be the decisive factor in this connection. However, the shifting of forces to the zone of the British Fourth Army indicates that here too, attacks are planned.

Numerous reports have again been received concerning attacks on the rest of the British front. A clear picture cannot yet be gained. The possibility still exists that a new attack front will be built up north of the SCARPE. From the reports, agents, and statements of prisoners the region of the La BASSEE Canal demands special attention.

One division has been taken out of the line without replacement between the La BASSEE Canal and the LYS, and another north of the LYS. There are no indications pointing to large-scale attacks in this region. Agents' reports speak of an enveloping attack on LILLE and extension of the offensive as far as the coast in conjunction with attacks by the fleet and landing parties. We must reckon with attacks executed to contain the German forces on this portion of the front.

The whereabouts of the American divisions formerly standing on the British front is unclarified. Rumors are current that the Americans will participate in the next British offensive. However, their employment is not very probable in view of the American attacks on the French front.

2. French Front: Combat activity between St-QUENTIN and the OISE has diminished. Several divisions have been taken out of the line without replacement, but the front is still held comparatively densely. So far we have no clues pointing to the major attack on the HAM--St-QUENTIN Road predicted by an agent to be made. However, thrusts in the region of St-QUENTIN are possible.

No change in the situation between the OISE and the AILETTE.

Between the AILETTE and the AISNE the French resumed their offensive on September 14 as anticipated. At the same time they attacked between the AISNE and the VESLE. These attacks can be expected to continue. According to agents' reports, prisoners' statements

and reliable observations, their extension beyond REIMS and as far as west CHAMPAGNE, remains possible.

Between the MAAS and the MOSELLE the Americans executed their first attack under their own command on September 12. The American First Army was in charge; French divisions were attached to it. Indications of the attack had increased the last few days preceding it. The withdrawal of our front had been planned. However it was effected more rapidly than intended and caused us considerable losses. The enemy advanced in general cautiously against the new positions; only directly west of the MOSELLE he is pressing forward more vigorously. A continuation of the attacks can be expected, also their extension toward the north as far as the region of ORNES as well as toward the east across the MOSELLE, to capture the hills east of VITTONVILLE-CHAMPEY. So far 8 American divisions have been identified in the fighting.

On the LORRAINE front and in the VOSGES no indications have been noted that attacks are imminent. However, it is possible that the enemy is making preparations there for an attack intended for later. This front therefore requires constant surveillance.

Additional reports have been received concerning the offensive to be expected in the SUNDGAU. Most of the indications point to the THANN-ALTKIRCH sector. An attack is always possible here. Several American and French divisions are suspected to be behind the front.

The number of the French divisions in reserve has increased owing to the relief without replacement of a few divisions north of the OISE. About 20 of these divisions can be described as fresh and ready for offensive employment.

The Americans still have a reserve of about 10 divisions available, which have been in line before. In addition to these, 11 other American divisions are assumed to be in France. Their whereabouts is unknown to us, but some may have been trained previously on quiet fronts.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

[German Intelligence evidently did not have a very good line on American participation in the SOMME Offensive. Ludendorff states identification of eight American divisions for the St-MIHIEL attack; on the line and in reserve there was a total of 14 American divisions.]

Rise in Enemy Morale

Foreign Armies Section
No. 36047 P. IV

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 15, 1918.

Retrospect and Estimate of the Situation

I

Western Front.

When on September 12 the French and Americans directed heavy attacks between the MOSELLE and the MAAS against the sharp angle of the St-MIHIEL Salient, the withdrawal of the troops into a short line at the base of the salient was executed in accordance with previously prepared places.

The enemy will doubtlessly still continued his attacks this fall. The flow of American forces and the mass employment of tanks will make it possible for him to do so. For our part, there will be no continuation of the tactics of conducting the battle for the purpose of gaining terrain, but rather in accordance with the principle of allowing the attacker to wear himself out, we will preserve the combat effectiveness of our army.

Morale in France and England has risen since the pressure of the German offensive has been taken off and has been further puffed out by the successes at the front.

In France, however, there is decided indignation against drafting the class of 1920. It is not understood that this measure was necessary despite the arrival of the Americans. The fact that the Americans have gained prominence in all spheres is irritating. France and England are increasingly more conscious of being vassals of America. In order not to yield the glory of the expected defeat of the central powers to the Americans next year and with it the controlling voice during the peace negotiations and in all European questions, it is obvious that they will attempt to seek a decision before the year is out.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. IIa: Order

Operations Section
No. 6690

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
September 17, 1918.

To the Commanding Generals of the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Armies

Again and again complaints from the front are reaching me that the infantrymen either fails to use his arms entirely or used them only insufficiently and relies on the auxiliary arms and the artillery.

I request that all commanders be instructed rigorously and at every opportunity to insist that this behavior of the infantry, which cannot be condemned too severely, be stopped once for all. Training in marksmanship, combat discipline and instruction provide

us with an infantry which does not need to shrink from any superiority. Every individual must know that a few guns, handled skillfully and on time, so far have always checked an enemy attack, even one executed by superior forces, and that many of our recent failures must be attributed to the fact that the infantry did not fire. The enemy fears nothing more than an infantry that fires well. I request that the company commanders and their immediate superiors who do not do everything in their power to remedy this most deplorable situation and are willing to assume responsibility for every single man, be reprimanded in the most severe manner.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of the German
Empire and Prussia Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Letter

Doc. No. 3

Section for Foreign Armies
No. 17 181

GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
September 19, 1918.

In reply to Ia of Sept. 18, 1918

Subject: Information about American army

The intention of the Americans to use their new army against Germany has not been doubted. Reports as to organization and recruiting gave always a sufficiently comprehensive picture of the development of the army. Until the spring of 1918, the Americans accomplished somewhat less than we had expected. After May 1918, however, the troops transported quickly caught up with the schedule. The increase in the number of troops transported per month has surprised us. The exploitation possibility of American, English, and neutral tonnage for troop transports has been underestimated. More was expected from the effects of U-boat warfare.

The evaluation of the American efforts and accomplishments has been made known from time to time to the various military authorities by this section through the information bulletins entitled "Reports about the Army of the United States of North America." The American assistance was estimated in these reports as follows:

At the time of entrance of the United States into the war, the army was estimated as having about 250,000 men (7,000 officers, 125,000 men of the Regular Army, 125,000 men of the National Guard).

As to the further development of the army, the following was stated on April 5, 1917:

According to all indications an increase and a reorganization of the United States Army is to be expected. This should take considerable time. There is no lack of men. The procurement of materials will be in view of the very well developed war industries, comparatively simple. The main difficulty will be in the lack of the instructor personnel.

In July 1917, a survey was made of the new organization of the American army, as well as of the mobilization and the execution of the draft laws. The military accomplishments of the United States to be expected up to the end of 1917 were estimated on July 25 as follows:

Parts of the regular army have been transported already as an especially organized expeditionary force to France. During the first part of June,

General Pershing arrived there with his staff as Commander-in-Chief. The first troops organized as units landed end of June. Already troops of all arms are supposed to have arrived. More transports are being expected.

For the time being the regular army will be able to furnish only a limited number of trained troops for the expeditionary force, due to the fact that it must provide to a great extent the nuclei and the training personnel for the numerous new organizations. Since the National Guard and the new army require a rather long period of time for their organization, training and equipping the mass of these troops will not be ready for transportation before the beginning of 1918. The number of troops that will then be transported will depend upon the shipping available.

It may be, therefore, expected that this year the United States will be able to transport to the theater of war only an expeditionary force of one to two divisions. In addition, a rather large number of special and labor troops may be expected.

An especially strong aid by furnishing aviators has been promised the Entente.

It can be assumed that up to this time there is not more than one division in France, and that its field equipment is not complete. The debarkation has taken place in several ports of France and also in England. St-NAZAIRE may be considered as the principal port. Large camps and depots are supposed to be there.

The expeditionary force still needs training. This will take place at first in camps and later on quiet fronts. American troops, when they first appear at the front, will have to be considered of the same value as new English divisions.

This estimate turned out to be essentially correct.

On December 11, 1917, the possibility of an increase of the American army in France until the spring 1918 was estimated as follows:

In France only the presence of the 1st Regular Army Division has been definitely established. Its units are at the front for training purposes. It has not as yet been employed as a division. Its participation in an attack during the winter is possible.

According to the latest reports it may be assumed that a short time ago the 26th and 42d (National Guard) Divisions started landing in France. American troops are supposedly also training in England. Altogether the total strength of American troops transported to Europe may have been increased to about 75,000 men.

The 26th and 42d Divisions are not expected at the front for the time being. They still need training. Until spring 1918, they need not be taken into consideration as suitable for offensive operations.

America is supposed to have obligated itself to send until the Spring of 1918, an army of 450,000 men to France. It is possible that the Entente has again urgently requested the aid of America at the PARIS conference. The large-scale preparations being made by Americans (camp and railway construction, improvement of harbors, building of factories) indicate that strong American reinforcements are expected.

The transportation and the supply of American troops depends on the shipping available. A larger number than 450,000 men is hardly to be expected because of the lack of shipping. The mass of this army cannot be fit to participate in offensive operations in the spring of 1918. Therefore, the value of American troops at first will be in relieving English-French divisions on quiet fronts.

At the same time in the "Estimate of the Military Situation of the Entente in the Winter 1917/18," the following was stated about the United States:

The United States are about to organize an army of about 50 divisions. So far only three divisions have been landed in France, one of which has been sent to the front for training. The other two still require considerable training behind the front.

Until spring 1918, the American forces can attain a strength of about 15 divisions. The majority of these divisions will be suitable only for employment on quiet fronts. Only the three divisions now in France may be expected to participate in a spring offensive.

The officers are not trained for the conditions of the great war. An independent employment of larger American units in difficult situation is, therefore, for the time being quite out of question.

Replacement, armament and equipment of American troops are good. Training is still deficient. However, the first organization placed into the front lines fought well during a German attack. It must be expected, therefore, that the American soldier after further training and war experience will become a worthy opponent.

According to the above, the Americans, until the spring of 1918, have been rather overestimated than underestimated. At the beginning of the German offensive, the expeditionary force had not reached the expected strength of 15 divisions. The total number of troops landed in France until March (incl.) was only 370,000 men (instead 450,000).

At the urgent request of the Entente, America from April 1918 on, increased the monthly transports considerably. In an announcement of the American Secretary of War in July 1918, the following figures were given:

1917	May	1,780	men
	June	12,261	"
	July	12,968	"
	August	18,383	"
	September	32,523	"
	October	38,259	"
	November	23,016	"
	December	48,340	"
1918	January	46,776	men
	February	48,227	"
	March	83,811	"
	April	117,212	"
	May	224,335	"
	June	276,372	"

The number of troops transported from May 1918 on was not immediately perceived or believed. Considering our previous experiences, these reports could not be taken for granted. That they were true was believed only after identifications were obtained and definitely confirmed. Since most of the newly arrived troops were held for training purposes far behind the front, reports of them were at first very few and were obtained only considerable time after their arrival.

The Americans announced openly by radio from time to time the number of troops transported to Europe. The announcements were, therefore, taken as propaganda and considered false. Previous experiences justified that assumption.

Also the views here as to shipping tonnage necessary for large troop movements made the great numbers of troops transported appear unbelievable. As a matter of fact, the Americans made better use of the interned neutral tonnage and the rebuilt German ships

than was estimated. Besides, as we heard later, England, by limiting its own requirements, handled with its own shipping two-thirds of the troop transports. Also this was not considered possible nor taken into account. America did not transport completely equipped troop units. Armament, vehicles, guns and horses, and to some extent also other war materials, were furnished by the Entente in France. In such manner, it is possible to increase the troop carrying capacity of ships considerably.

The production capacity of the war industries of the Entente was apparently greater than could have been expected considering our own heavy losses in materials.

A comprehensive estimate of the American aid was made the first part of July [following this document].

Since that time the following figures have been ascertained:

Until the first part of September, a total of 3,000,000 have been enlisted in the American army.

According to official American announcements 1,600,000 were shipped to Europe.

In France 35 divisions have been identified.

In America, since the 1st of July, 15 new divisions have been organized.

Accordingly, there are here still another 23 divisions.

In accordance with the new draft laws, which extend compulsory military service to all men of the age between 18 and 45, America is able to enroll several more millions of recruits.

[The German begins to admit that he has miscalculated the weight of American aid.]

Doc. No. 4

Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army
Section for Foreign Armies
No. 12,522

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
July 2, 1918.

Report No. 15

About the Army of the United States of America

American Troop Transports to Europe

Prior to the entrance of the United States into the war, there were already in the service of the Entente about 1,500 Americans. They were in the air service, in the service of supplies or hospital units.

End of June 1917, the first troops of the expeditionary force were landed. Up to fall, they had reached a strength of about 40,000 men. From these troops the 1st Division was organized. This division appeared at the front the end of October.

According to information from reliable agents, America obligated itself to send to France, until the first part of April 1918, a total of 450,000 to 500,000 men. Of these, two divisions (the 26th and 42d) of the newly organized National Guard arrived by the end of 1917. There arrived also several separate regiments from which was formed the 2d Division.

Under the assumption that the United States would live up to the promises made, the American aid to the Entente, until the spring of 1918, was estimated at approximately 15

divisions. * * * In addition, the arrival of numerous service of supply and labor troops had to be taken into account.

At the beginning of the German offensive the expected strength of American troops had not been reached. France and England were disappointed. At the urgent request of the Entente the United States accelerated the shipment of troops considerably. At this time 7 to 8 American divisions are at the front. One other division has been withdrawn from the front and is now in the rear area. In addition, 9 to 10 other divisions are supposed to be in Europe. They are still training. Accordingly, it must be assumed that a total of about 18 divisions is in Europe.

A steady increase of American forces is to be expected. In the United States there are still another 26 divisions. The government intends to transport all of them in the course of this year.

The determination of America to place its whole power into the service of the war is not to be doubted.

Nothing is yet known about the organization of additional new divisions at home. However, that must be taken into account. Enrollments of recruits have taken place in April and May. They are supposed to be continued on a large scale. Thus there will be no lack of men for replacements and new organizations.

The possibility of transporting 26 divisions this year and the necessary supplies for the American army depends on the shipping tonnage available. Judging by the American achievements in transportation during the past several months, the solution of the transportation problem is not impossible. In May and June each, at least 4 divisions have been landed in Europe. In addition, great masses of materials and provisions for the army have been shipped. Moreover some of the shipping still supplies England, France, and Italy with food. A temporary increase in troop transports is quite possible, should after the harvest, the shipment of food supplies to Europe be suspended.

The interruption of transports by U-boat warfare had to date no decisive effect. [A tribute to our convoy system.]

The combat value of the American divisions, considering their still limited war experience and insufficient training, is as a whole good. On the defensive, even the greenest troops are worthy opponents. The American soldier is courageous, strong, and clever. Casualties are not feared. The leadership, however, is not yet up to mark. When in action as larger independent units, the Americans will not be able to dispense with French guidance for the time being.

In estimating the combat value of Americans, it must not be overlooked that the troops, which until now appeared at the front, must be considered "crack troops" (elite). Whether the divisions which will arrive later, will be of equal value, remains to be seen. [The 77th Division, identified a short time ago, showed a decidedly poor morale and an inferior esprit. From its deficient training the conclusion must be drawn that it was sent to the front too soon.]

Remarkable, even among the good American troops, is the indifference as to the aims of the war. They know not for what they fight. After they serve for some length of time at the front, it may be quite possible, therefore, that they will become less eager to fight.

Weakness of Main Line of Resistance

FROM: Ludendorff

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: September 20, 1918 HOUR: 8:20 p. m. No. 10391

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The Supreme Headquarters liaison officer with the Second Army states his tactical theory, with which I agree, as follows:

I am convinced that many of the recent failures are due to the fact that the main line of resistance is held too weakly as a result of a schematic distribution of the regiments into front line, support and reserve battalions - thus the employment of battalions one behind the other without considering the width of the sector, effective strengths, the enemy's methods of attack and especially the state of the morale of the troops. This distribution, which has frequently proven sound in earlier experiences is, in most instances, ordered by higher authority, which also designates the lines, located one behind the other, for the individual battalions. The practice of holding the position with too weak a force leads to failure not only because the material means employed is inadequate but also because it deprives our people of confidence in being able to repulse a strong attack. The poorer the morale of the troops, the easier it is for this fateful feeling to arise. Unfortunately, however, the morale has suffered a considerable decline. When a company with an effective strength of 50-60 men, as is commonly the case, has 300 meters and more to occupy, and must, in addition, push sentries to the front and hold out a group for counter-attack for the company commander, this feeling arises very easily and is the reason for the failure of the company. Furthermore, in such wide sectors the company commander does not have his scattered men in hand, which is more important today than formerly.

The method of attack now frequently used by the enemy - brief artillery preparation and a sudden mass attack allows and demands, in contrast to former practice, a comparatively strong occupation of the main line of resistance.

Sufficient machine guns and rifles must be held in the front line to bring about the demoralization of the enemy before he effects any penetration. Often the sector will be held more securely if 2 battalions are placed in front line and 1 battalion is in reserve than if 3 battalions are placed one behind the other.

There are also some misgivings about the outpost, especially if it is held too strongly. Line officers can be heard giving expression to these ideas everywhere nowadays. They say that by occupying the outpost too strongly, an artificial situation is created which leads men to desert. The withdrawing outpost garrison easily carries the weak garrison of the main line of resistance back with it. Furthermore, the distribution in depth of the machine guns is frequently overdone and often leads to a dispersion. Moreover, the troops must be under the control of their officers in order not to fail in time of stress. Therefore, it is necessary that they be held together.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

LUDENDORFF.

[Note] This order will not be transmitted to the armies.

[Allied tactics were definitely upsetting German, pre-conceived ideas of battle.]

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Report

Americans in a Major Operation

Doc. No. 9

Chief of the General Staff
of the Field Army

Section for Foreign Armies
17504

Rec. Sept. 25, 1918, left...

Intelligence Officer at G. H. Q.
with Headquarters of Army Unit C

September 22, 1918.

J. No. 3538/18

(On Sept. 12, 1918 against Army Unit C)

At least 9 American and 3 French divisions participated in the attack of September 12 under the command of General Pershing.

It is not known how many divisions were in reserve.

Of the above 9 divisions were:

- 3 (1st, 2d, 42d) excellent attack divisions;
- 2 (4th, 26th) good combat divisions, which have stood the test in major operations in other parts of the front;
- 3 (5th, 89th, 90th) divisions, which were in the trenches either in front of Army Unit C for the first time or which had occupied front lines in other sectors without fighting;
- 1 (34th) division, which followed in reserve and had never been in the front lines before.

The attack was preceded by an excellent 4-hour artillery preparation with some trench mortar fire. The batteries were very well adjusted not only on the front line trenches, but also especially well on routes of approach and rear dugouts.

During fire intervals, the enemy pushed forward strong officers' patrols, to which were attached light machine guns.

The infantry attack followed immediately behind the last rolling barrage, very rapidly and deeply echeloned with an extraordinarily large mass of troops.

The attack hit the west front of the line CHAMPLON---south of SEUZY along a front 15 km. wide. It was carried out by 2 French divisions and one American (26th) division, and advanced only as far as St-REMY and, in the forest of VAUX les PLAMEIX, up to the artillery positions.

The main attack hit the south front of Army Unit C from RICHCOURT to FEY-en-HAYE along a front of 16 km. 8 American and 1 French division attacked here. The enemy succeeded in advancing in one place to north of THIAUCOURT. This made the St-MIHIEL Salient untenable.

Thereupon, the evacuation of the salient and the withdrawal into the MICHEL Position were ordered. They were executed according to plan.

The advance of the American infantry in the attack was altogether schematic. Great clumsiness was shown in the movement over the terrain of the waves of riflemen which followed each other closely. The shock troops hesitated when met by the least resistance, and gave the impression of awkwardness and helplessness. Neither officers nor men knew how to make use of the terrain. When met by resistance, they did not look for cover but went back erect. The American apparently does not know how to work himself forward or backward by crawling on the ground or by rapid rushes. At first he lies still and then tries to get up again. In fighting on shell-torn terrain the American is wholly inexperienced. He does not know how to stick to shell holes.*

The individual American is just as ignorant as to how to conduct himself in the attack as the mass. Undoubtedly, he is basically courageous, but nevertheless he attacks timidly. Hand grenades drive him to flight [?].

The American is obviously afraid of being taken prisoner. If this is threatening, he defends himself desperately to the last and does not raise his hands. This seems to be the result of the propaganda to the effect that Germans treat their prisoners cruelly.

The American is clever in the use of machine guns. On the defensive he is stubborn and strengthens his resistance with the very numerous machine guns.

The conduct of the infantry, as may be seen from the above, showed little military training.

The artillery was all right as long as it fired for the attack from initial positions. The firing procedure was good. It opened fire very quickly on targets as they appeared. This is due apparently to its plentiful technical equipment. The artillery was able to open in the shortest time a well-conducted fire.

The cooperation between infantry and artillery was perfect. When the infantry encountered machine-gun nests, it withdrew a little and very soon an artillery preparation by accompanying batteries set in. Technically the artillery is well trained, but in a moving situation it lacks the necessary flexibility and mobility.

A great number of tanks had been placed in readiness for the attack. However, use was made only of a small number because the mass employment of the infantry resulted in the desired success.

The command throughout was bad and clumsy. The enemy had obviously very many officers, but these officer slack all qualities of leadership.

Unmistakable was the perplexity after the initial objective was reached. The enemy was helpless when confronted by a new situation and unable to exploit the success. **

The French would have been much more dangerous in such a situation. The entire lack of military skill was also evident in the pursuit. No advantage was taken of favorable opportunities for attacks on flanks and envelopments.

The higher command also did not know how to grasp newly arisen situations and how to exploit them. It was capable of preparing the plans for the attack, but it failed to function when the infantry, rushing straight ahead, had reached its objective. The higher command was not familiar with the tactical principles pertaining to the employment of divisional units and their use for the destruction of the enemy. This made it possible for Army Unit C under the most difficult conditions possible to break contact with the enemy in one night and to occupy positions within a short distance and be again ready for combat.

* But why they, in spite of that, the success?!

** Like the English!

In general it may be said that the American seems to be a very chivalrous foe. He does not fire on recognized stretcher bearers.

Concluding Estimate: The American is too much of a dilettante, and therefore also in a major attack needs not to be feared. Until now, our men had a much higher opinion of Americans, due to the fact that in patrol undertakings they had shown themselves as dashing soldiers.*

Our troops had expected much more of them in a major battle. In spite of some local reverses, their confidence of being able to deal with the Americans has been raised. Imbecility!#

WEINIGER,
Captain.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Report

Situation on the West Front on September 22, 1918

Operations Foreign Armies Section

GENERAL SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
September 22, 1918.

No. 10436

1. British-Belgian Front: On September 18 the British resumed their offensive on the former battle front between HAVRINCOURT Woods and their south flank. There were 13 British divisions in line, all of which had participated in the earlier attacks. The British have not completely gained the objective of their attack, to force us back into the SIEGFRIED Position. Therefore we must reckon with the continuation of the offensive and extension of the attack toward the north.

On the rest of the front the general situation is unchanged. Reports about an extension of the attacks to the territory north of the SENSEE have increased. It is believed that Canadians are to be put in line here. Prisoners' statements, front line observations and agents' reports also point to the region of the La BASSEE Canal and the JEPEREN [YPRES]-ARMENTIERES sector. It is possible that in these sectors only the sector divisions are to execute attacks with limited objective. However for a major attack at one of these points, British reserves suffice even if the fighting against the left wing of the Seventeenth and Second Armies continues. There are no indications pointing to a participation of French or American forces.

Reports concerned an intended naval operation against the Belgian coast have increased. It is possible that an attempt will be made to blockade our submarine bases by employing small landing parties. It is not probable that a major landing operation is planned with the mission of acting against our right flank.

* In spite of that our troops retreated?

The handwriting for "Imbecility" appears to be that of General Geyer who was an active officer of the German army as late as 1935.

2. Franco-American Front. West of St-QUENTIN the French accompanied the British offensive with 2 divisions. Further attacks are possible.

Between the AILETTE and AISNE the heavy attacks were resumed, employing rested divisions. They can be expected to continue. Whether the French are still attempting to gain a distant objective here or whether they merely intend to improve their position and contain our forces will be seen later.

No attacks between the AISNE and the AISNE-MARNE Canal seem imminent for the time being. However, indications are on the increase pointing to the intention to attack in the area of REIMS, on the hilly terrain north of PROSNES, as well as on the front SOUAIN-MASSIGES. It also seems that the troops occupying the front have been reinforced here.

Between the ARGONNE and MAAS, where a fresh American division has been put in line which needs to be trained, an attack is improbable for the time being. The American colored troops that have been relieved, can be considered available for employment on an attack front.

Between the MAAS and MOSELLE the preparations for a continuation of the attacks are apparently not yet completed. It must be expected that the offensive will be resumed after these preparations have been completed. An extension of the fighting to the front between MOSELLE and SEILLE remains probable.

Preparations for attacks apparently are also being made on the LORRAINE front between the SEILLE and the VOSGES. The front is still thinly occupied, but the presence of the good divisions of the French XXXII and XIV Army Corps deserves attention. It is possible that the offensive here has been planned for a later date.

In the VOSGES, the American 92d Division has been withdrawn from the front after completion of its training. This colored division probably is an attack division; its appearance on an attack front can therefore be looked for. Reports have also been received concerning the departure for CHAMPAGNE of the divisions of the XI Army Corps (21st and 22d), which up to the present were assumed to be in reserve at REMIREMONT.

The French 151st Division has been moved from the SUNDGAU, presumably to the St-MIHIEL region. The French 36th Division assumed to be at BELFORT has been put in line on the AISNE.

Therefore the situation in the VOSGES and the SUNDGAU are less tense. However, local attacks in the region of THANN and ALTKIRCH are still possible.

In conclusion it may be said that the principal direction the attack on the French-American front will probably take has not yet been determined. The French dispose of about 20 fresh divisions in their reserves, the Americans of 13 trained divisions. Consequently they are not in a position to attack at the same time at all the points we have to consider for a full-scale attack. It is therefore especially important that the armies forcibly obtain a clarification of the enemy order of battle by all possible means. The latest intelligence points to an American attack against Composite Army C and a French attack in CHAMPAGNE.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

Rear Strategic Positions

Operations Section

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
September 25, 1918.

No. 10460

It has been reported to me that the organization of the rear strategic positions ordered by me has given occasion for officers in high authority to say in public that Supreme Headquarters is planning a withdrawal into these positions for the near future. I request that this idea, which has no foundation whatsoever, be opposed most energetically. It weakens the will to fight a decisive battle in our present positions.

To my regret I have gained the impression that some of the higher headquarters do not exercise a calm judgment over the general situation. The dissatisfaction inside Germany, the present heavy strain on our army, the difficulties in obtaining replacements, and the exhaustion of our Allies weigh heavily. But all reports from England, France, and Italy speak of a like strain among these populations as well.

However this may be, the more serious the situation, the more is it the duty of the officer corps, especially of the higher headquarters, to do all they can to preserve the moral and material resistance of our army. Faintheartedness is more destructive than undue optimism.

I am particularly worried about the reports becoming more and more frequent, that the former confidence between commanders and troops, between officers and men, is no longer the same everywhere as it used to be. No matter what the situation may be, the troops must always be aware of the sympathy of the higher commanders, the soldier particularly must always realize the constant interest of his officers in his physical well-being, especially in his food. Officers of all ages must be watched sharply for incorrect behavior which would injure the entire officer corps, including the very vitals of the army. The standards and behavior of every officer must be exemplary. Respect for the officer corps forms the foundation of discipline which is the basis for the achievements of the army.

von HINDENBURG.

To: Groups of Armies and Armies of the West (including Inspector General, Communications Zone), for oral transmission down to and including division commanders.

Status of American Troops and Equipment

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 28, 1918.

America

Present Status:

- 1. (a) Number of Divisions
 - Europe: 39 divisions
 - Interior: 19 divisions
- (b) Combat Strengths
 - Europe: 700,000 officers and men
 - Interior: 350,000 " " "
- (c) Guns and Tanks on Hand
 - Europe: 3,000 guns) several hundreds
 - Interior: 1,400 ") of tanks

Increase until Spring 1919:

- 2. (a) By March 1919 (incl.)
 - Europe: 30 divisions
 - Interior: [sic]
- (b) Combat Strengths
 - Europe: 540,000 officers and men
- (c) The supply on hand in guns can be increased by thousands, that in tanks

by hundreds.

Antitank Defense

Operations Section
No. 10295

GERMAN THIRD ARMY,
September 28, 1918.

There are dozens of demolished tanks lying before our front. We are prepared to deal even with this weapon of our enemies. The main thing is: remain calm. The tank is producing a bad effect by its appearance, not by its arms.

Infantry: Machine guns and rifles will not fire except from very close range, using armor-piercing ammunition.

The troops will withdraw laterally and seek cover until the tank has approached. Then aimed fire and machine-gun fire directed on a single point is delivered. The best targets are the observation slit and the space occupied by the crew. Several hand grenades will be thrown on top of the roof in a bundle.

At the same time the measure will serve to ease the railroad situation.

[Germany must practically go on alone from this date. The Austrian Emperor had already visited SPA to discuss the question of peace. The Bulgarian ministry had recently changed and Germany could expect no more held there. Collapse threatened Turkey's new Sultan. The peoples of the central powers were hungry and internal revolution threatened. Germany's resources were fast diminishing whereas the weight of American help had now reached the point where Allied hope and enthusiasm were on the up grade.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

Furlough Suspension

FROM: Ludendorff

AT: Operations Section, Supreme Headquarters

DATE: October 4, 1918 HOUR: 12:50 p. m. No. 10604

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince,

Reference your No. 6841

The reasons opposing a general suspension of furloughs are so very weighty that I do not want to insist on it for the time being. On the other hand, effective immediately, no more special trains for those on furlough will be granted in excess of the customary number.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
October 9, 1918.

[Extract]

In response to the call for help issued by the Group of Armies, Supreme Headquarters (Major von Stulpnagel) reported at 7 p. m. that the seriousness of our situation was fully appreciated, but that Supreme Headquarters had no reserves available at present. In an emergency the Group of Armies is to draw on the 88th Inf. Div. and, under certain conditions, also on the 10th Inf. Div. Perhaps the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht might be able to support us.

The operations section of the Group of Armies (Major Bramsch) stressed the importance of the front of this group, stating that a further weakening of Composite Army C would be hazardous. In addition thereto, not many troops can be made available. Furthermore the 10th Inf. Div. is exhausted. Therefore, the only reserves the Group of Armies has available at present, are the 123d Div. Major Bramsch also invited attention to the fact that the Group of Armies German Crown Prince must have some troops made available by the withdrawal. Major von Stuelpnagel replied that any troops that may thus become available will have to be shifted to the Eighteenth Army. However, he promised to bring the matter before His Excellency Ludendorff.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

Concentration of Additional Reserves

Operations-Intelligence Sections
No. 10067

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 10, 1918.

To Second and Seventeenth Armies

The strong pressure of the enemy at Le CHATEAU forces us to concentrate additional reserves in that region for the present.

Therefore, the 1st Guard Res. Div. will immediately be shifted from the Seventeenth Army to the Second Army. It will stand at the disposal of the Second Army.

Details will be arranged by the armies direct.

The Seventeenth Army and the north flank of the Second Army will withdraw into the position BOUCHAIN---HASPRES---SOLESMES, if forced by strong enemy pressure.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

Shortening of Front

Operations Section
No. 10065

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 10, 1918.

To Sixth and Seventeenth Armies

[Extract]

The left flank of the Sixth Army and the right flank of the Seventeenth Army will withdraw during the night of October 10/11 into the front PONT a VENDIN---DOUAI---ARLEUX ---Canal position---2d Wotan position. The exact time will be arranged by the two armies. Outposts will remain in contact with the enemy.

* * * * *

To shorten the front still further, the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies will prepare the withdrawal into the line east of WAVRIN (junction with the ENGLOS position)---SECLIN---THUMERIES---RAIMBECOURT---LEWARDE---AUBIGNY-au-BAC in such a manner that an order to this effect, issued prior to 12 noon, can be executed the following night.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT.
October 10, 1918.

[Extract]

Estimate of the Situation: The situation makes it imperative at present to withdraw the left flank of the Sixth Army and the right flank of the Seventeenth Army, in addition to the movements of the Seventeenth Army and Second Army already ordered. The Second Army must be supplied with new forces in order to support the battle and to relieve the exhausted divisions from the front.

* * * * *

If necessary, the Seventeenth Army and the north flank of the Second Army will withdraw before strong enemy pressure into the position BOUCHAIN---HESPRES---SOLESMESES.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

Coordination of Attack and Defense Training

Operations Section
No. 9635

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
October 8, 1918.

Lately our training has been directed almost exclusively toward the attack. But in this war it is now merely a question of hurting the enemy more than he hurts us. Therefore we can not neglect the defense. The directive of July 8, 1918 No. 9444 op. sect. is supplemented by the following:

MORALE OF THE TROOPS

1. Defensive action demands of the troops the same high qualities as the attack. Successful defenses therefore are to be valued, also with regard to outward recognition (decorations), as much as successful attacks.

The idea that attack divisions are considered too good to be employed in the defense deserves the sharpest rejection.

2. Under strict leadership and with a strong sense of duty; badly weakened troops have always accomplished substantially more than they themselves thought possible. Failures must be overcome. Troops which on one day had been denied success for some reason or other (surprise, lack of cooperation, poor leadership) have performed outstandingly the next day when they saw the situation clearly and overcame their faint-heartedness.

This is especially true in cases of overfatigue. Naturally the command must try to give the troops the necessary rest whenever it is possible, but this can not always be managed, and troops who are really exhausted have beyond a doubt performed excellently in spite of their condition. Strength of will is the decisive factor.

RELIEF AND RESERVES OF HIGHER COMMAND IN ACTION

3. The measures taken by the command for the relief and the employment of reserves are of great importance for the maintenance of the vigor of the troops. Their power of resistance is strengthened if the command remains cool and shows calm, lucidity and system, while a policy of giving in to every call for help from the front line will surely lead to intermingling of units and exhausting marches to and fro for the reserves.

4. The mixing of fresh units with tired ones is not the remedy which will make up for the sinking combat strength of the troops in line. The splitting up of divisions and regiments decidedly harms their fighting strength while the lack of steadiness of the weary troops has a demoralizing effect on the fresh units.

Leaving tired troops too long in their positions necessitates the rapid bringing forward of divisions that have been held in rear (counterattack divisions) into the zone of fire and causing much shifting back and forth. In this way they not infrequently suffer heavy losses before they get into action.

Therefore, when counterattack troops are available, it is more economical in most cases to relieve the front line divisions before they are completely exhausted, put the fresh divisions in line before their fighting strength is impaired and place the withdrawn divisions in rest billets. After a few days they are often fit for combat once more. Of course it is not always possible then to assemble new divisions as reserves, but this is also not necessary if fresh units disposed in depth are in the front line.

5. Reserves which have been withdrawn to rest billets must actually have rest. It is wrong to alert them too early and too often and make them march. The long range observation posts of higher headquarters and the reports of artillery observers and the air service when being transmitted along the chain of command have often caused a great deal of harm in this connection.

HOLDING THE POSITION; GIVING UP TERRAIN

6. The terms "outpost zone" and "main battle zone" are purely conceptions of higher command. The distinction can only confuse the troops when they are faced with it. The words "outpost zone" and "main battle zone" will not be used in speaking to them, but they will merely be told which zone they have to hold according to the present situation. That is their battle zone. The positions behind it are simply rear positions to them.

7. If indications of an enemy major attack are observed, the higher command, if necessary, will designate a special combat zone which the troops will hold, and will order when, to what extent and how (whether fighting or not) the terrain is to be evacuated.

8. Each time a combat zone is assigned to the troops the main line of resistance in it will be clearly indicated. At the conclusion of the fighting the troops must be in full possession of the main line of resistance. Also as complete as possible a recapture of the outpost zone must be striven for. It must always be remembered that the loss of the outposts, complete or partial, almost always forces a shift of the main line of resistance to the rear and also of the entire defensive system disposed in depth and makes necessary new and extensive field fortifications.

9. Only the strictest vigilance will protect against surprise attacks by the enemy. They must constantly be expected on all fronts. It would be wrong however if the command relied solely on the vigilance of the troops and if readiness for defense were increased by reinforcing the elements of the front line. On the contrary, on all fronts on which no enemy intentions to attack have been observed, only a small number of divisions will be put in the front line and stress will be laid on constituting strong reserves for higher command. In their disposition allowances will be made for enemy surprise attacks. The vigilance of the units in the front line and their resolute holding in the battle position will enable troops that have been held in rear, to be alerted in ample time. With these latter, an enemy who has penetrated by surprise will be counterattacked and thrown back beyond the battle position assisted by the divisions in line.

10. The command must realize that if immediate local counterthrusts have not resulted in the recapture of the positions, such repeated counterthrusts often develop into actually overhasty counterattacks as the enemy has had time to gain a firm foothold. They are then purposeless and cost heavy losses. It always requires serious consideration whether such local counterthrusts should be ordered or to what extent, in view of the general situation, the penetration may be contained. This will be regulated by order and applies especially to large-scale fighting. This discussion does not affect the question of systematically prepared counterattacks for the recapture of lost ground.

11. It is something else and entirely different from the fight in the battle position when large expanses of terrain have to be systematically evacuated. The fighting in the terrain to be evacuated will be conducted then as pure rearguard actions. The purpose here also must be to cause the enemy heavy losses.

12. In any case the troops must be instructed clearly as to whether they may yield any ground and how much and what part of it must remain completely in their hands at the close of the fighting.

COMBAT FORMATION OF THE INFANTRY

13. The High Command will order in each zone only the general trace of the main line of resistance and of the artillery protection position only. Moreover it will limit itself to general indications and will leave to lower commanders, particularly the regiment commanders, latitude in their instructions. These commanders are the ones, after all who are responsible for holding the battle position.

14. In front of the main line of resistance is the outpost, the depth of which depends on the nature of the terrain, the combat situation, the visibility and our own strength. The weaker our artillery is and the poorer the organization of the position, the more important is a deep outpost. On the other hand, the deeper it is, the more infantry forces are needed.

As a rule a depth of 1 to 3 kilometers is to be sought.

With an especially deep outpost it can be expedient to push forward beyond the outpost, special mixed detachments of varying strength as advance or rearguards, because the commander of the front line troops who is responsible for holding the main line of resistance cannot carry at the same time the responsibility for a terrain more than 2 or 3 kilometers distant.

15. The trace of the main line of resistance, of the artillery protective position and the extent of the outpost must be made absolutely clear to the troops.

16. The outpost will be occupied as an outpost position. In close, broken terrain where the visibility is good, disposition can be relatively thin. In similar terrain with poor visibility (night, fog) the garrison occupying the outpost must be pushed closer together. Whether this is done toward the further edge of the outpost toward the center or in the direction of the main line of resistance depends on the terrain. In such situations patrols will have to suffice in other portions of the outpost. The same procedure

will govern when only weak elements are available for the occupation of the outpost. The disposition of the outpost garrison must at any rate always be such that a surprise is impossible and the coordination of the separate elements of the garrison is assured through visual liaison and artillery support during the fight. The disposition of the outpost garrison and, in certain circumstances, also the depth of the outpost will consequently be different in the same sector according to conditions.

The forces will vary from a simple line of sentries to an outpost disposition with artillery and trench mortars.

No general statement can be made prescribing what proportion of the troops garrisoning a position belongs in the outpost. It depends on many things and is subject to frequent changes in the same position. The main forces however will be put in line in and behind the main line of resistance.

In combat the outpost garrisons operate according to the principles of outpost action. They will drive off enemy patrols or capture them. They do not conduct the fight in a set manner but in a mobile way using every favorable opportunity. They will be supported in this by the artillery and as far as possible by machine guns, etc., from the main line of resistance. In case of emergency the outpost garrison can be reinforced by pushing forward assault squads from the main line of resistance.

In enemy attacks (including patrol actions with strong enemy artillery preparation) the outpost garrison, according to a previously determined plan and instructions from its commander, will, as a general rule, withdraw fighting to the main line of resistance; on the flanks they will fall back laterally. They will inflict all possible harm on the enemy without however sacrificing themselves. In any case the outpost troops will gain enough time to allow the troops in rear time to get ready for action, even in case of surprise attacks. Of definite value are absolutely sure working and well installed communications (wire communications, visual and acoustic signals, wireless telegraphy, runners, etc.). Each commander of troops on outpost is personally responsible that his troops are not surprised and that reports reach the rear without delay.

If an enemy attack is repulsed, the outpost will be retaken and occupied as before unless the command orders otherwise.

The recapture of the outpost will be effected as far as possible independently by the front line troops; but if the enemy has consolidated his position by the command and for which forces stronger than those of the outpost garrisons are necessary.

17. For a determined stand in and for the main line of resistance, the terrain rearward of this line (incl.) will be organized for defense in depth. The main part of the troops will be put in line there in such a way that the fight for the full depth of the main position of resistance will begin with sufficient forces and can be carried to a conclusion.

Mutual support of the individual posts, machine-gun nests and strong points must be assured in this zone under any circumstances. The enemy must be prevented from penetrating into areas that are not swept by fire or that are in sight defilade and then rolling up adjacent defense installations from the flank. Experience has shown that separate squads fighting out of view of other troops, feel isolated and often evacuate their positions too early.

In close terrain which has not been systematically prepared for the defense, units must be more closely disposed and in less depth than in open terrain or in organized trench system.

Moreover disposition in depth is limited by the strength of the garrison available. If the troops are no longer sufficient for full occupation of the entire position, disposition in depth will be confined to the main line of resistance, with a weak outpost garrison.

18. If withdrawal movements or yielding of terrain threaten the morale of the troops it may be necessary to stop temporarily any movement to the rear. Steadiness of morale

must then receive first consideration. Everything which would further impair it must be avoided.

In such a situation it must be realized that the fighting in the outpost undoubtedly require special self-reliance and resolution qualities which are no longer to be found intact in troops whose morale has been weakened. Blameworthy behavior of the outpost troops would not remain without repercussions on the troops in and behind the main line of resistance. Their steadfastness would be uncertain.

In such cases it may therefore become necessary to give up the outpost. But as soon as the leaders have the troops well in hand again, and the enemy is again compelled to make systematic preparations for attack the establishment of an outpost will be immediately undertaken.

The order for such action is primarily the responsibility of the subordinate infantry commanders including the regimental commander, because they alone are in a position to judge whether and how long the condition of their troops makes these measures necessary.

ARTILLERY

19. The artillery can never be mobile enough. It must also be kept fresh. Therefore the batteries within each division, exactly like infantry battalions, etc., will be successively taken out of the positions and billeted farther to the rear. Part of them will be held at the disposal of the division, ready to answer an alert. These, together with infantry that has been taken to the rear from within the position divisions, mixed detachments immediately available to the command in case of surprise.

20. Again as in the case of the infantry, the artillery will be disposed in depth. Neither can this ever be done to too great an extent.

21. For the usual war of position, part of the artillery (with the exception of antitank defense and close-range guns) must be pushed well forward, in certain circumstances temporarily out beyond the main line of resistance, to engage the enemy artillery located far to the rear and deliver harassing fire on important enemy installations such as roads, railroads, and signal communications, shelters, fleeting targets, etc. This requires no large number of batteries, but careful preparation, the use of each favorable opportunity for observation, rapid decision and full use of the highly rapid rate of fire of our guns.

The mass of the artillery will remain farther in the rear, well disposed in depth so that it can engage the forward enemy artillery, deliver annihilation fire against surprise enemy attacks in our outpost zone in front of the main line of resistance and especially to operate against an enemy force which may have broken through.

Distribution and disposition in depth of the antitank defense and close-range guns will be governed by the nature of the terrain and the special missions of the individual guns. These guns will be silent until it is time for their mission, i. e., until the launching of an enemy attack.

22. If a major enemy attack is expected, that is if the enemy reinforces his artillery and pushes it forward, and we do not succeed in seriously disrupting his preparations, we must fall back with our artillery as far as is compatible with the mission of supporting our infantry. A rearward displacement is then effected and at the same time new dispositions in depth. This is necessary so that our artillery even though inferior in strength can still support the defense against the main attack.

23. The mobile employment of the artillery necessitates that numerous revetted and ammunitioned positions be available in great depth.

24. Insofar as the artillery conduct of the defense has not been discussed already the following remarks remain to be made:

a. In quiet periods and before the main attack, the neutralization of the enemy artillery by the destruction of its personnel, instruments, its observation, ammunition, etc., stands paramount. It must be emphasized over and over again that this measure has always had good results when it has been well considered and is energetically applied. It must also be remembered that the enemy artillery is the most dangerous enemy of our infantry and that without the protection of strong artillery fire the enemy infantry advances only hesitatingly to the assault.

b. It is understood that other important objectives must not be neglected.

c. When an enemy major attack is being prepared, timely gassing (Yellow Cross) [Mustard gas] of the enemy artillery and of the most important points in the assembly zone of the infantry can cripple the attack considerably.

d. If the enemy launches a large-scale attack, a brief, powerful burst of the entire artillery (close-range guns, etc., excl.) against the zone over which the enemy must develop and against his artillery zone is the best means of disrupting enemy communications. For the actual repulse of the enemy attack, engaging the enemy artillery remains as important as before the attack opens. It will take the form of placing the most powerful fire against the batteries endangering our infantry, especially therefore against batteries appearing with the enemy infantry.

e. Employing direct observation whenever possible the artillery will support the fight for the outpost by shelling the leading waves of infantry including their accompanying artillery and tanks. For those elements of the artillery which have no direct observation, and have no special missions annihilation fire zones on which they will direct their fire will be assigned to individual batteries. As the enemy presses forward they will shorten their range back to the main line of resistance. In any case powerful annihilation fire must lie in front of our main line of resistance when the enemy reaches it. If the outpost is withdrawn according to a previously prepared plan, it will make this firing easier for the artillery.

In case of poor visibility (fog, darkness) this annihilation fire will be specially regulated.

f. Also during the course of the enemy attack the mission of the mass of the artillery will consist of well planned annihilation fire against all known objectives or against those suspected with some degree of certainty (advancing enemy infantry or artillery, assembled reserves, approach roads used by troops, etc.). The above-mentioned disposition in depth at comparatively wide intervals between units toward the rear is the best way to enable the artillery to give the infantry the right kind of support.

g. A certain number of batteries (with the exception of close-range guns and antitank guns) will be designated to engage an enemy who has broken into the position.

h. Careful organization of observation is especially necessary, not only observation in and in front of the outpost, but over the entire terrain of the defensive zone; moreover this observation must be in the closest possible proximity to the batteries so that if the enemy breaks into the position, he can be fought with direct observation and if possible with direct fire.

i. All the artillery must thoroughly understand its missions and make use of all auxiliary means (air observation, flash and sound-ranging, firing from revetted positions, use of daily ballistic and other data). Ground observation alone is not sufficient. The necessary auxiliary means must be put under the direct control of the artillery.

k. The use of an artillery barrage fired according to a set plan to repel an assault is to be discarded. It is ineffective, is seldom well placed, is too thin, is launched mostly too late, costs a great amount of ammunition and considerably endangers the infantry in the latter's conduct of the elastic defense. In any case barrage fire

must be altogether forbidden in the ordinary war of position. Concentrated artillery annihilation fire will replace it.

l. This so-called concentrated fire is most effective, but caution is enjoined in its use in fighting on a large scale, because here adequate data is often unavailable and command communications are uncertain. The technical difficulty of execution and direction often results in the shelling of our own infantry and impedes freedom of maneuver in the defense more than it helps it. In this connection long-range batteries firing at maximum range are especially dangerous for our infantry because they often unexpectedly fire much too short.

Strict orders alone cannot correct the situation. Under certain circumstances they result in batteries scattering their fire all over the terrain at random so as to avoid censure (inaction, shelling of own infantry). The firing, consequently, is concentrated often only on paper. Rather fire little but well, than much and badly.

m. There exists in this connection a certain "gun mania," meaning an endeavor to have as many guns as possible in position. This also is wrong, less because of the difficulty encountered in ammunition supply, which can mostly be overcome, than with respect to gun commanders, instruments and crews. Too strong an artillery with insufficient ammunition complicates command. Material which is not kept in good condition and checked from time to time (ballistics), officers and men not adequately trained, or who are overtired, do not shoot well. Therefore the artillery must be given time for looking over its equipment, for training and resting its personnel. It is the responsibility of higher authorities to see that this help is granted in the same proportion to the divisional artillery as to the army artillery (light and heavy).

TRENCH MORTAR

25. The trench mortars have apparently been emplaced well to the front in the outpost to participate in the barrage fire. This barrage, if executed as mentioned in Par. 24 k. for the artillery, is worthless. As soon as the enemy has broken into a point of the outpost, the trench mortars are lost without even having been fired. They must therefore be emplaced farther back. Concerning the use of the various types of trench mortars the following is pertinent:

a. In the ordinary war of position the light trench mortars will be used for the most part for surprise fire only. By changing position, they will elude the enemy counteraction which will soon follow. In fighting on a large scale the light trench mortars, equipped with flat-trajectory mount will be used preferably as close-range or antitank guns and the light trench mortars with high-angle mounts will be used for annihilation fire on portions of the terrain in sight defilade.

b. Medium and heavy trench mortars themselves play a less important role in the defense than they do in the attack. In the ordinary war of position they can at most fire only sporadically and temporarily from alternate positions against targets in the enemy position which are capable of resistance. In full-scale fighting previously designated portions of terrain over which the enemy must pass have to be assigned to them. Because of their extraordinary effect on the morale of the troops they can be considerable help even with a few shots, especially in antitank defense.

ANTITANK FIGHTING

26. Antitank fighting which will again play a big role in the near future was successful where infantry, artillery and trench mortars performed skillfully. The 13-mm. antitank guns which are now being issued have also proved their value.

27. Usually strong enemy infantry follows behind the tanks. Where our infantry eluded the tanks, let them through and then held up the enemy infantry, trench mortars and antitank guns often disposed of the tanks that had broken through. Where horses were

lacking to move the mankind or the terrain was too unfavorable, antitank guns were emplaced 1,000 meters and more behind the main line of resistance.

28. Antitank guns will not participate in the fire fight before the enemy attack and will remain hidden from sight.

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMAND SYSTEMS, OBSERVATION

29. The maintenance of the communications net for command and intelligence between the command and the troops, between the infantry and artillery and within the several arms is of decisive importance. Particular importance must be attached to the support of the infantry by the artillery in the fighting for the outpost as well as for the main line of resistance and in the main defensive zone.

30. Maintenance of wire communications cannot be relied upon with certainty. The enemy will attempt to disrupt it at the beginning of the artillery preparations by powerful bursts of fire in the rear area.

31. Therefore communication will be ensured by vizual means, radio telegraphy, runners, mounted messengers, pigeons, messenger dogs, etc., so that in case of necessity, wire communication can be temporarily dispensed with. Wireless telegraphy has apparently proved of special value.

32. Air observation (planes, balloons) has become of even increasing importance. At the same time a reliable system of ground observation is in the long end the safest means for directing the fighting of the lower units and for assuring the direct support of the infantry by the artillery.

CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION

33. In battle the one who gropes most in the dark is at a disadvantage. The precaution for the concealment of our measures and for misleading the enemy can therefore be decisive. Concealment of all installations and movements from ground and air observation are included in this connection.

Prisoners' statements disclose, however, that in reconnaissances and in developing for the attack these precautions have been thoughtlessly ignored. Such negligence can have the direct consequences for our plans. The remedy is repeated instruction and, if necessary, severe punishment.

34. Protection against planes is becoming more important because of the increase in bombing. We must learn to protect men, horses, ammunition and all materiel against it in a more efficient manner.

35. Substantial means of concealment and deception lies in the mobility of infantry and artillery. Even in the quiet war of position the disposition of infantry sentries, close-range guns, advanced long-range guns, etc. can not be absolutely rigid, but must change within certain limitations, especially as soon as it becomes apparent that the enemy is accurately informed of our dispositions.

LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE

The higher command must keep in the background in the defensive the same as any other form of combat. Its most important missions are the creation of advantageous fighting conditions beforehand, preparation and training for the defensive, the bringing up of reserves, the responsibility for supplies and reliefs and the immediate renewal of preparations according to the issue of the fight. Only in a few cases during combat will it exercise an influence on the fight through direct combat orders.

Subordinates must be supervised and higher authorities must at all times be kept informed of their preparations for combat and of their conduct of the fighting. Each interference in details which is not absolutely necessary is more harmful than helpful.

Higher authorities must command in such a manner that initiative, self-reliance and enthusiasm do not suffer. These qualities have heretofore the foundation of our superiority and must remain so.

LUDENDORFF.

[The above is an excellent lesson in tactics from a master of the art. However, the sands in Germany's hour glass were now fast running out. More than the masterly concepts of Ludendorff and Hindenburg were needed and that more was no longer obtainable.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
October 19, 1918.

[Extract]

Observations of the enemy established the fact that a general movement from west to east was in progress. This indicated that the enemy was regrouping.

Therefore, a continuation of the large-scale attacks in the sector of the Fifth Army must be expected. An extension of the attacks toward the east also seems possible. The Commander of the Group of Armies invited the attention of Supreme Headquarters to this fact on October 9 and requested reinforcements. In reply to his report, the following units were promised on October 9: 3d Guard Division and Bav. 15th Inf. Div. of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, and the 1st Landwehr Div. of the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht. The 224th Inf. Div. had already received warning orders on October 9. Furthermore, despite grave doubts as to the advisability of this measure, the decision was made to weaken the front of the Composite Army C still further. ***

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT
October 11, 1918.

[Extract]

Estimate of the Situation: The general situation requires that we hold the present positions as long as possible. The decision to withdraw into the LYS-HERMANN Position will not be made until the military situation absolutely requires it. The enemy can be expected to continue his main effort against the Second Army and the south flank of the Seventeenth Army. We must count on an attack in FLANDERS and on the coast in the near future. On the remaining fronts enemy attacks on a larger scale are improbable at present.

Measures by the Group of Armies: In the Seventeenth and Second Armies we have re-organized the troops in the new positions; all available forces will be moved there. The Seventeenth Army must maintain the junction with the lake line at IWUY as long as possible.
* * *

The 111th Inf. Div. will be conducted to the Seventeenth Army in rear of the XIV Res. Corps, where it will be at the disposal of the Group.

The 25th Inf. Div. will be shifted from the Fourth Army to the Second Army. The 2d Cyclist Brigade will be assembled by the Second Army at the disposal of the army group in the vicinity of Le QUESNOY in such a manner that it can be shifted quickly to the left flank of the Seventeenth Army as well as the front of the Second Army.

With this measure the Group has disposed of its last reserves fit for offensive action. The armies can not expect further reinforcements. * * *

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GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
October 12, 1918.

[Extract]

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Prisoners' statements, changes in the ground-telephone and radio traffic, the deployment of enemy artillery opposite the front of Composite Army C, particularly opposite its left flank, lead to the conclusion that attacks on this front are imminent. The unfavorable situation of the enemy on the east bank of the MEUSE with the river in his immediate rear also induces us to assume that the enemy attacks will extend further to the south, in order to provide more space for the troops fighting east of the MEUSE. Therefore the

decision was made not to relieve the 88th Inf. Div. by the 224th Div., but to keep it at the front.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

Orders to Hold Position

Operations Section
No. 10094

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 11, 1918.

To Fourth, Sixth, Seventeenth, and Second Armies
(To Group of Armies German Crown Prince for information)

[Extract]

1. The general situation requires that we hold the present position as long as possible. The decision to withdraw into the LYS-HERMANN position will not be made until the military situation absolutely requires it.

Therefore, all armies will continue to hold their present positions.

2. The enemy can be expected to continue to make his main effort against the Second army and against the south flank of the Seventeenth Army. It is important to lose as little ground here as possible, as an early withdrawal of the other armies into the HERMANN Position would be the consequence of such a loss.

We have reorganized here in the new positions; all available forces will be moved there. It is probable that the enemy will not be able to launch a new large-scale attack before a few days have elapsed.

The Seventeenth Army must hold the junction with the lake line at IWUY as long as possible. Its position in the line IWUY-SOLESMEs will also make the attack in the direction of Le CHATEAU more difficult for the enemy.

3. We must expect an attack in the near future in FLANDERS and near the coast. There too we must stand fast, as a withdrawal on the north flank of the Fourth Army would also lead to a retirement of the rest of the front into the HERMANN Position.

* * * * *

5. If the decision is made to move into the HERMANN position, then it is planned to execute the HERMANN Movement in the following manner:

Intermediate positions (according to Map 1:300,000):

First Intermediate Position: 2d FLANDERS position---FLANDERS Switch Position---canal position as far as east of WAVRIN---SECLIN---THUMERIES---RAIMBECOURT---HAGEN Position ---BRUNEMONT Switch Position.

Second Intermediate Position: ZEEBRUGGE---BRUGGE---THIELT---OYGHEM---CORTRAI ---3d WOTAN Position.

Third Intermediate Position: (Only in the sectors of the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies): TOURNAI---SAMEON---DENAIN---SELLE Creek.

According to the developments of the situation, the HERMANN Movement can be temporarily changed, so that we move into the next intermediate position on some fronts, while remaining in the old position on the adjacent fronts.

If the HERMANN Movement is initiated by withdrawal into the first intermediate position, then this movement will be executed without any material delay in the several intermediate positions.

The order for the withdrawal into the various intermediate positions will be issued only the Group of Armies. Orders in this connection will be issued in every case by 12 noon. The orders will then be executed the following night.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I:

Orders to Hold Forward Positions

Operations Section

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,

No. 10793

October 12, 1918.

To: Group of Armies Gallwitz

The diplomatic negotiations to end the war have begun. Their result will be the more favorable the more we succeed in maintaining a high state of discipline in the army, in holding the ground gained and injuring the enemy. The battle must be conducted in the immediate future on the basis of these principles. The following individual points must be observed:

1. If a breakthrough is effected in the HERMANN and GUDRUN Positions, then it is essential that the thrust be checked as early as possible. If necessary, withdrawal must be made in rear of a sector. Consideration of adjacent fronts is of paramount importance.
2. The headquarters of supernumerary corps and divisions at the proper time will execute preparatory reconnaissance for suitable rear positions.
3. The organization of the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position and the evacuation of all dispensable supplies will be prosecuted with dispatch. The necessary number of MEUSE crossings must be assured.
4. Order and discipline must be strictly enforced on the lines of communications in the rear. Enemy withdrawal movement signifies a serious emergency step. It is injurious to the morale of the troops and costs us irreplaceable supplies. Enemy units, no less than our own, are freed from the front line and become available for employment elsewhere. I request the Group of Armies keep very close check on the withdrawal movements recommended. We do not want to underestimate the enemy; on the other hand we should not overestimate him.

von HINDENBURG.

Withdrawal into the Hermann Position

Operations Section,
No. 10119

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 12, 1918.

TELETYPE TO FOURTH, SIXTH, SEVENTEENTH AND SECOND ARMIES

Reference: Teletype No. 10094, Operations Section, October 11, 1918

It is possible that the decision withdraw into the Hermann Position will have to be made if the enemy should succeed in forcing our front south of the SCHELDE still farther back. In so doing it may be necessary for the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies to execute the HERMANN Movement more quickly than was formerly intended.

Accordingly the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies will prepare for the contingency, of withdrawing if necessary from the WOTAN III Position in one bound, without using the intermediate position TOURNAI---SAMEON---DENAIN, to the HERMANN Position (Sixth Army) and to the SEHNEN STELLUNG [position forming the chord of the salient] FLINES---St-AMAND---ESCAILLON Creek (Seventeenth Army). Also a withdrawal in one night from the canal---WOTAN II Position (east of WAVRIN---PONT-a-VEVDIN---DOUAI---ARLEUX) to the BERSEE---WOTAN III Position (east of WAVRIN---MONS-en-PEVELE---COUTICHES---BOUCHAIN) must be possible if circumstances require its execution.

For the Fourth Army it seems very desirable for military-political reasons to hold the coast of FLANDERS as long as possible even if the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies are withdrawn into the HERMANN Position. Therefore, provided the tactical situation in FLANDERS permits, it is proposed to withdraw only the left flank of that army in conjunction with the Sixth Army, into the HERMANN Position OYGHEM-BOSSUYT, holding the line NIEUPOORT---DIXMUDE---ROULERS---ISEGHEM---OYGHEM with the right flank and the center of the Fourth Army. The Fourth Army will provide also for this contingency.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Preparation of Antwerp-Meuse Position

Operations Section
No. 10118

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 12, 1918.

GROUP ORDER

To Second, Fourth, Sixth and Seventeenth Armies

[Extract]

1. ANTWERP-MEUSE Position: As an additional strategic rear position, the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position "A - M Position" will be prepared.

* * * * *

The organization of this position under the direction of the several armies will probably not be started before the HERMANN Position is occupied. Special instructions concerning this will follow.

2. "A - M Movement": Against the contingency that a withdrawal will have to be made from the HERMANN Position into the A - M Position, the armies will reconnoiter the intermediate positions within their sectors. * * * At the same time switch positions of such a type will be recommended that as much freedom as possible will be allowed for the execution of the A - M Movement.

How the A - M Movement, if necessary, will be executed with reference to time, whether step by step, offering obstinate resistance, or whether without any considerable delay in several successive positions, cannot yet be determined. The intermediate positions will not be considered as permanent positions. After the trace of the intermediate positions has been roughly established, it will be necessary to reconnoiter their trace in detail and to plot them accurately on the map. It is not contemplated to effect even a hasty organization of the intermediate positions. Only the intermediate lines lying directly in rear of the LYS-HERMANN Position will be organized as a rearward position of the LYS-HERMANN front, to the extent the available forces and means permit (particularly on the front of the Group of Armies south of CONDE).

Uniform designations for the intermediate positions, zones of movement of the armies, etc., will be fixed later.

Liaison between the Second and the Eighteenth Army will be established in agreement with the Group of Armies German Crown Prince.

3. Above provisions represent merely precautionary measures and will be kept strictly secret. The attached corps, etc., will not be informed concerning them.

By order of the Group of Armies Commanders:

von KUHL.

[On this date the American Second Army came into being. It was commanded by Lieut. General Robert L. Bullard. Now General Pershing is able to swing his First Army to the west of the MEUSE and to hold his flank east of the MEUSE safe with his Second Army.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

Suspension of Furloughs

Operations Section
No. 10812

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
October 13, 1918.

To the First, Third, Seventh, and Eighteenth Armies

The suspension of furloughs on the western front offers an opportunity to put a definite stop to the disorder which the overcrowding of railroad stations, the prevalence of unauthorized absences of troops, and the lack of discipline during rail movements produce in the rear area.

I request all army commanders to avail themselves of this opportunity and by increasing the number of railroad station guards, surveillance of the roads and other very

vigorous measures to restore the discipline in the rear area which our army needs now more than ever.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Preparations for Movement into Hermann Position

Operations Section
No. 10125

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 13, 1918.

GROUP ORDER

To: Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventeenth Armies

[Extract]

1. Forward of the LYS-HERMANN Position, and in that position, the canal will be operated in such a manner that all vessels can be in rear of the LYS-HERMANN Position two days after the order for the HERMANN Movement has been issued.

2. After the vessels have been passed through the locks within these two days, there will probably be at least one day available for completing the damming installations (obstructing the locks, etc.). Whether two or even more days can be used for this purpose, will depend particularly on the resistance that can be offered by the outposts in front of the LYS-HERMANN Position and this cannot be estimated in advance.

* * * * *

By order of the Group Headquarters:

von KUHL.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 13, 1918.

[Extract]

Estimate of the Situation: The penetration into the sector of the Fourth Army forces us to begin the HERMANN Movement on the front of the group during the night of October 14/15 and to execute it as planned.

Measures by the Group: At 1 p. m. the armies are given orders for the execution of the HERMANN Movement. * * * By order of the High Command, this order is amended at 6:30 p. m., and the north flank and the center of the Fourth Army as well as the Seventeenth Army are directed to remain in position, while concerning the Sixth Army the movement is changed by this order only insofar as it concerns liaison with the Seventeenth Army. * * *

* * * * *

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Army Boundaries

Operations Section
No. 10148

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 14, 1918.

Subject: ANTWERP-MEUSE Movement

ORDER

To Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventeenth Armies

[Extract]

The following boundaries between the armies are designated during the A-M Movement (Map 1:100,000):

* * * * *

Between the Seventeenth and Second Armies: ORSINVAL---WARGNIES-le-PETIT (south)---St-WAAST-les-BAVAI---HOUDAIN---HON---SARS-la-BRUYERES (south)---GENLY---NOIRCHAIN---SPIENNES---St-SYMPHORIEN---HAVRE (south)---BOUSSOIT---MAURAGE---GOEGNIES (south)---Bois d'HAINES---SENEFFE---Pt-ROEULX (road and villages to the Second Army).

Between the Second and Eighteenth Armies: Will be ordered later.

Above-mentioned zones of movement at the same time form the boundary lines for the occupation of the intermediate positions (Secret Order No. 10118 of the army group operations section, dated October 12, 1918) during the A-M Movement.

By order of the Group Commander,

von KUHL.

Preparations for Antwerp-Meuse Movement

Operations Section
No. 10124

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 14, 1918.

To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

With Secret Order No. 10118 of the Group of Armies, Operations Section, dated October 12, the first preparatory measures for the "A-M Movement" have been transmitted for information.

About double the number of the intermediate positions provided for in the zone of the Group of Armies of the German Crown Prince has been reconnoitered and fixed, in order to be able to withdraw in larger or smaller stages, according to the requirements of the situation. The Second Army is under instructions to determine the junction points of all intermediate lines with your first, second, third and fourth lines, in direct agreement with the Eighteenth Army. It is requested that the Eighteenth Army be instructed accordingly.

* * * * *

It has not yet been decided whether the Seventeenth or Second Army will be released after the A-M Movement. During the A-M movement the present organization of the Group of Armies into four armies will be retained. Those divisions of the Second Army which move into the A-M Position (south of the line GOSSELIES-FLEURUS the boundary of the Group of Armies in the A-M Position) would either be attached to Army A (Group of Armies German Crown Prince) at that moment or would pass through and be placed in reserve of the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht in the A-M zone of that group. This could be decided later.

* * * * *

By order:

von KUHL.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

Orders for Retirement

Operations Section
No. 10170

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 14, 1918.

From: Supreme Headquarters dated Oct. 14, 1918

Operations Section

Secret Order No. 10842

During the night of October 14/15, the left flank of the Fourth Army and the Sixth Army will retire into the general line MENIN---LILLE---DOUAI.

The right flank and the center of the Fourth Army will remain in their present positions or in the 2d FLANDERS Position.

If the Fourth Army does not succeed in holding its positions on October 15, then it will withdraw fighting to the east.

The order for the further execution of the movement of the Group into the HERMANN Position according to plan, will be issued by this headquarters only.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

Hermann Movement

Operations Section
No. 10155

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 14, 1918.

To Fourth, Sixth, Seventeenth, and Second Armies

(To Group of Armies German Crown Prince for information)

[Extract]

The situation in the Fourth Army forces us to begin the HERMANN Movement on the front of the Group of Armies during the night of October 14/15, and to execute it as planned.

* * * * *

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. V: Order

Directions to be Followed During Occupation of Luxembourg

Quartermaster General
No. 53405

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
October 15, 1918.

[Extract]

(1) Political Status of Luxembourg: LUXEMBURG is a neutral country which is occupied by us owing to the exigencies of war. Germany has pledged itself to respect its rights as

a neutral state as far as it at all compatible with military requirements, and to make immediate reparations for all damages.

It is in our interest by our correct and courteous behavior to mitigate as much as possible the discomforts and burdens placed upon the population by a military occupation.

All matters concerning the German authorities and the Luxemburg Government will be handled by the Deputy Quartermaster General for LUXEMBURG, General Tessmar. Therefore all questions affecting the Luxemburg Government will be referred to him; direct communication with the government is prohibited. Furthermore, General Tessmar will immediately be notified of all differences arising when dealing with local authorities and the population.

(2) Billets will be established by arrangement with the local authorities. Only if the latter fail to cooperate is it permissible to resort to independent action.

(3) Rationing: Requisitioning, seizure and purchasing in the open market are prohibited. The latter is not in our interest, as LUXEMBURG is not self-sustaining but receives some of its supplies from Germany. Therefore such purchasing would merely tend to raise prices, thereby aggravating the bad economical situation of the population of Luxemburg.

Whether and to what extent farm products can be made available by Luxemburg in exceptional cases, will be reported in every instance to the commanders concerned by General Tessmar.

(4) Means of Exchange: Payment will be made in German money. The population is not obliged to accept city notes in payment.

(5) Administration:

(a) Commanders are authorized to take any measures which they consider necessary in the interest of the safety of the troops and to protect the war objective. When exercising this authority, local authorities will be asked to assist to the greatest possible extent. If the central authorities (government offices) are concerned, communications will be transmitted through General Tessmar. Executive measures will be taken only if local authorities are unable to intervene or their intervention is insufficient, and only after notifying the Deputy Quartermaster General for Luxemburg, unless danger is threatening. Commanders are not authorized to issue instructions and orders containing penal clauses against the inhabitants of the country.

(b) The administration of the country lies exclusively in the hands of the local administrative authorities. Commanders are not authorized to issue any judicial or police orders merely concerning the interests of the population (for instance stipulating maximum prices, etc.)

(c) Administration of criminal justice will continue to be in the hands of the local authorities. However, all criminal acts punishable according to paragraphs 160 and 161 of the Military Penal Code, committed by civilians against the German army and its members or against German authorities, will be prosecuted by court-martial in conformity with Paragraph 5, Military Penal Code and Royal Order II of December 28, 1899.

* * * * *

(7) Policing of the railroad lines used by the lines of communication will be the mission of the line of communication troops, with the exception of Luxemburg (town), whose protection is assigned to the troops of the Deputy Quartermaster General for Luxemburg, as before.

(8) The Luxemburg Central Police will continue its activity in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in the former manner. It will also be under the control of the Deputy Quartermaster General for Luxemburg.

* * * * *

Main Combat Fronts to be Reinforced

Operations Section
No. 10848

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
October 15, 1918.

To Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The most likely directions of enemy attacks are at present as follows: FLANDERS--- front of the Seventeenth Army as far as the center of the Eighteenth Army and the right wing of Composite Army C. Each one would strike a sensitive point of our front, where a withdrawal would be not possible at all or only to a limited extent. However, it is absolutely necessary that our present position be held in general until the political situation has been clarified.

Therefore all forces at all available must be released relentlessly from sectors threatened to a lesser degree at present to reinforce the main combat fronts. We cannot help undergoing a risk in this connection. I request, therefore, that two divisions fit for employment be placed at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters, one of them to be held ready for movement by rail, the other to be moved behind the left wing of the Third Army at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters.

I request that the question of a reduction in density of the Seventh, First and Third Armies be investigated.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

Withdrawal from Line

Operations Section,
No. 10186

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 15, 1918.

To Fourth, Sixth, Seventeenth, and Second Armies

(Advance Information by Telephone)

(To Group of Armies German Crown Prince for information)

[Extract]

1. During the night of October 15/16, the north flank and the center of the Fourth Army will break contact with the enemy and retire to the approximate line: OSTEND---THOUROUT---COOLSKAMP---MEULEBEKE---COURTRAI.

The rest of the front of the Group of Armies will remain unchanged.

2. The withdrawal of the front of the group into the BRUGGES-THIELT Position and 3d WOTAN Position will be prepared for the night of October 16/17.

The exact times for this withdrawal movement will be arranged between the armies concerned. Final orders will be issued later.

* * * * *

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Antwerp-Meuse Position

Operations Section
No. 10171

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 15, 1918.

To: Second, Fourth, Sixth and Seventeenth Armies. * * *

[Extract]

1. The Fourth, Sixth and Seventeenth Armies will be in charge of the organization of the A-M Position.

The Second Army will not participate in this work for the present.

* * * * *

5. In the construction of the A-M Position it is of primary importance to create a partially organized position in the shortest possible space of time, which will provide a strong base around which the troops can quickly organize the defense as they reach the position. Naturally strong sectors must be exploited in establishing the detailed trace of the line. Construction of obstacles and, on water fronts, construction of dams is urgent, in order to create a continuous front within a short time. Construction requiring time is not to be considered. The work must be completed with simple field means and the application of all available forces.

By order of the Group Commander:

von KUHL.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

Operations Section
No. 10195

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 16, 1918.

TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

Order No. 10854, Operations Section

The Group of Armies will retire into the HERMANN Position as planned. It is important that the movement be executed as slowly as possible.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

[On this date, General Pershing placed Lieut. General Hunter Liggett in command of the American First Army.]

HS Ger. File: 801-21.8: Report

Identification of American Troops

Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army
Section for Foreign Armies
No. 18,550

October 17, 1918.

Report No. 19

1. Troops in Europe: It is estimated that 39 [actually there were elements of 42] divisions are now in France. Since the issue of Report No. 18, the following new divisions have been identified:

88th Div.	through capture of prisoners.
7th Div.)	through prisoners who had been
)	
39th Div.)	transferred as replacements to
)	
85th Div.)	other divisions.
)	
81st Div.)	through statements of
)	
84th Div.)	prisoners.
)	
36th Div.)	through newspaper
)	
86th Div.)	reports.

The regiments of the 93d (Negro) Division are attached to French divisions. The 93d Division is, therefore, not to be considered as one of the independent American divisions.

On September 12, northeast of St-Mihiel, a prisoner of the 2d Cavalry Regiment was captured. There is no information about the other 5 cavalry regiments which, according to statements of prisoners, are in France.

Number of troops transported:

July	300,000 men		
August	250,000	" (according to other reports	313,000)
September	311,000	" (" " " " only	250,000)

Up to the 5th of October, 1,850,000 men are supposed to have been shipped from the United States. For the summer of 1919, 4 million American troops for France are provided for in the budget.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. V: Report

Measures Recommended Concerning Evacuation of Civilians

Operations Section
No. 2865

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
October 17, 1918.

To: Supreme Headquarters

This headquarters is of the opinion that for tactical and military-political reasons the question as to how to deal with the civilians in the Kriegsmarsch [code word, "war march"] zone, parts of which are densely populated, at the time when the Kriegsmarsch Movement is initiated, requires uniform orders issued by Supreme Headquarters. The CHARLEROI basin alone is reported to have a population of about half a million. It is not possible to move these masses in a systematic manner either to the enemy territory or to the rear; neither will sufficient time and forces be available to organize groups of civilians at different collecting points and turn them over to the enemy in manner formerly done. The necessary freedom of movement on all routes of withdrawal requires that they be kept absolutely clear of columns of civilians. This result can only be obtained if no transfers of civilians, or only a very few, take place in the Kriegsmarsch area. Unmarried men between 17 and 50, capable of bearing arms, must be organized now in labor columns to be moved to the rear at once. This measure, which is here in progress at present, applies of course only to a portion of the civilians capable of bearing arms, owing to the limited number of military guards available. The remainder will have to be abandoned to the enemy, from sheer necessity.

Concerning the abandonment of the civilians to the enemy, it is recommended that they be left in their towns, and that the enemy be informed about this measure in time by messages dropped from airplanes or by radio messages. In this connection it must be stated that German authorities will promise to spare the towns and their inhabitants up to 24 hours before opening fire, in case of larger towns up to 48 hours after passing through, provided that the enemy does not force us by his behavior to take other measures. Special arrangements will have to be made concerning larger-sized towns directly on and behind the A - M Position, whereby an effort must be made to evacuate the civilians living just east of the position, for example CHARLEROI, in time to villages or sections of towns located just west of the A - M Position. The inhabitants are to be informed by proclamations prepared in advance concerning the measures taken and the procedure for them to follow.

It is requested that a decision be made soon.

By order:

Count SCHULENBURG,
Chief of Staff.

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 17, 1918.

[Extract]

Estimate of the Situation: The group of armies does not continue the HERMANN Movement tonight.

Measures by the Group: Order is issued to the armies to prepare the next withdrawal movement for the night October 18/19, as already ordered on October 16, by Secret Order No. 10195, Operations Section. However, the high ground between the mouths of the ESCAILLON and SELLE Creek is to be held as long as possible. * * *

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 18, 1918.

[Extract]

Estimate of the Situation: The situation in the sector and the right flank of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince requires a reinforcement of the Second Army. This reinforcement must be made at the expense of the Second Army [Eighteenth Army?], especially in view of the fact that the main pressure of the enemy will be directed against the Second Army, after the Eighteenth Army has moved its line back.

Measures by the Group: Orders issued to the armies to continue the HERMANN Movement during the night of October 18/19 * * *

Antwerp-Meuse Movement

Operations Quartermaster Sections
No. 10244

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 18, 1918.

To: Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventeenth Armies.

[Extract]

The armies will immediately make preparations for the A-M Movement. They will be guided by the following principles:

1. Tactical Principles:

(a) The situation may require either a slow or a rapid withdrawal from the HERMANN Position into the A-M Position. The number of intermediate positions to be selected and the length of the halt in them will be governed accordingly.

* * * * *

(c) After the A-M Movement has been completed, the following changes in tactical dispositions are planned:

The Second Army will be released, together with the inspector general of the army communications zone.

* * * * *

2. Principles governing the evacuation of the territory between the LYS-HERMANN Position and the A-M Position.

(a) The evacuation from the entire territory of all articles of military value as well as requisitioned farm products, to the extent to which their transport to the rear has so far been ordered by the Quartermaster general, will be continued with all means available. Evacuation by sector may be desirable. * * *

Everything that can be spared will be shipped direct into Germany; * * * everything else will be transported as far in rear of the A-M Position as possible.

Only those supplies which are absolutely necessary will remain in the depots and parks between the LYS-HERMANN Position and the A-M Position. The systematic evacuation of these depots, etc., will be prepared.

(b) During the entire evacuation movement the necessary measures will be taken to prevent looting. Only those articles of military value which have been properly requisitioned (see Paragraph 2 a) may be transported to the rear. Everything else, especially household utensils and furniture, is private property and must not be taken. * * *

(c) To ensure smooth execution of the retrograde movement, the following items are of particular importance:

Early determination of the transportation requirements,

Compilation of a complete priority list for the entire army area,

Thorough organization of unloading (labor details and transportation at the unloading stations, unloading officers),

Rendering mobile all fixed and lines-of-communication supply agencies by disposing of all immobile elements.

(d) Attention is directed to the reinforcement of the service of security in the rear areas (railroad and bridge protection, prevention of illicit traffic in weapons).

It is recommended that during the retrograde movement rear divisions be quartered in the suburbs or environs of the big cities.

(e) Efforts must be made to coordinate the rear installations of the Second Army in rear of the A-M Position in the zone of the "south" army with the installations of the Seventeenth Army in such a manner that duplications will be avoided and the groundwork be laid for the later withdrawal of the line of communications agencies of the Second Army. Further orders will follow.

It will be of advantage to the Second Army to establish its installations north of the south boundary of the south army, to the extent local conditions permit.

3. Demolition: Most important are the preparations for the thorough demolition of all important roads and telephone facilities. In addition to the destruction of the roads, its is important that they be barricaded, especially against tanks.

* * * * *

Withdrawals

Operations Section
No. 10271

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 19, 1918.

Teletype to Fourth, Sixth, Seventeenth, and Second Armies

To Supreme Headquarters and Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

During the night of October 19/20 the HERMANN Movement will be continued in the sectors of the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies. Exact times will be arranged between the armies.

1. The Sixth Army will also withdraw its left flank into the HERMANN Position. * * *

The Seventeenth Army will withdraw its right flank into a position forming the chord of the salient. It is planned to hold that position as long as possible, but to withdraw under strong enemy pressure. The final withdrawal movement, as positions in rear of the SCHELDE, will be prepared. Final orders to this effect will be issued later.

2. The Group will fight for a decision in the LYS-HERMANN Position, which must be held at all costs.

Troop Positions during Peace Discussions

Operations Section,
No. 10280

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 19, 1918.

Teletype from Supreme Headquarters of October 19, 1918

Order No. 10906, Operations Section

[Extract]

How long it will take to clarify the situation concerning the results of our peace negotiations, is uncertain. Under the sole supposition that the war will be continued, the organization of the position must be rushed vigorously. In this connection the following principles will govern:

1. The HERMANN-GUDRUN Position will be held as long as this is at all possible. We will fight for a decision there. A withdrawal from the attacks will be made only locally and in exceptional cases. The position will be organized and the troops occupying it will be disposed in it with that idea as much in mind as possible. But if the heavy enemy attacks continue, it may happen that the HERMANN-GUDRUN Position cannot continue to be

permanent. Therefore, when organizing the position, the possibility must be taken into consideration, that we shall be forced to withdraw within a few weeks.

2. Therefore, the possible rearward movement will be prepared by mapping out lines of resistance and march routes, as has already been initiated by the groups. Whether the withdrawal, when the time comes, will be made in one bound or with as much delay as possible, depends on the situation. At any rate it is necessary to gain time for the organization of the A-M [ANTWERP-MEUSE] Position.

3. Since the reconnaissances for the A-M Position have already been started, all forces available must now be used to get the organization of this position under way. For this purpose the mass of the work parties in and in rear of the A-M Position must be employed. Only the absolutely necessary forces will be employed in and in rear of the HERMANN and GUDRUN Positions. It will be necessary to forego construction of intermediate positions. * * *

4. In the work of organization itself it is important quickly to build lines capable of defense and strong points with obstacles distributed in depth, so that the troops will quickly find a strong point around which to organize their defense. In addition, material will be held ready where it will be needed.

A systematic organization of the position following weeks of preparation and a preliminary determination of all details as in the year 1917 when the SIEGFRIED or GUDRUN Position was built, is not in order, as circumstances may necessitate an early occupation of the A-M Position.

5. The evacuation of the territory between the HERMANN-GUDRUN and ANTWERP-MEUSE Positions must continue uninterrupted. Demolition of roads and means of communication will be prepared. Devastation of the country is prohibited.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

HS. Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VII: Order

What Men are Fit to Fight

Operations Section
No. 10945

SUPREME HEADQUARTEXS,
October 21, 1918.

I am repeatedly hearing it said that men suitable for garrison employment believe that they do not need to fight and that officers are afraid to demand that they do. We must do all within our power to make a definite break with this completely erroneous conception.

Field forces suitable for garrison and labor employment who are at all physically capable of bearing arms must fight.

LUDENDORFF.

Serious Supply Situation

GERMAN THIRD ARMY,
October 22, 1918.

Communication from Supreme Headquarters by Col. Heye, on October 22, 1918, Army Headquarters Balan

Supreme Headquarters is well aware of the difficult problems confronting commanders and troops. Deeds of heroism have been done. It has been shown that this Army is the very spot where the troops can achieve decisive results, particularly in the attack.

The present critical situation is directly traceable to the situation in the east. In view of this situation and the fact that the troops are in need of rest, the German Government has made a peace offer to our enemies.

Long ago Bulgaria started to make overtures for peace with the Entente and secured favorable conditions for herself in time. The withdrawal of the Bulgarian army came as a surprise to us. During that time the German troops carried out their missions with their well-known bravery. Finally they had to retreat and were covered by the Austrian General Koevess in the region of NISCH. In this movement much materiel was lost, and many officers and men were taken prisoners.

In Bulgaria 3 divisions are in movement from the east to the west. Austria wanted to send another 2 divisions upon request. These 5 divisions were turned around. They are now being withdrawn, since Bulgaria has become a neutral.

Serbia is free of our troops, as they are on the homeward march behind the DANUBE.

A portion of the enemy troops was headed east from the very outset, in order to take CONSTANTINOPLE. The operation on land is to be accompanied by an operation of the fleet. Submarines are reported to be in the DARDANELLES at this very moment. The fall of CONSTANTINOPLE is only a question of time. When that happens, Turkey will be lost for us. Communication is impossible, except by way of the Black Sea, from CONSTANZA. Roumania can be expected to ally herself with the Entente. French troops fired upon Roumanian territory from Bulgaria.

General von Mackensen disposes of 5 German and 5 Austrian divisions, as well as 1 Austrian cavalry division. With these troops he is to exert pressure in a surprise operation on MOLDAU and JASSY, if necessary.

If Roumania is no longer with us, then the oil supply will stop. We still have oil on hand for 2 months for airplanes and 8 months for submarine warfare. For a few months longer we should be supplied with stocks on an exchange basis. It is also necessary to influence the Ukraine, because the Ukraine supplies Austria and our eastern territory and furnishes cattle and horses for the interior.

To be sure, it seems as if Bolshevism was establishing a firm foothold in the Ukraine. If the Ukraine is eliminated, 10 divisions will be released there.

In Russia proper, Bolshevism is again rampant and attempting to spread to the west. The commander of the upper east wants to retain the 8 divisions located there.

Consequently there are 10 to 12 divisions coming from the east, 7 have arrived, 3 have started to move up. 20 to 22 divisions were expected to come from the east to the west. But the divisions of the west are content to do without aid permeated with Bolshevism. The divisions of the east consist essentially only of men between the ages of 35 and 40, who to be sure have done their duty here in the west in a thoroughly superb manner.

For the most part the men are not well trained now and therefore would have to be at first trained and subjected to discipline for a few months; therefore, they cannot be considered.

Reports from Austria are unfavorable. The Italian front stands firm, and morale is good. In the Italian attacks 60 Italian divisions attacked 53 Austrian divisions.

Help from the ally cannot be counted on beyond December 1. Italian forces will then perhaps be on the west front.

The following forces can still be moved this year to the west front: Approximately 600,000 men, including recruits now in the field recruit depots and including the recuperated men and industrial workers; 75,000 of these on November 1.

Supreme Headquarters would appreciate it if the armies would submit recommendations as to what divisions are considered for replacements. From time to time the quartermaster generals must institute investigations, perhaps by Landsturm troops, for stragglers and malingerers. It is necessary that railroad authorities work in the closest cooperation with commanders.

At present 1/2 million men are on furlough; for the time being an additional 4% are listed. Later it will be decided whether furloughs are to be discontinued or whether a small percentage is to be allowed. Suspension of furloughs is occasioned at present by the railroad situation. 2,000 cars daily are now moving to the homeland.

Energetic support by the quartermaster generals is needed, particularly in evacuation. Only the most necessary items will be moved to the rear. In one army communications zone horse manure and bones are reported to have been moved to the rear recently.

The replacement situation is not very favorable. The troops lack much-needed rest. This need of rest led to the peace offer 4 weeks ago. The enemy has recognized that fact and will not allow us any rest. He is attacking continuously, first here, then there, and the reserves are constantly on the move. No more reserves are available, not even in the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht.

Despite this situation, Supreme Headquarters must make the demand that the present position continue to hold out.

In this sector the situation is favorable; in the sector of the Fourth and Second Armies it is more difficult and will grow increasingly so in the course of time. Political reasons demand that every foot of ground be defended stubbornly.

It depends on the decision of President Wilson how much longer we are going to fight. Wilson is believed to be honest, Foch the contrary, and England is soft as putty. It is possible that Wilson will come up with severe conditions.

Completely destroyed territory has made it difficult for the enemy to pursue.

Enemy propaganda must be taken in hand. The Imperial Chancellor does not want to fan up the war.

Another withdrawal would make it possible for us to shorten our line; 25 divisions would be saved by so doing. To be sure, the enemy would also achieve economy in forces.

The old objective of the French is still ALSACE-LORRAINE.

The situation on the railroads has had an unfavorable effect on the bringing up of ammunition and replacements. The supplies promised to the armies also failed to come up to the extent required. Supreme Headquarters would welcome any suggestions how to remedy the situation.

Latest enemy reports as well as our own reports indicate that the enemy followed us by railroad with comparative speed. Apparently the railroads have not been thoroughly destroyed in time; in some instances the railroad troops had not been furnished sufficient explosives by the pioneers. In many instances the troops fighting at the front believed it was too soon to set off charges, as this action would indicate to the enemy our intentions to withdraw.

For the time being non-military demolitions will be avoided.

It is reported that the population participated in the fighting in some instances. Supreme Headquarters desires to be informed of such occurrences.

Are there any organizations that can be dissolved? Supreme Headquarters is open to suggestions. It is necessary to reduce the supply trains.

Studies are in progress concerning the dissolution of divisions. Some divisions may possibly be reorganized as mixed brigades.

BUSCH.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Memorandum

Officers' Responsibilities

Operations Section

No. 10950

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY.

October 22, 1918.

In the grave situation with which our country and the army is confronted, the officer especially must endeavor to fulfill the heavy responsibilities of his proud profession with the utmost devotion, in order to stand faultless before God, His Majesty the Emperor, the people, and his conscience. He must be the example for the soldier.

The soldierly virtues demanded of every soldier in the Articles of War must be demanded of the officer in increased measure. They grow to be duties of the profession, concerning which the supreme war lord leaves no doubt in the introduction to the Order of His Majesty on the subject of the courts of honor of the officers in the Prussian army. These words must be well known to every officer.

Strict self-discipline, moderation, and a morally irreproachable life must be demanded of every officer.

Furthermore he is responsible for the discipline in the army. Nothing is more serious than a weakening of discipline. It is and will continue to be, the indispensable foundation for the achievements of every army. Correct use of the punitive authority necessary to the maintenance of discipline represents a difficult problem and a great responsibility for the young officer. Energy and calm judgment are indispensable in its exercise. In serious cases the will to assert one's authority may demand the use of arms.

Complaints on the part of the men must be treated with the utmost scrupulousness. Only in this manner can a feeling of confidence be established which will survive the test of battle.

The troop officer lives and fights with his troops and shares their joys and sorrows. The relationship to his men must be ennobled by an untiring solicitude for the welfare of every individual man in all matters within the officer's jurisdiction, especially that of his rations and quarters. War even more than peace times makes it necessary for the officer to study the mentality of the man. The younger the officer and the older the man, the more difficult is the problem of the officer. But it can be solved. Even the old Landsturmmann looks up to the officer and follows him willingly, no matter how young he is, if the officer knows how to win the confidence of his subordinates by his devotion to the service and his personal behavior. The officer must talk with his men, study their personal problems and enlighten them concerning the daily events. The plight in which the fatherland would find itself if we were to lose, is to be discussed as well as the necessity of making a gallant stand in order to keep the worst from happening to our beloved fatherland.

The complaint is made that the officers live better than the men at the expense of the latter. The accusations contained in such complaints are so serious that I cannot help but challenge them. However, the very semblance of such a thing must be avoided. In general,

the troop officer must eat from the same kitchen as the men. In close billets in towns it is of course quite permissible to maintain officers' messes, in order to preserve comradeship within the officer corps, but life in these clubs must be kept appropriately simple. The same applies to the headquarters, which will, of course, receive the same rations as the men.

Special attacks are directed against the conduct of the officers in the line of communications zone. I expect that a special investigation will be made on this subject. The effect cannot fail to be demoralizing if conditions are allowed that at all resemble personal favoritism.

Fairness in the matter of furloughs is the foundation for the good spirits of the troops. Again and again the complaint is heard that officers' servants are given furloughs rather frequently, to carry packages to Germany.

Shipments to Germany to alleviate the distress in the living conditions of dependents certainly are permissible, provided they keep within the bounds of the orders issued in this respect. However, if the complaints concerning shipments of contributions in kind, particularly at the expense of the men, are confirmed in any way, then such actions are unwarranted.

The officer must return the salute of the soldier, but he is also required to see to it that the mark of respect to which he is entitled is given him.

Anyone complaining about lack of discipline, who at the same time tolerates not being saluted, is himself responsible for the disintegration of discipline.

Frequently the criticism is made that the men of units that have been relieved from the front line are not allowed the necessary rest and relaxation. These are absolutely necessary.

Much additional hardship and suffering will be imposed on every officer and man. Love and loyalty for our emperor and for our country, the heritage of our fathers, must remain the common good of the army, exemplified by each officer. Only in this manner shall we continue to be a proud people, and the officer the pillar of our future.

von HINDENBURG.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Estimate of the Situation

Military Political Division

No. 37317

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
October 23, 1918.

[Extract]

After we had completed the rather extensive movement on the CHAMPAGNE Front to positions in rear of the AISNE, the center of gravity of the enemy attacks shifted to the region on either side of VOUIZIERS as far as GRANDPRE. These attacks go hand in hand with the attacks of the Americans between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE. After the initial success

of September 26, won by a surprise attack, this fighting has brought the Americans only local and strategically unimportant gains in ground. Their losses are heavy. Renewal of large-scale attacks here are expected.

* * * * *

Group of Armies Gallwitz, Received Oct. 26, 1918, No. 380.

LUDENDORFF.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Memorandum

Withdrawal Problems

Railroad Section
No. 5485
Reference No. 436

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF RAILROADS,
October 30, 1918.

REASONS AGAINST AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL INTO THE ANTWERP-MEUSE POSITION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE RAILROADS

I. Evacuation of the territory located in front of the A-M Position: An early withdrawal into the A-M Position would preclude shipping to the rear the tremendous quantities of supplies lying in front of the position. The number of trains required for the movement of valuable material alone is so great that we must expect the evacuation to take at least 1 to 2 months. If we do not have this much time available for evacuation, it will be necessary to leave considerable quantities of valuable material to the enemy or destroy them. To a great extent the supplies concerned are of the kind that would be of special importance either for the troops if fighting is continued or for provisioning the homeland. In view of the increasing scarcity of raw materials it would be difficult to replace them.

In addition, it must be considered that an early withdrawal into A-M Position would cause the loss of a close-meshed network of highly improved railroads with numerous depots operating effectively, and that this loss of extensive operating stretches would considerably increase the problems existing at the present time on the railroads of occupied territory. The present difficult operating conditions are directly traceable to the fact that, at the time the HERMAN-GUDRUN Position was occupied, it became necessary to withdraw all the rolling stock of the abandoned lines within a short time, the logical consequence of which was to overcrowd the rear areas. This accumulation of rolling stock with the attendant operating complications that are inevitable and to our disadvantage, will even be materially increased if the territory in front of the A-M Position is evacuated at a time when the measures initiated for the removal of superfluous cars are gradually beginning to take effect. Unless a great quantity of rolling stock is left behind on the abandoned tracks, a speedy evacuation of additional territory would lead to an operating catastrophe to our railroads in the occupied territory.

If this is to be avoided, the early occupation of the A-M Position can be effected only if the rolling stock on the abandoned tracks is left to the enemy in order not to jam

the railroads in the rear areas completely with cars. However, the forfeiture of such large amounts of rolling stock would represent a loss which could never be replaced during the war, in view of the already existing general shortage.

II. The Railroad Net in Rear of the A-M Position: The conditions for troop movements of every sort will become much worse, compared with the present conditions, after the withdrawal into the A-M Position. To begin with, in addition to a lack of efficiently operating feeder lines to the front, particularly in the zone of the Group of Armies Crown Prince Wilhelm, there are not enough efficient parallels in rear of the position. Furthermore, empty cars have to be held on sidings in the rear areas in the homeland, because of the lack of suitable marshalling yards in the occupied territory, and must be moved to the front over the frontier crossings which are already heavily taxed. As a result, we cannot expect troop movements to begin as promptly as before. In future the military railway authorities will require a longer period for preparations than heretofore.

The railroads near the frontier of the homeland will be further taxed by the shipment to the rear of the ammunition reserves formerly laid down in occupied territory. These increased shipments represent a considerable extra load on the railroads of the western home territory, which are already being used to capacity for military purposes. It can only be taken care of by an increase in siding construction. However, the means necessary for this construction are not available at present.

The service of supply in rear of the A-M Position will also become much worse compared with what the troops have been used to before. In rear of the new position the troops will find neither efficiently operating unloading depots nor an organized field railway net, and will have to curb their demands on the railroads quite generally. Since in the construction railroads in rear of the A-M Position, operative requirements must be considered first, and the installations necessary to insure smooth operation must all be constructed before any others, it will be necessary to postpone the construction of unloading depots and the field railway net until later. Therefore, as far as the service of supply is concerned, in case of an early occupation of the position, the troops will have to make the best of extraordinarily limited installations of low efficiency.

III. In case of the possible withdrawal of the northern portion of the A-M Position to the rear of the MEUSE sector, the problems in the supply service of the position and in carrying out troop movements will increase still further. In that case only the narrow portion of the front located north of LIEGE can be supplied via AACHEN by efficiently operating railroads, while the supply of the adjacent front which is of larger dimensions will have to be based on the EIFEL passes, some of which are already severely taxed by other demands and are not favorable from the operating standpoint on account of the heavy grades. Two lines may be considered for this purpose, the one via TROIS PONTS toward RIVAGE, and the other via GOUVY---LIBRAMONT---MARLOIS. Since the use of the first line is not possible beyond RIVAGE, owing to the proximity of the front, the main portion of the LIEGE-NAMUR Position must be supplied via the line LIBRAMONT-MARLOIS which also has to serve as feeder line for the adjoining portion of the front to the south. This is more of a load than can be handled by this line considering its operating capacity.

A further important disadvantage of the northern portion of the front lies in the fact that the branches of this line, which run through mountainous territory, have limited station facilities, totally inadequate for the supply of the troops. To expand these stations would in most cases be impossible in view of the local conditions. To this must be added that troop movements to and from the right wing of the army on the mountain railroads which are already under heavy demands involved in supplying the troops, are as good as impossible, and that all movements must be effected on the railroads of the national frontier which are already heavily burdened.

von OLDERSHAUSEN.

[In a late document, No. 11183 of November 3, von Hindenburg states “. . . the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position, which existed only on paper”]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Political Propaganda

Intelligence Section
No. 4304/18

GERMAN COMPOSITE ARMY C,
October 27, 1918.

To: Group of Armies Gallwitz

Officers well acquainted with the frame of mind of the peasantry of BADEN have made the observation that in BADEN the campaign of inciting large segments of the population against Prussia has assumed alarming proportions. We are assured that a large part of the population of BADEN declares the Prussians to be their worst enemies, and not the French or the English.

Since the campaign to stir up the various German states against each other is one of the points in the program of the enemy propaganda service, it seems obvious to perceive in the veering around of public opinion in BADEN the work of enemy propaganda, the more so as a spreading of the influence beyond the Swiss border lies entirely within the realm of possibility.

In view of the otherwise favorable disposition of the BADEN population, our own propaganda under the leadership of capable individuals, will probably have no difficulty in bringing back the misled population of BADEN upon the right track, by the use of proper enlightenment.

Army Headquarters desires to invite the attention of the group of armies to this matter with the request that Supreme Headquarters be induced to take suitable counter-measures through the domestic propaganda service, the more so as it has already been noticed that the discord noted above is spreading to troops of the BADEN contingent.

FUCHS,
Lieut. General, Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. IV: Field Message

Withdrawal of Front of Seventh Army

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: SENT: October 27, 1918: 9:30 a. m. No. 2909

TO: Seventh Army

A brief report is requested before the end of the forenoon concerning the following points:

1. Is the army in its present positions and with the forces at its disposal able to offer successful resistance to heavy enemy attacks?
2. Does the army consider it necessary that the front be withdrawn and if so, in what manner (by sector, according to the enemy pressure, or in a general coordinated movement)?

In this connection it must be taken into account that the A-M [ANTWERP-MEUSE] Position is not yet sufficiently organized for defense, and that the provisioning of the troops in the A-M Position would encounter difficulties at present because of the inadequacy of the railroad net. However, the decisions must be guided by the consideration that under any circumstances a breakthrough must be prevented.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Mutiny

Operations Section
No. 407

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
October 30, 1918--6:45 p. m.

To Supreme Headquarters

[Extract]

On October 29, about 200 men of a regiment of the 18th Landwehr Division refused to go into the line. Very severe measures have been taken. Report will follow. Two more regiments of this division, which has many Alsations and Poles in it, are not reliable, according to the report of the division commander. Nevertheless the Group of Armies will put the division in line and will effect the relief of the 10th Inf. Div. as ordered.

* * * * *

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

Directions for Execution of Antwerp-Meuse Movement

Operations Section
No. 11080

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
October 30, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The ANTWERP-MAAS Movement will probably be effected in general in accordance with the reports of the groups of armies. * * * The time of execution of the entire front or on portions of the front will be ordered by this Headquarters.

2. * * * Chronological coordination with the Group of Armies German Crown Prince would have to be effected by an order of Supreme Headquarters allowing the right wing of Group of Armies German Crown Prince a head start of 2 days. Local coordination on the boundary will have to be arranged in detail between the Second and Eighteenth Armies in each case. Whether short bounds will be made in the withdrawal, as contemplated by the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht, or longer bounds as planned by the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, with rest days inserted, is left to the discretion of the groups of armies and must be adjusted on the boundary.

3. The dissolution and movement of units at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters must begin while the retrograde movement is in progress. Not later than the first march day at least a portion of the units to be withdrawn will be separated from the tactical control of the group of armies and will be placed at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters at a point previously to be designated. In this connection the following is directed:

(a) Armies: The Second and Eighteenth Armies will be dissolved as quickly as possible after the A-M Position has been occupied. The time and location will be reported by the groups of armies.

(b) Corps: The Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht will withdraw 2 and the Group of Armies German Crown Prince 3 corps for a speedy dissolution. The corps will be designated by number by this Headquarters; time and location will be reported. If necessary, the withdrawal of the corps need not be effected until their arrival in the A-M Position.

In the near future the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht will have to give up 1 additional corps and the Group of Armies German Crown Prince 2 additional corps.

(c) Divisions: The Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht will place initially 8 divisions at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters and the Group of Armies German Crown Prince 6 divisions. Of these divisions, 4 of each group of armies will start the rearward movement without delay, not later than the 1st march day. When the time comes, Supreme Headquarters will decide which divisions will be G. H. Q. reserve, after consulting the wishes of the groups of armies.

(d) Separate Units: Special orders will be issued for these.

4. I approve of the contemplated disposition in the A-M Position. However, the groups of armies must reckon with the fact that additional detachments and combinations of units will soon have to be demanded by Supreme Headquarters to achieve greater economy in the use of the headquarters, means of communications, and the trains.

By order:

GROENER.

[Groener now succeeds Ludendorff.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

Instructions for the Withdrawal Behind the Meuse

To Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The development of the situation may lead to a further withdrawal of the right wing of the west front behind the MAAS at LUTTICH [LIEGE] and NAMUR. This position is very unfavorable from a railroad technical standpoint. A withdrawal into those locations can be considered only in an emergency case.

The Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht is being instructed to prepare the withdrawal according to the following principles:

1. The preparations will initially be limited to reconnaissance and charting on maps. The armies will not be informed of the measures under consideration before beginning of the ANTWERP-MAAS Movement.

2. Before the movement starts, the Seventh Army will be attached to the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht.

3. Only 2 armies, the Sixth and Seventh, are planned to remain in the MAAS Position. The other armies and as many other headquarters and troops as possible will be withdrawn during or after the movement and will be placed at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters. It is contemplated to organize an army echelon northeast of AACHEN, under the control of the Fourth Army.

von HINDENBURG.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

Demolitions in the Kriegsmarsch Area

Operations Section
No. 2934

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
October 31, 1918.

To First, Third, Seventh and Eighteenth Armies

Concerning demolitions in the Keiegsmarsch [code word, "war march"] area, the following supplementary orders are issued:

1. Wells will not be destroyed nor rendered unfit for use.

2. Steeples will not be destroyed, with the exception of those which are located immediately in front of the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position and can with certainty be assumed to be used by enemy observers because other surmounting observation points are lacking.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. V: Report

Disapproval of Measures Contemplated for Antwerp-Meuse Position

To His Excellency von Hintze

On October 25, under No. 10947, Supreme Headquarters submitted to the Government General of Brussels the telegrams exchanged with the Group of Armies German Crown Prince concerning the organization of the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position. This order prescribes that as long as we are dealing with exigencies of war, all other considerations must be ignored, so that the group of armies is granted maximum authority for the destruction of towns, villages, factories and woods and the evacuation of civilians. If plans are carried out in this manner, the towns of CHARLEROI, CHATELET, VIREUX, CHARLEVILLE, MEZIERES, SEDAN, DONCHERY and TORNY would be affected and probably be annihilated.

I request that Supreme Headquarters be impressed with the fact that the execution of these downright monstrous measures as they are contemplated by the Group of Armies German Crown Prince is no longer justified in view of the present situation. The politics of the Imperial Chancery would be completely thwarted. A storm of indignation would arise in the neutral and enemy countries, causing all negotiations to be broken off immediately.

A report by wire requested.

MAX,
Prince of Baden,
Imperial Chancellor.

HS Ger. File: 810-3.5: Fldr. I: Memorandum

Provisions to Meet Expected Allied Attack

No. 415

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
October 31, 1918.

To Supreme Headquarters

Reference: Supreme Hq., Operations Section No. 11102

[Extract]

The reentry into line of the fresh American 79th Division and the French 15th Colonial Division, the great activity of the enemy's artillery and aviation east of the MEUSE, and the heavy traffic observed since the afternoon of October 30 moving east toward VERDUN, point to the expected large-scale attack west of the MEUSE and also indicate an intention to attack on a large scale east of that river. Troops occupying the front of the Fifth Army are reduced in strength by heavy fighting. Only the tired 117th and 36th Inf. Divs. available as reserves. 20th Inf. Div. not yet fit for employment. Relief of the Austro-Hungarian 1st and 106th Inf. Divs. necessary. Therefore, release of the 236th Inf. Div. to the METZ Group not possible. Front of Composite Army C weakly held by Landwehr divisions. Relief of the Austro-Hungarian 35th Inf. Div. by the tired 45th Res. Div. in progress. Therefore the 241st Inf. Div. indispensable as reserve in rear of the center of Composite Army C. Commitment of the inferior and extremely unreliable 18th Landwehr Div. only possible after sorting out several hundred mutineers. To guard the

11-km. wide sector that is to be taken over by it, the completely exhausted 2d Landwehr Inf. Div. (actual strength 330 men) is not sufficient.

According to statements made by prisoners from the American 7th and 92d Divisions, and the observations of enemy activity and traffic in the rear area, an early attack against METZ is not precluded. In view of the importance of METZ, the removal of the 10th Inf. Div. in the present situation would constitute the greatest danger. Therefore, the Group of Armies again urgently requests that the 10th Inf. Div. be permitted to remain here. * * *

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Growth of Bolshevism in German Army

Operations Section
No. 3956 - 420

COMPOSITE ARMY C,
October 31, 1918.

[Extract]

On the strength of reports and conferences with subordinate headquarters and units, the Army makes the following report:

Some of the troops employed in the east up to the present, were exposed too long to the demoralizing influence of the Russian revolution and Bolshevistic propaganda. With their ideas they are poisoning the minds of the soldiers of the army on the west front which so far had remained firm. Therefore it is dangerous to use troops transported from the east as replacements in western divisions, and it often constitutes not a strengthening but a great peril for the west front. But above all, troops that received a great many Alsations and Lothringians by transfer to the east must not now be used in the Imperial Provinces of ALSACE and LORRAINE.

The constantly recurring discussion in the newspapers, concerning the imminent recession of ALSACE-LORRAINE, DANZIG and other portions of the Prussian east provinces has not been devoid of consequences for the troops. Alsations and Lothringians in rather large numbers have refused to fight against their future fatherland, France. Although there has been no evidence of insubordination so far among the soldiers from Prussian-Polish territories, nevertheless they too are animatedly discussing the proposition that they will soon be a part of the new Poland and that therefore it is senseless for them to keep on fighting for Germany. In view of the speed with which such ideas are disseminated today, it cannot be doubted that we are faced by the great danger that units which are still good today will no longer be reliable a few weeks hence. If such a situation arises to a rather large extent in several divisions, then there will be no longer any means to proceed against these people.

Then too, the circulation of newspapers and pamphlets of the Independent Social Democrats, openly and secretly inciting to revolution, has a demoralizing effect at present. * * * Measures must be taken immediately to prevent and render punishable the distribution of such pamphlets and newspapers in the Army.

The home press of every shade of political opinion must immediately initiate a systematic and skillful counterpropaganda against the enemy propaganda bent on the spreading of

Bolshevism and the incitement of southern Germany against northern Germany. For this purpose it is necessary that short but impressive articles be published again and again which will show the consequences of a dissolution of the social order and disintegration of the country in the right light and will underline the fact that commerce, industry, jobs and bread are inseparable.

By order of the Army Commander:

FAUPE,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Estimate of the Situation

Military Political Division
Propaganda Section
No. 37569

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
October 31, 1918.

[Extract]

West: Since our withdrawal to the LYS the enemy has been seeking to reduce the LYS Position by continuous attacks southwest of DEYNZE and between the LYS and the SCHELDE. This intention still seems to persist. The attacks are made by the French and English; the Belgian army has remained inactive recently.

The relentless shelling of the localities in and east of the lowlands of the SCHELDE by the English artillery caused heavy casualties to the population and is forcing the people to abandon the region.

The English attacks between the SCHELDE and the OISE, started October 23, were intended to reduce that front by an advance on MAUBEUGE and AVESNES. After the local success on the first day of attack their main effort was made in a northerly direction. Continuation of these attacks can be expected.

Between the OISE and AISNE, the local attacks of the French, conducted since the middle of October, have developed into large-scale attacks designed to open the OISE and AISNE front. So far they have been without even local success. The very large forces engaged indicate a continuation of the attacks. East of the AISNE the French limited themselves after the failure of their large-scale attacks to local minor operations, which led to no change in the situation. After the heavy losses which the Americans suffered last month on either side of the MEUSE, they have not yet sufficiently recovered to undertake coordinated attacks on a large scale. However, such attacks are in preparation at present.

* * * * *

By order:

HEYE.

[The month of October had brought events of world-wide importance throughout the whole theater of war. German sailors had mutinied at KIEL. The British had taken ALEPPO and decisively defeated the Turks on the TIGRIS. The Serbians had taken NISH. King Ferdinand had abdicated and Bulgaria was no longer an asset to the Central Powers. On the western front the British-American attack (the SOMME Offensive) had reached the SCHELDT River, while the Franco-American attack was steadily rolling the German lines back, capturing critical points all along the front. Austria, beaten at the front, driven across the PIAVE River, and torn by internal revolution, sent Armistice Commissioners to Italy on the same day, October 31, that Turkey ceased fighting. Ludendorff resigned his command on October 27. American participation in battle had now definitely turned the balance in favor of the Allies and Foch was able to plan and execute the hammer blows that, in the next eleven days, would bring the conflict to a close.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. V: Report

Reply to Reproaches of Imperial Chancellor

Operations Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMIES,
November 1, 1918.

No. 11141

To His Excellency von Hintze

Reference: Wire No. 2849, Imperial Chancellor, October 30 [31?], 1918.

In wire No. 2883, Group of Armies German Crown Prince, it is expressly stated that the preparations concerned involve clearing of the field of fire at very close range but no destructions on a larger scale. As long as it is necessary to carry on a war and organize positions, this measure cannot be abandoned. It is a universally recognized exigency of war, in the execution of which as much consideration is to be exercised as possible, although not all rigors can be avoided. This assurance has been made to the Foreign Office again and again and also was expressly mentioned in Wire No. 10947, October 25, 1918.

The request of the Imperial Chancellor implies no more nor less than that we are to abandon completely organizing a position in Belgium and the north of France. I do not believe that such a demand would be justified in view of the present situation. It would render us practically defenseless. In my opinion, reference to the unavoidable destructions forced upon us by the war should constitute a strong means of exerting pressure in our politics particularly at this moment. This, of course, would require that we assume the standpoint of the aggressor and accuser instead of being content with the roll of the accused forced upon us.

Moreover, the concept exigency of war is stretched to a far greater extent by our enemies. It made them destroy their own towns. The Foreign Office is daily receiving reports on that account.

I would have been grateful if the Imperial Chancellor, before reproaching Supreme Headquarters and, indirectly, the entire German army, for the "downright monstrous measures" and for "completely thwarting the policy of the Imperial Chancery" would have paid attention to the objective reasoning following from the conditions of war.

A copy of the telegram of the Imperial Chancellor and above reply is being submitted to the group of armies with renewed instructions to limit all rigors to the possible minimum; another copy is sent to the Governor General of Belgium.

von HINDENBURG,
General Field Marshal.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. II: Report

Estimate of Political and Military Factors

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
November 2, 1918.

[Extract]

Conference with His Excellency Groener

* * * * *

His Excellency Groener

The situation at home is more alarming than that at the front. The new government has not succeeded in gaining full control of the state. Bolshevism has spread into East Hungary; up to now only very isolated instances of it have sprung up in our country.

The Fatherland can be saved only if the army cooperates within itself.

Provision has been made for the men in battle, not for those behind the front. It is the duty of all commanders to make every effort to secure discipline.

Military Situation: Deliberation as to whether to hold the present position or to take possession of the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position.

Disengagement from the enemy brings the troops rest and sleep. Reorganization can be carried out if necessary; on the other hand, holding out in the present position is of enormous political importance. A withdrawal of the front at this time will produce a more widespread critical depression at home, a triumph for the enemy.

The 2d Guard Division has been transported to BERLIN for political reasons; one division has been moved to MUNICH: a further shifting of battalions, machine gun sharpshooter detachments and artillery into the coal district becomes necessary.

In advance of the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position there are still at this time 30,000 wounded Germans and 800 vehicles, which can not yet be evacuated because of road stoppage. The great disadvantage of the ANTWERP-MEUSE Positions consists in the extremely faulty rail-road net east of the position which is just sufficient for the supply of the army and can scarcely be considered for a lateral shifting of the reserves. This would make the whole defense exceedingly difficult since there would also be an insufficiency of local reserves available.

The Chancellor of the Empire gave out the information that the answer of the Entente was to be expected in 3 or 4 days. We must hold out at all costs until that time. Further decisions will depend on the result of this answer.

If the defense is shifted into the ANTWERP-MEUSE or the GRENZ Position a great part of the war industry will stop, especially an exchange between the ore and coal industries.

According to the experts' reports we have enough weapons and ammunition to last until April if we continue to occupy the GRENZ Position for two months more only.

Our sources of military strength lie in LORRAINE, the SAAR Basin and the RUHR District. For these reasons it is impossible to carry on a war in Germany since this very location would block off these resources.

Supreme Headquarters expressly calls attention to the fact that despite the great disadvantage which the withdrawal of the western front will entail, the German army ought by no means to be smashed in its present position. Supreme Headquarters has left the choosing of the proper moment for the evacuation to the discretion of the armies which at all times will have to adjudge the question in the light of all factors being taken into consideration.

F. D. R.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Estimate of the Situation

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
November 2, 1918?

No. 431

Our American opponent, who had allowed himself eight days in which to make new preparations after his heavy losses, yesterday used all his available means decisively to force back the elements of the Fifth Army that were still west of the MEUSE. The first breakthrough was made in the sector of the 52d Inf. Div., which after an insufficient rest had to be put back in line a second time because fresh divisions were lacking. On the evening before, one of its battalions was entirely destroyed by being shelled with an apparently new gas. The exterior flanks of the ARGONNE and MEUSE-WEST Groups, which had held their positions, have been withdrawn because of the deep penetration, into the FREYA Position, a position existing in name only. The left flank of the Third Army likewise was withdrawn.

Only tired divisions, and those back in rest areas, can be brought up as reserves. Of the reserves formerly located here, the 17th Res. Div. and the 103d Inf. Div. have been transferred away from the Group of Armies. The 20th and 241st Inf. Divs. recently transferred here for refitting, are not yet ready. The 10th Inf. Div. also is to be moved away. In addition, 3 Austro-Hungarian divisions had to be relieved by German troops. The reinforcements required to the Group of Armies to serve as pivot and support for future operations therefore have not been supplied. The bow which has been stretched too far cannot hold out indefinitely, and can do so still less after yesterday's reverse. The orderly movement into the MEUSE Position thus becomes doubtful and with it the safe withdrawal of the Third Army and our forces to the right thereof.

For some time I have been inviting attention to the fact that to persist in holding our weakened armies on a broad extended line can only lead to utter destruction, no matter how outstanding their achievements may be at the time, and that only a timely withdrawal to a rearward line which is shorter and better secured can for a certainty strengthen the front and release the reserves required for the pivot and other threatened points. Yesterday's events apparently indicate not only that it is high time for this movement, but also that it should have been carried out before.

von GALLWITZ.

Mutiny

Operations Section
No. 5
Reference: No. 453

BREDOW'S 18th LANDWEHR DIVISION,
November 2, 1918.

To Metz Group

On the afternoon of October 30, the 2d Bn., 72d Landwehr Regt. was scheduled to go into line to effect a relief. An angry mood was noticeable among the men of the advance detachments who were to be sent ahead in trucks; they were angry because the trucks had not come, and the men - still tired from unaccustomed exertion of the foot march the day before (28 km. with full pack) - had to wait on the road for hours.

The angry mood was transmitted to the companies of the bn. and was further aggravated by the news brought by the transportation personnel that the 47th Landwehr Regt. in HAGENDINGEN had refused to board the trains and then had remained there. Furthermore it can be assumed that on the preceding days the men had been incited by the local population, whose efforts probably fell on fertile ground, particularly as far as the ALSACE-LORRAINERS were concerned. Furthermore the unfavorable political news probably had a strong influence on the morale of the troops.

When the companies - with the exception of the 2d M. G. Co., which had not to relieve until the following day - were to march into position, the majority of the men refused to obey the order to start. The bn. commander in the position and the regimental commander being informed, they immediately went to the bn., likewise the Commander of the 10th Inf. Div. with the Commander of the 18th Landwehr Brigade. One noncommissioned officer and one man, who had been pointed out as suspected ringleaders, were arrested.

On October 31, by order of the group, the billets of the bn. were surrounded by troops of the 2d Landwehr Division. The regimental commander then assembled the companies and admonishing them earnestly, called their attention to the consequences of disobedience, whereupon the bn. quietly and without any further ado complied with the order to march, with the exception of 15 men, who persisted in refusing and were arrested and taken to the authorities in METZ.

The next day the 15 arrested men were immediately brought before a court-martial of the Governor of METZ and were sentenced by the latter to serve 10 to 15 years in the penitentiary. Furthermore, the division has ordered the regiment to submit a subsequent report to division concerning all noncommissioned officers and men who had refused to go into the position the previous day.

GADECKE,
Major-General and Division Commander.

Remark: The actions of the officers will likewise be examined.

METZ GROUP.

Operations Section

No. 984

To: Headquarters, Composite Army C

Submitted in conformity with order issued by telephone.

LEQUIS,
Lieut.-General, Commander of Metz Group.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Report

West Front Situation

Operations Section
Foreign Armies
No. 11181

CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
November 3, 1918.

SITUATION ON THE WEST FRONT ON NOVEMBER 2, 1918

In FLANDERS the expected large-scale attack was opened October 31. Americans were identified in this action. The attacks can be expected to continue against the general line: GHENT---east of ROUBAIX.

In the adjacent portion of the front as far as north of VALENCIENNES the situation is essentially uncharged. Local attacks are still possible here.

South of VALENCIENNES the English attacked again in heavy force on November 1. The offensive will certainly be continued in a northeast direction and will be extended to include the Bois de MORNAL. According to statements of prisoners the entrance into line of Australians between VALENCIENNES and QUESNOY can be expected.

Between the OISE and the swampy terrain of PIERREPONT activity has slackened. However, the density of the troops occupying the front, the results of aerial reconnaissance and the presence of strong reserves indicate the possibility of a resumption of the attacks.

In the combat zone west of the AISNE the attacks were continued after fresh units had been brought to the front. Although the French have been denied any important successes so far, we must look for an energetic continuation of the attacks in a northeast direction. The forces available are sufficient for this.

Between the AISNE bend at SEMUY and the MEUSE the expected large-scale attacks of the French and Americans have begun. It is probable that they will extend to the east bank of the MEUSE, although there are at present no indications pointing directly to such action. For continuation of the attacks in the direction of SEDAN numerous French and American divisions ready for immediate employment are in reserve.

The enemy is regrouping opposite the right half of Composite Army C. The extent of these operations cannot yet be definitely determined and requires observation.

In ALSACE-LORRAINE the situation has been further relieved after the battle-tested XXI Army Corps was moved to CHAMPAGNE. Opposite the right flank of Composite Army A and the center of Composite Army B divisions suitable for offensive employment seem to be in process of relief from the front. No large-scale attacks are expected for the present against the front of the Group of Armies Duke Albrecht.

By order:

GROENER.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

FROM: Operations Section
AT: Supreme Headquarters
DATE: November 3, 1918 No. 11183
TO: Group of Armies Gallwitz
Reference: Your No. 431, Operations Section

[Extract]

For a long time Supreme Headquarters has been doing everything in its power to strengthen the Group of Armies to the extent to which it was possible, in view of the general situation. Even though in consequence it was not possible to organize the resistance of the Fifth Army with complete success, nevertheless we are able to inflict serious damage upon the enemy and to gain several weeks time. This was necessary not only from a political but also from a military standpoint. Too hasty a withdrawal of the entire front into the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position (which existed only on paper) would not have resulted in the strengthening expected by the Group of Armies, in view of the difficult railroad situation. Things of immense value, irreplaceable and indispensable for the continuation of the war, would have been lost. Until recently there were about 80,000 German wounded and sick in front of the A-M Position. Only small numbers of reserves would have been made available immediately as a result of the withdrawal. On the other hand, the enemy with his offensive powers unimpaired would have been able everywhere to push forward against the unimproved A-M front, which would have been difficult to supply from a technical railroad standpoint. He would still have had ample forces available to attack simultaneously in LORRAINE and in ALSACE.

* * * * *

There is the further consideration that political reasons made every withdrawal movement undesirable. Even at this time it is still necessary for military and political reasons to delay the withdrawal into the A-M Position. Therefore, for the present the Fifth Army has to hold the now-prescribed line south of the MEUSE.

von HINDENBURG.

Received: Group of Armies Gallwitz, 5:25 a. m., November 3, 1918.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

Amendment Concerning Demolition of Mining Machinery

FROM: Quartermaster General
AT: German Supreme Headquarters
DATE: SENT: November 3, 1918: 8 p. m. No. 57507
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The instructions of October 25, No. 55778, are amended to the effect that the hoisting engines will not be destroyed completely but merely rendered unserviceable for about three months by removing or destroying essential parts, primarily the cylinders. To the extent to which hoisting engines must remain intact in order to prevent the mines from being flooded, they will not be damaged.

Likewise electrical installations necessary to preserve the water level in the mines will not be destroyed.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Failure of Gasoline Supply

Operations Section
No. 33/November 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
November 3, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 111/NOVEMBER 1918

[Extract]

6. No more gasoline is coming from Roumania, and our own production of benzol is of limited amount. Therefore the quantities allotted to the armies by Supreme Headquarters are very small.

Only by drastic measures will it be possible to maintain the most essential motor transportation in operation.

The motor transport officer will take the necessary measures with all means at his command to achieve economy.

von BOEHN,
Commanding.

Commendation

Operations Section
No. 51/November 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
November 4, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 112/NOVEMBER 1918

[Extract]

The Group of Armies German Crown Prince wires as follows:
"His Majesty, the Emperor, has addressed the following telegram to us:

To the Group of Armies German Crown Prince

When I returned to Supreme Headquarters, Field Marshal von Hindenburg again spoke to me concerning the extraordinary exploits of the Western Army during the last few months.

I desire to express my deep appreciation to all commanders and troops. I have particularly in mind the troops on the OISE and AISNE, whose bravery so far has defeated the big plans of the enemy.

I have full confidence that the Group of Armies will continue to do its duty also in the future.

WILHELM,
Emperor and King.'

I rejoice wholeheartedly over the recognition awarded to my brave troops. Our beloved Emperor and King can continue to depend on his troops.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince."

* * * * *

[Twenty-four days later Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated.]

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
November 4, 1918.

[Extract]

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In conformity with telegraphic orders from Supreme Headquarters, the Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and German Crown Prince will begin the withdrawal the night of November 4/5 into the line BAVAI---AVESNES---HIRSON---CHARLEVILLE---SEDAN---STENAY (MEUSE Movement). Appropriate orders telegraphed to the Fifth Army under Secret Order No. 443, Operations Section, with instructions for the WEST-MEUSE and ARGONNE Groups to return to the control of the Fifth Army after completion of the occupation of the MEUSE Position. Time for passage of command will be ordered later.

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HS Ger. File: 810-3.5: Fldr. I: Memorandum

Deficiencies of Antwerp-Meuse Position

Operations Section
No. 436

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
November 5, 1918.
(Forwarded Nov. 8, 1918)

Reference: Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section No. 11170 [Not available]

To: Supreme Headquarters

Supreme Headquarters has referred to me the memorandum [No. 436] of the Chief of the Railroad Service in the Field, dated October 30. The facts contained therein no doubt are very impressive. However, I request that I be permitted to make the following comments in this connection:

1. Some of the deficiencies arising when the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position is occupied, are unalterable or, at least, cannot be removed during the time on which we can count. Therefore they can be left out of the discussion whether a withdrawal into the rearward position is to be effected soon or not until later.

2. For the evacuation every day brings a little gain. But if at least 1 or 2 months are declared to be essential for the transportation to the rear of valuable articles alone and if there are no means available at present for the amelioration of the railroad situation in rear of the new position, so that no efficient remedy can be found before several months have elapsed, then the question arises: What will have become of the army in the meantime, if it is going to have to hold out on a broad front, out of consideration for the railroad situation? It can be foreseen that the north and center elements of the army, in constant contact with the enemy, will continue to be pressed back, will be ground down, and owing to losses, will be unable to supply that increase in strength to the Group of Armies Gallwitz which is required to hold this pivotal strong point of any defense in Belgium, regardless of whether that defense is further in front or in the rear. Without such an increase in strength neither the divisions of the Fifth Army, weakened by the fighting with the American masses, nor the generally inferior Landwehr troops of Composite Army C will be able to offer steady resistance.

3. Therefore, it seems to me that there is danger that the effort to avoid a catastrophe in the operation of the railroads may result in the greater danger of a catastrophe in the army, which would include a catastrophe in the operation of the railroads as well. Undoubtedly, it is of the greatest importance that the railroads be considered; however, this consideration must not go too far. Strategy must utilize the railroads to

their utmost capacity, but it must not become secondary to consideration for the railroads.

von GALLWITZ,
General of the Artillery,
Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

Amendment Concerning Demolition of Coal Mines

FROM: Quartermaster General

AT: German Supreme Headquarters

DATE: November 5, 1918: 1:30 a. m. No. 57553 II. [Addendum No. 1]

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

Demolition of Belgian coal mines and burning of coal supplies will be omitted entirely if these actions would endanger buildings. The measures will be limited to rendering machinery unserviceable by removing essential parts in conformity with orders given. This regulation is final. Any orders to the contrary will be rescinded.

It is requested that the receipt of this telegram be confirmed by wire.

Sent to Group of Armies German Crown Prince, Eighteenth, Second, and Seventeenth Armies and the Military Mining Directorate MONS.

HS Ger. File: 810-335: Fldr. I: Message

Units for Homeland Duties

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: November 7, 1918 No. 11295

TO: Group of Armies Gallwitz No. 461

Fifth Army, by Wegener, November 7---1:55 a. m.

Composite Army C, " "---2.30 a. m.

[Extract]

For use in the homeland, Supreme Headquarters must be able to dispose at the earliest possible date of a large number of units strongly organized, absolutely reliable, even though somewhat small, under the command of energetic, picked officers. For this purpose it is desired to form composite units, each with a few machine guns, of about co. to bn. strength from field training depots, assault bns., G. H. Q. pioneer bns. and trench mortar and gas bns., and to hold them in readiness along the railroad lines, at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters.

In this connection it is recommended that regular army captains, perhaps brigade, division or corps adjutants, or orderly officers at C. P.'s, be picked and that the greatest possible number of regular army noncommissioned officers be assigned to the units. Combat fitness is of secondary consideration. Only the most reliable personnel and well disciplined troops will be considered.

* * * * *

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS.

Operations Sect., Secret No. 11295 to Fifth Army. Received November 7---2:55 [sic] a. m.
Lieut. Wendig
" " " " Composite Army C. Received Nov. 7---2:30 a. m.
Lieut. Achenbach

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

Difficulties of Withdrawal

Operations Section
No. 464

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,
November 7, 1918.

To: Supreme Headquarters

(Forwarded: November 8, 1918)

On several occasions recently I have invited attention to the necessity of reinforcing this Group of Armies as the cornerpost of the big withdrawals. This reinforcement could only be obtained as a corollary to a shortening of the north front; a decisive and rapid execution of this operation was to result in an early release of forces for the MEUSE-MOSELLE region.

Supreme Headquarters has informed me of its reasons for which it is opposed to the early execution of such a measure. I wrote a short note in reply to Fecht's memorandum, but did not submit it, as the withdrawal into the ANTWERP-MEUSE Position had been ordered for the night of November 5/6, despite contrary views on the subject. Although the purpose of its contents has consequently become obsolete in the main, I submit it nevertheless, as I should like it to be included with the records.

In the meantime events have taken the course foreseen by me. The west bank of the MEUSE could not be held by the tired divisions. Temporary placing of the two groups located on that bank under strange command led to eccentric withdrawals, vacillation in the exercise of command at the most important point at the critical moment, and to such an extension of the weak forces remaining on the east bank, that their resistance became too weak. The enemy has seized a foothold at an important point on the east bank; he will continue his attack with fresh masses. The weak reinforcements now being brought up, which at an earlier period would have been able to render effective support to the defense of the MEUSE, will soon be used up in the defense of the point, where the enemy has

already gained success. There is no possibility whatsoever at present of strengthening the front of Composite Army C., occupied by troops of inferior quality, against which the enemy will probably soon extend his attack. As the Groups of Armies Rupprecht and German Crown Prince are expressly directed to execute their withdrawal movement at a slow rate, and as I notice from the plan of the latter group that its movement will have to be executed while in continuous contact with the enemy, I presume that the prerequisites do not exist which would allow sufficient reserves to be brought up that would enable my group of armies to offer a decisive and stubborn resistance. However, if we are forced back here any further, we will be cut off from an important part of our communications, and from the utilization of the ore basin as well, and will reduce the space into which the enemy will seek to compress our army between the coast, Holland, and the pressure from the southwest.

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery, Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Memorandum

Troops for Homeland Duty

COMBRES GROUP,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
November 9, 1918.

To: Composite Army C

[Extract]

The following troops are suitable for use in the interior of the country and reliable:

- A. 13th Landwehr Division *****
- B. 94th Inf. Div. *****
- C. 45th Res. Div. *****
- D. 28th Inf. Div. *****
- E. 36th M. G. Sharpshooter Bn.

By order:

[Name illegible]

Note: Is this not somewhat optimistic?

von GALLWITZ.

Extreme Military Measures for Homeland

FROM: von Hindenburg

AT: Supreme Headquarters in the Field, Operations Section

DATE: Received at Group of Armies Gallwitz: November 10, 1918---10:45 p. m.

By: Kutter, 204th Tel. Det.

To: Group of Armies Gallwitz No. 11399

1. In order to be able to move the army under firm control and in good order back into the homeland, which is threatened by a civil war caused by Bolshevism, all officers and men are under moral obligation to set aside all scruples, no matter how justifiable in their minds, concerning the military oath to His Majesty, the Emperor and King, and to do their duty in undiminished measure to save Germany from the greatest danger. For the same reason I have resolved to remain at my post and have assumed the supreme command over the German army, in conformity with the instructions given to me personally by His Majesty, the Emperor and King.

2. Since the movement to organize soldier councils has already gained a foothold in the army, and, in my opinion, can no longer be stopped by resistance, it is necessary to get this movement into the hands of the officers. To this end, reliable councils will be organized in all companies, batteries, troops, etc., countermanding the orders issued in this connection by Supreme Headquarters on November 10, 1918. It is recommended that the councils be created by the free vote of officers and men and to determine the number of members in each case according to the conditions prevailing in the unit concerned. In all questions of an economic-political nature troop commanders will cooperate closely with these councils so that order will be preserved in the army. However, the leadership of the troops must remain under the firm control of the commanding authorities. The men must be influenced in this direction, and it must be made clear to them that at the present moment, when the most difficult movements are required of the army to end the war, the return of the troops can only be assured if these movements are executed in strictest order and discipline.

3. It may be announced that Supreme Headquarters is prepared to cooperate with Chancellor Ebert, formerly the leader of the moderate social-democratic party, in order to prevent the spreading of terroristic Bolshevism in Germany.

4. Supreme Headquarters has petitioned the Chancellor to issue a government decree retaining insignia of rank in the army. In the meantime it must be left to the tact of each individual officer, to act in such a manner that excesses on the part of the men will be avoided.

von HINDENBURG.

[This letter is but one more evidence of von Hindenburg's unwavering loyalty to his Emperor.]

Preparations for Cessation of Hostilities

Operations Section

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,
November 10, 1918.

No. 11370

To: Group of Armies Gallwitz

[Extract]

1. Cessation of hostilities is imminent.
2. The ANTWERP-MEUSE Movement will be continued.
3. In order to assure the smooth return movement of the field army into the homeland, it is necessary to establish with the utmost dispatch a firm control over the railroads and roads leading from the occupied territory into Germany, by a system of frontier guards.
4. By mutual agreement the Groups of Armies will take the necessary measures to this end within their present boundaries. Boundary between Groups of Armies of the Crown Prince Rupprecht and the German Crown Prince: As before, as far as La REID, the CREPPE-FRANCORCHAMPS (localities to the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht).

* * * * *

6. The Groups of Armies Gallwitz and Duke Albrecht, together with the acting corps headquarters, will regulate the security measures as they see fit, as far as German territory is concerned. For this purpose the Group of Armies will have all troops in its territory at its disposal.
7. Major General von Estorff with specially assigned troops, will be responsible for local security at Supreme Headquarters. Limits of the security area are: POLLEUR---SART---FRANCORCHAMPS---CREPPE---MARTEAU---THEUX.
8. Special orders will be issued concerning the conduct of the frontier-guard troops against elements disturbing the peace.
9. All previously issued orders contrary to these instructions are rescinded.

By order:

GROENER.

Commendation

Operations Section
No. 12257

GERMAN THIRD ARMY,
November 11, 1918.

Firing has ceased. Undefeated and tested again and again in numerous battles you are terminating the war in enemy country. What you have accomplished in the face of an enemy force many times superior to ours in number, belongs to history. You can be certain to possess my undying gratitude and the gratitude of the fatherland.

Comrades, we have lived through hard times. God has been with us! Praise be to Him.

Now I want to lead you back to our beloved homeland, to our parents, to wife and child. Their hearts are longing for us. With unbroken ranks, each one staunchly in his place, proudly as we left in 1914, so we want to return to our native soil.

Long live the Third Army!

von EINEM,
General Commanding.

HS Ger. File: G. of A. German Crown Prince: 810-33.5: Fldr. VI: Report

Antwerp-Meuse Movement Continued

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht

DATE: Received for transmission: November 11, 1918: 2:54 p. m. No. 10710

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

The ANTWERP-MEUSE Movement will be continued during the nights November 11/12 and 12/13 * * *
