







# The Armistice Agreement



# UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917-1919

## The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents

Volume 10, Part 1



*CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  
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# UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919

Volume 1	Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 2	Policy-forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 3	Training and Use of American Units With the British and French
Volume 4–9	Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 10	The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents
Volume 11	American Occupation of Germany
Volume 12–15	Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services
Volume 16	General Orders, GHQ, AEF
Volume 17	Bulletins, GHQ, AEF



# FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . , [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army's historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War*, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army's months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of "the war to end all wars." Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C.  
1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Military History



# CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Preface . . . . .	1
Bulgarian Armistice . . . . .	1
First German Note for Peace . . . . .	3
Bulgaria Requests Peace . . . . .	3
Germany Ready To Ask for Armistice . . . . .	4
First Statement of Armistice Terms . . . . .	4
Formation of New German Government . . . . .	11
Austria-Hungary Requests Negotiations for Armistice . . . . .	14
Senlis Conference Concerning German Armistice . . . . .	19
Armistice With Turkey . . . . .	27
Pershing Advocates Demanding Unconditional Surrender . . . . .	28
Mutiny Among German Naval Personnel . . . . .	31
Foch Authorized To Communicate Armistice Terms . . . . .	32
Terms of Austro-Hungarian Armistice . . . . .	36
Warning Instructions for Cessation of Hostilities . . . . .	43
Abdication of German Emperor . . . . .	45
False Armistice Report . . . . .	46
Ebert Becomes Chancellor of Germany . . . . .	48
Germany Accepts Armistice Terms . . . . .	48
Foch Orders Cessation of Hostilities . . . . .	52
Final Terms of Armistice With Germany . . . . .	52
Germany Orders Cessation of Hostilities . . . . .	61
Establishment of Permanent International Armistice Commission . . . . .	73
German Revolution . . . . .	81
Instructions for Civil Administration of Occupied Territory . . . . .	85
Foch's Instructions for Occupation of Rhenish Provinces . . . . .	90
Disposition of Released American Prisoners of War . . . . .	93
Handling of Prisoners of War in Replacement Depots . . . . .	98
Control of Prisoners, Civilians, and Material . . . . .	99
Forces for Rhine Occupation . . . . .	101
Liberation of Luxemburg . . . . .	117
Date of Occupation of Rhine Provinces . . . . .	132
Only French Troops To Be Stationed in Luxemburg . . . . .	132
Order for Crossing of German Frontier . . . . .	136
Administration of Occupied Territory . . . . .	139
Conduct of Americans While in Luxemburg . . . . .	142
Problems of a Mixed Command . . . . .	169
Proposed Use of American Troops To Rebuild France . . . . .	173
Organization of Technical Commissions With Army of Occupation . . . . .	177
Condition of Released American Prisoners . . . . .	189
Political Situation in Germany . . . . .	193
Agreement Concerning Repatriation of Prisoners . . . . .	198
No American Units To Be Used in Rebuilding France . . . . .	209
German Payments of Costs for Maintaining Allied Armies . . . . .	232
Prolongation of Armistice . . . . .	239

	<i>Page</i>
Transportation Situation in December 1918 . . . . .	245
Orders for Evacuation of Luxemburg . . . . .	255
Settlement of Mixed Command Problem in Bridgehead . . . . .	264
Instructions for Administration of Luxemburg . . . . .	272
American Orders To Evacuate Luxemburg . . . . .	276
Prolongation of Armistice . . . . .	282
Closing of Luxemburg-Rhineland Frontier . . . . .	291
Limits of American Zone of Occupation . . . . .	301
Conditions Imposed on Germans in Turning Over Property . . . . .	344
Discussion of Joint Occupation of Luxemburg . . . . .	346
Foch Indicates Occupation Force To Be Maintained . . . . .	347
Organization of Coblenz Bridgehead . . . . .	352
Second Conference on Administration of Occupied Territories . . . . .	357
Repatriation of American Troops . . . . .	362
Modified Decree Controlling Luxemburg . . . . .	388
Marshal Foch's Authority Along Rhine . . . . .	404
German Elections . . . . .	405
Conditions in German Prison Camps . . . . .	408
Economic Conference at Luxemburg . . . . .	420
Interallied Economic Committee Constituted . . . . .	445
Agreement on Maintenance Costs . . . . .	457
Report on Internal Germany . . . . .	459
German War Material Not Covered in Armistice Terms . . . . .	471
Personnel of Permanent Armistice Commission . . . . .	500
Second Armistice Prolongation . . . . .	503
Occupation Forces as of March 31, 1919 . . . . .	553
January 1919 List of Available German Sea-Going Vessels . . . . .	568
Foch Yields Occupation of Luxemburg to Americans . . . . .	569
Judge Advocate General's Recommendations Regarding the Enemy War Materials Board . . . . .	608

## Map

<i>No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
129. Allied Offensive Operations, July–November 1918 . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>

# The Armistice Agreement



# THE ARMISTICE

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## *Preface*

The following selection of documents has been compiled with a view to showing the conditions which forced the German Government to request an Armistice; how such Armistice was drafted and agreed to; and, finally, how the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission administered the accomplishment of the Armistice terms.

Following the Armistice documents are two separate compilations dealing respectively with, "The American Third Army," and "American Military Government of Occupied Germany."

The three compilations herein named carry American activities to July, 1919, when the American Third Army, as such, ceased to function in Germany, its work being turned over to The American Forces in Germany under General Henry T. Allen. The work of this Force is recorded in the published writings of General Allen.

-----

SWC: Fldr. 315-3: Cablegram

## *Bulgarian Armistice*

No. 230-S

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
Versailles, September 27, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF - Not for Publication

Was informed this morning by British Section of receipt here by them of telegram from London War Office to effect that Bulgaria had requested 48 hour armistice to discuss peace terms. Later in the day French Section informed me that M. Clemenceau had telephoned here verifying above information and further stating that General d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief on Macedonian Front had refused the armistice but that Bulgarian authorities had stated that they were through fighting and desired in any case to send representatives to General d'Esperey to discuss peace terms; that three Bulgarian representatives are now with General d'Esperey discussing terms.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General, U. S. A.

-----

**Armistice**

[Editorial Translation]

THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION  
WITH BULGARIA

Signed September 29, 1918

I. Immediate evacuation, in conformity with an arrangement to be concluded, of the territories still occupied in Greece and Serbia. There shall be removed from these territories neither cattle, grain, nor stores of any kind. No damage shall be done on departure. The Bulgarian Administration shall continue to exercise its functions in the parts of Bulgaria at present occupied by the Allies.

II. Immediate demobilization of all Bulgarian armies, save for the maintenance on a war footing of a group of all arms, comprising three divisions of sixteen battalions each and four regiments of cavalry, which shall be thus disposed: Two divisions for the defense of the Eastern frontier of Bulgaria and of the Dobrudja, and the 148th Division for the protection of the railways.

III. Deposit, at points to be indicated by the High Command of the Armies of the East, of the arms, ammunition, and military vehicles belonging to the demobilized units which shall thereafter be stored by the Bulgarian authorities, under the control of the Allies.

The horses likewise will be handed over to the Allies.

IV. Restoration to Greece of the material of the Greek IV Army Corps, which was taken from the Greek army at the time of the occupation of Eastern Macedonia, insofar as it has not been sent to Germany.

V. The units of the Bulgarian troops at the present time west of the meridian of Uskub, and belonging to the German Eleventh Army, shall lay down their arms and shall be considered until further notice to be prisoners of war. The officers shall retain their arms.

VI. Employment by the Allied Armies of Bulgarian prisoners of war in the East until the conclusion of peace, without reciprocity as regards Allied prisoners of war. These latter shall be handed over without delay to the Allied authorities, and deported civilians shall be entirely free to return to their homes.

VII. Germany and Austria-Hungary shall have a period of four weeks to withdraw their troops and military organizations. Within the same period the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers, as also their nationals, must leave the territory of the Kingdom. Orders for the cessation of hostilities shall be given by the signatories of the present convention.

FRANCHET d'ESPEREY,  
General.  
ANDRE LIAPCHEF.  
E. T. LOUKOF.

General Headquarters,  
September 29, 1918, 10:50 p. m.

-----

***Preliminary History of the Armistice***

[Editorial Translation]

FIRST GERMAN NOTE TO PRESIDENT WILSON, ON OCTOBER 3, 1918

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotiations, the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918.

In order to avoid further bloodshed the German Government requests measures be initiated for the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

MAX,  
Prince of Baden, Imperial Chancellor.

-----

Cable: L.S.-1184

***Bulgarian Request for Peace***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 4, 1918--12:40 a. m.*

Colonel Boyd

Widewings, France

Following from Warburton Third Following just received 121 29th Strictly Confidential for Pershing only and must not be disclosed to anyone else. Bulgarian secret and special request for peace is still pending and is now being given acid test for honesty. This test, in all probability, will develop Bulgarian Governments' real intention this week. Washington is informed.

DAVIS,  
Military Attache.

-----

Cable: L.S.-1185

**Germany to Ask for Armistice**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 6, 1918--12:30 a. m.

Colonel Boyd

Widewings, France

Following from Colonel P. H. Clark It is Secret. According to report French secret service center, Belfort, newspapers of Switzerland will publish tomorrow that Central Powers are asking through Sweden for immediate armistice for the purpose of discussing peace based on 14 conditions by President of the United States.

DAVIS.

-----

SWC: Fldr. 315-3: Cablegram

**Armistice Terms**

No. 242-S

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
Versailles, October 7, 1918.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

URGENT To be brought to the instant attention of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and M. Orlando have been in conference in Paris since last Saturday, October 5. At this moment 9 o'clock tonight I received from the British Military Representative the following secret document:

The conference of Ministers at a meeting held on October 7, 1918, agreed to refer to the military representatives at Versailles, with whom shall be associated representatives of the American, British, French and Italian navies, the consideration of the terms of an armistice with Germany and Austria, on the basis of the following principles, accepted on the previous day:

1. Total evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Italy.
2. The Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany.
3. Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the

Allies.

4. The same conditions to apply to the Trentio and Istria.
5. Servia and Montenegro to be evacuated by the enemy.
6. Evacuation of the Caucasus.
7. Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to

Russia and Rumania before the war.

8. Immediate cessation of submarine warfare.

(It was also agreed that the Allied blockade should not be raised.)

The above document was handed to me with statement that it would be considered at a meeting of military representatives tomorrow morning October 8, at 15 minutes after

9 o'clock, and I am requested to make arrangements for the presence of an American Naval Representative. I intend to be present and shall inform the military representatives that I have cabled the above document to the Government in Washington and have asked for instructions. I shall cable developments but of course shall take no action whatever without formal instructions. I assume that the action of the three Prime Ministers is due to the proposals made by Germany to the Government of the United States, but I have no knowledge whether they consulted the President before preparing the above quoted document. I have had no time to examine the document but at first glance it appears to me to be crudely drawn from the military point of view. Paragraph 8 is the only one which requires immediate action by the enemy. The other seven paragraphs fix no time limit. Under paragraph 2 the Germans may retire to the strong position behind the Rhine with their army and armament and supplies intact. This might be completed long before the evacuation of territory in Russia and Rumania and even in Servia and Montenegro. If such a situation be created and if meanwhile all the territory which Belgium, France, and Italy desire is evacuated it is conceivable that one or more of the Allies may refuse to fight any longer even if Germany while holding the line of the Rhine should eventually act in bad faith with respect to territories to the east of her. No guarantees are exacted of her except the evacuation of territory which she knows that she may lose anyway early next spring. I request immediate instructions.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General, United States Army.

-----

SWC: Fldr. 315-3: Cablegram

***Conditions for an Armistice***

No. 243-S

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, October 8, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

In further reference to my number 242, the military and naval representatives prepared a document today which the three Prime Ministers desire to have signed by three o'clock this afternoon. I declined to do this stating that I could take no action pending receipt of instructions from my government. I shall cable a translation of the document as soon as made this afternoon. From the purely military point of view the document removes the criticisms suggested in my cable No. 242 because it establishes immediate disarmament of the enemy as the basis of all other conditions. Another cable follows.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General, United States Army.

-----

***Conditions for an Armistice***

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
Versailles, October 8, 1918.

No. 244-S

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

To be brought to the immediate attention of the Secretary of State the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff.

In compliance with resolution of three Prime Ministers communicated to you in my No. 242 the below quoted document was drawn up this morning. It was not drawn up by the military representatives in their official capacity as connected with the Supreme War Council but by them as individuals associated with representatives of the four navies. It is not in the form of a Joint Note but is entitled A Joint Opinion. I do not know whether the Prime Ministers intend to communicate it to the American Government or not. The Americans have taken no official part in it nor is the American Government committed to it in any way by any action here. I have informed the Prime Ministers in writing that I cannot sign it in the absence of instructions from my Government. The document follows:

The military representatives and naval representatives meeting together on October 8 in accordance with the resolution taken by the Conference of Ministers at their meeting held on October 7, 1918, are of opinion that the first essential of an armistice is the disarmament of the enemy under the control of the Allies.

This principle having been established, the conditions specified by the Ministers at their meeting held on October 7, require from a military point of view to be supplemented as follows:

1. Total and immediate evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Italy on the following conditions:

(a) Immediate reoccupation by Allied troops of the territories so evacuated.

(b) Immediate repatriation of the civil population of these regions interned in enemy country.

(c) No sabotage, looting or fresh requisitions by enemy forces.

(d) Surrender of all arms and munitions of war and supplies between the present front and the left bank of the Rhine.

2. Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany.

3. Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the Allies, with the exception stated in Clause 18 below.

It is understood that the Allies will not evacuate the territory in their occupation.

4. The same conditions apply to the territory included between the Italian frontier and a line passing through the Upper Adige, the Pusterthal as far as Toblach, the Carnic Alps, Tarvis and the meridian from Monte Nero, cutting the sea near the mouth of Volosca \* \* \*.

5. Serbia, Montenegro and Albania to be evacuated by the enemy - under similar conditions to those stated in Clause 1.

6. Evacuation of the Caucasus by the troops of Central Powers.

7. Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to Russia and Rumania before the war.

8. Prisoners in enemy hands to be returned to Allied Armies without reciprocity in the shortest possible time. Prisoners taken from the armies of the Central Powers to be employed for the reparation of the wilful damage done in the occupied areas by the enemy, and for the restoration of the areas.

9. All enemy surface ships (including monitors, river craft, etc.), to withdraw to naval bases specified by the Allies and to remain there during the Armistice.
10. Submarine warfare to cease immediately on the signature of the Armistice. 60 submarines of types to be specified shall proceed at once to specified Allied ports and stay there during the Armistice. Submarines operating in the North Sea and Atlantic shall not enter the Mediterranean.
11. Enemy naval air forces to be concentrated in bases specified by the Allies and there remain during the Armistice.
12. Enemy to reveal position of all his mines outside territorial waters. Allies to have the right to sweep such mines at their own convenience.
13. Enemy to evacuate Belgian and Italian coasts immediately, leaving behind all naval war stores and equipment.
14. The Austro-Hungarian navy to evacuate all ports in the Adriatic occupied by them outside national territory.
15. The Black Sea Ports to be immediately evacuated and warships and material seized in them by the enemy delivered to the Allies.
16. No material destruction to be permitted before evacuation.
17. Present blockade conditions to remain unchanged. All enemy merchant ships found at sea remain liable to capture.
18. In stating their terms as above, the Allied Governments cannot lose sight of the fact that the Government of Germany is in a position peculiar among the Nations of Europe in that its word cannot be believed, and that it denies any obligation of honor. It is necessary, therefore, to demand from Germany material guarantees on a scale which will serve the purpose aimed at by a signed agreement in cases amongst ordinary civilized nations. In those circumstances, the Allied Governments demand that: Within 48 hours:
  1. The fortresses of Metz, Thionville, Strassburg, Neu-Breisach and the town and fortifications of Lille to be surrendered to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief.
  2. The surrender of Helgoland to the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief of the North Sea.
19. All the above measures, with the exception of those specially mentioned in paragraph 18, to be executed in the shortest possible time, which it would appear should not exceed three to four weeks.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General, United States Army.

-----

SWC: Fldr. 316: Cablegram

***Answer to German Peace Proposal***

No. 95-R

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., October 8, 1918.  
[Received October 9, 1918---7:15 p. m.]

BLISS, AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

1. Your numbers 242 and 243 were taken over by me to the White House and received at 10 p. m., October 8, and read personally by the President, who directs me to cable you

in open code the answer which he has today handed the Swiss Minister for transmission to the Entente Powers as his answer to the Proposal of Peace from Germany. His answer is as follows:

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8 last and in subsequent addresses and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestions of an Armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of discussion worthy of consideration manifestly depends upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answers to these questions vital from every point of view.

No other instructions. MARCH.

P. C. HARRIS,  
Major, General,  
The Adjutant General.

-----

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,  
*October 12, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

With Order No. 10793 of Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section, the beginning of the diplomatic negotiations to end the war was announced. At the same time it was pointed out that the front must be held at all costs to facilitate these negotiations, and that the occupied ground must be defended under all circumstances. \* \* \*

-----

***German Reply to President Wilson's Note***

[Contemporary Translation]

*October 12, 1918--Noon.*

In reply to the questions of the President of the United States of America, the German Government hereby declares:

The German Government has received the terms laid down by the President in his note of January 8 and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace based on justice. Consequently, it is the object of this Government in entering into discussion to be entirely clear on the principles involved. The German Government presumes that the Governments associated with the Government of the United States also take the position which the President has taken in his address. The German Government in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself absolutely ready to comply with the parts of the President's note regarding evacuation. The German Government suggests that the President call a meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning evacuation. The present German Government which has taken this step towards peace, has been formed by a large majority in the Reichstag. The Chancellor is supported by the will of this majority, and speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

SOLF,  
State Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

-----

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,  
*October 13, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

In Order No. 7982 of Supreme Headquarters, Personnel Section, Field Marshal von Hindenburg pointed out that in consequence of the latest political events considerable agitation was making itself apparent among the officers and men. In conformity with the old regulations, he stated that the army must continue to refrain from all political activity in the future.

The Field Marshal concurs in the steps taken to bring about peace.

-----

***President Wilson's Reply to the German Note of October 12, 1918***

*October 14, 1918.*

The following unofficial, approximately accurate version of the President's answer to the Swiss Government, for relay to the German Government, has been telephoned to G-2, G. H. Q., as follows:

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government, by a majority of the German Reichstag, of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America, in his address to the Congress of the United States, on January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justify the President in making a frank and direct statement of his position with regard to the communications of the German Government of October 8 and 12, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the processes of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are all matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisors of the Government of the United States, and the Allied Governments, and the President feels that it is his duty to say that no arrangements can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States, and of the Allies in the field. We feel confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels it is also his duty to add this: [Neither] the Government of the United States, nor, he is quite sure, the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice as long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane processes which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace, its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety, and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France, the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as being in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain; not only this, but of their inhabitants.

The Nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued, which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary also in order that there may be no possibility of a misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at MOUNT VERNON on July 4 last. It is as follows:

"The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere, that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice, disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, its reduction to virtual impotency." The power which has heretofore controlled the German Nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German Nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace to come be the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against

Germany should know beyond peradventure with whom they are dealing. The President will make a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary.

ROBERT LANSING,  
Secretary of State.

-----

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr I: Report

**Formation of New German Government**

[Editorial Translation]

Political Section  
No. 37063 - 345

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,  
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,  
October 15, 1918.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

The formation of the new German Government has plainly made an impression in the hostile and neutral countries, promising more success to our peace overtures. To be sure, at first almost the entire Entente press declined the peace offer bluntly, but gave in immediately when Wilson's counterinquiry showed a conciliatory attitude. The German answer to this inquiry is motivated by the great desire to avoid further counterinquiries and above all to bring about a cessation of fighting. With this answer nothing is said about giving up the Imperial Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine nor the Polish-populated territory of Germany; nor do we promise the unconditional surrender of the occupied territories in the west. Prior to evacuating occupied territory when military operations do not force us to surrender them, we will first obtain assurances that we shall not later on be confronted with augmented demands.

We can only obtain acceptable peace conditions if the German people will let it be known that they are determined to accept nothing but an honorable peace. Unfortunately, there is no evidence so far that such a desire exists on all hands. We shall strive with all means at our command to bring it about in a manner that will impress the enemy. One of the requirements in this connection is to refrain from every criticism of the new Government and its actions.

In view of the difficult nature of our situation and the possible start of negotiations in the very near future, a calm, dignified and confident attitude on the part of all Germans in foreign countries is of especial importance. Pride in our achievements during four years of war against the greatest coalition in History, consciousness of our steadfast loyalty to the Alliance, confidence in our just cause and the unshaken belief in the future of the German people cannot fail to preserve our self-respect and the respect of other nations.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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**First Army Urged to Strike Harder**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 17, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM for the Commanding General, First Army.

Please have the following transmitted as a telegram to corps and division commanders:

Now that Germany and the Central Powers are losing, they are begging for an armistice. Their request is an acknowledgment of weakness and clearly means that the Allies are winning the war. That is the best of reasons for our pushing the war more vigorously at this moment. Germany's desire is only to regain time to restore order among her forces, but she must be given no opportunity to recuperate and we must strike harder than ever. There can be no conclusion to this war until Germany is brought to her knees.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5; Fldr. I: Memorandum

**Estimate of Political Situation**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  
No. 10905; 355

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,  
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,  
*October 18, 1918.*

In the enclosure I desire to bring to your notice an estimate of the political situation which has been submitted to me confidentially, and which I believe to be correct. It again emphasizes that the holding of our present positions is important for the outcome of the negotiations now in progress. It is the duty of the armies to hold their fronts.

The unity of our front within the country can now be considered as assured. The utterances of the press of all political parties, with the exception of the Independent Social Democrats and the Poles prove this to be so. The War Department has promised additional replacements, and to use all the forces of the country which are at all dispensable.

I request that the strictest care be exercised to ensure that every man fit for service at the front be sent to the fighting troops from the lines-of-communication and administrative organizations.

von HINDENBURG.

To: All Groups of Armies and Armies of the West.

At present there exists a great contrast: Wilson - Foch. Wilson wants to have a just peace of reconciliation and understanding. Foch wants a complete humiliation of Germany and satisfaction of French vanity.

Every strengthening of the German front and the German diplomatic attitude will strengthen the position of Wilson; every sign of military and political weakness strengthens Foch.

Wilson requires us to yield only in two points:

(1) Submarine warfare; no more passenger boats to be sunk.

(2) Make Germany a democratic country. (No abdication of the Emperor; only a constitutional monarchy to be formed, position of the crown similar to that of England.)

Wilson does not seek military humiliation of Germany. Foch, however, is willing to obtain with all the means at his command, complete military capitulation and humiliation (satisfaction of the French desire for revenge).

Which one of the two will get the upper hand, will depend solely on the attitude of Germany. If the front holds fast and we preserve our diplomatic dignity, then Wilson will win. A yielding to Foch's demands will mean the annihilation of Germany and the shattering of every prospect for peace.

England's attitude is more conciliatory. France represents the main obstacle to peace.

If the negotiations should fail on account of the French imperialists, then a coalition of the French Socialists, English Liberals and the Workers' Party with Wilson will probably result.

Wilson is greatly handicapped in his efforts to obtain a conciliatory peace by the chronological coincidence of the process of democratization and the preliminaries to peace. This is construed as a sign of weakness and has strengthened Foch's position. Friends of a just peace now counsel us to go slow in everything, especially as to our desire for peace and an armistice, and to do everything we can to hold the front and direct the movement toward democratization into peaceful channels, worthy of confidence.

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GHQ, AEF: LS Conf.: Nos. 1146-1200: Telegram

### ***Information on Situation of German Army***

No. 1199-L. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
October 20, 1918.

Colonel Boyd

Wide Wings, France

From a source which has proved very good we are given the following information from Germany under date of October 10: Hindenburg and Ludendorff state that resistance is impossible even on the Antwerp-Metz Line, on account of the lack of German forces; they judge that all conditions should be accepted. Demoralization is complete in the entire Empire. Numerous strikes have broken out everywhere. Austria demands immediate peace, otherwise she will make peace separately. The Court is aware, through Swiss diplomatic

channels, of the negotiations of Turkey with the Entente, through the mediation of Venizelos. The Court is still opposed to the cession of Alsace-Lorraine. A note from Berlin has been received by the Bavarian Government relating to the abdication of William II. Another and also well-tried source furnishes the following information under the same date: All naval materiel in Flanders is evacuated by way of Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne. Hirson, Maubeuge and Mons are evacuated in the direction of Givet. Namur is blocked up. Charleroi is congested. Montmedy is evacuated by way of Luxemburg, Liege by way of Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne. Concentrations of troops are reported between Maubeuge and Liege and between Strassburg, Metz, and Thionville, as well as in Luxemburg. The Bavarian Minister of War expects entrenchment behind the fortification of the Rhine by the end of November. Germany accepts the conditions of America, but Hindenburg wants to mask the actual strength of his army by an obstinate resistance. A reinforced state of siege has been declared in Posen on account of the Separatist movement of Poland.

DENNIS E. NOLAN,  
Brig. Gen., Gen. Staff,  
Asst. C. of S., G-2.

Received: 4 p. m., October 20/18.

Sent: 5:30 p. m., October 20/18.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Note

***The Austro-Hungarian Note of October 7, and President Wilson's  
Reply of October 18***

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
October 20, 1918.

Washington, D. C.

Secretary of State today made public the following:

From the Minister of Sweden, to the Secretary of State

Legation of Sweden, Washington, D. C.  
October 7, 1918.

Excellency: By order of my Government I have the honor confidentially to transmit herewith to you the following communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President of the United States of America:

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses himself to his Lordship, The President of the United States, and offers to conclude with him and his Allies an Armistice on their fronts, on land, at sea and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the message

of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 12, 1918, should serve as a foundation and in which the viewpoint declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account.

Be pleased to accept, etc.

EKENGREN.

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From the Secretary of State, to the Minister of Sweden:

Department of State, Oct. 18, 1918.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 7th instant, in which you transmit a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President. I am now instructed by the President to request you to be good enough, through your Government, to convey to the Imperial and Royal Government the following reply:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestion of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which have occurred since the delivery of his address of January 8 last and necessarily alter the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at the time occurred the following:

The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development. Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a de-facto Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom. The President is therefore no longer at liberty to accept mere autonomy of these people as a basis of peace but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judge of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conceptions of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

ROBERT LANSING,  
Secretary of State.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Memorandum

***The German Reply to President Wilson's Note of October 14, 1918***

[Contemporary Translation]

*Berlin, October 21, 1918.*

Berlin, October 21: The German Government is accepting the proposal to evacuate occupied territories, accepts also the suggestions that the problems of determining the

procedure to be followed in this evacuation and of fixing the conditions of an armistice ought to be left to the estimate of military counsellors, and that the actual relative positions of the forces on the fronts should be assured and guaranteed by an agreement. The German Government depends upon the President of the United States to create an opportunity for arranging these details.

The German Government has confidence that the President of the United States will not approve any requirement irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and the preparation of a just peace. The German Government protests against the reproaches for illegal and inhuman acts addressed to the German troops on land and sea and also to the German people.

Some destruction will always be necessary to cover a retreat. It is, to this extent, permitted by the Law of Nations. The German troops have received most rigid instructions to protect private property and care for the population as far as possible. In cases where, notwithstanding, excesses occur, the offenders are punished.

The Government denies also that the German navy in sinking vessels has intentionally destroyed life boats with their occupants. The Government proposes to have a neutral commission investigate the facts on these points.

In order to avoid everything which may render more difficult the work of peace initiated by the German Government, orders have been given to all submarine commanders prohibiting the torpedoing of passenger steamers, but for technical reasons the Government cannot guarantee that these orders will reach the submarines now at sea before their return.

The President has named as a condition fundamental for peace the disappearance of all power founded on the arbitrary will of one who, uncontrolled, can at his own pleasure trouble the peace of the world.

To this the German Government replies:

In the German Empire, the representation of the people has up to this time had no influence in the formation of the German Government. The Constitution did not foresee the collaboration of popular representatives in our Government's decisions on matters of war and peace. This situation has undergone an essential change. The actual Government has been formed in complete accord with the desires of popular representation as a result of a vote, equal, general, secret and direct. The chiefs of the great parties of the Reichstag are included among its members.

Moreover, in the future no Government may assume control, or remain in power unless it has the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. Likewise, the responsibility of the Chancellor to popular representation is extended and guaranteed in a legal manner.

The first act of the Government was to present to the Reichstag a law modifying the constitution of the Empire in such a way that the approval of popular representation is necessary for the decision on war or peace.

But the guarantee of the duration of the new system rests not solely in legal assurances, but also in the steadfast will of the German people, which, by an enormous majority, supports these reforms and demands their energetic development.

President Wilson's demand to know with whom he and the Allied Governments are dealing thus receives a plain and unequivocal response, namely, that the offer of peace and of an armistice comes from a Government, which, free of all arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the agreement of an enormous majority of the German people.

SOLF,  
Trans. by Lt. Sturges?

[Unauthenticated document; signature of translator not clear.]

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**French Attitude towards Germany**

[Editorial Translation]

Military Political Division  
No. 37317

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,  
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,  
October 23, 1918.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

It is obvious from the American Note of October 14 that the Entente chauvinists, led by Clemenceau and Foch, have gained the upper hand. Their aim is a complete prostration of Germany.

The German reply of October 20 endeavors not to disrupt the relations that have been initiated and has already gone beyond the limits of conciliation compatible with military propriety. But it also shows that Germany is determined to refuse conditions which would infringe upon its national honor. It will further our aims, if the public in the neutral countries will call attention in the following sense, to the consequences which the failure of the peace negotiations would entail: Continuation of the war in a more violent form; impossibility for Germany to adhere to the policy, practiced so far, of sparing evacuated territory, as it would injure itself in a military way by doing so; the resultant destruction of values which cannot be replaced by money; revival of the unrestricted submarine warfare. All this would merely be the consequence of the unrestrained desire for conquest and destruction on the part of the powers who play with the word humanity but do not want to practice it.

Only if the desire for peace of the great masses of the people in the countries of the Entente asserts itself, will there be any prospect of peace, should the present efforts to bring it about come to naught. It must then be expected that Germany will continue to fight with the utmost vigor.

LUDENDORFF.

Group of Armies Gallwitz; received Oct. 26, 1918---No. 380.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Memorandum

**President Wilson's Reply to German Note of October 21, 1918**

Washington, D. C. October 24, 1918.

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of September 27, and that it desires to dis-

cuss details of their application and that this wish and purpose emanates not from those who have hitherto dictated Germany's policy and conducted the present war, in Germany's behalf, but the Ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rule of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated, the question of an Armistice. He feels it his duty to say again, however, that the only Armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her, in a position to enforce any arrangement that may be entered into to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of the Germans impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace from the terms and principles indicated, their military advisors and the military advisors of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany, the necessary terms of such an Armistice as will surely protect the interests of the people involved and assure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an Armistice possible from a military point of view. Should such terms of Armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds. The President would deem himself lacking in candor, did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of October 20, it does not appear that the principles of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantee either exists or is in contemplation, that the alteration of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon would be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people but the present war has not been, and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany.

Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh, that the Nations of the world do not and cannot trust the words of those who have hitherto been the masters of German politics and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war, the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchial autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later, in regard to the International obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

ROBERT LANSING,  
Secretary of State.

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***Recommendations of President Wilson***

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Secret Intelligence Section, Supreme Headquarters, Chief of Staff of the German Field Army

AT: Longwy Station

DATE: Sent: October 24, 1918, 11:07 [p. m.?]: No. 19724

TO: Group of Armies Gallwitz

Wilson states in his reply that he will recommend to his Allies that they enter into Armistice negotiations, but that the armistice must render Germany militarily so defenseless that it will be unable to take up arms again. Concerning peace he will negotiate with Germany, only if the latter will submit completely to the demands of the Allies in regard to its inner form. Otherwise there is only unconditional surrender.

This reply of Wilson demands military capitulation. Therefore it is unacceptable for us soldiers. This proves that our enemy's will to annihilate us, which let loose the war in 1914, remains undiminished. Furthermore, this proves that our enemies merely play with the words a just peace in order to deceive us and break our resistance. Therefore, for us soldiers Wilson's reply can only be a challenge to continue our resistance with might and main.

If the enemy sees that the German front cannot be broken for all their sacrifices, they will be ready to accept a peace which assures Germany's future especially for the broad masses of the people.

von HINDENBURG.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1190: Note

***Proceedings of Military Conference at Senlis***

[Contemporary Translation]

NOTES ON CONFERENCE HELD AT SENLIS, OCTOBER 25, 1918

between:

Marshal Foch  
Field Marshal Haig  
General Petain  
General Pershing

Also were present:

General McAndrew (only for the latter part of the conference)  
General Lawrence  
General Weygand

Colonel Boyd  
Captain de Marenches

Marshal Foch opened the conference by saying that, having been entrusted by the Allied Governments with the care of drafting the general lines of an eventual armistice with Germany, he had asked the Commanders-in-Chief to assemble with the view of discussing with them these conditions.

Those conditions, in President Wilson's own words, should be such as to . . . (here the Marshal read the corresponding passages of the President's note).

Therefore, he would ask the Commanders-in-Chief, each in turn, to express opinions on the matter.

General Petain said that the conditions of peace did not concern the Commanders-in-Chief; their duty was to only outline the conditions of an armistice which would make the resumption of hostilities impossible.

General Pershing called attention to the fact that Commanders-in-Chief should act only on authority of their respective Governments, and asked if the different Allied Governments had referred this question to the Commanders-in-Chief for them to draw up conditions for an armistice provided they deem it possible to give an armistice.

Marshal Foch replied that the French Government had asked him, with approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, to take up the question with the Commanders-in-Chief. He therefore considered that they were justified in drafting the conditions of an eventual armistice. He stated that he considered that these conditions could be laid down.

He asked Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to express his views on the question.

Sir Douglas Haig stated that, as for the western front, in his opinion, a very great part of the German forces had been beaten. However, the German army had not been disintegrated. In his opinion, that army was still capable of withdrawing to a shorter front and of making a very effective stand there against equal or even superior forces. On the other hand, the Allied Armies were pretty well exhausted. The British infantry was short 50,000 men and the conditions in the French army were pretty near the same. The American army was not yet organized, not yet formed, and [\*had suffered a great deal on account of its ignorance of modern warfare]; that it requires time to get in shape. Were the Americans and the Allies capable of undertaking a great offensive, they could defeat the enemy before he could reach the Meuse and save himself from destruction. The conditions of an armistice under such circumstances could be very severe; but that he did not think that the Allies could prevent the Germans from getting to the Meuse. Furthermore, the Germans could not be prevented from destroying the railroads in the course of their withdrawal. He accordingly believed that the German army was not sufficiently beaten to cause them to accept any conditions of an armistice.

For the reasons above stated, he believed that the conditions imposed on Germany for an armistice should be the following:

1. Immediate and complete evacuation of invaded Belgian and French territories.
2. Occupation by the Allies of Alsace, Lorraine, and the fortresses of Metz and Strassburg.
3. Restitution of all the rolling stock seized by the Germans in France and Belgium, or its equivalent.
4. Repatriation of inhabitants of invaded territory.

Those conditions, he pointed out, would place us on the German frontier in case of a resumption of hostilities, and we could carry on war on German territory. The armistice

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\* The words in brackets were on October 29 changed by Sir Douglas Haig in original record to statement to the effect that it would be some time before the American army would be sufficiently large to relieve the diminishing Allied Armies.  
Carl Boyd, Col., A. D. C.

would give the Americans time to organize. The possession of Metz and Strassburg would give the Allies a very good base for an offensive against southern Germany. It is quite possible that in case of a resumption of hostilities, it would be more favorable to the Allies to have the German armies astride the Rhine than to have them entrenched on its eastern bank. We could in this event attack the part on the western bank.

Marshal Foch replied that he did not wish to discuss Sir Douglas Haig's conclusions, but that he would discuss the reasons on which they were based. Sir Douglas Haig had said that the German army was not disintegrated; it could not be said that the German army is not beaten; but the Marshal stated we could not say its exact condition, but we are dealing with an army that has been beaten every day for three months, an army that is now losing on a front of four hundred kilometers; that has, since July 15, lost more than 250,000 prisoners and 4,000 guns; an army that is, physically and morally, thoroughly beaten. Certainly, the Allied Armies are not new, but victorious armies are never fresh. In this matter the question is relative; the German armies are by far more exhausted than ours. Certainly the British and French armies are tired; certainly the American army is a young army, but it is full of idealism and strength and ardor. It has already won victories and is now on the eve of a victory; and nothing gives wings to an army like victory. When one hunts a wild beast and finally comes upon him at bay, he then comes in the face of greater danger, but it is not the time to stop, it is time to redouble his blows without paying any attention to the ones he himself receives.

Our military situation, the Marshal concluded, is better than his. We must push it, he said. He asked General Pershing to express his opinion.

General Pershing said he wished to hear General Petain's opinion before expressing his own. The French and British had been in the war longer than the Americans and had, if possible, a still more vital interest in its issue.

General Petain said that the Germans, after reading President Wilson's message, expect very severe conditions, since the President told him that no confidence could be placed in the present German Government. He wished to express himself exclusively from the point of view of the armistice; peace conditions not being his business. The armistice conditions, in his opinion, should give the Allies:

1. Guarantees.

2. The possibility of resuming hostilities under favorable conditions. The occupation of the entire line of the Rhine fully meets both of these requirements.

We must furthermore occupy on the right bank a stretch of ground from 20 to 30 kilometers deep, which would enable us, if the war was resumed, to destroy the German forces east of the Rhine.

The occupation of Alsace-Lorraine does not mean much from the military point of view. Opposite Alsace-Lorraine is the Black Forest, where operations are almost impossible. North of Germersheim, he stated, is the flat country over which operations would be possible. Therefore he deemed it necessary for the Allies to hold all the line of the Rhine. Furthermore, the Germans had seized in France and Belgium:

126,000 railroad cars;

2,500 locomotives.

All that rolling stock must be given back. However, if it was judged advisable, he thought that we ought to demand a little smaller number of cars and more locomotives, say:

100,000 cars;

5,000 locomotives.

He concluded by saying that, should the Allies occupy the line of the Rhine and prevent the Germans from taking away their heavy material, a resumption of hostilities by Germany would thus be made utterly impossible.

General Pershing asked General Petain to develop this last idea (prevent the Germans from removing their heavy material.)

General Petain replied that he had made a study of the time that it would take the

Germans to remove their artillery, heavy material, etc., based on the number of roads and railroads at their disposal.

That study had lead him to the conclusion that by allowing them three days for the evacuation of parallel zones, which he had drawn on a map, they would have time to evacuate their men and nothing else. That object would also be accomplished by compelling them to surrender part of their artillery, say 10,000 to 15,000 guns.

Marshal Foch asked General Pershing to express his point of view.

General Pershing said that to begin with, he agreed with the opinion expressed by the Commanders-in-Chief of the British and French armies and with President Wilson as to the general conditions of an armistice which should provide a guarantee against a resumption of hostilities, give the Allies a decided advantage and be unfavorable to Germany in case hostilities should be resumed. If the German Government was really sincere in its desire to end the war, then neither the German Government nor the German people should object to strict conditions regarding an armistice. He thought that the damage done by the war to the interests of the powers with which the United States is now associated against Germany had been so great that there should be no tendency toward leniency with Germany and her Allies in fixing the terms of an armistice. That the present military situation was very favorable with the Allies. The German forces since the beginning of the counteroffensive on July 18 have been constantly in retreat and had not been able to recover since that counteroffensive was begun.

The situation of the French and British armies could best be judged by pointing out the fact that they have been continuously on the offensive since then, and that they are now attacking with as much vigor as ever. As to the American army, the part it has taken in the great counteroffensive since July 18 has not been inconsiderable. It is constantly increasing in strength and training, its staffs, its services and its higher commanders have improved by experience, so there is every reason to suppose that the American army will be able to take the part expected of it in the event of resumption of hostilities after an armistice. In consideration of these facts and of our favorable situation the terms we demand would not be light. He therefore proposed:

1. The evacuation of France and Belgium within thirty days and of all other foreign territory occupied by Germany without delay.
2. The withdrawal of the German armies from Alsace-Lorraine and occupation of those territories by the Allied Armies.
3. Withdrawal of German armies to the east of the Rhine and the possession of such bridgeheads on the eastern side of the Rhine by the Allies as may be necessary to insure their control of that river.
4. The unrestricted transportation of the American army and its material across the seas.
5. The immediate repatriation of all nationals of foreign territory now or heretofore occupied during the war by Germany.
6. Surrender of all U-boats and U-boat bases to the control of a neutral power until their disposition is otherwise determined.
7. Return to France and Belgium of all railroad rolling stock that has been seized by Germany from those countries.

Marshal Foch said he wished to express his thanks to General Pershing for what he had said. It was true that the American army was still young, but its spirit was splendid and it was tremendously increasing every day in efficiency and in numbers.

(General Pershing said that he also wished to include in his remarks the statement that the American army is increasing also in numbers.)

Marshal Foch stated that in the presence of an exhausted German army, the growth of the American army more than compensated the decrease of the French and British armies; it was in our favor a formidable asset which made our military situation most favorable.

General Petain stated that he had not overlooked the question of submarines, but had

thought these boats, if taken over, should be held by an ally rather than a neutral. He thought, however, that this might be settled by a peace conference.

General Pershing pointed out the vital importance of the question for the transportation of American forces.

Sir Douglas Haig, in reply to a question put by Marshal Foch, said that he did not see any reason to alter the opinion he had expressed, he thought that the question of U-boats was a naval question, which was to be dealt with by the naval authorities.

Marshal Foch said that on account of its bearing on the transportation of troops, the submarine question was a military question, and that we must get rid of the submarines.

Marshal Foch then asked all those present if they had anything to add. There being nothing further to add, he asked that each commander turn in, in writing, his opinion as stated. The conference then adjourned.

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HS Secret File: Fldr. H-1: Cablegram

### ***Pershing's Proposals for Armistice***

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, October 25, 1918.*

No. 1840

The Adjutant General

Washington, D. C.

1. At a conference of the British, French, and American Commanders-in-Chief, called today, the 25th, by Marshal Foch to discuss the terms of an armistice with Germany pursuant to the indications contained in the President's recent letter to the German Government, each Commander-in-Chief expressed his views on the military situation and the conditions that should be demanded of Germany. My own views are expressed in the following paragraph.

2. To begin with I would state that I agree with the opinion expressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the British and French Armies and with President Wilson as to the general conditions of an armistice which should provide a guarantee against a resumption of hostilities, give the Allies a decided advantage and be unfavorable to Germany in case hostilities should be resumed. If the German Government is really sincere in its desire to end the war, then neither the German Government nor the German people should object to strict conditions regarding an armistice. I think that the damage done by the war to the interests of the powers with which the United States is now associated against Germany has been so great that there should be no tendency toward leniency with Germany and her Allies in fixing the terms of an armistice.

The military situation at present is very favorable to the Allies. The German forces since the beginning of the counteroffensive on July 18 have been constantly in retreat and have not been able to recover since that counteroffensive was begun.

The situation of the French and British armies can best be judged by pointing out the fact that they have been continuously on the offensive since then, and that they are now attacking with as much vigor as ever. As to the American army, the part it has taken in the great counteroffensive since July 18, has not been inconsiderable. It is constantly increasing in strength and training, its staffs, its services and its higher commanders have improved by experience, so there is every reason to suppose that the American army will be able to take the part expected of it in the event of resumption of hostilities

after an armistice. In consideration of these facts and of our favorable situation, the terms we demand should not be light. I therefore propose:

1. The evacuation of France and Belgium within thirty days and of all other foreign territory occupied by Germany without delay.
  2. The withdrawal of the German armies from Alsace-Lorraine and occupation of these territories by the Allied Armies.
  3. Withdrawal of German armies to the east of the Rhine and the possession of such bridgeheads on the eastern side of the Rhine by the Allies as may be necessary to insure their control of that river.
  4. The unrestricted transportation of the American army and its material across the seas.
  5. The immediate repatriation of all nationals of foreign territory now or heretofore occupied during the war by Germany.
  6. Surrender of all U-boats and U-boat bases to the control of a neutral power until their disposition is otherwise determined.
  7. Return to France and Belgium of all railroad rolling stock that has been seized by Germany from those countries.
3. The proposals of Marshal Haig are included generally in paragraphs number one, two, five and seven of the above, omitting all others, his opinion being that the terms should not be too severe. The views of General Petain are covered practically by paragraphs one, two, three and seven of the above, omitting the others. The opinion of Marshal Foch was not given definitely, but it is presumed will be communicated to Washington through the French Prime Minister.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Wireless Interception

***German Reply to President Wilson's Note of October 24, 1918***

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*October 27, 1918.*

German Wireless Press  
Oct. 27, 1918, 9 p. m.  
S. C., A. E. F. Interception

The answer of the German Government to the last note by President Wilson is as follows:

The German Government has taken cognizance of the reply of the President of the United States. The President is acquainted with the far-reaching changes which have been and are being accomplished in German constitutional existence. The peace negotiations are being conducted by a national Government having in its hands actual and constitutional authority to make a decision. The military powers are also subordinate to this Government. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice preliminary to a just peace as characterized by the President in his public statements.

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[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,  
October 28, 1918.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

At 5:30 p. m. Major Stuelpnagel (Supreme Headquarters) reports that Austria-Hungary has made a separate peace offer. Preparations must be made for the relief of the Austro-Hungarian divisions and, since unreliability is to be anticipated, this relief must be effected soon. Such divisions may work on improvement of the position until they are moved away. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

***Austria-Hungary Seeks Peace***

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: von Hindenburg

AT: Supreme Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General

DATE: Received: October 28, 1918, 11:40 a. m.

By: Eberts, 204th Tel. Det. No. 11064, Ops. Sect.

TO: Group of Armies Gallwitz

According to the information at hand here, Austria-Hungary is about to conclude a separate peace with the Entente.

Therefore, it will be necessary within the very near future to withdraw the Austro-Hungarian troops now in line in the west. They will then be used as labor units in the rear area. If a complete evacuation should be necessary, it will be effected as slowly as possible and in proportion to the evacuation of the German troops fighting in the eastern Theater in Serbia. The Supreme Command will issue orders for the withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian troops later.

Sent to: Fifth Army, No. 390, Oct. 29, 1918, 11:42 a. m. by Kuempel.

Sent to: Composite Army C, No 393, Oct. 29, 1918, 12 noon by Kreller.

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***Desire for an Armistice***

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: von Hindenburg

AT: Supreme Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General

DATE: Received: October 28, 1918, 3:05 p. m.

By Ferrero, 204th Tel. Det. No. 11054, Ops. Sect., Secret

TO: Group of Armies Gallwitz

In reply to the recommendation to withdraw into the A. M. [Antwerp-Meuse] Position, the following telegram was sent to the Group of Armies German Crown Prince: The Government is determined to bring about an armistice as quickly as possible. If the army succeeds in repulsing the enemy attacks for a little while longer and in losing only little ground, then the conditions laid down for us by the Entente will be less severe than they would be if our entire front between the Meuse and Verdun were to withdraw. Such an action at this moment would have the most weighty consequences at home and abroad. According to the Chief of the Field Railway Service, irreplaceable war material worth billions would be lost.

Therefore, I cannot concur in the recommendation of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince at the present time and expect that it will continue to resist the enemy attacks in the next few days as before. The preparations for the withdrawal are in progress.

Remark: I presented the same viewpoint as the Group of Armies of the German Crown Prince at Supreme Headquarters yesterday.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Message

***Austria-Hungary's Reply to President Wilson's Note of October 18***

[Contemporary Translation]

*October 29, 1918.*

BY TELEPHONE FROM PARIS:

In reply to the note of President Wilson of October 18, addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Government, and in the sense of the decision of the President to deal in particular with Austria-Hungary in regard to the question of an armistice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that, as in the case of the preceding statement of the President, it also adheres to his point of view as laid down in his note regarding the rights of the people of Austria-Hungary, particularly those of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs. Consequently, as Austria-Hungary accepts all the conditions upon which the President makes the entry into negotiations regarding an armistice and peace dependent, nothing now stands in the way, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, of the commencement of pourparlers. The Austro-Hungarian Government declares it

is, in consequence, prepared, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter into pourparlers regarding peace between Austria-Hungary and the states of the opposing parties and regarding an immediate armistice on all fronts of Austria-Hungary. It begs President Wilson to be good enough to make overtures on this subject.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1194-A: Memorandum

### ***Armistice with Turkey***

[Editorial Translation]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Paris, October 30, 1918.*

#### TURKEY ARMISTICE CONVENTION

Conditions of an armistice agreed to and concluded between Vice Admiral the Honorable Sir Somerset Arthur Gough Calthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Station, acting under authority from the British Government, in agreement with their Allies

and

His Excellency Raouf Bey, Turkish Minister of the Navy

His Excellency Rechad Hikmet Bey, Turkish Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs

Lieutenant Colonel Saadullah Bey, Turkish General Staff, acting under authority from the Turkish Government:

1. Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.
2. Positions of all mine fields, torpedo tubes and other [obstructions] in Turkish waters to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.
3. All available information as to mines in Black Sea to be communicated.
4. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned [persons] and prisoners to be collected at Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to Allies.
5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except for such troops as are required for surveillance of the frontiers and for maintenance of internal order. (Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by Allies after consultation with Turkish Government.)
6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey, these ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.
7. The Allies to have the right of occupation of any strategic points, in the event of situation arising which threatens the security of Allies.
8. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by [to] enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.
9. Use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.
10. Allied occupation of Taurus tunnel system.
11. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from northwest Persia to behind the pre-war frontiers has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasus has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops, the remainder to be evacuated if required by Allies after they have studied the situation there.
12. Wireless telegraph and cable stations to be controlled by Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.

13. Prohibition to destroy any naval, military or commercial material.
14. Facilities to be given for purchase of coal, oil, fuel and naval material from Turkish sources after requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.
15. Allied control officers to be placed on all railways including such portions of Trans-Caucasus railways now under Turkish control which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to needs of population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batoum. Turks will raise no objection to occupation of Baku by Allies.
16. Surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia to nearest Allied commander and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia except those necessary to maintain order as will be determined under Clause 5.
17. The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.
18. The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to nearest Allied garrisons.
19. All Germans and Austrians, naval, military and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions; those in remote districts as soon after as may be possible.
20. Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for disposal of the equipment, arms and ammunition, including transport of that portion of the Turkish army which is demobilized under Clause 5.
21. An Allied representative to be attached to Turkish Ministry in order to safeguard Allied interests. This representative to be furnished with all [aid] necessary for this purpose.
22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age to be considered.
23. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with Central Powers.
24. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve the right to occupy any part of them.
25. Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, Thursday, October 31, 1918.

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HS Secret File: Fldr. H-1

### ***Pershing Advocated Unconditional Surrender***

*PARIS, October 30, 1918.*

TO: The Allied Supreme War Council, Paris

Gentlemen:

In considering the question of whether or not Germany's request for an armistice should be granted, the following expresses my opinion from the military point of view.

1. Judging by their excellent conduct during the past three months, the British, French, Belgian, and American armies appear capable of continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale is high and the prospects of certain victory should keep it so.

2. The American army is constantly increasing in strength and experience, and should be able to take an increasingly important part in the Allied offensive. Its

growth, both in personnel and material, with such reserves as the Allies may furnish, not counting the Italian army, should be more than equal to the combined losses of the Allied Armies.

3. German manpower is constantly diminishing and her armies have lost over 300,000 prisoners and over one-third of their artillery during the past three months in their effort to extricate themselves from a difficult situation and avoid disaster.

4. The estimated strength of the Allies on the western front, not counting Italy, and of Germany [respectively], in rifles is:

Allies	1,563,000
Germany	1,134,000
An advantage in favor of the Allies of 37%.	

In guns:

Allies	22,413
Germany	16,495
Advantage of 35% in favor of the Allies	

If Italy's forces should be added to the western front we should have a still greater advantage.

5. Germany's morale is undoubtedly low, her Allies have deserted her one by one and she can no longer hope to win. Therefore, we should take full advantage of the situation and continue the offensive until we compel her unconditional surrender.

6. An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German army and enable it to reorganize and resist later on, and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end.

7. As the apparent humility of German leaders in talking of peace may be feigned, the Allies should distrust their sincerity and their motives. The appeal for an armistice is undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more advantageous.

8. On the other hand, the internal political conditions of Germany, if correctly reported, are such that she is practically forced to ask for an armistice to save the overthrow of her present Government, a consummation which should be sought by the Allies as precedent to permanent peace.

9. A cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones if it does not render impossible the imposition of satisfactory peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army with its present strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms were not satisfactory to her.

10. An armistice would lead the Allied Armies to believe this the end of fighting and it would be difficult if not impossible to resume hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we have fought for.

11. By agreeing to an armistice under the present favorable military situation of the Allies and accepting the principle of a negotiated peace rather than a dictated peace the Allies would jeopardize the moral position they now hold and possibly lose the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would insure its permanence.

12. It is the experience of history that victorious armies are prone to overestimate the enemy's strength and too eagerly seek an opportunity for peace. This mistake is likely to be made now on account of the reputation Germany has gained through her victories of the last four years.

13. Finally, I believe the complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany, but if the Allied Governments

decide to grant an armistice, the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany again take up arms.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
American Expeditionary Forces.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Report

***Austro-Hungarian Situation***

[Editorial Translation]

Military Political Division  
Propaganda Section  
No. 37569

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMIES,  
*October 31, 1918.*

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

East:

\* \* \* \* \*

The outcome of the war for Germany is influenced more than before by the attitude of Austria-Hungary. The final disintegration of the Danube monarchy into individual states and the offensive across the Piave which has been initiated by the Entente and in the meantime is being carried out with success, have led to the peace offer of the new Lammasch Cabinet. To our objections that at the forthcoming peace conference such a separate action will only diminish the strength of the Central Powers, this strength being entirely dependent on unity, and that therefore we must expect the conditions to be made more severe, Emperor Karl replied that it is impossible for him to meet our wishes, as he can no longer rely upon the peoples of the monarchy, with the exception of the Austro-Germans. He states, however, that he will by no means enter into any agreements that would call for the release of the railroads for moving Entente troops to the German border. Wilson's last Note of October 23, 1918, no longer expresses the determination to establish a conciliatory or just peace; rather it shows the clearly-discernible intention to subject Germany completely to the will of its enemies.

Apparently, the proponents of the most severe terms have the upper hand in the countries of the Entente. Our Government is endeavoring to meet Wilson's demands to the fullest extent and hopes that this will help to bring about an early peace.

By order:

HEYE.

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**Foch in Accord with Pershing on Terms**

MESSAGE CENTER, FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,  
October 31, 1918.

Telegram Recd.: From: G. Q. B.  
Dated: Oct. 31, 1918  
Recd.: 14 h.

Colonel Boyd

For General Pershing

Headquarters, First Army

No. 20 Thursday 12:15 p. m. No. One.

Marshal Foch is in complete accord with your idea. However, he says if Germans send flag of truce and ask armistice he could not answer, "I will accept nothing but unconditional surrender." He would be obliged to treat. But he could and would make the conditions such as suggested in last paragraph your letter. The result might not bear the name of unconditional surrender but virtually it would approximate to that. Marshal Foch says you are right in your estimate of Marshal Haig's view. He authorizes me to repeat to Colonel House his remark am [sic] going now.

T. BENTLEY MOTT,  
Colonel, Chief, American Mission,  
Allied G. H. Q.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Gallwitz: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

**Mutiny Among German Naval Personnel**

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section  
AT: Supreme Headquarters  
DATE: Received: November 6, 1918,  
By: [Name illegible], 204th Tel. Det.  
TO: Group of Armies Gallwitz No. 11277

In Kiel disorders have broken out in the fleet.

It must be expected that radio stations occupied by mutineers will send messages of revolutionary content. Measures will be taken to prevent the spreading of such telegrams,

by occupying all radio stations within the zone of the Group of Armies.

Transmitted to Fifth Army and Composite Army C, November 6, 1918, 9:10 p. m.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Memorandum

***Foch Authorized to Communicate Armistice Terms***

2d Section, General Staff  
TELEPHONED FROM PARIS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 6, 1918--12:30 noon.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., NOVEMBER 5, 1918

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, November 5, 1918.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE PUBLIC THE FOLLOWING:  
SIR:

I have the honor to request you to transmit the following communication to the German Government:

In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President has transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that if those Governments were disposed to effect a peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisors and the military advisors of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view. The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows:

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress on January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause 2 relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress on January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it, they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damages done to civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.

I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. I am further instructed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments,

to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

ROBERT LANSING,  
Secretary of State.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,  
*November 7, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

9:35 a. m.: Supreme Headquarters (Major von Stuelpnagel)---Major Bramsch. Supreme Headquarters is oriented on situation. The Group of Armies is informed that toward noon the Armistice Commission will cross the lines in the vicinity of Guise. The situation requires holding the position at all costs, as otherwise the armistice negotiations might be made very difficult. It is necessary for the Group of Armies to concentrate all reserves at its disposal, in order to contest every enemy success. \* \* \*

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Telegram---German Document No. 102

### ***Preliminary History of the Armistice***

[Editorial Translation]

To Imperial Secretary of State (retired) to the Foreign Office

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*November 7, 1918.*

German Armistice Commission left Spa at twelve noon today in automobiles for the French lines. The Commission consists of:

Secretary of State Erzberger, Chairman

Minister Count Oberndorff

Major General von Winterfeld

Naval Captain Vanselow

A captain, and interpreter, and two secretaries went with them.

General von Gundell withdrew.

A second section will go to the headquarters of the Army Group of the German Crown Prince at three o'clock this afternoon. This section includes:

Major Duesterberg, Major Brinckmann, Major Kriebel, Major von Botticher and, at the request of Secretary of State Erzberger and Count Oberndorff, Councilor of Legation Baron von Lersner; also several cipher officers and a journalist.

von HINTZE.

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192-32.16: Fldr. 1: Message

***Parliamentaries to be Stopped at Front Line***

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 7, 1918.

To: Commanding General, 33d Division, A. E. F.

11:50 h. Number 101 G-3. Confirming telephone message the following message from G. H. Q. is repeated for necessary action Hq., A. E. F., Nov. 7, 1918, C. G., American Second Army, Amex Force, November 7, 6 a. m. The following message from Marshal Foch's headquarters is transmitted for necessary action: If parliamentarians present themselves at any point on the front to submit a request to Marshal Foch, they will be stopped at the front line division. The division will immediately inform Marshal Foch of their status and the object of their mission. They will be detained at the division until Marshal Foch has made known his reply. Acknowledge. McAndrews.

Interpretation of foregoing is that parliamentarians can be brought back as far as division P. C., but no farther. Acknowledge.

STUART HEINTZELMAN,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, Second Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1203: Telegram

***Order Forbidding Cessation of Hostilities***

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE EAST,  
November 7, 1918.

No. 10,091

C-in-C, French Armies

To: Staffs

PICARDIE  
CHAMPAGNE  
MIRECOURT  
CONDE  
LAHEYCOURT

For PICARDIE ) ARDON  
only ) CAUROY  
GRANDS-USAGES [Not identified]  
ROULERS  
LURE  
FLAVIGNY  
TANTONVILLE

It has happened that the enemy has spread the noise that an armistice is signed in order to deceive us. There is nothing in it.

Nobody will stop hostilities of any sort without a report from the C-in-C.

The First Army has received very particular instructions. \*

By order:

BUAT,  
Dep. Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1194: Note

### ***Armistice Terms with Austria-Hungary***

*November 8, 1918.*

Copy to the Chief, G-3, G. S., G. H. Q., A. E. F., France

for his information

Subject: A copy of the Armistice Protocol and the Secondary Protocol giving details, signed between Italy and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary, November 3, 1918.

From: (O. N. 4470

No. 3020

1. Forward herewith an English translation of a copy of the official Protocol of the conditions of the Armistice between Austria-Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers signed on November 3, 1918, at Villa Giusti near Abano, Italy. This Protocol has eight principle articles with eleven different naval clauses. The names of the seven plenipotentiaries each for Italy and Austria-Hungary are given at the end of the instrument.

The Protocol was written in French and the copy attached is an accurate translation thereof into English from an official copy obtained from the Comando Supremo of the Royal Italian Army.

2. The Secondary or annexed Protocol gives the details and the execution of certain points of the original Armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary.

This Secondary Protocol has ten articles in the military portion thereof, and nine in the naval portion and like the original was signed by the seven plenipotentiaries of both Austria-Hungary and Italy.

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\* On account of the passing of German Plenipotentiaries.

3. A copy of this report, with enclosure, has been forwarded to Chief, G-2, G. S., G. H. Q., American E. F., France.

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"Armistice, 1918: Rudin": Library Army War College: Agreement

### ***Armistice with Austria-Hungary***

#### I. Military Clauses

1. The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, sea and air.

2. Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in Clause 3 below, there shall only be maintained as an organized military force a [maximum of 20 divisions], reduced to prewar [peace] effectives.

Half the divisional, corps and army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the Allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

3. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of war. Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Piz Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio it will follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, passing thence by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the heights of Otz and Ziller. The line thence turns south crossing Mount Toblach and meeting the present frontier [of the] Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Col of Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou) and the watershed of the Cols di Podberdo, Podlanischam and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast towards the Schneeberg, excluding the whole basin of the Save and its tributaries; from the Schneeberg it goes down towards the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglie and Volosca in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Trivania and, to the south, territory limited by a line from the [shore] of Cape Planca to the summits of the watershed eastwards so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and water courses flowing towards Sebenico such as the Cikola, Kerka, Butisnica and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premude, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura in the north up to Melida in the south, embracing Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta, as well as the neighboring rocks and islets and [Pelagosa], only excepting the islands of Great and Small Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza.

All territory thus evacuated [will be occupied by the troops] of the Allies and of the United States of America.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds, including coal, belonging to or within those territories, to be left *in situ* and surrendered to the Allies according to special orders given by the Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage or requisition to be done by enemy troops in the territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the forces of the Associated Powers.

4. The Allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and

Hungarian means of transportation.

The armies of the Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the troops of the Associated Powers wherever they may be.

5. Complete evacuation of all German troops within 15 days, not only from the Italian and Balkan fronts, but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary within that date.

6. The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be entrusted to the local authorities under the control of the Allied and Associated armies of occupation.

7. The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all Allied prisoners of war and interned subjects and of civil populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by the Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the various fronts.

8. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

## II. Naval Conditions

1. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

2. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines, completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed, and to remain under the supervision of the Allies and United States of America.

3. Surrender to the Allies and United States of America with their complete armament and equipment of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 1 mine layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and United States of America. All other surface warships, including river craft, are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and United States of America.

4. Freedom of navigation to all warships and merchant ships of the Allied and Associated Powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the River Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure the freedom of navigation of the Danube, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

5. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allies and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture, save exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by the Allies and United States of America.

6. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America.

7. Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary

outside their national territory, and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

8. Occupation by the Allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defenses and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

9. All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the Allies and Associated Powers to be returned.

10. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

11. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1194: Protocol

### ***Annexed Protocol to Armistice with Austria-Hungary***

[Editorial Translation]

#### ANNEXED PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE DETAILS AND COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN CLAUSES OF THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

##### I. MILITARY CLAUSES

1. Hostilities on land, on sea, and in the air will cease on all Austro-Hungarian fronts, 24 hours after the signature of the Armistice; namely at 15 h, November 4, 1918 (Central European time).

From said moment, the Italian and associated forces will refrain from advancing beyond the line attained at that time.

Austro-Hungarian troops and troops of countries allied to Austria-Hungary, will withdraw a distance of at least 3 kilometers, air-line, beyond the line attained by the Italian troops or by those of the Allied and Associated Powers. Inhabitants within the said three kilometers zone comprised between the two lines indicated above can apply to the authorities of their own national army or to those of the armies of the Associated Powers, to obtain necessary provisions.

Austro-Hungarian troops which happen to be behind the fighting line attained by the Italian troops at the hour when hostilities cease will be considered prisoners of war.

2. Concerning the clauses of Articles 2 and 3, pertaining to artillery materiel and equipment, as well as to war material, which is either to be collected at designated points or left in place within the territories which are to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces, the Italian plenipotentiaries announce that, acting as representatives for all of the Allied and Associated Powers, they will interpret said clauses; further, that such interpretation will include the details for the execution thereof.

(a) Any object which can serve for war purposes, or whose component parts can be converted thereto, will be turned over to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Austro-Hungarian army and associated German forces will be authorized to retain and remove only such items as form part of the individual armament and equipment of the troops which are to evacuate the territory indicated in Article 3, including officers' mounts, the trains and the horses organically assigned to those units for the transportation of rations, kitchens, officers' baggage, and medical equipment. This clause applies to all branches and services of the armies concerned.

(b) With particular reference to artillery, it is established that the Austro-

Hungarian army and associated German troops will leave all of their artillery materiel and equipment within said evacuated territory.

An accurate and complete check will be made at a later date to ascertain the total divisional corps, and army artillery available to the Austro-Hungarian army at the cessation of hostilities; half of which is to be turned over to the Associated Powers. This check to be made in such a manner as to permit determination, if necessary, of additional artillery materiel which the Austro-Hungarian army may be called upon to deliver to the Allies, as well as materiel which may eventually have to be returned to the Austro-Hungarian army by the Allied and Associated armies.

All organic divisional corps, and army artillery, without exceptions, is to be turned over to the Allies; however, it will not be necessary to count same.

(c) For the Italian front deliveries of divisional corps, and army artillery will be made at the following places: Trent, Bolzano [Bozen], Pieve di Cadore, Stations in Carniola, Tolmino, Gorizia and Triest.

3. The Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies on the various Austro-Hungarian fronts will appoint special commissions which, accompanied by necessary escorts, are to proceed immediately to such points as may be considered most suitable to control execution of the foregoing.

4. It is hereby established that the terms M. Toblach, and M. Tarvis, as used herein, refer to the mountain ranges which dominate the Sella di Toblach and the Tarvis Basin.

5. Withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian forces and of troops allied to Austria-Hungary beyond the line indicated in Article 3 of the Protocol to the terms of the Armistice shall be completed insofar as the Italian front is concerned, within fifteen days after the day on which hostilities cease.

On the fifth day, insofar as the Italian front is concerned the Austro-Hungarian troops, or those of the Allies of Austria-Hungary, are to be beyond the line: Tonale [Pass]---Noce [Stream]---Lavis---Avizio [River]---Pordoi [Pass]---Livinallengo---Falzerego [Pass]---Pieve di Cadore---Mauria [Pass]---Upper Tagliamento [River]---Fella [River]---Raccolana---Sella di Nevea---Isenzo [River]. Moreover, they shall have completed their withdrawal from that portion of the Dalmation territory which is indicated in the above mentioned article.

Austro-Hungarian land and sea forces, as well as those of the allies of Austria-Hungary, which have not effected their withdrawal from the territory in question within said fifteen-day period will be considered as prisoners of war.

6. Payment for requisitions which the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers may issue in Austro-Hungarian territory will be made in accordance with the regulations contained in Paragraph 1, page 227, of *Servizio Guerra*---Part II---1915 edition, now in force in the Italian army.

7. Concerning railroads and exercise of the rights accorded to the Associated Powers by Article 4 of the Protocol of the Armistice between the Allied Powers and Austria-Hungary, it is established that: Movements of troops, war materials, and supplies for the Allied and Associated Powers over the Austro-Hungarian railroad lines situated outside of the territory which is to be evacuated in conformity with the clauses of the Armistice, including the administration and operation of said railways, will be executed by employees of the Austro-Hungarian Railroad Administrations under the control, however, of special commissions appointed by the Allied Powers and of Allied military railway station which will be established wherever deemed necessary.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities will give priority to all such Allied movements and will be held responsible for their safety.

8. In that territory which is to be evacuated at cessation of hostilities all mines, whether on highways or railroad lines, mine fields, and all other prearranged means designed to obstruct such highways and railroads are to be disarmed or rendered harmless.

9. Within 8 days after the suspension of hostilities, Italian prisoners of war and

civilians interned in Austria-Hungary shall cease all work; and exception being made in the case of agricultural labor, insofar as this affects prisoners and internees who were already employed in agricultural pursuits previous to the day of signature of the Armistice. All such persons should, however, be ready to leave immediately, upon request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian army.

10. Austria-Hungary is to provide for the protections, security, and subsistence (cost of which to be reimbursed) of the various commissions appointed by the Allied Governments to receive war materials and exercise controls, regardless of whether such commissions are located within the territory which is to be evacuated by Austro-Hungarian forces or whether they are within any other portion of the Austro-Hungarian territory.

## II. NAVAL CLAUSES

1. The hour for suspensions of hostilities on sea is the same as that for cessation of hostilities on land and in the air.

At that hour the Austro-Hungarian Government shall have furnished the Italian and Associated Governments, by means of the wireless station of Pola which, in turn, will transmit same to Venice, all necessary information concerning the location as well as the movements of Austro-Hungarian ships.

2. All naval units mentioned in Articles 2 and 3, which are to be turned over to the Associated Powers, are to proceed to Venice between 8 and 15 h. on November 6, 1918. They will take a pilot aboard 14 sea miles from the coast.

An exception is to be made in case of the Danube River monitors which are to proceed to a port to be designated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Associated Powers on the Balkan front, and under such conditions as that Commander-in-Chief may establish.

3. The following Austro-Hungarian naval units are to proceed to Venice:  
TEGHETHOFF---PRINZ EUGEN---FERDINAND MAX---SAIDA---NOVARA---HELGOLAND.

Nine torpedo boat destroyers of the TATRA type (of at least 800 tons) of most recent construction.

12 torpedo-boats of the type displacing 200 tons.

The mine-layer CAMALEON.

Fifteen submarines constructed between 1910 and 1918, and all German submarines which now in, or which may enter, Austro-Hungarian territorial waters.

Any damage whether prearranged or otherwise which may occur aboard ships which are to be turned over to the Allies will be deemed by the Associated Governments to constitute a grave infraction of the present Armistice.

The Lake Garda Flotilla will be turned over to the Associated Powers in the port of Riva.

All ships which are not to be turned over to the Associated Powers are to be assembled, within 48 hours after cessation of hostilities, in the ports of Buccari and Spalato.

4. In connection with the right of the Allies to sweep all the mine-fields and destroy all other obstacles to navigation the Austro-Hungarian Government gives its word of honor to turn over, within 48 hours after cessation of hostilities, to the Commander of the Fortress of Venice and to the Commander of the naval forces at Brindisi, plans of the mine-fields and barriers in the ports of Pola, Cattaro and Fiume; and within 96 hours of that same event, plans of all mine-fields and barriers in the Mediterranean, in Italian rivers and lakes; moreover that it will also give information concerning all mine-fields or obstructions laid by order of the German Government of which it may have any knowledge.

Within this same period of 96 hours, a similar communication concerning navigational war hazards pertaining to the Danube and the Black Sea is to be addressed to the Commander of the Associated Forces on the Balkan Front.

5. Restitution of merchant ships belonging to the Associated Powers is to be effected within 96 hours after cessation of hostilities, in conformity with such conditions as may be set forth by each Associated Power concerned and which will be brought to the knowl-

edge of the Austro-Hungarian Government in due time.

The Associated Powers reserve the right to establish the commission referred to in Article 5, and to advise the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning its functions and where it is to meet.

6. The naval base referred to in Article 6 is Spalato.

7. The evacuation referred to in Article 7 is to be executed within the delay established for withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian troops beyond the line prescribed by the terms of the Armistice.

No damage must be done to stationary, mobile, or floating materiel, in the ports.

Evacuation may be effected through the canals of the Lagoon, by means of Austro-Hungarian craft brought in from outside.

8. The occupation referred to in Article 8 will take place within 48 hours after cessation of hostilities.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities are to guarantee the safety of ships transporting the Allied personnel destined to take possession of Pola, the islands, and other localities designated in the terms of the Armistice for the army.

The Austro-Hungarian Government will take the necessary measures to insure that ships of the Associated Nations proceeding to Pola will, when within 14 sea miles of said fortress, be able to secure pilots capable of indicating the safest route to follow.

9. All damage to persons and property of the Associated Powers will be considered a grave infraction of the present Armistice.

The undersigned, duly authorized, plenipotentiaries declare that they approve the above-indicated conditions.

November 3, 1918.

Representatives for the Supreme Command  
of the Austro-Hungarian army:

Victor Weber Edler Von WEBENAU

Karl SCHNELLER

Y. Von LIECHTENSTEIN

J. V. NYEKHEGYI

ZWIERKOWSKI

Victor Freiherr Von SEILLER

Kamillo RUGGERA

Representatives for the Supreme  
Command of the Italian army:

Lt. Gen. Pietro BADOGLIO

Maj. Gen. Scipione SCIPIONI

Col. Tullio MARCHETTI

" Pietro GAZZERA

" Pietro MARAVIGNA

" Alberto PARIANI

Naval Capt. Francesco ACCINI

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ.

*November 8, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

11:35 a. m.: Major von Bothmer reports that a train is approaching from Longuyon with 500 men, who want to force their trip home. Arrangements are made with the Fifth Army to conduct the train to Arlon and disarm it there.

\* \* \* \* \*

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***Preliminary History of the Armistice***

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*November 8, 1918.*

FOREIGN OFFICE, BERLIN:

Secretary of State Erzberger sends the following wireless:

It appears from the conference which took place under the presidency of Marshal Foch, only French military officers and English naval officers being present, that the armistice terms which have been presented have been concerted by the military authorities and Governments of all enemy countries and are binding, consequently Marshal Foch was obliged to refuse the respite (delay of twenty-four hours) which was urgently requested, and based on technical difficulties, and also, on the same grounds, refused the provisional suspension of hostilities which was asked for. So far as can be judged up to the present, no counterproposals will be permitted so far as the main decisive points are concerned. An attempt will, nevertheless, be made in individual conversations which have already been arranged, to arrive at the modification of certain points, primarily for the maintenance of internal order and for the prevention of the threatened famine. For this purpose we shall attempt to acquire a prolongation of the respite and a decrease in the amount of material to be surrendered.

In case a refusal is not determined on, request express authorization to sign at once with whatever modifications in the matter of practical execution of the terms we may be able to attain here.\*

Furthermore, request authorization that, in case of acceptance, there may be added to the protocol a declaration somewhat in the following terms: "The German Government will, of course, make every effort to execute the obligations it has undertaken. The undersigned, however, deem it their conscientious duty in the interest of the honesty of the relations between Germany and her opponents, to point out at the present moment that the execution of these terms will plunge the German people into famine and anarchy, and that, therefore, there may arise a situation, without any fault of either the German Government or the German people, which may render impossible the further observation of all obligations."

Final decision as to the answer to be returned must be made by you, as must also the decision whether the preceding declaration should be added, even at the risk of upsetting the armistice negotiations. In view of the shortness of the respite, request that the final wording be left to the plenipotentiaries.

von HINTZE.

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\* Ambiguous phraseology. However, no original German text available to make correction.

**Warning Instructions for Cessation of Hostilities**

The Commanding General  
American First Army  
France

SOUILLY, *November 8, 1918.*

My dear General:

The following message has just been received from Marshal Foch and the directions contained therein will be carried out:

1. Hostilities will cease along the whole front beginning at date and hour not yet determined, Paris time.
2. The Allied troops will not pass the line reached by that hour on that date until they get further orders. Report carefully what this line is.
3. All communication is forbidden up to the time of receipt of instructions, which will be sent to the Commanders-in-Chief of armies.

FOCH.

In compliance with above instructions, the necessary orders will be given by army commanders, who will report by telegraph to G. H. Q., Chaumont, the exact line occupied at the time of receipt of orders referred to. These orders are to be sent direct from Allied Commander-in-Chief to American army commanders according to my request in order to avoid any delay.

Very sincerely,

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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**No Cessation of Hostilities**

Chief of Staff, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont

PARIS, *November 8, 1918.*

Reference message regarding armistice transmitted by Colonel Mott and sent by me to army commanders this afternoon, inform army commanders immediately that the armistice has not been signed and there is no cessation of hostilities.

The message above referred to was sent by Colonel Mott in anticipation of signing of armistice and does not take effect until armistice is signed and until orders from these headquarters.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

Telephone to General Eltinge  
by General Pershing 7:50 p. m.

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[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,  
November 9, 1918.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

The train with the 500 men who wanted to force their furlough, has been disarmed in Arlon.

\* \* \* \* \*

10:50 a. m.: Composite Army C reports that a soldiers' council (sailors) has appeared in Metz and has entered into negotiations with the Government. The agreement was made to lay down all arms. Quiet prevails in the town.

11:35 a. m.: Report to Supreme Headquarters (Captain von Poseck) concerning the happenings in Metz. Everything is being carried out quietly. No disturbances.

The group of armies is of the opinion that the matter can be settled very soon. According to the report from Composite Army C (Major Faessig), the behavior of the Landwehr Divisions is good. The men reject outside influences. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

4:35 p. m.: Major Faessig reports on the incidents in Metz. The sailor movement has spread farther. About 10,000 mutinying soldiers are said to be in the town. General Lequis will enter into negotiations with the soldiers' councils at 5:15 p. m. The following countermeasures were taken: The 14th Assault Bn. and one pioneer company were sent to Metz. They are expected to arrive there toward evening. Composite Army C (Major Faessig) points out that the cutting off of mail causes unrest. It is his belief that the Government itself will have to warn the troops to keep order.

5:55 p. m.: Report to Supreme Headquarters: Events in Metz, countermeasures taken by the group of armies, and order to battalions to keep in readiness for November 10.

6:05 p. m.: Supreme Headquarters (Major von Stuelpnagel) issues instructions governing procedure if trouble breaks out. In principle, armed force will be used only when order is disturbed and looting, for instance, is taking place.

\* \* \* \* \*

7:25 p. m.: Appeal of Field Marshal von Hindenburg (Operations Section No. 11373, Secret) to the Field Armies on the Western Front, to keep peace and order within the army.

In the course of the afternoon, the Fifth Army and Deputy [Chief of Staff] Major von Bothmer had reported that the 20th Pioneer Bn. which was to be moved to the front, refused to travel any farther and had arrested its officers. The bn. is moved to Arlon at 11 p. m.

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**The Kaiser Abdicates**

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Berlin, November 9, 1918.

German Wireless Press  
November 9, 1918, 3:25 p. m.  
S. C., A. E. F. Interception

Abdication of the German Emperor

Imperial Chancellor Prince Max von Baden publishes the following statement:

The Emperor and King has decided to abdicate the throne. The Imperial Chancellor will remain in office until the questions connected with the abdication of the Emperor, the renunciation of succession by the Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia and the establishment of the Regency. He intends to propose to the Regent that Deputy EBERT be appointed Imperial Chancellor to submit a bill for the immediate calling of a general election for the constitutional national congress, which will be charged with finally establishing the future form of government of the German people, including such parts of nations which may desire to be received within the boundaries of the Empire.

Berlin, November 9, 1918.

MAX,  
Prince von Baden,  
The Imperial Chancellor.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1203: Telegram

**Foch's Order for Decisive Results**

[Contemporary Translation]

November 9, 1918.

EXHIBIT H

From General Staff Bacon to the Mission at Chaumont. (For General Pershing)  
The enemy disorganized by our repeated attacks, is withdrawing along the whole front.  
It is important to maintain and hasten our action.

I appeal to the energy and initiative of the Commanders-in-Chief and to their armies to secure decisive results.

MARSHAL FOCH.

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***False Report of Signing of Armistice***

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,  
November 9, 1918.

From: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, S. O. S.

To: Commanding General, S. O. S.

1. Report on the matter of the false information, given in many quarters as official throughout American circles that the Armistice terms had been signed on the morning of Thursday, November 7, is hereby made. At about eleven-thirty of this morning this office was in conversation over the telephone with Captain H. J. Whitehouse, Acting Director of the Liaison Service at No. 45, Avenue Montaigne, Paris. Captain Whitehouse stated that the Armistice had been signed. Surprise was expressed by this office, as well as doubt, but Captain Whitehouse stated that his information was absolutely reliable and authentic. A half an hour later this office again rang up the liaison office, not having been able to get information from the French 2d Bureau that this was correct. The liaison office once more assured this office of the correctness of the statement that an Armistice had been signed that morning. It was felt, however, by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, S. O. S., that it was incredible that this report, however authenticated, could be correct. For example, it would have seemed physically impossible for the German delegates to have left Berlin at the time wired, and, given the conditions of the railroads and war-destroyed traffic roads, to have reached the point designated in the French lines; and, as a matter of fact, the delegation did not reach the designated point until ten o'clock that night, and met the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces at nine-fifteen the following morning.

2. Meanwhile, G-2, S. O. S., between the first telephone messages from the liaison office, sent the following telegram to G. H. Q.: "Rumor stated by responsible parties to have been received from the Ministry of War states that German signed Armistice terms at ten o'clock this morning. This is sent with all reserve." Headquarters S. O. S., Tours, was communicated with by telephone and given the information, but was informed by this office that despite the apparent authenticity, this rumor should be accepted with the greatest reserve.

3. At one o'clock on this day Major Warburton, Military Attache to the American Embassy, stated to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, S. O. S., that he had received authentic information, and had sent a cable to Washington during the morning to the effect that the Armistice had been signed. There is reason to believe that he also was called up on the telephone by the liaison service. However, other departments did not treat the matter cautiously as did G-2; despite the fact that we answered all inquiries by stating that the Chief of the French 2d Bureau and the representatives of Marshal Foch in Paris both refused to confirm the rumor, it was nevertheless telegraphed to Brest, and it is believed to one or two other points. Having been sent as official, the French at Brest assumed that it was correct, and a celebration on a large scale ensued. There were celebrations at other points, notably at Le Mans, although there is much evidence to show that at this latter place the information came from French sources. Some members of the French Staff Departments undoubtedly telephoned the rumor to various banks in Paris, and it spread at a remarkable rate and was generally believed in Paris by all those who are apt to accept such information without question.

4. Investigation by this section reveals the fact that the liaison office obtained the information from a member of the staff of General Alby, Chief of the 2d Bureau. (This

is Captain Stanton, representative of the liaison service.) He is accustomed to inform his chiefs in the liaison service of any information he may have picked up. In this case some reports stated that Captain de Cartusac had been the one to inform Captain Stanton of the liaison service. The liaison officer with the Chief of the 2d Bureau who gave the information to the Acting Director of the liaison service, and other sources, has been interviewed by this office. He states that as a part of his duty he had been accustomed to send any news he received whether informally or officially, to his liaison headquarters. In this case he states that he was told by the Chief of Cabinet of the Head of the 2d Bureau, but that he gave the message as all other messages of this type, unofficially and personally; he believed that it was true, but did not pass it along in any official sense. Messages from the French War Office were going out the entire day, stating to people the so-called news, and French officials originally circulated the rumor. These are the facts thus far ascertained by this office.

5. The matter seems to have assumed a more serious aspect as a result of the cables sent by the Naval and Military Attaches in Paris to the United States. It appears that all the American morning papers gave out as a fact the news that the Armistice had been signed, and that Washington has now cabled over for an investigation.

6. Vice Admiral Henry B. Wilson, Commanding U. S. Naval Forces in France, received this information from Captain Jackson, the Naval Attache, who has just been relieved by Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long, Naval Attache, Paris. The American Embassy, it appears, received the news also through the liaison service, which source was again traced to Captain Stanton. The latter states that in the absence of the Chief of Cabinet of the General in Command of the 2d Bureau, he answered the telephone and was talked to by M. Audibert, editor of the newspaper *l'Information*. The latter stated that the Armistice had been signed. Captain Stanton repeated this to various French officials, merely as news, without stating it was official in any way. Immediately various members of the Ministry began telephoning it. The banks were also informed. The news spread quickly around France. For example, at Chartres at six o'clock in the afternoon it was reported semi-officially, and a celebration was held.

7. The Consul-General gave it out as a fact at the American Club luncheon, but had to retract afterwards. Captain Jackson, the American Naval Intelligence Officer in Paris, wired it as authentic to Admiral Wilson at Brest, who informed Roy Howard, head of the United Press, who cabled it to the newspapers of the United States. Major Warburton cabled it to the State Department and the War Department, but it did not get out to the press of the United States in this way.

8. From the information received by this office, it would appear that the original source of the mistake was the fact that a number of officers here caught a wireless telegram stating that an order had been given to cease firing at 3 o'clock on that afternoon. This, as it since appears, was to allow the German Armistice Delegates to get through the lines, and was only local in its scope. It was, however, interpreted as being a signal that the Armistice had been signed.

9. It should be stated that the Intelligence representatives at G. H. Q. and in Paris both answered all inquiries by stating that it was a rumor that should be taken with the greatest caution, and that official confirmation could not be obtained from the Chief of the 2d Bureau, or the representative of General Foch in Paris.

10. In conclusion, it should be stated that, although in American circles the liaison service, through their Captain Stanton, gave out the information and stated it was correct, they did so in each case as a personal message, and in no case stated or acted on it as official. The French reported it, and their dissemination of the news from semi-official sources was much more widespread than that through our American sources.

CABOT WARD,  
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

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[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GALLWITZ,  
*November 10, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

11 p. m.: According to Telegram No. 11391, Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters, Chancellor Ebert has notified Supreme Headquarters that he has taken over the office of Chancellor and requests headquarters to place itself at his disposal. To this, Supreme Headquarters makes the comment that it will support the Chancellor to the best of its ability.

11:35 p. m.: Supreme Headquarters reports by Telegram No. 11397, Operations Section, that the Peace Delegation has been notified that the German Government accepts the armistice conditions proposed November 8. Time set for the beginning of the Armistice will be announced later.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Gallwitz: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Message

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: Received: November 10, 1918, 11 p. m.

By: Kutter, 204th Tel. Det. No. 11397

TO: Group of Armies Gallwitz, Nov. 10, 1918, 11:35 p. m. by Metz.

Receipt acknowledged: Eckes

Composite Army C, Nov. 11, 1918, 11:15 p. m. Receipt acknowledged by Schmitt

Group of Armies Gallwitz. Receipt acknowledged by: Weise, 11:10 [p. m.]

The Peace Delegation has been informed that the German Government accepts the terms of the Armistice as stipulated November 8. Time for the Armistice to begin will be announced later.

Transmitted to Fifth Army by Metz: Received at Fifth Army Nov. 10, 11:35 p. m.

Transmitted to Composite Army C: Received at Composite Army C Nov. 10, 11:15 p. m.

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***Preliminary History of the Armistice***

[Editorial Translation]

Received *November 10, 1918.*

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army telegraphs to the Foreign Office:  
Following wireless in cipher from the German plenipotentiaries has just arrived here:  
To the Supreme Army Command for the Imperial Chancellor:

Full authorization has just arrived. As soon as the Armistice has been concluded, we recommend advising President Wilson of it by wireless and requesting him to institute negotiations to bring about a preliminary peace at once, in order to prevent anarchy and famine. We further request that it be arranged that through Holland's mediation a first meeting of the plenipotentiaries may take place at the Hague immediately. Only by an immediate conclusion of the preliminary peace can the disastrous effect of the execution of the Armistice terms be mitigated.

Our opponents so far have shown no comprehension of this danger.

ERZBERGER,  
Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

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***Preliminary History of the Armistice***

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*November 10, 1918.*

To the Ministry of War:

An attempt must be made to procure the modification of the following points in the Armistice terms:

1. Extension of the date for evacuation to two months, the greater part of this time being needed for the evacuation of the Rhine Provinces, the Palatinate and Hess, otherwise the army will collapse, as the technical execution of the terms is absolutely impossible.
2. The right wing of the army must be allowed to march through the corner of Maestricht.
3. Abandonment of neutral zones for reasons of internal order must be restricted, at least, to a depth of ten kilometers.
4. Honorable capitulation of East Africa.
5. A considerable reduction must be affected in the railway material to be surrendered, otherwise industry will be seriously endangered. With regard to paragraph 7, only a small number of personnel can be left; more detailed arrangements required on this point.
6. Army only provided with 18,000 motor lorries, fifty per cent available for use; surrender of the number demanded would mean complete breakdown of the army supply system.
7. Only 1,700 pursuit bombing aeroplanes in existence.

8. If there is to be a one-sided surrender of prisoners of war, at least the present agreements as to treatment of the latter must remain in force.

9. The blockade must be raised so far as food supplies are concerned. Commissioners to deal with regulation of food supplies are on the way.

If it is impossible to gain these points, it would nevertheless be advisable to conclude the agreement. In case of refusal of points 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 a fiery protest should be raised, and an appeal addressed to Wilson.

Please notify Government of outcome of these matters at earliest possible moment.

Von HINDENBURG.

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Telegram---German Doc. No. 108

### ***Preliminary History of the Armistice***

[Editorial Translation]

BERLIN, *November 10, 1918.*

TO HINTZE, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS:

I beg Your Excellency to request the Supreme Army Command to send the following message by wireless to the Armistice Commission:

For Secretary of State Erzberger. You are authorized to sign the Armistice. You will at the same time add the following declaration to the protocol:

The German Government will make every effort to execute the conditions imposed. The undersigned, however, conceive it to be their duty to call attention to the fact that the execution of certain points of these conditions will plunge the population of the unoccupied parts of Germany into the misery of starvation. The abandonment of all provisions in the territories to be evacuated- provisions which were destined to feed the army - as well as the curtailment of the traffic facilities, which is equal to an abstraction, while the blockade is at the same time maintained, makes the nourishment of the nation and any organized distribution impossible.

The undersigned therefore request that they be allowed to negotiate on such alterations of these points as will ensure the question of nourishment.

I also agree that the Supreme Army Command be permitted, through His Excellency Erzberger, to effect the capitulation of East Africa in an honorable manner, and furthermore to arrange for the march of our troops through the corner of Maestricht.

MAX,  
Prince von Baden,  
Imperial Chancellor.

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**German Government Accepts Armistice Terms**

A 141 RS 750B  
Col. Carl Boyd

*SENLIS, November 10, 1918.*

A D Chaumont

No. 39. Sunday 11 o'clock p. m. confirming telephone message of 21 h. German Government has announced by wireless that they accept terms of Armistice so far as we know Armistice has not yet been signed but such action will probably occur within few hours no message yet received from Marshal Foch stating that any paper has been signed you will be immediately advised of developments.

T. BENTLEY MOTT,  
Colonel, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Mission,  
Allied G. H. Q.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Memorandum

**German Declaration at Signature of Armistice**

[Editorial Translation]

*November 11, 1918.*

The German Government will naturally make every effort to watch over the execution of the conditions that have been imposed.

The undersigned representatives recognize that in certain points of the intervention some good will was demonstrated. Consequently, they can consider that remarks they had made on November 9 regarding conditions of Armistice with Germany and the answer that they received on November 10 are an integral part of the whole agreement.

But they can have no doubt that some facts, in particular, the briefness of time allowed for the evacuation, as well as the provision of necessary means for transportation, threaten to create a situation which will make it impossible to continue the carrying out of the conditions, without any fault on the part of the Government nor the German people.

Moreover, the undersigned representatives consider their duty, referring to their repeated written and oral declarations, to stress forcibly the point that the execution of this treaty can precipitate the German people into anarchy and famine. After the discussions that brought about the Armistice, we expected conditions which, while assuring full and complete military security to our adversary, might bring the end of suffering to the noncombatants, the women and children.

The German people who during 50 months have struggled against a world of enemies, will, in spite of all violence, preserve their liberty and unity.

A people of 70 million suffers, but does not perish.

ERZBERGER,  
OBERNDORFF,  
WINTERFELDT,  
VANSELOW.

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**Foch's Order on Cessation of Hostilities**

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,  
*November 11, 1918--5:45 a. m.*

French Wireless Message  
November 11, 1918, 5:45 a. m.  
S. C., A. E. F. Interception.

1. Hostilities will cease on the entire front beginning at 11 a. m. (French time), November 11.
2. The Allied troops will not pass the line reached at that date and at that hour without a new order.

To the Commanders-in-Chief:

MARSHAL FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Armistice Convention

**Final Armistice Terms**

[Contemporary Translation]

CONVENTION\*

Between Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, acting in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, assisted by Admiral Wemyss, First Sea Lord, on the one hand;

and

The Secretary of State Erzberger, President of the German Delegation,  
The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Count von Oberndorff,  
The General Major von Winterfeldt,

The Captain of Navy Vanselow, furnished with powers in due form and acting in accordance with the directions of the German Councillor, on the other hand - an Armistice has been concluded under the following conditions:

A. CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED WITH GERMANY UPON THE WESTERN FRONT:

- I. Cessation of hostilities upon land and in air six hours after the signature of the Armistice.
- II. Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries: Belgium, France, Luxemburg - as well as Alsace-Lorraine - regulated in such a way as to be completed within 15 days from the date of signature of the Armistice.

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\* [Editorial Note: During the latter part of October, 1918, Marshal Foch and General Pershing had exchanged views as to what should be included in Armistice terms; practically all of their recommendations are included in this present Convention.]

The German troops which have not evacuated the territory above mentioned within the time limit fixed will be made prisoners of war.

The occupation by the Allied troops and by those of the United States will follow, in all of these countries, the progress of the evacuation.

All movements of evacuation or of occupation are governed by Note Number 1, hereto appended, which was drawn up at the moment of signing the Armistice.

III. Repatriation, commencing immediately and which must be terminated within a period of fifteen days, of all the inhabitants of the countries enumerated above (including hostages and the persons who have been accused or sentenced).

IV. The delivery by the German armies of the following material of war in good condition:

5,000 guns (of which 2,500 shall be heavy and 2,500 field guns;)

25,000 machine guns

3,000 trench mortars

1,700 pursuit and bombardment airplanes, preference being given to all of the D-7's and all of the night bombardment machines, all of the above to be delivered where they are now to the Allied troops and to those of the United States in accordance with detailed conditions set forth in Note No. 1, appended hereto, which was drawn up at the moment of the signature of the Armistice.

V. Evacuation of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine by the German armies.

The country on the left bank of the Rhine will be administered by the local authorities under the control of the troops of occupation of the Allies and of the United States.

The troops of the Allies and of the United States will assure the occupation of this country by garrisons holding the principal points of passage of the Rhine (Mayence [Mainz] Coblenz. Cologne) with, at these points, bridgeheads having a radius of 30 kilometers on the right bank, and likewise with garrisons holding the strategical points of the region.

A neutral zone 10 kilometers wide will be reserved (upon the right bank of the Rhine) included between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and the river, extending from the frontier of Holland to the frontier of Switzerland.

The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine countries (left bank and right bank), will be regulated so as to be completed within a period of 16 days additional delay, that is, 31 days after the signature of the Armistice.

All movements of evacuation and of occupation are regulated by Note No. 1, hereto appended, which was drawn up at the moment of the signing of the Armistice.

VI. In all the territory evacuated by the enemy, all evacuation of inhabitants will be forbidden; neither any damage nor anything prejudicial will be done to the persons or to the property of the inhabitants. No one will be prosecuted for any failure to participate in warlike measures preceding the signature of the Armistice.

There will be no destruction of any kind.

All military installations of whatever nature will be handed over intact; likewise all military supplies, food stuffs, munitions, equipment, which shall not have been taken away within the time limit set for the evacuation.

The depots of food stuffs of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc. shall be left in place.

No general measure or official order will be promulgated which may have as a consequence a depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

VII. The ways and means of communication of all kinds, railroads, navigable waters, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, will not be damaged in any way.

All civil and military personnel employed at the present moment on these means of communication will be maintained on them.

There will be delivered to the Associated Powers:

5,000 locomotives, 150,000 cars, in good working order and provided with all necessary spare parts and accessories, within time limits the details of which are fixed by Annex No. 2, and of which the total will not exceed 31 days.

There will also be delivered 5,000 trucks in good condition within a delay of 36 days.

The railroads of Alsace-Lorraine, within a delay of 31 days, will be handed over, together with all personnel and materiel which form an organic part of these lines.

Moreover the material necessary for their development in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine will be left in place.

All supplies of coal and all other matter intended for their upkeep, rail, signal and shop materiel, will be left in place. These supplies will be maintained by Germany insofar as concerns the exploitation of the means of communication of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. All the canal boats taken from the Allies will be returned.

Note Number 2 regulates the details of these measures.

VIII. The German Command will be required to point out within a delay of 48 hours after the signature of the Armistice all the mines or other agencies of delayed action which have been installed upon the territories evacuated by the German troops, and to facilitate the search and the destruction of such mines and traps.

It will also point out all injurious measures which may have been taken (such as the poisoning or pollution of springs, wells and other water supply sources); all of this under pain of reprisals.

IX. The right of requisition will be exercised by the Allied Armies and by those of the United States in all the occupied territories, having regard for the adjustment of the accounts with the legal owners.

The upkeep of the troops of occupation of the countries of the Rhine (not including Alsace-Lorraine), will be charged to the German Government.

X. Immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, under detailed conditions to be drawn up, of all prisoners of war including the accused and the sentenced, who belong to the Allies or to the United States. The Allied Powers and the United States may dispose of these prisoners as they see fit.

This condition annuls the previous agreements on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including that of July 1918, now in process of ratification.

However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war now interned in Holland and in Switzerland, will continue as heretofore. The repatriation of German prisoners of war will be regulated upon the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

XI. The sick and wounded who cannot be evacuated and who are left in the territory evacuated by the German armies will be cared for by German personnel which will be left in place with the necessary materiel.

#### B. DISPOSITIONS RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY:

XII. All of the German troops who are now within the territories which before the war formed a part of Austria-Hungary, or Rumania or of Turkey must be immediately withdrawn within the frontiers of Germany as those frontiers existed on August 1, 1914.

All German troops which are at the present within the territories which formed a part before the war of Russia shall likewise withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as defined above, such withdrawal to take place as soon as the Allies deem proper, consideration being given to the interior conditions of these territories.

XIII. The immediate beginning of the evacuation by German troops and the recall of all instructors, prisoners and civil and military agents of Germany who are now within the territory of Russia (within the boundaries as of August, 1914).

XIV. Immediate cessation by German troops of all requisitions, seizures or coercive measures with the object of procuring resources for Germany in Rumania and in Russia (within the boundaries as of August 1, 1914).

XV. Renunciation of the Treaty of Bucarest and of Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

XVI. The Allies will have free access to the territory evacuated by the Germans upon the eastern frontiers, either by Danzig or the Vistula, in order that they may supply the population and in order that they may maintain order.

C. IN EASTERN AFRICA:

XVII. Evacuation of all German forces operating in Eastern Africa within a time limit set by the Allies.

D. GENERAL CLAUSES:

XVIII. Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum delay of one month, under detailed conditions to be decided upon, of all civilians who may be interned, including hostages, those under trial or sentence belonging to Allied Powers, or to the Associated Powers, other than those enumerated in Article III.

XIX. Financial Clauses: Without prejudice to any future renunciation and demand on the part of the Allies and of the United States.

Reparation for damages.

During the duration of the Armistice there shall not be removed by the enemy any public securities which may serve the Allies as pledge for the recovery of indemnities of war.

Immediate restitution of the cash deposit of the Bank of Belgium and in general the immediate return of all documents, monies, securities (shares and paper money with the plant for making same), concerning the public and private interests of the invaded countries.

Return of the Russian and Rumanian gold taken by the Germans or turned over to them.

This gold will be taken in charge by the Allies until the signature of peace.

E. NAVAL CLAUSES:

XX. Immediate cessation of hostilities on the sea and the precise information as to the location and the movements of German vessels. Notice to be given to all neutral powers that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is accorded the Naval and Merchant Marine of the Allies and Associated Powers without raising any questions of neutrality.

XXI. Restitution, without reciprocity, of all prisoners of war now in the hands of the Germans, belonging to the Naval or Merchant Marine of the Allied and Associated Powers.

XXII. Delivery to the Allies and to the United States of all the submarines (including submarine cruisers and mine layers) which Germany now has, with their armament and equipment, at ports designated by the Allies and by the United States. All of these which cannot take the sea will be disarmed both as to personnel and as to materiel, and they shall remain under the surveillance of the Allies and of the United States.

The submarines which are ready to put to sea will be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders are received by wireless for the voyage to the port designated for their delivery, and all other submarines must leave as soon as possible.

The conditions of this article will be carried out within a period of 14 days from the signature of the Armistice.

XXIII. The German surface vessels of war which may be designated by the Allies and by the United States will be immediately disarmed and interned in neutral ports or, such ports being lacking, within Allied ports designated by the Allies and the United States. These vessels will remain under the care of the Allies and of the United States, detachments for guard only being left on board.

The Allies will designate:

6 cruisers

10 battleships

8 light cruisers (2 of which shall be mine layers)

50 destroyers of the most recent type.

All of the other above surface war vessels (including river boats) will be assembled and completely disarmed in German naval bases designated by the Allies and United States and will be there placed under the guard of the Allies and of the United States.

The military armament of all the vessels of the auxiliary fleet will be removed.

All of the vessels designated to be interned will be ready to quit the German ports 7 days after the signature of the Armistice.

Wireless instructions for the voyage will be given.

XXIV. Right of the Allies and of the United States, beyond the territorial waters of Germany, to sweep all minefields and to destroy all obstructions placed by Germany, whose location must be indicated to the Allies.

XXV. Right of free entrance to and exit from the Baltic for the Naval and Merchant Marine of the Allied and Associated Powers, assured by the occupation of all the forts, works, batteries and defenses of all kinds belonging to Germany in all of the channels leading from the Cattegat to the Baltic, and by the sweeping and the destruction of all mines and obstructions in and without the territorial waters of Germany.

The description and the exact location of these mines and obstructions will be furnished by Germany who cannot raise any questions of neutrality.

XXVI. Maintenance of the blockade of the Allied and Associated Powers under present conditions.

The German commercial vessels which are found on the sea remain subject to capture.

The Allies and the United States will undertake the supply of Germany during the Armistice to the extent that they deem necessary.

XXVII. Assembly and immobilization in German bases designated by the Allies and by the United States of all air forces.

XXVIII. The delivery by Germany, in place and intact, of all port material and materiel for river navigation, and of all commercial vessels, tugs, barges, and of all apparatus, materiel, and maritime airplane supplies, all arms, apparatus, supplies, of all kinds, upon the evacuation of the Belgian coast and ports.

XXIX. Evacuation of all the ports of the Black Sea by Germany and the delivery to the Allies and to the United States of all Russian war vessels seized by Germany in the Black Sea; the liberation of all neutral commercial vessels which have been seized; the delivery of all war or other materiel seized in these ports, and the abandonment of the German material enumerated in Clause XXVIII.

XXX. Restitution, without reciprocity, in ports designated by the Allies and the United States of all commercial vessels belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers which are now under the control of Germany.

XXXI. The destruction of ships or materiel before the evacuation, delivery or restitution is forbidden.

XXXII. The German Government will formally notify all neutral governments, and particularly the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland that all restrictions imposed on the traffic of their shipping with the Allied and Associated Powers, whether by the German Government itself or whether by private German enterprises, or whether in exchange for defined concessions such as exportation of naval construction material, or not, are immediately annulled.

XXXIII. No transfer of German merchant ships of any kind under a neutral flag whatever shall take place after the signature of the Armistice.

#### F. DURATION OF THE ARMISTICE:

XXXIV. The duration of the Armistice is fixed at 36 days with the option of prolonging it.

During this duration the Armistice may (if the clauses are not executed) be denounced by one of the contracting parties, who shall give 48 hours warning thereof. It is understood that the execution of Articles III and XVIII will not be causes for denouncing the Armistice on account of failure to execute these clauses within the time limit set unless this failure is intentional.

In order to assure the execution of the present Convention under the best possible conditions, the principle of a Permanent International Commission of Armistice is admitted. This Commission will function under the high authority of the Military and Naval Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

This Armistice is signed the 11 day of November, 1918, at 5 h., French time.

F. FOCH  
R. E. WEMYSS  
ERZBERGER  
A. OBERNDORFF  
WINTERFELDT  
VANSELOW.

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#### ANNEX NO. 1

I. Evacuation of invaded territories; BELGIUM, FRANCE, LUXEMBURG, as well as ALSACE-LORRAINE: This will be carried out in three successive phases under the following conditions:

1st Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between the present front and line No. 1, of the attached map: To be completed within a period of five days after the signing of the Armistice.

2d Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between line No. 1 and line No. 2: To be completed within a period of four more days (a total of nine days after the signing of the Armistice).

3d Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between line No. 2 and line No. 3: To be completed within a period of six more days (a total of fifteen days after the signing of the Armistice).

The troops of the Allies and of the United States will go into these territories upon the expiration of the periods accorded to the German troops for evacuation of each of them.

Accordingly: The present German front will be crossed by the Allied troops beginning with the sixth day following the signing of the Armistice;

Line No. 1, beginning on the tenth day;

Line No. 2, beginning on the sixteenth day.

II. Evacuation of the Rhine territory: This evacuation will also take place in several successive phases:

1st Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between lines No. 2 and No. 3 and line No. 4: To be completed within a period of four more days (a total of 19 days after the signing of the Armistice).

2nd Phase: Evacuation of territories situated between line No. 4 and line No. 5: To be completed within a period of four more days (a total of 23 days after the signing of the Armistice).

3rd Phase: Evacuation of territory situated between line No. 5 and line No. 6 (Line of the Rhine): To be completed within a period of four more days (a total of 27 days after the signing of the Armistice).

4th Phase: Evacuation of bridgeheads and of the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine: To be completed within a period of four more days (a total of 31 days after the signing of the Armistice).

The troops of occupation of the Allies and of the United States will enter these various territories upon the expiration of the periods accorded to the German troops for evacuation of each of them.

Accordingly: They will cross line No. 3 on the 20th day following the signing of the Armistice;

They will cross line No. 4 on the 24th day following the signing of the Armistice;

Line No. 5 on the 25th day;

Line No. 6 (Rhine) on the 32d day for occupation of the bridgeheads.

III. Delivery by the German Armies of War Material Provided for by the Armistice: This war material should be delivered under the following conditions:

The first half before the 10th day;

The second half before the 20th day.

This material will be turned over to each of the armies of the Allies and of the United States by each tactical group of the German army in proportions which will be determined upon by the Permanent Armistice Commission.

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## ANNEX NO. 2

### CONDITIONS CONCERNING MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(Railways, navigable rivers, roads, sea and river ports, telegraph and telephones.)

I. All means of communication in territory up to and including the Rhine, or located in the territory constituting the bridgeheads on the right bank of that river occupied by the Allied Armies, will be placed under the full and entire authority of the Chief Command of the Allied Armies, who will have the right to take all measures which he may judge necessary to ensure the occupation and exploitation. All documents relative to means of communication will be made ready for transmittal to said command.

II. All materiel and all civil and military personnel now employed for the maintenance and exploitation of Means of Communication will be maintained as they stand on said Means, in all the territories evacuated by the German troops.

All the additional materiel necessary for the maintenance of these Means of Communication in the country on the left bank of the Rhine, will be furnished by the German Government during the entire existence of the Armistice.

III. PERSONNEL: The French and Belgian personnel belonging to the Services of Communication, whether interned or not, will be turned over to the French and Belgian armies during the 15 days following the signature of the Armistice.

The personnel organically belonging to the railway lines of the Chemins de Fer d'Alsace-Lorraine will be maintained or restored to its place so as to assure the exploitation of this line.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies will have the right to make such changes and replacements as he sees fit in the personnel of the Means of Communication.

#### IV. MATERIEL:

(a) Rolling Stock: The rolling stock turned over to the Allied Armies in the zone comprised between the present front and line No. 3, excluding Alsace-Lorraine, shall consist of at least

5,000 locomotives

150,000 cars.

This delivery will be effected within the period fixed in clause 7 of the Armistice, the details of the conditions to be fixed by the Permanent International Armistice Commission.

All this materiel will be in good maintenance and rolling condition and provided with all the usual spares or equipment. It may be operated with its own personnel or any other, on any part of the railway system of the Allied Armies.

The materiel organically belonging to the line operated by the Railway System of Alsace-Lorraine will be maintained or restored and placed at the disposition of the French army.

On the other hand, the materiel to be left as it stands in the regions on the left bank of the Rhine as well as within the territory of bridgeheads must ensure the normal operation of the railway lines in these territories.

(b) Road, Signalling and Workshop Materiel: The signalling materiel, the machine-tools and the equipment taken from the workshops of the French and Belgian railway depots, will be turned over under such conditions as will be fixed by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. There will be furnished to the Allied Armies track materiel: Rails, small materiel, implements, bridge materiel and the necessary ties to repair the lines destroyed beyond the present front.

(c) Fuel and Maintenance Supplies: During the Armistice the fuel and supplies for the maintenance of the lines will be delivered by the German Government at the depots normally belonging to the railway system in the regions on the left bank of the Rhine.

V. TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS: All permanent telephone and telegraph lines, all wireless stations will be turned over to the Allied Armies with all the civil and military personnel and all the materiel, including all the supplies stored on the left bank of the Rhine.

The additional supplies necessary to maintain the lines must be furnished during the Armistice by the German Government as they are needed.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies will institute military occupation of this system; he will ensure the direction thereof and among the personnel will make such changes and replacements as he may deem necessary.

He will send back to the German army all the military personnel which he will not consider necessary for the operation and up-keep of the systems.

All the plans of the German telegraph and telephone systems will be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

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Supplement to Armistice Conditions. The text is changed as follows:

XXII. The surrender to the Allies and the United States of all submarines, including the submarine cruisers and mine layers now on hand, with their armament and complete equipment. These will proceed to the harbors designated by the Allies and the United States. Those which cannot put to sea will be dismantled and relieved of their personnel and will remain under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States. Those submarines which are ready to put to sea will be prepared to leave the German harbors as soon as they receive orders by wireless to depart to the designated harbors. The others will follow as quickly as possible. The conditions of this paragraph will be carried out within a period of fourteen days after the signing of the Armistice.

XXIII. The following addition is made: All ships to be interned will be ready to leave German harbors seven days after the signing of the Armistice. The route which they are to take will be communicated by wireless.

XXVI. The following sentence is added: The Allies and the United States will concern themselves with the question of Germany's food supply during the Armistice to the degree considered necessary.

XXVIII. This paragraph is to be so interpreted that the designated materiel must be left uninjured on the spot so that the Allies and the United States may dispose of it as they see fit.

XXIX. It is ordered that the Allies be informed as quickly as possible of the agreement referred to.

XXXIV. This paragraph now reads: The time limit is 35 days with the possibility of a continuation. In the course of this period the Armistice may be renounced by one of the

contracting parties if the conditions are not carried out. Notice of this must be given 48 hours in advance. It is to be understood that Article XXVIII will only lead to the renouncing of the Armistice within the designated period on account of inability to fulfill the conditions, if malevolence is manifested in carrying out the conditions. In order to assure the carrying out of the conditions imposed on both sides under the most favorable circumstances, the principle of a Permanent International Armistice Commission is accepted. This Commission will work under the supreme direction of the Supreme Commander of the Army and Navy of the Allied Armies.

ADMIRALTY STAFF.

[Editorial Note: The origin of the Naval Supplement is not clear. A comparison of its content with the clauses concerned shows changes involved to be negligible.]

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

***No Allied Advance for Five Days***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 11, 1918.*

Telephone message received from Colonel Mott:

Colonel Mott will not leave Senlis until noon the 11th because orders and instructions which he is to bring will not be ready before that time. He gives, however, as advance information the following:

1. There will be no movement of Allied troops for five days.
2. The Armistice was signed as written, but, owing to material difficulties, there were added a few annexes pertaining to troop movements.

CARL BOYD,  
Colonel, U. S. A.,  
A. D. C. to the C-in-C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

***German Complaint***

*November 11, 1918---4 p. m.*

Phone message Col. Mott to Col. Boyd

Col. Mott informed by Gen. Weygand that the Germans are complaining of failure of Americans to stop firing at Stenay, Beaumont, and above the Meuse. Gen. Weygand requests that instructions be given to have it stopped immediately.

CARL BOYD,  
Colonel, U. S. A.,  
A. D. C. to the C-in-C.

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**Signing of Armistice Agreement**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  
No. 11410

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*November 11, 1918.*

To: Groups of Armies in the West

1. The Armistice agreement has been signed. All hostilities will cease today, November 11, at 11:55 a. m.
2. Order for the return march into the homeland will follow. The front line occupied by us at the beginning of Armistice will continue to be occupied by sentries until the return march is started. It will no longer be crossed forward even by patrols of the enemy.
3. Airplanes and balloons will remain at least 6 km. in rear of our own front line.
4. The discipline of the troops must be maintained by every possible means. Fraternization of our men with enemy troops must be prevented. Order must be established in the units and stragglers assembled. No furloughs will be granted.

By order:

GROENER.

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**Orders Requiring Rigid Discipline**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Division  
Demobilization Section  
No. 105454

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,  
OFFICE, COMMANDING GENERAL,  
*November 11, 1918.*

Supreme Headquarters has received the following telegram from the Government:  
To: Field Marshall von Hindenburg: We request that you issue an order to all the field forces to the effect that military discipline, peace and strict order must be maintained in the army under all circumstances. Therefore, orders of military superiors must absolutely be obeyed by all troops until the moment of their discharge, and such release of individuals from the military service will be effected only on order from the military authorities. Officers will retain their arms and insignia of rank. Wherever soldier councils or committees have been organized, they will without reservation support the officers in their efforts to maintain order and discipline.

Signatures: Ebert, Haase, Scheidemann, Dittmann, Landsberg, Barth.

This government order will immediately be published in its original text to all troop units.

von HINDENBURG.

Note: Submitted to commander for immediate publication.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Order

***Relief of American Units***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff  
3d Bureau, No. 5964

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 12, 1918.*

Marshal FOCH, COMMANDER-in-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

To General PERSHING, COMMANDER-in-CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

By General Directive of November 11 on the subject of the execution of the conditions of the Armistice established, between the American Second Army and the French Armies of the East, a limit which does not correspond to the present dividing line between the armies on this front.

In order to place progressively, during the period of halt from November 11 to 17, the American and French troops opposite their respective zones of march and in order to facilitate the movement of these troops, the following measures will be taken:

1. The American units actually in sector to the east of the MOSELLE will be relieved by French units before November 17.
2. For their future movement toward the east the Americans will have at their disposal all of the region to the west of the MOSELLE. They will be replaced in the zone between the river and the line (exclusive) CONFLANS---BRIEY---GANDRANGE, when this zone has been passed by the American troops.
3. After the resumption of the movement to the front, that is to say November 17, the French elements now under orders of General Pershing, that is: Elements not assigned to divisions of the XVII Corps, elements not assigned to divisions of the II Colonial Corps, and the 10th and 15th Divisions of Colonial Infantry, will be returned to General Petain.

I beg you to be kind enough to arrange with General Petain for the execution of these measures.

F. FOCH.

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**Troop Movements Preparatory to March to Rhine**

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Text  
No. 5243/M

FRENCH MISSION,  
*Chaumont, November 12, 1918--16:30 h.*

From the General in Chief of the Armies of the East and Northeast

To: MIRECOURT

French Mission at CHAUMONT Allied Commander-in-Chief (as a report rendered).

The order of Marshal Foch No. 5,913 of November 11 sets forth that the American zone and the zone of the Group of Armies of the East will be separated by the general line THIAUCOURT---CHAMBLEY---CONFLANS---MOYEUVRE---GANDRINGEN---THIONVILLE---MALLINGEN---SCHENGEN, all of these points belonging to the Americans with the exception of THIONVILLE which has been assigned as a billeting region for the French.

In consequence and in conformity with the dispositions approved by the Marshal:

1. The Group of Armies of the East will relieve in the shortest possible time, and in any case before November 17, all of the American elements which are now in the sector to the east of the MOSELLE (right bank).

The Group of Armies of the East will agree directly with General Pershing as to the manner of executing this relief.

2. For the movement to the front which will begin during the morning of November 17, under conditions which will be prescribed by a future telegram, the Group of Armies of the East will have at its disposal the territory to the east of the MOSELLE and that of METZ and THIONVILLE, leaving to the American armies the territory to the west of the MOSELLE.

3. The taking over by the Group of Armies of the East of the territory included between the MOSELLE and the general line THIAUCOURT---CHAMBLEY---CONFLANS to the River ORNE will be prescribed by orders to be given hereafter.

4. The Group of Armies of the East will report the conditions under which the relief of the American elements to the east of the MOSELLE will be made and the date of the assumption of command of the Second (?) Army between the MOSELLE and the SEILLE.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telegram

**Circulation in Front Lines Prohibited**

*November 12, 1918.*

Commanding General, American First Army

G-3 Number 1929. Following telegram received from Allied Commander-in-Chief repeated for compliance: In conformity with the dispositions which have been taken by the German High Command the following measures will be applied during the entire duration of the Armistice in all the Allied Armies: First, circulation by road or by water in front of the present lines is formally forbidden. Second, circulation in the air in front of the pres-

ent lines is also formally forbidden. Third, no small-arms target practice will take place within four kilometers of the lines. No artillery target practice will take place within eight kilometers of the lines.

Acknowledge.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

[A duplicate telegram, marked Rush, was sent to Commanding General, American Second Army.]

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1202: Telegram

***Investigation of Attack after 11 a. m., November 11, 1918***

Received at: 1 di o 530b

WIDEWING, *November 12, 1918.*

C. G., V Corps

No. 260 Sec. G. S. Reference incident reported by German High Command troops were attacking after 11 h., November 11: Army Commander directs thorough investigation be made of this incident and a written report submitted to these hq.

12:25 p. m.

HUGH A. DRUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, First Army.

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V ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,  
*November 12, 1918.*

Official Copy furnished: Commanding Generals, 2d and 39th Divisions, and Corps Inspector.

For information and compliance.

Corps Inspector to make independent investigation and report.

W. B. BURTT,  
Chief of Staff.

-----

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1202: Report

***V Army Corps Report on Cessation of Hostilities***

V ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,  
*November 12, 1918.*

STATEMENT of Brigadier General W. B. BURTT, Chief of Staff, V Army Corps

1. Sometime about 7:30 in the morning of November 11, I received a telephone call from the Chief of Staff, First Army, who informed me that the Armistice would go into

effect at eleven hours that date. Immediately after receiving this information, I consulted with the Commanding General, V Corps, and he directed me to communicate the order to the divisions. Between 8:15 and 8:45 a. m. I telephoned to the 2d and 89th Divisions, and informed them of the hour of the Armistice, at the same time directing them to make every effort to see that the front lines were notified. Several times later in the day I called the divisions, and asked them to send officers to the front line to insure that firing was stopped.

2. Later in the day I received word that firing was reported by the Germans as coming from our side. I again ordered the divisions to send an officer to see that the order was being carried out, and to insure that all front line elements had received it.

3. About three o'clock p. m., the Commanding General, 77th Division, called me on the telephone, and reported that seven large caliber shells, fired from the German side of the river, had fallen in the vicinity of La BESACE, and requested that action be taken to stop this. I reported this shortly after to the Chief of Staff, First Army, who informed me then of the receipt of a wireless message from the Germans who claimed our fire had not stopped. Immediately after that I called on the division Chiefs of Staff, and again required them to send an officer to insure that the firing had been stopped.

W. B. BURTT,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

***Foch Warns Against Negotiations with German Command***

[Contemporary Translation]

*November 12, 1918--10:45 p. m.*

Following telephoned by Lieut. Alexander, American Mission, Marshal Foch's Headquarters:

Telephone message from Marshal Foch to General Pershing:

A German radio, which is addressed directly to you by General Galwitz, asks you to send a delegation to negotiate at Metz. In a telegram of the 12th I authorized army commanders to enter into relations with the German Command opposite them to obtain information and necessary cooperation in the seeking out of mines, but I warn you against all other direct negotiation with the German Command, the object of which might be to obtain a change in the conditions which the Armistice Convention has definitely settled.

[The following pencil notation appears on this document:]

C. G. S.

This should go out to our comdrs.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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**Messages Concerning Location of Mines**

Phoned by Lt. Col. Magruder

November 12, 1918--11:45 p. m.

C. G., First Army

C. G., Second Army

Various messages are being received concerning negotiations with Germans relative to the location of mines. You will transmit any such messages from German or other sources direct to these headquarters but will make no reply. All such negotiations will be conducted direct by these headquarters without using subordinate commanders as intermediaries.

By direction:

LEROY ELTINGE,  
Deputy Chief of Staff,  
Brigadier General, G. S.

To Lt. Col. Magruder to be transmitted by telephone

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First Army

Received by General Drum at 11:45 p. m., Nov. 12. General Drum requests telegram copy tomorrow.

Second Army

Received by General Heintzleman at 11:50 p. m.

B. MAGRUDER,  
Lt. Col., Gen. Staff.

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Second Army Gen. File: Fldr. 3-I: Telegram

**Disposition of Germans Entering American Front Lines**

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 12, 1918.

To: Commanding General, IV Corps, A. E. F.

22:35 h. Number 161 G-3. Confirming telephone instructions this date, army commander directs, first, that if any German enters our lines he be arrested and treated as a

prisoner; second, if parliamentaries present themselves with the object of giving information regarding mines and dangerous dispositions as required by paragraph 8 of the Armistice, they will be brought back as far as division P. C., but no farther and immediate notice thereof given to these headquarters; third, men on outpost duty will be properly equipped with arms and accoutrements; fourth, necessary divisional staff officers will be sent to the front lines to enforce the order prohibiting all communication with the enemy and to see that all orders which have been issued are rigidly enforced. Acknowledge.

STUART HEINTZELMAN,  
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, Second Army.

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HS Fr. Files: 432-20.2: Telegram

***Bolshevik Propaganda***

[Editorial Translation]

No. 288

ALLIED HIGH COMMAND,  
*Senlis, November 12, 1918--12:25 p. m.*

To French General Headquarters

The Russian Bolsheviks have sent to Germany, who is said to have authorized its forwarding toward Holland, an enormous stock of revolutionary literature intended to be slipped in the Allied countries. Immediate instructions on the subject have been telephoned without delay to Hq. Conde.

Kindly exert particularly strict supervision to prevent these pamphlets from reaching the Allied Armies and the French territory.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 37: Memorandum

***Instructions on Meeting with German Communications Representatives***

[Contemporary Translation]

EXECUTION OF ANNEX NO. 2 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

I. FRENCH RAILWAYS: On November 14, 1918, at 14 o'clock, the representatives designated by the German army will present themselves at the stations of NANCY and MAUBEUGE to the Commissaires Militaires des Reseaux de l'EST et du NORD\* to receive their instructions regarding the turnover of the French railway lines occupied by the German army.

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\* There were 5 major railways systems in France - theoretically belonging to the state and operated by "Companies"; i. e.: (1) "Nord" (2) "EST" (3) "Etat" [with "Etat Sud-Ouest"] (4) "PLM" [Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee] and (5) "Midi."

They will bring with them all the documents concerning the situation of these lines and all the information relative to the personnel and the material employed on them.

II. ALSACE-LORRAINE RAILWAYS: On November 14, 1918, at 14 o'clock the representatives of the Alsace-Lorraine Railways designated by the German army will present themselves at the station of NANCY to the President of the Commission des Chemins de Fer de Campagne to receive his instructions. They will bring with them general information concerning the organization of the Alsace-Lorraine Railways and their personnel with nominal indication [list's] of the principal chiefs of service and of the destructions made or repaired on these lines.

III. BELGIAN RAILWAYS: On November 15, 1918, at 14 o'clock, the representatives designated by the Germany army will present themselves at the station of BRUGES to take the instructions of His Majesty the King of the Belgians regarding the turnover of that part of the Belgian railway system occupied by the German army.

They will bring with them all the documents concerning the situation of the lines of that system and all information regarding the personnel and the material employed on the lines.

IV. GERMAN AND LUXEMBURG RAILWAYS: The control of the exploitation of the German and Luxemburg railways of the left bank of the Rhine and of the bridgeheads of the right bank (except the railways exploited by the Belgian Government and the Alsace-Lorraine Railways) will be assured by an Interallied Commission de Chemins de Fer de Campagne.

On November 16, 1918, at 14 o'clock, representatives of the above systems accredited by the German army will present themselves at the station of NANCY to the President of the Interallied Railway Commission to receive its instructions.

They will bring with them general information concerning the organization of the Alsace-Lorraine Railways, their personnel, with lists of the principal chiefs of service, and of the destruction made or repaired on these lines.

The Interallied Commission des Chemins de Fer de Campagne will meet on November 14, 1918, at 15 o'clock at the Headquarters of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.).

V. FRENCH NAVIGABLE WATERS: On November 14, 1918, at 14 o'clock, the representatives of the Service of Navigation designated by the German army from the French territory still occupied by the said army, will present themselves at the station of CHARLEVILLE to the representative of the Commission de Navigation de Campagne Francaise to receive his instructions.

VI. ALSACE-LORRAINE NAVIGABLE WATERS: On November 14, 1918, at 14 o'clock, the representatives of the Service of Navigation of Alsace-Lorraine and of the Rhine, designated by the German army, will present themselves at the station NANCY to the President of the Commission de Navigation de Campagne d'Alsace-Lorraine to receive his instructions.

VII. NAVIGABLE WATERS OF BELGIUM: On November 15, 1918, at 14 o'clock, the accredited representatives of the German army of the Navigation [inland waterways] Services within that portion of the Belgian territory still occupied by the German army will present themselves at the station of BRUGES and receive the instructions of His Majesty the King of the Belgians.

VIII. NAVIGATION ON THE RHINE (BETWEEN THE DUTCH FRONTIER AND ALSACE-LORRAINE) ON THE MOSELLE AND ON THE SAAR: An Interallied Commission de Navigation de Campagne will control the navigation on the Rhine between the Dutch frontier and Alsace-Lorraine as well as that on the Moselle, from its exit from Alsace-Lorraine to its confluence with the Rhine, and on the Saar from its exit from Alsace-Lorraine to its confluence with the Moselle.

On November 16, 1918, at 14 o'clock, the accredited representatives of the German army of the Service of Navigation on the Rhine, the Moselle and the Saar, will present themselves at the station of NANCY to the President of the Interallied Commission de Navigation de Campagne to receive his instructions.

This Commission of Navigation will meet on November 14, 1918, at 15 o'clock, at the Headquarters of the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.).

IX. ROAD SERVICE: The commanders of each of the Allied Armies, within their respective zones, will take delivery of the material and will insure the reception of the personnel of upkeep and exploitation which will be left on the ground in execution of Article 1, Paragraph 2 of Annex 2 of the Armistice Agreement, including those which shall be turned over between Line No. 3 and the Rhine.

All the measures for execution will be indicated to authorized representatives of the German army who will present themselves on November 15, 1918, at 14 o'clock, at the station of BRUGES (for the Belgian army), at the station of MONS (for the British army) and at the station of NANCY (for the American and French armies).

X. TELEGRAPH SERVICE: The commanders of each of the Allied Armies, within their respective zones, will take delivery of the material and will insure the reception of the personnel which will be left on the ground in execution of Article 5 of Annex 2 of the Armistice Agreement, including those which will be turned over between line 3 and the Rhine.

The points at which the personnel and the upkeep material shall be assembled for this transaction, and all the conditions for execution, will be indicated to authorized representatives of the German armies, who will present themselves on November 15, 1918, at 14 o'clock, at the station of BRUGES (for the Belgian army), at the station of MONS (for the British army), and at the station of NANCY (for the American and French armies).

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

### **Official Contact Channels**

[Contemporary Translation]

*November 13, 1918.*

Telephoned by Captain Hughes, 11 a. m.

Direct relations between Allied Armies and the German Commandment opposite their front are only authorized for the question concerning delayed action mines.

The regulation of detail regarding other questions, i. e., prisoners, materiel, etc., is a function of the Permanent Interallied Committee for carrying out terms of the Armistice. All separate pourparlers for this subject would lead to disorder. They are therefore to be absolutely avoided. Please communicate this to all armies.

F. FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Order

### **German Officers Bearing Communications Documents to Cross the Lines**

*November 13, 1918.*

Commanding General, American First Army

G-3 Number 1950. In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, certain German officers carrying documents relative to the reestablishment of lines of communication (railroad, waterways, telegraphs and telephones) are to confer with French authorities at the railroad station of NANCY at 14 h. on November 14, 15 and 16. The French authorities request that if the German representatives arrive at any point of the American army such

representatives be given all facilities for crossing the lines and that they be accompanied by an officer to the railroad station of NANCY. You will comply with the request of the French authorities in the event the German representatives present themselves before your lines.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

[A duplicate telegraphic order was sent to the Commanding General, Second Army.]

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

### ***Responsibility for Condition of Certain War Material***

*November 13, 1918.*

Telephone message from G-2, First Army, received at 11 p. m., November 13, from French II Colonial Corps.

A German officer came into our lines this afternoon with the following message: Reserve Lt. Krast of Army Detachment C is instructed by the Commanding General of the Detachment and by the Chief of Staff to say that the latter declines all responsibility in case the Germans, because of circumstances not within their control, should be unable to carry out the conditions of the Armistice as strictly as they might wish. Thus, for example, Germany has agreed to hand over a certain number of airplanes in good condition. If the people of Metz should damage some of the planes this would not be the fault of the Germans. Also the Chief of Staff proposes that French officers accompanied by a detachment be sent straight to Metz to take charge of the airplanes and the guns.

[Unsigned]

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Telegram

### ***Relationship of Soldiers' Councils to German Government***

No. 389                      *SGRAVENHAGE* [*S GRAVENHAGE or the HAGUE*], November 13/14, 1918.

Received at: GHQ, AEF

AMEX

HAEF

272 Thirteenth. Press reports from Germany indicate so-called revolution proceeds in orderly fashion under control and direction of Government. Vorwaerts says most excellent sign is that soldiers and socialists insist that unity be maintained at all costs. Soldiers have complete confidence in new German Government and they distrust all who seem to threaten its unity. All recognize the fact that the German people must have a voice

in determining future of country. First duty is to conclude peace, insure food supply, and prevent hasty demobilization. On these points there are no differences of opinion between various socialist branches. Berlin reports Commander-in-Chief Major General von Linsingen has issued following notice: "In certain circles intention exists to form workers and soldiers council like in Russia. This in disregard of provisions of the law, and such institutions are in opposition to existing state organizations and might endanger public safety. Therefore, in virtue of paragraph nine letter B of the law for the enforcement of a state of siege, I hereby forbid the formation and membership in any such association." General Field Marshal von Hindenburg and Groener Deputy Chief of Staff, ordered Workmen's and Soldiers' Council to immediately send a deputy to Great General Headquarters for a discussion. Therefore, on Monday morning the soldiers' and workmen's deputy in compliance with the order sent three representatives to Hindenburg, who stated that he and the German army were ready to put themselves at the disposal of the new Government.

DAVIS,  
Military Attache.

3:21 p. m.  
Recd. G-2 4 p. m.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1194-A: Agreement

### ***Military Convention Relative to the Armistice with Hungary***

[Editorial Translation]

Military Agreement relative to the Armistice in Hungary

November 13, 1918

I. The Hungarian Government is withdrawing all its troops to the north of the following line: Upper valley of the Grand Szamos---Bisritz---Maros [Maros-Ujver?] (village)---Maros River to its confluence with the Thiess [Tisza]---Marie-Theresipel---Baja---Fuenkirchen (these localities not occupied by Hungarian troops)---course of the Drave, as far as the junction of this river with the Slavonian-Croatian border. Evacuation to be completed within 8 days.

The Allies will rightfully occupy the said evacuated region under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Civil administration therein remain in the hands of the local authorities.

There will be maintained in the evacuated zone only such police and gendarmerie forces as are indispensable for the maintenance of order, as well as those responsible for assuring the security of the railroads.

II. Demobilization of the Hungarian army, forces on land and sea, with the exception of six infantry and two cavalry divisions destined to assure interior order, and of the police detachments referred to in Paragraph I.

III. Right of occupation by the Allies of such localities or strategic points as may be designated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies who, at all times, will have the right to determine the necessity for same.

Right of passage and sojourn by the Allied troops throughout the Hungarian territory.

IV. Railroad personnel and materiel normally assigned to the service of the occupied territory (see paragraph I) will remain in place; in addition, a reserve of 2,000 pieces

of rolling stock and 100 locomotive (standard gauge) and 600 pieces of rolling stock and 50 locomotives (narrow gauge) will be delivered within a month to the Commander-in-Chief, to meet the needs of the Allied troops and to compensate for the shortage of Serbian materiel resulting from acts of war. Part of this materiel may be taken from Austria. These figures are approximate.

V. Navigating personnel and navigable materiel, normally assigned to the service of the occupied territory, will remain in place.

In addition, six naval monitors will be delivered immediately to the Allies, at Belgrade.

The remainder of the Danube flotilla will be brought into one of the ports of the Danube, to be designated later by the Commander-in-Chief, where said flotilla will be disarmed.

From this flotilla 6 passenger boats, 10 tugboats, and 60 barges will be selected as soon as possible to meet the needs of the Allied Armies and to compensate for the shortage of Serbian navigable materiel resulting from acts of war. These figures are approximate.

VI. There will be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, within 15 days, a detachment of 3,000 railway troops, provided with all necessary materiel, for the repair of railroads in Serbia. These figures are approximate.

VII. There will be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, within 15 days, a detachment of telegraph operators, provided with all necessary materiel, for the reestablishment of telephone and telegraph communications in Serbia. These figures are approximate.

VIII. There will be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, within a month, 25,000 horses and such transport materiel vehicles as he may consider necessary. These figures are approximate.

IX. Arms and war materiel will be deposited at points to be designated by the Commander-in-Chief. Part of the materiel will be used in connection with the constitution of certain units which are to be placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

X. Immediate liberation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. These persons will be assembled at suitable railway points, from whence they will be directed and thence repatriated to points on dates which will be prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief. Hungarian prisoners of war are detained temporarily.

XI. An interval of fifteen days is granted for passage and stationing of German troops across Hungary, effective the day of the signing of the Armistice of General Diaz (November 4 [1918], 15 h.).

Postal and telegraphic communications with Germany will operate only under military control of the Allies. The Hungarian Government pledges itself to prevent transmission of telegraphic communications from this country [Hungary] into Germany.

XII. Hungary will facilitate the supply of Allied troops of occupation. Requisitions will be permitted on condition that they not be arbitrary; they will be paid for at current prices.

XIII. The location of mines laid by Austria-Hungary in the Danube River and in the Black Sea will be reported immediately to the Commander-in-Chief.

The Hungarian Government further pledges itself to stop floating mines thrown into the Danube, upstream of its frontier with Austria, and to remove all those now within its own waters.

XIV. The services which operate the radio stations, telephones, and telegraphs as well as the Hungarian railway services will be placed under control of the Allies.

XV. A representative of the Allies will be assigned to the Hungarian Ministry of Supplies to safeguard Allied interests.

XVI. Obligation on the part of Hungary to sever all relations with Germany and to prohibit all movements of troops and ammunition, unless specially authorized by the Commander-in-Chief, destined for German troops in Rumania.

XVII. The Allies will not interfere in the interior administration of the Hungarian State.

XVIII. Hostilities between the Allies and Hungary have ceased.

Made in duplicate November 13, 1918, at 23:15 h. at Belgrade, with correction of the heading and of Paragraph XI and XVIII.

For the Allies:

For Hungary:

Delegates of the Commander-in-Chief,

Delegates of the Hungarian Government.

Voievode [Governor] MICHITCH

General HENRYS

Bela LINDER

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

***Establishment of the Permanent International Armistice Commission***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 6013

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,

Telephone Message (received at 12:15)

*November 13, 1918.*

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To: The French Military Mission with the American Army

Pursuant to clause 34 of the Armistice conditions of November 11, there is established a Permanent International Armistice Commission.

This Commission is charged with studying and preparing, together with the members designated by the German Staff, for the carrying out of clauses 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 18. It has no power to modify the conditions set forth by the text of these clauses which are not to be touched. Its purpose is to propose, after study, practical measures governing their being put into effect, to be submitted to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies who will give the orders for executing same. This Commission will comprise a mission from each of the Allied Armies, having a General, Chief of Mission, assisted by officers and others, empowered to deal specially with the questions of war materiel, prisoners, civil and military, transportation and supplies:

The Chiefs of these Missions are:

French army	Division General NUDANT
British army	Lt. General HAKING
American army	Division [Major] General RHODES
Belgian army	Major General DELOBBE

The Chief of the French Mission will represent the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies; all proposals of the Commission will be presented to the Marshal by him.

WEYGAND.

P. S. A later telegraphic order will indicate the name of the place to which the Chiefs of Mission and personnel are to go.\*  
Referred to the Commanding General of the A. E. F., November 13, 1918.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: File 20376-P: Memorandum

### ***Assignment of Officers***

*November 14, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

1. Please issue orders for the following officers to report to Major General Rhodes, Chief of the American Committee of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission:

Col. Shartle, now in G-2, G. H. Q.  
Col. Youngberg, now in G-4, G. H. Q.  
Major Lewis A. Craig, now with the American Second Army  
Capt. J. K. Fornance, Aide  
2d Lt. Shellins, now with G-2, G. H. Q.  
1st Lt. Wulson, now with the 42d Division,

and necessary personnel selected by Major General Rhodes to report at G. H. Q. at 8 a. m. tomorrow.

NOTE: This order should be ready for delivery to General Rhodes by 8 a. m. As a matter of fact, all the personnel has already received verbal orders.

2. The American Committee of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission, in charge of Major General Rhodes, will be ordered to proceed at once to Spa, Belgium.

3. Major General Rhodes will be authorized, while on duty with this Commission, to issue orders for the necessary travel.

ELTINGE,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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\* [This order not found.]

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

***Responsibility for Condition of Certain War Material***

*November 14, 1918.*

Commanding General, American First Army

Commanding General, American Second Army

No. 1959 G-3. Decision of Marshal Foch's Headquarters concerning the message sent by General von Gallwitz to the First Army relative to the protection of German war material concentrated at Metz is as follows: "The conditions on this special point are those proposed by the Germans themselves and they are responsible. If any other German approaches the American lines with the same proposals the above should be the reply."

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Wireless Message

***Allied Armies Forbidden to Take Over Material or Prisoners Before  
Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission Begins to Function***

[Contemporary Translation]

*November 14, 1918.*

Copy of wireless message sent by Marshal Foch to German Headquarters,

November 14, 1918, at noon

No. 6072-2

From: Allied High Command

To: German High Command

German Army Commanders continue to propose to Allied Army Commanders opposite their fronts to turn over immediately material of war or prisoners.

Marshal Foch, considering the Armistice Agreement, has forbidden Allied Armies to take over such material or prisoners before the Permanent International Armistice Commission starts to function.

If the German Command wishes from now on to leave in public squares material or prisoners it should leave, for their guard, detachments commanded by officers who will be responsible until surrender is made to Allied Armies.

These detachments will be given their freedom as soon as surrender has been made.

F. FOCH.

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**Measures to Prevent Fraternizing**

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 14, 1918.

To: Commanding General, VI Corps

1 h. Number 180 G-3. Army commander directs the most rigorous investigation to determine the names of any officer or soldier of your command who has had or permitted fraternizing between our troops and Germans or others who have presented themselves at or near our lines since the Armistice went into effect. These names will be submitted to these headquarters at the earliest practicable date in order that they may be relieved from their organizations and attached to salvage organizations to sort dirty clothes until further orders. The same proceeding will be had should any further cases arise. The army commander further directs that division, brigade, and regimental commanders and their staffs by personal investigation and action energetically repress any such attempts. Acknowledge.

STUART HEINTZELMAN,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, Second Army.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 37: Instructions

**Operation of Railroads in Luxemburg and the Rhine Provinces**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.\*  
No. 525 C. R.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
November 14, 1918.

[Extract]

- I. The Luxemburg and Rhine Provinces railroads shall be under the direction of an interallied field railway commission \* \* \*.
- II. Following par. 7 of the Armistice conditions of November 11, 1918, the railroads operating in the above designated zone shall function under the authority of the same commission \* \* \*.

\* \* \* \* \*

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\* Director-General of Communications and Supplies of the French Armies.

III. The whole personnel spoken of in par. 2, shall be placed under the military rules of the Allied Army in whose zone it will operate.

IV. Till further orders the trains circulating in the above-mentioned zone shall follow the troops progress. The outposts lines shall not be crossed neither in one way nor in the other way.

The rail material and the revictualling trains for the civilian populations shall only be authorized to cross them.

The Field Railway Commission shall submit proposals to the Marshal C-in-C of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.), for passenger traffic.

V. The railway telegraphic and telephonic lines shall be left untouched. The president of the Interallied Field Railway Commission shall take all necessary measures to prevent any traffic beyond the outposts.

He will have the right to authorize the necessary traffic to assure the operating of the railroads.

VI. \* \* \* The Commission president shall give an account of the taken dispositions to the Marshal, C-in-C of the Allied Armies.

B. O. The D. G. C. R. A.,  
PAYOT.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Wireless Interception

***Russian Attempt to Communicate with German Government Through  
Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils***

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff  
Moscow to Berlin and all stations

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 14, 1918--1:21 a. m.*

To all Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils in Germany:

In view of the most urgent necessity, the Russian Government has been attempting for the last few days to enter by direct line in communication with the leading comrades, who are well known today, in the German Government. The efforts have been in vain. In spite of the distinctly expressed wish of the Berlin working people the Russian Government has not yet obtained connection with the German Government. We do not even know yet whether the Russian diplomatic representatives have already returned to Berlin. In consequence of this state of affairs we are not in a position to advise our German friends of the danger which is becoming more threatening every day in the occupied regions, namely, the danger of regrettable and fatal conflicts. While the ferment in these regions is increasing with elemental force, the masses of people, however, have not the means at present to become organized together with the organized Germans to regulate the extraordinarily difficult conditions. We do not doubt that the Germans as well as the masses of the people of these regions desire to avoid such conflicts, which may have serious consequences. There is, however, no organization except our own which can bring about the settlement of the situation, particularly as agents of the old German Government, supported by well provided bands of White Guards, are at present threatening our liberty as well as German liberty. We beg all Workmen's and Soldier's Councils of Germany to

bring these conditions to the knowledge of the new Government in Berlin while we are at present deprived of direct connection with the latter.

CHICHERIN,  
People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Wireless Interception

***Internment of Officials***

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 14, 1918--4:55 p. m.

To The Russian People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Moscow:

According to reports which have reached here, (1) the German general consulates at Moscow and Petrograd have been taken over by a Soldiers' Council formed on the spot by German prisoners of war with the assistance of Russian elements, (2) both consul generals with the entire personnel have been interned and (3) the archives have been confiscated. The German Popular Government takes the liberty of directing the attention of the Russian Government to the fact that the former German authorities, among them the Foreign Office, have placed themselves at the disposal of the new Government and that therefore these two general consulates are accredited representatives of this Government. Their legality and their ex-territorial rights are valid now as formerly. But even if no information had reached Moscow as to the position of the former German authorities with reference to the new Government, the ex-territorial rights of the consulates should have remained inviolate until the information on this subject had reached the Russian Government. The German Popular Government therefore requests the Russian Soviet Government for an explanation of the facts underlying these reports and in how far the general consulates are restricted in the execution of their duties. A statement is requested as to how the Russian Government could permit this violation of ex-territorial rights and a promise of responsibility for protection in the future (?). The German Government further requests the Soldiers' Council in Moscow and Petrograd to see to it that both general consulates with their baggage and other persons, notice of whose departure has already been given, be allowed to leave Russia immediately. The personnel of the local representation of the Russian Government which is now at Bolissow will then be allowed to proceed at once. A communication will then follow concerning the regulation of mutual relations.

EBERT,  
HASSE.

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**Small Detachments in Forward Zone**

*November 15, 1918.*

Commanding General, American First Army  
Commanding General, American Second Army  
Commanding General, American Third Army, WATERFALL

No. 1979 G-3. Following order received from the Allied Commander-in-Chief is transmitted to you for compliance: "In order to insure the maintenance of order in the regions evacuated by the enemy, the Allied Armies may, at the request of the inhabitants, or of the German Command, or in case of disturbance, send small detachments, beginning on Nov. 16 at 5 a. m., into the zone between our present line and Line No. 1. These detachments should not in any case cross Line No. 1, near which German troops still have the right to be. This line should be very accurately indicated to them. These Allied detachments can also, beginning today, take over material of war reported by certain German armies to have been left in place and which it is important not to have pillaged. A very exact list of the material so taken over and of its condition should be sent as soon as possible to Marshal Foch's Headquarters, 2d Bureau. You are reminded that the organized detachments left by the enemy to assure the surrender of this material should be given their freedom as soon as the Allied troops have taken over such material." In carrying out the above instructions the necessary detachments will be sent by the First and Second Armies, information being given to the Commanding General, Third Army, of the detachments so sent. The dividing line between the First and Second Armies for this purpose will be FRESNES---ETAIN---AUDUN-le-ROMAN. No detachments will be sent to METZ by the Second Army. Any German requests made on the Second Army to send detachments to METZ will be referred to the French Tenth Army, the Command Post of which is now at CHAMPIGNEULLES. Your attention is especially invited to the fact that none of these detachments will cross Line No. 1. Lists of material taken over by each detachment will be forwarded promptly to these headquarters.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Message

**Classification and Distribution Centers**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

*November 15, 1918--10:30 p. m.*

Telephone message received from Colonel Mott

Chief of Staff:

The following instructions from Marshal Foch have been handed to Colonel Mott with the request that they be forwarded to Chaumont:

Civilians and soldiers coming from regions occupied by the enemy and who cross our lines to enter the zone occupied by Allied troops, should be stopped by barriers and sent

to designated places where boards are established for classification and distribution. It is requested that the British and American armies be good enough to make their own arrangements for establishing these barriers and for sending these civilians and soldiers to centers for examination and distribution.

These centers should be selected by direct consultation between the French Missions at Montreuil and Chaumont and the Chief of French G. H. Q., Special Service Section.

These boards for classification and distribution will be constituted from resources now at the disposal of the two French Missions above named, reinforced as far as is necessary by the Special Service Section of the French G. H. Q. after consulting with the above named French Missions.

Please report especially as to the execution of the last paragraph.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Service Note

***Commissions and Technical Troops Authorized to Enter Enemy Territories***

[Contemporary Translation]

SERVICE NOTE  
No. 560/CR

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*November 15, 1918.*

1. The personnel of the direction of the various commissions created for the organization and operation of railroads, navigable ways [inland waterways] and fluvial [river] ports, is authorized to go into the territories where the necessities of service require, without awaiting that [until] the enemy armies wholly evacuate these territories.

2. However, in all parts of the territory still occupied by the enemy, this personnel cannot circulate except when accompanied by an officer or official belonging to the corresponding German organ [service].

3. The Presidents of the Commissions des Chemins de Fer de Campagne and de Navigation de Campagne are authorized to have technical troops follow step by step the German army in its retreat, in such manner as to assure the occupation of the railroads and navigable ways.

There should be no contact with the rearguards of the enemy.

By order:

CH. PAYOT,  
Director General des Communications  
et des Ravitaillements aux  
Armees.

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**The German Revolution**

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 15, 1918--4 p. m.

[Extract]

As we anticipated in our last message, the revolutionary movement which began at Hamburg and Kiel, has extended to many other cities on the coast in the interior. The republic has been proclaimed in Munich and the government has already been formed. Councils of soldiers and workmen are masters of the most important capitals of the Empire, but up to now the main preoccupation of these councils is to prepare order. The decrees and proclamations of the revolutionists are models of governmental measures which might have been drawn up to be signed by functionaries of the Empire. For instance, the councils of Kiel not only adopted measures for the protection of life and property of the inhabitants, but their first concern was to provide for the defense of the naval port and those on the Baltic against the possible enemy attack. In Hamburg and other cities these revolutionary councils cooperate with the local authorities in order that distribution of foodstuffs continues and the commercial life does not become paralyzed. The measures adopted have inspired such confidence among the population that no obstacles have been encountered. From the impressions gained we would say that the Germans have dominated Bolshevism instead of Bolshevism dominating them. The Germans cannot live without order. Hardly have they removed the discipline of yesterday that they have already established other even more severe. This people cannot undertake anything without order, not even a revolution. This in itself will be a guarantee that the scenes of horror witnessed in Russia will not be repeated. Nobody could have believed yesterday that Berlin was the capital of a state in full revolution. There was much animation in the streets because, besides the usual crowds, there were many provincials in search of news who could not return to their homes owing to the practical suspension of the railroads, and also soldiers and sailors who left Kiel and Hamburg because they did not wish to join the revolutionary elements. The expectations as regards the decisions which the Kaiser would adopt did not manifest itself in noisy or disorderly movement, and the precautionary measures taken proved superfluous. During the morning, the officials on leave responded to the call of the council and returned to their residences with instructions to present themselves when called upon. The shops and restaurants remained open during the usual hours and the theaters gave their performances.

\* \* \* \* \*

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**Personnel of German Government; Meeting of Spartacus Group**

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 15, 1918--3:40 p. m.

According to the decision of the Council of the People's Deputies, the Imperial [Government] offices have been filled as follows:

Foreign Office: Dr. Solf  
Imperial Treasury: Schiffer  
Imperial Economic Office: Dr. August Mueller  
Imperial Office for Economic Demobilization: Dr. Koeth  
War Food Supply Office: Emanuel Wurm  
Imperial Labor Office: Bauer  
War Ministry: Scheuch  
Imperial Naval Office: von Mann  
Imperial Department of Justice: Dr. Krause  
Imperial Post Office: Ruedlin.

The following are appointed Undersecretaries to the Imperial Offices:

Foreign Office: Dr. David  
War Food Supply Office: Dr. Schmidt  
Imperial Labor Office: Giesberts.

The following have been appointed Assistant Secretaries:

Foreign Office: Karl Kautsky  
Imperial Treasury: Edward Bernstein  
Imperial Economic Office: Erdman Koeln  
Imperial Office for Economic Demobilization: Buechner and Schumann  
Imperial Labor Office: Noske and Vogtherr  
Imperial Department of Justice: Dr. Oscar Cohn.

State Secretary Erzberger will have charge of peace negotiations along with the Foreign Office. Discussions are still taking place regarding the appointment to the Imperial Department of the Interior.

The establishment of the Spartacus Party as an independent party, which was scheduled for November 14, did not take place. A meeting was held but neither Leibknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, nor the well-known members of the party were present. The speakers confined themselves to agitation and theoretical discussion against the attitude of the Majority Party.

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***Detachments for Safeguarding of Enemy Materiel***

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
November 15, 1918.

The following is telephone message from Marshal Foch to General Pershing, received at 11:45 a. m.

In order to insure the maintenance of order in the regions evacuated by the enemy, the Allied Armies may, at the request of the inhabitants, or of the German Command, or in case of disturbance, send small detachments, beginning on November 16 at 5 a. m. into the zone between our present line and Line No. 1. These detachments should not in any case cross Line No. 1, near which German troops still have the right to be. This line should be very accurately indicated to them.

These Allied detachments can also beginning today, take over material of war reported by certain German armies to have been left in place and which it is important not to have pillaged. A very exact list of the material so taken over and of its condition should be sent as soon as possible to Marshal Foch's Headquarters, 2d Bureau.

You are reminded that the organized detachments left by the enemy to assure the surrender of this material should be given their freedom as soon as the Allied troops have taken over such material.

FOCH.

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193-32.16: Fldr. C: Telegram

***Detachment of Allied Troops to Preserve Order***

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,  
November 15, 1918.

Received at 671A FX H 369 OB 1

Commanding General, Third Army, Waterfall

No. 1979 G-3. Following order received from the Allied Commander-in-Chief is transmitted to you for compliance:

In order to insure the maintenance of order in the regions evacuated by the enemy, the Allied Armies may, at request of the inhabitants, or of the German commander, or in case of disturbance, send small detachments, beginning on November 16 at 5 a. m., into the zone between our present line and Line No. 1. These detachments should not in any case cross Line No. 1, near which German troops still have the right to be. This line should be very accurately indicated to them. These Allied detachments can also beginning today take over material of war reported by certain German armies to have been left in place and which it is important not to have pillaged. Very exact list of the material so taken over and of its condition should be sent as soon as possible to Marshal Foch's Headquarters, 2d Bureau. You are reminded that the organized detachments left by the enemy to assure the surrender of this material should be give their freedom as soon as the Allied troops have taken over such material.

In carrying out the above instructions the necessary detachments will be sent by the First and Second Armies, information being given to the Commanding General, Third Army, of the detachments so sent. The dividing line between the First and Second Armies for this purpose will be Fresnes---Etain---Audun-le-Roman. No detachments will be sent to Metz by the Second Army. Any German requests made on the Second Army to send detachments to Metz will be referred to the French Tenth Army the command post of which is now at Champignuelles. Your attention is especially invited to the fact that none of these detachments will cross Line No. 1. Lists of material taken over by each detachment will be forwarded promptly to these headquarters.

By order:

CONNER.  
2:50 p. m.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1202: Report

***Investigation of Firing After 11 a. m., November 11, 1918***

V ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CORPS INSPECTOR,  
A. P. O. 769, November 15, 1918.

From: Corps Inspector, V Army Corps

To: Commanding General, V Army Corps

[Extract]

1. This investigation commenced November 13, 1918.

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4. Facts: From a personal investigation, it was learned that no firing or attacking was made by divisional or corps artillery or corps engineers.

From the \*\*\* report of Lt. Col. Harry Lay and personal investigation, no firing or attacking was done by troops of the 2d Division after 11 h., November 11.

From the \*\*\* reports of the 89th Division, the only other division of the V Corps on the front \*\*\* it is shown that all elements of the command were warned, and attacking and firing ceased except in the following elements of the 178th Brigade, 356th Infantry, of which the 1st Battalion, leading bn. in the attack (Bois de Hache) received notice of the Armistice at 12:30 p. m., the 3d Bn., 356th Infantry, at 11:30 a. m.

Also 355th Inf., the 2d Bn. at 11:05 a. m. (Cesse) and the 3d Bn. (Pouilly reserve bn.) at 11:05 a. m.

That Capt. Puffer, Commander 1st Bn., 356th Inf. \*\*\* states that all firing ceased in his bn. by 11 h.

That Lieut. Shinn, 3d Bn., 356th Inf., states that return firing continued in his command until 11:10 h.

That the Brig. Commander, 178th Brig., received notification of the Armistice at 8:45 a. m., November 11, and that the message left his office at 9:40 a. m.

That he sent the word to the attacking units by mounted messenger who had to dismount, cross river and advance through the firing 4 kilometers.

That the word was so sent because all telephonic communication with his advance elements had been destroyed by hostile fire.

That all firing ceased by the various elements at 11 h. or on notification.

5. Conclusions: \* \* \* it is shown that hostile artillery fire continued on our rear areas after 11 h. That there could have been no reason why all enemy artillery commanders could not have been advised of the Armistice and prevented this fire. That due effort was made to stop the attacking and firing at 11 h. by American troops and it was only because the enemy artillery fire had cut the communications that any shots whatever were fired and these were by elements of the 178th Brigade, 89th Division.

6. Recommendations: That no further action be taken in the case of American troops.

S. FIELD DALLAM,  
Colonel, Corps Inspector.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 103: Instructions

### ***Civil Administration of Occupied Territory***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 562/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 15, 1918.*

I. PRINCIPLES: In conformity with the principles stated in the Rules of The Hague, the control of the German Administration belongs to the Generals commanding the Allied Armies, under the supreme authority of the Marshal Commander-in-Chief.

II. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: German officials will continue to exercise the functions with which they are charged; they will assure the administration of the occupied territories under the direction and control of the military authorities.

With this end in view, particularly qualified interpreters and officers will be in due time put at the disposal of the generals commanding the armies.

The generals commanding the armies will maintain the services of the high authorities of the occupied country on matters of administrative decisions, for the space of territory under their control; they will, in consequence, issue decrees which will be applicable on the whole of their territory.

They will assign officers, who, in each territorial district of the occupied territories, will be charged with the control of the Civil Administration, independently of the military functions which, owing to their situation, they may on the other hand have to assume. These officers will take the title of officers charged with the administration. Besides their proper hierarchical subordination, based on the administrative division of the territories, they will work under the local military commanders (army, corps of divisional generals, town governors, C. O. of garrisons) to which the generals commanding the armies would have delegated part of their personal powers.

The officers will control the administration of the German officials, in the administrative districts they are entrusted with.

The decrees concerning the police, public order of the security of the armies are to be issued by the Allied military commanders or approved by them if they emanate from German authorities.

Each measure which would be the object of a decree or a law will be submitted to the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

The principles to follow in the accomplishment of their function by the officers in charge of the administration are indicated in inclosed Annex No. 1 which includes copies of standard decrees and proclamations.

III. REALIZATION OF THE OCCUPATION: The occupation of these regions will necessarily be progressive. To realize its terms, the troops charged with the occupation will have to march and be stationed on the enemy territories upon which the Allied commander will have not as yet have established his authority. Therefore, as long as they will not have attained the zone, which, in the combined disposition, has been assigned to them, these troops will not dispose of the necessary time to take preparatory measures for the seizure of the original administrative services of the land by the Allied military authorities in the whole space of territory they are marching through. But, as it is indispensable that these preparatory measures be taken in the briefest of delay following the arrival of the first Allied troops the following dispositions will be applied:

1. In the delay preceding the occupation, the generals commanding the interested groups of armies and armies, will proceed to the assignment of the officers who have been put at their disposal in order to administer the various administrative districts to be occupied. \*

2. As soon as the final terms of occupation and the military measures meant to realize them have been taken (composition, itinerary and successive zones of stationing of columns), the officers assigned to administrate districts located on the itinerary of each first line division, will temporarily be reattached to this division as well as the subordinate personnel, the constituted units, \*\* and the means of communication which will be necessary for their use as soon as they will commence to function.

3. As the first line divisions will by degrees progress in the interior of the land to be occupied, the officers charged with the administration will establish themselves in the districts where they are assigned, and will immediately take urgent measures complying with the occupation. Relieved of these measures, the troop commanders will simply have to take the necessary dispositions to guarantee the security of their troops, assure order in the localities temporarily utilized as cantonments and, if it is necessary, give assistance to the administrators and help them in the accomplishment of their mission.

These attached annexes specify the measures which, in the first stage of occupation, will be carried out on the one hand by the passing troops and on the other hand, by the officers in charge of the administration.

WEYGAND.

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#### ANNEX No. 1

Police and Administration of the occupied German territories

Attributions of the officers charged with the administration

LAWS AND REGULATIONS: The laws and regulations in force at the time of the occupation will be respected as long as they do not interfere with the right of the occupant and compromise his security. The regulations will, however, be carried out in conformity with the laws and regulations of the interested Allied Armies.

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\* In case these officers would not have reached in time or if they were not sufficiently numerous, the general officers interested would proceed to the assignment of temporary administrating officers selected from the units under their command.

\*\* These constituted units will be chosen among those which, in accordance with the final terms, are to occupy the considered districts.

Until further orders are issued, these requisitions will only necessitate the remittance of receipts to municipalities; the conditions of payment will be settled later on.

All supplies necessary for the maintenance of the population will be left at their disposal. It is necessary that this rule be strictly observed in order to avoid effervescence among the populations on the one hand, and on the other to carry out the Allies' obligations in supplying these populations.

The officers charged with the administration will not fail to demand from German notables and competent officials, each time they think it advisable, all information of juridical and administrative nature which they might require; besides, they will find in the libraries of Administrations and of Tribunals the necessary documentation.

**SERVICES:** The public service organization will be maintained under the intimate control of the Allied military authority. The Allied military authority will strive to assure the resumption of local life; the opening and normal functioning of schools, churches, tribunals, charity boards, hospitals, alm-houses, day-nurseries, meetings of administrative committees, of chambers of commerce, and boards of administration, will be authorized and moreover, insisted upon.

Instructions will later on be given on the conditions under which the financial services might function as regards the rate of change, the collecting of taxes, premiums, contributions, the payment of officials, the seizure of deposits, on postal stamps, the issue of paper money, and municipal bonds.

Officials and agents, namely those of the administration, justice, finance, churches, public schools, medical services, etc., will be, in principle, kept in their office.

It would not be advisable to compel officials to remain in service against their will; however, in case of necessity, it would be proper to requisition the services of certain personnel.

The replacement of absent or revoked officials will be demanded of local administrations. In case of refusal, this service will be assured by an officer designed for the purpose.

In the shortest time possible, the officers charged with the administration will summon together the most important officials maintained on duty, the mayors, the municipal councillors, the presidents of Chambers of Commerce, in order to confirm them in their office, and advise them that they have to be constantly at the disposal of the Allied authorities. These officials will be informed that the service will function under their own responsibility, and that they are liable to criminal punishment in case of destruction or concealment of documents, books, species or means of communication (telephone, wireless, carrier pigeons); that the most severe punishments are reserved to those who will not accomplish conscientiously the duty of their charge.

The administrative committee, the administration boards, the commissions called upon to function will meet by order or with the authorization of Allied authorities. The deliberations will positively be maintained in the province of questions as fixed in the order or authorization given.

**PROCLAMATION:** Army commanders or army corps commanders will address a proclamation which will establish, as regards the inhabitants, the occupation by the Allied authorities, while informing them of their duties and their obligations and to which they will be required to apply themselves.

**ORDERS OF POLICE:** The officers in charge of the administration will publish as soon as possible an order edited in both languages in order to regulate the cantonment police on the subjects of cafes, meetings, the press, photography, carrying and selling of ammunition, etc. The attached copy of such an order is given as a matter of information, and it may be subjected to any modification as details imposed by circumstances.

**PENALTIES:** No penalty can be pronounced without the intervention of a tribunal.

When the violation of a decision or the refusal to obey an order issued by the Allied authorities will constitute a fact which may be qualified as a crime or offense by the penal laws of the Allied nations, the culprits will be court martialed.

The penalties for any violation of decrees issued by Allied military authorities may defer the transgressor of police orders before police courts; which will be constituted if necessary and will render justice in conformity with the customs of each Allied nation, under conditions as fixed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

These infractions may also be brought before court martials upon the demand of the public ministry.

It is not acting contrary to regular dispositions relative to the jurisdiction of the provost marshals.

Army commanders and officers charged with the administration may decide upon the evacuation of transgressors or disobedients, or the closing up temporarily or definitely of commercial or industrial establishments.

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## ANNEX II

A. Measures to be taken by commanders of passing troops in enemy localities not having been occupied as yet:

1. The placing of guard posts at cantonment outlets. These guard factions interdict the going out or coming into the locality of inhabitants, until they have received orders issued by the cantonment commander. If the cantonment commander judges it necessary he may maintain the above-mentioned interdiction and may require from the inhabitants their remaining indoors from a determined hour on.

2. The posting of guard posts and sentries in order to safeguard the public buildings and services, archives, barracks, staff bureaus, military premises of all kinds, factories and machinery, being of military or general utility.

3. The putting under arrest and cross-examination of doubtful individuals. Evacuation to the D. I. Staff of those considered suspects.

4. The immediate issue of the police decrees rendered necessary by circumstances (traffic, closing up of cafes, etc.).

B. Measures to be taken by officers charged with the administration when entering into functions in their district.

## FIRST URGENCY MEASURES

### Military Buildings

1. The staff buildings, barracks, forts, recruiting bureaus, arsenals, and in a general way all the military buildings will immediately be occupied by a detachment responsible for its guard. No one is allowed to penetrate into the above-named premises until a staff officer of the nearest unit has inspected and seized all documents and materiel of interest. The premises will then be put at the disposal of the military authority.

The documents will be forwarded to the Army Staff, 2d Bureau.

2. Search for enemy soldiers, stragglers, wounded, etc.

3. Convoke the Bourgmestre or, instead, one or several notables offering sufficient guarantee, question them on the sites of telephone, telegraph or wireless centers, civilian or military, the overhead or under ground lines, the private lines, the pigeon cotes. Despatch at once officers or noncommissioned officers to reconnoiter and examine same.

4. To assure the safeguard of the public buildings and services which would not have been guaranteed by the passing troops: Finance bureaus, collectors offices, city tolls, customs, savings banks, tribunals, lawyers offices, attorneys offices, recorders offices, police stations, Gendarmeries, etc., and in a general way of all the establishments and of all the buildings where public funds may be deposited.

To post sentries there without delay.

To affix seals on bureaus and services to be preserved, as well as on archive cases, safes containing public funds, and on private safes in public establishments.

To set posters prohibiting the troops to touch same.

To question officials and agents on the functioning of their services and invite them to assume same, rendering them responsible for it, as well as for any concealment or deterioration; charge them with the preservation of the seals, of the archives and of the accounts, and assign if necessary civilians guards to those buildings.

Nothing is to be destroyed.

5. In the post and telegraph offices, railroads, railroad stations, bridges and road offices, waterways and forests offices, motor-power and lighting establishments, hospitals and pharmacies, banks and public savings banks, to endeavor to assure the safeguard of all apparatus, documents, species, etc., while awaiting orders from the interested military authorities.

6. At the town hall and at the Kreisdirection, seize: The plan of the locality, of the year books, the last drafts of billets and military documents, the registers of special police and espionage.

AT THE POLICE COURT, have a particular watch made over the real estate book, which is usually deposited in the premises of the police court, and which certain persons would have particular interest in seeing disappear.

#### MEASURES OF SECOND URGENCY

These above-mentioned measures will be, as soon as possible, completed by the following:

1. Sorting of suspects and evacuations.

Continue to arrest suspected individuals.

Look after the securities of abandoned buildings.

Assure the guarding of prisons, make a census of the confined persons; the jail book will permit to distinguish between the political or criminal offenders.

2. Ask the mayor or the person temporarily in charge of the municipal functions the list of men aged from 17 to 48, who are not mobilized.

List of horses and vehicles which are available.

3. Search in barracks, public buildings and sewers for mines and conducting wires, which may exist.

4. Search for and assure the guard of stocks of arms and explosives, depots of arms, gasoline, wood, construction material, and make an inventory of them. Have the pigeon cotes guarded (pigeons cotes must be kept opened day and night; the owners of the pigeons must declare and make a descriptive list of their pigeons).

5. Regulate in accordance with the military administration the civilian medical and veterinary services. To prescribe all useful hygienic and sanitary measures. (Analysis of water.)

6. Make a census of all means of transportation, cars, automobiles, bicycles, and of the necessary material for these vehicles (tires, spare parts, oil, gasoline, etc.).

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**Occupation of Rhenish Provinces**

[Contemporary Translation]

Commander-in-Chief  
of the  
Allied Armies  
---  
1st Sect., General Staff

G. H. Q., ALLIED ARMIES,  
Senlis, November 16, 1918.

3d Bureau, No. 6231

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces

General Degoutte, Chief of Staff of the Group of Armies of Flanders

Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies

General Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

My dear General:

I have the honor of sending you herewith a note relative to the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces by the Allied troops. The realization of this occupation will begin on the first of December.

I intend very shortly to issue this note in orders unless you see some serious objection thereto.

Another note will set forth the strength of the Allied forces to be maintained in the rear.

I intend to install my General Headquarters at LUXEMBURG about November 22. I request that you be kind enough to notify me as to the location which you have chosen for your headquarters.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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NOTE

Upon occupation of the Rhenish Provinces during the Armistice. (Country [territory] on the left bank of the RHINE and bridgeheads on the right bank.) The tables and the map \* \* \* indicate the general distribution of the Allied troops for the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces.

This distribution justifies the following considerations:

1st. The territory to be occupied is divided into four zones, placed respectively under French, American, British and Belgian command.

The elements of these zones are divided as follows:

1st Zone (French Command):

Between the frontier of ALSACE-LORRAINE and the line: SIERCK (inclusive---THABEN

on the SAAR River---FROMMERSBACH---REINSFELD---THALFANG---MORBACH---KIRCHBERG  
---SIMMERN---RHEINBOLLEN---HEIMBACH on the RHINE River (all of these places exclusive).

2d Zone (American Command):

Between the above limits and the administrative limit separating the districts of COBLENZ and TREVES from those of COLOGNE and of AIX-la-CHAPELLE; this limit is approximately marked by LOMMERSWEILER (exclusive)---MANDERFELD (exclusive---KRONENBERG (exclusive)---RHEINBACH (exclusive)---OBERWINTER (exclusive).

3d Zone (British Command):

Between the line above given and the line VERVIERS---EUPEN---STOLBERG---JULIERS (JULICH)---GREVENBROICH---NEUSS---(all these places exclusive).

4th Zone (Belgian Command):

Between the line above given and the frontier of Holland.

2. In each zone the troops belong, in principle, to the same nationality as the command of the zone.

Within the bridgeheads, as well as in the country on the left bank of the RHINE between the bridgeheads of COLOGNE and the frontier of Holland the garrisons are constituted from troops belonging to the several Allied Nations, this arrangement maintains the character of the Allied occupation.

3. Method of Occupation

(a). Each of the three bridgeheads is held by an army corps of four divisions of infantry, each of which is charged with securing the occupation of the bridgehead by the dispositions and organizations (Translator's note: By "organizations" is meant all kinds of work, --- fortifications, etc., as may be necessary) which may be necessary.

(b). In rear of each bridgehead two army corps of two divisions of infantry constitute a reserve for the several bridgeheads; these reserves are charged, moreover, with holding the intermediary points and with assuring the occupation of the country.

(c). To the south of the bridgehead of MAYENCE, one army corps of two divisions of infantry is charged with holding the passages of the river above this bridgehead as far as the frontier of ALSACE-LORRAINE and of assuring the occupation of the country.

To the north of the bridgehead of COLOGNE two army corps of two divisions of infantry are charged with holding the passages of the river below this bridgehead as far as the frontier of Holland and of assuring the occupation of the country between the RHINE and the projecting corner of detached territory in the region of MAESTRICHT.

(d). The occupation of the Rhenish Provinces is completed toward the rear by one army corps of three divisions of infantry in the region of [ZWEIBRUCKEN] DEUX-PONTS---NEUNKIRCHEN (1st zone);

one army corps of two divisions in the region of TREVES (2d zone);

one army corps of three divisions of infantry in the region of MALMEDY (third zone);

one army corps of two infantry divisions in the region of AIX-la-CHAPELLE (4th zone).

(e). Each zone will also have 1 or several divisions of cavalry.

4. In the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces the number of troops required from the several Allied Armies is practically proportional to their effective forces.

However, the American and Belgian Armies are asked to contribute a little more proportionately than are the Armies of Great Britain and France on account of the duties which these last two armies have in their theatres of operation.

F. FOCH.

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***Employment of Allied Forces Outside of the Rhenish Provinces***

[Contemporary Translation]

Commander-in-Chief  
of the  
Allied Armies

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 16, 1918.*

1st Section  
3d Bureau, General Staff  
No. 6230

The Allied forces not employed in the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces will, in principle, be maintained to the west of the frontier separating Germany from Belgium, Luxemburg and ALSACE-LORRAINE.

A part of these forces will be stationed and so located in rear of these frontiers as to be ready for being rapidly thrown into action, with all necessary means in German territory, if the circumstances demand such action.

The forces thus held ready to intervene on short notice will have a minimum effective of-

- 20 French Divisions\*
- 10 American Divisions
- 20 British Divisions
- 2 Belgian Divisions

They should be stationed in front of the line: MOSELLE---just above TOUL---thence to the MEUSE---following the MEUSE to MEZIERES and then the road MEZIERES---HIRSON---MAUBEUGE---MONS---GHENT.

The remainder of the Allied forces will be maintained at rest and instruction, a certain number among them being stationed in the regions where their immediate embarking is assured.

The rear limit of the zones of the different armies are not modified for the present.

F. FOCH.

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\* Of which 3 from the French Army of Belgium and a certain number of divisions to be maintained in the present zone of the Group of Armies of the Center.

**Disposition of Released American Prisoners of War**

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 16, 1918.

TELEGRAM:

TO: Commanding General, First Army  
Commanding General, Second Army  
Commanding General, Third Army  
Commanding General, American II Corps  
Commanding General, American 37th Division  
Commanding General, American 91st Division

No. 3840 G-1. Released American prisoners of war and repatriated American civilians will be sent to regional replacement units at SALEUX Department SOMME, CHELLES Department SEINE-et-MARNE, REVIGNY Department MEUSE, and CHAUDENEY Department MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE where they will be temporarily cared for. Instructions as to final disposition will be given later. Notify regional replacement units and issue necessary instructions.

ANDREWS.

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193-32.16: Fldr. C: Telegram

**Zones of March of French and American Armies**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 16, 1918.

Commanding General American Third Army Waterfall

1992 G-3 Following telegram has been received from the Allied Commander-in-Chief and is quoted for your information and guidance.

On account of the zone of march effected to the French Army and the American Army the limits between the American and French zones fixed by directive 5913 of the eleventh instant as follows: THIAUCOURT---CONFLANS---MOYEUVRE---GANDRINGEN---THONVILLE---MALLINGEN---SCHENGEN (these places to the Americans) will be prolonged toward the south beginning the seventeenth instant at 5 h. by the line: THIAUCOURT---FLIREY---BERNECOURT---MESNIL-la-TOUR (these villages to the Americans). The road from MESNIL-la-TOUR to TOUL to the Americans. The city of TOUL common for the Americans and for the French. The road from TOUL to BLENOD to the Americans; thence following the old limits.

The American Army will retain within the zone ceded to the French Army and especially at TOUL the installations which are indispensable to it.

Circulation in TOUL will be assured by American and French police.

Nothing in the above changes limitation in instructions already given relative to occupation of THIONVILLE.

CONNER.

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Second Army Gen. File: Fldr. 3-I: Telegram

**Troops Permitted to Cross Front Lines**

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 16, 1918.

Commanding General, VI Corps, A. E. F.

18:40 h. Number 192 G-3. So much of orders heretofore issued forbidding American troops to pass north of our front line is amended so as to permit at 5 h. tomorrow the advance of any troops or detachments of the Third Army under proper orders and also such troops of Second Army as may be engaged on work of repairing highways, railroads, 60 centimeter [railroads], etc. These instructions should be communicated to divisions in order that there may be no misunderstanding tomorrow morning. Troops of front line divisions not concerned with the advance of the Third Army will be retained south of our old front line as heretofore.

STUART HEINTZELMAN,  
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff

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193-32.16: Fldr. C: Telegram

**Detachment to take Over War Material and Prisoners**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 16, 1918.

Commanding General, II Colonial Corps

Our number 764 G-3. Increase strength of detachment sent to SPINCOURT in accordance with Telegram Number 759 G-3 to one regiment. SPINCOURT detachment will take over German war materiel reported in SPINCOURT, MAINBOTEL, AMERMONT, POLIGNY, DUZEY, MUZERAY, and BARONCOURT. Detachment will also take over prisoners held by enemy at SPINCOURT. Copy of German commander's written notes of location of dumps and prisoners of war will be sent by courier. Prisoners of war held by Germany at our disposal will not be returned to our lines without specific authority from Army Headquarters. Report of their number and location will be made as soon as known. Acknowledge.

DRUM.

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**Relief of German Detachments Guarding War Material**

G-3

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
France, November 16, 1918.

Commanding General, III Corps

Our number seven six G-three

Following received from Forceful three, "Four German officers representing themselves as parliamentarians from the German 10th Division, headquarters at VIRTON, presented themselves at the Examining Post of the 126th Infantry at JAMETZ. They showed proper credentials from their division commander directing them to get in touch with a like commission from the American service to return with them to VIRTON and make arrangements for accepting and guarding the large quantities of German war material, now in fourteen different towns in that vicinity (that is, division sector), which they propose to turn over under the provisions of the Armistice. Their division is about to leave VIRTON and they did not want to leave the material without getting a proper receipt or without proper guard. They suggest that representatives of the American Army meet them at LOUPPY and return with them, followed by camions containing sufficient guard to leave at the fourteen different towns. These officers came across the line at 2:15 p. m., this date, in a motor car, to wit, November 15, 1918. They said this was the result of a certain wireless message to our command which provided for their meeting like parliamentarians, but they had been unable to find any American parliamentarians." A detachment from the 90th Division consisting of one battalion of infantry and one machine gun company with wireless sending and receiving set, under command of a selected officer of good judgment, will be sent to VIRTON immediately. At least five days' rations will accompany detachment. This detachment will take over war material left by the enemy as indicated in above message and will form a base from which detachments can be ordered by Army Headquarters to designated points to restore order. Detachment commander will not assume control of any local Government unless, in his opinion, the emergency demands it. Terms of Armistice require enemy to turn over all means of communication. Detachment commander will utilize these to fullest extent necessary. Division commander will insure communication with the detachment, establishing relay posts if wireless fails to function. Detachment commander will make daily report of situation. In taking over material, German detachment found guarding such material will be released. Exact lists of material taken over will be telegraphed immediately to these headquarters.

HUGH A. DRUM,  
Brig. Gen. U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, First Army.

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***Strength of British Army; Plans for Repatriation***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*London, November 16, 1918.*

C-in-C, HAEF

Paragraph 1.

Lord Milner informs me that the British Government expects to send into Germany two armies commanded by Generals Plummer and Byng composed of probably 32 divisions in all. He himself feels that this is larger than necessary and [wants] to bring the number of troops down by reducing the personnel of divisions. He said that the British Government felt that they would probably be obliged to keep 20 divisions in the field indefinitely including all accessories which would total 500,000 men. He thought this might last six months or a year. They have decided to bring home coal miners immediately and the general principle they will follow is to repatriate immediately men of what he called pivotal occupation whose labor will make it possible to start the industries which will give occupation to other men. He cited miners and railroad employees as the principal example of these. The British Government is not desirous of repatriating men in a hurry when the principal industries in which they are skilled are not yet able to function. All men of their pivotal occupation needed at home at once will be taken out of the divisions which go into Germany. He said they are considering the possibility of repatriating men in the order of their length of service but as to this and other details he would inform me more fully in a few days.

Paragraph 2.

The public demand for the strictest economy in government expenditure has already begun here as in United States and it, together with the economic necessities of the country, will be the controlling factors in determining demobilization policy. The opinion and desire of the army itself have dropped to secondary importance excepting where any military necessity can be shown.

Paragraph 3.

Lord Milner said he intends to visit you and the American battlefields at the earliest opportunity and he will probably combine it with a visit to the British troops in Germany. He expects to leave for France in a few days.

LLOYD C. GRISCOM,  
Lt. Col., U. S. A.,  
Liaison Officer with Lord Milner.

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***Instructions for Receiving Prisoners and Material***

*November 17, 1918.*

[Contemporary Translation]

French Military Mission  
2d Bureau  
No. 8932 CP

From: The French Mission

To: The C-in-C., A. E. F.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies telephones:

No. 6283-2. As a result of the disorganization of the German Army, the transfer of war material and the repatriation of prisoners apparently cannot be carried out with the precision and method anticipated.

The German Armies release prisoners of war "en masse," without resources, and abandon their material on the spot.

For the common interest and in spite of the irregularity of the procedure, it is suggested that the Allied Armies treat directly with the German Armies facing them in accordance with the following instructions:

1. The Allied Armies will receive all prisoners who come to present themselves to outposts or who are delivered by the German Military authorities, and will arrange for their distribution according to previous instructions.

2. The Allied Armies will assume charge of the material abandoned or regularly turned over by the [German?] military authorities; they will examine and report in writing the condition of this material, i.e., whether good or bad; they will arrange for its disposition in their own zone and for its care and guarding.

It will not be transported to the rear without further orders, in order that the railroads may not be burdened by useless transportation.

The Allied Armies will keep account of this material until such time as its division shall have been arranged among them in accordance with the decision of the Marshal and in proportion to the number of divisions in each of the armies.

This will be done only once for the material as a whole.

The Commanders-in-Chief are requested to render account each day of the material taken to E. M. Bacon, 2d Bureau.

WEYGAND.

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**Action of Regional Replacement Depots**

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
November 17, 1918.

Commander-in-Chief, G-1

Commanding General, 40th Division

Repatriated Prisoners of War

1. Commanding officers of regional replacement depots will prepare, daily, a list in triplicate, of all officers and soldiers of the American Army who were prisoners of war in Germany and who have been received at their depot. The list will state, for officers, name, rank and former organization, and for soldiers, name, rank and former organization. Two copies of this list will be forwarded by courier to the Central Records Office, A. P. O. 902, and one copy will be forwarded by courier to the Adjutant General, G. H. Q.

2. Similar lists will be prepared for officers and sailors of the U. S. Navy, who were prisoners of war in Germany, and who have been received by replacement depots. One copy of this list will be sent by courier to Naval Headquarters, PARIS; one copy by courier to the Central Records Office, A. P. O. 902; and one copy by courier to the Adjutant General, G. H. Q.

3. A similar list of repatriated American citizens who have been prisoners in Germany and who are received at regional replacement depots, will be prepared. This list will give name, time of capture and prison camp in which interned. One copy of this list will be forwarded by courier to the American Embassy, PARIS, one copy by courier to the Central Records Office, and one copy by courier to the Adjutant General, G. H. Q.

4. Commanding officers of regional replacement depots will not release or transfer any officers, soldiers or sailors of the U. S. Army or Navy who have been prisoners of war in Germany until a full and absolute identification is secured. When such officers, soldiers or sailors are released or transferred in accordance with any instructions or orders, immediate notice will be sent the Central Records Office in the case of officers and soldiers of the army, and the American Naval Headquarters, PARIS, in case of officers and sailors of the navy.

5. Notify all separate units of your division operating as regional replacement depots.

By order of the C.-in-C.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

Copy to Commanding General, First Army:  
For his information.

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**Control of Prisoners, Civilians, and Material**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*November 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM:

Instructions in reference to civilians, prisoners and material received from German sources.

In view of the terms of the Armistice and the method of evacuation by the German army, the conditions indicated below will be met by this Army as herein stated:

I. Persons entering our lines:

The following classes of persons are and will be entering our lines:

1. French civilians.
2. French prisoners of war.
3. American prisoners of war.
4. British prisoners of war.
5. Rumanian prisoners of war.
6. Russian prisoners of war.
7. Italian prisoners of war.
8. German deserters.
9. Other classes.

All of these classes will be taken under military control. No person of the above classes will be allowed to circulate without authority from these headquarters except as indicated below.

In order to carry the foregoing into effect the following system has been prescribed.

1. Detachments from this army have been placed at SPINCOURT, LONGUYON, VIRTON, and MARGUT. In addition to receiving war materiel these detachments will preserve order and take charge of all persons in the locality other than the French residents, included in above list. These persons will be sent under charge of military escort to the division to which the detachment belongs (for further disposal see later).

When the situation demands it, these detachments will provide food and medical assistance.

2. Each corps commander will have each division located on the line held by this Army on Nov. 11, 1918, established the following:

(a) Patrols to cover the patrol zone prescribed in F. O. 116, these headquarters.

These patrols will preserve order in the zone and will escort to the examining posts of their respective divisions any persons included in the classes stated above except French residents, found in their patrol zones.

(b) Examining posts to cover all roads crossing the line of Nov. 11, 1918. See F. O. 117.

In addition to preventing circulation of unauthorized persons, these examining posts will receive from patrols operating in the patrol zone and take charge of all persons of the classes described above.

From the examining posts all persons of the above described classes will be sent under escort to the divisional collecting station.

(c) Division collection station.

At this point the persons received will be segregated into the classes stated in Paragraph 1.

All classes except Americans will be sent under escort to VERDUN. Americans will be sent under escort by rail to REVIGNY.

(d) Guards at all crossings of the MEUSE in each corps zone. These guards will form a rear barrage line and will collect persons and forward them to the divisional collecting station as indicated for examining posts.

Divisions will supply such food and medical assistance as may be necessary.

3. The Army Sorting Station at VERDUN will receive all persons except Americans. This station will function under the direction of the Commanding General, 6th Division, until further orders.

Persons arriving at this station will be examined by G-2 specialists, deloused, bathed, fed, and if necessary, clothed. They will be turned over to French authorities for disposition. While awaiting disposition these persons will be held under military control.

4. Accurate check will be made by divisions and at the Army Sorting Station of the number of persons received of each class and their disposition, and also of all clothing, food and other supplies furnished. Reports will be submitted each day to G-1, First Army, by each division and the Army Sorting Station as follows:

- (a) Number on hand at the beginning of the day.
- (b) Number received during the day.
- (c) Number evacuated during the day and point to which evacuated.
- (d) Number remaining on hand.

## II. Material received:

This will consist of artillery material (guns, gun carriages, etc.) machine guns, rifles, dumps of all classes, locomotives, railroad cars, etc.

Some of this material will be turned over by German authorities and some will be found in various localities.

All of this material, whether turned over by Germans or found, will be taken under charge.

Where materiel is turned over by Germans a receipt will be given. In either case the American officer receiving or finding the material will make a careful inventory of the material and its condition; a copy of the inventory will be left with the guard placed over the material. Written reports of these inventories will be sent without delay through military channels to G-1, these Headquarters. Telegraphic summary of inventory will be sent as early as practicable.

The detachments sent to SPINCOURT, LONGUYON, VIRTON, and MARGUT are primarily charged with receiving and locating German material. The officer in charge of each of these detachments will have the neighboring country searched for material. As far as practicable all material received will be collected in central localities and kept under guard, until further orders. No material will be sent to the rear until further orders.

The Chief of Artillery, Chief of Air Service, Chief Engineer, Chief Ordnance Officer, Chief Surgeon and Chief Quartermaster, of these Hq., will send a representative to each advance detachment to inspect the property held by the detachment and to recommend disposition.

The representative of the Chief of Artillery will make a careful check of all artillery material. A report thereof will be sent through the Chief of Artillery to G-1.

The other staff officers will do the same for material of their services and departments.

The representative of the chief surgeon will also look into and report upon the sanitary conditions, etc.

3. All reports will be submitted to A. C. of S., G-1, who is charged with preparing the reports required by higher authorities. These reports will be submitted daily to the Chief of Staff.

III. Division commanders are charged with the transmission of these orders to all detachments operating under their control.

By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

H. A. DRUM,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Memorandum

***Forces for Rhine Occupation***

3d Section

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

*November 17, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR

Chief of Staff:

SUBJECT: Notes from the Allied Commander-in-Chief relative to the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces and the forces to be held in reserve.

1. The zone within Germany designated for American occupancy is about 70 kms. by 100 kms. in area. Under the orders, 8 American and 2 French divisions are to occupy this area. We are also supposed to furnish 1 division for the bridgehead at MAYENCE.

This gives a total of 9 American divisions in occupied territory. Nine divisions have already been assigned to the Third Army. It is noted, however, that the plan calls for 4 American corps headquarters instead of the 2 which we have already assigned and 1 additional corps headquarters which we contemplate assigning to the Third Army.

2. The American, French, British and Belgian divisions to enter Germany are:

9 American  
17 French  
10 British  
4 Belgian

3. In addition to the troops to enter Germany, certain units are to be held in reserve in rear of the frontier, viz:

10 American  
20 French  
20 British  
2 Belgian

Insofar as concerns our reserves, the note would require to place our troops north of TOUL and east of the MEUSE.

Considering the nature of the terrain of the WOEVRE and our boundaries to the east and north, this means that we would be limited in billeting the 10 divisions to the regions of MONTMEDY, LONGUYON, and LONGWY and to the southern half of LUXEMBURG.

Not only would the billeting of these troops be difficult and probably require more or less extra construction, but the matter of supply would, in the beginning at least, practically forbid this distribution unless the military situation urgently demanded such an arrangement. It will be several weeks before we can provide animals and trucks in sufficient quantity to fit out additional divisions, it having been necessary to draw on divisions not destined to enter Germany both for animals and trucks.

4. It may be that the mixing of troops may cause certain complications; however, this is not necessarily important.

5. The letter from the Marshal gives an opportunity for a reply. I recommend that the accompanying letter be sent.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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193-32.16: Fldr. C: Telegram

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 17, 1918.*

Commanding General, Third Army GY

Number 3853 G-1. Following from French G. Q. G. repeated for your information and guidance. "Civilians and soldiers coming from territory occupied by the enemy who cross our lines in order to regain the zone by the Allied troops should be stopped by barriers and sent to points where there are sorting companies. It is requested that the British and American Armies be good enough to arrange by appropriate means for the use of barriers and the direction of returning. Portions to sorting stations. Sorting stations are assigned by agreement among the French mission at MONTRUIL and CHAUMONT and the General Staffs at French G. H. Q. (special service): the sorting committees are made up of personnel at the disposal of the two French missions supplemented as far as necessary by the special service G. Q. G., after agreement with the mission." Based on latest information received from French mission here, you will be guided by the following instructions; civilians and Allied soldiers coming into our lines will be assembled by each army at such point as its commanding general may determine. Each army will from time to time report to the General commanding the Zone of the ETAPES at BAR-le-DUC and follow his instructions with respect to disposition of Allied soldiers other than Americans so assembled. Civilians assembled within each army will be placed at the disposition of the French SR officer attached to the army namely First Army Lieutenant Jacob at TRIAUCOURT, Second Army Lieut. Baudoin Hunter at TOUL, Third Army Lieut. Deneviel at LIGNY. Russians will in all cases be treated as civilians; in this connection French G. Q. G. informs us that in Zone of SPA prisoners were being evacuated and set free in great masses and that Marshal Foch urges all of the armies to proceed with the utmost rapidity to prepare the measures above set forth. You have been wired separately as to disposition of American soldiers and civilians. Acknowledge.

ANDREWS.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1234: Telephone Message

**Prisoners Recovered by French Armies**

*November 17, 1918, at 10 p. m.*

From Lieut. Alexander American Mission, SENLIS

MESSAGE FROM MARSHAL FOCH TO GENERAL PERSHING:

The French armies are daily recovering great numbers of Allied soldiers who had been taken prisoners. These men are under their guard being directed to centers of classification from which, after examination, they should be sent to designated collected centers (CALAIS, CHAUMONT, and LYON).

The French armies, however, have not enough of the special personnel which is indispensable for properly carrying out this task.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the American, British, and Italian Armies are therefore asked to be good enough to appoint officers and subordinate personnel sufficient to assure this service in each of the 3 groups of French Armies. Each Allied Army is asked to send as soon as possible to each of the 3 French Groups of Armies a detail of two or three officers and a few noncommissioned officers and men who know French.

The question of detail can be treated directly with French G. H. Q., E. M., S. R. A., General Staff, Information Section.

FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telegram

**Instructions Requested for Disposition of Materiel**

FIRST ARMY,  
*November 17, 1918--3:15 p. m.*

TELEGRAM

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GHQ ATTENTION G-1

Number 1076 G-1 Request instructions as to disposition to be made of materiel turned over by enemy in accordance with terms of Armistice.

HUNTER LIGGETT,  
Lt. Gen.,  
Commanding, First Army.  
3:15 p. m.

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193-32.16: Telegram

***Disposition of Repatriated American Prisoners of War***

THIRD ARMY,  
November 17, 1918.

G-1, Second Army

No. 10 G-1

In accordance with directions contained in Telegram No. 3840 G-1 G. H. Q., American E. F. directions have been issued III Corps to turn into replacement depot Second Army all released American prisoners of war and repatriated American civilians. Presume you have been advised to same effect but if not this will explain any of these transfers that we may make.

CRAIG.

-----

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1234: Telephone Message

***Supply of Allied Prisoners in Luxemburg***

[Contemporary Translation]

November 17, 1918.

9004/CP

From: French Military Mission, CHAUMONT

To: C-in-C, American E. F.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast telegraphs: No. 5864/DA. The Allied prisoners left by the Germans in Luxemburg will be supplied with food by the American or French troops who are to penetrate into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

These prisoners will then be sent to the sorting centers, organized in each of the Allied Armies, to be sent to the Interior later.

Please ask the American Staff to take necessary action in this regard.

Similar instructions will be given by the Commander-in-Chief to the French troops who are to penetrate into Luxemburg.

Please report immediately the approximate number of prisoners that will be found in Luxemburg.

By order:

Chief of the 2d Bureau,  
Illegible.

-----

***Propaganda of Independent Social Democratic Party***

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 17, 1918--9:30 a. m.*

To the International Labor Party:

Comrades! The great historical deed has been accomplished; the German revolution is no longer merely an object of longing, it has become a living reality. In a few days the laboring class throughout Germany rose up with the unanimous cooperation of the soldiers and sailors firmly resolves, cost what it might, to boldly cast off oppression. Led by the splendid men of the navy the working people of Germany took possession of the ruling power. The assurance of peace, the restoration of destroyed economic life, the building up of Socialistic Society, these are now our greatest tasks. Our nation bleeds from countless wounds inflicted by our moneyed classes and their representatives in the government. Only by assembling all forces will it be possible for a new world to arise upon the ruins, a world of freedom and brotherhood. The severe terms of the Armistice render this work unusually difficult. The German politicians who assented to the disgraceful peace of BREST-LITOVSK have no cause to complain because the Entente has treated them in the same fashion. We, however, fought against that treaty as against the peace of BUCHAREST with all the weight which our International Socialist Movement gave us. With bleeding hearts we experienced at that time that we were not strong enough to prevent those acts of force, but the desire to make good the wrong strengthened us with the highest revolutionary energy. Now when the world is freed of the oppression of Prussian-German militarism it is up to you to lead the battle against the policy of force in your country and prevent our revolution from dying and sowing the seed for new wars. Today we bow to the necessity of the hour if we acquiesce to even the most oppressive conditions which have been laid upon us. We appeal, however, to your class solidarity, to your sense of justice, to your Socialistic sentiments and we are certain that you will so increase your power that an act of violence of one brother against another can never again take place. If you follow us, the hour of capitalism has struck throughout the world. Long live International Socialism, the solidarity for all nations!

The Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany

Ernst Daeming, Wilhelm Dittmann, Hüge Hasse, Adolf Hefer,

Gustav Lankang, George Ledebour, Robert Wegels, Louise Zeitz

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**First Meeting of American Section With P. I. A. C.**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 17, 1918.*

No. 1

FROM: Chief

TO: Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. In order to keep the Commanding General in touch with conditions existing at these Headquarters, constant reports will be made from time to time.
2. The Chief of American Section took part for the first time in the deliberations of the Mission at 3 p. m. today (4 o'clock German time). Great cordiality appears to exist between the members of the Mission. The four generals are present at these meetings each with his chief of staff. Lieut. General Haking (British) presides \* General of division Nudant (French), who assists in conducting the conferences in French, shows a disposition to monopolize the deliberations, although apparently very willing to defer to the wishes of the other Allied representatives.
3. In passing through Belgium, the utmost enthusiasm and good will was exhibited towards our party by the Belgians; in a lesser degree by returning French soldiers. Thousands of French and Belgian prisoners were met with, who had been set free by the Germans. DINANT was crowded with them this morning asking for food and sorely taxing the resources of the city. Two French soldiers were interviewed who had been prisoners in WESTPHALIA for 51 months, working in factories. Their liberation was a violation of the terms of the Armistice, but apparently the Germans are paying little or no attention to many provisions of the Armistice. German soldiers were encountered driving off hundreds of Belgian cows; and every column of German transport had private carriages stolen from Belgians, containing German officers or supplies. The German soldiers appeared stolidly curious at our presence; a few saluted our car; one shook his fist after we passed but probably thought we were from the German High Command.

\* \* \* \* \*

General Haking (British), informs me that the Germans are really being ruled by representatives of the "Soldaten Rath," or Soldiers League. Two representatives of the latter have talked with him, bearing identification cards of belonging to the "Soldaten Rath," stamped by the German G. H. Q., thus giving some official sanction to their status.

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\* Either General Haking presided temporarily or General Rhodes' first impression was erroneous, for subsequent reports indicate that General Nudant was the presiding officer.

They stated that they were permitting the German High Command to get the Army back to Germany because they could best do it.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-2, GHQ, AEF: File 380, Fldr. 4: Letter

***Passage of American Army through Luxemburg***

386.2

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
JUDGE ADVOCATES OFFICE,  
*November 18, 1918.*

FROM: Adjutant General

TO: Commanding Generals

1. Although by international law we are entitled to regard Luxemburg as hostile territory, yet, as the inhabitants are generally friendly, they will not be considered as enemies. So far as possible Luxemburg will be treated as a friendly state. Our presence in Luxemburg is not for the purpose of hostile occupation but merely for the passage and maintenance of communications which its geographical situation makes necessary.

2. No military government will be set up in Luxemburg. The general and local administration of the country will not be interfered with. The persons and property of the inhabitants will be absolutely respected. The effort will be made to avoid, wherever possible, all friction with the people, all causes of irritation and all appearance of military control over the government.

3. Public and unoccupied buildings will be utilized for barracks, offices and other necessary military purposes. Additional accommodations needed may be provided by billeting or requisition in accordance with the principles of G. O., 18, G. H. Q., January 31, 1918. In all cases the use of public or private buildings will be obtained by arrangement with the local authorities. Where the local authorities refuse to comply, the necessary buildings will be taken, upon authority of a regimental or higher commander. For buildings used certificated identifying the building and owner and showing the nature and duration of the use, will be given to the municipal authorities. Copies of such certificates will be forwarded to and preserved by the finance officer, A. E. F., Headquarters, S. O. S.

4. Necessary supplies which have to be procured locally will be paid for in cash at a fixed and fair valuation. If the required supplies are withheld by the inhabitants, application will be made to the Luxemburg authorities to requisition them, failing which they will be taken, payment being made as in other cases. Care will be taken always to leave to the inhabitants sufficient supplies for their own need.

5. The Telegraph and telephone systems of Luxemburg are government owned utilities. The railroads are privately owned under government control. For all use of these utilities, certificates showing the nature of the service, the object thereof and when and to whom rendered, will be prepared in duplicate one copy to be delivered to the proper

Luxemburg authority, the other to be forwarded for preservation to the finance officer, A. E. F., Headquarters, S. O. S.

6. No Luxemburg official will be allowed to exercise any authority over any member of the American Army under any circumstances whatsoever. On the other hand to avoid just grounds of complaint by the Luxemburgers, the strictest discipline will be maintained while in this country, with a special view to preventing, as far as possible, all intermingling of the troops and the local population.

7. Notwithstanding anything herein contained, the American troops will at all costs insure their safe and uninterrupted passage and communications in Luxemburg. Offenses against the Army will be dealt with by the military authorities regardless of the nationality of the offenders. All communication with the enemy will be prohibited to the inhabitants. Suspected person will be arrested and dealt with as the circumstances warrant. In case violence or resistance is offered the offender may be shot on the spot. In general, so far as the security of the Army is concerned, all persons may be treated in accordance with the principles of the laws of war.

8. The treatment of Luxemburg as a friendly state is primarily for our own advantage. It is the duty of all commanders to endeavor to maintain these friendly relations in order to avoid the necessity of establishing a military government in Luxemburg.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

### ***German Protests on Armistice Timetable***

No. 2

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 18, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. The International Armistice Commission met again at ten o'clock a. m. this date with the German Military Commission appointed by the German High Command, headed by General Winterfeldt, the German Great General Staff.

2. General Nudant (French) opened the proceedings, on the part of the Allied Commission, by stating the necessity of proceeding with the work of the Commission without delay and that this would be expedited by lists of the prisoners of war and the amount of military material to be turned over by the Germans, showing in each case the location. General Nudant quoted a telegram from Field Marshal Foch, urging that the International Commission should carry out the purposes for which it was created.

In reply, General Winterfeldt stated as the spokesman of the German Higher Command, that the latter had several times pointed out the great danger arising from the short time allotted to the German Army to comply with the conditions of the Armistice. Furthermore, he stated that in many instances the local French and Belgian population had showed itself hostile to the Allied troops, making it exceedingly difficult for German military commissions to work in places evacuated by German troops. Naturally, he stated, the German High Command would do everything possible to carry out the terms of the Armistic, but that in the name of the German High Command he could not guarantee that all the conditions

would be fulfilled, unless a short delay is granted to Germany by the Allies. One of the German army groups had informed the German High Command that a German commission which was perfecting the delivering up of material could not fulfill its mission because the Allied Army with which it was working had refused to receive the German Parlemtaire. To this General Nudant replied that it was believed that present arrangements made in the Allied Armies, with respect to turning over material, would suffice and that the difficulties which General Winterfeldt had announced would be obviated---the German Commission advising the Allied Army in its front where the material is and can be obtained and delivery made as the retreat of the German Army proceeds. General Nudant then pointed out that in certain respects units of the German Army were violating the terms of the Armistice by requisitioning supplies from the local French and Belgian population. More particularly this refers to the taking away of animals and also to food supplies in various places destroyed or removed.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. On the part of the German Great General Staff, Captain Guyer stated that from information received in the last few days from the German Army, it will be technically impossible to make the marches provided for in the terms of the Armistice on account of having too few roads and too many troops. Study of the question indicated that it would be necessary to march columns on single road extending for 190 K's [kilometers] or more. The greatest difficulties encountered would arise in Luxemburg. It will be difficult to maintain order and discipline in the German columns and it is not improbable that German troops will leave their ranks and pillage the country, because now at the end of the war they have nothing more to fear than to be taken as prisoners of war. Furthermore, having been four years away from Germany, they now desire to return home, and on account of recent political events in Germany, it will be difficult for German commanders to restrain the men. General Winterfeldt emphasized the remarks made by Captain Guyer and asked the Military Commission if something could not be done to give more time for the evacuation of the German troops. General Winterfeldt therefore transmitted to Marshal Foch a note relative to this matter.

To this General Nudant replied that he had no doubt, Marshal Foch would very seriously consider the matter presented, but that he did not believe the reply would be that which was desired; that the military obstacles named by the German Military Commission did not appear insurmountable and that columns of 190 K's. [kilometers] in length would be of exceptional occurrence only; that frequently in the territory to be evacuated, German troops would not have to make a march of more than 30 K's. [kilometers] a day.

To this Captain Guyer replied that columns of 190 K's. [kilometers] are not of exceptional occurrence, but will have to continue up to the passage of the RHINE, and that on the greater part of the front the German Armies will have to make marches of 300 (K's. [kilometers] in twenty-seven days - these distances being measured as the crow flies. Such a march is unprecedented in the history of the war, and in the present instance many of the German units have not been trained for marching and are suffering from many weak and sick soldiers. Furthermore, up to the present time the weather has been exceedingly favorable for marching, but if it gets colder and rain and snow occur, conditions will make it still further difficult for the German Armies to cover the distance in the time allotted by the terms of the Armistice.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Advance to the Rhine***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED FORCES,  
*November 18, 1918--8:50 p. m.*

No. 109--2

To the French Military Mission, CHAUMONT

In order to guarantee the procedure in accordance with the withdrawal of the German troops in the countries evacuated by those troops: Belgium, Luxemburg, ALSACE-LORRAINE, Article 1, of Note 1, will by common accord between the Allied High Command and the German High Command be modified as follows:

The first four paragraphs will remain unchanged.

Beginning with the fifth paragraph a new wording replaces the original text up to the end of the article.

This wording is:

The troops of the Allies and of the United States will penetrate these territories, following up the German troops. Their movement will be regulated in such a way that a safety zone of ten kilometers will always be kept between the opposing forces. Consequently the commanders of the armies in front of one another will come to a direct understanding so as to order their movements in such a way as to fulfill these conditions and to avoid all misunderstanding.

I request you to kindly give the necessary instructions without delay to the generals commanding the armies under your orders. It must be well understood that the above mentioned change authorizes the army commanders to accelerate their advance after agreement with the German command in front of them; but in no case to delay this advance as provided for in the Armistice Agreement.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Memorandum

***Prisoners of War***

*Spa, Belgium, November 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL RHODES:

The following matters were brought out in the discussions of the Sub-committee on Liberation of Prisoners of War:

Russian prisoners are not to be liberated through France. General Foch objects at the present time to the concentration of prisoners in the Neutral Zone, which I understand to be the zone between the right bank of the RHINE and the position of the German army at the end of the Armistice.

Much difficulty has been occasioned by the liberation of prisoners in the territory on the left bank of the RHINE. These prisoners, in many cases, being thrown upon the resources of Belgium, in some cases sick and not able to obtain treatment.

The Boche state that this condition is unavoidable on account of the revolutionary conditions in many parts of the country. The prisoners have been liberated by the people, but the Germans state that they are using every means in their power to live up to the terms of the Armistice.

They seem to be unable at the present time to give very definite information as to the location of prisoners west of the RHINE, and they are unable, at present, to give information about other prisoners, but they are expecting a Major Pabst, from Berlin, who, it is expected, will be able to answer all these questions. At the present time there seem to be no Americans in prison camps west of the RHINE. There are about one hundred thousand French, about thirty thousand Italians, about thirty thousand English, and about three thousand Portuguese and Poles together.

There seems to be some apprehension among the French members of the Committee, and justly so, that a large number of Russian prisoners of war will be turned loose on France, and to this end Marshal Foch has directed that all prisoners situated in the camps beyond the right bank of the RHINE be evacuated to their proper country - not through the zone of the Armies, but through Switzerland, and down the rivers to the sea, and thence to the coasts of Britain and France; that Russian, Serbian, and American prisoners be sent to their own country direct.

Colonel Shartle informs me that our prison camps are all near Switzerland, which should facilitate their evacuation.

During the retreat of the German Armies it was necessary to pick up the prison camps and move them to the rear, ahead of the retreating armies, which will account for the lack of exact information with regard to the location of prison camps on this side of the RHINE.

As soon as definite information can be obtained from Major Pabst it seems to be universally desired that each of the Allied Armies take charge of the prisoners now in the zone of the Armies, making direct arrangements with the commanding officers of the German Armies opposite. This arrangement will have to be authorized as intercourse between the lines is not authorized. The Germans have already attempted this measure, but their envoys have not been received, according to orders.

In anticipation of the receipt of rather large numbers of French, Belgian, Italian, American, and British prisoners, each army will have to organize to receive these men, to isolate them for a temporary period, to quarantine those with contagious diseases, to clean, feed and clothe them all and then to pass them on to their proper localities when all precautions have been taken. The Commission has requested that it be supplied with such information as may be available of the sanitary condition of each of the camps.

The question was raised as to the supply of food to Allied prisoners in the camps. Food sent to the prisoners has not been reaching its destination. It was asked if it would be possible to send trains into Germany with Allied guards. This was objected to by the Germans as a dangerous measure. They were asked to obtain information as to whether it would be possible in the future to guarantee security for the passage of food trains to their proper destinations.

A member of the French Commission has requested that the Red Cross in Switzerland be instructed to turn over its resources in food and clothing to the Bureau de Secours de BERNE in order that this food may be used for all Allied prisoners.

Colonel Shartle informs me that the food stored in Switzerland is enough to last our own prisoners for some time but would be nothing in meeting the demands of over a million Allied prisoners. It will be necessary to make a definite recommendation upon this point.

If armies are required to receive prisoners from armies opposite them representatives of Britain, France, Italy, and the United States should be in each one of these centers. It would be very desirable to have some means of holding the prisoners together between the

period in which the rearguards of the German Army pass and the advance guards of the Allied Armies arrive. This end might be accomplished by sending Allied guards ahead to relieve the German guards, upon proper arrangement with the German authorities.

READ J. CRAIG.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

***Prisoners of War***

No. 2

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 18, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Continuing his discussion of the details of carrying out the provisions of the Armistice, General Winterfeldt stated that the German Military Commission would be grateful if the weak and wounded men, referred to in Article 11 of the Armistice, and who could not be transferred upon the evacuation of Allied territory of German troops ---could remain in their places and be attended by German surgeons---the latter not to be considered prisoners of war.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Memorandum

***Organization for Handling Abandoned Material and Personnel***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. The accompanying telegram was received yesterday afternoon from the First Army asking instructions as to disposition of enemy materiel.

2. In the evening instructions were received by telephone from Marshal Foch concerning enemy materiel and personnel, a translation of which is annexed hereto. These instructions were at once telephoned to the First, Second and Third Armies.

3. If the First and Second Armies are withdrawn, they can do little or nothing on this subject.

4. The 6 divisions of the Third Army who are advancing can give this matter temporary attention, particularly during their halts, but an organization in their rear will be necessary in order to carry out Marshal Foch's instructions. The proper organization for this purpose would seem to be the 3 divisions in support. They could receive personnel and materiel sent back to them from the 6 divisions in front; and in turn, either organize local depots therefor or send them materiel back under guard to depots further in the rear.

5. As soon as the 3 divisions in support are organized into a corps, it is recommended that these instructions of Marshal Foch and such other instructions upon this subject as may be received be sent to them for attention.

EVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Letter

***Pershing's Plan For Disposition and Control of American Troops***

*November 18, 1918.*

My dear Marshal Foch:

I have received your letter (6231) enclosing the notes which you propose to issue in the form of a directive.

I have already designated nine divisions for the duty of occupation. I had, however, planned to employ only three army corps staffs. I suggest that my original plan as to the number of corps staffs be carried out. I can readily distribute the troops as required by your note and yet control them with the three staffs.

I think that it is likely that we will find great difficulty in quartering and supplying the ten divisions which I am to hold in reserve unless we keep them somewhat further back than your note contemplates.

Troops quartered north of TOUL and east of the MEUSE must, if we remain within the boundaries you have already fixed for American troops, be limited to the regions of LONGUYON, LONGWY, ARLON and the southern half of Luxemburg in order to find comfortable billets. Even then we should probably have to undertake certain installations. It would seem to me very advisable not to send reserves beyond "No Man's Land" in this region, at least not until all the railroads have been repaired or some emergency appears at hand.

The disposition which I had planned to make of the divisions, other than the nine which I had designated for the advance into the German territory, left in the region of TOUL and VERDUN is as follows:

Nine divisions in the areas around CHAUMONT and seven in the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU GONDRECOURT, TOUL, COMMERCEY and BAR-le-DUC.

This plan would enable us to take full advantage of our existing installations and would enable me to push the work of reconstituting, refitting and training of the divisions under the best conditions. I believe that you will agree with me that this disposition would also enable us to bring the ten reserve divisions which you require, up in ample time to meet any considerable emergency.

As I have already begun to carry out the plan above outlined, may I ask that you telegraph your observations; it being, of course, understood that reserve divisions would move forward into Luxemburg on the first indication of complications.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

To Marshal Ferdinand Foch,  
Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Letter

***Pershing to Establish Advanced Headquarters at Treves***

*November 18, 1918.*

My dear Marshal Foch:

I expect to establish an advanced headquarters at TREVES immediately after American troops have entered that place.

I am writing you separately with reference to certain points contained in the notes, which you have been kind enough to send me, on the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

To Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Memorandum

***Entry of American Troops Into Luxemburg***

2d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM: For the Commander-in-Chief

1. Reference entry of our troops into Luxemburg, I recommend that General Francis LeJ. Parker, Colonel Moreno, Major Quekemeyer and Captain Dellschaft proceed on November 19 to Luxemburg, through our lines to make the following preliminary arrangements:

a. Transmit to the Luxemburg Government for publication in the local press previous to the entry of our troops, our proclamations to the people of Luxemburg. This proclamation has been translated into French and German and a number of copies can be printed tonight.

b. Arrange with the local municipal authorities for the necessary police protection for the entry of the Commander-in-Chief at the head of the troops.

c. Arrange a formal interview for the Commander-in-Chief with the Grand Duchess, the present head of the Luxemburg Government. (Up to the present time, we have no information of a revolution in Luxemburg.)

d. Arrange to have the necessary officials of the Government presented to the Commander-in-Chief at the place selected for his temporary residence or on his train. General Parker to arrange for the passage of a regiment, or brigade of the division in whose sector of the advance Luxemburg falls, to enter the city and pass in review by the Commander-in-Chief in the PLATZ des ARMES [PLACE d'ARMES] or other suitable square.

2. After these preliminary arrangements have been completed, General Parker and Major Quekemeyer to join the Commander-in-Chief. Colonel Moreno to remain in Luxemburg to see that the necessary details are carried out regarding the police measures previous to the arrival of our troops and Captain Dellschaft to remain as expert interpreter of the German language.

3. General Parker is to be furnished with 200 copies of the map of the city of Luxemburg on which can be marked the route of passage of troops to the place of review for distribution to the regiment or brigade which marches through the city.

D. E. NOLAN,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Wireless Interception

***Plea for Repatriation of Polish Army***

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 18, 1918--10:45 p. m.*

To General Foch, General Headquarters of the Allied Forces, France

Not being able to get in direct communication by radio with the President of the United States, I ask the Government of the Republic to please send through your Excellency the following message:

Mr. Wilson, President of the United States. In the name of the Polish Army, of which I am Commander-in-Chief. Please allow the Polish Military Forces, reunited under the American flag, to be sent to Poland as soon as possible, there to be incorporated into the Polish Army which is now reunited under my command. The Polish Nation, which has so long submitted to the occupation of its territory by foreign armies, is now preparing with the greatest enthusiasm to receive on its native soil the sons of the country who are scattered throughout the world. She appeals to all soldiers of Polish nationality, who have fought under foreign flags. In your consent, Mr. President, you whom Poland considers as its first protector, the whole Polish Nation will see a new testimonial of your interest in and goodwill toward the cause of Poland.

PILSUDSKI.

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**Retention of Railway Personnel of Rhineland**

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
November 18, 1918.

From: Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.)

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

The President of the Permanent International Armistice Commission reports that the personnel for the exploitation of the means of communication, particularly that of the railroads, fearing hostility from the populations or the Allied soldiers, are following the retreating movements of the German troops, despite the stipulation of Article VII of the Armistice Convention.

This personnel is absolutely necessary to the operation of the various means of transportation.

By Letter No. 551-C R of November 15, copy of which I have sent to you and an additional copy of which is attached hereto. I invited the Presidents of the different Commissions des Voies de Communication to insist that each one remains at his post.

Please bring this to the attention of your troops, in order to avoid all conflict between them and the German personnel on the lines of communication, who remain in place.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

-----

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Order

**German Communications**

[Contemporary Translation]

November 18, 1918.

From: Marshal, C-in-C, Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.)

To: C-in-C, American E. F.

The President of the Permanent International Armistice Commission reports that the personnel for the exploitation of the means of communication, particularly that of the railroads, fearing hostility from the populations or the Allied soldiers, are following the retreating movements of the German troops, despite the stipulations of Article VII of the Armistice Convention.

The personnel is absolutely necessary to the operation of the various means of transportation.

By Letter No. 551-CR of November 15, copy of which I have sent to you \* \* \* I invited the Presidents of the different Commissions des Voies de Communication to insist that each one remains at his post.

Please bring this to the attention of your troops, in order to avoid all conflict between them and the German personnel on the lines of communication, who remain in place.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

-----

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Letter

***Liberation of Luxemburg***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 19, 1918.*

To Her Highness  
The Grand Duchess of Luxemburg

Your Highness:

In offering to Your Highness the congratulations of the American Army upon the liberation of your country and its people from the yoke of the invading Germans, I take occasion to send to you as my personal representative Brigadier General Francis LeJ. Parker. In addition to conveying to Your Highness my personal felicitations, General Parker will present copies of a proclamation which I have issued to reassure the people of Luxemburg regarding the necessary passage of American troops through your territory. I am happy to believe that his audience with Your Highness will make unmistakable the friendly relations that I hope may exist between the American Army and the Government and the people of Luxemburg.

I have the honor to be Your Highness' most humble servant,

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
American Expeditionary Forces.

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PROCLAMATION

TO THE PEOPLE OF LUXEMBURG:

After four years of invasion Luxemburg is now happily liberated. Your freedom from German occupation was exacted of the invaders by the American and Allied Armies as a condition of the present Armistice. It now becomes necessary for American troops to pass through Luxemburg and to establish and maintain for a time their communications upon your territory.

The American troops have come to Luxemburg as friends and will conduct themselves here strictly in accordance with international law. No hardship need be expected from their presence, which will not be extended beyond what is deemed strictly necessary. Your Government and institutions will nowhere be interfered with. You will be undisturbed in

the peaceful pursuit of your lives and occupations. Your persons and your property will be fully respected. It will be necessary for the American Army to utilize certain buildings, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, and possibly other public works, for shelter, transportation or communication; but beyond that whatever supplies may be required will be paid for at a just valuation.

It is assumed that you will commit no aggressions upon the American Army and will not give any information, aid or comfort to its enemies. You are expected cheerfully to observe such rules as the American military commanders may find it necessary to make for the safety of their troops and your own protection.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207:

### ***Morale of German Troops***

*Spa, Belgium, November 19, 1918.*

[Extract]

1. Information supplied by an officer of the German General Staff with reference to the political and military situation.

He described in some detail the development of the present political and military crisis in Germany and its similarity and relationship with the break-up of the Russian Empire. The following are perhaps the only points worth recording in connection with the work of the Armistice Commission. They are given with all reserve, though the officer appeared to be perfectly open and sincere and stated that a resumption of hostilities against external enemies was unthinkable; that all that Germany wanted was to get the Army back in some order before chaos supervenes, and that all the information of every kind available is at our disposal.

2. The situation in Germany, particularly with regard to military and naval affairs is very complex, in some places there is a little republic run by sailors or soldiers, in other cases, chaos reigned; in other, some form of ordered government of different kinds.

3. The "Soldaten Rath" [Soldiers' Council] is a by-product of these conditions and its functions and power vary considerably in different localities.

This variation is attributed to many causes, chief of which is the difference between the still good discipline of troops in the line and the utter indiscipline of troops in the interior. The officer described the arrival of a magnificent, highly disciplined storm battalion in SPA, in a condition of high morale, and thorough military efficiency. He states that there was in SPA at the time another battalion infected with indiscipline and political chaos, and that the good battalion immediately collapsed and lost all discipline and control. What he fears most is the suddenness with which a similar outbreak of anarchy is likely to occur amongst the troops now in the line and under reasonable control.

4. Troops in the interior consist almost exclusively of very young recruits and old men and their discipline has almost disappeared. In the interior, the "Soldaten Rath," appears to have very great power, in some cases having complete executive control of military matters and of Government. On the lines of Communication the "Soldaten Rath,"

has still considerable power, but with troops in the front line where discipline is still good (though not by any means what it used to be), the "Soldaten Rath," is accepted by the authorities, but has advisory powers only.

\* \* \* \* \*

7. The staff officer explained the line from the date of the Armistice to their present position, and showed the strips which were now allotted to armies, and described the congestion arising out of the present constriction into totally inadequate space. He is sending up to the British Mission a map showing disposition of armies, zones allotted to them for retreat, line on which they stand, line to which the Germans consider it technically possible to withdraw them by the 21st and the line to which they are compelled to withdraw in terms of the Armistice.

8. It is stated that this information was presented at the Compiègne Conference, that it was believed at the time it would be impossible to comply, but that internal events in Germany made it absolutely necessary for the delegates to sign any Armistice terms that were put before them.

\* \* \* \* \*

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

***Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 19, 1918.*

No. 3

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. A paper was read from the Allied to the German High Command in which hope was expressed that the liberation of prisoners of war will reach the following figures: 15,000 a day for Switzerland; 3,000 per day through Holland and Denmark if the necessary ships can be made available.

\* \* \* \* \*

7. The German Commission requested information as to its request that the sick and wounded left in the evacuated zone, be not treated as prisoners of war, as being in the interests of humanity and because an Armistice and not a state of war exists at present; and furthermore, because the Allied Armies could not expect to profit by interpreting such persons as prisoners of war.

To this, reply was made that interpretation of such persons as anything but prisoners of war could not be contemplated, as such interpretation was plainly according to the rules

of war applying to combatants left behind in the region of an advancing army; and furthermore such interpretation was in accord with an article of the Armistice. But relative to the medical personnel, it goes without saying that they would be returned to Germany in accordance with the terms of the GENEVA Convention.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telegram

### **Safety Zone**

[Contemporary Translation]

*Senlis, November 19, 1918--1:35 p. m.*

Chief of Staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Number 48. Confirming telephone message to Deputy Chief of Staff 1140, following message addressed by Marshal Foch to Commanders-in-Chief, Allied Armies:

In order to assure order in the countries evacuated by the enemy, (Belgium, Luxemburg and ALSACE-LORRAINE) during the progressive retirement of the enemy, Article 1 of Annex 1 of the Armistice Agreement has, by mutual agreement between the Allied High Command and the German High Command, been modified as follows: The first four paragraphs remain unchanged. A new text reading as follows, replaces the original text from the beginning of paragraph five to the end of the article.

The troops of the Allies and of the United States will go forward in these territories following up the retreating Germans. Their movement will be so regulated as to maintain at all time safety zone of ten kilometers between the opposing forces.

Generals commanding Armies of the Allies and of the United States should accordingly come to a direct understanding with the Generals commanding German Armies opposite their fronts in order that they may regulate their movements in such a way as to fulfill these conditions and avoid misunderstanding.

I ask you to be good enough to give without delay the necessary instructions to the Commanding General of the Armies under your command.

It must be understood that the above modification authorizes Commanding Generals of Armies to quicken their advance upon agreement with the German Commanding Generals opposed to them but in no case to retard this advance as provided for in the Armistice Agreement. FOCH.

T. BENTLEY MOTT      1:35 p. m.  
Colonel,  
Chief, American Mission Allied G. H. Q.

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**German Requests for Modifications in Timetable**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 19, 1918.

Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., G. H. Q.

G-3 No. 6. Staff officers from the General commanding the German Fifth Army in our front area are at these headquarters with the following requests: That they may be granted until 24 hours, November 20 to withdraw their forces beyond the line BERG---LINTGEN---LORENTZWEILER---NIEDER-ANVEN---SCHUTTRANGE---REMICH; until 24 hours, November 21 to withdraw their forces beyond the line REISDORF---BEAUFORT---CONSDORF---BECH---GREVENMACHER; until 24 hours, November 23 to withdraw their forces beyond the Luxemburg-German frontier between WALLENDORF and GREVENMACHER. They state that due to a scarcity of roads it is practically impossible to withdraw their forces beyond the Luxemburg-German frontier strictly in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. Instructions are requested. German officers wait reply at these headquarters.

JOSEPH T. DICKMAN,  
Major General,  
Commanding, Third Army.

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193-32.16: Fldr. C: Telegram

**Evacuation of Luxemburg by Germans**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 19, 1918.

C. G. Third Army

Replying to your telegram concerning request of Germans for extension of time for the evacuation of Luxemburg the following reply has been received from Marshal Foch. "It has been decided to refuse all requests for modification of the Armistice and to hold strictly to the execution of the Armistice terms. The German-Luxemburg frontier should be crossed by all German troops by the 20th at 5 o'clock in the morning."

McANDREW---7:40 p. m.

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***Entry into Luxemburg***

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*November 19, 1918--10:45 a. m.*

Telephone message to General Drum, First Army

General Eltinge: This message is for the Third Army, and I want you to get it to them by wire, and at any rate, whether you get it to them by wire or not, I want you to put an officer in a special auto and tell him to hike it out there, and then try and get it out to them by wire also. Here it is, are you ready?

Under the terms of the message from Marshal Foch's headquarters transmitted to you last night, which authorizes your army to follow the enemy within 10 kilometers, the Commander-in-Chief directs that no American troops enter Luxemburg until further orders. You should communicate with the German army commander and make preliminary arrangements for keeping informed of the distance to which the German troops have withdrawn, but under no circumstances will American troops enter the territory of Luxemburg until the Commander-in-Chief has completed arrangements now in progress, and until you are notified how and when to proceed.

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Note

***Administration of Luxemburg***

[Contemporary Translation]

684/CR

*November 20, 1918.*

The occupation by the German troops, in 1914, of the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, took place in violation of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, which guaranteed the neutrality of that country.

Account should be kept of the treaty of November 11, 1902, which affirmed the control of Prussia over this territory:

(A) By placing the railroads of Luxemburg under the exclusive authority of the Imperial Government, under reserve (Article 2), that they would never be used for the transportation of troops or war material, which article Germany violated deliberately in August 1914.

(B) By incorporating Luxemburg in the German Zollverein, with this guarantee, that the minister of Prussia has the right of presentation to certain posts of service and that certain public posts will be reserved to Prussian subjects.

While giving proof of the greatest spirit of conciliation and avoiding all measures of vexatious character, the Allied troops should remember these considerations in their occupation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. In particular they will exercise the control of the administration and the right of requisition and will assure the general policing of the Grand Duchy.

The requisitions will be exercised in the same conditions as in France, by means of orders and receipts for requisition given to the Burgomaster of each Commune.

FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Telegram

***Foch's Headquarters***

*November 20, 1918.*

Commanding General, American Third Army

No. 2055 G-3. At the request of Marshal Foch the town of Luxemburg will be reserved for his headquarters.

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff.

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193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

***Safeguarding Enemy Material***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*November 20, 1918.*

Commanding General, IV Corps

No. 33 G-1

Important dumps enemy material at ATHUS, AUBANGE, and MONT-St-MARTIN. All in zone of your advance. All these points now understood to be occupied by small German detachments who under terms of Armistice will not be treated as prisoners of war but after they have transferred this property will be convoyed back through our advance lines. Place guard as soon as possible at all these three points to prevent looting and take all necessary measures to protect any German detachments left at these points. Understood German P. C. these detachments now at 34 Ohrstrasse, Athus. G-4 will send out representative to take over property and receipt to Germans for it. Will arrange to send troops out to relieve your guards as soon as possible but your guards must be maintained until relieved. If any other enemy depots are found within the limits of the line of your advance, automatically follow foregoing procedure and see that none of this material is taken out of these dumps or depots without competent written authority left in hands commander guard detachment.

CRAIG.

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**Looting of German Equipment**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 20, 1918.

1. A thorough inspection of all units of this command will be made at once with a view of finding panoramic sights, electrical equipment and any other German military equipment left to be turned over to the Government of the United States or the Allies which may be in the possession of any men or officers of this command.
2. Inspections already made here developed the fact that American personnel are interfering with the materiel left by the Germans, originally complete and in good order. Drastic action will be taken to discipline anyone found guilty of such practice.
3. All soldiers, armed with the rifle, will habitually wear their belts and carry their rifles except when on duty, the performance of which would be interfered with or handicapped by such equipment. When arms are not carried they will be properly stacked and kept under guard.

By command of Major General Dickman:

W. A. HAVERFIELD,  
Adjutant General.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telephone Message

**Surrender of Artillery**

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 20, 1918.

Following is telephone message from Colonel Mott

Allied General Headquarters, 2:10 p. m. today

The Germans are not giving up their artillery. This morning at five o'clock they were to have surrendered 2,500 guns. Apparently, from all the reports we get here, they are not doing it. Of course the count has not been made but everything goes to show that they have not done it. The guns they have surrendered are, in a great majority, old guns captured by the Germans and not modern guns belonging to the Germans. It is a question as to whether or not the surrender of the guns which the Germans have captured from the French and Russians would constitute the fulfilling of the Armistice. We could claim that that was simply returning guns they took from us and that we require 5,000 German guns.

Another thing which I wish to speak to you about is that they are not retiring behind the line which it was prescribed they should retire behind today. That is especially true in the front of the Army of General Maistre (G. A. C.); it is also apparently true in other parts of the front. I have no instructions on this but think it is important that you should know what instructions have been sent to General Maistre. These are to the effect that if

the Germans have not retired behind the line where they were to be that he is to move forward and take prisoner anything that is found there in that territory. These instructions were given to General Maistre; they have not been given to General Pershing (?). It is simply a question of the Army commander carrying out his instructions in his own way. As you probably know, the French took prisoner yesterday a whole battalion. They did not evacuate and were simply taken in.

Colonel Birnie: "Instructions have been sent to our Third Army to cover the case of the Germans not coming up to the terms of the Armistice."

Colonel Mott: "I thought I would let you know the attitude here and let you know what has been done in the case of General Maistre's Army."

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

***Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 20, 1918.*

No. 4

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Concerning Russian, Rumanian, and Serbian prisoners of war:

The Russian and Rumanian prisoners cannot be evacuated through the western front. They must therefore have evacuated the left bank of the RHINE upon the same day that the German troops shall have evacuated that territory. Only the 12,000 Italians and 7,000 Serbian prisoners may remain in this territory. The German High Command requests that there shall be collecting places in the zone of the Armies for the prisoners of war that are on the left bank of the RHINE. Answer: Marshal Foch sees no objection to this at the present time and communication has been received concerning Article 15 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This communication does not contain any special request.

This question is further settled by the article of the Armistice which states that the treaty is abrogated. Consequently the stipulations of the agreement do not hold.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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**Movement of French Units Through American Zone**

November 20, 1918.

FROM: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

TO: Chief of French Military Mission

1. In compliance with your request of November 19 to arrange, if possible, staging areas in the vicinity of St-DIZIER, and of REVIGNY, for the passage of French divisions across the line of march of the First Army, I have the honor to inform you that suitable arrangements have been made, as indicated in Paragraph 2 of this letter, and that the necessary orders in conformity with these arrangements have been issued to the American First Army.

2. The REVIGNY region will be free for use by French units at the following times:

- (a) From 12 hours, November 22, to 8 hours, Nov. 23.
- (b) From 12 hours, November 23, to 8 hours, Nov. 26.
- (c) From 12 hours, November 27, to 8 hours, Nov. 28; then at all times after 12 hours, November 29.

The REVIGNY area is bounded as follows: BETTANCOURT, inclusive---VROIL, inclusive---REVIGNY, inclusive---NEUVILLE-sur-ORNE, inclusive---VARNEY, inclusive---COMBLES, inclusive---BEUREY, inclusive---SERMAIZE-les-BAINS, inclusive---to this area may be added, in case of need, the following area east of it: NAIVES, inclusive---RESSON, inclusive---SILMONT, inclusive---LONGEVILLE, inclusive---COMBLES, exclusive---FAINS, exclusive---VARNEY, exclusive---CHARDOGNE, inclusive.

The ST-DIZIER area will be free for the use of French units at the following times:

- (a) From 12 hours, November 23, to 8 hours, Nov. 25.
- (b) From 12 hours, November 26, to 8 hours, Nov. 29.
- (c) At all times after 12 hours, December 1.

The boundaries of the St-DIZIER area are as follows: St-EULIEN, inclusive---BAUDONVILLERS, inclusive---SOMMELONNE, inclusive---La HOUPETTE, inclusive---COUSANCES-aux-FORGES, inclusive---BIENVILLE, exclusive---HUMBECOURT, exclusive---St-LIVIERE, inclusive---AMBRIERES, inclusive. To this area may be added, in case of need, the following area, which lies to the east: RUPT-aux-NONAINS, inclusive---BAZINCOURT, inclusive---MONTPLONNE, inclusive---MAULAN, inclusive---Le BOUCHON, inclusive---JUVIGNY, inclusive---NARCY, inclusive.

3. French units are free to pass through the GONDRE COURT area, the COLOMBEY-les-BELLES area, and the VAUCOULEURS area, until the completion of the movements at present planned for the French units mentioned in your letter of November 19.

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff.

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***Distribution and Boundaries***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 20, 1918.

Commanding General, III Corps

G-3 No. 10

Following from Commanding General, First Army repeated for guidance:

"G-3 805. Following message from French Mission CHAUMONT repeated for your information: The General Commanding-in-Chief wires that his Note Number 2208 of November 15 is amended so as to include the town of OBERFEULEN, ETTELBRUCK and ERPELDANGE and the road joining GROSBOS to DICEKIRCH in Zone of C. A. E. P. O. the Chief of the 2d Section MERLEX. Liggett."

CRAIG.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

***The German Retirement***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, Belgium, November 20, 1918.

No. 5

FROM: Chief

TO: Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. \*\*\* advantage is taken of the departure of an automobile for the American lines to briefly report upon general conditions to date.
2. The impression prevails in the Armistice Commission that the German are thoroughly defeated, quite as much by internal conditions at home, social, industrial and economic, as from military considerations. The impression prevails among the French that the interjection into our proceedings of many extraneous questions by the Boche, \*\*\* is for the purpose of gaining time to transport his armies safely across the RHINE. These questions in some cases pertain to the functions of military administration as for example, the "manner of occupation" of the bridgeheads; and in other cases pertain entirely to the functions of a peace commission.

It is my belief that the Germans will really have great difficulty in withdrawing their Armies within the time allotted by the Armistice, more particularly through Luxembourg; especially if snow, rain and cold weather supervene. It is believed this opinion is shared by the British Commission.

3. It is beyond question that the retiring German Armies are violating Article 6 of the Armistice forbidding the requisitioning of food supplies in the territory evacuated, especially in driving off cattle. The Commission brought this to the attention of the German High Command, which has vigorously stated that stringent orders have been given to the contrary but admit that in the precipitancy of withdrawal some German troops may have committed excesses by getting out of hand.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Memorandum

### ***Placing of Reserves***

G-3

*November 20, 1918.*

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

1. I handed General Weygand the letters from the Commander-in-Chief dated November 18. General Weygand, after some discussion, appeared to admit that from a military point of view the placing of ten divisions in advance of the line of the MEUSE was unnecessary. He, however, insisted that it was essential to have troops in Luxemburg and north of the WOEVRE. I then told him that if that was the decision the number of troops should be held at the lowest limit consistent with actual military necessities.

The telegram \* \* \* from Colonel Mott dated 9:30 p. m., November 19, appears to be Marshal Foch's final conclusion, i. e., five divisions to go forward.

I recommend that this decision be accepted but that we do not be in too great a hurry to send these divisions forward.

The divisions to go can be taken from the Second Army and it will be possible to avoid moving more than two or three for a considerable time.

2. After discussing the matter of the 10 reserve divisions General Weygand expressed a desire to talk, informally, on the general subject of our troops.

The idea that appeared uppermost in his mind concerned the length of time our troops would remain in France and the amount of labor which our troops would furnish in rebuilding France. I told him very frankly that my personal opinion was that our people would soon become insistent on our soldiers going home and that our task in the war as a nation was finished. I also told General Weygand that, in my opinion, America would continue to do whatever she thought was necessary in a military way but that a seemingly purposeless dragging of peace negotiations would not be likely to hold our troops in Europe. I gave him my opinion that within two months American troops would go home as fast as transportation could be provided.

3. General Weygand spoke of the necessity of receiving locomotives and cars from America and asked if the Commander-in-Chief would press this matter. I replied that I did not know the Commander-in-Chief's present views on this.

4. In all of the above I made it clear to General Weygand that, except for the location of our divisions, I expressed only my personal opinion.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Telegram

***City of Luxemburg Reserved***

*November 20, 1918.*

Commanding General, American Third Army

No. 2064 G-3. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies has directed that a regiment of French troops from G. A. C., be sent to the city of LUXEMBURG to arrive there at the same time the first American troops arrive. You are directed to make all necessary arrangements with the French G. A. C. to insure this order being carried out. You will notify G-3, G. H. Q. of the route this regiment will follow and the date it will arrive at LUXEMBURG. Acknowledge.

By order:

CONNER.

-----

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Order

***Occupation of Telegraph and Telephone Lines***

[Contemporary Translation]

OFFICE OF THE C-in-C OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 20, 1918.*

SERVICE NOTE

I. The personnel of the telegraph service of each of the Allied Armies is authorized to go into the territory which the enemy is to evacuate, in execution of the Armistice, wherever the necessities of service require, without waiting for the enemy to evacuate all of the territory.

II. However, in all those parts of the territory still occupied, this personnel cannot circulate unless accompanied by an officer or official belonging to the corresponding German service.

III. Moreover, in order to assure the taking over of the telegraph and telephone lines, and in conformity with the stipulations of Article I of Annex I of the Armistice Convention (new text communicated under No. 109/2 of November 16), the detachments of technical troops should take possession of the telegraph and telephone lines by following from 10 kilometers the retreat of the German troops.

Please give instructions in this regard immediately, to the Generals commanding armies under your orders.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Service Note

***Military Occupation of Luxemburg Railroads***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 686/OR

*November 20, 1918.*

1. According to the terms of the Instruction Generale No. 525/CR of November 14, the Direction des CHEMINS-de-FER de LUXEMBOURG not being a part of the RESEAU d'ALSACE-LORRAINE et des PAYS RHENANS, it is exercised by the Interallied Commission for Railways in the Field.

Each one of the representatives of the Allied Armies to this Commission, will ask the C-in-C of the Army which he represents for the personnel necessary to assure the military occupation of the railroads in the zone assigned to the Army.

2. According to the terms of the Armistice Convention, the German personnel of the railway service is to remain in place on the occupied territory, to assure the operation of the lines.

These agents, wearing their uniforms or insignia, are considered as requisitioned and subject to the military regulations of the Allied Army in whose zone they are serving. They should be treated with kindness.

3. The German personnel maintained in place can be authorized to receive rations, subject to reimbursement, from the Allied Armies, if they can procure none elsewhere.

Each one of the representatives of the Allied Armies on the Inter-Allied Commission for Railways in the Field, will send the necessary requests to the C-in-C of his army.

The President of the Inter-Allied Commission for Railways in the Field will report on the 1st and 15th of each month to the C-in-C of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.), the authorizations so given.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telegram

***German Communications Personnel Retreating; Must Remain at Posts***

*November 20, 1918.*

Commanding General, American Third Army

2067 G-3. The Allied Commander-in-Chief reports that the mission now at German General Headquarters for carrying out the terms of the Armistice report that certain

German personnel of Communications, who under article seven of the Armistice Convention were to be left in place, are following the retreating German Army fearing the hostility of Allied troops. Take every possible measure to secure the remaining in place of all German personnel connected with the operation of means of communication.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General,  
Asst. Chief of Staff G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207

### **Allied High Command Decisions**

*Spa, November 20, 1918.*

Substance of replies given by the Allied High Command to the German High Command, through the Permanent International Armistice Commission.

1. Will not materiel remaining on left bank of the RHINE (exclusive of that handed over under terms of Armistice) be considered German property?

Answer. No, it will be spoils of war for the Allies.

2. Will the Allies give information as to whether or not black troops will occupy bridgeheads?

Answer. The Allies will not answer as to the composition of its forces.

3. As to the police of the Neutral Zone?

Answer. German police will remain in the neutral zone but the Allied Armies will control its numbers and duties.

4. As to responsibility for the security of private property in Germany?

Answer. No nation will guarantee this; the civil administration will be responsible.

5. Will not the Allied Armies bring the Armistice dates relative to the withdrawal of General Mackensen's Armies from Hungary into line with those applicable on the western front?

Answer. No.

6. Will not the Allies occupy the Baltic ports - REVAL, RIGA, and LIBAU?

Answer. Deferred until later.

7. Will not the Allies send advance parties to prepare for occupation of the bridgeheads?

Answer. Such parties are now being made ready.

8. In addition: Demobilized German personnel in ALSACE-LORRAINE may remain, but German military administration will at once disappear, while the civil administration will continue. In the Rhineland demobilized German personnel may remain, if domiciled there before the war. German military administration, medical, recruiting, fortifications, continue under Allied supervision but an Allied military administration is prepared to be superimposed on the German civil administration.

9. Relative to interpretation of that article of the Armistice which requires the German railroad personnel to remain in the evacuated territory?

Old rates of pay, food, and good treatment will be accorded such personnel, as a consideration to remain at their posts.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Note

***Date of Occupation of Rhine Provinces***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff  
3d Bureau  
No. 6636

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 21, 1918.*

The note appended to my Letter No. 6231 of November 16, 1918, relative to the occupation of the Rhine Provinces during the Armistice will take effect December 1, date on which the frontier will be crossed which separates Germany from Belgium, Luxemburg, and ALSACE-LORRAINE.

Note No. 6230 of November 16, concerning the employment of the Allied Forces outside of the Rhine Provinces during the Armistice, will likewise become effective on and after December 1, with the addition for the American forces of the modification indicated in Telegram No. 6458 of November 19.

F. FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Telegram

***French Regiment to be Stationed in Luxemburg***

G-3

*November 21, 1918.*

Commanding General, American Third Army

Number 2104 G-3. In accordance with instructions from the Allied Commander-in-Chief no troops other than the French 109th Regiment of Infantry will be stationed in the city of Luxemburg.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff G-3.

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**Protection of Railway Personnel**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 21, 1918.

C. G., III Corps

C. G., IV Corps

No. 45 G-1. The following extract from letter of General Weygand to C-in-C furnished for your information and necessary action. "Railway personnel fearing hostility of civilian population and Allied soldiers continues to follow retreating movement of German troops."

Two Annex No. 2 Armistice provides in part that "All material and all civil and military personnel now employed for the maintenance and exploitation of means of communication will be maintained as they stand on said means in all the territory evacuated by the German troops." The commanding general desires that you warn our troops that the railway and other personnel covered by above quoted paragraph, whether they be civil or military, must not be intimidated but given every protection. Acknowledge.

CRAIG.

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G-3: GHQ. AEF: Fldr. 1207: Report

**German Retirement**

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, November 21, 1918.*

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

NOVEMBER 21, 1918

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

8. Captain Geyer, as spokesman for the German Commission, then took the floor and explained that the German troops have evacuated Allied territory in perfect order with only occasional disturbances--first, by the hostile attitude of the local population, and, second, by the difficulties attending the withdrawal of German technical troops. Captain Geyer stated that these latter troops are troops of the rear, which, as attention has already been directed, are those which have given the German High Command the most trouble. Captain Geyer stated that, whereas, the infantry and artillery have withdrawn in the greatest possible order, the signal troops, the automobile park troops and aviation troops have not been held so well in hand. He claims, moreover, that the difficulties would increase as the retreat is prolonged and that beginning with November 20 or 21 greater

difficulties in the evacuation of German troops would be encountered. These difficulties will consist, first, in the matter of provisioning, and, second, on account of the fact of lack of maps. A retreat through the occupied portions of Belgium, France, and Luxemburg had been ready for months; whereas, in the Rhineland and in ALSACE-LORRAINE no such preparations had been made. The German staff, he claims, has only one map for five divisions.

Furthermore, Captain Geyer stated that up to the present time the country over which the German Army has retreated has been very wide, but in future the front available for withdrawal will become much narrower. For example, in the narrow space between SPA and MASTRARLICH [not identified] the German High Command must squeeze sixty division, while in the next district to the south sixty-six divisions must be squeezed through a still smaller space. For the districts that lie below, the matter is not so serious, but it is well known that the available roads in this district are few and poor. The problem of rationing 3,800,000 is very serious, and by far the greater part of this number are found in the district north of Luxemburg and their withdrawal is limited to the few roads that lead to the RHINE. If these troops should now be strongly pressed by the Allied troops the entire building may fall to pieces, and as we have before pointed out there is grave danger of straining too much at the arch of the bridge.

To this the Allied Commission replied that it fully understands the difficulties which the German Commission has presented and that some hundred divisions must be pressed through the very narrow space. The difficulties are just as Captain Geyer explained, and they may become more serious if the terms of the Armistice are not carried out. The situation is explained by Marshal Foch's note of two days ago and the Allied High Command will not further reply to such inquires. The conditions of the Armistice are to be taken as they have been agreed to by both contracting parties.

\* \* \* \* \*

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Third Army: 193-22.2: Fldr. 49: Memorandum

### ***Withdrawal of German Troops Along the Moselle***

2d Section, G. S.

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*November 22, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM TO: G-3

At 12 o'clock today there were no German troops on this side of the MOSELLE between REMICH and GREVENMACHER. The last German troops, a sanitary unit, passed through REMICH last night. These were in good order and carried German flags. The last German troops left GREVENMACHER this morning. The troops are rapidly pulling out from the towns opposite GREVENMACHER. At present the aviation depot of the Fifth Army is at NITTEL. In REHLINGEN, parts of a supply column are visible from this side of the river. The towns opposite REMICH have been completely cleared of troops with the exception of a few Landsturm, probably left behind to maintain order. From this region the bulk of the troops had already left two days ago.

R. H. WILLIAMS,  
Colonel, U. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-2,

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**Troop Movements**

[Contemporary Translation]

*November 22, 1918.*

Amerian Third Army

No. 2673. Progress continues normal. We have reached BASTOGNE---NOBRISART---NIEDRE---KOLPAS---GROS Bois---an occurence at GROS Bois where a German regiment is \* \* \* surrounded and disarmed. Our troops have everywhere found the same enthusiastic reception as on preceding days. Prisoners have been returned to our lines: 105 French, 25 Russians, 25 Italians, 7 English, 8 Americans, 25 French civilians.

Staff Charleville.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telegram

**Hospital Facilities**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*November 22, 1918--1:11 p. m.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL

GHQ ATTENTION G-1

12SGS. Request authority for Third Army to establish hospital facilities in TREVES. Seven military hospitals well equipped and suitable are located there which will accommodate 5,000. 2,000 Allied and German patients of which several hundred are reported to be American must be cared for upon withdrawal of German troops so immediate action is imperative. If this request is approved send two evacuation hospitals completely equipped except tentage to TREVES at once. Will call for other later if needed. TREVES also excellent place for medical supply depot which should be sent to that point as soon as authority is secured. TREVES has about 60,000 inhabitants and there is ample room for Advance Headquarters G. H. Q. and hospitals. One will not interfere with the other. Request immediate reply.

DICKMAN. 1:11 p. m.

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**Foch Requests Pershing's Plans for Use of American Installations**

[Contemporary Translation]

Received by telephone November 22

American Mission, Lt. Alexander, Senlis

No. 6707

FROM: Marshal Foch

TO: General Pershing

American installation already completed or in course of construction or projected in the interior zone (as it at present exists or is to be) corresponds to a situation which has just been modified by the signing of the Armistice and alterations, and probably a curtailment in the program for these installations is accordingly to be anticipated so as to correspond with the reduction, or move, or new requirements of all American services: training and rest areas, camps, barracks, warehouses, supply depots, hospitals, etc. In addition, the needs of the French Army for barracks will now greatly increase due to the repatriation of prisoners of war, reopening of depots, etc.

The Minister of War should accordingly be advised as soon as possible as to what the plans of the American C-in-C in this connection are. This is essential in order either to put into operation the program just outlined or to avoid unnecessary requisition and transportation having to do with American construction under way or planned which the American Army may now decide to abandon.

I accordingly ask you to be good enough to let me know without delay what your intentions are.

FOCH.

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193-32.2: Fldr. P: Telegram

**Crossing German Frontier**

*November 22, 1918.*

Commanding General, Third Army

No. 2115 G-3. Allied Commander-in-Chief has fixed December 1 as date on which Allied troops will cross German frontier. Instructions will be sent you November 23.

American zone includes bridgehead at COLOGNE [corrected to COBLENZ] and with axial line approximately marked by TREVES and COBLENZ is approximately 70 kilometers in width.

By order:

CONNER.

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**Boundary Between French and American Zones**

1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
November 22, 1918.

No. 6714

[Extract]

As a modification to Note No. 6231 of November 16, and in order to make the boundary between the French and American zones in the RHINE territory coincide with administrative limits, the line between these zones is established as follows:

Southern limit of the Circle of SARREBOURG,  
Northern and eastern limits of the Circle of MERZIG,  
Northwestern limit of the Principality of BIRKENFELD,  
Northwestern limit of the Circle of KREUZNACH.

\* \* \* \* \*

In order that this boundary modification may not in any way hinder circulation, the General Headquarters of Armies concerned will come to the necessary understandings.

By order:

WEYGAND.

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Third Army, Gen. File 384.2: Fldr. Occupancy: Letter

**German Railways and Railway Personnel**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 22, 1918.

FROM: C-in-C

TO: C. G., Third Army

1. By the terms of the Armistice, the personnel in the service of the German railways ways must remain on duty in occupied territory to carry on the handling of traffic, under the orders of the Interallied Railway Commission.

2. These German employees, wearing their uniforms and the insignia of their organisation, are considered as requisitioned for the needs of the Allied Armies. They must not be molested or should they be subjected to any hostile demonstration by the Allied troops. You will issue the necessary orders to this effect.

3. Further, as the Third Army advances, you will assure the policing of all stations in the zones occupied. Local commanders will be furnished with the necessary troops and explicit instructions to insure this policing. Transportation officers, under the directions of our representative on the Interallied Railway Commission, will make a constant

inspection of the operation of these roads by the German personnel and your commanders will be instructed to coordinate with them to meet such situations as may arise from time to time.

By direction:

J. W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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HS Confidential File H-1: Memorandum

***Use of American Troops for Rebuilding France***

G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 22, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR The Chief of Staff

Certain statements made by, and action taken on the part of, French officials, as well as what appears to be a concerted attitude of French Staff officers, indicate an expectation of utilizing these forces in the rebuilding of the devastated regions of France.

If such an expectation exists and is allowed to grow, it is manifest that the withdrawal of our troops will be delayed and attended by complications and great possibility of friction. Although the evidences of this assumed French expectation are not conclusive, it is believed that the following incidents are sufficient to make it advisable seriously to consider whether or not the American Government should not now announce its policy with reference to the withdrawal of our troops, and communicate this announcement to the governments with whom we are associated in this war:

On November 9, Mr. Tardieu, French High Commissioner to the United States, made statements, widely quoted in the press, which virtually assumed that the restoration of France, both by our money and the labor of our troops, was incumbent upon the United States. References to Mr. Tardieu's speech still appear in the French press and it is now announced that he is on his way to France.

These headquarters arranged, prior to November 20, for the rail transportation of the 27th, 30th, and 77th Divisions from the devastated regions to proper training areas. Rail transportation was also arranged for 6 artillery brigades, which are immobile through lack of horses, from the devastated region to training areas. On November 18, the immediate headquarters of Marshal Foch interested itself in the destination of these troops. During the last few days Marshal Foch's staff and other French officers have displayed so much interest in what we propose to do in the matter of bringing engines, cars and railroad troops to France that it is permissible to suspect that they know S. O. S. Cable 456 of November 16, reducing the number of cars requisitioned by the A. E. F.

In any event, the French have cancelled arrangements for all the troop movements, above noted, except that of the 30th Division, which was under way, and have served notice on us that they will move no more large troop units by rail until further notice. The French have also reduced the number of trains available for bringing horses and replacements from our bases to the front. The reason given for this suspension is the demands upon transportation for sending food into the countries evacuated by the enemy and for moving coal required by various industries. On its face, this reason is plausible, but even a summary consideration of the let-up in the shipment of war materiel is sufficient to cause doubt as

to whether the reason stated is the sole motive. This doubt is accentuated by the frequent reference by French staff officers to the necessity for our continuing to send R. R. operating personnel and materiel to France.

French staff officers have frequently referred, during the last two weeks, to the idea of the assistance of the labor of our troops in the rebuilding of France. Knowing the methods of the French we can have little doubt but that these references form a part of a concerted effort.

Several efforts have been made to obligate G-4 to the maintenance and restoration of certain roads. The last of these efforts was subsequent to the signing of the Armistice.

On November 20, General Weygand displayed a very keen interest in our probable attitude toward furnishing labor for rebuilding France and toward accelerating our shipments of rolling stock.

In the various remarks and statements which have come to my attention I have been struck by the fact that the French appear to be acquiring the conviction that, in expecting American labor and money to be a large part of the burden of restoring France, they are but demanding their just dues.

2. After carefully noting the trend of the French attitude during the past month I am convinced that there is great danger in this attitude and that unless steps are taken to counteract the possibility of misunderstanding we may find ourselves seriously embarrassed. By passive measures it is perfectly possible at present for the French to prevent any rational execution of the withdrawal of our forces. In my opinion only the announcement of the American Government of its policy is a sufficient guarantee against these passive measures being put into effect and to guard against the spread of what appears to me to be an active propaganda for the restoration of France by the labor of American soldiers.

I am firmly of the belief that if such a policy is not announced, any possible miscarriage in our plans for withdrawal will be accompanied by an attempt both here and at home to fasten criticism on the Commander-in-Chief.

\* \* \* \* \*

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S. G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Memorandum

***Interallied Conference on Administration of Occupied Territory***

[Contemporary Translation]

INTERALLIED CONFERENCE

of November 22, 1918

relative to the administration of the occupied territory

Comments on and adjustment of the general instructions

I. PRINCIPLES: It is recognized, on the proposal of the representative of the British Armies, that the command of the occupying armies should intervene as little as possible in the civil life of the occupied countries, especially because of the difficulty of assuring its effective control.

It is, however, understood that control over the administration must be exercised even in localities not occupied by garrisons.

The Burgermeisters will be made responsible for the execution of regulating measures. On their side, the Allies will cause the execution of measures which have been determined upon to be controlled by quick-moving patrols or detachments (*equipés volantes*).

II. JUDICIAL PENALITIES: The following principles are adopted:

No penalty may be inflicted without the intervention of a court.

To facilitate the execution of this decision, the following is adopted:

Simple police tribunals may be constituted and will operate in accordance with the customs of each Allied Nation.

They will be competent to pronounce sentences of six month imprisonment and 5,000 francs fine.

The conditions for the operation of the simple police tribunals will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

They will have jurisdiction over offenses of which they are normally cognizant and the police decrees made by the military commanders.

Infractions of these decrees may also be brought before courts martial upon the demand of the Public Ministry.

No infraction is made on the usual functions relating to the jurisdiction of Army provost marshals.

DEATH PENALTIES: It is decided that the execution of death sentences will be submitted beforehand to each Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army concerned.

(It will be advisable to suppress at the top of Page 4, of Annex I, the paragraph beginning "infractions" and closing "1,000 francs fine.")

III. REQUISITIONS: Until further orders the payment of requisitions in occupied territory will be assured by the delivery of requisition orders. It is to be noted that requisition orders should not show the value in marks, but only a description of the object requisitioned.

The final payment must indeed take the rate of exchange of the mark into consideration. The German Government besides will have to supply marks to the Allied Armies.

Requisitions will be made in accordance with the laws of each Allied Army.

IV. ANNEXES RELATING TO POLICE MEASURES:

1. Declaration and registration of population.

It is decided that the Burgermeister will have to execute this measure; police lists are in existence besides in the large cities. The Germans adopted this measure in Belgium.

Representatives of the British Armies accept the measures proposed under this form. They have further planned that a list of inhabitants should be fastened to the door of each house.

Identity cards delivered by the Germans.

These cards must be made and countersigned by the Burgermeisters, and should not go back more than three months, beginning September 1.

They must be presented whenever requested by the military authorities and verified by them at that time.

2. In articles 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8 replace the expression "zones" by "territory occupied by the Allied Armies."

3. Circulation:

It will be forbidden to leave the territory of the Commune or to enter thereon without authorization from the commander of the Army concerned, or his delegates, and without bearing the identity card which will be countersigned by the military authorities.

The 8th Article is maintained. No one can penetrate into the occupied territory without authorization from the commander of the Army concerned.

4. Telephone:

Telephoning is forbidden without special authorization given by the Army commander.

5. It will be advisable to suppress the words "or the Directors of Etapes" in

the various articles in which they figure and to substitute, "the Army commander or his delegates."

V. POSTAL CONTROL: Should be organized as soon as possible.

1. Frontier control to which all correspondence going in or coming out of Allied territory should be submitted.

This control will comprise representatives of the different Armies (economic control and safety control).

Interior control: Quick moving detachments (*Equipes volantes*).

VI. LUXEMBURG: To a continuation of the communication made to the Allied Armies in the note from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, the representative of the American Armies suggests that it would be desirable that political instructions be given to the American command concerning the general attitude to be observed and the relations to be maintained with the Government of Luxemburg, this question not interesting the United States directly but being capable of presenting a special interest for other Allied nations.

Colonel Payot answers that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is busy with the question.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Report

### ***Prisoners of War***

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa November 22, 1918.*

#### REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

#### PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

[Extract]

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5. General Haking, British representative on the Armistice Commission, read a note from the British Government in which protest was made in regard to the manner in which British prisoners of war, in Germany, have been turned loose, without proper food or clothing, resulting in great suffering and some deaths; and that unless such conditions were relieved the British Government would be forced to modify its intentions to take part in the feeding and care of the civilian population of Germany.

To which the German Commission replied that it had done all in its power to turn over prisoners of war in good condition, but that on account of the rapid withdrawal imposed upon the German Army, such procedure had been most difficult. The German Commission alleged that a large number of prisoners had run away during the first few days of the evacuation and had made their way towards the Allied lines, without food or protection. Therefore, the German Government cannot assume responsibility for their condition or protection. The attention of the Allied Commission was also invited to the fact that the condition of these prisoners, so far as nourishment and clothing is concerned, was no worse than that of German women and children, a condition which has been brought about by the four years' blockade by the English fleet.

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7. The German High Command made known to the Allied High Command that it was absolutely impossible to leave the personnel of the railways as required by the terms of the Armistice.

stice, for the reason that much of the personnel has abandoned its posts. It is requested by the German High Command that a sufficiently large Belgian personnel be sent within the German lines to take charge of the traffic. The German High Command also states that the regular delivery of material imposed by the Armistice is likewise impossible. A large part of it has already been abandoned where it stood and it is proposed to have this counted and turned over to the Allies. The delivery of five thousand locomotives of the capacity required is also impossible, as the entire number in Germany is considerably under this amount, and there are only three thousand locomotives in the occupied territory that are in a condition to be used. The bringing of additional locomotives from Germany would cause a collapse of the German economic life and would make impossible transportation of German troops to the rear. The same thing is true in regard to railroad cars.

The German High Command, therefore, proposes that German material be brought from Turkey, Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, and Austro-Hungary, and from the states in the [adjacent to] Russian frontier to be utilized for the maintenance of German economic life, and also in the interest of the Allies, to be counted in the total of the transportation material required to be turned over. This material includes 3,000 locomotives, of which, perhaps, 2,000 are in condition to be used, and 30,000 railroad cars.

To this request of the German High Command, the Allied Commission replied, as follows:

If the locomotives and other railroad material are not turned over, the Belgians and the French in the evacuated territories will be left in as bad condition as will the Germans if these locomotives and railway material are taken away from them. The terms of the Armistice relating to material and personnel will strictly apply.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Order

### ***American Control in Luxemburg***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 23, 1918.

FROM: Adjutant General

TO: Commanding Generals

1. Although by international law we are entitled to regard Luxemburg as hostile territory, yet, as the inhabitants are generally friendly, they will not be considered enemies. So far as possible Luxemburg will be treated as a friendly state. Our presence in Luxemburg is not for the purpose of hostile occupation but merely for the passage and maintenance of communications which its geographical situation makes necessary.

2. No military government will be set up in Luxemburg. The general and local administration of the country will not be interfered with. The persons and property of the inhabitants will be absolutely respected. The effort will be made to avoid, wherever possible, all friction with the people, all causes of irritation and all appearance of military control over the government.

3. Public and unoccupied buildings will be utilized for barracks, offices and other necessary military purposes. Additional accommodations needed may be provided by billeting or requisition in accordance with the principles of G. O., 18, G. H. Q., January 31, 1918. In all cases the use of public or private buildings will be obtained by arrangement with

the local authorities. Where the local authorities refuse to comply, the necessary buildings will be taken, upon authority of a regimental or high commander. For buildings used certificates identifying the building and owner and showing the nature and duration of the use, will be given to the municipal authorities. Copies of such certificates will be forwarded to and preserved by the Finance Officer, American E. F., Headquarters S. O. S.

4. Necessary supplies which have to be procured locally will be paid for in cash at a fixed and fair valuation. If the required supplies are withheld by the inhabitants, application will be made to the Luxemburg authorities to requisition them, failing which they will be taken, payment being made as in other cases. Care will be taken always to leave to the inhabitants sufficient supplies for their own needs.

5. The telegraph and telephone systems of Luxemburg are government owned utilities. The railroads are privately owned under government control. For all use of these utilities, certificates showing the nature of the service, the object thereof and when and to whom rendered, will be prepared in duplicate---one copy to be delivered to the proper Luxemburg authority, the other to be forwarded for preservation to the Finance Officer, American E. F., Headquarters S. O. S.

6. No Luxemburg official will be allowed to exercise any authority over any member of the American Army under any circumstances whatsoever. On the other hand, to avoid just grounds of complaint by the Luxemburgers, the strictest discipline will be maintained while in this country, with a special view to preventing, as far as possible, all intermingling of the troops and the local population.

7. Notwithstanding anything herein contained, the American troops will at all costs insure their safe and uninterrupted passage and communications in Luxemburg. Offenses against the Army will be dealt with by the military authorities regardless of the nationality of the offenders. All communication with the enemy will be prohibited to the inhabitants. Suspected persons will be arrested and dealt with as the circumstances warrant. In case violence or resistance is offered the offender may be shot on the spot. In general, so far as the security of the Army is concerned, all persons may be treated in accordance with the principles of the Laws of War.

8. The treatment of Luxemburg as a friendly state is primarily for our own advantage. It is the duty of all commanders to endeavor to maintain these friendly relations in order to avoid the necessity of establishing a military government in Luxemburg.

By command of General PERSHING:

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III Corps Gen. File: Fldr. 27: Telegram

***Enemy Turning Over Allied Materiel Instead of German***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*Luxemburg, November 23, 1918.*

TO: C. G., III Corps

Number seventy-one G one. Following telegram just sent commander of communications Third Army and quoted for your information. Begin quote. Number seventy-one. Reference administrative bulletin number one these headquarters part four French mission advise that enemy have been turning over Russian and Italian heavy guns under Armistice Agreement instead of their own modern type. Instructions should be issued to all concerned that when giving receipts to enemy representatives for any Armistice materiel, receipts show definitely not only caliber of gun but all details as to dates of types and models. Also

statement as to serviceability of material and whether or not complete equipment sights, etc. with guns when transferred. Importance this is obvious. Issue necessary instructions to your Armistice Commission. Craig. Unquote take steps to see that any part ordered out from your corps under provisions Paragraph 18 Administrative Bulletin Number 1 be particularly instructed accordingly.

CRAIG. 3 a. m.

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III Corps: General File: Fldr. 27: Telegram

***German Materiel Turned Over to III Corps***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 23, 1918.

TO: C. G., III Corps, A. E. F.

Number 74 G-1 hereof report by wire quick, material formally turned over by enemy representatives to representatives of your corps upon 5 a. m., November 21 indicate what material is in good conditions and what in bad condition, distinguishing between field guns and heavy guns and giving number of guns of all caliber which are not of German manufacture, namely: Those of French, English and Russian origin. Marshal Foch's Headquarters states that the time within which the Germans should have given over half the material stipulated by the Armistice having expired, it is necessary to ascertain without delay what of this material has actually been surrendered, and for this reason report is required quick. Your report will not include material taken over formally by units of First and Second Army, the guard of which you may subsequently have undertaken, as these latter data must necessarily be submitted in reports to be submitted by First and Second Armies. Report should be submitted before noon November 24.

CRAIG.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Wireless Interception

***Condition of German Army***

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 23, 1918--9:30 p. m.

On November 22, Hindenburg sent the following telegram for Headquarters in the WILHELM-SCHOICHE (sic) Palace to the Imperial Government: "This Armistice Commission reports that the attitude of the enemy members of the Commission, especially the French, is exceedingly unconciliatory, that our enemies continue to demand the impossible and that it is not inconceivable that the French desire a pretext for resuming the fighting. I must expressly emphasize the fact that the German Army, as a result of the severity of the Armistice Conditions and events at home, is not in a position to resume hostilities. It would not even be possible to fight the French Army alone." (Rest of message not received.)

Note: For the last several days the German wireless press has continued numerous long articles protesting against the attitude of the French Armistice Commission and the failure of the French Army to live up to the terms of the Armistice.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Order

**Modification of Armistice Terms**

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff  
2d Bureau  
No. 196/2

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 23, 1918.*

FROM: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

TO: Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France  
General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American E. F.  
General Gillain, Chief of Staff with Belgian Army  
Marshal Petain, Commander-in-Chief French Armies of the North and Northeast  
Commanding General, French Sixth Army

My Letter No. 109/2 November 18, 1918, informed you of the following modification of Paragraph I, Annex I, of the Armistice Agreement which had been reached by agreement with the German command:

The troops of the Allies and of the United States will go into these territories following up the German troops. Their movements will be so regulated as to maintain at all times a safety zone of 10 kilometers between the opposing forces.

Commanding Generals of Armies of the Allies and of the United States should accordingly come to a direct understanding with the German Generals commanding opposite their fronts in order to direct their movements in such a way that these conditions will be fulfilled and all misunderstandings avoided.

It must be understood that this modification concerns only Paragraph 1 of Annex 1 with regard to the enemy's evacuation of Belgium, France, Luxemburg and ALSACE-LORRAINE.

Paragraph 2 of Annex 1, having to do with the evacuation of the RHINE territories, accordingly remains unchanged.

Therefore line No. 3 prolonged by line No. 2, formed by the frontiers of Germany with Belgium, with Luxemburg and with ALSACE-LORRAINE, cannot be crossed before December 1, and the movements to the place on and after that date are only to be regulated, until further notice, solely by Paragraph II of Annex I.

By order:

WEYGAND.

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**The German Retirement**

[Contemporary Translation]

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

November 23, 1918

[Extract]

1. The Allied Commission informed the German Commission that if it was determined that any German detachments which had been captured by Allied troops in the rear of the German Army had been left back for the purpose of liaison or for turning over material, they would be released at once.

The German Commission was also informed that information received indicated that the German Seventeenth Army was two days behind the schedule arranged for the evacuation of Allied territory.

To this the German Commission replied that if certain portions of the German Army were behind schedule it was not the fault of the German High Command nor of the commanders of the various German Armies. The explanation is to be found simply in the fact that in the regions of certain armies the difficulties of withdrawing are greater than in others.

To this the Allied Commission replied that it was believed that if all the German Armies would do as the German Fourth Army is doing, in keeping in constant liaison with the opposing French Army, by radio and otherwise, there would be no friction or collision.

2. The Allied Commission here read a note from Marshal Foch, stating, in substance, that where friction has occurred between French and German troops it had been the result of failure to apply Art. 1, Annex 1, of the Armistice Agreement. The movement of troops should be regulated in such a way that a zone of safety of ten kilometers will be maintained between opposing forces. Therefore, commanders of opposing armies should arrange their movements in such a way as to avoid collision. It is the duty of the German High Command to call the attention of their commanders to this agreement. The movement in the front of the German Fourth Army appears to have been carried out in regular manner, and in most orderly fashion. It is noted that Art. 1, Annex 1, fixes the dates at which the successive lines must be crossed by the German Army groups. Delays in the evacuation of the zones defined must, therefore, result in the imprisonment of German units left behind, except insofar as it pertains to detachments left there for the purpose of turning over material.

"We will take no account of these delays no matter what may be the cause of them. The explanations that the German High Command might feel called upon to give in this respect are not receivable."

To the above the German Commission replied, in substance, that friction between the opposing armies has been due in part to the great difficulties in the way of liaison--- more particularly the German communication systems. Exception is taken to the statement of General Nudant that no reason for the delays of German columns will be received. The German High Command and the commanders of German Armies are very frequently reproached that they do not carry out the stipulations of the Armistice on time; and the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission must be in a position to reply to these reproaches which seem to be based upon "force majeure." If explanations are not receivable, then responsibility, therefore, must rest with the High Command.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The Allied Commission made known contents of a telegram received on November 22, from the French War Office in PARIS which stated that so far as the provisioning of Germans is concerned, it is our intention to provide such provisions as may be believed necessary. The Allied Governments are at the present time studying means with which to carry out this intention. The Allied Committee will make known to the German Government the conditions under which this provisioning may be brought about, as soon as Mr. Hoover, United States representative, shall have arrived in France. The solution of the problem can be hastened if the German Government will make available all data relative to its system of distribution of food. This telegram was signed "Clemenceau."

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

***Meetings of the Permanent International Armistice Commission***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 24, 1918.*

No. 6

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. \* \* \* These meetings take place daily at 10 a. m., the remainder of the day being taken up in subcommittee work, with special reference to (1) repatriation of prisoners; (2) transfer of transport; (3) transfer of war materiel.

In addition, the four Generals of the Allied Commission, with their Chiefs of Staff, meet daily at 9:30 a. m., and 6 p. m., to consider important communications to and from the Allied and the German High Commands.

2. It should be remarked that in the earlier meetings of the Interallied Commission, there was strong disposition on the part of the French to monopolize control of the situation, more especially in communicating direct with Marshal Foch on important Interallied communications and subjects. Just as I was about to tactfully interpose objection to this procedure, General Haking, the British Commissioner did it for both of us frankly but very pleasantly on November 19. This conference of the four Generals was very harmonious and since that occasion, General Nudant and his French associates have adopted a much more agreeable attitude, both in full committee and in subcommittees, in giving the representatives of each Army an equal share in the proceedings, and in concerted action by such representatives upon all communications to and from the Allied High Command.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief American Section.

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**German Morale**

HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 24, 1918.*

FROM: Chief, American Section, P. A. C.

TO: Commanding General, American E. F.

1. Although partially embodied in my regular report of today, as to general conditions existing behind the German lines, I deem it my duty, because of its extreme importance, to make special report as follows:

Observation of the German troops passing through this city convinces me that a large portion of the German Army is in extremely fine physical and moral condition to resume active military operations east of the RHINE. It would appear that the reports of disorder and demoralization among German troops has applied only to second-line troops, which were sent to the rear early in the present withdrawal. The first-line troops which have come under my observation have been well disciplined, orderly and apparently still full of fight. Their transportation has been decorated with evergreens, German flags, and their retreat has been given the aspect of triumphal return to Germany. German officers have claimed within the last few days that they still have 9 million effectives available for operations east of the RHINE.

2. While the information of the General Staff is no doubt better than my own as to the preparedness and designs of the German High Command, I feel that no stone should be left unturned to prepare for any eventuality beyond the RHINE. In other words, that our Third Army should not merely contemplate its future duties as one of occupation only, but that the future might bring about such a change in the situation that active mobile operations might be necessary. To this end, I would invite special attention to the necessity for maintaining an adequate ammunition supply and that such additional troops be kept in readiness as would be immediately available to reinforce our Third Army if necessary. The location, organization, and actual supply of Army and corps ammunitions dumps in the zone of our Third Army would to my mind be very advisable.

3. In conclusion, I might add that the above remarks are in substance in keeping with a secret dispatch which the British Mission is today sending to its General Headquarters.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Prisoners of War**

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, November 24, 1918.*

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

[Extract]

1. The German Commission informed the Allied Commission that the German High Command desires the repatriation of Allied prisoners to take place as rapidly as possible; and are of the opinion that further negotiations might better be carried on from the General Station at Berlin. They, therefore, expressed the wish that the Allied Armies might send their representatives there as soon as possible. All necessary measures have been taken to this end. To this the Allied Commission replied that in a few days representatives from France, England, and the United States would reach Berlin.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 383.6: Fldr. 21: Telegram

**Delivery of American Prisoners**

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 24, 1918.*

TO: Chief, American Committee to the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission,  
Spa, Belgium

No. 4033 G-1. Following telegram just received from J. B. Dimmich, American Red Cross Commissioner for Switzerland:

Levy, head of our Prisoners of War Department, with other Red Cross representatives visited prison camp at RASTATT today, found twenty-three hundred American prisoners well organized, well clothed, morale excellent, German General, Inspector of XIV Army Corps, willing to deliver them at RASTATT railroad bridge at once and will transfer nineteen American officers from KARLSRUHE to take charge during journey. Recommend that train be ordered to this point immediately so that delivery may be made forthwith of this probably preponderating number of American prisoners and that this single step be taken without awaiting a general plan at hands of Armistice Commission. Levy will await your orders at STRASSBURG.

We are taking up at once transportation and other questions involved in this movement, but before deciding on any course of action, desire to know whether this program is authorized by proper authorities and meets with your approval. An early reply requested. Above quoted telegram dated OBERNAI [OBEREHNHEIM] November 24.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

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**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 24, 1918.*

No. 6

FROM: Chief

TO: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

4. West of the RHINE, Allied prisoners have undoubtedly been turned loose by the Germans and have drifted toward the Allied lines. My information is that 264 American prisoners are so accounted for. \* \* \*

Last evening a radiogram was sent to your office, announcing that the German High Command was prepared to transport on one week's notice prisoners totaling 96 officers and 2,000 enlisted men from KARLSRUHE to ROTTERDAM; and asking your office if a vessel could be made available for the reception and transportation of our prisoners, who would require rations, underclothing, and overcoats. A reply from your office has not yet been received. While this number would account for most of the American prisoners alleged by the German High Command to be in their hands, it is very probable that a few other Americans have been segregated with British and French prisoners of war, and the Germans maintain that it will be very difficult in general, to turn over prisoners of war by nationalities. The principal thing is now to get our prisoners out of Germany promptly.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Chief American Section.

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***Delivery of War Material***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 24, 1918.*

No. 6

FROM: Chief

TO: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

6. Materiel---The delivery of materiel is not proceeding satisfactorily. It would seem that the Germans are abandoning war materiel without leaving detachments to turn it over; that much of this materiel is in poor condition, contrary to the terms of the Armistice; that effort has been made by the Germans to count fortress artillery, Russian, and Allied guns as part of the artillery required to be turned over; and that a large number of Boche aeroplanes have flown to Germany. Many of them on the initiative of the aviators are returning to their homes.

In general, the Germans claim that they have sincerely ordered detachments to turn over the material wherever possible; and that where the hostility of the people prevents such action, turning over the materiel to local civil officials. The civil population, especially in Belgium, is said to be bitterly hostile to these detachments, so much so that they fear for their lives.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief American Section.

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**Conditions in Germany; the German Attitude**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 24, 1918.*

No. 6

FROM: Chief

TO: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

7. General Conditions---It would appear from observation of the troops passing through this city, that the Germans first sent their second line and inferior troops to the rear, some of whom are said to have been openly rebellious and carried red flags in ranks; and that the rearmost troops are of excellent physical quality, and discipline, well clothed, equipped and fed. With the arrival of these disciplined troops in Germany it is possible that Socialistic disorders may disappear. It is no secret, however, that many German officers (especially the older officers) believe (and hope) that in the course of time, the military party will again obtain ascendancy, and that the Kaiser will return from retirement. On the other hand, it is quite openly stated that all lower grades of the German Army are permeated with Socialism, and that many of the younger officers are strongly opposed to a revival of the old regime.

The attitude of General von Winterfeldt, who represents the German Government on the Armistice, is coldly haughty and even repellent. Although continually asking many concessions for his Government, he shows no disposition to conciliate diplomatically the representatives of the Allied Armies. While his words admit the alleged helplessness of the German High Command to control all of its troops, to provide food for Germany's armies and civilian population, and to even neutralize the demands of the Allied Armies, his attitude and even the wording of some of his notes, are those of a man who believes the withdrawal of the German Army from France was a concession which should secure from the Allies much greater consideration.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Chief American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Limits Between French and American Zones in Rhineland**

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, Gen. Staff  
3d Bureau  
No. 6919

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*G. Q. G. A. November 24, 1918.*

N O T E

To follow note No. 6,636 of November 21.

In order to facilitate the movements of the American Army, the limit between the French Zone of the Group of Armies MAISTRE and the zone of Advance of the American Army will be determined as follows, beginning at the time when the American troops of occupation of the Rhenish country will begin their movement beyond the eastern frontier of Luxemburg:

Limit at present fixed between CARIGNAN and MERZIG, then MERZIG to the French, OBER and NIEDERFEULEN, BOURSCHIED, HOSCHIED, CONSTHUM, BOCKHOLTZ, these localities to the Americans, MUNSHAUSEN to the French, MARBOURG and RODER to the Americans, HEINERSCHIED and KALBORN to the French, then eastern frontier of Luxemburg.

By order of Major General WEYGAND,  
General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of American A. E.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1: Letter

**March Zones Across American Areas**

*November 24, 1918.*

FROM: Commander-in-Chief

TO: Chief of French Military Mission

1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 22, in which you suggested that a conference be held at BAR-le-DUC for the purpose of settling certain details as to the available billeting capacity in two zones of march across the American areas, which the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., has been pleased to place at the disposition of French forces.

2. In compliance with your request, a representative of the 3d Section, General Staff, these Headquarters, was present at a meeting with the D. E., BAR-le-DUC, yesterday. In course of this conference, arrangements were concluded for a northerly zone of passage, which were completely satisfactory to the French authorities present. Along this route of march, the following billeting zones were placed at the disposition of the French command: Areas of RANCOURT, LAHEYCOURT (on certain specified dates pending the passage of the American First Army, and at all times after November 29); areas of TRONVILLE, GONDRE-COURT, VAUCOULEURS, and COLOMBEY-les-BELLES (available without limitation until the termination of the contemplated French movement).

3. With reference to the second, or southerly, route of march passing through St-DIZIER into the region east of NEUFCHATEAU, it was agreed that the billeting capacity already placed at the disposition of the French command in my letter of November 20 would be sufficient, with the addition of the following three towns in the American fourth area: GRAND, BRECHAINVILLE, VILLOUXEL. These latter villages are at present occupied by American field artillery, but I have the honor to state that in order to meet the expressed desires of the French authorities in every particular, their evacuation will be directed and they will be placed at your disposition, from whatever date you may set. A small guard will be left in each of the three towns to care for artillery materiel which cannot be at once removed due to impossibility of obtaining rail transportation for movement of our horses from our base ports to the immobilized artillery units now occupying those towns.

4. The two areas of passage above referred to and agreed upon in the D. E. Bar-le-Duc, are therefore at once available. The evacuation of the three towns mentioned will be ordered immediately upon receipt of information from French Mission that these zones of passage are desired, either for temporary use or for permanent use.

By direction:

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff (G-3).

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

### ***The German Retirement***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 24, 1918.*

No. 6

FROM: Chief

TO: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3. German Retirement---The retirement of the German Armies appears to be progressing satisfactorily according to the Armistice, except in local cases and in the passage of the German Seventeenth Army, which was at one time two days behind schedule.

Collisions and friction have occurred at several points between the French and Germans, as shown in the Minutes of daily proceedings. For these the German High Command have offered various excuses---the difficulty of withdrawal over poor and few roads; lack of control over certain second-line troops; extreme hostility of local inhabitants towards German troops; French cavalry exceeding the prescribed safety sector; and, mistaken capture by Allied troops of German detachments left to turn over materiel. Exceptional smoothness was maintained between the German Fourth Army and the Allied troops following, by reason of excellent liaison; and the Allied Commission has called the attention of the German High Command to this requirement.

The French believe the Germans are tardy in retiring from evacuated territory, in order to withdraw materiel. It is my impression, however, that the Germans are really having a difficult time in certain sectors, in controlling second-line troops, who are reputed as somewhat demoralized by Socialistic propaganda, and, as in some cases, carrying red flags in ranks.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Memorandum

### ***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 25, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Rhodes

1. It is now 14 days since the signing of the Armistice, and not a single engine or car has been officially received from the Germans, in accordance with Article VII, by either of the two Allied Subcommittees. The Germans have left a certain number of engines and cars behind them, the number of which is not easy to determine; but it is not felt that the total is high. Furthermore in the case of the engines, it is very doubtful whether any of them will reach the minimum tractive power specified by Marshal Foch, in the specifications mentioned in Annex 2, Section 4; namely, 2,500 engines capable of hauling 750 tons from a standing start on a 1% grade, and 2,500 of 900 tons from a standing start on a 1% grade.

2. It is understood that the 5,000 engines and 150,000 cars are badly needed not only to protect the constantly lengthening line of communications of the Allied Armies, but to reestablish civil transportation in the evacuated territories. Along this line it may be stated that portions of France served by the Est Railroad and the Nord Railroad are short of engines and cars, in the same manner as Belgium, due to the capture of a large number of engines and cars by the Germans in 1914.

3. The German Transportation Section of the P. I. A. C. has been asked to deliver the number and type of engines specified by Marshal Foch, but as stated in the opening paragraph, not a single engine has yet been delivered. The Allied Section of the Transportation Committee is without definite knowledge as to whether Marshal Foch had information as to whether the Germans could furnish 5,000 engines of such high capacity. Until the Marshal, however, may see fit to change his existing instructions, the formal request upon the Germans remains unchanged.

4. It is the unqualified opinion of the Allied Section of the Transportation Committee of the P. I. A. C. that the delivery of engines and cars should begin immediately, in order to remedy the situation described in the second paragraph.

5. Neither the American representative upon the Transportation Committee or his railroad associate have sufficient knowledge of general conditions, or of the reasons which led Marshal Foch to specify the types of engines, to recommend that a modification be made,

but it is recommended that steps be taken to have the German representatives state positively, (if they do not do so at the meeting tomorrow, 11 a. m., November 26) whether they can or cannot deliver 5,000 engines of the types described by Marshal Foch. If it is then deemed advisable to make a modification of the demand of the Allies in the event that the Germans show that they cannot meet the present demand, immediate study will be made as to the most advantageous demands which can be made by the Allies which may be capable of fulfillment by the Germans.

G. A. YOUNGBURG,  
Colonel, G. S.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207

### ***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 25, 1918.*

#### COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

\* \* \* \* \*

SESSION OF NOVEMBER 25, 1918---11:30 a. m.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

IV. The Field Committee from Brussels: The Allied Chairman announced that the Field Committee convened at BRUSSELS would be in SPA this date and arrangements were thereupon made to meet a similar German committee from AIX, with a view to formulating a method of procedure for taking over railway rolling stock. It was arranged that the technical experts on the Transportation Committee of the Armistice Commission meet with these field committees. The Allied Chairman stressed the importance of speeding up the delivery of this rolling stock and of taking into account the operation of the field committee at METZ in order that it might not lag behind the BRUSSELS Committee.

V. Field Committee at Bastogne: The Allied Chairman requested the Germans to send a representative to BASTOGNE. The German Chairman stated that a German colonel with two experts have been to BASTOGNE but had found no representative of the Allies there. This was followed by a discussion of the difficulties connected with getting the various German and Allied representatives in touch with each other, and was followed by the usual discussion as to means to be taken for their protection when traveling in territory occupied by the various forces. It was arranged that the representatives of such committees meet at SPA or under specific instructions to be issued simultaneously by the Allies and the Germans for meeting in the field.

VI. Report of Technical Subcommittee: The German Chairman stated that the Technical Subcommittee desired to submit a report which consisted of a form which had been agreed to by all concerned as to information to be recorded by the field committees in taking over

rolling stock. This was followed by some discussion as to the importance of all details being stipulated in both languages, in order to avoid discussions and misunderstandings on the part of the field committees. The Allies took the position that details must be adjusted by the field committees and only in cases of absolute disagreement would their reports and recommendations be referred to the Transportation Committee of the Armistice Commission, which would then take steps to adjust the differences, if possible, or if not would report to their principals.

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HS Fr. Files: VII Army Corps: 432-20.2: Report

### ***Morale of German Troops***

[Editorial Translation]

2d Section, General Staff  
No. 153/2

FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,  
*November 25, 1918.*

The events which took place in BRUSSELS during the day of November 10, 11 and 12 are already known in their broad outlines. It is good, however, to specify certain facts according to various evidence collected.

From the moment it became known that Armistice negotiations were under way, some unruly elements of the German Army, coming especially from among the troops of the rear billeted in BRUSSELS, met of their own accord and abandoned themselves to all sorts of excesses: corteges flaunting the red flag, soldiers disregarding their officers and ransacking local supplies to make money, etc. No resistance whatever seems to have been shown by the terrorized officers.

A Dr. Freund of MUNICH, employed at the Kommandantur [German headquarters at] of BRUSSELS is named as one of the principal instigators of these movements.

The same riots took place in LOUVAIN where the troops plundered a supply train. Soon, however, the leaders of the movement, acting on orders from the Socialist chiefs from BERLIN, SCHEIDEMANN, EBERT, and others, bent all their efforts to the restoring of order, as is shown by the attitude of the latest copies of the "Belgischer Kurior."

As a matter of fact, the new Ministry, even under its Socialistic label, is composed of dyed in the wool Pan-Germanists who until further orders will preserve the same ideal as their predecessors, that of a greater Germany.

So the people of BRUSSELS saw little by little the disorder subside. At the end of 5 days calm had returned. The new chiefs the soldiers had chosen made the greatest efforts toward the evacuation of all those in authority and of all the stragglers.

By November 17 no German in uniform was left. A few may have been hidden but the local authorities made it their business to find them.

The units returning from the front seemed much less affected by the virus of anarchy. Most of them marched in good order, with flags unfurled and bands playing. It was noticed that the Bavarians flew the blue and white flag [of Bavaria] and obeyed their officers.

Moreover it is to be noticed that the number of deserters and stragglers arrested is very low. The prospect of remaining in foreign country until the complete restoration of its territory is certainly a great contributing factor.

In withdrawing on the army corps front the enemy committed numerous acts of violence on the inhabitants, notably thefts of cattle and of vehicles. All cases reported to the French military authorities of the 1st line have been made the subject of inquiries undertaken by the reporting commissioners assisted by O. L. P. (liaison officers with the civilian population). They were forwarded to the competent Belgian authorities.

Materiel left behind is relatively considerable [in quantity], but generally in bad condition. Special reports have been made on the subject. Therefore it is not included in the terms fixed by the Armistice Convention and is to be considered only as war prize.

Rumors were circulating on the 24th in the TIRLEMONT region that German troops were causing trouble in passing through LIEGE. Up to the present this information could not be checked. The bottleneck of LIEGE is very narrow, the obstruction on the roads is very great and the evacuation of the columns is slow.

There would be nothing extraordinary in the enemy's desire to cast upon us the wave of Bolshevism now spreading on his home ground and to make of it an article of exploitation.

A deserter stated to the British II Corps with which we are in liaison that some of- ficers and men, dressed in mufti, had been left behind to mix with the civilians and create a revolutionary disturbance. It is advisable to call the particular attention of the troops to this category - sort - of individuals.

The prisoners state that they are ignorant of the terms of the Armistice. Some of- ficers are better informed. To the very end the German High Command has concealed the truth from its men. It puts up now with the imposed terms, but as an officer said at Dr. Van de Fruelle's in DUISBURG "We promise all that, but we won't keep our promises." So its up to us to see to the execution of the accepted terms.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: 383.6: Fldr. 12: Memorandum

### ***Treatment by Germans of Repatriated Americans***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
STATISTICAL DIVISION,  
November 25, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FROM G-1, G. H. Q.:

Enclosed herewith is copy of statements made by American prisoners returning from Germany.

T. EDWARD HAMBLETON,  
Adjutant General.

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### REPORT ON AMERICAN PRISONERS RETURNED FROM GERMANY AT THOUVENOT BARRACKS, TOUL

The American prisoners sent to CHAUDENEY (MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE) are assembled at THOUVENOT Barracks, TOUL. Up to the present the following numbers have been received:

Nov. 19 - 12 U. S. Army

Nov. 20 - 2 U. S. Army

Total 14 U. S. Army

The men are from the following divisions:

1st Division - 1

7th Division - 2

26th Division - 5

28th Division - 5

33d Division - 1

Total 14

The period during which the men were prisoners in Germany varies from 12 days to 7 months. In general the appearance of the men was good. They all state that the American prisoners in Germany were better treated than those of other nations. When asked how they accounted for this the general opinion was that many of the Germans either had been in America or had relatives there and that the Germans looked to America for assistance in their food problem.

The chief complaint of the Americans in regard to their treatment in Germany was lack of food. They stated that they could not have kept alive without the Red Cross packages. Another complaint was that in almost all cases their shoes were taken from them after capture.

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193-32.16: Fldr. D: Telegram

### ***Released Prisoners of War***

THIRD ARMY,  
*November 25, 1918.*

Commander of Communications

No. 104 G-1. From reports received from French sources we should be prepared to receive two hundred thousand released prisoners of war between now and the attainment of our final objective on the RHINE. We are advised by French Mission that arrangements have been made with the enemy to evacuate these prisoners in train load lots from enemy territory rather than by releasing them and allowing them to wander back in small parties as heretofore. In accordance with orders of Marshal Foch it will be necessary for each Army to establish a large released prisoners of war dump where these prisoners will be sent and cleaned up before being sent to repatriation depots to be organized and prepared by the French. The French have practically effected arrangements for their repatriation depots at TOUL and VERDUN. We are considering locating our prisoners of war depot at LONGWY to which point prisoners of war in train load lots could be sent and also those received from railheads. Under the proposed system you would arrange directly with the French for evacuation to the repatriation depots. It is believed that much material required for the operation of your depot such as rolling kitchens, wagons, etc. can be found in German depots; and if so you are authorized to use them. This organization would require a very large installation at LONGWY to handle it.

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**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 26, 1918.*

NO. 7

FROM: The Chief

TO: The Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Prisoners:

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In reply to your radiogram signed "Andrews" asking for confirmation of the plan of repatriation of some 2,300 American prisoners via Switzerland, I have today wired the approval thereto of both the Armistice Commission and the German High Command. On account of the comparatively small number of our prisoners in Germany, and the growing lack of control of German troops by the German High Command, I would recommend a vigorous initiative on the part of the Red Cross representatives of G. H. Q. without reference to this mission except where complications develop. Thousand upon thousands of Allied prisoners have been liberated promiscuously and are streaming unattended towards the Allied lines, so that any measures arranged for the security and repatriation of our remaining prisoners which has the approval of the local German officials, will in no wise interfere with any policies laid down by the International Commission, which so far as prisoners are concerned are mainly concerned with the million or more British and French prisoners, many of whom are reported in lamentable plight.

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I shall welcome any requests from G. H. Q. which will assist and expedite the work of repatriation, and the work has proceeded much slower than I desired because until now, the German representatives seemed unable to furnish me with the locations of our prisoners. All Allied prisoners must be repatriated either through Switzerland or Holland.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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**Establishment of Prisoner of War Depot**

109 D1 D 85 OB

5th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
November 27, 1918.

Commanding General, Third Army

Number 472 G-1. Retel 104 G-1 Hq. Third Army and 466 G-1 Hq. 5th Division. After investigating conditions for establishing prisoner of war depot at LONGWY recommend that large prisoner of war depot be not established at LONGWY. Sleeping, bathing, and delousing facilities will not accommodate more than four thousand men. Recommend that some large point farther forward be selected.

ELEY. 5:06 a. m.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1207: Letter

**Delivery of War Material**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, Belgium, November 26, 1918.

FROM: The Chief

TO: The Commanding General, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Materiel: While the orderly turning over by German detachments of the artillery and machine gun materiel, required by the terms of the Armistice, seems now out of the question, because most of these detachments have simply turned their faces towards Germany; the abandonment of materiel by the German Armies is so great that in all probability it will largely exceed the terms of the Armistice.

The one exception is in aeroplanes. A very large number of German aviators disappeared with their planes, presumably flying home to Germany; Major Marsh has found one Boche plane near here, maliciously destroyed with a hammer \*\*\*; the representative of the German High Command on the Commission, states that documents describing the position of German aerodromes on Allied territory, have been destroyed by a Captain Deitwart.

\*\*\* it is recommended that the Chief of the Air Service with the Third Army check up on all German aeroplanes found within the zone of that Army and report same to the Chief of the Air Service, A. E. F., and to this Mission. I am sending an officer tomorrow to Commanding General, Third Army, to make this recommendation direct.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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***Circulation of Trains in Alsace-Lorraine***

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, Belgium, November 26, 1918.*

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

SESSION, TUESDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 26, 1918

[Extract]

ALLIES: I have here a communication in answer to a note addressed by me on November 21.

Thereupon the communication was read, as follows:

"From the Allied High Command to General Nudant, President Armistice Commission, No. 3074, D. T. M. A.

(1) In answer to the Telegram 18-T of November 23 first of all, the President of the Field Railway System in ALSACE and LORRAINE, in conformance with the instructions given him by Colonel (sic) in circulation of trains on the ALSACE-LORRAINE system will continue in support of and immediately after the French troops. The lines of the advance posts must not be crossed neither in the one direction nor in the other, except by trains bringing provisions and the necessary materiel. They will not be allowed to circulate in the lines. The circulation of passengers must be regulated in conformance with the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army.

(2) The president of the railway system of ALSACE-LORRAINE has received instructions to push forward all necessary provisions to the industries in LORRAINE; and (3) especially the transportation of coke that comes from the valley of the RUHR destined for the town of TUERVILLE, authorized from November 19."

ALLIES: A certain number of trains carrying military and civil personnel arrived yesterday without our having been given previous warning at the POPINSTER Railway Station. I request urgently that if further transportation comes from the left bank of the RHINE that we will be told of it in advance.

GERMANS: I have the following answer to make to these requests: It is entirely the intention of the German High Command to announce in advance such trains. In the present case, the coming of these trains was not announced to us either. The necessary measures have been taken.

\* \* \* \* \*

ALLIES: Thereupon, the following note was read:

"The Colonel (sic) Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies makes known to me on November 24, in answer to your request for the continuation of the train, BERLIN-SPA--first, the daily train requested between BERLIN and SPA, and between SPA and BERLIN is authorized, with the reservation that the measures of control that you propose be applied. Second, I have given the necessary instructions to the Interallied [Field] Railway Commission of CALAIS and the Interallied Field Railway Commission for the RHINE countries so that the train will be stopped as it passes our lines, convoyed and supervised under the conditions that you propose. Herewith, is presented a note indicating the measures to be taken in supervising this train between BERLIN and SPA. Measures of control to be applied to the BERLIN-SPA train, first, until the complete occupation of the RHINE countries [territory]

has occurred, the daily train between BERLIN and SPA must be convoyed from our lines to SPA, and vice versa. Every measure must be taken for the supervision of the personnel between these two points, as well as at intervening stops. Second, during the intervening period---that is to say, before the complete occupation of the RHINE country [territory], the BERLIN-SPA train will be stopped at a signal agreed upon at the first station located near our lines and convoyed as has been described above. The train SPA-BERLIN will be treated in the same fashion."

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Report

***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

SESSION, WEDNESDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 27, 1918

SPA, BELGIUM

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission: On behalf of the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission. The Chairman of the Subcommittee for Transport has repeatedly declared that he must protest against the interpretation that has been established by the Allies as to what types of locomotives and cars Germany is to deliver. In that connection, the Chairman of the Interallied Subcommittee for Transport has declared that by the Allies the horsepower of the locomotives to be given over and the kinds of cars that are to be given over has already been determined. According to Point Number 4-a Annex Number 2, which regulates, in general, the delivery of the railway materiel and the details which are regulated by Art. 7, the delivery of 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars are to be determined by the conditions that are to be regulated by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. Inasmuch as the conditions of the Armistice do not contain any regulation concerning the types of the 5,000 locomotives, nor concerning the kinds of cars, as for example, as the case in Art. 4 for delivery of cannons and ammunition, materiel, and as in the case in Art. 3 for ships and also in Annex Number 2. Therefore, the details concerning locomotives and cars must be established in common accord by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. In the note of Marshal Foch of November 22, it is further requested in Point Number 4 that the weakest horsepower of the locomotives that are to be turned over must be capable of drawing 750 tons on an incline of one per cent, and that the proportion of the materiel to be given over must be, as follows: Half of the locomotives must be of a horsepower of 900 tons on a one per cent incline, and half a horsepower of 750 tons on a one per cent incline. Against this one sided interpretation of the horsepower of locomotives which represents a considerable strength of the conditions of the Armistice compact and which would rob the German railways almost entirely of their strongest types of locomotives, the strongest protest is made, because the interpretation is not in conformance with the text of the Armistice Agreement. On the contrary it is proposed that the locomotives and cars be delivered in the proportion as they exist on the German railways, and likewise that the

Belgian and French locomotives and cars that were formerly taken as booty of war by the Germans be given over in their entirety insofar as they don't fail to conform with the conditions of the Armistice. In order not to delay delivery of the rolling stock, it is further requested that in the meantime Germany bring forward immediately locomotives of the strongest horsepower.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Letter

**Delivery of Rolling Stock**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 27, 1918.*

No. 8

FROM: Chief

TO: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Transport: It now seems quite certain that within a few days Germany will be required to turn over 5,000 locomotives of high tonnage, selected by the Allies from 7,000 whose whereabouts have been located.

After the conference of today the former counselor of the German Embassy at Washington, who speaks English perfectly, and who is evidently selected for the purpose of influencing me, came to me and represented that the German Government had received a very courteous note from Mr. Lansing, our Secretary of State, in which the latter stated that under certain conditions President Wilson would be glad to furnish Germany with food; and further stating that if the Armistice Commission crippled the German Railway system by taking away all of her high grade locomotives, it would be impossible to distribute America's food supplies to the starving German population and that the food would rot in the harbors.

I listened attentively to what the German diplomat had to say, but, of course, gave him no intimation of how I felt in regard to the matter.

I reported the incident promptly to General Nudant, who stated that to his certain knowledge Germany had 33,000 locomotives now available and that the transfer of 5,000 to the Allies would in nowise affect the distribution of food supplies to her population.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Lines of Information***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 27, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff

To: Commanding General, III Army Corps, A. E. F.

1. Due to transport difficulties and the amount of labor and material required to install wire systems on the march, the commanding general directs that communication by telephone and telegraph be reduced to the minimum, and that you issue such instructions to all divisions and other units within your corps as will assure the desired results. The greater part of the official business now carried on over the telephone and telegraph lines can be transacted through the regular scheduled messenger service without loss of efficiency, if officers concerned will use sufficient forethought to anticipate their requirements. Many periodical reports now being telephoned can be dispatched via M. D. S. and be received in time to answer all purposes.

2. The civil and military telephone and telegraph lines now existing in territory to be occupied will be employed as lines of information by our forces on the march and at permanent stations. However, none of these lines will be cut, nor the lines bridged onto the outside wires of existing systems, except under orders of the Chief Signal Officer of this Army. All circuits required by corps and subordinate units will be connected to switchboards at established centrals under direction of the corps signal officer.

3. Ordinarily there will be no telephone service on the march, or at daily halts, within a division. In exceptional cases the brigade may be permitted to use telephone circuits, if local facilities exist. Communication will generally be conducted by courier, radio and visual signals within a division.

4. One circuit only will ordinarily be established between a corps and each of its divisions. Existing civil and military lines will be used for this purpose, if circuits can be obtained.

5. The above instructions will obtain during the remainder of the march, and during the period of getting settled at the several permanent stations, after which time the service will be extended as conditions permit.

MALIN CRAIG,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Advance Detachments for Bridgeheads***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 27, 1918.*

From: Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

To: Commander-in-Chief

[Extract]

1. Although reported upon in my routine reports of conditions, I believe its importance requires that I make special report of the fact that with the consent of the German Government, it is the intention of the Armistice Commission to recommend the sending of advance detachments to prepare for the military occupation of the bridgeheads on the RHINE and to take over all useful establishments in the hands of the occupants of those places.

2. In a communication from the President of the Armistice Commission to Marshal Foch, dated November 26, 1918, it is recommended that these detachments go forward by way of SPA to their respective destinations in order to receive their final instructions through the Interallied and German Commissions. It is planned that the Allied Armies shall reach the RHINE on December 13, unless unforeseen delays occur.

The numbers and organization of these advance detachments are as yet unknown here, but it is stated that a specially trained economist and industrial specialist will form part of each detachment.

3. This advance information is furnished you in order that G. H. Q. may get in touch with Marshal Foch's Headquarters as to what is expected of the American Army in this respect; and in order that when the plan is finally brought to your notice by Marshal Foch's Staff, our G. H. Q., may be in position to immediately have such a detachment already organized and forward it to its destination.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**The German Retirement**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 27, 1918.*

No. 8

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

2. German Retirement: While the retirement of the German Army appears to be perfectly satisfactory, much friction has resulted through a difference of interpretation between Articles 2 and 5 of the Armistice Agreement, concerning the capture of the German troops which have not evacuated Allied territory. Article 2 permits the capture of such troops as prisoners of war in Luxemburg, ALSACE-LORRAINE, Belgium, and France, while such permission is not included in Article 5 for the countries on the left bank of the RHINE. The Commission has ruled that a strict interpretation shall apply to the countries on the left bank of the RHINE, and that German troops which have not evacuated such territory within fourteen days after the signing of the Armistice shall be held as prisoners of war.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 27, 1918.*

No. 8

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

14. Prisoners: With respect to other radiograms from General Andrews of G-1, replies have been made direct, but it may be stated that there appears to be no objection to the

evacuation of all of our prisoners by way of Switzerland if the German authorities are willing to transfer them over their railroads. Major Pabst, the representative here of the German Government, in regard to prisoners of war, states, however, that the German rolling stock is so difficult to obtain that it may be impossible to do otherwise than to bring the isolated groups of American prisoners, which are now in mixed camps of French and British prisoners, northward to Channel ports with the French or British prisoners, in order to take advantage of the rolling stock. An attempt has been made to make this clear to General Andrews by radiogram, but as the lack of rolling stock appears to be the only objection in the eyes of the German representative to the evacuation by way of Switzerland, it would appear possible for the Red Cross representatives of G-1 to carry out the plan of Swiss evacuation wherever it is possible to assemble American prisoners at RASTATT. If this be not possible, our prisoners will have to go to the Channel ports and either be assembled there or proceed on French or British ships to French or British Channel ports and there be repatriated to our Armies. This matter will be pushed and further information furnished G-1 as soon as available.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telegram

***Portion of Alsace-Lorraine in American Zone Considered French Territory***

[Contemporary Translation]

*November 28, 1918.*

French Military Mission  
with the American Army

2d Bureau

No. 162/GP

Bacon D. G. G. R. A. (Directeur General Controle Service Arriere)

Telegraphs: No. 914/G. R.

The territory of ALSACE-LORRAINE must be treated as French territory. Consequently the authority of D. E. (Director of ETAPES) U. S. zone will extend over that portion of formerly annexed LORRAINE incorporated in the American zone of action.

True copy transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. (Chief of Staff)

By order Chief of 2d Bureau:

illegible.

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**Mixing of Different Nationalities in Occupation Forces**

*November 28, 1918.*

My dear Marshal Foch:

After very careful study I feel that it is most advisable that during the occupation of German territory there be no mixture of units.

Many perplexing problems concerning our relations with the civil authorities and with the inhabitants of the occupied countries are certain to arise. In dealing with these problems the troops of each nation must act in accordance with the laws and customs of their own country. It is as inadmissible that a French commander should act under the laws and customs of America as it is that an American commander should have to carry out instructions relative to German citizens emanating from any source not directly responsible to his own government.

My government holds me responsible for the relations of American troops with the German inhabitants and it also holds me responsible for all such relations within the American zone.

I must, therefore, request you to modify so much of your instructions concerning the occupation of German territory as would place an American division at MAYENCE and as assigns two French divisions to my Army of Occupation.

JOHN J. PERSHING  
General, United States Army.

To: Marshal Ferdinand Foch,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Allied Armies.

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G-3; GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Memorandum

***Disturbance at Esch***

2d Section, Gen. Staff

HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,  
*November 28, 1918.*

Rioting at Esch, Luxemburg

On Tuesday evening, November 26, 1918, word was received at Luxemburg that serious rioting, accompanied by looting of stores, was taking place at ESCH, an important manufacturing city in the south of Luxemburg. Captain Beck of the Luxemburg Gendarmerie, at whose house the writer was at the time the information arrived, immediately left by automobile for the scene of the disturbances.

The writer, on leaving Luxemburg for G. H. Q., at noon the following day, November 27, took the road leading through ESCH in order to obtain, if possible, some further information as to the nature and reason for the trouble. Captain Beck was stopping at the Hotel Cresto, where the writer saw him and obtained the following information: Apparently on Tuesday evening two or three American soldiers went into a store to buy some candy. The price asked of them was very exorbitant and it is stated that the American soldiers became

incensed and broke the windows of the store. Certain individuals of the population who were present at this demonstration apparently sympathized with the American soldiers and joined them in the acts of violence. Very soon a crowd of several hundred people, largely of the working classes, had collected and proceeded to the largest German stores in the town, particularly the "Monopol" store, and after smashing the windows, looted the place from top to bottom. The captain stated that when the American troops saw that looting was taking place, they refused to have anything more to do with the trouble, and in fact, other American soldiers who happened to be there used all their efforts to disperse the crowd and to restore order, which, after the first feelings of the crowd had been vented, they apparently did with success. Further troubles were expected to occur Wednesday evening. The identity of the American soldiers who started the disturbance could not be discovered.

Captain Beck gave his opinion that the patience of the people had been severely tried during the past four years by the persistent extortion practiced by the German stores, and that their feelings are further aggravated now by the fall in German exchange and the consequent loss to them on the application of French prices. He stated that no dissatisfaction with working conditions or political reasons were connected with the troubles.

In order to meet the situation Captain Beck stated that he was in communication with His Excellency, the Minister of State who, he understood, was in touch with the American authorities, for the purpose of obtaining assistance. The Captain stated that there is very good feeling between the population and the military authorities of both American and French, but that they had particular respect for the American troops whom they looked upon as disinterested friends. He regarded the situation as still serious however, as political conditions in the state are unsettled.

FREDERICK DELLSCHAFT,  
Captain, U. S. A.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Report

### ***Inhabitants of Rhine Territory***

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

Session, Thursday Morning, November 28, 1918

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the French Armistice Commission, General Nudant: In the note of Marshal Foch of November 18, the following decisions were given concerning the demobilized soldiers whose homes were on the left bank of the RHINE: "All persons demobilized, including officers, may remain there, or return there if their place of residence was there before the war. According to the interpretation, it can be understood that those people who have been brought to the Rhineland during the war and who are now there active must leave their domicile. On account of this possible interpretation the greatest unrest has occurred among the people, which has been further aggravated by an unadroit pressure from the Soldiers' Council. According to the interpretation of the German Armistice Commission, this interpretation is unjustifiable and the Commission has so stated to the local authorities. It supports this

interpretation on Art. 6, of the Agreement in the fifth paragraph of which it is expressly stated that no measures should be taken by the local authorities that would bring about a diminution in the work of the factories or a limitation of the personnel. Both of these events would occur if the answer of Marshal Foch were to be interpreted otherwise. Then, at the present time, both in the offices of the state and in the cities many people have been brought together on account of the losses of war or in order to replace other people, many people have been brought together, who, if driven away at the present time, would bring about an interruption of the entire apparatus of the administration. In addition, in order that the organization of the war and also the public provisioning and clothing, etc. might continue, many factories and organizations that were called into being during during the war and have brought about the calling together of a large number of employees and functionaries will also be affected by this order. All of this is of the greatest importance for the strengthening of the industries whose increased operation has called into being the bringing together of a large number of workmen in addition to the demands of war, and the present changes brought about by the necessities of peace. Finally, in the arrangements that are now under consideration, a large number of new industries have arisen that will break down completely in case the occupation of the left bank of the RHINE is limited to the workmen who were there before the war. In the interest of all these persons and in order to fulfill the conditions of the 6th Article of the Armistice Agreement, a request is made for an express confirmation of the justice of this interpretation. The rapid approach of the time when the left bank of the RHINE will be occupied by the Allies make a rapid answer all the more necessary."

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HS Conf. File: Fldr. H-1: Letter

### **Mixed Command**

[Contemporary Translation]

*November 28, 1918--5 p. m.*

General:

Please allow me to explain with greater clearness than I did this afternoon, the conversation which I had with General Pershing November 25, regarding troops designated for the occupation of bridgeheads at COBLENZ and MAINZ.

On arriving in PARIS the morning of November 25, General Pershing intended to come here to see Marshal Foch that day or the next, in order to talk to him about this question. He did not know that the Marshal was absent on a trip and has no idea that he would be gone so long a time. He seemed visibly disappointed on learning it.

The General explained to me his objections to the projected arrangements, saying that from a strictly military point of view the arrangements appeared to be the least advantageous. If hostilities recommenced, two mixed commands were evidently not to be preferred; for mere occupation of enemy territory the same arrangement seemed, in his opinion, to offer complications, in the matter of supply, civil administration, police regulations, discipline, etc.

At the same time, since the Marshal might have other reasons, of higher importance, which had led him to prefer the proposed organization, General Pershing did not wish to make a formal written objection until he had sought occasion to discuss the whole question with him and estimate these reasons. He, therefore, directed me to explain this to you and

say how very satisfactory it would be to him if, after reflection, the Marshal should decide that other dispositions, which would not involve a mixture of French and American units would equally well assure what he had in view.

I think that the above represents quite exactly General Pershing's thought.  
Believe me, etc.

T. BENTLEY MOTT,  
Colonel, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Mission,  
Allied G. H. Q.

To: General Weygand

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***Pershing's Views on Use of American Troops***

*November 28, 1918.*

No. 1933-S

AGWAR WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Paragraph 1. I have received the following letter from Marshal Foch:

The reconstitution of the soil and the means of habitation of the devastated regions will necessitate considerable labor and effort. It will be impossible for France to furnish, within the time limit set for restoring the country to the economical condition which is indispensable to it, this labor and effort after she has been reduced to her own resources.

The French Army in the zone which it occupies will, for the present moment, cooperate in the work of reconstitution by furnishing to the civil authorities who are charged with it the assistance of units at rest and the available material resources.

The American Army has, like the French Army, a great part of its units at rest. Those units which are stationed near the devastated regions or near those which are encumbered by trench systems, etc., could render precious service to our population.

I do not doubt that your sentiments will lead you to continue to give France, during the period of the Armistice, the aid which you have so generously given her during the war. I am equally convinced that your troops will put all their soul into repairing, as far as they are able to do so before leaving France, what has necessarily been destroyed during the course of the operation.

The work which would be asked of the troops would be of the same nature as that to which they have become accustomed during the campaign. The nature of the various classes of work and the methods of execution are set forth in the note herewith.

I would be very much obliged if you will be kind enough to inform me as to what extent and in what manner it appears to you possible to assist in this work by the cooperation of the troops and of the services under your orders.

The note mentioned gives in detail the work considered of first urgency and states that the work will be carried out under the direction of the civil authorities. This work varies from the filling of trenches to the fabrication of all forms of building material and the undertaking of the cleaning up and repair of destroyed and damaged cities and villages.

Paragraph 2. Any extensive use of our troops, such as it is now evident the French authorities plan, for the purpose of rebuilding France must inevitably very seriously delay our withdrawal. Our combat troops entered the heaviest battles with inadequate training and however remote the resumption of hostilities it would be unjust and even criminal to them to use our soldiers as laborers and deprive them of the training which can be given during the Armistice. Moreover and still more important, the temper of our soldiers, if not that of their relatives at home, precludes any idea of the general employment of the American soldier as a laborer in rebuilding France. There is of course considerable work in the maintenance of our Forces, and their withdrawal from France which can be so directed as to be of permanent benefit to France. We will also be able to assist to a certain extent in relieving cases of distress.

Paragraph 3. I strongly urge that immediate announcement of policy be made and that it be made very clear to the French Government that they cannot expect to utilize our

soldiers as laborers. A complete and frank statement is needed in order that there be no misunderstanding and in order that the French Government may not delay our withdrawal by railway embargo and other measures taken without thorough understanding of the intention of the American Government. In this connection it is to be noted that there are marked evidences of a growing sentiment among the Allies that American Armies or a part of them should largely perform such police or garrison duty as may possibly arise.

Paragraph 4. The military situation seems sufficiently clear to obviate any disadvantage in making public our policy. An announcement that the return of a few troops has already begun and that the withdrawal of our forces will be expedited by every possible means as soon as the preliminaries of peace are signed would be keenly appreciated by our soldiers and by their families at home. I therefore recommend that a policy be adopted, publicly announced and transmitted to associate Governments. Such policy might state in effect that American troops will not be held in Europe to assist in the repair of devastated regions nor for ordinary police or garrison duty; that on the contrary it has been decided to begin at once the withdrawal of all troops not indispensable in furnishing America's proper quota in the actual occupation of German territory during the Armistice and maintenance of that quota, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. has been given directions accordingly. It would also be advisable to state that the withdrawal of combat divisions would begin at such time as may be necessary to insure filling all available space on our transports upon condition that they can be spared from active service.

Paragraph 5. I have informed Marshal Foch that his request involves policy of American Government and that I am awaiting your instructions. Request early reply so that I can fully inform Marshal Foch of your attitude.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Letter

### ***Traffic in Occupied Districts***

[Contemporary Translation]

[Extract]

The Representative of the German Government to the President of the Interallied Commission, General Nudant.

\* \* \* \* \*

The claim is fundamentally maintained that the economic life of the occupied districts in ALSACE-LORRAINE and in the remaining territory on the left bank of the RHINE as well as in the districts comprised within the zones of the bridgeheads must not be interrupted, that traffic in goods and passengers and also the use of the postal, telegraph and telephone services within the occupied districts, as well as between these districts and those parts of Germany not occupied, must be free.

The exchange relations especially between the iron works of LORRAINE, Luxemburg and industries in the districts on the left bank of the RHINE, and also on the right bank, are of such a nature that the restoration of well ordered traffic conditions of all kinds can no longer be in any way postponed. The industrial population of the occupied and not occupied districts have a right to expect that a condition would not arise when owing to deliberate measures taken by the occupying powers, wages would not be available for the workmen

on pay days, and when as a result of obstacles placed in the way of the exchange of information and goods, the necessary supply or raw material would be doubtful, a condition which would lead to interruption in the working of factories and unemployment.

The President of the German Armistice Commission already in his note of November 17 called attention to the dangers already incurred by the population's economic conditions of existence, and further, requested the summoning of economic experts. The request is most insistently repeated that the above mentioned grievances be remedied without delay, and that economic experts be sent immediately to settle points of detail.

Spa, November 28, 1918.

v. HANIEL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Letter

***Boats Carrying German Troops from Finland***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 28, 1918.*

No. 9

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Blockade: Announcement was made by the Interallied Commission that the British Admiralty had informed the Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet that boats carrying German troops from Finland might pass freely, on condition that the Allies have approved in advance the ports of embarkation and debarkation. These boats must not, however, stop at any port between the ports of embarkation or debarkation, and that the proposed ports must, therefore, be indicated in advance by the Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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**Food for Military Hospital at Treves**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 28, 1918.*

No. 9

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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4. American Red Cross: General Rhodes read to the German Commission the following note:

1. Information reaching General Headquarters, American E. F. from the American Third Army, is to the effect that the military hospital at TREVES is in need of food for about one thousand wounded Allied soldiers.

2. It is requested that authority be given for the American Red Cross to send forward to TREVES, the food, clothing, and necessary supplies, with a minimum of personnel, to handle the distribution of the same. The American Red Cross is prepared to act at once upon receipt of permission from the German High Command.

To the above communication, the German High Command replied that the request would be forwarded and that a favorable reply would, no doubt, be given at once.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Radiogram

**Food for Military Hospital at Treves**

[Contemporary Translation]

Radio No. 1231

*Spa, November 28, 1918.*

The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission, Major General v. Winterfeldt, to the Chairman of the American Mission, Major General Rhodes.

In connection with the request of today, I have the honor to inform you that the German High Command is completely in accord with the proposed immediate sending of a committee of the American Red Cross to TRIER. The German Fifth Army will immediately communicate by radio the road that is to be taken.

v. WINTERFELDT.

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**Alsace-Lorraine Rolling Stock**

[Contemporary Translation]

GERMAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, November 28, 1918.*

Fech No. 233

The President of the German Armistice Commission

To the President of the P. I. A. C.

Answer to the Note of November 26, 1918.

If only a few of the cars which belong to the ALSACE-LORRAINE System (and which are accordingly marked "ALSACE-LORRAINE") are in ALSACE-LORRAINE, the reason is we suppose here that in Germany every railroad system uses the freight cars of all the other systems as if they were its own, on the basis of agreement made by the railroad union.

As a result some of the cars which belong to the ALSACE-LORRAINE System are always in the other parts of Germany, in Austria-Hungary, etc.

The breakdown of telephone and telegraphic communication with STRASSBURG has made it impossible for us to find out exactly whether our supposition is correct.

The telegram of the Marshal of France has been forwarded to the competent higher authorities of the German railroads. They have been called on to agree on questions of detail regarding the return or the exchange of cars with the administration of railroads in ALSACE-LORRAINE.

If there should be more cars in ALSACE-LORRAINE than the system of that country owns, it is suggested that the excess be counted as part of the cars to be delivered in carrying out Article VII of the Armistice Convention.

The competent higher authorities are urged to begin the return of ALSACE-LORRAINE cars to the territory they belong to.

Still it is possible that cars of this system are in Rumania, Belgium, Turkey, etc., in which case their return is not possible at present.

von WINTERFELDT.

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G-2, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-84: Letter

**Organization of Technical Subcommissions**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, November 28, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

1. The above article requires that certain specified materiel shall be turned over to the Allied Armies by Germany. The duties of the Interallied Armistice Commission have

been interpreted as not dealing directly with the transfer of this materiel, but that such transfer shall be left entirely in the hands of the General Headquarters of the four Allied Armies concerned. It is quite possible that G. H. Q., A. E. F., has received instructions from Marshal Foch's Headquarters as to the organization of technical commissions to inspect and take over this materiel; but in case this has not been done the following recommendations are forwarded to G. H. Q. as suggestions from the Subcommittees of the Armistice Commission, but are not intended to be more than suggestions, to assist G. H. Q. in carrying out the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

2. Artillery Materiel, Machine Guns and Trench Mortars: From an officer sent to the Headquarters Third Army it has been learned that large quantities of this materiel were taken over by the First Army between November 11 and 21, part of such materiel being formally transferred by enemy commanders and part being taken over as abandoned property. Subsequently, the Third Army took over prior to November 21, a large amount of similar materiel. Practically no attempt has been made to gather this materiel into central depots, and the 5th Division of the Third Army has been assigned the whole policing of the zone of communication of the Third Army with headquarters at LONGUYON. It is probable that as the 5th Division moves forward this enemy materiel may be again transferred to officers of the Second Army. It will thus be seen that as at present arranged there is no permanency of responsibility for the enemy materiel.

Practically no expert inspection of this materiel has been made to determine whether it complies with the requirements of the Armistice. Headquarters Third Army have never received any information as to the interpretation placed on the words *en bon etat*. By Administrative Bulletin No. 1, Headquarters Third Army, an inventory of captured materiel of all kinds is required, but no inspection is provided for. Practically no information is available at Headquarters Third Army to show whether guns and howitzers have limbers, sights, and other accessories.

On November 24, it appears that two telegrams were sent by Headquarters Third Army to the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., giving lists of materiel taken up by the First and Third Armies during the first ten days of the Armistice. These figures were based on inventories made by officers of the 5th Division, who in many cases, did not distinguish between guns and howitzers and who did not undertake to pass on the suitability of the pieces.

From the above it will be seen that no standard system has yet been put into operation for the purpose of expert inspection of materiel and the making of careful lists of same by officers familiar with the materiel. It is, therefore, recommended that a technical commission of trained officers be sent to the American zone to carry out the requirements of Article VII, Armistice Agreement, and make special reports of its work to G. H. Q. It is proposed that when notified of the dispatch of such a commission to the Headquarters of the Army of Occupation, to send a trained member of my staff to such commission to assist it in initiating the work and to standardize it as far as possible.

Appendix A contains suggestions made by the Subcommittee on materiel of the Armistice Commission relative to reports which might be submitted to G. H. Q., and specifications to be followed in the inspection of materiel. The Armistice Commission forwards these suggestions merely as such and does not desire to interfere with any policy of G. H. Q. relative to this matter.

3. Railroad Materiel: As stated in my letter of even date, it is recommended that in addition to the technical commissions already organized or under instructions from Marshal Foch to meet at LIEGE, METZ, and other places, the following technical experts be added to the staff of the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation to protect American interests in taking over the facilities enumerated in Paragraph VII of the Armistice Agreement:

- A railway officer familiar with maintenance of equipment,
- A signal officer familiar with telephone, telegraph, and wireless,
- A railroad officer familiar with maintenance of way,

An officer familiar with inland waterway service, and  
An officer familiar with maintenance of highways.

It would seem desirable that these officers should have authority to enter the German lines in advance of our Third Army when accompanied by a German officer of the corresponding service; should this be deemed necessary, authority for same will be secured through these headquarters. It is recommended that G. H. Q. communicate on the subject of this paragraph with Marshal Foch's Headquarters (Chapin) in regard to any specific recommendations which such headquarters desires to make in the premises.

4. Motor Transport: The Armistice Commission believes that the Chief Motor Transport Officer of the American Army of Occupation can, with the assistance of the Transport Officer of each division, handle the requirements of Article VII, Armistice Agreement, so far as any general preliminary survey of motor transport is concerned. Unlike the railroad, telegraph, telephone, etc., no fixed installations are necessary for the operation of the motor transport, and therefore, it is not probable that it will be necessary to make any general survey of the German motor transport before it is delivered under the terms of the Armistice. The delivery of the specified number of motor vehicles with certain equipment is to be made at specified locations between definite dates, and although much abandoned transport has been taken over by the American Army of Occupation, most of it is unserviceable and cannot be applied to the total transport required to be turned over to the American Army.

While the Armistice Commission does not contemplate dealing with the details of the application of Article VII, Armistice Agreement, which as has been already said is left entirely in the hands of G. H. Q., it will agree to send a liaison officer from the Staff of the Armistice Commission to instruct the motor transport officer and his assistants of the Army of Occupation in regard to the interpretations of the terms of the Armistice so far as they relate to motor transport.

It is, therefore, recommended that a detail of technically qualified inspecting and receiving officers be organized from the personnel of the Motor Transport Corps headquarters, to report at Headquarters Army of Occupation several days previous to the date when the delivery of Army transport equipment will commence, and who will make inspection and accept that quota of the motor trucks delivered by the Germans, which the American Army may at that time be charged with receiving. Major Slade of my staff, representative of the Motor Transport Corps, will meet this detail and start it on its work of inspection and acceptance; and he is also prepared to send to M. T. C. Headquarters a list of the officers who in his opinion should compose this detail.

5. Aeroplanes: It would seem that under Paragraphs IV and VI of the Armistice Agreement the first step is the obtaining and collecting of aeroplane equipment; the second step is the inspecting of this equipment to determine how much of it shall be accepted as coming up to the requirements required by the terms of the Armistice; and, third, the allocation and disposition of such materiel when collected and inspected. For the execution of the first step the office of the A. C. of S., G-1, Third Army, has under date of November 21, issued Administrative Bulletin No. 1, which is now in effect. The first step is, therefore, provided for. With the execution of the second requirement it is believed G. H. Q. is now most concerned.

It is, therefore, recommended that a group of competent Air Service materiel inspectors be designated by the Chief of the Air Service to proceed direct to the zone of the Army of Occupation and carry out the requirements of inspecting and listing the aeroplane equipment required to be turned over under the terms of the Armistice.

As in the case of other materiel, the Armistice Commission desired that the working out of the details shall be left in the hands of G. H. Q., but will be most glad to send at the proper time the officer of the Air Service now on my staff to the zone of occupation to start and standardize the work and give such interpretations of the terms of the Armistice to the Technical Commission as they may ask for.

6. While some and perhaps all of the above suggestions have already been anticipated by G. H. Q., the foregoing has been prepared and forwarded in case such has not been anticipated, and because from a visit yesterday of my staff officers to the zone of the Army of Occupation it would appear that the regular inspection and listing of the enemy materiel required to be turned over under Articles IV and VII of the Armistice Agreement is not being carried out in such a systematic manner as will result in the American forces receiving in proper condition the materiel to which they are entitled under the terms of the Armistice.

Interviews with members of the German Commission working in cooperation with the Interallied Armistice Commission, seem to indicate that on account of the precipitate retreat of the German Armies and of internal disorders which have rendered control of certain German troops rather difficult, the Germans themselves have no distinct idea of how much of the materiel has either been turned over to the Allied Armies or abandoned in retreat. Therefore, the Armistice Commission has been unable to proceed very promptly and intelligently in regard to detailed instructions relative to interpretation and acceptance of this materiel. By the terms of the Armistice the materiel was to have been regularly turned over by German personnel left for that purpose, but present information seems to indicate that much, if not all, of this personnel has left for the Fatherland, and that our technical commissions will have to take over this materiel wherever they may find it.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section,

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#### APPENDIX A

#### MEMORANDUM ON ARTILLERY, MACHINE GUN AND MINENWERFER MATERIEL

1. The following personnel to take over materiel within the Armies, regularly delivered by the Germans or abandoned, is recommended:  
One chief, preferably a staff officer or of a field officer's rank.

#### FOR ARTILLERY

Two officers, heavy artillery  
Two officers, field artillery  
Four officers, machine-gun service  
One officer, trench mortars

#### AIRPLANES

One inspector for planes, photo and instruments  
One inspector for engines  
One inspector for radio and electrical apparatus  
One inspector for airplane ordnance

#### MISCELLANEOUS

Two officers, inspection of general equipment  
Two field clerks

2. These officers should be thoroughly familiar with the work. Circumstances will determine whether or not the work will require additional officers.

3. Upon the organization of this committee liaison should be established with the P. I. A. C., with the object of cooperating.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Note

***Alsace-Lorraine Rolling Stock***

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
SUBCOMMISSION ON TRANSPORTATION,  
*Spa, November 29, 1918.*

No. 49/T

Major General Nudant, President of the Permanent International Armistice Commission,  
to General von Winterfeldt, President of the German Armistice Commission.

ANSWER TO NOTE NO. 223 OF NOVEMBER 28, 1918

(1) The reasons given by the President of the German Armistice Commission are not sufficient to justify the deficits which are found in the materiel of the ALSACE-LORRAINE railroad system. The German authorities must take steps to insure the materiel being complete within 31 days.

(2) If within 31 days this materiel is not complete, the German authorities will have to deliver provisionally a sufficient quantity of rolling stock from the German reserve to bring the total up to the amount which properly belongs to the ALSACE-LORRAINE railroad system.

It is well understood that this German materiel would be over and above:

(1) The 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars to be delivered by the German Government.

(2) The materiel necessary for operation in the country of the left bank of the RHINE, and would be returned eventually only by exchange for materiel of the ALSACE-LORRAINE system of equal quantity and value.

(3) The proposal to count among the cars to be delivered those which are in ALSACE-LORRAINE and which are over and above the total number of cars which the ALSACE-LORRAINE system owns, is an entirely different question, which will be studied later.

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**Acceptance of Railway Equipment from Germany**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
November 29, 1918.

Received at 19 A. AD. 153 OB

HAEF, Nov. 29

C. G., Third Army G-4 Luxemburg

Number 7041 G-4. Following telegram from American delegate, Permanent International [Interallied] Armistice Commission is quoted for your information, guidance and compliance:

Number 28. Have information that First Army prior to November 21, formally accepted 15 Belgium locomotives and 22 German locomotives and that American Third Army prior to November 21 formally or informally accepted two locomotives. Must meet the requirements of tractive reports prescribed by Marshal Foch and that sub-commissions at BRUSSELS and METZ alone have authority to give formal receipt for locomotives and cars but it is highly desirable that inventory be taken of any and all material left by the Germans including locomotives and cars. All such material being left under guard.

Joint to First, Second, and Third Armies.

MOSELEY. 2:17 a. m.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Letter

**Control of Communications**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, Belgium, November 29, 1918.

No. 10

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Radiograms: The Allied Commission announced that its interpretation of the control of the radio system at SPA is that the Allies shall have control of all communications, filing a copy of messages received and sent out, in the same way that the German Commission has heretofore done in regard to messages coming from or destined for the Interallied Commission. The question of communication by code still remains under consideration.

A telegram from Marshal Foch was also read in which it was stated that a conference will take place, in regard to radio communication at SPA, between Colonel Cartier, Allied representative, and the German radio representatives, at present stationed at SPA.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: 20375-S: Memorandum

***Duties of Interallied Field Railway Commission***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,  
*November 29, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR Asst. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q., American E. F.

1. I am enclosing a translation of a memorandum prescribing in detail the division of duties and the functioning of the Interallied Field Railway Commission.
2. Will you be good enough to notify me the American members of the subcommissions called for in this memorandum.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,  
1st. Lt., Cavalry,  
Liaison Officer, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Note

***Tactical Organization and Policing of Bridgeheads***

1st Section, General Staff  
3d Bureau  
No. 7282

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 29, 1918.*

1. Circles of land with radii of 30 kilometers, described about the principal squares of COLOGNE, COBLENZ, MAINZ [MAYENCE] as centers, are reserved to be organized as bridgeheads. The object of these bridgeheads is to open up and maintain outlets on the right bank of the RHINE. They will accordingly be organized and occupied in accordance with the following principles:

1. Increase the number of passages from the left to the right bank.
2. Organize defensively, taking into account the topographical situation and the work to be done in neighboring bridgeheads, and avoiding all destruction of property:
  - (a) Have the arc with the longest possible radius provided for above as the line of advance posts.

(b) Further to the rear, have successive defensive positions (main resistance position, safety position, etc.).

3. Distribute troops in such a way as to:

(a) Be able to occupy in force and in time the principal resistance position in case of sudden attack.

(b) Assure the maintenance of order, especially in industrial centers, while at the same time avoiding the quartering of large numbers of troops in these centers.

II. The forward limit of each bridgehead will be defined by the arc of a circle whose radius is 30 kilometers, described about the most eastern abutment of the central bridge of each main square as a center.

As an exception to this rule, the centers of FRANKFORT [on the MAIN] (cut by the circle) and DARMSTADT (tangent to the circle) are left cleanly outside of the territory to be occupied.

In order not to give the enemy any reason for complaint, the forward limit of each bridgehead will be very exactly determined, brought to the attention of the troops, and marked on the terrain (signs, sentries, etc.). Allied soldiers shall not under any pretext cross this line.

III. A neutral zone, open to troops of whatever nationality, will be reserved on the right bank of the RHINE between that river and a line, at a distance of 10 kilometers from the river, drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river from the frontier of Holland to the Swiss Border.

German police forces whose constitution and direction are in the hands of the Allies, will maintain order in the Neutral Zone.

The work of organization outlined in Article I will be immediately studied by the advanced detachments, explained in Note 7281. This study, of which a copy should be sent to General Allied Headquarters, will be far enough advanced so that work may begin as soon as the occupation has been completed.

F. FOCH.

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GHQ, C-in-C AEF: File 20376-A95: Letter

### ***Occupancy of French Installations***

*November 29, 1918.*

My dear Marshal Foch:

Replying to your letter of the 22d instant, in reference to American institutions in France and French institutions used by our forces, I have the honor to advise you that practically all our construction projects have been stopped. Orders have been issued discontinuing the forwarding of construction materials, except in special cases connected with important railway repair and reconstruction.

In reference to French barracks and depots now used by the American forces, it will be necessary to continue the occupancy of all such buildings until the American forces are withdrawn. Here and there certain buildings can be given up, but these cases can be handled separately as they arise. Some have already been so adjusted.

These facilities, placed at our disposal by the French authorities, cannot be released to any great extent until the American Army begins to withdraw in large numbers in embarking for the United States.

When this withdrawal begins, it is planned that the shipments will total at least 200,000 men per month. With such a policy in effect the situation would change very rapidly from month to month and French facilities in our hands could give up in the same

proportion. Under such a policy French barracks and depots now occupied by the Americans in the forward areas would become gradually available, but there are many such facilities connected with the Services of Supply, especially in the base and intermediate sections, that will be needed as long as we have any forces in France.

J. J. P.

Marshal Foch,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Allied Armies.

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HS Confidential File: Fldr. H-1: Letter

***Mixed Command***

AMERICAN MISSION, MARSHAL FOCH'S HEADQUARTERS,  
*November 29, 1918.*

[Extract]

My dear General:

As soon as General Weygand returned here, yesterday morning, I went to see him, the Marshal arrived with him but left immediately afterwards for PARIS. I talked to him quite a while the matter of the occupation of our bridgehead and the one at MAINZ. I explained how contrary it was to your desires, as well as to your conception of what was most efficient, to have French divisions in our Third Army and American divisions in a French Army, and that you would be very glad to see the matter arranged differently; i. e., placing all American divisions in American Armies and French divisions in French Armies.

He immediately said, "Why did not General Pershing say this before," I answered that it did not seem a matter which up to the present had pressed for solution and that one of the objects of your coming to PARIS on the 25th was to discuss this very matter with the Marshal; that, moreover, even now two weeks must elapse before the troops arrived in these bridgeheads and that it was in no sense too late to change the dispositions.

I added that unless some reason of very great importance dictated the arrangement I hoped the Marshal would modify it. General Weygand answered that the only reason was the one indicated in the original letter, namely, the desire to mark the interallied nature of the occupation.

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An hour afterwards I sent to General Weygand, in French, the letter whose translation I enclose.

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General Weygand's note is as follows:

Dear Colonel:

The Marshal, to whom I communicated the contents of your letter of November 28, directs me to answer that he finds no reason for modifying

at present the arrangements made. He expects, moreover, to talk over this subject with General Pershing in his next interview with him.

Marshal Foch leaves tomorrow, Saturday night for LONDON with Mr. Clemenceau. He will not be back here before Tuesday and probably not before Wednesday.

\* \* \* \* \*

I had hoped that General Weygand, and after him the Marshal, would see that you did not desire the proposed arrangement, would realize that the Marshal had no right to impose it if objectionable to you, and upon your objections being expressed through me would gracefully adopt your view without further combat. They have not done so, and I feel I should not go any further without orders from you. For above all I do not know to what extent you propose to go in enforcing your views. One thing is certain the arguments are all on your side, since those they really have they seem unwilling to avow.

Believe me Sir

Very sincerely yours,

T. BENTLEY MOTT,  
Colonel, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Mission,  
Allied G. H. Q.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Note

### ***Advance Detachments to Enter Bridgeheads***

1st Section, General Staff  
3d Bureau  
No. 7281

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*November 29, 1918.*

In order to prepare for the occupation of the bridgeheads and for the organization of Allied control in the Neutral Zone along the right bank of the RHINE opposite each of the Allied Armies, the Commanders-in-Chief of the American, Belgian, British and French Armies are asked to detail advanced detachments composed, to begin with, of several staff officers.

The mission of these detachments will be:

1. To prepare for the occupation of the bridgeheads \* \* \*
2. To make detailed proposals, under the direction of General Nudant, with regard to the effective strength and exact distribution of the German police forces to be maintained in the Neutral Zone: Reasons being given for such proposals.

All of these detachments will first be sent to SPA as soon as possible. Please be good enough to report their departure.

General Nudant will give them all information at his disposal and will, insofar as he deems fit, place them in contact with German authorities who can give them all other information.

Commanders of advanced detachments will communicate directly with their Commanders-in-Chief in all matters concerning the details of the occupation of the bridgeheads.

General Nudant is ordered to stop his work with regard to the Neutral Zone and to forward it at once to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

F. FOCH.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 77: Letter

***Report on Acceptance of German Planes***

1st Section, General Staff  
2d Bureau

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
November 29, 1918.

(d) Document No. 235/2

From Marshal Foch, C-in-C of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, C-in-C, A. E. F. in France

[Extract]

The information given by the different Armies relative to the delivery of aviation material by the Germans must be given with a great precision so that they can be compared. Consequently I beg you to send me every day:

1. A telegram showing briefly the aviation material delivered during the day.
2. Detailed confirmation of same telegram made according to the annexed model, in double copy.

Further, a total list on the same model for all the aeroplanes delivered since the beginning of the Armistice till No. 30, inclusive, shall be sent too as soon as possible in double copy.

By order of the Major General:

WEYGAND.

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**German Request for Allied Troops**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 29, 1918.*

No. 10

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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7. Allied Troops for AIX-la-CHAPELLE: The German High Command made urgent request that the city of AIX-la-CHAPELLE shall be occupied as soon as possible by Allied troops and that an Allied general staff shall be sent on December 1 to COLOGNE to arrange matters with the Military Governor; and that the occupation of that city shall take place December 5,---the several officers of these two cities proceeding by way of SPA.

The foregoing request of the German Government is interpreted by the Allied Commission as meaning that local disorders at AIX-la-CHAPELLE and COLOGNE make it necessary for the German High Command to ask for Allied troops to preserve the peace.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-1, Third Army: Gen. File 383.6, Fldr. 4: Memorandum

**Repatriation of Prisoners of War**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*November 29, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM for A. C. of S., G-1:

1. In accordance with your orders, have proceeded on the 28th inst., to TREVES for the purpose of establishing liaison with the German authorities with reference to receiving released prisoners of war, and obtained information as to the number in the vicinity which we might expect to have handed over to us.

2. Arrived in TREVES at 4 p. m. and went to the office of the Super-burgomaster of the town and surrounding country who received us very cordially, and apparently was very willing to transact business.

(a) He states that all the Russians, excepting perhaps 200, within his zone of information, have either been sent across to France, or have been returned across the RHINE to Germany for transportation to Russia.

(b) That the greater part of the prisoners of other nationalities have already crossed our line.

(c) That fifty French officers had left the day before by train for THIONVILLE.

(d) That he would collect in the future all the scattered prisoners, and hold them in the barracks across the river from TREVES, marked on the attached map; 3 bat., inf., regt. E. F., 29 stad kaserne, and that he would immediately establish liaison with the German military command which had already gone out of his district, with a view of getting definite information as to the number of prisoners which might be expected to be turned over to the Allies, and for this purpose I have agreed to keep in touch with him to get this information.

3. (a) He informed me that at the present time he was policing the city with four hundred volunteers who were armed with rifles and wore white bands on their sleeves, but upon arrival of American troops these arms would be turned in.

(b) That there was a committee of the soldiers council also operating in the city, and who claimed to be in control of the city government, and that the people who had business with the civil government transacted it either with the burgomaster or the soldiers council as they saw fit, but that up to the present time there had been no disorders in the town.

4. I drove through this town to reach the city hall, and the appearance of the city gave me the impression of an ordinary city in peacetime.

There was no excitement, and business seemed to be carried on in an ordinary way.

There were no flags displayed of any kind whatsoever and the only indications which were shown were friendly waves of the hands from about fifty percent of the people we passed.

There seemed to be many discharged soldiers with their extra clothing tied together with rope, and carried as a pack, both in the town, and on the roads leading into it.

5. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that authority be obtained to reserve the section across the river from TREVES \* \* \* for a sorting station to care for and maintain the released prisoners of war, which are expected to be turned over as soon as we enter Germany, and if this reservation is made, that a suitable detachment be sent up to control this plant, and care for the prisoners pending their transfer to the rear.

W. C. GARDENHIRE,  
Col., Asst., G-1.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1234: Report

***Condition of American Prisoners***

*November 29, 1918.*

No. 1939-S

AGWAR WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

For Churchill

Paragraph 1

Reference your Number 327 to Military Attache PARIS for Von Deman re American prisoners released from German prison camps.

Subparagraph A. Complaints of poor scanty food bad housing conditions, universal among returned American prisoners. Majority suffering colds, slight bronchial troubles, intestinal disorders. Only small percentage hospital cases on arrival in American camps. Practically all recover rapidly with proper food and housing.

Subparagraph B. Of 5 officers, 344 men, reaching one classification Camp, 14 sent to hospital. 4 others sent to hospitals on way. No evidence discrimination against Americans. Out 7,000 prisoners, all nationalities, only half dozen specific instances brutality authenticated and these were British-French. Majority American prisoners state German soldiers also suffered food privations and cases where Americans suffered most were due to lack of supply. In such cases prisoners' food was cut off before German soldiers.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, U. S. A.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Telegram

***Treatment of German Transportation and Communication Personnel***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
November 30, 1918.

TELEGRAM TO: Commanding General, First Army  
Commanding General, Second Army  
Commanding General, Third Army  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Advance G. H. Q.

Number 4196 G-1. Following from commission at SPA repeated for your information and guidance:

No. 34. Armistice Commission is issuing credentials and brassards to members of the German Committee dealing with transportation and communication who may have to enter Allied lines of such additional German personnel as may also have to remain within same under Article 7 of the Armistice. It is of the highest importance that German representatives of any rank possessing proper credentials and conducting themselves in a proper manner should be given good treatment and that any demonstration against them by the civil population should be sternly repressed as their presence in many instance vital at the present moment for the operation of railroad lines and other means of communication. Please notify commanders of our troops in zone of occupation. Richards.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff G-1.

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**Money Transactions in Alsace-Lorraine**

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, November 30, 1918.*

No. 38/0

Major General Nudant, President of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission  
To General von Winterfeldt, President of the German Armistice Commission

By means of Note of Nov. 29, No. 1003/CR, the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, make known the following:

Money transactions by Cheque, which are of considerable importance to the economic life of ALSACE-LORRAINE, are at present completely suspended. The important industrial and commercial men of the district request, as a measure of urgency, the reestablishment of the service, within the limits, it should be well understood of ALSACE and of LORRAINE. But, I have been advised that no transaction can take place until it has received the visa of a central organization sitting at KARLSRUHE, and that, moreover, this central organization deals indiscriminately with accounts opened in ALSACE-LORRAINE as well as in the Grand Duchy of BADEN.

I request you:

(1) To require the German Government to separate exactly the accounts opened in ALSACE-LORRAINE from those opened in the Grand Duchy of Baden.

(2) As soon as this work shall have been accomplished, to receive at KARLSRUHE two French officials, who will be charged with the duty of taking delivery of documents of all kinds, bearing on this part of the service, and necessary toward assuring its continuity, and finally of taking these documents to ALSACE-LORRAINE, along with the personnel assigned to the service.

(3) To regard this question as one of great urgency.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Letter

**Internment of German Troops in Hungary**

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 30, 1918.*

No. 11

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.,

[Extract]

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3. The German High Command brought up the question of a conflict of interpretation between Article 12 of the Armistice Agreement by which all German troops at that time in

any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Rumania, or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914; and the provisions of an Armistice agreement made by the Allied High Command with the Hungarian Command at a time when hostilities were still in full force between Germany and the Allies. The question concerns the internment of the German troops of General von Mackensen, who, under Article 12 of the Armistice Agreement began their return march to Germany, but who are now, under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement made with Hungary, in danger of being interned by the Hungarian Army authorities.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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HS Confidential File: Fldr. H-1: Letter

***French Political Aims in Mixed Control***

AMERICAN MISSION,  
MARSHAL FOCH'S HEADQUARTERS,  
*November 30, 1918.*

[Extract]

My dear General:

\* \* \* \* \*

The Belgians expect Luxemburg to be returned to them exactly as ALSACE-LORRAINE is being returned to France, with or without plebiscite; France is planning to get it for herself. Occupation being nine points of the law, the French decided to get a regiment sent to the Capital under guise of a guard for the Marshal; and doubtless he made what seems the unusual and unnecessary choice of his hq. with the view of favoring the project. I believe this regiment has been sent already to Luxemburg or certainly will soon arrive there, although the date for the Marshal's establishing his hq. in this place is now fixed for about December 12.

\* \* \* \* \*

It seems to me unfortunate, I said coming on top of the entire absence of American troops in any part of ALSACE-LORRAINE and at any of the celebrations in the regained provinces, that the Marshal had decided to send a French regiment to Luxemburg as his personal guard. I felt sure that if he had known of the Marshal's desire to have a large guard, General Pershing would have been happy to give him an American one. At any rate it would have been a graceful thing to have authorized me to suggest it to General Pershing and find out whether difficulties of a technical nature presented themselves---in other words give General Pershing the choice of sending an American guard or of conforming to the Marshal's suggestion of a French one.

\* \* \* \* \*

I cannot escape the conviction that the Marshal, either of his own motion or on suggestion from his Government, is using his position as Commander-in-Chief to further the political designs of the French Government. I think the action taken in regard to mixed commands in the bridgeheads goes much deeper than any desire on his part to have French divisions at every point, or any thought of holding the American forces in tutelage. It is a part of a plan to make the Germans feel that the French Army has won the war, other troops helping. If French soldiers are in or about all the important towns along the whole RHINE, the population is impressed with the fact that France is standing astride of Germany at every point.

The desire to create this feeling is natural and even from the point of view of America and England may be desirable and useful for the future of Europe; but what seems unacceptable is that the French Government or Marshal Foch or both should not frankly take you into their confidence over this matter, ask if you or our Government object to us aiding them to impress their powerful neighbor, and express their gratitude for what is accorded.

Instead of this the Marshal takes measures and gives orders alleged to be based on military exigencies and which he seems to expect you to follow with unquestioning obedience, or, if you demand a modification, it is granted as a concession to American unreasonableness. I expect to be able to make them see this in my conversations and it will be as much for their benefit as for ours. I am sorry and I know you are that they should be showing so little wisdom and such inferior statesmanship.

Believe me, Sir

Very sincerely yours,

T. BENTLEY MOTT,  
Colonel, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Mission  
Allied G. H. Q.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Letter

### ***Political Situation in Germany***

*Spa, Belgium, November 29, 1918.*

From: 1st Lt. R. Schellens, A. G. O.

To: Major General C. D. Rhodes, Chief American Section

[Extract]

1. The following information was given me by Baron von Ow Wachendorf in the course of a conversation in which several questions bearing on the political future of Germany were touched upon. Baron Wachendorf is one of the representatives, in the German Section of the Armistice Commission, of the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) of the de-facto German Government. He has been in the German Diplomatic Service since 1909, except for about a year (1915-16) when he was a pilot in the Military Aviation Service on the eastern front. Since leaving the Army he has held important posts in the Foreign Office, having been sent on several occasions to SPA for the purpose of discussing the political situation with Luchendorff. He was recently on the point of being sent to WARSAW as German Charge d'Affaires,

but political developments intervened at the last moment, and a man with more radical political convictions was sent. Baron Wachendorf is a member of an important aristocratic family in BADEN (south Germany).

2. The Baron first of all explained the anomalous position of the German Armistice Commission. All its members were men of the old regime in Germany, and were holding office at the present moment by the grace of the de facto government (Ebert Solf, Scheidemann, etc., the self appointed Volksbeauftragte from the Majority and Minority Social Democratic Parties). This government was in a very precarious position, and the Baron expected its resignation at almost any moment, in fact he was practically certain that his immediate superior, Solf, would resign today, and was momentarily expecting a telephone message from Berlin to that effect.

If the Government resigned, its place would have to be taken by a central committee chosen by the Councils of Soldiers and Workmen, and the immediate consequence of this, as far as the present Armistice Commission was concerned, would be that its members would be replaced by men chosen by the new government, and men of an entirely different stamp. The Allies would then be faced with a situation similar to that faced by the Germans at BREST-LITOVSK when Trotsky would reply to all German proposals with the words: "Do what you like with us. For us the war is over."

3. The burning question in Germany at the present moment is the question of a constituent assembly. This is necessary not only for the purpose of giving the German people a constitution, and a government that would be capable of negotiating a peace with the Allies, but also for the purpose of counteracting the increasingly threatening Separatist tendencies of the south German states, which regarded the present BERLIN Government with suspicion. The overwhelming majority of the German people were in favor of an immediate summoning of the Constituent Assembly in spite of the undoubtedly great difficulties in the way of obtaining a free expression of the will of the German people at the present time. The Baron dwelt on these difficulties at some length; but thought that the Berlin government considered them more insurmountable than they actually were. A constituent assembly chosen at the present time might possibly give the country a provisional constitution and government, to be amended and given definitive form at some later time, when conditions would have become more settled, and a free expression of the popular will more easily obtainable.

The so called Spartacus Group (out and out Bolshevists, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, et al) opposed the plan of calling the Constituent Assembly with all their might, knowing that the popular verdict would be against them. In a general election held now they would probably not get more than 5% of the votes. They wanted time to consolidate their gains and to make fresh conquests. Unfortunately it was this group that had military force at its disposal in BERLIN. "A great deal could be done," he said, "and in a very short time, by twenty armored motor cars equipped with machine guns, in the hands of a determined and irresponsible minority imbued with ideas that were subversive to all established principles of law and order."

4. The German Press did not at the present time, according to the Baron reflect the true state of affairs in Germany. Never since the beginning of the war had the censorship been exercised as strictly as it is being exercised today.

5. The Soldier's and Workmen's councils all over the country are by no means uniform in pattern and profess different principles in different localities. Some of them are almost conservative, a great many are in favor of the principles advocated by the middle class political parties, and a few are of the extreme revolutionary and Bolshevik type. As yet there has been no centralization except in BERLIN and its neighborhood where the councils have elected a central committee. With disorganization in the industrial system, the attendant general unemployment, and with increasing difficulties that were to be foreseen in the conditions of living, it is probable that the councils would become more and

more radical and revolutionary, that they would become uniform in type, and develop a powerful central organization.

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R. SCHELLENS,  
1st Lieutenant, A. G. O.

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HS Fr. Files: 402-30.1: Memorandum

***Condition of War Material to be Delivered***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 2d Section, General Staff  
No. 234/2

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
November 30, 1918.

To the Commanders-in-Chief

Pursuant to the terms of the Armistice Agreement, the Germans will surrender to the Allies the war material in good condition.

Since differences of opinion have become manifest in the interpretation of the phrase in good condition, I consider it necessary to state precisely the meaning that should be given it.

The war material (guns, trench mortars, machine guns, etc.), received or abandoned by the Germans, will be designated in good condition, if it is in a state of immediate utilization, i. e., if the guns are equipped with parts and accessories (except ammunition) regularly provided for firing, according to German regulations.

As to airplanes, they must be in condition for immediate flying and able to execute a military mission of an order corresponding to their type. Consequently, they must be fitted out with aircraft instruments, armament and regular equipment, following German regulations in force (revolution counter, thermometers, pressure guage, etc.).

For classifying war material, whether in good or bad condition, the commissions assigned to receive German war material will be guided by the above instructions.

It will be understood, that German war material, only properly so called, will be considered in the counting of the surrendered guns, trench mortars . . . , with the exclusion of all war material coming from the Allied Armies.

I request the army commanders to send me, as soon after December 1 as possible a recapitulation report of all war material, whatever it be, German and Allied, received by the Armies under their command.

This report will show clearly war material appraised as in good condition and that in bad condition. The nature of information to be furnished concerning airplanes is indicated in the attached memorandum.

By order,

WEYGAND,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Belgian-French Ambitions in Luxemburg***

*November 30, 1918.*

My dear General:

The Belgian Government, through diplomatic channels, has sought and obtained from the French Government, its accord in the Belgian desire to send a Belgian regiment into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. It appears that the French Government made no difficulties.

However, in order to carry out this plan transportation had to be obtained from Marshal Foch. The Belgian representative here, Colonel Menschaert, has had no success whatever in getting the four railway trains necessary. The reasons alleged are the difficulty of cutting through the lines of march of French and British units in order to make this move.

Colonel Menschaert believed that the French Government are hiding behind Marshal Foch and trusting to him (if not instructing him) to make difficulties which will prevent the realization of a plan which they are afraid to oppose openly. The Belgians are very hot about the whole matter, which may account for this allegation of motives. What is certain, however, is that the Marshal puts difficulties into the way of the Belgians and gives reasons which hardly bear examination.

The Belgians expect Luxemburg to be returned to them exactly as ALSACE-LORRAINE is being returned to France, with or without plebiscite. France is planning to get it for herself. Occupation being nine points of the law, the French decided to get a regiment sent to the Capital under guise of a guard for the Marshal; and doubtless he made what seems the unusual and unnecessary choice of his hq., with the view of favoring the project. I believe this regiment has been sent already to Luxemburg or certainly will soon arrive there, although the date for the Marshal's establishing his hq. in this place is now fixed for about December 12.

When the Belgians learned of this plan to send a French regiment into the Duchy they decided that to offset this action they too must send one; hence the negotiations related above.

I had quite a talk with General Weygand and also with Captain Pupier (the Marshal's confidential secretary) regarding the sending of this French regiment to Luxemburg as a guard to Marshal Foch.

I was careful, as I always am in such cases, to say that the ideas expressed were my own and that you had not inspired them.

It seemed to me unfortunate, I said coming on top of the entire absence of American troops in any part of ALSACE-LORRAINE and at any of the celebrations in the regained provinces, that the Marshal had decided to send a French regiment to Luxemburg as his personal guard. I felt sure that if he had known of the Marshal's desire to have a large guard, General Pershing would have been happy to give him an American one. At any rate it would have been a graceful thing to have authorized me to suggest it to General Pershing and find out whether difficulties of a technical nature presented themselves - in other words give General Pershing the choice of sending an American guard or of conforming to the Marshal's suggestion of a French one.

The facts that American troops were occupying the greater part of the Duchy would make it quite conspicuous, that the Marshal commanding the Allied Armies should find it necessary to introduce into this region a French regiment.

Shortly after this I saw the Marshal and he gave me the message to you (which I transmitted orally in PARIS and afterwards in writing to Colonel Boyd), in which, with rather confused sentences, he told me to say that he had not wanted to bother you, that all your

regiments were occupied with their own business and it was perfectly simple to pick up a French regiment that had nothing better to do and send it to Luxemburg.

I said to Pupier, and I believe he will repeat it to the Marshal, that I felt a mistake was being made in handling the Franco-American relations - a mistake which would bear solely upon the French. Remember, I said, that now and hereafter we have nothing whatever to ask of France; she on the other hand has and will have a great deal to seek from us. If advantage is taken of our natural generosity and altruism you go very far in obtaining our help and sympathy. If however, you do not take us into your confidence, if you try to fool us and beat us you will find we are just as clever as you are at all business arrangements. Moreover, we have the whip hand.

I added, in all that concerns our Army you Frenchmen ought to have enough imagination to realize that the American people are just as proud of their Army as the French are of theirs, and that they are just as jealous of any real or imaginary slights put upon it, its generals or its privates as you would be where your Army and its chiefs are concerned. Our Army over here is the emblem, as it is the instruments of our sovereignty and our sentiments. All the formal speeches of politicians and glowing compliments of the press addressed to America in general are not worth anything to our people except as they are confirmed by your attitude and your action toward our Army here in France.

I cannot escape the conviction that the Marshal, either of his own motion or on suggestion from his Government, is using his position as Commander-in-Chief to further the political designs of the French Government. I think the action taken in regard to mixed commands in the bridgeheads goes much deeper than any desire on his part to have French divisions at every point, or any thought of holding the American forces in tutelage. It is a part of a plan to make the Germans feel that the French Army has won the war, other troops helping. If French soldiers are in or about all the important towns along the whole RHINE, the population is impressed with the fact that France is standing astride of Germany at every point.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Letter

### ***Occupation of Aix-la-Chapelle***

AMERICAN SECTION,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 30, 1918.*

No. 11

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. The Allied Commission announced that in accordance with a request of the German High Command the city of AIX-la-CHAPELLE would probably be occupied by Allied troops on

December 1, and the city of COLOGNE would be occupied by Allied staff officers as soon as possible, but that they could hardly be sent by the first of December.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1234: Telegram

***German Sick and Wounded Prisoners to be Evacuated***

4303RS 84 OB  
Senlis 30

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*November 30, 1918.*

Chief of Staff

Number 62. Saturday, 11 p. m. Following note from Marshal Foch, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, received, "On the recommendation of the Permanent Armistice Commission at SPA, Marshal Foch has decided that sick and wounded, not in a condition to be transported, which are left by the Germans in the Rhine Provinces, will not be considered as prisoners. They should, therefore, be evacuated into Germany as soon as their condition permits."

MOTT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1208: Agreement

***Prisoners of War***

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
SUBCOMMISSION OF PRISONERS OF WAR,  
*Spa, Belgium, November 29, 1918.*

**AGREEMENT CONCERNING REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS**

(Annex to the Agreement of November 11, 1918, relative to the conclusion of an Armistice between the Allied Governments and the United States on the one hand, and Germany on the other.)

I. General Conditions of Repatriation:

Repatriation of prisoners of war belonging to the Allied Nations and the United States shall take place upon the following conditions:

(a) The prisoners that are stationed in the territory of the west bank of the RHINE (prisoners in the zone of the Armies) and in the territory of the west bank of the

RHINE shall be turned over on the spot to the military authorities of the Allies and the United States.

(b) The prisoners that are stationed in the territories of central Germany and northern Germany lying east of the RHINE shall be repatriated in principle by way of the sea.

(c) The prisoners that are stationed in the territories of southern Germany shall be repatriated, principally by rail, by way of Switzerland.

II. Prisoners of War on the Left Bank of the Rhine: These prisoners shall be maintained in their camps or in the centers where they are employed and assembled as far as possible in collecting centers in case they have already left their camps. These collecting centers are as follows: STRAELEN, WEGBERG, GEILENKIRCHEN, AIX-la-CHAPELLE, EUPEN, MALMEDY, St-VITH, LICHTENBORD, NEUERBURG, NEUNKIRCHEN, MAYENCE [MAINZ], WORMS, PIRMASENS, BERGZABERN. The maintenance of the prisoners there shall be assured under suitable conditions by the German Government, which remains responsible for feeding and medical care, hygiene and prophylaxis only of the camps and collecting camps on the left bank of the RHINE. These prisoners shall be delivered in measure as the Allied troops arrive at the points where they are assembled. German detachments left to guard these prisoners shall be left free to return to their lines after their mission is accomplished. The Commanding officers of the Allied Armies may decide, after agreement with the Commanding Officers of the Armies opposing, to send forward precursory detachments under the white flag into the opposing lines to the points where these prisoners are collected, in which case the prisoners shall immediately be turned over to them. The number of prisoners assembled in each point with indication of their nationality shall be communicated from the German Army to the Allied Army concerned before the arrival of the precursory detachments.

III. Prisoners of Central Germany and Northern Germany: These prisoners shall, according to their geographical situation, be sent to the following maritime ports for the purpose of repatriation: KONIGSBERG, DANZIG, STETTIN, STRALSUND, LUBECK, HAMBURG, BREMERHAVEN, ROTTERDAM, ANTWERP, FLUSHING. Their transportation to these ports shall be assured either by rail or by river boat and in such a way that embarkations at the maritime ports may not suffer any delay on account of transportation from the interior of Germany or on account of sanitary and prophylaxis measures, which will be taken either at their departure from interior camp or at their arrival in the port.

Interallied Commissions, called Commissions of Reception of Prisoners of War, protected by the Convention of GENEVA, shall be installed in these ports. They shall have as their mission the taking charge of the prisoners as soon as they set foot on the boat and to assure as far as possible their embarkation by nationalities and to regulate details of transportation by sea and to assure themselves that all useful measures have been taken with a view to dividing the men in the best way for the voyage. They will not meddle in any way with the organization or execution of transportation from the interior of Germany, except where the German authorities shall call for their assistance.

These Commissions shall have every facility for communicating freely with the Allied Governments and with that of the United States either by telegraph or by wireless. So far as the prisoners of the RHINE district are concerned (the right bank of the RHINE) the Commission for reception of prisoners shall sit at WESEL.

Camps of the Neutral Zone and of the bridgehead zones shall be utilized as assembly points with a view to the embarkation for river transportation. Delegates from the Commission of Reception shall be furnished by the Armies of Occupation and shall be detached in these different camps to aid in looking after all operations and in maintaining order.

IV. Prisoners of Southern Germany: These prisoners shall be repatriated by rail. Three routes of transportation shall be organized to this effect through Switzerland, which shall be entered by way of BALE [BASEL], SINGEN and CONSTANCE (the question of transportation of prisoners at INNSBRUCK is held in abeyance for the present).

Reception commissions of the Allies shall be installed at these points. Their mission

shall be analogous to that indicated under Article 3 above. The German Government retains full responsibility for the prisoners up to the moment that they are taken in charge by these Commissions.

V. Civil Prisoners: Civil prisoners shall, according to the position of their camp, be repatriated in like manner as prisoners of war. They will necessarily form a part of the first transports whatever shall be their condition, whether interned or detained or condemned, etc.

VI. Provisioning: The feeding of the prisoners of war is assured by the care of Germany and under her entire responsibility up to the time when the prisoners shall be turned over to the military authorities of the Allies. The Allied powers and the United States shall nevertheless continue in conformity with previous agreements to send the prisoners of the Entente bread and other food, clothing and underclothing.

(a) Transition Period: In order to cause no disturbance in the additional provisioning measure to the prisoners, the organization of this provisioning as it was functioning and before the signing of the Armistice is maintained for the present, the trains coming from Switzerland, from Holland and Denmark being routed by the most expeditious routes under the entire responsibility of the German Government.

These trains may be convoyed either by a guard furnished by the Allied Armies or by Neutral Armies or by delegations of the Allied and Neutral Armies according to the choice of the Entente. Aid committees of the camps and detachments may beginning with the present communicate by telegraph with the organizations of the Entente which provision them.

(b) Second Period: The repatriation of prisoners being organized without distinction of nationality, partly by rail and partly by sea, the provisioning shall likewise as soon as possible be organized under the same conditions. The provisioning of prisoners stationed in Bavaria and WURTEMBERG shall be by Switzerland. The provisioning of other prisoners in region east of the RHINE shall be transported on the boats destined to transfer prisoners to be repatriated.

Provisions and effects shall be unloaded in the maritime ports of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. The storehouses shall be managed by the German authorities on conditions to assure their absolute safety. Part of these provisions shall be sent to the different ports and part to the camps and detachments.

The German Government will take every care necessary to assure the entire safety and the expedition of these transports, which may be convoyed under the same conditions as above. In all the river and maritime ports where depots of provisions and clothing shall be established there shall be immediately established an aid committee under the conditions provided in the Agreement of BERNE of April 26, 1918. These committees shall function up to the time of the liberation of the prisoners. They shall be able to correspond freely by telegraph with the organizations sending provisions and with the Governments of the Allied States and of the United States. All facilities according to these expeditions by previous agreements remain in force.

VII. Sanitary Measures: General sanitary and prophylactic dispositions to be applied for the evacuation of prisoners form the object of a special detailed note attached. Interallied Medical Commissions placed with the Commissions for the Reception of Prisoners of War shall function under the conditions determined in said note. Further, at the river embarkation points, there will be placed Interallied medical subcommissions, which shall work under the same conditions and shall keep in touch with the corresponding medical commission. For this purpose, all facilities for telephonic, telegraphic and wireless communication shall be assured these subcommissions.

VIII. Russian and Rumanian Prisoners of War: The present agreement is not applicable to prisoners of war or civil prisoners of Russia or Rumania. The German Government is required to take all necessary steps for the repatriation of these prisoners either directly to their native country through Germany or by way of the sea. In any case:

(a) The convoys for repatriation of Russian or Rumanian prisoners of war shall not be allowed either to precede or to hinder the convoys of other prisoners on any line.

(b) All the Russian and Rumanian prisoners who are at present stationed on the left bank of the RHINE must have been evacuated from this territory at the same time with the German Armies.

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G-1: GHQ: 383.6: Fldr. 12: Telegram

***Repatriation of American Prisoners***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*December 1, 1918.*

To: Colonel Harvey D. Gibson, American Red Cross, PARIS

Number 4213 G-1. In connection with return of American prisoners of war and civilians from Germany, we recently telegraphed Colonel W. F. H. Godson, Military Attache at BERNE, asking if he, either alone or through Red Cross, could arrange for systematic search of all occupied territory between Switzerland and territory now occupied by American Army for American prisoners or civilians. Although French Army are expected to care for such Americans, we feared that some neglected sick and wounded would be overlooked or not promptly reported and hence suggested that thorough search be made. We are just in receipt of following reply from Colonel Godson: "Stewart, Red Cross here and I, both believe that PARIS Red Cross can handle territory south of that occupied by American Army and STRASSBURG and vicinity more efficiently than we can here owing to difficulty of supply from Switzerland and in passing frontier. Levy, Red Cross at STRASSBURG, but can't reach him by wire now. Suggest that Red Cross searchers be sent at once from France with motor service and personnel to cover ALSACE. Gibson is advised of this recommendation and will comply. Am sending representatives to BALE and COLMAR from here to get in touch with Levy and secure all possible information. Red Cross have sent delegates into Germany to concentrate prisoners at RASTATT and CONSTANCE and care for invalid cases." We greatly appreciate splendid work which is being done by Red Cross for American prisoners and hope that you can undertake this work. American detachments with medical personnel and supplies for care of American prisoners and civilians have been established at BESANCON and LYON, where they should be sent if possible but if impossible to send them there or to turn them over to Red Cross in Switzerland, we will send transportation wherever necessary.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

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**Prisoners of War**

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
SESSION, SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 1, 1918.  
SPA, BELGIUM.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

ALLIES: From "Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to the German High Command, Number 226-2; I have been informed that Allied prisoners of war belonging to all nationalities continue to enter our lines without any resources and in a state of physical exhaustion. The German authorities without taking account of the wounded or ill are freeing these prisoners without any kind of care and in large numbers, instead of gathering them together at certain well defined points as they were several times asked to do and thus make impossible their acceptance in respectable conditions. I protest energetically against these unendurable acts of the German authorities. If a change of attitude does not occur the severest measures of reprisal will fall. The French Government in agreement with the British Government has formally reserved the right to render justice to the ruthless acts imposed upon our prisoners and to take personal action against all responsible authors."

GERMANS: We have even discussed in this Commission the very difficult subject of prisoners of war. It has been noted here again and again that neither the civil or military authorities of Germany have any other desire than to deliver up the prisoners under the most orderly and excellent conditions. In this connection we are doing all that is within the realms of human power to do. I believe that the members of the Inter-allied Commission have the impression that the German members of the Commission likewise are making every endeavor to this end. I wish to enter emphatic protest in this connection. Marshal Foch is delivering himself of a very severe and unjust criticism against the German authorities. The reasons why the return of these prisoners of war is so difficult are two: One reason is the extreme disorder that is occurring at the present time in German internal civil life. This disorder is very regrettable and very unpleasant to us. It paralyzes our internal life and has its affect also upon our returning prisoners. The second reason is, however, the attitude of the prisoners of war themselves. We are busying ourselves in every way possible to urge these prisoners of war to remain or to return to the camps and workshops until the regular and orderly delivery can occur. But the prisoners of war usually pay no attention to these prescriptions. They have but one desire, to get back as soon as possible to their country, and they have the feeling that they can get back sooner through their own initiative than to depend upon the assistance of the German authorities. We had the same experience when the revolution broke out in Russia. A large number of prisoners came back into Germany under their own initiative, and without waiting for the help of the military authorities. It is no wonder that a great many these people who ran away and who were under the greatest difficulties, reached our lines under the most lamentable circumstances. The same thing is true at the present time for a large number of the prisoners of the Allies. Yesterday, even, I had a long telephonic conversation with the Chief of Police of AIX-la-CHAPELLE. He told me in terms of great emotion that he was giving himself the greatest trouble to keep back at AIX-la-CHAPELLE the prisoners and get them under military supervision. That he had taken measures to secure for them good treatment and good provision, and in spite of this half

of the prisoners ran away scarcely had they been received. In this connection I would like to read a communication that arrived yesterday:

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission, General von Winterfeldt, to the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission, General Nudant. The Ministry of War at BERLIN has just informed me that the sick and officers camp - that is, the prisoners of war camp at EUSTIN has become untenable. Within the recent nights about a hundred officers have run away in order to reach home under their own initiative. The prisoners request the exact time expedition. They refuse to obey and they demand complete liberty of movement outside the camp. The commander of the camp refuses under these circumstances to take any responsibility for the security of the prisoners. The same thing has occurred as has already been stated in VILLINGEN, MANWHEIM and other camps. I beg that information be given to the prisoners of the Allied Government by the Allied Government as soon as possible through the German press that these prisoners be urged to obey the orders of the German authorities until they are sent off if importance is laid upon an orderly delivery of prisoners. The circumstances demand the greatest haste. The German authorities wish to avoid as far as possible the use of force.

ALLIES: I have nothing to add to the statement of Marshal Foch, the text of which is perfectly clear.

\* \* \* \* \*

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Report

### ***Closing of Alsace-Lorraine Frontier***

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
SESSION, SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 1, 1918.  
SPA, BELGIUM.

[Extract]

ALLIES: I hand over to you a note that has come to me from Marshal Foch concerning bank checks in ALSACE-LORRAINE;

From the Commander-in-Chief to General Nudant, Number 217-2: The ALSACE-LORRAINE frontier will be closed until further orders as far as neighboring countries, Swiss, [Switzerland], D \_\_\_\_\_ of BADEN [Grand Duchy of BADEN] and the regions of LUXEMBURG are concerned, probably for about ten days. It is requested that these measures be communicated to the German troops for the purpose of avoiding congestions at the roads of contact. The ALSACE-LORRAINE frontier between the RHINE and the MOSELLE is defined by Line Number 2.

\* \* \* \* \*

GERMAN: From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the French Armistice Commission, General Nudant: By means of the telegram of November 30,

Number 217-2, the Armistice Commission is informed that the frontier has been ordered closed between ALSACE-LORRAINE and the land bordering upon it. Thereby the territory of SAARBRUCKEN and SAARLOUIS are drawn into the limits of ALSACE-LORRAINE. The Armistice Commission will transmit this information to the German Government, but now enters protest against the wilful and cruel policy of force which lies herein to prevent all communication - that all intercourse is prohibited between these lands previously named which are bound together with the neighboring lands through the narrowest economic and personal relationship. The measures affect to the severest degree the Provinces of SAARBRUCKEN and SAARLOUIS that form a part of the Prussian Rhine Provinces. The independence of the daily life of these people is inseparable in all of these questions. For example, a well ordered exploitation of the railway system is made impossible by the closing of the frontier limits. The closing of the frontier could hardly be based upon the military necessities as they now exist. It is rather an economic question. It is calculated further to becloud the circumstances that may arise in the occupied lands. Germany according to her experiences so far has the right and duty to ask that it be allowed to keep watch upon the circumstances that arise in the occupied German lands.

ALLIES: I do not know the reason for this action on the part of the High Command, but I presume they are consistent with certain definite information. I believe that the reason is based on something deeper than the mere communication of territory with territory. But this question of cruelty toward the population of SAARBRUCKEN and SAARLOUIS I believe is a very small part of the question.

\* \* \* \* \*

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G-3: GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Note

### ***Type of Locomotives Specified***

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION,  
*Spa, December 1, 1918.*

No. 54/T

Major General Nudant, President of the Permanent International Armistice Commission

To General von Winterfeldt, President of the German Armistice Commission

Reply to Note No. 290, of November 30, 1918.

The latest instructions of the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, are decisive: The locomotives to be turned over by the German authorities must be of a type able to haul at least a load of 750 tons up an incline of 1 in 10.

The Allied technical experts have decided which series of locomotives in the German park are capable of fulfilling this requirement.

The list of these series of locomotives has been transmitted to the German delegates. The question is not to be discussed at further length by the Sub-committee on

Transportation until you will have informed me whether the German Armistice Commission is prepared or not to conform to the instructions of the Marshal, Commanding the Allied Armies.

I request you to give me your reply within 24 hours.

-----

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Telegram

### ***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C., sent to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, November 30, 1918, the following Telegram, No. 88:

The Germans have offered 1,500 machines of 800 to 900 tons, 2,000 machines of 650 to 800 tons, 1,000 machines of 500 to 600 tons and 500 machines of lesser weight.

We have vigorously affirmed the following point of view: 2,000 machines of 900 tons; 2,000 machines of 750 to 800 tons; and 1,000 machines of about 750 tons.

The discussion in today's session of the Subcommittee on Transportation was very heated. Here the question of acceptance or rejection was flatly opposed, and to bring an end to the discussion the attention of the German Subcommittee was called to the gravity in maintaining its point of view.

The decision indicated by Telegram 918/CR regarding the minimum category of 750 tons will be notified to the President of the German Armistice Commission in full session for the last time tomorrow morning.

In view of the gravity of the situation would it be possible to lower the figure to around 650 tons and in how far?

Numbered and sent Nov. 30, 1918,  
at 10:05 with the No. 61/N.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Letter

### ***German Railroad Personnel***

AMERICAN SECTION A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 1, 1918.*

No. 12

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Railway Transportation.

In regard to the retention of German railroad personnel, the Allied Commission has

notified Marshal Foch of instructions given to the officials charged with the management of railways in the occupied territory in which (a) the German personnel left on the left bank of the RHINE would be assured of the service under Allied direction who will establish necessary rules for each branch of service - such German personnel being subject to the same disciplinary measures as the French railroad personnel; (b) the operation of such railroads would follow the German system in the occupied territory, but under the direction and control of the Inter-Allied Railroad Commission; (c) the rationing of the German personnel will be guaranteed by the [said] Railroad Commission, who have received instructions to that effect; (d) all the personnel, including that pertaining to navigation and to the materiel services will be furnished with a brassard and credentials according to a form furnished by the C. I. P. A. [P. I. A. C.], which will stamp and countersign each set of credentials.

A German delegate is requested to be accredited to each commission to smooth out local difficulties which may arise.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Letter

***Naval Clauses Pertaining to North Sea***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, Belgium, December 1, 1918.

No. 12

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

6. Blockade: In a radiogram received from the French Ministry of Marine, \* \* \* it was announced that the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the North Sea was empowered to arrange with the Admiral at KONIGSBERG as to the details of the execution of clauses of the Armistice Agreement relating to the North Sea and will arrange for a commission to supervise the execution of clauses relating to ports and sea coasts of Germany. It was pointed out that the German Admiral must be similarly empowered.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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***Effect of Political Unrest on German Armistice Commission***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 1, 1918.*

No. 12

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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9. Private Conference with General Winterfeldt: The substance of the private conference with the Chairman of the German Commission, General von Winterfeldt, is hereto appended, marked G, participated in by the four Allied Generals and the German General.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G.

[Extract]

This morning, after the general conference of the International Armistice Commission, General von Winterfeldt requested that the four Allied Commissioners meet him privately to discuss certain matters of importance. In addition to General von Winterfeldt, there were present Generals Nudant, Hanking, Delobbe, and Rhodes.

General von Winterfeldt prefaced his remarks by thanking us for the privilege of speaking to the commissioners privately. He then went on to say that in his opinion Marshal Foch had no true conception of the state of political unrest in Germany, and of the difficulties which both the German Commission and the German High Command had in carrying out the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Furthermore, he depreciated the fact that Marshal Foch was inclined to make the application of the details of the Armistice as difficult as possible. He brought before us a book containing the terms of the agreement made between the German and French Armies at METZ in 1870, in which he pointed out a clause which stated that interpretations would be construed in favor of the French Armies. He remarked that a similar construction should now be followed in favor of the German Armies, when as a matter of fact all of recent interpretations had been construed against the German Army.

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He also remarked that the question of the privilege of German fishermen fishing on the north coast of Germany was one which had not been settled as yet and which was of the greatest economic importance to his country, in view of the very critical food situation now existing.

\* \* \* \* \*

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Note

***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

[Contemporary Translation]

File No. 1456/330

ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 2, 1918.*  
For the Belgium Mission.

The President of the German Armistice Commission

To the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, General Nudant,

The German Armistice Commission has the honor of replying as follows to the Note of General Nudant of Dec. 1, No. 54/7.

Marshal Foch demands that the locomotives to be handed over must at least be powerful enough to haul 750 tons up an incline of 1 in 100. The German Armistice Commission cannot recognize this point of view as being justified. Nothing is said in the Armistice Agreement in regard to the strength of the locomotives to be delivered. In such questions, according to generally valid principles of law, when the quality of the objects to be delivered is not clearly specified, objects should be delivered whose quality corresponds to the average of the qualities on hand.

The demand that the capacity of 750 tons should be applied to all locomotives if insisted on would signify an alteration in the conditions of the Armistice. The German Government could agree to this alteration only if the Allied High Command were prepared to postpone the term of delivery until Feb. 1, 1919. Only by means of this extension of time would the German Government be in a position by the repair of defective locomotives, to deliver locomotives of the required strengths.

The statement is repeated, moreover, that the German Government is guided by the desire loyally to execute the obligations it has undertaken, and has therefore issued orders that no interruption in delivery shall take place.

WINTERFELDT.

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***Return of Troops and Reconstruction of France***

No. 2274-R  
PERSHING

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
ADJUTANT GENERALS OFFICE,  
*Washington, D. C., December 2, 1918.*

AMEXFORCE HAEF

Paragraph 1.

Your number 1933, November 28, received. It is not thought wise to make any public announcement of a policy on this subject, but a definite policy has been adopted and you are free to communicate it to Marshal Foch and such others as may present aspect of the matter to you.

Subparagraph A.

The policy of the United States is to bring about the immediate return to the United States of our soldiers in France as rapidly as transportation facilities are available or can be supplied. Meantime, the number needed for necessary military uses in occupied territory will be retained abroad, but only so long as they are absolutely needed. This Government is not averse to the use of American troops in the Army of Occupation pending the conclusion of peace and the carrying out of the terms of the treaty, and in view of the fact that the soldiers of our Allies have been longer engaged than ours, it would seem just for our Army to do perhaps more than its strictly numerical share in supplying soldiers to the Army of Occupation; but no soldier of the United States can be retained in France for any other than strictly necessary military purposes. It is highly desirable to have our soldiers in France, while awaiting transportation home, usefully occupied both in maturing their training and in any other way which will be helpful to them, and if incidental advantage results to the people of France, it will be all the better; but no soldier of the United States can be retained in France to be used as laborer or in reconstruction work, and the most which can be done in that regard is to offer to our soldiers such opportunities as are consistent with the necessary military situation to work voluntarily upon such reconstruction enterprises. There are perhaps large numbers of our soldiers who would be glad to assist the French people among whom they have been so hospitably entertained. The gift of service, however, is from them as individuals to France. No part of their duties to their own Government as soldiers would justify our Government in requiring them to perform such labor for such purpose. BAKER.

P. C. HARRIS,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
The Adjutant General.

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**Regulation of Circulation by Belgian Military Secret Service**

[Contemporary Translation]

BELGIAN MILITARY MISSION  
attached to  
American G. H. Q.

No. S 66

*Arlon, [Belgium] December 2, 1918.*

REPORT concerning the activity of the Belgian  
Military Service attached to the American  
Third Army During the week of Nov. 25 to  
Dec. 2.

[Extract]

I. CIRCULATION: With a view to restraining and controlling circulation and to prevent penetration into our zone by enemy agents, a service has been organized regulating:

- (a) the circulation in the interior of the American sector in Belgium;
- (b) the circulation towards France and Luxemburg;
- (c) the circulation from France or from Luxemburg towards the American sector in Belgium.

Circulation permits are not accorded except for very serious reasons and to persons about whom we have full information.

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LAGNEAUX,  
Inspecteur de la Surete Militaire Belge,  
attached to the American Third Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telegram

**Status of Demobilized Persons in Occupied Territories**

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Senlis, Dec. 2, 1918.*

Received at GHQ, AEF:

Chief of Staff, GHQ, AEF:

Number 64. Monday, 4:45 p. m. Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies fixes as follows the situation of demobilized persons found in occupied countries:

In ALSACE-LORRAINE: All demobilized persons, officers included, already on the spot or returning to their homes, may live there or return there. No administrative military official can live there or return there.

In the Rhenish countries to be occupied by the Allied troops: All demobilized persons, officers included, may remain there or return there if they were domiciled there before the war. Following administrative military officials: Those of the Quartermaster Department, Medical Department, Fortification Service, Recruiting Service, will continue to function there until further orders with same status as civil administrations under control of the Allied Command. Signed FOCH.

T. BENTLY MOTT,  
Colonel, Chief, American Mission,  
Allied G. H. Q.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telegram

### ***German Garrisons***

FC G-3

*December 2, 1918.*

Commanding General, American Third Army

2276-G-3. Telegram received from Allied Commander-in-Chief, copy of which is being sent you by courier, authorizes German garrisons to remain, on special request from German commanders, in important cities until such garrisons are relieved by Allied troops. In no case however are the garrisons to remain beyond the time limit imposed by the conditions of the Armistice. Moreover such garrisons as do remain until relieved by Allied troops are, by implication, limited to the personnel necessary to maintain order.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff.  
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Note

### ***Prisoners of War***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 46/P. G. 2

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 2, 1918.*

General Nudant, President of the  
Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission

To General von Winterfeldt, President  
of the German Commission

It is established, on the basis of information furnished by the British Admiralty, that numerous submerged mines in the waterways of the Baltic and of the North Sea, do not



I have the honor of requesting you to let me know as soon as possible of your agreement in this matter.

NUDANT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telegram

**Maintenance Funds**

*Spa, Belgium, December 2, 1918.*

To Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

Number 39. By direction of Marshal Foch Armistice Commission has today notified Government regarding payment of funds to Allied Armies for maintenance of same under article nine Armistice Agreement while occupying certain German territory. Amount due American Government to cover one month on this maintenance fifty-four million marks payable at time and place to be made known later. This dispatch is merely advance information of more detailed instructions from Allied High Command.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Letter

**Maintenance of Armies of Occupation**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 2, 1918.*

No. 13

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

6. Payment of Funds to Allies: The Allied Commission advised the German High Command that ten million marks would be turned over to the British Army at DUREN, on December 5, and thirty million marks at COLOGNE on December 12, for the maintenance of that Army for one month; in like manner, fifty-four million marks would be turned over to the American Army for one month's maintenance at such time and place as would be made known later.

To this the German Commission replied that it would be necessary to come to some agreement as to the amounts to be paid over to the British and American Armies through a subcommission, and that a request for the organization of such a subcommission should receive prompt consideration by the Allied High Command.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Letter

**Naval Armistice Commission**

AMERICAN SECTION A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 2, 1918.*

No. 13

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Naval Armistice Commission.\*

In a note from Marshal Foch to the Allied Commission it was announced that questions relating to the Naval clauses of the Armistice Agreement would be decided by the Naval Armistice Commission, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied fleet was not authorized to treat questions pertaining to the Armistice Agreement.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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\* Editorial note: The execution of the naval clauses of the Armistice does not appear to have been either a direct function of the A. E. F. or a primary concern of the P. I. A. C. However, several of the documents thereon which passed through the P. I. A. C. and certain others are presented as an indication of the general naval problems faced.

**Treatment of German Railway Workers**

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 2, 1918.

TO: Commanding General, G-4, Third Army

1. Four your information the following extracts from a communication dated November 28, 1918, from the D. C. G. R. A., relative to measures taken to safeguard German personnel working on railroads, is quoted. The measures suggested will be carried out as far as it is practicable to do so.

It is highly desirable that confidence should be inspired in all German personnel on the ways of communication who have remained at their posts and to facilitate the return of those who fled through of the hostility of the population and Allied soldiers. For this purpose, there will be distributed, through the Permanent International Armistice Commission, to each official and employee of the ways of communication who remained at or returned to his post:

1. A laissez-passor written in French, English and German languages, with the following text:

This man belongs to such a German organization, personnel intended for the upkeep and operation of ways of communication, Note Annex two, Article two of the Armistice Convention. While on duty and off duty there is due him the protection of his person and goods. He is under the protection of the Allied Armies and cannot be arrested or interned without reasons which would demand the arrest of Allied subjects. He cannot be made prisoner. In compliance with the order of the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, he should be well treated.

2. A brassard of white cloth with black letters V. C. and numbered in the same manner as the French railroad employees.

Please give these instructions to the American authorities, requesting them to give all necessary orders for the protection desired to be accorded to the foreign personnel who have the laissez-passes and the brassard, as indicated above.

Chief of Staff.

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**Postal Censorship**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 2, 1918.*

No. 13

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Postal Exemption: The Allied Commission announced that postal communications addressed to and from the German Armistice Commission would be exempted from Allied control and censorship.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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**Political Conditions in Treves**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 3, 1918.*

No. 14

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Political Conditions in TREVES: A member of my staff visiting TREVES on December 2 saw no indication of any disturbances. He was told that on November 9, certain Bolshevick demonstrations were made, and civil prisoners were released, but that on the following day order was restored. A member of the Soldiers and Workmen's Council claimed that order had been restored by his organization, which he stated was anxious for a national assembly. The staff officer reports great bitterness existing on the part of German officials of the old regime against the Soldiers and Workmen's

Council; and that the people of TREVES apparently look forward to American occupation without misgivings.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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HS Fr. Files: 402-30.1: Letter

***Movement of American Division to Mayence Bridgehead***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.  
No. 7680

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
December 3, 1918.

Lieut. Colonel GEORGES

To Colonel BENTLEY MOTT, Chief of the American Military Mission  
with the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

Dear Colonel:

According to a telephone message received today, General Fayolle could not have reached an understanding with the American Third Army on the movement of the American division which will participate in the occupation of the MAYENCE bridgehead.

General Fayolle states that it will be necessary for this division to commence its movement at once in order to arrive at its destination at the proper time.

General Desticker, now ill, instructs me to ask if you will kindly invite General Pershing's attention immediately to that fact, so that the movement of the division may be conducted expediently and begun as soon as possible.

Will you accept, Colonel, my respectful and devoted sentiments.

GEORGES.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telegram

***Military Occupation of Important Centers***

December 3, 1918.

To Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

No. 43

In contemplation that no German troops shall remain in evacuated zones after the dates named in the Armistice Agreement and in view of the desirability of leaving no cities in evacuated zones without police protection Marshal Foch has directed that in the event commanders of Allied Armies receive specific requests from the German command in

their front, they shall take all necessary steps to provide for such previous military occupation of important centers by Allied troops as will be necessary for maintenance of order.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telegram

***Entry of Troops into Coblenz***

*December 3, 1918.*

To Commander-in-Chief, G. H. Q., American E. F.

No. 44

The following extract of message presented to the Armistice Commission by the German High Command is transmitted for your information. "The entry of enemy troops in COBLENZ may presumably take place on December eighth at four o'clock in the afternoon. The staffs of the Allies enter at noon of December seventh through the west road out of METTERNICH (west of COBLENZ)."

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-1, Third Army: Gen. File 383.6, Fldr. 4: Telegram

***Disposition of Sick and Wounded Germans***

57 V-Q-CV-63 OB

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*December 3, 1918.*

Commanding General, Third Army

Number 4267 -G-1. Instructions received from Marshal Foch that sick and wounded not in condition to be transported who are left by Germans in Rhine Provinces, will not be considered as prisoners but will be evacuated into Germany as soon as their conditions permit. You will be guided by these instructions.

ANDREWS.

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**Repatriation of American Prisoners**

*December 3, 1918--6:59 p. m.*

TOURS 3

C-in-C

H. A. E. F., G-1.

249 G-1. Reference your 4251 G-1. Arrangement has been concluded for British to transport to England all American prisoners in the vicinity of the various German ports at the same time they move their own large prisoner personnel from these same ports. General Biddle and Army Transport Service in England will take care of all prisoners arriving and will arrange to forward them to France or America as is desired.

JAMES G. HARBORD,  
Major General, U. S. A.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 383.6: Fldr. 21: Memo

**United States Representative for Berlin Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners**

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*December 3, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Prisoners

1. Following telegram has just been received from Chief, American Committee, Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission:

An Allied Government committee to handle repatriation of prisoners is being constituted at BERLIN. It is suggested that Mr. Husband of Red Cross now in BERLIN or another suitable representative be instructed to represent American interests.

2. We do not approve of sending Mr. Husband of the Red Cross to BERLIN as the American representative. We have asked the Military Attache at BERNE to send a competent representative who is familiar with the existing plans for repatriating American prisoners through Switzerland, and suggested that Mr. Husband might join such representative. The Military Attache has been told that any representative sent for this purpose will be limited solely to facilitating existing plans for repatriating our own prisoners and will be subordinate to any officer sent from these headquarters to represent American interests generally.

3. The difficult question in the repatriation of prisoners will be the proper handling of Russians, Serbians and other eastern prisoners who will be liberated in large numbers. Existing orders from Marshal Foch require Russians to be refused admittance to our lines and sent back to Germany; but this may not be entirely easy to accomplish.

4. It is believed that a very strong stand should be taken by the American representative to insist that all of these eastern prisoners be repatriated by Germany to their own homes and not allowed to come to or through our lines for food. There are other questions involved which have been discussed between G-4 and this section, and which ought to be taken up by a competent representative.

5. It is recommended that an officer, preferably of high rank, be sent to BERLIN for this purpose via SPA where he will receive full information from General Rhodes. Brigadier General John J. Bradley, G. S., is reported available for this purpose, and will be at these headquarters tomorrow, December 4.

6. Your instructions are requested.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1234: Cablegram

***Evacuation of American Prisoners***

No. 1952-S

*December 3, 1918.*

AGWAR  
WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

[Extract]

Paragraph 1.

Further referring to A 2245, Subparagraph C and P 1938, we have requested British Government to evacuate our prisoners with their own prisoners from scattered Baltic ports direct to England, where they will be delivered promptly to American units. While accurate information is impossible, later reports from Chief, American Committee Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission confirm earlier reports that number of American prisoners to be evacuated from Baltic ports will probably be small, scattered, and not sufficient to justify sending special steamers therefor.

\* \* \* \* \*

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, U. S. A.

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**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 3, 1918.*

No. 14

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Prisoners: The French Government is sending General Dupont of the French Army to BERLIN to assist in the collection and repatriation of French prisoners. I have sent a radiogram this afternoon stating this fact and suggesting that, should it be found desirable to send an American officer to BERLIN for a similar purpose, the matter be taken up with Marshal Foch.

On December 1 and 2, a member of my staff visited St-VITH and MALMEDY and found that no prisoners of war had been collected at these places, - the Allied lines having already advanced thus far. In TREVES the staff officer found that a number of prisoners had been collected and sent to SAARBRUCKEN. He found in the hospital at TREVES 150 Allied prisoners, of which 55 were Americans, and 3 of the latter were officers. All had been more or less severely wounded, and some of these Allied prisoners had been in German hands as long as six months. They all told my staff officer that they had no complaint to make and had been treated by the Germans with all possible consideration. Indeed, some of them stated that the food was better than that which the German population receives. The hospital was taken over at 11 o'clock, December 2, by the American authorities.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Delivery of War Material**

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION, A. E. F.,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 3, 1918.*

MEETING OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON MATERIEL

Captain Geyer states that according to his report the Germans have delivered up to date materiel as follows:

Aeroplanes	1,493
Field guns	2,689

Heavy guns	2,512
Machine guns	24,290
Minenwerfer	1,851

Captain Geyer further stated that these reports are as yet incomplete and that he expects that all materiel, except perhaps the aeroplanes, will be delivered in larger numbers than required by the Armistice.

Lists of military installations in the districts to be occupied were handed over - copies to follow.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telegram

***Correction in Text of Armistice***

AMERICAN MISSION, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Senlis, December 3, 1918.*

Received at G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Chief of staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Number 67. Following received from Marshal Foch: "Correction of the text of the Armistice Agreement of November eleventh, 1918. Clause thirteen for the words: Of the evacuation by the German troops and substitute: Immediate putting into operation of the recall of all the instructors, prisoners, etc. The remainder without change."

T. BENTLEY MOTT,  
Colonel, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Mission, Allied G. H. Q.

[Editorial Note: The clause referred to reads as follows: The immediate beginning of the evacuation by German troops and the recall of all instructors, prisoners and civil and military agents of Germany who are now within the territory of Russia (within the boundaries as of August 1914.)]

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**Occupation of German Territory by Allied Troops**

AMERICAN MISSION, A. E. F.,  
Serlts, December 3, 1918.

General Fox Connor

Asst. Chief of Staff G-3

American E. F. Chaumont

No. \_\_\_\_\_. Tuesday, 11 p. m. Following having been telephoned you by me is now being forwarded as a matter of record. Letter from Marshal Foch to General Pershing No. 7386 of November 30, 1918:

I recognize and appreciate thoroughly the considerations which you mention in your letter of November 28, relative to occupation of German territories by Allied troops. However, because of reasons of high importance it is not possible for me, for the moment, to modify the dispositions contained in my Decision 6636 of November 21, confirming proposals which I had the honor to submit to you by Letter 6231 under date of November 16. F. Foch.

Letter No. 576 dated December 2, from General Weygand to Etat Major Bacon for Colonel Mott:

The Marshal transmitted to you, on November 30, his reply to be forwarded to General Pershing. As he is for the moment busily engaged with other questions, he cannot take up this matter again. Weygand.

Copies of above communications for your files will be forwarded by courier.

MOTT.

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Third Army Gen. File: Fldr. 275: Memorandum

**Organization of Troops in American Zone of Occupation**

December 3, 1918.

From: Colonel Mott for Colonel House

The following technical points may be useful in your conversation with M. Clemenceau.

1. The distribution of troops prescribed by Marshal Foch for our bridgehead could not possibly have been dictated by military considerations. It is fair to assume, then, that political motives suggested it. This assumption has been made by General Pershing, and for this reason he has presented the matter to you as the President's representative. This justifies you in discussing it with the French Prime Minister. It appears to be a political question open to debate between political men.

If this point is not made clear, M. Clemenceau (who doubtless by now has learned from Marshal Foch of General Pershing's protest) will meet you with the statement that he has religiously refused to interfere with Marshal Foch's military decisions, and that if he did not maintain this reserve now it would be dangerous precedent. Moreover, he will say

he feels sure that if he did attempt to change or influence the Marshal's actions he would meet with a merited rebuff.

I foresee that this is the ground M. Clemenceau will take, as will Marshal Foch when you talk to him.

2. If the French have political reasons for desiring a mixture of units, we have equally strong ones for desiring that in our zone of occupation there be only American divisions.

These reasons, as seen by General Pershing, I gave you in detail yesterday.

3. Up to the present neither General Pershing nor I have mentioned to Marshal Foch anything about the English bridgehead, the objections Marshal Haig and the British Government opposed to Marshal Foch's arrangements, and the final carrying of their point.

In order to bring out this fact I beg to suggest that you ask M. Clemenceau and the Marshal, "What arrangements have been made in the zone occupied by the British?" They will have to answer. You could then easily ask why, if the Marshal's orders could be changed for the British, they cannot be changed for the Americans.

4. The answer to this question I foresee will be that the British offered their objections at once and that General Pershing delayed presenting his until the movements were under way; that it is now too late, etc., etc. In reply to this I beg to point out that General Pershing came to Paris to present his case in person to Marshal Foch on November 25; it was impossible to get at the Marshall till November 28, when I presented the General's request, and his letter of same date urged it with increasing force.

At both of these dates it was altogether easy to make the change, and on November 30, I pointed out this fact to the Marshal's Chief of Staff. Again on December 1, I telegraphed the Marshal in General Pershing's name. Therefore, if when you see the Marshal on December 4, he urges this point, he should not be allowed to make out a case *non possumus* ["We are not able"]. The fault is his.

I believe all the evidence shows that he has desired to allow the debate to drag on until this situation was produced.

5. Marshal Foch has offered no reasons, military or otherwise for his persistence in refusing General Pershing's request. He has merely stated that for "reasons of a superior order" he could not alter his dispositions. Yet when he originally announced these dispositions he wrote that "they would be carried out unless you have serious objections."

General Pershing has serious objections, and presented them in full time to have them acceded to or else met by argument or some form of persuasion or appeal. But the Marshal has made none. He has proceeded as though he were ordering matters fully within his prerogative and for which he had no explanations or arguments to advance.

But if this were really the case, why, in his first letter, did he say "unless you have serious objections?" The Marshal is not given to consult when he has the clear right to order.

6. I will not go into the details of General Pershing's objections to the arrangements proposed, as I gave them to you verbally; I merely enumerate most briefly.

(a) Technical military reasons, supply, discipline, administration of the command, food, transportation, etc., etc.

(b) The feeling produced in him and his generals and men that this arrangement, though technically not so, nevertheless really is, a manifestation of a lack of confidence in the American Army to acquit itself of any task without some form of French supervision.

(c) The unwillingness of General Pershing to be held responsible for the possibly excessive acts of French soldiers under his command in occupied German territory. This point it is hoped may influence your representations, though General Pershing does not ask you to urge it upon the French. This seems to him a matter which the United States Government has a right to decide for itself and which certainly Marshal Foch has no mandate to settle if General Pershing is unwilling to assume such a responsibility and his

government does not require it of him. It is not a strategic or a tactical question but a political one.

(d) General Pershing earnestly desires not to precipitate an unfortunate incident, above all at this time, but I personally do not think there is any doubt that he will feel obliged, if it comes to that, to refuse responsibility for French troops placed against his will under his command, and he will decline to send American troops to serve in Germany under French command. The General feels he would be doing only what the President would expect of him and he is certain the President will support him. The spirit of all the President's instructions and decisions in the past confirms General Pershing in the belief that he would receive his approval over the stand he now takes.

But he sincerely hopes that your representations will make such extreme action unnecessary, and that the self-interest of the French authorities, added to their natural wish to do what you may ask them to do, will settle this question in the sense which our whole Army ardently desires.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Memorandum

### ***Control of Occupied Territory***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 49/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 3, 1918.*

#### OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELANDS AND OF THE BRIDGEHEADS

Detailed arrangements decided on by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies and the President of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission, brought to the attention of the General who is President of the German Armistice Commission for execution.

LIST OF INHABITANTS: To facilitate the checking up and identification of the inhabitants present in each locality of the RHINE countries the Mayors have been invited to make up a list of all the inhabitants legally domiciled in the Commune. To this list must be added a list of all military and other establishments, of the telephone and telegraphic systems, factories, etc., with a list of the military personnel employed there.

\* \* \* \* \*

STRAGGLERS: Any German soldier who has not been regularly demobilized or who has not been authorized by the nature of his employment to be there, who is met in the territories of the left bank of the RHINE and the bridgeheads will be made prisoner.

\* \* \* \* \*

DEMOBILIZED MEN: Any demobilized person, officers included, may live in or return to the RHINE countries, provided that he lived there before the war.

\* \* \* \* \*

As a result demobilized persons whose families established themselves in those countries during the war are not allowed to live there.

\* \* \* \* \*

**SAFE CONDUCTS:** Each demobilized soldier must have demobilization papers whose validity will be judged of by the Allied military authorities. These papers will constitute a safe conduct or authorization for residence in the occupied territories.

In passing upon demobilization papers mentioned above the Allied military authorities will consult, if necessary, the local civil or military authorities, who must furnish, if called upon, all necessary information.

\* \* \* \* \*

**CIVIL OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS OF THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION:** The following military administrative authorities will continue to function until further orders under the control of the Allied Command in the same way as the civil administration:  
Supply, Medical, Fortification, Recruiting.

\* \* \* \* \*

Civilian and military officials, who in the normal course of transfers arrived in the Rhine Provinces after August 1, 1914, and who constitute, subject to verification, the very frame work of the local administrations, will be supplied with safeguards in the same way as the officials on duty before August 1, 1914.

\* \* \* \* \*

**SICK GERMAN SOLDIERS:** All sick who can be transported must be evacuated before the arrival of the troops, otherwise they will be made prisoner.

The sick who cannot be moved and who are left by the Germans in hospitals, watering places, etc., will be forwarded to Germany as soon as their condition permits.

\* \* \* \* \*

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Note

### ***Demobilized German Soldiers***

[Contemporary Translation]

ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa.*

Section K W No. 1352

The President of the German Armistice Commission

To the President of the French Armistice Commission, General Nudant

[Extract]

(1) According to reports now available here, all German soldiers left behind in territories on the left bank of the RHINE are to be interned in the neighborhood of SAARBRUCKEN by French troops, if they appear in public in uniform or if their discharge papers are not in order.

In this connection, it should be noted that the soldiers are not in a position because of the prevailing scarcity of clothing in Germany, to provide themselves, in the immediate future, with civilian clothes, and that, moreover, the troops as a consequence of their precipitate retreat cannot be discharged in the prescribed way with proper military papers. Many soldiers' councils have, on their own responsibility, dissolved entire organizations.

Without a knowledge of the muster rolls it is impossible to issue fresh military papers. These muster rolls are now, for the most part, packed with the heavy baggage of the troops and are, in view of the difficulties of transportation, now to be contended with in Germany, unobtainable. It is urged that the different authorities exercising command be requested to take the above mentioned conditions into consideration, because otherwise, as innumerable reports show, a general flight to the right bank of the RHINE will begin.

As a result of this the continuation in operation of industries called for by Article VI of the Armistice Conditions would be impossible.

It is suggested that the local district commandants, the chief recruiting stations, the mayors and the presidents of the communes be summoned, for these are in a position to establish according to lists in their possession whether the military persons in question belong to districts on the left bank of the RHINE, or not.

\* \* \* \* \*

von WINTERFLEDT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Letter

***German Forces in Russia, Rumania and Austria-Hungary***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 3, 1918.*

No. 14

From: Chief

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. German Retirement: The Allied Commission informed the German Commission that the German troops in Russia must be kept there until the time fixed by the Allies prescribed in the Armistice Agreement, and that evacuation would be regulated by later instructions. On the other hand the German troops of General von Mackensen still in Rumania must immediately evacuate that territory under conditions to be regulated by General

Berthelot. German troops on Austro-Hungarian soil after November 19 are liable to internment

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Letter

***Delivery of War Materiel***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 4, 1918.*

No. 15

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Delivery of Materiel: Marshal Foch announced, through the Allied Commission, that no artillery materiel delivered by the German Army, in compliance with Art. 6 of the Armistice Agreement, shall include materiel taken by the German Army from the Russians, Rumanians, and others. To this decision, the Chairman of the German Commission made protest as not appearing to be justified by the text of the Armistice Agreement. In reply, the Chairman of the Allied Commission stated that the materiel required to be delivered over by the Armistice Agreement was intended to reduce the combatant power of the German Army, and, consequently, it could not include any materiel which is not specifically German materiel. To this, the German Commission replied that captured materiel becomes an integral part of the German artillery, and, consequently, forms a part of the German materiel. The discussion closed with a positive statement from the Allied Commission that Marshal Foch's decision would stand.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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**Bolshevism Among German Troops in the Ukraine**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, December 4, 1918.

No. 15

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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8. Preservation of Order in Ukraine: The German Commission reports that consular representatives of the Entente at ODESSA had complained that German troops were not maintaining order in the Ukraine. The German High Command explained that an agreement had been arranged by which a certain distance was maintained between the Ukraine troops and the German troops at KIEV, with a cessation of hostilities between the opposing sides. The German High Command further stated that it was impossible for German troops to do more in the Ukraine for the reason that a large part of the German commands were in sympathy with the Ukraine Republicans, or have been infected with Bolshevism. Germany, according to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement, should not be held to the maintenance of order in the Ukraine, although it is doing its best in this regard. According to the original wording of Article of 12 of the Armistice Agreement, Germany was to have immediately withdrawn its troops from the Ukraine; but as this would have left the population without any protection, Germany proposed a temporary arrangement of leaving troops there, and, therefore, the question of repressive measures by the Allied Governments would be an unjust measure in view of the foregoing facts. To the foregoing statement, the Allied Commission made reply that it would be communicated to Marshal Foch.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Memorandum

**Responsibility for Receiving Enemy Materiel**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 4, 1918.

Memorandum for - G-1  
G-4

1. While the reception of captured materiel of war is delegated to G-1, by existing

orders, nothing is decided by existing orders relative to materiel of war delivered pursuant to the terms, of the Armistice.

2. This surrender of materiel is pursuant to the work of the International Armistice Commission and is under the direct supervision of numerous boards and commissions of technical experts. The American representatives on these commission of technical experts have mostly been selected by and worked under G-4.

3. The work of reception of this materiel, besides that of technical inspection, consists mostly of storage and shipment which is also the work of G-4.

4. After conference with G-1 and G-4 it has been agreed that G-4 shall be responsible for coordinating the work of receiving this materiel, G-1 to be kept informed of such data as may be necessary to permit G-1 to keep the required records in conjunction with tabulations of total amounts of materiel captured and surrendered.

G-4 is to be responsible for the reception, care and transportation to destination of such surrendered materiel and the coordination of the work of expert technical commissions to deal with the subject.

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 77: Letter

### ***Classification of Enemy Material***

1st Section and Bureau, G. S.  
(g) Document No. 294/2

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*December 5, 1918.*

Etat Major Bacon, to French Mission at Headquarters of the Allied Armies

Addition to our No. 234/2 of Nov. 30.

1. Material of fortresses (guns, minenwefer, machine guns, etc.) should be considered as not having been susceptible of being removed by the Germans and should accordingly not enter into the account of material given over by the Germans in accordance with the Armistice Agreement.

2. Accordingly, statements required by Note 234/2 should include fortress material only as a matter of memorandum.

3. Please send these statements as soon as possible.

(not signed)

(Message originally sent through French Mission. Original forwarded herewith for confirmation and record.)

J. S. ALEXANDER, Jr.,  
for  
Col. T. BENTLEY MOTT.

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**Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1666

*Spa, Belgium, December 4, 1918.*

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the French Armistice Commission, General Nudant

In session of the Subcommittee for the Payment of the Troops of the Army of Occupation, held Dec. 4, 1918, the following statement was made by the German delegates:

The German Government regards the previous payment demanded as an advance and requests for the purpose of accounting that a special account be kept of the total. It takes it for granted that the payment in marks will cover the total expenses for the support of the Army of Occupation - men and horses, so the question of further charges will not be raised.

The German Government requests that the needs in money for the maintenance of the Army of Occupation will be notified at least 14 days in advance and indicate the commissions and persons who are qualified to receive the payments.

It is further requested that facilities be accorded to all postal and transportation means used for sending the funds by the Reichsbank to the occupied regions and to the Armies of Occupation.

WINTERFELDT.

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183-10.2, Fldr. 1: Telegram

**Russian Prisoners To Be Turned Back**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*December 4, 1918--2:05 p. m.*

SG S sixty five. Army commander directs that no further Russian prisoners be permitted to pass into our lines. They will in all cases be turned back toward German lines. Take prompt steps to insure full compliance. Acknowledge.

CRAIG.

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**Maintenance of Allied Armies**

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 1666

ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 4, 1918--3 p. m.*

SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMISSION  
ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE TROOPS OF OCCUPATION

[Extract]

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The Belgian representative was absent. The representative of the French Delegation undertook to inform him of the business transacted at the session.

Major Dusterberg states that, so far, the following demands of the Allies for cost of maintenance are on hand:

5.	December	DUREN	10	million	British
6.	"	LANDAU	10	"	" French
7.	"	AIX-la-CHAPELLE	8	"	" Belgian
12.	"	COLOGNE	30	"	" British
15.	"	MAINZ	10	"	" French
	undated		54	"	" American

122

The representative of the American Delegation asked that ten million marks be paid as soon as possible to the Chief Disbursing Officer of the Third Army in TREVES as the first payment for the American Army. This claim will be transmitted to the German Treasury.

The German side asked that any future requirements be brought to its notice at least 14 days in advance and that at the same time it be notified of the authorities and persons authorized to receive payment. If the Allies desire a special distribution of payment. [this means what denominations of funds] this must be stated when payment is asked for. It is further requested that the Allies raise the ban on postal and other shipments of money from the Reichsbank, so that the latter can furnish the occupied territories with the means of making payment. As a result of the postal ban which has existed up to the present, the ten million marks which were demanded for the French Army in LANDAU on Dec. 6, 1918, can only be sent as far as MANNHEIM. The representatives of the Allies will transmit these desires to the appropriate authorities.

The following further declarations were made by the German side: The German Government regards the payments called for as advances and requests that, for the sake of accounting, the amounts be called for distinct purposes. It assumes that the total cost of maintenance of the occupied territories for men and animals, etc., will be fully covered by those cash payments in marks.

At this point the British side inquired whether requisitions in the occupied territory are to be made for cash or for receipts. The German side declared that requisitions for receipts are no longer to be considered if the whole cost of upkeep is to be demanded of Germany in cash. Reference is further made to General Nudant's statements in one of the first meetings of the whole Commission. According to it requisitions are to be made only for the genuine upkeep of the troops and only through the German local authorities.

The American representative asked how prices are to be determined for deliveries from the occupied territories for the upkeep of the troops. The German side answered that the question of prices in this case is absolutely a matter for the German authorities, as Germany on the one hand is saddled with the payment and on the other hand it is the German population which receives the payment.

It is agreed that the German position shall be stated in a note and handed over.

The next session shall be decided on in a full meeting of the Commission according to the need that there may be for it.

DUSTERBERG,  
Major.

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Third Army Gen. G-1: File 380: Letter

***Requisitions by Armies of Occupation***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, Belgium.

No. 15

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

1. The matter of payment for requisitions in the occupied territory has been covered by three notes that are repeated for your information.

Note 1:

From General von Winterfeldt to General Nudant: To the Note of December 5, 1918. No. 61/G'1 - The German Government understands Marshal Foch's order as follows:

In principle, the orders concerning requisitions will be laid before the German local administrative authorities and will be carried out by them. If there are no local administrative authorities or if these refused the requisition of articles that are at hand without any reasonable basis for their refusal, then direct requisition may be made on the populace. In return for the articles requisitioned the troops of occupation will give official statements. It would be desirable that the possessor of the original and the local administrative authorities both have duplicates. von Winterfeldt.

Note 2:

Marshal Foch, Dec. 5, No. 1264-C. R. (Extract) 1. Requisitions in the Rhineland will be met by vouchers (bons) and not be paid out of the funds advanced by the Germans.

Note 3:

Presented by Chairman Interallied Armistice Commission to Chairman of the German Armistice Commission, December 11; In response to Communication 1086

of December 9, of the German Armistice Commission: The point of view of the German Government on the subject of requisitions is acceptable, except that it cannot interfere with the administrative rules and regulations of the Allied Armies. These provide for a single receipt delivered to the Municipality.

Copy furnished Commanding General, Third Army, for his information.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Letter

***Delivery of Trucks***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 4, 1918.*

No. 15

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Auto Trucks: The Allied High Command announced, through the Allied Commission, that the taking over of 1,000 trucks is authorized at PFEDDERSHEIM, west of WORMS, and that the Subcommittee for taking over these trucks would meet at the railway station at PFEDDERSHEIM on December 7. If the trucks delivered with their spare parts are not in conformity with specifications, necessary reservation will be made.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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**Traffic Across the Rhine**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 5, 1918.*

No. 16

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Communication Across the RHINE: The German Commission complained that, according to information reaching it, all communication between the two banks of the RHINE had been closed, and only vehicles carrying raw materials from east to west or bringing provisions in the same direction are allowed to cross. Empty wagons only are allowed in the direction west to east across the RHINE. It is requested to know if an order of this nature has been given by the Allied High Command, and, if so, a protest is made against this interference with the economic life of the east bank of the RHINE which is contrary to the Armistice Agreement.

If such a plan is put into operation the economic life of the region will be paralyzed. When the text of the Armistice Convention was discussed in the forest of COMPIEGNE, both Marshal Foch and General Weygand stated that it was not the purpose to interrupt the economic life of the regions on the left and right banks of the RHINE; and the precise words of General Weygand were that "nothing would be read between the lines."

The Allied Commission replied that this important question had already been brought to the attention of the Allied High Command, and that it would again be submitted to them.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Use of American Installations***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,  
December 5, 1918.

Liaison Officer, G-4

Director General of Army Communications and Supply

Motor Transport Park at Sampigny

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2. Gen. Moseley wishes me to state that we are, in principle, in entire accord with the desire of the Marshal C-in-C of the Allied Armies to return to the French such buildings as we can vacate by degrees as our movement to the bases continues, and that we will make every effort consistent with the proper functioning of our services to give up these buildings as quickly as possible. It is, however, impossible for us to dispense with certain installations at once, and the use of the buildings at SAMPIGNY is something which we cannot give up at the present time. I, therefore, request that you be good enough to arrange this matter with the Commanding General of the 6th Region with a view to our occupation of these premises as long as the Third Army is functioning in its present capacity.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,  
1st Lt., Cavalry.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1209: Memorandum

***Policing of Neutral Zone***

[Contemporary Translation]

*December 5, 1918.*

- I. In principle, the police force of the Neutral Zone will include only the local Gendarmarie, reinforced if necessary, and mobile cavalry forces.
- II. The number of the latter will be strictly what is sufficient to ensure public order.
- III. They will be at the disposal of the civil authorities, who will be held responsible for their use.
- IV. They cannot be stationed less than two kilometers from the advanced limit of the occupied zone and cannot circulate in that zone. (Note: Apparently refers to advanced 2 km. zone.)
- V. Infantry units may in case of disturbance be called into the Neutral Zone by the civil authorities. These units will be normally stationed on the edge of and outside of the Neutral Zone and, like the mobile forces, must be kept at a minimum figure.

VI. Important cities and labor centers may, however, receive garrisons made up of infantry and cavalry:

Less than 150,000 inhabitants---	3 battalions---	4 squadrons
" " 50,000	" 2	" 2
" " 25,000	" 1	" 1

VII. There will be no mobile cavalry forces in towns of less than 5,000 inhabitants.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Memorandum

**German Shipping; Mine-Sweeping**

[Contemporary Translation]

*December 5, 1918.*

Marshal Foch

To General Nudant, No. 291/2

The Ministry of Marine has transmitted to me the following telegram, which has been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet. Referring to the proposition of softening the clauses of the Armistice, the proposition of Article XXIII is accepted insofar as this modification relates to ships actually within the German ports. The crews of the auxiliary German ships who are in the ports of other countries should be repatriated and the ships turned over to the Allies. As regards Article XXIV, the propositions in regard to armanent used for sinking mines are accepted. The only dragging boats permitted in the North Sea outside territorial waters are those necessary for the maintenance of a free passage between the pilot boat *South Doggerbank* and *Helgoland* and between *Helgoland* and the naval bases. The Commission of the Allies will indicate every other route which it regards as advisable to drag. In accordance with Article XXIV, permission to drag the Baltic has already been granted, and a list of ships for this duty should be turned over to the Commission, which will decide if certain of them can be utilized. Germany should pay the complete value of all damaged ships, and in regard to Article XXVI, the propositions are not accepted.

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**German Complaints Allied Advance**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 6, 1918.*

No. 17

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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8. German Complaints: The German High Command has complained that French troops in LANDAU and ZWEIBRUCKEN established their staffs in private houses, throwing the furniture out on the street; they also insulted inhabitants and in MORZHEIM confiscated the postal safe. Trade has been paralyzed by cutting off postal and telegraph communications. Black troops are also quartered in these towns. The German Commission also complains of mistreatment of a detachment left behind to deliver cannons to the Allies, which included four men, one of whom acted as interpreter. They had ten cannons to be turned over at TERMULPEN (sic). It is alleged that these Germans were cut off from food and made to shift for themselves, mistreated and finally shoved across the line.

General Winterfeldt stated that press notices still mention pillaging by German soldiers during the retreat. Individual cases are unfortunately uncontradicted and are to be explained as a result of the precipitate retreat of the German troops, which resulted in a considerable portion of the German Army getting out of hand. In a good many cases, however, the native population itself indulged in plundering, - as for example at BRUSSELS.

The German Commission complain that Allied troops of occupation have stopped Rhine boats on the left bank of the RHINE in the stretch between COLOGNE and NEUSS. In DUSSELDORF, certain boats that were moving were shot at, and Dutch ships were prevented from continuing their journey. These measures are opposed to the text and spirit of the Armistice Agreement, which provides for the security of transportation on the RHINE. They are also further opposed to international terms of agreement. Information is requested as to measures to be taken immediately in this matter.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Policing Neutral Zone**

[Contemporary Translation]

55/G

*Spa, December 6, 1918.*

Application of the principles laid down in Note 7281, Nov. 29, 1918, from Marshal Foch.

PROJECT OF ORGANIZATION OF POLICE OF NEUTRAL ZONE.

[Extract]

I. The German police forces may be maintained in the Neutral Zone. The High Command of the Allies reserves the right to limit and control the strength of these forces.

II. Consequently, orders should be assured:

(a) Normally by the local police force.

(b) Exceptionally by garrisons for security established in especially important localities.

III. The police forces should be at the disposal of the civil authorities, who will be help responsible for their utilization. In case of trouble the German authorities, as foreseen in Paragraph 5, should make suitable arrangements for reinforcement of these garrisons. The reinforcements sent may include cavalry and, in case of necessity, infantry. The command then passes to the military authorities.

IV. In no case can the troops detailed for policing penetrate within the Neutral Zone or in the zone occupied by the Allied Armies. Except to the limit of the large cities situated at the outskirts of the occupied zone they cannot circulate in less than two kilometres. [Meaning obscure; no French text available].

V. German police commands will be established by the Germans to correspond where occasion arises, with the military authorities of the Allies opposite, and will make all modifications in garrisons and in effectives which the control of the Allies might involve. \* \* \*

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

**Prolongation of Armistice**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 6, 1918.*

No. 17

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Prolongation of Armistice Agreement: Marshal Foch telegraphed that the necessity of prolonging the Armistice can be foreseen and that, therefore, the Allied High Command

requests the German High Command to name plenipotentiaries to meet at TREVES, December 12 or 13, in the morning, to settle this matter.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 159: Minutes

### ***Consideration of Civil Functions***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*December 6, 1918.*

Record of the Meeting Held December 6 Between the  
Bridgehead Commission, Established for the District  
of Coblenz, and the Advanced Party, General Staff  
Third Army, American Expeditionary Forces, Germany.

Colonel Rhea in the Chair

After the usual greetings Colonel Rhea assured the Commission that the American Army's presence in the vicinity, was guided by the principle of no interference in public or civil affairs; but on the contrary, to do everything in their power to further and protect civil functions, charitable organizations, etc., in their usual routine. No hindrance will be offered the population in any respect other than preserving good order.

It was mutually agreed that the representatives of the various departments, railroads, highways, waterways, etc., should work in conjunction with the corresponding representatives on the Bridgehead Commission.

The first question brought up was the subject of bridges, temporary, and those that already existing over the RHINE. It was agreed that the two bridges at COBLENTZ and the railroad bridge and other permanent structures would be left in the condition which they now were, and that if necessary the Bridgehead Commission would do all in their power to facilitate the crossing of our troops by other means than pontoon bridges, inasmuch as this would be a great hindrance to the RHINE traffic.

It was further agreed that the interpretation of the 30-kilometer radius from the bridgehead should be interpreted through agreement with the Bridgehead Commission and the American military authorities, without reference to the exact thirty-kilometers limit as soon as possible.

At the urgent request of the Burgomaster, and by him committed in writing, a battalion of American infantry was asked for, to enter the city of COBLENTZ as nearly after the departure of the German troops as possible.

The point was brought up that great stores of ammunition and weapons were in various depots throughout the city, and considerable uneasiness was entertained as to the conduct of the population in the absence of military authority.

It was established that the jurisdiction of the Bridgehead Commission extended from the city of COBLENTZ within the 30-kilometer radius and through the occupied area to the Luxembourg border. It was further agreed that the Bridgehead Commission would furnish all necessary billeting statistics in the forward areas of the city of COBLENTZ, and to include the 30-kilometer radius.

It was brought out by the Commission that heretofore the Soldaten Rat and the Arbiters Rat had claimed the rights of supervision over the dealings of the Bridgehead Commission, and they requested to be informed as to whether this should be recognized in their dealings with the American Forces of occupation. It was agreed that the American military authorities would deal through the Bridgehead Commission alone.

The question of carrying of arms was brought up before the meeting, and it was decided that police as well as civil authorities would be permitted to carry their arms in the fulfillment of their duties. Permission for sportsmen and foresters to carry arms would be a matter of decision at a later date. It was further agreed that such people allowed under these conditions to carry arms would also have proper authentication.

The President of the Bridgehead Commission brought to the attention of the meeting the fact that the Belgian commander to the north had forbidden all RHINE traffic in the territory under his jurisdiction. He also brought attention to the fact that this would work great hardships on the population and the Army of Occupation in this district, inasmuch as it affected the coal and other supplies for this area.

Subject of roads. It was agreed by the Commission that a great number of discharged soldiers would be employed at civic expense in maintaining good roads.

It was brought up by the American Commission that the rights of requisition were deserved and would probably be resorted to. It was further maintained that while no requisitions for food would probably be made, materials and tools for road building and repair would be requisitioned.

It was further established that for the present there would no hindrance to the free circulation to and from EHRENBREITSTEIN over the RHINE bridges.

The ration situation as it existed under the German military and civic administration, still exists and is in operation.

J. C. RHEA,  
Colonel, General Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

### ***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 6, 1918.*

No. 17

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Transportation: The question of including in the five thousand locomotives which are to be turned over by the Germans to the Allies those locomotives left behind in the evacuated zone, but not turned over to some responsible party, today has been definitely settled. The Allies have agreed to accept such locomotives so long as they comply with

power requisites and are in good order; the question of the parts to accompany locomotives centers over brake shoes, and will be continued on December 7. \* \* \*

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210

### ***Expulsion of Civilians from Occupied Areas***

[Contemporary Translation]

The Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission - General Nudant

I have the following remarks to make concerning the expulsion of employees and other people from the occupied areas, especially from ALSACE-LORRAINE.

Article VI of the Armistice Agreement orders the following:

In all the territories evacuated by the enemy, evacuation of the inhabitants is prohibited in all cases; no damage or prejudice can accrue to the person or property of the inhabitants.

In the Armistice negotiations in the forest of COMPIEGNE, the question of the protection of the inhabitants of the occupied areas was brought up early for discussion by the German representatives. Their attention was called by the French representatives expressly to the requirements of Article VI by which the person and property of inhabitants were protected from every attempt against them.

In addition, the French Minister on November 17 answered by reading to the representative of the German Foreign Office at the Armistice Commission at SPA, who had expressly directed a question to him concerning the security of the employees in ALSACE-LORRAINE who were of old German stock, the following:

No declaration is necessary for us, for everybody knows that it is not the troops of the Allies who have committed acts of depredation or who have practiced violences on the inhabitants of the regions occupied by them. The Armistice contains formal statements in this respect about the security of persons and property. This clause as all others will be carried out to the letter.

But if, as in various notes of mine has been represented, Germans, among them university professors, officials, schoolmen, merchants, in other words persons of no military character, continue to be expelled, this is in opposition to these orders and to these express assurances. The opinion of General Nudant expressed orally that it is laid down in the Armistice Commission that the German officials may be replaced in ALSACE-LORRAINE by French officials seems to be based upon a mistake. The Armistice Commission contains no limitation of this kind or of any other kind to the prohibition contained in Article VI.

It is to be added that the expulsions apparently are carried out everywhere in most careless fashion, since a very short time is granted to those who are expelled for leaving their native heath and since no attention is paid to illness, and since only a very small

pack is permitted to be taken along. The expulsions are therefore not only opposed to the first sentence of Article VI which forbids in the clearest fashion any expulsion of inhabitants in any occupied area, but also in the manner in which they are carried out they oppose the understanding that no harm could come to the person and to the property of the inhabitants.

In conclusion, attention must be called to the fact that the apparently systematic expulsions seem to be carried out according to political aims. Such measures are intended and destined to prejudice the decisions of the peace compact and therefore also in that way go far beyond the limits of the measures allowed by the terms of the Armistice.

In behalf of the German Government I enter emphatic protest therefore against such an action and I beg that the orders given in this connection be revoked.

Spa, December 6, 1918.

V. HANIEL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

***Maintenance of American Third Army***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 6, 1918.*

No. 17

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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7. Place of Deposit of Funds for American Army: General Rhodes presented a note requesting that the fifty-four million marks, estimated as the expense for maintaining the American Third Army for one month, be placed on deposit at BITBURG to the credit of Captain H. L. Dupont, Q. M. C., and that if part of these funds have already been deposited at TREVES, they be transhipped to BITBURG with the least practical delay.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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***Delivery of Funds to French***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 6, 1918.*

No. 17

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

11. Funds for the French Government: The French Government informs the German Government that a car containing eighty-two million marks in city bonds, which the German Government should turn over to the French Government, must be delivered to the agents of the French Ministry of Finance, sent to TREVES, under the same conditions as the car containing the Russian gold. The first shipment of Russian gold will be delivered to the French authorities December 6, at noon, in the railroad station of LAUTERECKEN.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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***Control of Rhine Bridges and Ferries***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau

HEADQUARTERS OF THE MARSHAL,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 6, 1918.*

No. 7913

In execution of Article I of Annex Note No. II [2], the Allies will assure, in their respective zones, the guarding, the technical surveillance, and the upkeep or verification of upkeep of all the bridges or ferries on the RHINE, from the Swiss border to the Dutch border.

Outside of the bridgeheads of MAYENCE, COBLENZ, and COLOGNE, the activity of guard detachments will be limited to the east bank of the river (excluded). Nevertheless, the technical detachments of Allied troops, which are necessary for the conservation, the surveillance, and the upkeep and repair of the bridges and ferries will have the right to run along side of and to land on the right bank and even to establish themselves

permanently thereon in immediate proximity of points of crossings as far as is strictly necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. The German civilian personnel which is normally employed in the work and upkeep of the bridges and ferries may be maintained in its functions barring a decision to the contrary by the local Allied command.\* But the German military personnel must be relieved as soon as possible by Allied military personnel.

The above arrangements have been brought to the attention of the German Commissaires by General Nudant, President of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission. They have been requested to inform the German military authorities interested.

The details of relief will be arranged by agreement between the commanders of the American, Belgian, British, and French zones and the commanders of the groups of armies who are opposed to them.

A report of arrangements carried out will be forwarded to the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

FOCH.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 37: Memorandum

***Conference on Transportation Situation***

ZONE OF ADVANCE, A. E. F.,  
TRANSPORTATION SERVICE,  
*December 6, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4

1. I hand you herewith a memorandum of conference on the transportation situation at Colonel Payot's Headquarters on December 4. There were four conclusions reached, and as a result I would suggest that the attached letter be sent at once to the C. G., First, Second, and Third Armies, and to the Chief Regulating Officer.

J. A. McCREA,  
Colonel, R. T. C.,  
Deputy D. G. T.

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MEMORANDUM of Conference on Transportation Situation held at Lamorlaye,  
Wednesday, December 4, 1918

[Extract]

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Col. Payot first outlined the reasons which had led to the calling of the Conference,

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\* It is understood that in the execution of Art. II of Annex Note No. II, the materiel necessary for the upkeep of lines of communication (bridges and ferries) must be furnished by the German Government.

to wit: numerous letters of complaint from each Allied Army relating to their inability to obtain rolling stock or move trains.

He then, in a general way, outlined the causes for the present crisis as follows:

1. The general situation is that there are, at the present time, practically two railway systems which are only linked by four connections, these by single track. The systems are:

- (a) Nord, Est and P. L. M. Railways
- (b) Belgian, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg and Rhine Railways

The connections between the two are only made between:

- (a) NANCY-AVRICOURT
- (b) NANCY-METZ
- (c) VALENCIENNES-MONS
- (d) GHENT-BRUSSELS

The fact of these insufficient connections makes the circulation of the whole very difficult. In addition, the length of haul for all trains has been increased without a corresponding increase in the rolling stock. All shipments of munitions and engineering material have practically stopped but movement of small detachments and permissionnaires [military personnel on leave or furlough] have increased. It was found necessary, in order to make the rolling stock available, to suppress troop movements in T. U. Rames [Standard type sections or trains] of large units, but this suppression does not include the movement of reinforcements or small detachments, the latter having been done to satisfy the demands of the British, French, and Americans tending towards demobilization.

Col. Payot stated that the situation would be exceedingly serious until about January 15, when he hoped for improvement due to the completing of the double tracking of certain existing connections between the two systems and the reestablishment of others, as well as the increase of rolling stock through deliveries from the Boche and receipts from the United States.

He then outlines the following steps which he suggested should be adopted to tide over the critical time, and these points became the basis for the later discussions.

1. A reduction to 5 trains per day per each Allied Army for the movement of large units for T. U. Rames.

2. Supply movements:

(a) Munitions: To avoid holding loaded cars of munitions by unloading these promptly in small depots to be established with each army.

(b) Engineer Material: To discontinue shipments of defense accessories, such as timber for dugouts and other shelters, barbwire entanglement material, etc. Also barrack and contentment material.

(c) Food and Clothing: To adopt a scheme of establishment in each zone where approximately the same numbers of troops will be at all times, stocks of provisions (as is done by the Americans in training areas). This will avoid the forming of T. R. Q.'s [daily supply trains] and will permit trainloads of supplies to be shipped at given intervals to keep these depots stocked. This will change the system of supply at the railheads and will greatly simplify the work of the regulating officers.

The different Armies were then heard from.

Gen. Ragueneau emphasized the lack of cars on the systems in the interior and stated that the Minister of Supply had refused to be responsible for the maintaining of the supplies in the depots unless the situation was considerably improved.

Gen. Atterbury then stated that from the point of view of a railway man, he saw two great defects and that to continue the process which had brought these into being was to commit suicide. These were (1) lack of cars in the interior and (2) lack of locomotives in the forward areas, plus an excess of loaded and empty cars in this latter area, which he stated no effort was apparently being made to remedy. He then stated that,

in his opinion, there were too many commissions functioning: that from the U. S. point of view the subcommission at METZ, recently established by agreement between Col. Boquet and Col. McCrea, should be given full authority to operate all lines in which we were interested. He then stated that we had three needs:

- (1) To move our troops
- (2) To move gasoline
- (3) To move horses

If these needs were satisfied we offered our personnel, traction and rolling stock to the absolute limit.

Considerable discussion was then had between Col. Payot, Col. Boquet and Gen. Atterbury as to the reason for the apparent failure to return empty cars to the interior. Col. Payot reiterated and indicated again by the map the difficulties of circulation produced by the two systems and their insufficient links, explaining that it now took more than twice as long to get a car through its circuit and return it to the interior. He reiterated, however, that everything possible was being done to circulate these cars as fast as possible and was of the opinion that Gen. Atterbury's statement that the cars were allowed to stand idle was exaggerated.

Gen. Crookshank, for the British Army, then enumerated the difficulties into which they had fallen and stated they were due to the fact that great numbers of cars were being held on the Belgian lines to operate this system which had been stripped by the Germans, and to assist in the reconstruction of the destroyed buildings, etc. Col. Payot had this point emphasized to Gen. Atterbury. Gen. Crookshank stated that the VALENCIENNES-MONS Line would be doubled about December 12 and the line TOURNAI-ATH, etc., would be in operation about that time as well. At this moment the situation for them should improve. The failure of the British to get sufficient cars in their ports was then discussed and Col. Payot produced figures since the Armistice, showing that each army had been satisfied up to the average of 66%. Col. Payot then emphasized again the fact that no embargo had been placed on the shipment of small units, and several letters from Marshal Haig were discussed, which had apparently been written on the wrong basis.

The discussion with Gen. Atterbury about troop movements was then resumed and it was decided that Col. Boquet would furnish the 5 T. U. Rames per day to us for the movement of large units if we insured the traction. In addition, we were free to constitute T. U. Rames from our own material and marches would be given us if possible. Further, we were also free to load our returning supply trains with men and move them to the bases. Gen. Atterbury was satisfied with these arrangements.

At this point two letters from Gen. Pershing were produced which had come directly to Col. Payot, one regarding the movement of five divisions, the answer of which was submitted to Gen. Atterbury, he stating it was satisfactory from his point of view, and the other dealing with the supposed embargo on horse shipments. Col. Payot asked where this embargo had originated, and upon being told by Gen. Atterbury and Col. McCrea that a note had been received from the regulating officer at GRAY, and that this note had been concurred in by the Commission de Reseau de l'Est, manifested great annoyance that the matter had not been brought personally to his attention before the letter of the Commander-in-Chief had been written. He stated that no embargo had been placed on the transport of horses; that it had been possible on a given date that cars might have been unavailable for these shipments, but that is an incident and not a permanent embargo. It was agreed that in the future that all orders received by the American Army from railroad authorities would be submitted to Col. Payot before they were obeyed.

The meeting concluded with the following points agreed upon by each representative as measures to be adopted to tide over the present acute crisis:

1. The METZ Subcommission to be supreme for U. S. operations.
2. No supplies of any nature to be left in cars. All cars to be unloaded at once and returned as quickly as possible.

3. The establishment of supply depots in each zone to obviate the necessity of T. R. Q.'s.

4. Troop movements of large units to be restricted to 5/24 per day per each Allied Army.

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Supreme War Council: Fldr. 280: Memorandum

### **German Political Trends**

2d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 6, 1918.

Source: American Agent in Switzerland.

The following are given as opinions held in the German Legation at BERNE where the atmosphere is described as extremely anxious.

#### SEPARATISM BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND THE REST OF GERMANY

The Separatism between Prussia and the rest of Germany is constantly increasing. It is thought to be fostered by the Entente. If realized it will be an end of the former regime. Bavaria, which clearly aims at hegemony in Germany, will do everything possible to eliminate Prussia, once for all. Bolshevism in Prussia throws Germany into Bavarian hands. It is sometimes thought that the Bolshevistic movement will reach Bavaria and the south of Germany and hinder Separatism. But, as a matter of fact, the south is said to be calm and organizing. The food situation in Bavaria, WURTEMBERG, etc., is good, and work is being resumed. Many desire an Allied occupation of the north of Germany, BERLIN included, as an aid in the struggle against Bolshevism.

#### SOLF

Solf is intent on bringing about cohesion and his resignation is not foreseen, except through the violence of the Revolutionary Party. Solf will remain a representative of the old regime. He aims at the restoration of order, whereas a Liebknecht government would throw Germany into Bolshevistic chaos. Solf is working toward a great Germany, with the idea of ultimate revenge.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ALLIES

There is a wave of hatred against France, said to be the result of English labor propaganda. It is thought that England is disposed to treat Germany less harshly than France, not being a direct competitor in the European markets. Japan's requirements were welcomed with great joy, as a possible source of future conflict between Japan and the United States.

#### CONDITIONS IN POLAND

Since the beginning of the German debacle, BERLIN has carefully fostered Bolshevism in Poland, where the danger is increasing daily, by reason of German-Jewish-Russian propoganda. Germany is endeavoring to throw all her troublous elements into Poland.

Nevertheless the peasant element in Poland, in spite of their wretched condition, resist courageously. Sixty wagons of armed peasants are reported to have arrived at WARSAW and placed themselves at the disposal of the Government, to defend the city against Bolshevism. It is thought, however, that only an armed manifestation by the Entente and the sending of troops into Poland can save the country. The appearance of troops in Poland will end the Socialistic regime, and the entire country will rally around the National Democratic Party which is the only party that is popular and that is capable of reorganizing Poland.

Pilsudski, ill and weakened by imprisonment, is losing in popularity. Paderewski is considered as the man who should be the first president of the Polish Republic.

Ligocki, recently returned from WARSAW, denies that there were Pogroms in Poland such as were represented abroad. Ligocki accepted the post of secretary to the Pseudo-Polish Legation at BERNE, in order to return to Switzerland. Secretly he is hostile to the Legation.

D. E. NOLAN,  
Brigadier, General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Supreme War Council: Fldr. 280: Memorandum

### ***Bolshevist Propaganda in Occupied Territory***

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 6, 1918.

Source: Official telegram, The Hague (Dec. 4)

#### **BOLSHEVIST PROPAGANDA IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY**

Information from various sources indicates that the Germans intend to use their best men to spread Bolshevik propaganda in the territory occupied by Allied troops. The better grade intelligence agents and more capable army officers will ingratiate themselves with Allied officers and men doing all sorts of useful services in a most self-effacing manner like the old Filipino Amigo. Humility and generosity will be their strong cards.

Having established themselves with numerous unsuspecting, appreciative individuals, they will begin to slip in little remarks about harsh Armistice terms, unduly severe on chastened German people, etc.

They will point out that while the Germans have thrown off military tyranny, Allied soldiers are still slaves of Army rule, being kept away from home and family in order to oppress the free, liberty-loving German people; that the Allied soldiers are being used as tools to fight their own ideals.

The same agents will insinuate remarks calculated to arouse animosity between the Allies and to create spirit of discontent among the individuals.

D. E. NOLAN,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

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***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 7, 1918.*

No. 18

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Marshal Foch has rendered the following decision in regard to the types of locomotives to be turned over by the Germans: 1,000 locomotives of 900 tons on an incline of one percent from a standing start; 1,000 locomotives of 800 to 900 pounds [tons] on a similar incline; 1,500 locomotives of 750 tons postively; 1,200 locomotives of about 750 tons; and 300 locomotives of 650 tons as a minimum.

On behalf of the German High Command, the Chairman of the German Commission stated that the delivery of rolling stock in accordance with Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement is being carried out with exceedingly great difficulty for which Germany cannot be held responsible. The German field committees left in the evacuated zone to turn over rolling stock do not enjoy the freedom necessary for travel about and getting into communication with their subordinates; to a certain degree they are experiencing difficulties which are not compatable as representatives of the Armistice Commission; in the interior of Germany there is also considerable difficulty. In some places the Allied field committees did not reach their destination in time to begin work on the appointed date which resulted in a accumulation of rolling stock from Germany which required a large number of locomotives and cars to be put to one side in order to avoid congestion. Germany cannot be held responsible for these events and for having not successfully fulfilled the requirements of Par. 7 of the Armistice Agreement within the required time.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German Forces in the Neutral Zone**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 323/2

December 7, 1918.

NOTE for General Nudant, President of the C. I. P. A. at Spa.

I. German forces, composed in principle of police forces, can be maintained in the Neutral Zone to assure order. The High Command of the Allies reserves the right to limit and control the effectives of these forces.

II. Consequently, order should be assured:

(a) normally by the local gendarme forces:

(b) exceptionally by the Surete [security] garrisons in particularly important localities.

III. The police forces will be at the disposition of the civil authorities held responsible for their service.

In case of trouble, it will be the duty of the German authorities referred to in Par. 5, to make propositions towards obtaining reinforcement for these garrisons. The reinforcements so sent may include cavalry and, in case of necessity, the infantry.

IV. In no case will the police forces or surete garrisons of the Neutral Zone, penetrate into the zone occupied by the Allied Armies. Except in the large cities situated on the boundary of the occupied zone, they will not circulate at less than 2 kilometers from this boundary.

V. The commandants of the police forces will be instituted by the German High Command to correspond with the Allied military authorities opposite, and have executed all the changes of garrison or effectives which may be required for the control of the Allies  
\* \* \*

These commandants of the police forces will have under their orders the surete garrisons stationed in that sector.

VI. The total effectives of the surete garrisons will not exceed ten (10) infantry battalions and ten cavalry squadrons.

These forces will be distributed by the German authorities according to requirements, under the reserve that no grouping will exceed the strength of two battalions.

FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Annex

**Subdivision and Control of Neutral Zone**

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 2d Bureau,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

General Staff

The following provisions relative to the occupation of the Neutral Zone by police forces, and surete garrisons, should be immediately regulated:

1. Subdivision of the Neutral Zone in sectors, the boundaries of which will be prolongations of those between the Allied Armies.

2. The nomination by the German High Command, in each of these sectors, of a commandant of the police forces with whom the Commander of the opposing Allied Army (or the commander of the bridgehead), will treat to regulate all questions, particularly those relative to the control of the Neutral Zone, and of reinforcements in case of trouble, etc.

3. Precise determination, as soon as possible, of the eastern limits of the Neutral Zone, by agreement between the commanders of the Allied Armies and the commanders of the corresponding German sections, in accordance with the clauses of the Armistice Convention.

4. Furnishing all the personnel of the police forces with a special insignia.

5. Those German soldiers not demobilized can go on leave in the Neutral Zone on condition that their families are domiciled there and that they have been previously disarmed.

FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

***Blockade of Germany***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 7, 1918.*

No. 18

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3.

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In connection therewith\* Marshal Foch has laid down certain rules which will be adhered to: In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, the blockade of Germany being maintained, no circulation of merchandise or of goods will be permitted for the time being between the regions of the left bank of the RHINE and the regions on the right, with the exception of certain shipments of coal and of foodstuffs and of those materials indispensable for the functioning of the factories on the left bank of the RHINE. Instructions regulating the utilization of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications have been sent to the Armies of Occupation.

To this the German Commission has replied that the decision is untenable which bases the interruption of the transmission of food supplies and the operation of the railroads between the occupied areas and the Neutral Zone. The conception of a blockade is limited to the sea and to closing of the frontier of the land on the side of the sea. It cannot

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\* The reference is to a German plea for economic freedom.

be extended wilfully to the land. Such an unusual extension of the conception was not intended in the Armistice Agreement is clearly to be seen from the fact that the prescriptions of Article XXVI upon which Marshal Foch bases his decision are included under the term naval clauses, having reference only to the sea and which do not in any case concern the land.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

### **Control of Bridgeheads**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 7, 1918.*

No. 18

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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#### 5. Bridgeheads:

Marshal Foch has laid down the following regulations in regard to the occupation of the Rhineland:

1. In accordance with Article 1 of Supplement 2 of the Armistice Convention, all the lines of communication up to the RHINE and on the right bank of the RHINE within the bridgeheads held by the Armies of the Allies are placed under the complete and entire command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who will have the right to take all measures which he may deem necessary to either insure their occupation or exploitation.

2. The crossings of the RHINE are included in the category of lines of communication mentioned above. It is ordered therefore, that all the bridges and fords which at the present moment are over the RHINE from the Dutch frontier to the Swiss frontier will be under the technical control and verification of the Allied troops.

3. Except the bridgeheads of COLOGNE, COBLENZ, and MAYENCE, the zone patrols will be limited to the left bank of the RHINE. However, technical detachments of the Allies whose business is to conserve or make repairs and to keep in order the fords and bridges will have the right to land and to debark on the right bank of the RHINE and to fix themselves there, if there is occasion for it, close to the point of crossing with a view to completing their mission.

4. Unless a contrary decision is made by the Allied Command, the German civilian population, which is at this moment engaged in working and maintaining the passages, and

crossings, of the RHINE, will in part be maintained in office. However, the German military personnel will be replaced by Allied personnel.

5. This decision will be transmitted to the German High Command, who should at once notify the Armies concerned in order that the German military personnel may be relieved as rapidly as possible.

6. In each zone of the Allies, the details of this replacement will be fixed and determined by the commander in the zone and the German commander opposite him. The Armies of the Allies are receiving instructions to this effect.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

***Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 7, 1918.*

No. 18

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Prisoners:

The General of the American Mission submitted the following note to the German High Command:

1. It is reported to General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, by Lieutenant Theobald Manguenoe, 254th French Infantry, who had just returned from a year's imprisonment in Germany, that a number of American officers and soldiers at KARLSRUHE are without food and clothing and are being used by the German Government to get out railroad ballast.

2. It is requested that this matter be investigated at once, and, if true, that steps be taken to immediately correct same.

3. It goes without saying that any neglect or mistreatment of American prisoners of war must receive serious consideration in future negotiations between Germany and the United States concerning food and other supplies.

The Chairman of the German Commission stated that he would cause the necessary investigation to be made.

In connection with improving the living conditions of the Allied prisoners of war, the War Ministry at BERLIN has issued the following orders:

1. All limitations as to the freedom of movement of prisoners of war in Germany are revoked. They have free entrance and exit except that they must be in possession of a proper pass. They, as well as all other soldiers, must be in camp by taps. For permission to visit theatres and so forth they are given special passes.

2. Prisoners of war are no longer obliged to work at forced labor. If they work of their own free will they will receive the same pay as the German workmen, so that a number of these men have earned up to as high as twenty marks a day.

3. Prisoners of war who do not want to work must remain in their work places because the principal camps are overfilled. The High Command of the Army pays for their maintenance the same as for German soldiers, - that is to say, two marks seventy a day.

4. The mess served prisoners of war is exactly the same as is given to German civilians.

5. All regulations concerning the censor and in regard to the reception and sending of postal, letters, and cards, are revoked.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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HS Fr. File: 402-30.1: Memorandum

***Luxemburg and Suburbs to be Evacuated***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, General Staff  
No. 7959

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 7, 1918.*

Please inform the General, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces in France;

1. That the STEINSEL-Chateau (about 9 kilometers north of LUXEMBURG) will be reserved for a military mission attached to the headquarters of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

2. That the city of LUXEMBURG and its suburbs will have to be evacuated, December 11, by all units or American services which might be there.

By order:

DESTICKER,  
Chief of Staff.

To the Colonel, Chief of the French Military Mission with the General,  
Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

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Supreme War Council: Fldr. 280: Memorandum

***Aims of Bolshevik Leaders***

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 7, 1918.

Source: Official dispatch, Copenhagen, transmitting estimate of German situation by observer in Denmark.

**BOLSHEVISM IN GERMANY**

The Chief danger the present Government of Germany faces comes from the extreme left, the Bolsheviki. The Bolshevik purpose being world proletariat revolution, any steadying of Germany on a democratic basis is hateful to them. They are in the minority in Germany, more of a minority than in Russia, but they will undoubtedly attempt to carry through the revolution to the Dictature of the Proletariat if possible. Their chance is now and they know it. They must use the masses of deserting but armed soldiers who will soon be filling the RHINE cities to force out the dual soldier-political control now in existence and establish the absolute power of the Soviets. These Soviets with the influx of disgruntled soldiers will become steadily more Bolshevik in character as they did in Russia following the fall of RIGA and the break up of the Russian Army.

When the Bolshevik leaders, who understand how the game was worked in Russia, find they have a demandful, probably hungry mass behind them, they will easily carry the revolution through to the Dictature of the Proletariat if the Conservative Socialist Leaders are not able to check them. These conservative leaders also understand how the Bolshevik revolution was accomplished in Russia and they have been fighting Bolshevism for a month now. All depends on whether the Conservative Socialists are strong enough to hold out while the wave of armed soldiers passes in the next few weeks. The Bolsheviki, to accomplish their purpose, must prevent Germany from arriving at a national assembly as that will reveal their numerical weakness, so they must get action as the German Army disrupts.

D. E. NOLAN,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Supreme War Council: Fldr. 280: Memorandum

***Opinion of British Circles on German Politics***

2d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 7, 1918.

Source: From an observer in close touch with British Governmental Circles.  
(London, Dec. 3).

**GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN AMERICA**

The British Foreign Office seems to be under the impression that Germany is making a deliberate effort to work the American press for propaganda purposes. It is considered

here that the whole pre-revolution press bureau system is still in existence in Germany, including censorship, so that news matter that leaves the country is of a character regarded as useful for German's purposes.

The emphasis laid on the normal condition of affairs is considered suspicious in England and designed to impress the United States (for food purposes) mainly.

#### HEAVY INDEMNITIES

A sentiment in favor of big indemnities and stern punishment of Germany is being formed here in consequence of the election campaign. Candidates for Parliament outrival one another in demanding stiff reparation and personal expiation by the Kaiser, on account of the useful effect of such a platform on electors.

English papers argue that Germany can pay if the Allies make her. They point to the tremendous tangible and potential wealth of Germany.

#### GERMANY STILL MILITARY

It is urged here that the majority of the people in Germany remain Militarists and consider that the German Army has not been beaten. The people will turn towards the Militarists as soon as the Bolshevik coup d'etat has succeeded. The Militarists will then easily defeat the Spartacus group and will be considered by the people as having saved the country.

D. E. NOLAN,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Supreme War Council: Fldr. 280: Memorandum

#### ***Conflict of Authority in German Army Retreat***

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 8, 1918.

Source: Military Attache, The Hague, Dec. 7

#### HINDENBURG'S DEMOBILIZATION PROCLAMATION

On November 28, a proclamation signed by Hindenburg, asked all soldiers to have patience and to respect the orders issued. It added that everything possible had been done to assure their comfort during their retreat to the east bank of the RHINE, that proper food, transportation and shelter could not be arranged unless good order was kept in all units.

The proclamation concluded by stating that all soldiers would be sent to their homes as rapidly as possible except the classes of 1917 and 1918.

#### GENERALS ASSERT AUTHORITY

General von Eberhard issued a proclamation to soldiers of the First Army asking their assistance in keeping order during the march through the Rhine provinces, adding that Soldiers' and Workers' Councils would be under the orders of the military command, that

red flags and other Socialist insignia would be strictly prohibited and that the safe passage of his Army necessitated scrupulous obedience to his orders.

General von Boehn issued an identical appeal to the Seventh Army and General von Mudra did the same to the Seventeenth Army.

(NOTE: No date is given for the above proclamations. From their context it is inferred that they must have been issued during the last days of November or the first days of December, i. e., during the days that the three Armies named were crossing the Rhine Provinces.

It was evidently these orders which caused the storm of protests from Soldiers' and Workers' Councils in Prussia and Bavaria and which resulted in the issuance of a proclamation by Hindenburg that no orders prohibiting red flags or Socialist insignia would be issued by the Army. In other words, it would seem that the orders of generals putting their authority above that of the Soldiers' and Workers' Councils have since been countermanded.

Which orders are being actually carried out and which side had the upper hand in directing military affairs is not clear in present dispatches from Germany and probably varies in different districts.)

D. E. NOLAN,  
Brigadier General,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Memorandum

***Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 6-F  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 8, 1918.*

General Nudant to General v. Winterfeldt

Marshal Foch writes the following on December 8, 1918: The marks, delivery of which has been prescribed, must be deposited in the branches of the Reichsbank in the places and on the dates indicated. These funds are indispensable to the Allied Armies. Consequently, in case of a delay of more than 3 days, they will be requisitioned. Kindly notify the German delegation. In future dispositions will be made so that the German delegates will be notified sufficiently in advance and they will be notified in what denominations the sums must be paid. The length of the notification is still under consideration. The question of authorizing transportation and correspondence to be allowed the Reichsbank is likewise under consideration.

General NUDANT.

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**Political Disturbances in Berlin**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 8, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

1. Reference my radiogram of yesterday with regard to the above subject, the following additional details are now available.

2. On December 6, the Guard Corps summarily arrested the Executive Council (the self-appointed body without whose consent no government measure can be executed), and offered Ebert the Dictatorship of Germany. Ebert declined to take advantage of it, which in the opinion of the German Mission was a great mistake because it would have saved the situation. Ebert subsequently released the Executive Council which is, therefore, in the same position of power that it occupied before.

In the meantime the Spartacus group of Radical Socialists had marched on Berlin and had been met with machine-gun and rifle fire from the guards, who dispersed the Spartacus followers with considerable bloodshed. The Spartacus group then officially communicated to all officers of the War Office that the latter as well as their wives would be held as hostages. The wife of one of these officers, now at SPA, put herself under the protection of the Soldatenrat in BERLIN.

3. The German Mission appears to believe that this incident will have a bad effect on the reestablishment of law and order in Germany.

4. BERLIN is said to be quiet today.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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HS Confidential File: Fldr. H-1

**Return of American Divisions**

*Strassburg, December 8, 1918.*

NOTES ON CONVERSATION

between General Pershing and General Foch

General Pershing stated that he had come to talk over the question of the railway transportation of American division; that as the Marshal was aware, he intended to use the region of Le MANS as a zone of concentration where American divisions should be brought prior to their embarkation for administrative purposes, putting of the papers in order, delousing, re-clothing, etc., and that it was the intention that those divisions should make a stay of about a month in above said region. It was therefore necessary, in

his mind, to consider without further delay the transportation of the first American divisions to Le MANS, considering that a month would elapse between the time of their transportation to that zone and the time when they would be ready for shipment. In a talk which he had had with the Marshal towards November 12, it had been considered sufficient to maintain 19 divisions in the Zone of the Advance. It was furthermore necessary to have the whole of the transportation system so organized that it would start working as soon as it became practicable to begin shipping troops. The transportation of about 80,000 men belonging to the S. O. S. had been contemplated, but once the transportation of those men was over, it would become impossible to transport more men from the S. O. S. without interfering with the supply of combat divisions still maintained in France. Before reducing the S. O. S. troops any further it would therefore be necessary to then ship a certain number of combat divisions.

Marshal Foch replied that his point of view was as follows: We are living now under Armistice conditions; we have to consider the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. Furthermore, in this case, the stronger our forces the less serious could the trouble be.

General Pershing replied that in his opinion, and, he believed, in the opinion of the Marshal, a resumption of hostilities by the German Government was highly improbable.

Marshal Foch said that he agreed to that, but that in the course of the peace negotiations the Germans might make the discussion more difficult if they felt that the Allied forces had a tendency to decrease.

General Pershing replied that he felt that even should the American, French and British forces be cut down by one-half, the Germans would still not be in a position to resume the war.

Referring to the verbal agreement of November 12, that the Americans should maintain 30 combat divisions in France, General Pershing stated that, in view of the changed conditions in Germany, he thought it might be feasible to reduce this number at once to 25.

It developed in the conversation that the 27th, 30th, 37th and 91st Divisions are now either at Le MANS or soon to arrive there from the northern part of the front, and that the 92d, from the vicinity of PONT-a-MOUSSON, is to be transported there at once, and that these divisions might prepare to return to the States.

Marshal Foch stated that he thought that we might prepare to ship these five divisions to the States, but that he did not believe it advisable to decide now on any reduction below the number of combat divisions already decided upon, namely 30, before J day, which, he said would be the day when a preliminary peace is signed.

General Pershing questioned particularly the transportation of the 92d Division which, it had been reported to him was interrupted.

Marshal Foch stated that orders had been given two days before yesterday for the transportation of this division to be resumed.

General Pershing asked Marshal Foch if he intended that this division should be transported directly to Le MANS.

Marshal Foch replied that he did.

General Pershing stated that he understood that orders had been given to have this division stopped somewhere in the American area.

General Weygand stated that this was a mistake.

As to the desired reduction of the A. E. F. by shipments home, General Pershing promised to give Marshal Foch a memorandum covering the details as to S. O. S. troops and combat divisions which he wished to prepare to ship to the United States and with reference to the establishment of areas which might be occupied at the base ports.

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**Report of American Bridgehead Commission**

*Coblenz, December 8, 1918--20 h.*

From: Chairman, American Bridgehead Commission, Coblenz

To: The Chief of Staff, Third Army, American Exp. Forces

[Extract]

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7. All matters which have come up have been settled very satisfactorily, and all of our dealings with the German civil and military authorities have been most amicable. Their whole attitude has been that of desiring to please and to meet any wish that we might express. The people in general have received us very cordially; their welcome seems to be sincere. I anticipate no trouble with them whatever in this section, so long as we pursue our present announced policy.

8. The Burgomaster of COBLENZ has published a proclamation which I sanctioned, and a copy of same will be sent you, which says in effect that the American military authorities are coming into this territory to exercise control for certain period; that their own troops have left; that order must be preserved; and as long as order is preserved and we are treated properly, he has been assured there will be no unnecessary interference with local affairs; and exhorting the people to behave themselves and carry on their usual business in an orderly manner. He ordered children under twelve years of age off the streets after six o'clock in the evening; prohibited public gatherings of more than three people; closed all beer halls, etc., at eleven o'clock; has established his own police protection; and has handled, and is handling the situation in a very competent and orderly manner. In this connection, I request that you send me as soon as possible copies of General Pershing's proclamation in order that the same may be promulgated in this vicinity, as I believe it will have a wonderful effect on these people if they could know at once exactly the policy of our Commander-in-Chief, as the contrast with some other proclamations I have heard of will be greatly to our advantage in dealing with the German people.

9. I strongly recommend that Army headquarters be established at COBLENZ, as all of the facilities for doing business in this area center at COBLENZ. It is convenient as regards crossing the river, use of railroads, telephones and telegraph; besides convenience as regards billeting space and office accommodations. The III Corps Headquarters would then go across the river to EHRENBREITSTEIN, which is the logical place for it as regards its divisions.

10. Request that any instructions received which might effect the situation here be forwarded to me at once, as I have to make many decisions daily, and at present it is necessary to base them on common sense and general policy, rather than on anything definite which I have received from higher authority.

11. The situation during the four days I have been here has been very satisfactory, and I think will continue so, if our present policy, as I know it, is adhered to. There has been no disorder, and no unpleasant incidents.

J. C. RHEA,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Chairman, American  
Bridgehead Commission,  
Coblenz.

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### **Occupation of the Rhine Provinces**

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
No. 1/P. C. M.

HIGH COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*Metz, December 8, 1918.*

Modifying the Bulletin concerning Occupation of the Rhine Provinces joined to letter of November 16, No. 6231, it has been determined as follows:

(1) The American division which was to participate in the occupation of the MAYENCE bridgehead will be replaced by a French division\*

(2) The 2 French divisions taking part in the occupation of the COBLENZ bridgehead will occupy the southern part of this bridgehead.

So that these units may be placed under French command, the boundary between the French and American Armies is modified to reserve to the French Armies at least one of the COBLENZ bridges and the highways leading thereto; it will be traced according to the general line;

Old boundary between METTLACH and BUNDENBACH inclusive, administrative limit between BUNDENBACH and TRARBACH, the MOSELLE and COBLENZ to Americans, southern bridge of COBLENZ to the French highway, EHRENBREITSTEIN and HAHN to the Americans.

This boundary will be determined in its details by the Commander-in-Chief of the French and American Armies.

(3) The cavalry division designated to take part in the occupation of the American zone will be placed in the north part of the French zone, so that it may be ready to give assistance to the American Army of Occupation if circumstances should make it necessary.

(4) These steps are to be taken in the shortest possible time.

The Commander-in-Chief of the American and French Armies are requested to kindly report as soon as they are completed.

FOCH.

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\* The total number of French occupying divisions will thus be 18. The total number of American occupying divisions will thus be reduced to 8, the total number of occupying troops having already been given to the German High Command.

***Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 9, 1918.*

No. 19

From: Chief

To: Commanding-in-Chief, A. E. F.

Subject: Report of Condition

[Extract]

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11. Prisoners of War: The American Commissioner has already informed the Commander-in-Chief of the American Armies that on December 6, the Germans evacuated 770 American prisoners from RASTATT, via BALE; on December 7, via hospital train, from RASTATT to BALE, - twenty patients lying, one hundred-fifty slightly ill, and ninety-four convalescent; on December 9, another train load will leave RASTATT for BALE; on December 10, the last train load by the same route, which will complete the evacuation of American prisoners from south Germany.

Brigadier General George H. Harries reached here the evening of December 7, en route to BERLIN as a member of the Interallied Commission on Prisoners of War. I have made all necessary arrangements with the German authorities for his transportation to and reception in BERLIN and have furnished him with one of my best German interpreters. He had hoped to start for BERLIN yesterday or today, but is as yet delayed by reason of the non-arrival of his baggage. He has had a number of conferences with the members of the Subcommittee on Prisoners of War, including Major General Adye, of the British Army, and Major von Pabst, the German Commissioner.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German Officers in Bridgeheads**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, December 9, 1918.

No. 19

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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8. Presence of German Officers in Bridgeheads: In reply to the German note regarding the sending of two German liaison officers to the three bridgeheads at SPEYER, Marshal Foch has decided that German officers cannot be permitted to establish themselves permanently in the bridgeheads, or at SPEYER, but, with a view of giving useful information to the Allies, German officers may be authorized to remain in the bridgeheads at SPEYER for not longer than a week after the arrival of the Allied Armies of Occupation.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 275: Telegram

**Occupation of Bridgeheads at Coblenz and Mayence**

[Contemporary Translation]

December 9, 1918.

Corrected Copy

From: The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies

To: French Mission, Chaumont

Staff. BITBOURG via CHAUMONT - No. 5574

1st - Marshal Foch notifies the following decision:

(a) American division planned for Mayence bridgehead will be replaced by a French division.

(b) The two French divisions planned for the COBLENZ bridgehead will occupy the southern part of the bridgehead and will be placed under French command.

(c) French cavalry division planned to participate in occupation in the American zone will be likewise placed under French command and will be billeted in the north part of the French zone, to be ready to give aid to American Army of Occupation.

(d) Boundary between French and American Armies is modified to reserve for the French Army at least one of the COBLENZ bridges and highways leading thereto. It will be traced according to general line: boundary as it now stands between METTLACH and BUNDENBACH inclusive, administrative limit between BUNDENBACH and TRARBACH, the MOSELLE and COBLENZ to the Americans, south bridge of COBLENZ to the French, highway EHRENBREITSTEIN to HAHN to the Americans.

2d - Consequently:

(a) The FAYOLLE Army Group will designate one French division to replace the American division at the MAYENCE bridgehead.

(b) The 48th Division and 2d Cavalry Division, dismounted, now with the Fifth Army and the 4th Cavalry Division now with the Sixth Army will be transferred to the FAYOLLE Army Group and will proceed in the direction of COBLENZ. The FAYOLLE Army Group will furnish from its present means a nondivisional element to assure the command of these elements in the COBLENZ region.

(c) The 48th Division and 2d Cavalry Division, dismounted, will be put in motion beginning December 10 at noon by the Fifth Army - 4th Cavalry Division by the Sixth Army by agreement between these Armies and the American Third Army. FAYOLLE Army Group will assure continuation of the movement after agreement with French Fifth and Sixth Armies and American Third Army.

(d) FAYOLLE Army Group will determine by authority of Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, and by direct understanding with American Third Army, the details of the new Franco-American boundary conforming to the general outline indicated above, making it coincide with the administrative boundaries. It is necessary to facilitate the passage of the French troops in the American zone north of BIRKENFELD and COBLENZ. region.

3d - FAYOLLE Army Group will report on the movements of the elements specified above and the details of the Franco-American boundary established by agreement.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

### ***Unjustified Belgian Regulations***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 9, 1918.*

No. 19

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

13. Belgian Regulations in JULICH and AIX-le-CHAPELLE: On December 2, the Belgian military authorities in JULICH and AIX-le-CHAPELLE posted proclamations, a copy of which is hereto appended and marked A. As will be seen from its text, the regulations are very exacting and include the requirement that the entire civil population must greet passing

officers by taking off their hats and leaving the sidewalk, under penalty of being shot, after investigation.

The German Commission has protested against this Act, and, in reply the Belgian authorities have stated that the proclamation was an exact copy of the one issued by the Germans in 1914 for certain Belgian towns.

In my opinion, this proclamation, which so far as can be learned has not yet been disapproved by Marshal Foch, is an act of retaliation which has no justification during the existence of an armistice agreement. Its revocation will, undoubtedly, be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, but it serves to indicate the bitter frame of mind of certain Belgian, as well as French, officials.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1607

A. From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission, to the Chairman of the French Commission, General Nudant.

The German papers publish the following order:

Two automobiles containing Belgian military came to JULICH, December 2. The following proclamation was posted:

In fulfilling the military mission for which I have been placed in JULICH, and with a view to maintaining order within the town, I hereby order:

- (1) From today on it is forbidden to anyone to leave or enter the town without my orders, except those bringing foodstuffs.
- (2) All inhabitants must from 7 o'clock in the evening until 5 o'clock in the morning, Belgian time, remain at home. In the interim all circulation is forbidden
- (3) All meetings of every kind are forbidden. Where the occasion arises you will be forced apart.
- (4) All public establishments, theatres, movies, cafes, and saloons are closed until further orders.
- (5) All weapons in the possession of the civil population and all military equipment of whatever kind it may be must be turned over tomorrow night in the Town Hall at 6 o'clock.
- (6) Hostages whom I will designate must hold themselves at my disposition at the Town Hall as a pledge for the security of the Belgian occupation of the town. This evening you will report there and remain there 24 hours. Each day these will be replaced.
- (7) The whole police and local government is subject to my orders in the town hall and police station.
- (8) All circulation of wagons is prohibited until the promulgation of new orders. Excepted only is the circulation of electric street cars, and the circulation of wagons that are carrying food provisions. Fire carts may pass, of course, at any time.
- (9) No newspapers, no publications and no placards, no matter what kind they are, may appear without being first censored and without my permission. All public articles that receive my permission must appear both in French and in German. All publications that concern provisions may appear the same as previously.
- (10) German sailors and German soldiers in uniform must not circulate in the streets of the city.

(11) Anybody who is found in the possession of arms will be arrested at once and shot without further investigation.

(12) Between 4 o'clock, Belgian time, and 8 o'clock, the first floor of all places of business must be kept lighted.

(13) I reserve to myself the right to search all dwellings no matter what they may be.

(14) The entire civilian population must greet passing officers by taking off their hats and at the same time leaving the sidewalk.

(15) Whosoever trespasses against these, my orders, will be taken prisoner and will be shot after investigation. In addition a payment of money will be demanded of inhabitants who were concerned as well as of the town.

(16) The home guard is hereby revoked.

(17) These present orders go into force at once.

Colonel GARCIA.

On behalf of the German High Command I ask for information as to whether actions of this kind in the German occupied lands are in conformance with the purpose of the High Commands of the Allies and the United States.

von WINTERFELDT.

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HS Fr. Files: 402-10.1: Letter

### ***Execution of Foch's Orders***

[Editorial Translation]

No. 4/P. C. M.

ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 9, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces

My dear General:

Since November 16 I have continually given you military orders which you have not carried out. You have consequently retarded the advance of the two French divisions which have had, since November 21, their orders to begin movement.

Finally, you have requested me not to place French divisions under the American command or American divisions under the French command. With a view to acceding, I changed, by my memorandum of December 8, my dispositions: I took one American division from the MAYENCE sector, in conformity with your request, and I withdrew from the American command the French divisions in COBLENZ, still conforming to your desire.

You told me on December 8, through Captain de Marenches, that that memorandum regulated everything and afterwards, in our conference on the same day, you did not actually make any reference to the memorandum. But on the 9th, when you were leaving for several days' absence, you sent me a letter in which you raised a question about everything, retarding once more the execution of measures to be carried out without delay by the French troops: for instance, you request me to take the French troops from COBLENZ in

order to give their sector to American troops; this after having announced on the 8th that you would like to reduce from 30 to 25 the number of American divisions to be kept in Europe.

I do not refuse to consider your recent request. But I can not continue the discussion with you if you do not carry out beforehand the orders I have issued.

When these orders are executed, I shall willingly take up the matter of what is advisable to do at COBLENZ.

Very sincerely,  
F. FOCH

Delivered at the NANCY Railroad Station at 12:20 a. m., the 10th, by Captain Gerodias to Private Rabette from the station commissariat, in the absence of Captain Vincent, with order to deliver it to Captain de Marenches when General Pershing's train passes.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Letter

### ***The Blockade of Germany***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 9, 1918.*

No. 19

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Decisions of Marshal Foch

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5. Reply to Note 287, from Mr. von Haniel which protests against the order of the High Command of the Allies fixing the circulation of trains between the two banks of the RHINE. The blockade of Germany is maintained.

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9. Allied Blockade: Minister von Haniel again made a statement regarding the importance of considering the provisioning of Germany. While evidently a good deal has been said that was considered by the Allies as exaggeration, the seriousness of the situation cannot be minimized; and the Allied Powers are assuming tremendous responsibility in making the blockade still more severe through terms of the Armistice Agreement.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German Complaints on Treatment of Railroad Personnel**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 9, 1918.*

No. 19

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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11. German Complaints.

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(c) The German Commission complained that although Marshal Foch had promised that railway personnel would be protected, a number of delivery committees are still subjected to unworthy and dishonorable treatment. In BRUSSELS, eighty Germans, employees of the railroads, were quartered in two rooms of barracks in which there was no preparation made for beds. In LIEGE, the railway personnel had to remain in unheated railway trains because there were no quarters ready for them. On December 5, at noon, they were divided into groups of twenty men for dinner. At the head went the guard and on both sides three soldiers. As they left the railway station, the guard called out to the people, very loudly: "Attention, look out for the dirty Germans, they are going to PARIS." The guard's number was 115. The Germans were then insulted by the screaming mob. As the second group came to eat, the first one was still at the table. The people of the second group had to take their places along the wall opposite. The guards stood with them, as well as four men of the watch. The public could, therefore, not insult the employees for more than half an hour. As the Germans on December 6 were standing along the wall and waiting to be given something to eat, a French Officer came past them and called out loudly, in German: "You German pigs, are you still here, - it is all over with you." The Belgian soldiers forbade the German soldiers to smoke and to talk. German notes as high as fifty marks were everywhere refused. Except for one warm meal, at noon, the people had nothing to eat, not even bread. Against this unheard of treatment of honest people, men who have come back confident and with the full assurance of Marshal Foch to Belgium, strong protest is raised. It is requested that their liberty be given. With particular emphasis, attention is called to the fact that under no circumstances no German can be induced to come back to take service in the evacuated area and thereby the fulfillment of the Armistice Convention, in conformance with Paragraph 7 of the Armistice Agreement, is made impossible.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Bolshevism in Germany***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 9, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Rhodes

[Extract]

1. In the course of a conversation today with Baron von Ow, a member of the Foreign Office assisting on the German Armistice Commission, recent developments in the internal economic situation in Germany were discussed. At the beginning of our conversation he repeated the conventional German fears of the Bolsheviks, and drew the conclusion that unless we came to their help with foodstuffs and raw materials we would throw the Germans into their arms. He admitted further, however, that the immediate need for food is not as great as it would be made to appear; that while there is an immediate shortage in sugar, none the less in another month there will be an ample supply; that while there is a shortage in potatoes, at least there would be enough for two or three months more if transportation facilities could be assured.

2. In reply to my objection that the Germans have been long disciplined and are too intelligent to become Bolsheviks in the Russian form, he admitted that possibly five per cent of the proletariat is at the present time Bolshevik in the Russian sense of the word. He argued, however, that without food and without object in life - as so many of the Germans are - it would be a fertile field for anarchy. He admitted that they were unable to define Bolshevism and doubts if the Bolsheviks themselves can. He declared, however:

Bolshevism is disorder combined with mysticism. Those who preach it have a fanatical energy which makes them, even though a minority, by far the dominant element in the community. Germany is overrun by agents paid by Russian money. Among these are a large number of south Russian Jews who are now old at the game. They were paid for a long time by Joffe, Russian Ambassador to BERLIN.

3. Their activity in his opinion has been more successful in BERLIN, HAMBURG, BREMEN and KIEL. The roll of the Bolshevik agents through the Spartacus Party is on the increase, while that of the sailors and A. and S. rata [Workers' and Soldiers' Councils] is on the decline. He is of the opinion that the A. and S. rata has outlived its usefulness and is rapidly disappearing as such. I gather the impression that there is a sincere fear of Bolshevism among the Germans here, even though the conclusions they draw may be for our consumption. In BERLIN, for example, Baron Ow declared the Spartacus Party seem to be having things increasingly their own way. Ebert and Scheidemann while in all probability able to command a majority of votes seem to be following on the track of Kerensky. They are sending out patrols to maintain order in the streets, but forbid them to use their weapons. In the BERLIN Kommando, for example when the French Commissioner General Dupont arrived, a band of Spartacus followers came in and disarmed the entire guard there. On the streets it is the same story. The Ebert patrols are being disarmed by the Spartacus people, who not only have collected a large quantity of fire arms but know how to use them. For this reason it is essential in his opinion that the general assembly constituting a regular government take place before February 16.

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6. In discussing the relation of the German Foreign Office to the new Government Baron Ow declared that the Socialists are turning it upside down. He denies the statement printed in some of the German papers that compromising documents were destroyed, and asserts that the archives were given over intact to the new de facto Government. A number of members of the Foreign Office have been obliged to flee the country or go into hiding because of menace of prosecution for acts in which they have participated.

The office is now topsy-turvy since Mr., Mrs., and Miss Kautsky have started reading through the papers to fix responsibility for beginning the war.

No one of the old regime now dares open his mouth. Officers, especially, men who take any initiative are arrested on the slightest provocation.

Baron Ow admits the ambiguous position of the German delegates here. He said, 'We have often debated the utility of our staying here. Any day we may be disavowed, and the only interest we have in holding on is the feeling that we must do something to keep everything from falling apart. Every time I telephone to BERLIN I know that there is a listener-in from the A. and S. rata.'\*

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8.

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Baron von Ow states that thus far no complaint has been received against the conduct of the American Army of Occupation, and he is of the opinion that there is not likely to be difficulty here. He admits that he is at a complete loss to understand why we are in the war and what our game is now. He implied, however, that we appear more or less willing to be the tail to a French kite.

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SANFORD GRIFFITH,  
Captain,  
Corps of Interpreters.

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\* Workers' and Soldiers' Councils

**German Delegates to Armistice Prolongation**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 9, 1918.*

No. 19

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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6. German Plenipotentiaries: The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission announced that full power in the matter of the prolongation of the Armistice Agreement had been given to the same persons who signed the original Agreement:

Secretary of State, Erzberger;  
Major General von Winterfeldt;  
Representative Count Oberndorff;  
and Captain Vanselow.

They will meet at TREVES on December 12. These plenipotentiaries will be accompanied by Ambassador von Haniel and several assistants, part of whom will come from BERLIN and part from SPA.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Memorandum

**Instructions for Administration of Luxemburg**

[Contemporary Translation]

*December 9, 1918.*

INSTRUCTIONS

RELATIVE TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The dispositions hereafter, in conformity with the general directions contained in Note 684/CR of November 20, are destined to give the populations of Luxemburg sufficient

liberty, assuring at the same time the indispensable guarantees for the security of the troops of the Allied Armies.

The French General, designated as Military Commandant for the city of LUXEMBURG, has under his orders an Interallied Office, the duties of which consist to assure the execution of all the police and disciplinary regulations concerning the civilian population and particularly those relative to residency and movement.

He will reside at LUXEMBURG.

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#### DECLARATION OF RESIDENCE:

(a) Inhabitants of Luxemburg are not obliged to make any declaration.

(b) Subjects of enemy and neutral powers must make a declaration at the Mairie [city hall] accompanied by a request for an identification card.

The card issued by the Bourgmestre [Burgmaster or Major] must be transmitted to the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg, to be countersigned.

The refusal by the Military Authority of the countersignature involves expulsion  
CIRCULATION (without any distinction of mode of locomotion):

1. Within the interior of the Grand Duchy:

(a) Inhabitants of Luxemburg. No formality.

(b) Subjects of enemy and neutral powers. Must present the identification card at any request.

2. Between the Grand Duchy and Foreign Countries.

(a) To leave the Grand Duchy.

1. For destination of France, Belgium and Lorraine: Request passport from the Luxemburg Government, this passport must bear the Visa of the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

2. For destination of the countries of left bank of RHINE: (This circulation will be quite unusual.) The passport is transmitted by the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg to the General commanding the interested Army of Occupation, who, if he judges it convenient, will deliver a circulation permit.

3. For destination of the right bank of the RHINE. Prohibition of all circulation.

(b) To enter the Grand Duchy:

1. Coming from France, Lorraine or Belgium: Address requests to officer at PARIS or BRUSSELS, which will decide after advice from the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

2. Coming from the left bank of the RHINE: (This circulation will be quite exceptional.) Address requests to the General commanding the Army of Occupation of the zone who will decide, after advice of the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

3. Coming from the right bank of the RHINE: Prohibition of all circulation.

#### MEETINGS

Any meeting, any representation, any assembly, of whatever kind it might be, must be preceded by a declaration, made 48 hours in advance, to the local military authority. This authority can prohibit the meeting.

#### PRESS

No newspaper, no pamphlet, no notice, no placard, no poster, no drawing, may be published unless a copy be submitted to the local military authorities at the time of publication and in accordance with the usual rules.

The circulation and the sale of newspapers of enemy origin or Russian newspapers is prohibited.

The sale and distribution of periodicals is limited to persons in possession of a permit issued by the municipal authorities and countersigned by the military authorities. This permit can be cancelled at any time.

#### PHOTOGRAPHY

No Restriction.

#### POSTAL, TELEGRAPH and TELEPHONE CONTROL:

1. Letters and telegrams:

(a) Interior circulation. No control.

(b) Letters and telegrams for foreign countries or coming from foreign countries.

Will obligatorily pass through the hands of an Inter-allied Control Commission, functioning at Luxemburg under the authority of the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

Mobile gangs of technical employees equally under his authority will ascertain that the Administration des Postes et Telegraphes of Luxemburg does not forward letters and telegrams through any other channel than through the Centralizing Bureau at Luxemburg.

The exchange of correspondence between the [Grand Duchy] of Luxemburg and Germany will be strictly limited to commercial correspondence by firms nominally designated by the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg, to whom they must apply to obtain the authorization for corresponding.

2. Telephone:

(a) Urban Communications: No restrictions.

(b) Interurban Communication: Controlled by the French or American technical employees in accordance with the rules to be fixed by the interested technical services according to the orders issued by the General Commandant d'Armes at Luxemburg.

(c) Communication with foreign countries. Is prohibited.

#### PIGEONS

The breeding and keeping of carrier pigeons is prohibited in Luxemburg.

#### ARMS AND MUNITIONS

The arms and munitions must be handed over to the municipal authorities who will be held responsible towards the local military authorities.

#### BARS AND DRINKS

The sale of alcohol or alcoholic drinks to soldiers is prohibited. This prohibition is also applicable to sales people and to private people.

This prohibition does not include the sale of alcohol for medicinal purposes.

The access to the bars, cafes and restaurants is prohibited to soldiers of all ranks outside the following hours:

	7 o'clock	to	8-1/2 o'clock	
10-1/2	"	"	13	"
17	"	"	21	"

## DISCIPLINARY ACTION

The Tribunaux [tribunals] of the Grand Duchy will continue to function in conformity with the ordinary laws and in the name of the Grand Ducal Government.

In addition, people who will be found guilty of offense against the Allied Armies, or of a crime according to the penal law of the interested Army, will be committed to court-martial.

WEYGAND.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telephone

### ***Reception of German Plenipotentiaries***

Telephone message received at 8:15 p. m., December 10, 1918.

Colonel Boughton has doubtless telephoned the instructions he received from General Pershing this afternoon concerning the arrangements to be made at TREVES for the reception of the German plenipotentiaries tomorrow.

Colonel Boyd telephoned to me that General Pershing had given instructions to you (Chief of Staff) to comply with the wishes expressed by the Marshal's Staff to Colonel Boughton regarding this whole matter.

The Chief of Staff here communicated to me the following at 7:30 p. m.

General Nudant telegraphed that the German personnel arriving at TREVES tomorrow, December 11, will be composed of two parties, the first arriving from SPA to be made up of 13 plenipotentiaries or officers and 9 clerks or orderlies; the second party coming from BERLIN will be composed of 14 plenipotentiaries or officers and 7 clerks or orderlies. The German plenipotentiaries beg that measures be taken to insure telephone communication between their hotel at TREVES and their Government.

Colonel T. BENTLEY MOTT,  
American Mission, Senlis.

193-28.3: Bulletin

### ***Occupation of Bridgeheads***

General Staff  
No. 1/P. C. M.

HIGH COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
December 10, 1918.

Modifying the Bulletin concerning occupation of the Rhine Provinces joined to letter of November 16, No. 6231, it has been determined as follows:

1st - The American division which was to participate in the occupation of the MAYENCE bridgehead will be replaced by a French division.

2d - The 2 French divisions taking part in the occupation of the COBLENZ bridgehead will occupy the southern part of this bridgehead.

So that these units may be placed under French command, the boundary between the French and American Armies is modified to reserve to the French Armies at least one of the COBLENZ bridges and the highways leading thereto; it will be traced according to the general line.

Old boundary between METTLACH and BUNDENBACH inclusive, administrative limit between BUNDENBACH and TRARBACH, the MOSELLE and COBLENTZ to Americans southern bridge of COBLENTZ to the French highway EHRENBREITSTEIN and HAHN to the Americans.

This boundary will be determined in its details by the Commander-in-Chief of the French and American Armies.

1. The total number of French occupying divisions will thus be 18.

The total number of American occupying divisions will thus be reduced to 8, the total number of occupying troops having already been given to the German High Command.

3d - The cavalry division designated to take part in the occupation of the American zone will be placed in the north part of the French zone, so that it may be ready to give assistance to the American Army of Occupation if circumstances should make it necessary.

4th - These steps are to be taken in the shortest possible time.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the American and French Armies are requested to kindly report as soon as they are completed.

FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Telegram

***Luxemburg to be Evacuated by American Units***

*December 10, 1918.*

Commanding General, American Second Army

Commanding General, American Third Army

2364 G-3. Following telegram received from Allied Commander-in-Chief transmitted for your information and for compliance insofar as concerns troops and services under your command:

First the Chateau of STEINSEL (about 9 kilometers from the north of LUXEMBURG) will be reserved for the Military Mission attached to the Staff of the Marshal commanding the Allied Armies.

To the city of LUXEMBURG and its suburbs will be evacuated on December 11 by all American units or services which may be located therein.

Acknowledge.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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***Evacuation of American Prisoners of War***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 10, 1918.

To: Commanding General, Third Army

Number 4470 G-1. Shortly after signing of Armistice effective steps were taken to evacuate greatest possible number American prisoners of war from southern Germany through Switzerland to France and with valuable help from Military Attache in BERNE and Red Cross this has now been accomplished. There remain in Germany, however, an indefinite number of Americans, estimated at an aggregate of several hundred who are widely scattered in small groups or entirely isolated and include many sick and wounded. You are requested to organize promptly the necessary personnel and transport to thoroughly search for Americans in the zone in front of the Third Army and extending as far as practicable to the north and south thereof. Red Cross personnel was sent into your territory largely to assist in this work. The Armistice Commission and German High Command have already approved sending Red Cross into Germany for this purpose and arrangements can be made with local German command for sending medical personnel and transport wherever necessary for this purpose. A few Americans will be evacuated from the noterhn ports upon British ships but it is desired that the fewest possible number be evacuated in that way. You are requested to promptly take such measures as may be necessary to insure the speedy location and repatriation of the greatest possible number of Americans within reach of your Army. Repatriated prisoners should be sent to replacement depots except sick and wounded who should be given any necessary attention locally until able to go to depots. Telegraph daily number and disposition of persons received.

ANDREWS.

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G-1, Third Army, General File 383.6, Fldr. 4: Telegram

***Disposition of Repatriated Prisoners of War***

1st Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 11, 1918.

General Staff Chaumont, December 11, 1918

Commanding General, Third Army

Number 4493 G-1. Marshal Foch's Hq. directs that Serbian soldiers coming from Germany be sent to TOULON by their Fayolle Army Group. To accomplish this your territory designate a repatriation center as assembly point for Serbian soldiers and arrange direct with Fayolle Army Group, present headquarters KAISERSLAUTERN, as to point they wish them delivered. Please inform these headquarters repatriation center designated send direct to BESANCON any Greek, Montenegrin, Serbian, and Polish repatriated civilians, the same French repatriated civilians.

ANDREWS.

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**Control of Correspondence of the Rhine Country**

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff, D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 1546/CR

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED ARMIES,  
December 11, 1918.

NOTE OF APPLICATION

Relative to Control of the Correspondence of the Rhine Country.  
(Pursuant to Section II of the Note of Nov. 24, 1918, D. G. C. R. A.)

In order to assure control of postal communication between the Rhine territory occupied by the Allied Armies, and other countries, the following measures will be taken as soon as the forward movement of the Allied Armies shall be completed:

I. AUTHORIZED POSTAL COMMUNICATION

Correspondence will be subject to the regulations set forth in Section I of the Memorandum of Nov. 24, 1918, D. G. C. R. A.

All newspapers, reviews, pamphlets other than those of Allied countries, will be strictly prohibited from entering or leaving.

In regard to postal communication with German territory not occupied, or neutral countries, commercial, industrial, financial or administrative correspondence will be allowed to enter or leave the occupied Rhine territory only when directed to or written by parties designated by name.

The Army commanders will prepare, each for the zone which he commands, lists of the names of these persons.

The lists will be forwarded to the control commissions designated below and kept up to date.

II. CONTROL COMMISSIONS

All correspondence from or to German territory not occupied, enemy or neutral countries, will be required to pass through the hands of the control commissions at the frontier points shown in the following table.

Postal Communications with	Zone of the Belgian Army	Zone of the British Army	Zone of the American Army	Zone of the French Army
German Countries not occupied	DUSSELDORF	COLOGNE	COBLENZ	(MAYENCE (LUDWIGSHAFEN- (RHINE (SPIRE
HOLLAND	(CLEVES (AIX-la- (CHAPELLE	AIX-la- CHAPELLE	AIX-la- CHAPELLE	
BELGIUM	AIX-la- CHAPELLE	AIX-la- CHAPELLE	(AIX-la- (CHAPELLE (TREVES	TREVES
LUXEMBURG	TREVES	TREVES	TREVES	TREVES
ALSACE- LORRAINE	SARREBRUCK	SARREBUCK	SARREBRUCK	(LANDAU (SARREBRUCK

Each Allied Army will organize, as soon as possible, control commissions for the frontier point within its zone accordance with the plans set forth in the memorandum of November 24, 1918, mentioned above Section II.

The personnel selected will be sufficiently experienced and numerous to avoid delays in the postal service. The Armies will send their representatives directly to the various commissions designated to control the correspondence to and from other zones.

### III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN

The present regulations will be brought to the notice of the population of occupied Germany through action taken by the German authorities.

The French and German services affected will be notified by the various Allied headquarters.

TR. ThMcK.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Telegram

#### ***German Shipping for Carrying Food***

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*December 12, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies

TREVES, Germany

Reference the supply of food to the peoples in the central states and in territory evacuated by them I have received information from Mr. Hoover that Germany has 2,500,000 tons of merchant shipping including cargo and passenger vessels. Mr. Hoover has consulted with representatives of both British and French Governments and expresses Allied opinion that this shipping should be turned over to Allied control under an agreement already reached for its use in carrying food and supplies from America and elsewhere as needed by peoples referred to. In consultation this morning with Mr. House we have agreed that it would be wise if transfer of this shipping could be made a condition for the extension of the Armistice as desired by Germany. While this matter does not come in an official manner yet it is undoubtedly the view of the Allied Powers that this be done. Therefore at request of Mr. Hoover and Mr. House I present the matter to you for such action as you may consider it advisable to take.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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**Released Prisoners of War**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
December 12, 1918.

C-in-C G-1

No. 254, G-1. Reference your 4493 G-1 Third Army Prisoners of War Depot at TRIER designated as assembly point for classes released prisoners of war specified and from which point they will be evacuated to final destinations indicated. Suggest similar instructions be sent C. G., Second Army as it is believed we will shortly receive trainload lots of released prisoners of war who will be sent directly through to depots we have previously established at LONGWY, LONGUYON, and BRIEY which latter depots are now within the territory on the Second Army. Unquestionably many of the classes mentioned your telegram will be on these trains.

DICKMAN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Letter

**French Units to Guard Frontier**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 750/3  
1806/00

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,  
POSTAL SECTOR 10,  
December 12, 1918.

Colonel Linard, Chief of French Military Mission with the American Army

To the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces. G-3.

I have the honor to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies has decided that French units will be placed the whole length of the French frontier of 1914, from the North Sea to Switzerland.

These units will be charged with the assuring of a custom house and police service along this frontier.

In executing this decision the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies the following telegram:

1st---The guard at the Franco-Belgian frontier will be assured in the British zone by 3 French divisions designated by you, of which you will regulate the movement, billeting, use and supply by understanding with Mission MONTREUIL.

2d---Similar service will be assured by you between the British zone and the coast by means of divisions of the Sixth Army stationed in the DUNKIRK region; Sixth Army has been notified.

3d---You are requested to send proposals to assure the same end in the American zone between the boundary MAISTRE Army Group and MOSELLE.

The French Headquarters has informed Foch Staff that it planned upon using for a frontier guard in the American zone an army corps of 3 divisions coming from the MAISTRE Army Group.

I have the honor of bringing these facts to your attention to allow you to study the conditions for the movement, the billeting and distribution of these units in the American zone, when the question which is now being studied only will have received the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

Col. L. LINARD,  
Chief of Mission.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Memorandum

**Frontier Guard**

3d Section, G. S.

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*December 13, 1918.*

Memorandum for: The Chief of Staff

1. Herewith is translation of a letter showing that under instructions from the Allied Commander-in-Chief three French divisions are to occupy that part of the American zone which lies along the Belgium-Luxemburg zone.
2. These three French divisions will very likely occupy the regions of BRIEY---LONGWY---LONGUYON---MONTMEDY---STENAY.
3. Under instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the Second Army has been told to go slowly in the movement of troops toward the north.  
There are, however, certain detachments in the regions mentioned above. Moreover, in order to obtain suitable billeting facilities the Second Army had intended to move the 79th Division to the region Stenay-Montmedy; this movement has been suspended.

\* \* \* \* \*

In this connection it is well to note that we must send divisions home beginning January 1, if we are to utilize available transportation.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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**Extension of Armistice**

*December 13, 1918.*

Copy of the Convention passed at TREVES, December 13, 1918, for the prolongation of the Armistice with Germany:

THE CONVENTION

The undersigned, vested with the power by virtue of which they signed the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, have concluded the following additional conventions:

1. The duration for the Armistice decided upon November 11, 1918, is extended one month, that is to say, to January 17, 1919, at 5 o'clock. This prolongation of a month is extended up to the conclusion of the Peace Preliminaries, subject to the approbation of the Allied Governments.
2. Those clauses of the Convention of November 11, not completely fulfilled will be continued and completed in accordance with the detailed terms decided upon by the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission, under the instructions of the Allied High Command.
3. The following clause is added to the Convention of November 11, 1918:

The Allied High Command from this date reserves the right to occupy, when it deems necessary, by right of the new guarantee, the Neutral Zone on the right bank of the RHINE from the north of the COLOGNE bridgehead as far as the Dutch border. The Allied High Command will give advice of this occupation six days in advance.

Treves, December 13, 1918.

ERZBERGER.  
A. OBERNDORFF.  
WINTERFELDT.  
VANSELOW.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1272: Letter

**Information Regarding Treves Meeting**

ADVANCED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Treves, December 13, 1918.*

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Adv. G. H. Q., A. E. F.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Advanced G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. It appears to have been the studied policy of the French military authorities to keep this Advanced General Headquarters in the dark as to information necessary for the making arrangements for the meeting of the Armistice Commission at TREVES, Germany, on December 12, 1918. Information received with respect to the essential details has either

been entirely lacking and when furnished has, almost without exception, been inexact or was so late in arriving that the arrangements could only be carried out hurriedly.

2. The following is a summary of the information received as compared with events as they occurred:

German Armistice Commission:

Time of Arrival: On Dec. 9, advice was received from G. H. Q. that the party would arrive Dec. 11.

On Dec. 10, 1:30 p. m. an order was telephoned from G. H. Q. signed Boughton that the party would arrive Dec. 11 in the afternoon in two trains, one from BERLIN and one from SPA and that the exact time of arrival would be notified to General Brown later.

On Dec. 10, 6:30 p. m. information was obtained from the regulating officer, TREVES, that the train from BERLIN conveying German delegates was to arrive at 3 a. m., Dec. 11 (German time) at the main station east side of the river.

On Dec. 10, 10 p. m., the Secretary of the G. S., G. H. Q., informed General Brown that the German personnel will arrive at TREVES tomorrow Dec. 11, composed of two parties, the first arriving from SPA and the second party coming from BERLIN.

Actual Conditions: On Dec. 11, the arrival of the German delegates took place as follows:

First train from BERLIN, 2:30 a. m. at main station. These passengers requested permission to remain on the train until 9 a. m. The party was escorted to their hotel at 9:15 a. m.

Second train from SPA, 4 p. m., at main station. The party was then escorted to the hotel.

It may be pointed out that exact time of arrival was not notified to General Brown as was to be done according to the message from G. H. Q., signed Boughton, of Dec. 10.

In the case of the train from BERLIN, it was possible to get the information as to arrival locally, but regarding the SPA train all efforts to obtain the necessary details were unsuccessful.

Number of persons in the delegation:

The advices regarding the numerical strength of the delegation were as follows:

Date	From	Information received (particulars)
Dec. 9	G. H. Q.	4 officers, accompanied by clerks and attendants.
Dec. 10-1:30 p. m.	G. H. Q. Message signed Boughton	About 12 persons and 2 trains, one from BERLIN and one from SPA
Dec. 10-10: p. m.	Sec'y G. S., G. H. Q.	The German personnel. . . will be composed of two parties; the first arriving from SPA will be made up of 13 members and 9 clerks. The second party coming from BERLIN will be composed of 14 members and 7 clerks. (a total of 43).

Actual Conditions: The last mentioned advice was received, after arrangements had been made for about 12 persons at Hotel zur Post, at an hour leaving very little margin before the arrival of the party to arrive December 11, at 3 a. m. It should be

stated that orders were given for the strict isolation (and protection) of the delegates. It was therefore necessary to find quarters offering not only proper comfort for the delegation but also facility for carrying out the orders for isolation. The city is rapidly filling with officers requiring billets and the hotels are practically full, so that the quartering of the German delegation made it necessary to oblige residents in the hotel whose presence was undesirable to leave.

Furthermore, it was ordered that provisions be supplied for the party and under present conditions, time is required to find the necessary foodstuffs of proper quality.

The delegation expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the accommodation provided, but under the circumstances no better could be found, answering the requirements for isolation.

It should be noted, furthermore, that no list of the members of the delegation and staff was furnished, for purposes of control.

Arrival of Marshal Foch: No information was received as to the arrival of Marshal Foch and the only indication available was the statement in the message of Dec. 10 from G. H. Q., signed Boughton, that conference will be December 12 at Marshal Foch's train.

Actual Conditions:

The orders received were for:

Officers with sufficient guards to allow at least ten men always on duty around Marshal Foch's train.

Provision of telegraph and telephone for Marshal's train.

As there are two stations at TREVES that might come in question, it was necessary to keep necessary guards at both stations beginning the evening before December 12. The Marshal's train arrived December 12, at 9:15 a. m.

The uncertainty in the time of the Marshal's arrival made it difficult, particularly with the small number of automobiles available here, to make the necessary arrangements to convey the delegates from their hotels to the Marshal's train for the conference without delay. This headquarters has received no official notification whatever as to the conferences which occurred today, although required to provide the necessary transportation and guard for the delegates.

It has also been reported to this office that officers of the Marshal's staff showed some astonishment that this headquarters had provided no automobiles for their accommodation immediately on arrival. On the other hand, satisfaction was expressed at the promptness with which cars were provided when asked for and the telephone connection required for the Marshal's car was established.

3. The discrepancies in information, as well as the entire lack of it in some respects, reported in the preceding paragraph, had a tendency not only to cause unsatisfactory execution of orders but also, undesirable friction in dealing with the population.

A. L. CONGER,  
Colonel, G-2.

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**Financial Arrangements**

[Contemporary Translation]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*Treves, December 13, 1918.*

I

The German Government agrees that it will not without the previous consent of the Allies dispose of the specie in the vaults of the Treasury or the Reichbank, of paper or of other assets on or in foreign countries, or of movable foreign property belonging to the Government or the Public Treasury.

The German Government agrees not to give its consent without previous agreement with the Allies to the exportation for the credit and values above mentioned which are the property of individuals or of corporations.

II

The German Government agrees to take all necessary steps in consent with the Allied Governments to decide as soon as possible how securities lost or stolen in the invaded regions shall be returned to their rightful owners.

III

The German Government is obliged to pay the Alsatians and people of LORRAINE when due and according to law all debts and all bills falling due or to fall due during the Armistice and affecting the German public funds as for example; public bonds, money orders, drafts, acceptances, and so on, the enumeration above being an indication and not a limitation on its obligations.

The German Government is obliged to refrain from interfering with the free disposal by Alsatians and people of LORRAINE of their property securities and assets and depots which belong to them and are located in Germany.

IV

The German Government agrees to investigate with the Allied Governments as soon as possible the measures to be taken for restoring property of Allied citizens which has sequestrated.

By France:  
MM. Ch. De LASTEYRIE,  
P. TIRARD.

For Germany:  
MM. BURSING,  
RATSEN.

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**Repatriation of Prisoners by German Shipping**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 95-G

*Spa, December 14, 1918.*

From General Nudant to General v. Winterfeldt

Marshal Foch telegraphed the following:

1. In order to avoid the serious difficulties indicated by our delegates in BERLIN as well as by the German Government, every step should be taken to repatriate as rapidly as possible the prisoners of war.

2. This repatriation being impossible to carry out on land, the German Government should put the entire number of its passenger ships at the disposal of the Allies.

3. Consequently:

(1) The ships the enumeration of which follows should be turned over to the Allies by the German crews in such Allied ports as will be indicated.

(2) The ships destined for the English will receive British crews, and the German crews will be repatriated.

As to the ships destined for the French, the German officers and crews will be totally or in part kept on board.

(3) Pilots will be supplied for each ship by the German authorities.

(4) The ships will be delivered in perfect sailing order and will have on board the coal, machinery, and general equipment necessary for navigation.

(5) No remuneration will be asked of the Allies for the use of these ships.

(6) The flag from the moment of leaving the German port will be that of the country to which the ships should be delivered. The flag of the C. A. T. M. serving as the flag of the country.

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AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-410: Cable

***Economic policy during Occupation***

AMERICAN EMBASSY,  
*Paris, December 14, 1918.*

SECSTATE

WASHINGTON

WARTRABORD No. 68. The occupation of German territory as far as the west bank of the RHINE and the bridgeheads raises questions of economic policy of the greatest importance, which will last during the period of occupation. To deal with these questions the French Ministry of Blockade, acting on the request of Marshal Foch under whose control these territories are, have prepared a plan of which the general outline is, we are informally advised, as follows:

FIRST: There shall be constituted to deal with these questions:

(a) An Interallied committee which shall sit at PARIS under the chairmanship of one of the French undersecretaries of State attached to the Conseil d'Etat, said committee to deal with general questions of policy.

(b) An Interallied committee which shall sit at a place to be designated in the occupied territory, for example TREVES, which committee shall:

(1) Handle the administrative questions arising out of the policies to be laid down by the PARIS Committee, such as the granting of licenses, etc., and

(2) Supply the PARIS Committee with data upon which it may base its determinations of policy.

SECOND: The questions of policy to be dealt with by the PARIS Committee shall be in general the determination of:

(a) How far the Nationals of the Associated Governments shall be permitted to export to and import from the Nationals of the enemy in the occupied territory raw materials, semi-manufactured articles, etc., and

(b) How far the enemy Nationals in the occupied territory shall be permitted to have commercial and other relations with the territories on the east bank of the RHINE.

THIRD: It is not at present the intention of the French to ration or fix contingents for the occupied territories, but to treat these territories as they have treated Spain. This will mean that all raw materials, semi-manufactured and manufactured articles will be permitted to go to the occupied territory provided:

(a) Same can be spared by the Associated Governments.

(b) Transport conditions allow.

(c) Industries in occupied territory which desire to import are not competitors of similar industries in the Associated Governments. In connection with Paragraph (c), a large German steel factory will not be permitted to receive raw material and machinery if their output competes with similar factories in the Associated Governments.

FOURTH: The same policy will be followed with respect to permitting imports into the Associated countries from enemy Nationals in the occupied territory.

FIFTH: One of the French Delegates on the PARIS Committee will be Seydoux of the French Ministry of Blockade.

SIXTH: It is the opinion of the French that the TREVES Committee should by preference be comprised of military delegates. In this connection the French Ministry of Blockade will be pleased to place at the disposal of any delegates which the Associated Governments may appoint to the TREVES Committee all information and facilities in their possession on the questions and principals which may arise and will give such delegates an opportunity to spend several days in the Ministry to study same.

SEVENTH: The French would be pleased if the United States Government would designate the proper delegates for both the PARIS and TREVES Committees as soon as possible. In this connection, we draw your attention to the variety of questions involved: Political, military, financial, transport, and import and export control.

GENERAL COMMENTS:

(a) The foregoing was informally transmitted to us with the request that it be advised to the proper authorities in WASHINGTON.

(b) The final draft of the plan which is not yet ready will be cabled you in a few days.

(c) We have communicated the foregoing to the Embassy, Generals Pershing and Bliss, Hoover and Davis of the Treasury.

We suggest your approving the plan in principle and taking the necessary steps to designate a delegate to represent the War Trade Board. Stetson and Taylor will confer with Seydoux on this subject within a few days and report further. Stetson.

SHARP.

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***Prolongation of Armistice***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 14, 1918.*

No. 21

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Prolongation of Armistice: On December 12 and 13, General Nudant and Staff, representing Marshal Foch, met General von Winterfeldt and Staff, representing the German Government, at TREVES with a view to agreeing upon the prolongation of the Armistice Agreement. Marshal Foch was also present. From a conversation today with General Nudant, it was learned that the conference was a stormy one, more especially with respect to a protocol which Marshal Foch insisted should be added to the Armistice Agreement providing for certain penalties to be exacted because of the German Government failing to live up to the terms of the original Armistice with respect to turning over transport and materiel. So far as I could learn the penalties were in general the occupation and control by the Allied High Command of the Neutral Zone, extending from COBLENZ to Holland; and, secondly, a demand for additional transport and materiel as a penalty for failure to comply with the original terms of the Armistice. It is my impression that the Allied High Command demanded a certain number of horses for every aeroplane which the Germans failed to deliver. The agreement to continue the original Armistice for thirty days longer has been signed by both contracting parties. The protocol, which was the subject of violent argument on the part of the German plenipotentiaries, has not yet been signed by the German representatives, who now have it in their possession under consideration.

This morning one of my Staff officers had occasion to visit the quarters of the German Commission in regard to the subject of delayed action mines, and as he is a fluent German conversationalist he gathered from the German General Staff officer that the German Commission was highly indignant over their treatment at TREVES,--- being met on their arrival by a guard of American soldiers with fixed bayonets, who practically prevented them from leaving the hotel where they were quartered and who treated them not as plenipotentiaries, but as prisoners. The German officer further stated that on arrival in the hotel their relations with the Americans improved and the private soldiers received cigarettes from the Americans, and that two American officers shook hands with German officers. One of the American officers told the German officers that his colonel had stated that the armed guard over the Germans was not ordered by the Americans, but at the instance of Marshal Foch.

This afternoon at a preliminary conference at General Nudant's quarters the latter took occasion to remark that at TREVES, December 12, General Dickman, Commander of the American Third Army, had applied rather rigorous measures to the German Commission, treating them not as plenipotentiaries, but virtually as prisoners, by placing a guard over their hotel and not allowing them to leave during their stay at TREVES.

I made no comment to this voluntary statement, but could hardly reconcile it with the report from the Germans that American officers had stated that the guard was ordered by Marshal Foch.

These incidents are reported for what they are worth, but if the familiarity reported as having taken place between the Germans and American officers at TREVES, is correct, it should be deprecated.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-2, GHQ, AEF: Secretary File 380: Fldr. 4: Letter

***Responsibility for Treatment of German Delegates at Treves***

2d Section, General Staff

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Treves, December 14, 1918.*

[Extract]

Dear General Nolan:

In connection with the visit of the German delegates, I have already reported through the daily letter sent to the Chief of Staff (and the appendix to yesterday's letter) the main circumstances connected with the handling of the arrangements for the Commission.

I received a very vigorous protest from Erzberger the first day for the confinement of the party to the hotel, but replied that the arrangements for the Commission had been dictated by the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, and that any request for their alteration would therefore have to be made to Marshal Foch. Upon leaving, Erzberger had a little talk with Captain Dellschaft down at the station in which he took occasion to thank him for the courtesies shown him and the other members of the party "by every American from the officers in charge down to the privates of the guard and soldier attendants." He further stated that he and the other members of the party thoroughly appreciated that the indignities put upon them here had not been by any wish of the Americans to humiliate them, but had been done by order of the French Generalissimo, and that the execution of these orders by the Americans had been accomplished with the utmost consideration.

I was rather pleased at this, since I gained the conviction that one intention of imposing these conditions was to stir up feeling on the part of the German delegates against their American jailors. Or, on the other hand, to accuse us, if we failed to carry out the instructions to the letter, of ignoring the instructions given by the Marshal - or of being inefficient in executing them. As it turned out we were able to carry them out to the letter and at the same time place the responsibility for the conditions imposed precisely where it belonged, so that the outcome was very satisfactory from our point of view.

\* \* \* \* \*

A. L. CONGER,  
Colonel, G. S.

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**Coke, Coal, and Iron Demands**

*Spa, December 14; 1918.*

FIRST MEETING OF DELEGATES IN THE  
ECONOMIC COMMISSION

Missions represented: French  
American  
German

The French delegate, representing Marshal Foch, made the following statement: "The purpose of the meeting is merely to assure the fulfillment of the conditions of the Armistice. All economic questions relating to this I have authority to discuss. Other questions of a mere general economic nature I am ready to discuss, but unofficially." He fixed the discussion of the meeting to economic questions relative to metallurgical industries of ALSACE-LORRAINE. He enumerated the following demands made by Marshal Foch:

(a) Coke---Germany must supply from the right bank of the RHINE 10,500 tons per day. The price paid will be that of the last quarter of 1918. This represents the amount now being shipped (the last ten days) and is a demand for continuance.

(b) Coal---2,500 tons per day must be supplied from the right bank of the RHINE. This should preferably be shipped by water to STRASSBURG, or if impossible by water, to other RHINE ports and from there by train to ALSACE-LORRAINE.

The French Government will continue to supply Switzerland with a portion of coal from the SAAR region, contracted for in the German-Swiss Convention.

The right bank of the RHINE must supply 75,000 tons of coal per month to the Armies of the Allies in occupation of the bridgeheads.

(c) Manganese---Owing to the delay which the French will have in securing a supply, in the interim, Germany must supply the French with 9,000 tons of pure manganese per month. The low grade of manganese [slag] flags, containing 7 to 8 per cent, must continue to be furnished in the quantity supplied these last years.

(d) Pig Iron---Germany must supply approximately 40,000 tons per month.

(e) Replacement of parts pertaining to railroads, etc., removed by the Germans, must be made good by them.

(f) Machinery taken must be returned or replaced, among this a quantity of electric motors and power belts. All documents relating to these or to the factories and the region in question must be turned over to the Commission.

All questions relating to contracts between the two parties will be handled by a central French bureau established in ALSACE-LORRAINE.

These demands in no way affect the questions of damages which may be raised later. The French Chairman insists that immediate steps be taken for the Armistice fulfillment and admits no discussion which might lead to a compromise in regard to the terms.

The German delegation protested that conditions are included which are not covered by the Armistice.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,  
Captain, Corps of Interpreters.

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***Sale of Alcohol to Soldiers and Officers***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, G. S.  
2d Bureau  
No. 399/PCL

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*G. Q. G. A., December 14, 1918.*

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F.

The instructions given by the American Commander in LUXEMBURG regarding the sale of alcohol specify that this sale is prohibited to soldiers and non-commissioned officers, which leads to suppose that it is authorized to officers.

It is important to avoid all errors of interpretation and to act uniformly in the various Allied Armies, and in view of this, to state exactly, in the various instructions relating to the sale of alcohol, that this sale is also prohibited to officers.

WEYGAND.

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***Closing of Frontier***

[Contemporary Translation]

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 14, 1918.*

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F.

The instruction of December 9, 1918, regarding the administration of the Great Duchy of Luxemburg determines exactly the conditions under which the frontier between Luxemburg and the Rhineland may be crossed by the inhabitants of these two regions. It also prescribes that all correspondence between these two regions is to be submitted to the approval of the Commission de Controle of Luxemburg, which functions under the orders of the General, Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

The application of this instruction therefore requires that the frontier between Luxemburg and the Rhineland be strictly closed. Owing to the great interest connected with the closing of these frontiers, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, begs the American commander to advise him of the measures taken to insure its realization.

WEYGAND.

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**French Commandant d'Armes Appointed**

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, G. S.  
2d Bureau  
No. 398/2

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 14, 1918.*

To: Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies  
Marshal Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies  
General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces  
Lieutenant General Gillain, Chief of the General Staff of the Belgian Army  
The General Commandant of the French Sixth Army

In compliance with the instruction regarding the administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, dated December 9, 1918, Brigadier General Lacombe de Latour has been appointed to the office of the French Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg. The duties connected therewith are defined by the above instruction and consist namely of assuring the execution of all police and disciplinary measures with regard to the civilian population and particularly those relating to residence and circulation.

Kindly bring this nomination to the attention of the Armies under your command, who, in the event they would occupy part of Luxemburg, would have to correspond directly with the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg for all matters within his competence.

WEYGAND.

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**German Wireless Material at Spa**

No. 22

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 15, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

4. German wireless materiel at SPA: The Allied High Command has decided \* \* \* that the wireless materiel at SPA is the property of the Allies, who have complete control over its utilization; and directs that a new wireless station which was put in operation

on December 11, by the German Mission without the authorization of the Interallied Commission, must be immediately dismantled.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 3: Memorandum

***Refusal to Give Up Essential Installations***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,  
*December 15, 1918.*

Liaison Officer, G-4

Directeur General des Communications et des Ravitaillements aux Armees

Barracks Occupied by American Troops at Toul

1. Confirming conversation with Cdt. Lescanne, I have the honor to call to your notice that the American troops now occupying barracks number 69-O-R1 and 10-O-Genie at TOUL have received orders from French G. H. Q. through Commanding General D. E., U. S. zone at BAR-le-DUC, to vacate these barracks within four days. It is impossible for the American forces to give up these barracks within the time specified, and moreover as the occupation of these buildings is indispensable to the American Second Army, it cannot be said when these installations can be vacated, as American G. H. Q. has not been informed what disposition is to be made of the American Second Army which now occupies the territory north of TOUL.

2. In this connection your attention is respectfully called to the 2d Paragraph of Telegram 563/CR of Nov. 16 worded as follows:

American Army will keep indispensable installations in zone ceded to French Army, particularly at TOUL.

It is upon the strength of this statement that the American Army has maintained its important services at TOUL.

3. The needs of the French Army for demobilization purposes are recognized by American Headquarters as of the utmost importance. It is felt, however, that their first duty is maintaining the Armies in the field in such condition that the orders received from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, may be given effect with the minimum possible delay and that the essential installations of the Army services cannot, therefore, be allowed to suffer for the purposes of the French demobilization.

4. American Headquarters further requests most urgently that you make arrangements with French G. H. Q. whereby matters such as the above will be referred to Allied General Headquarters, where an agreement can be reached before definite orders are issued. It is hoped that in this way situations may be avoided wherein it is necessary to revoke or modify orders which have been issued and which may possibly give rise to misunderstandings between the French and American Armies.

5. It is respectfully requested that this office be informed what action you are able to take in compliance with this request.

for

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,  
1st Lt., Cavalry.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Memorandum

**Table of American Prisoners Evacuated**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa Belgium, December 15, 1918.*

Memorandum for General Rhodes

American prisoners of war are reported by the Ministry of War, BERLIN, to have been evacuated as follows:

Officers	Men	How Evacuated
5	30	From the III Army Corps District by way of the Baltic
	16	From the VII Corps District; from the IX Corps District, by way of the RHINE to ROTTERDAM.
	100	
1	60	From the XIII Corps District; from the XIV Corps District, by way of Switzerland.
210	2,500	
	130	From the XVII Corps District, by way of STRASSBURG.
	176	From the XVIII Corps District, by way of METZ.
3		I Bavarin Corps District, by way of Switzerland.
3	221	Left of the RHINE absorbed by advancing Armies.
Total - 222	3,233	

We have no figures as to the arrival of American prisoners in ROTTERDAM.

In comparison with the 221 prisoners announced as having been absorbed by advancing Armies, the French G. Q. G. reports 342 Americans as absorbed up to November 24. These figures do not include those absorbed by British Armies.

The exact figures as to the number of Americans left in each camp are expected this week.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

-----

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Memorandum

***Transfer of German Prison Camps***

[Contemporary Translation]

From General Nudant to Marshal Foch

No. 118---PG2. In view of the growing impatience of prisoners, to assure order and see to better future supply and attention, I ask that you in accord with the German Commission in SPA, take over under the authority of the Armies of the Allies the nearest large prison camps on the RHINE, that is to say, FRIEDRICHSFELD by the Belgian Army, WAHN by the English Army, and DARMSTADT and RASTATT by the French Army.

Personnel of the Allies should be detailed to command and assure the sanitary service of these camps.

Chief of Staff.

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Third Army Gen. Corres. File: Fldr. 275: Telegram

***Limit on Number of Divisions to Enter Germany***

*December 15, 1918.*

General Preston Brown, Advanced General Headquarters, Treves

No. 2485 G-3. Reference your A 57, following telegram sent Commanding General, American Third Army. "2480 G-3. Instructions from Allied Commander-in-Chief limit number of divisions entering Germany to eight. The 33d Division is transferred to Second Army to take effect on date agreed upon in consultation with Commanding General of that Army. Any elements of this division which may have crossed Luxemburg-German frontier will be withdrawn to west of that line. Reference your G-3 No. 127 Luxemburg-German boundary is designated as rear limit Third Army. Acknowledge. By order Conner."

CONNER.

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**Postal Control**

FROM GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE FRENCH ARMIES

SPECIAL SERVICE OF POSTAL CONTROL OF THE ARMIES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*December 15, 1918.*

REGULATIONS OF COMMISSIONS OF POSTAL CONTROL OF

JULY 1, 1918

Supreme Command of the Allied Armies, General Staff

*G. Q. G. A., November 24, 1918.*

NOTE RELATIVE TO THE REGULATION AND CONTROL

OF CORRESPONDENCE IN THE RHINE COUNTRIES AND LUXEMBURG

(It will be inserted as 17th Article in the proclamation issued in connection with No. 1 of instructions with regard to the Rhine countries.)

I. Regulation:

Correspondence will be subject to the following rules:

1. Writing, legible as far as possible, and in Latin characters.
2. The only languages authorized are French, English, Italian, Spanish, Alsatian dialect and German. High Command will only be authorized as a substitute for local patois.
3. Address of the sender: Letters shall have on the reverse side of the envelope a complete legible address of the sender. Any violation of this provision or any inscription of a false address are liable to bring about the detention of the correspondence.
4. The use of double envelopes is prohibited.
5. The mailing of letters: Letters will be placed sealed by the individuals in the ordinary post boxes.
6. Prohibition against special transmission (Colporter) of correspondence: No person who is not a member of the postal service, no company doing transportation by land, water, rail or air will be allowed to take part in the transportation of correspondence (letters, notes and postal cards), handwritten.
  - (A) On behalf of a third party, whatever the destination may be.
  - (B) On his own behalf between original postal circuit (territory covered by the postal service).

Process will be served upon him by the police and by all qualified agents of the public forces, leading to investigation and to the taking of suspects necessary for appearance at a hearing, whether there has been a violation. A violation thereof will be punished by a penalty to the extent of one year imprisonment and 1,000 francs fine.

## II. Control:

### CENTRALIZATION OF CORRESPONDENCE

The Rhine countries and Luxemburg occupied by Allied Armies will be divided for the purposes of postal control in zones corresponding to the zones of the Armies of occupation, due attention being given to the necessities of technical consideration.

Along the circumference of each zone there shall be located points of transit, few in number and through which correspondence which enters and leaves the zone shall be obliged to pass, exception being made if necessary for correspondence circulating for a short distance (20 kilometers at the most), between zones occupied by the Allies.

All correspondence from or for German nonoccupied territory and for enemy or neutral countries will be forced to go by this point of transit. All authorities charged with the control may moreover demand the centralization of correspondence circulating in the interior in one zone in one or more designated points, keeping under consideration the normal condition of postal circulation.

**Commissions of Control:** At each point of transit at each point of centralization, a commission or control will function permanently, to which all of the correspondence passing by this point will be submitted.

**Visiting Control:** Moreover, the members of boards of control are authorized to travel from point to point in the zone at their discretion for the purpose of insuring local control.

**Composition of Boards of Control:** Boards of postal control will each be composed of: the president, belonging to the Army in the zone of which the board will function; one or more officers, belonging to each of the Allied Armies; and readers and interpreters of the German language.

**Nature of Control:** The purposes of control will be to cover the following two points:

(a) Control of the routing of correspondence. The purpose of this control is to insure that all of the correspondence coming from a given zone has been well routed as provided above. This will be handled by expert officers.

(b) Control of the contents of correspondence.

Each commission shall make such inspection as it may deem necessary with regard to common carriers and can carry out any seizure of letters which it may consider necessary.

Articles of value will be inspected in the presence of a local representative of the postal service. (The following sentence is unintelligible.)

All correspondence opened by the censor shall be closed again with censorship strips and with the Commission's stamp. Each commission shall make use of such means as it may consider proper for discovery of clandestine correspondence (chemical substances, etc.). The commissions shall be bound by instructions which they shall receive regarding the exercise of censorship whether from the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, or of the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army of the territory under their jurisdiction.

**Object of the Censorship:** The control of correspondence in occupied territory will serve a double purpose:

1. **Surveillance of Suspects:** With regard to this, it will be necessary to cause the correspondence of officials and members of all religious creeds, as well as that of politicians of all parties, to be submitted to a particular surveillance.

2. **Surveillance of Public Opinion:** In order to inform the command of the state of public opinion, it will be necessary to study the following points with special concern:

(a) Public opinion with regard to the peace negotiations and terms of peace.

(b) Attitude of the people with regard to the different countries of the Entente.

(c) Attitude with regard to the occupying troops.

(d) Attitude toward question of internal politics (different views entertained between the different political parties of Germany regarding political and social reform, etc.)

(e) Economic questions.

Information gathered will be reported in weekly reports and in special reports when the presidents of the boards of postal censorship shall deem it advisable.

The reports of the presidents of the boards of censorship will be drawn up in duplicate:

(a) One copy shall be addressed to the Marshals, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.).

(b) The other copies will be sent to the General commanding the Allied Armies in the territory over which the commission has jurisdiction.

#### PUBLICATION OF RULES REGARDING CORRESPONDENCE

So much of the regulations set out above, which are of interest to the population of occupied Germany, will be brought to the knowledge of the population by the German authorities themselves, by means of daily papers and of notices posted in post offices and near post office boxes.

It will be necessary to inform the nationals of the independent states of Poland, Bohemia, Servia, Romania, Greece and the independent Yugo-Slav states, that as soon as the postal routes of their respective countries will permit it, every facility for the forwarding of their correspondence will be afforded them.

As far as the German population is concerned, it will be made clear that the measures taken for the surveillance of correspondence are not the result of the desire to unlawfully oppress them, but flow from the necessities of military securities and that of the general public.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Memorandum

#### ***Signal Corps Personnel Prevented from Entering City of Luxemburg***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE ASSISTANT CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,  
*December 15, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM TO A. C. of S., G-3

1. Telephonic report has just been made from the Chief Signal Officer of the Advance Section, S. O. S., that Captain Turner, Signal Corps, and party of Signal Corps men have been prevented from entering the City of LUXEMBURG by the American Military Police. As it is absolutely necessary for this personnel to enter LUXEMBURG to maintain wire communication, it is requested that necessary orders be issued directing that Captain Turner and such personnel as he has with him or may designate will be permitted to enter LUXEMBURG.

2. As soon as possible a complete list of the names of Signal Corps men necessary to maintain service in this area will be forwarded in order that proper individual passes may be obtained from these headquarters. The Commanding General at Advance G. H. Q. states that he has no authority in this matter.

For and in the absence of the Asst. C. S. O.

DONALD B. SANGER,  
Lieut. Colonel, Signal Corps.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Telegram

***American Signal Corps Personnel to Remain in Luxemburg***

*December 15, 1918.*

Advance G. H. Q., Treves

Number 2491 G-3. Message received at these headquarters from Colonel Payot states that order excluding American Signal Corps personnel from LUXEMBURG was a mistake. Following telegram sent December 11, to Commanding Generals, Second and Third Armies is repeated for your information. "Reference our Number 2364 G-3. Detachment of Signal Corps necessary for the maintenance of the American switchboard in city of LUXEMBURG is authorized to remain." As soon as possible passes will be provided by Signal Corps for the men operating the LUXEMBURG exchange.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, December 16, 1918.*

No. 23

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Railway Materiel: The inspection and acceptance of locomotives and cars is proceeding very slowly, and the proportion of acceptances to locomotives examined is very small indeed. The proportion of cars accepted to those examined is larger. The following

report of the METZ and BRUSSELS technical committees will serve to indicate what has been accomplished up to date:

METZ SUBCOMMITTEE  
UP TO AND INCLUDING DECEMBER 10, 1918

Examined	Accepted
Engines - 202	97
Cars - 2,432	769

BRUSSELS SUBCOMMITTEE  
UP TO AND INCLUDING DECEMBER 13, 1918

Examined	Accepted
Engines - 1,286	177
Cars - 35,585	19,940

Total:

Engines - 1,488	274
Cars - 38,017	20,709

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Motor Trucks: The delivery of motor trucks by the German Armies is proceeding so slowly that the German Commission has been openly charged in Committee with negligence, and a somewhat heated colloquy ensued. It is believed that behind the slow delivery of motor trucks is the probably fact that as most of these trucks were subsidized before the war by the German Government, the original business houses, as well as unauthorized persons, have possibly seized these trucks on their arrival in Germany and refused to give them up, ---this proceeding being more or less covered by the state of unrest in Germany. This might serve to explain the difficulties which the German High Command is evidently experiencing in complying with the terms of the Armistice regarding the delivery of trucks.

\* \* \* \* \*

In a note hereto appended and marked C will be found the report of the German High Command as to the number of motor trucks ready to be delivered on December 11, 1918, and the places of delivery.

It is recommended that so much thereof as concerns the zone of the Third Army be transmitted to the Commanding General thereof for his information.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Delivery of War Material***

[Contemporary Translation]

*December 16, 1918.*

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE COURSE OF PROLONGING THE  
ARMISTICE IN ORDER TO ASSURE COMPLETE EXECUTION OF THE CLAUSES  
INCOMPLETELY CARRIED OUT

Article IV: Delivery of materiel of war: The 865 heavy cannon, the 1,000 trench mortars, the 7,000 machine guns that are still lacking will be delivered before January 1, 1919, upon the territory of the bridgeheads of Cologne, Mayence, and Coblenz, under the conditions which shall be fixed by the International Armistice Commission.

However, materiel of the above kinds which have not yet been counted by the Allied Armies up to the date of December 9, or which may have been taken by these armies between that date and January 1, shall be deducted from the quantities above indicated, under the reserve that this materiel shall be in good condition.

There shall likewise be delivered before January 1, 1919, to make up the deficit, and under the same conditions, 200 bombing planes, 400 pursuit planes.

All this materiel shall be delivered in good condition such as has been defined by the International Commission. In the case that the German High Command shall not be in position to deliver the 600 planes, it is stipulated that each plane missing shall be replaced by 20 draft horses in good condition less than 15 years old and of a minimum height of 1.52 meters. These horses shall be provided with bridles.

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193-32.16 Fldr. C: Telegram

***Limits of American Zone of Occupation***

AMERICAN MISSION,  
*Senlis, December 16/17, 1918.*

Chief of Staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

No. 9367 No. 79 Tuesday 5:45 p. m. Following note just handed me by General Weygand.

In application to my note 1- P C T of December 12, the eastern limit of the American zone to the south of Schengen will be defined by the course of the Moselle, the northern limit of Canton Thionville, the western limit of the Canton Hayange, Moyeuivre, Metz, Gorge, frontier of Lorraine to the point where it leaves the Seille (2 kilometers south of Cheminot) the course of the Seille to Port-sur-Seille, Ste-Genevieve, Bezaumont, Velain-en-Haye, Villey-le-Sec, Sexey-aux-Forges, Viterne, Germiny, Crepey, Selaincourt, Dolcourt, Saulxerotte, Tranqueville-Graux, Barville, Rollainville, Rouvres-la-Chetive, Darney-aux-Chenes, Ollainville, Hagneville, Morville, Vaudoncourt, Aingeville, Urville, Sauville, Robecourt, Blevaincourt, Rozieres-sur-Mouzon, Damblain, Colombey-les-Choiseul, Fresnoy, Larviere, Mont-les-Lamarche, Isches, Fouchecourt, Godoncourt, Fignevelle, Regneville, Martinville, Vougecourt, Demangevelle, Corre, Ormoy, Betaucourt, Cendrecourt, Jussey, Bougey, Oigney, Arbecy, Combeaufontaine, Cornot, Nervezain, Vauconcourt, Fleury-les-Lavoncourt, Villers-Vaudey, Pisseloup, Fouvent-le-Bas, Pierrecourt, Neuville-les-

Champlitte, Le Prelot (point of contact with the rear line of the zone of communications, southern limit of the starting of Haute-Saone) all communes beginning with the Port-sur-Seille (inclusive) are given to the Americans. The date on which, and the conditions under which, this change of boundaries will be effected will be arranged by direct agreement between the Commanders-in-Chief of the American and French Armies.

By order:

WEYGAND.

Original follows by courier.

MOTT.  
7:15 p. m.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1193

### ***First Armistice Prolongation***

[Contemporary Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*December 17, 1918.*

Copy of the Convention passed at Treves, December 13, 1918, for the  
prolongation of the Armistice with Germany

#### THE CONVENTION

The undersigned, vested with the powers, by virtue of which they signed the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, have concluded the following additional Convention:

1. The duration of the Armistice decided upon November 11, 1918, is extended one month, that is to say, to January 17, 1919, at 5 o'clock. This prolongation of a month is extended up to the conclusion of the Peace preliminaries. subject to the approbation of the Allied Governments.

2. Those clauses of the Convention of November 11, not completely fulfilled will be continued and completed in accordance with the detailed terms decided upon by the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission, under the instructions of the Allied High Command.

3. The following clause is added to the Convention of November 11, 1918:

The Allied High Command from this date reserves the right to occupy, when it deems necessary, by right of the new guarantee, the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine from the north of the Cologne bridgehead as far as the Dutch border. The Allied High Command will give advice of this occupation six days in advance.

Treves, December 13, 1918.

ERZBERGER  
A. OBERNDORFF  
WINTERFELDT  
VANSELOW

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***Treatment of Lorraine Workers in American Zone***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff  
3d Bureau, No. 9388

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 17, 1918.*

From: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces

The southern limit of the American zone in the region of Thionville follows the northern limit of the Canton of Thionville and the western limits of the Cantons of Hayange and Moyeuivre.

It results that a portion of annexed Lorraine, of slight extent it is true, but very important from an industrial point of view, is in the American zone.

The temper of the working people there, a majority of which are German, is only fair, and I have already had to ask you to take preventive measures so as to prevent the disturbance of order.

Today the Commissioner of the French Republic at Metz has again informed me of the angry spirit of the workers in this region (particularly the miners), a spirit which may entail the most serious difficulties if precautions are not taken.

The discontent of the people seems to arise from the fact that they fear that they are being treated differently than people of the remainder of annexed Lorraine.

In order to remedy this condition, it seems to me to be indispensable that the regime to which the people of the part of annexed Lorraine situated in the American zone are submitted should be identical with that of the people in the French zone.

This similarity of treatment can only be established by intimate liaison and constant collaboration between the American military authorities charged with the occupation of the region and the Commissioner of the French Republic at Metz and the staff of the French Seventh Army.

In view of the seriousness of the situation I would be grateful if you would be good enough to give, without delay, the necessary instructions in this record.

I am sending similar directions to the Commissioner of the Republic at Metz and the Commanding General of the French Seventh Army.

By order:

WEYGAND.

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***Return of War Material not Accepted***

[Contemporary Translation]

GERMAN HEADQUARTERS,  
*December 17, 1918.*

ANNEX 1

In connection with P. I. A. C. No. 3349

Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the Field  
Ib No. 108 362 op

I According to Paragraph IV of the Armistice Agreement, the following materiel of war was to be given over to the Entente in good condition:

5,000 Cannon (2,500 heavy guns and 2,500 field guns)  
25,000 Machine guns  
3,000 Minenwerfer  
1,700 Pursuit and Bombing Airplanes.

According to the information obtained from the armies, which to a large extent is verified by the receipts received from the officials of the enemy army commands or from the mayors, or from the information of troops that have been left behind (the originals have reached the Armistice Commission), the following materiel has been delivered:

2,810 Field Guns  
2,500 Heavy Guns  
27,260 Machine Guns  
3,561 Minenwerfer  
2,000 Airplanes.

Only the following has been announced by the Entente as accepted:

2,500 Field Guns  
1,635 Heavy Guns  
18,000 Machine Guns  
2,000 Minenwerfer  
600 Bombing and Pursuit Airplanes, and 200 C-planes.

The remainder, that is to say 835 heavy guns, 7,000 machine guns, 1,000 minenwerfer and 600 airplanes, must be delivered according to the new agreements.

The very large difference in figures between the materiel of war that has been given over and that has been acknowledged by the Entente is due to the following reasons:

(1) The original Armistice agreement contains no statements about details in connection with the materiel to be delivered (the kind, type, owner or station). It demands merely the delivery of materiel in good condition. It was in accordance with this that the orders of the German High Command and the subordinate army authorities were given. The demands of the Entente which were made afterwards and which were not justified by the Armistice agreement could not be observed to the fullest extent in the deliveries. More than half of the materiel had already been delivered. There is no clause in the



***Return of French Installations Following Armistice***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,  
December 17, 1918.

Liaison Officer, G-4

Brig. Gen. Geo. Van Horn Moseley, G. S., Asst. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.,

American E. F.

Evacuation of French Barracks by Americans

1. I am enclosing the letter written to this office by Col. Payot following the talk which I had with him yesterday, and which I outlined to you by telephone, on the subject of the needs of the French to retake the military buildings which have been lent to the American army.

2. Colonel Payot offers us numerous establishments and installations of a more temporary character to take the place of these permanent barracks which the French army needs. Colonel Payot told me that he felt that this question had not been properly explained to the American army, and that the irritation which had been caused by the frequent demands made by the regional commanders was the failure of the Ministry to properly instruct their subordinates. He, therefore, as you will notice by the letter, has endeavored to clarify the situation and hopes that the French point of view will be understood somewhat better in consequence.

3. Will you be good enough to notify me the answer which I shall make to Colonel Payot.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,  
1st Lt., Cavalry.

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[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 1769/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
December 17, 1918.

MEMORANDUM for Lieutenant Chapin, Chief of the American Mission with the D. G. C. R. A.:

At different times demands have been addressed to the American authorities by the representatives of the regions looking to the evacuation, often within very short intervals, of French barracks occupied by elements of the American army.

These demands having given rise to complaints on the part of the services occupying the barracks, I would like to give you the following explanations of this matter:

During the war the French territory is divided into two zones, the Zone of the Interior, which remains under the orders of the Ministry, and the Zone of the Armies, the territorial command of which belongs to the Commander-in-Chief of the French armies.

But within these two zones the territorial military organization in existence before the war continues and remains under the orders of the Ministry. This organization comprises organs of command of the territorial zones (regions), troops (depots of army corps and mobilization services), and especially the barracks in which these depots are normally located. When near the firing line these depots were moved farther towards the interior and the barracks thus evacuated were placed at the disposal of the armies.

At the present time it is a question of proceeding with the military territorial reorganization and of replacing these depot units in the barracks which they occupied normally before their withdrawal.

France has made stupendous efforts during the war and has mobilized all men from the ages of 18 to 50.

This situation cannot now continue and there is an absolute necessity to proceed without delay to return the old classes to their homes.

This demobilization can only be accomplished by sending the men to the depot of their regions which is the nearest to their residence. It is accordingly necessary to replace at the disposition of the Ministry the barracks in which these depots were installed before the war.

This question, therefore, presents an importance for the French army which you will not fail to see and I ask you to be good enough to take the matter up with the high command of your army in order that the evacuation of the barracks situated within this zone be considered and accomplished as soon as possible.

In order to make this operation easier I can place at the disposal of the American army, if you judge necessary to replace the barracks, some of the numerous establishments and installations which have been completed during the course of the war and are situated in your zone or nearby.

I have asked the Ministry to leave the barracks of Chaumont and Sampigny at your disposition.

Le Directeur General des Communications  
et des Ravitaillements aux Armees.

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**Precautions Incident to Delivery of Trucks**

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 1767/CR

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 17, 1918.*

CONFIRMATION OF TELEGRAM

Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To: Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces  
Marshal, Commander of the British Forces in France  
General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces  
Lt. General, Chief of Staff, Belgian Army  
General, Commander of French Sixth Army

1. The German army is endeavoring to make much of local incidents which occur in delivery of camions [motor trucks], often though they be of very small importance, to excuse possible delays of delivery.

2. In this matter, I earnestly request you remain in touch with the German armies opposite you and ask them to detail with you delegates to attend to the conditions of delivery in detail. You can allow the German delegates the necessary facilities of circulation and communication under a strict control by you.

3. Will you be good enough to draw to the attention of the authorities under your orders that no steps of a clearly vexatious character should be taken towards the German delivering detachments.

4. As soon as a detachment of camions arrives in your lines place a guard over it to avoid damages which might lead to later complaints.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

WEYGAND.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

**Circulation of German Newspapers**

American Section

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 17, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. German newspapers in occupied territory: The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies has decided that the Commanding Generals of the Allied Armies have absolute right

of control and censorship of the German newspapers in the occupied territory. In forbidding the circulation of all newspapers in this region from the left bank to the right bank of the Rhine, they are entirely within their rights.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

***Addition to Coblenz Bridgehead***

American Section  
No. 25

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 18, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Addition to Coblenz bridgehead: Marshal Foch has telegraphed to the International Armistice Commission as follows:

December 16, No. 420-2. The limits of the zone of the bridgehead of Coblenz-Mayence leave between them a narrow strip of neutral territory. The consequences are (1) the French troops in the bridgehead neighboring this territory are obliged to make long detours on the left bank in order to maintain contact; (2) the communes situated in this portion of the neutral zone have no other route towards the northeast and cannot maintain relations with Germany except in crossing the territory of the bridgeheads, a fact which is contrary to the terms of the Armistice, and consequently it is requested that this narrow strip of territory be included in the line Michelbach-Allendorf, inclusive. It is also to the interests of the communes in question because their food supply would be practically impossible if Germany were not to adopt the measures proposed. The president of the German Armistice Commission is requested to be good enough to communicate the reply of his Government.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

**Prisoners of War**

American Section  
No. 25

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 18, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. British prisoners of war: General Haking presented a note to the German Commission which stated that three hundred British prisoners of war were still working in mines in Sagan, Silesia; that they are short of food and many are dying from grippe. Also that there are two hundred British prisoners of war in camps at Zwickau, of whom many are sick and wounded, including a wounded captain. The German authorities are requested to take immediate steps to remove this state of affairs and report as early as possible what has been done.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

**Prisoners of War**

American Section  
No. 26

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 19, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. British prisoners of war: General Haking, British Commissioner on the Armistice Commission, presented a note to the German Commission as follows:

Number 258, A. C.: To the president of the German Armistice Commission: From the chief of the British Armistice Commission: (1) It has been reported that many prisoners of war working in small groups and on farms have not learned of Armistice, and employers are concealing the news to retain their labor. (2) I am directed to request that all

necessary measures be taken to avoid this happening and to collect all such individuals into camps. Dated December 19, 1918.

5. Condition of Allied prisoners in Germany: The chairman of the International Commission made known the contents of a telegram which he had sent to Marshal Foch relative to the grave situation in Germany with respect to prisoners of war and which has been communicated to the Commission by General Dupont, French Commissioner of prisoners, at Berlin.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Telegram

### ***Prisoners of War***

[Contemporary Translation]

C. I. P. A.  
257

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*December 18, 1918.*

From Gen. Nudant to Marshal Foch. The situation which General Dupont indicates, of which a detailed report is being sent to you, is of exceptional gravity. Prompt and radical solutions must be found. Prisoners must be transported from Northern Germany, where they are in frightful misery. They are dying of hunger. Many are escaping into Poland. Since German ports cannot be utilized for many weeks, new measures must be taken. Prisoners of war do not understand why the trains delivering supplies to the Allies are not being utilized for repatriation. They could in this way await in the Rhine Provinces, be billeted and nourished there, even though this were only on half rations and await their final evacuation. The exasperation among them is great. At certain points the Soldiers' Councils are trying to profit by this. There is reason to fear that we may feel in France the effects of the rancor increasing among them.

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Third Army Gen. File: G-1, 381: Fldr. 40: Memorandum

### ***Conditions for Delivery of War Material***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff  
G-2 (Sic)  
No. 452/2

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 18, 1918.*

COMMUNICATION TO THE ARMIES

[Extract]

I. Here enclosed, copy of the convention agreed to on December 13, relative to the war material remaining to deliver by the Germans before January 1, 1919 (Document No. 1).

This material will be delivered to the Allied Armies under the conditions stipulated in communication hereunto annexed (Document No. 2).

II. Messrs. The Commander-in-Chief is requested to assign commissions who will be responsible for receiving the material, that is:

for the English army at Cologne  
for the American army at Coblenz  
for the French army at Mayence.

III. In order to keep the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies regularly informed as to how the terms of the Armistice are executed, Messrs. the Commanders-in-Chief are requested to forward to General Staff, Bacon (2d Bureau).

1. As soon as possible a special recapitulation list indicating the material received up to December 8, inclusive.

2. Every 2 or 3 days, a list mentioning the quantity of material received December 9.

These lists can be advantageously gotten up like the following model:

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Document No. 2

Manner in which the terms of the Convention of December 13 apply as regards the war material to be delivered by the Germans:

I. Repartition of the Material: The material to be delivered will as a rule be turned over under the following conditions:

Towns	Heavy guns	M. G.	Airplanes		Horses
			D	G	
Cologne	450	3,000	111	38	2,500
Coblenz	150	2,000	50	38	1,500
Mayence	265	2,000	20	38	2,000

Modifications of small importance can occur as regards above figures, taking into account difficulties of transportation and on the other hand the impossibility for the Germans to determine exactly at this time the number of horses and planes to deliver.

II. Processes of receiving airplanes: All the planes are to be examined on trucks and in addition to this, one out of every twenty will be assembled in flying order and tried (duration of the flight: About 15 minutes).

All planes examined on trucks and refused will be replaced by 20 horses, according to the new agreement.

All planes examined in a flight and refused will be replaced by 400 horses, but in this case 20 planes assigned by the Commission of Reception will be turned over to the Germans.

The necessary gas for the trial flights will be furnished by the Allies.

The Germans were given notice to have turn up in due time in the necessary assembly areas, the pilots in charge of the trial flights, as well as the necessary . . .

(1) The horses' height to be taken under a measuring stick; trailers for transportation between the detraining stations and airdromes.

The detailed measures will be decided upon by the Reception Commissions and the German delegates in charge of the deliveries at the place itself.

III. German Commissions of Deliveries: The German staff officers who have already been accredited by each bridgehead commander are authorized to prolong their stay until the reception of new order, in order to assure carrying out of the processes of delivery.

Bridgehead commanders are requested to put them (German officers) in touch with the Allied Commissions of Reception.

The necessary passes, for the accredited staff officers, as well as for the subaltern personnel and specialists, they shall be permitted to call for, after agreement with the Allied Commissions, will be issued by the bridgehead commander, so as to entitle the German personnel to all the necessary movements, in order to fulfill their missions, without running the risk to be interned.

The German accredited staff officers are allowed to correspond with their commanding authority, either by phone or wire and even by wireless, under control of the bridgehead commander, in order to be informed of the arrival, and regulate their destiny in accordance with the bridgehead commander. They are obliged to notify the bridgehead commander of the foreseen arrivals twenty-four hours in anticipation.

The German specialist personnel shall be sent back to Germany under proportion of the Reception Commission, after agreement with the German staff officers, delegates, as soon as their presence is reckoned of no more use.

IV. Detail: The German convoying personnel will be ordered back to Germany by empty returning trains as often as the case is possible.

The guarding of the material will be assumed by the bridgehead commanders, as soon as it arrives in the railroad station.

V. Delivery delays: The materiel should be delivered in the shortest time possible; however, it is more probable that:

1/3 only, will be delivered before December 25

1/3 between the 25th and 28th

1/3 from the 28th to the 30th.

VI. Officers of the Interallied Commission of Spa will go to the bridgeheads in order to give the Reception Commissions all the useful information.

By order The Major, G-1:

WEYGAND.

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***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 2865/735

GERMAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 18, 1918.*

Major General v. Winterfeldt

To: General Nudant

The 1,100 locomotives which should be turned over from December 17 to 26 are, according to the Minister of Public Works, being sent in numbers to the following stations:

Strassburg	200
Homburg	150
Saarbruecken	200
Karthaus	250
Aix-la-Chapelle	300

WINTERFELDT.

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No. 2842/724

GERMAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 18, 1918.*

Major General v. Winterfeldt

To: General Nudant

Telegram from the Minister of Public Works:

350 German R. R. cars should be given over daily to the General R. R. Director of Strassburg to make up the Alsace-Lorraine quota, and 250 wagons for the Allies. The Karlsruhe Direction informs us that there is only Kiel with 4 tracks which can be utilized. Without further crossings the deliveries cannot be made. Request that Neuenburg, Breisach and Roeschwoog be opened up for this traffic.

A prompt answer is requested to this inquiry of the Minister.

V. WINTERFELDT.

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**Circulation of Germans in Neutral and Allied Zones**

No. 25  
American Section

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, December 18, 1918.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Circulation in Allied Zones: The Allied Commission communicated the following to the German Commission:

The German Commission raises frequently questions with the Interallied Commission requests for passes to enter the zone occupied by the armies of the Allies, to circulate there and to leave the territory. In the territory occupied by the armies of the Allies these armies have charge of the policing of the circulation in their zone, and have received instructions that all demands should be addressed to the local military authorities. In the neutral zone requests are presented to the military authorities of the Allies by the communes of the sector in the neutral zone. The German Commission is requested to give the necessary notification in this respect.

2. Circulation in Belgian zone of occupation: The Belgian Commissioner, General Delobbe, communicated the following to the Chairman of the German Commission:

I have the honor to transmit the following replies to various questions raised by the German Commission: (1) Reply to note number 379-381, of December 9, 1918: The orders have been given by the Commander of the Belgian army of occupation to the effect that persons obliged to cross the Rhine in order to carry on their business in Duesseldorf and in Munichsburg (sic) may do so without other formalities than showing a card of identification or their workman's book stamped by the Belgian military authorities. (2) Reply to note number 2145 of December 10: The soldiers who state that they are commissioners and employed by the command in the district of Rheydt, but who have not their papers proving this function, have been requested by Colonel Hermond, Commander of the 8th Regiment to telegraph to Spa, in order to arrange their papers and to remain at the disposition of this Commander of the corps awaiting a reply to their telegram. This reply was received the next morning and the Commanding Officer of the 8th Regiment declared that he was satisfied, and the affair was concluded. The soldiers in question were in no respect discommoded.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Transportation of Prisoners**

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, December 19, 1918.*

General Nudant

To: General von Winterfeldt

This morning at the subcommittee on transportation, the Allied delegates proposed to the German delegates to make use of the trains of empty cars that were coming from different parts of Germany in order to be given over to conformance with the Armistice agreement, to make use of them for the purpose of bringing Allied prisoners of war to the concentration camps along the Rhine. The amount that could be brought daily would hasten considerably the repatriation of prisoners since this is a mode of transportation that had not been considered up to this time. The German delegates have promised to do everything they can immediately to solve the questions.

At the end of the meeting of the Transportation Committee, the Allied and German members went over to the Subcommittee of Prisoners of War to study certain questions in regard to the repatriation of prisoners. In the course of the joint meeting of the two subcommittees the German delegates of the Subcommittee on Prisoners of War, while recognizing the advantages of the use of the trains of empty cars, declared that within a few days Germany would no longer be able to promise the transportation of prisoners of war on account of the lack of locomotives, either in the direction of the ports or in the direction of Holland or Switzerland. They added that the only way to carry on this transportation would be to use for this purpose for a stated length of time certain numbers of locomotives that were to be given over in conformance with the Armistice agreement and not deliver these locomotives until the end of the work of repatriation of prisoners.

In other words, the point of view presented by the German delegates of the prisoners of war subcommittee is equivalent to a request for a lightening of the clauses that concern the delivery of rolling stock. If this alleviation is not allowed, prisoners of war cannot be transported by railway in Germany.

I have the honor to ask you to confirm or deny in writing this point of view before tomorrow, December 20 at noon, and I think I ought to notify you now that if the German Government suspends the transportation of prisoners, contrary to agreements, I shall notify the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the fact and shall beg for the most severe measures of reprisal.

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***Establishment of Interallied Committees for Economic Control  
of Left Bank of Rhine***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
*December 19, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM for the Chief of Staff:

This is a letter from the War Trade Board concerning the establishment of Interallied Committees for the control of imports and exports for the occupied territory on the west bank of the Rhine.

My notion of this is that we should select a military man from our forces here who has had some experience in banking and possibly who has had some service in the State Department. In any event, please give it your attention at once. Please handle the whole thing and notify Mr. Stetson of your conclusion.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
WAR TRADE BOARD,  
*Paris, December 14, 1918.*

General John J. Pershing,

American Expeditionary Forces, Paris

Sir:

For your information we are enclosing herewith copy of a cable which we have sent to Washington in connection with the establishment of two Interallied Committees for the control of imports and exports into and from the occupied territory on the west bank of the Rhine. This is but an informal outline of the plan.

Would you kindly inform us which of your adjutants is qualified to deal with this question so that we may discuss the matter with him when the definite formal plan is presented to us by the Minister of Blockade, which we expect will be in the course of a few days.

We have the honor to be, Sir,

Respectfully yours,

WAR TRADE BOARD,  
by  
CLARENCE C. STETSON.

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Cable

PARIS, December 19, 1918.

SECSTATE

WASHINGTON

WARTRABORD 704. Referring Embassys 6292 of December 15, 12 a. m., our 680. Following is translation of text of note of French Ministry of Blockade, dated December 18. Economic organization of the left bank of the Rhine. The Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, entrusted with the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, has informed the Government of the French Republic of certain propositions relative to the economic regime to be set up in these territories.

The blockade, is by right, maintained on the left bank of the Rhine. However, it seems that a well-defined policy ought to be inspired with the principle that the Allies (while not losing sight of the enemy character of the populations) should accustom these populations to the occupation and, in consequence, not render the occupation unbearable to them. Furthermore, it is necessary to maintain order in the district. The work and the economic life must be assured to it within certain limits. It is these limits which it is necessary to define and the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, is qualified from the point of view of authority to regulate, according to circumstances and in conformity with the instructions of the Allied Governments given through the intermediary of a Committee sitting at Paris, the economic relations of the Rhine countries with the rest of Germany, with the neutrals and with the Allied countries.

This Interallied Committee should define the general lines of policy, acting in accordance with the interest of the states represented and deciding what products of the Rhine countries may be permitted to be exported, whether towards the Allied countries (taking into full account the import prohibitions made by each of these countries), whether towards the neutral countries (taking into account the existing agreements with them, N. O. T. and S. S. S.) or whether with Germany (since it appears impossible to sever all relations between the two banks of the Rhine) The Interallied Committee should also control importations into the Rhine district, the same being in principle forbidden, except such as shall appear upon the free list which the Allied Governments will publish and of which the exportation from these countries will take place without authorization. For all other products licenses should be asked for only in cases of extreme necessity. Products of supply should be imported only on the orders of the Commission *Interalliee de Ravitaillement*. The Committee should also see that the merchandise imported should not be reexported to Germany, each of the Governments regulating in accordance with its Nationals to do business with houses established on the left bank of the Rhine.

The Interallied Committee of Paris will have as correspondent attached to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, a local Interallied Commission, which will be executive. This is the same system applied for Switzerland and also for the northern neutrals of Europe.

The proposed procedure appears to be the best suited to the circumstances and one which permits a solution of each different case conformably with the necessities and without being compelled to establish principles which it seems impossible to define in the absence of any regulation. In any event the regime will have to be stabilized as soon as circumstances permit, that is to say, after the signature of peace or even after the signature of the preliminaries of peace.

The Ministry of Blockade, entrusted by the Government of the Republic to create the Interallied Committee, would appreciate if the Embassy of the United States would inform them at once of the name of the delegate designated by the Federal Government.

Please instruct. Stetson

SHARP.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

**Provisioning Germany**

American Section  
No. 26

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION  
*Spa, December 19, 1918*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Food shortage in Germany: Minister von Haniel, representative of the German Government on the Armistice Commission, requested that in view of the food shortage in Germany, prompt information be furnished as to when and where negotiations may be begun with a view to supplying Germany with food, as arranged in the Armistice agreement.

With respect to this request, General von Winterfeldt stated that he wished to call attention to the fact that at Treves, Marshal Foch stated that these questions would not be treated at Spa, so that the request cannot be answered by the Armistice Commission; but General von Winterfeldt would be grateful to General Nudant if the latter would transmit the request to the proper authorities, and that the reply be sent back through the same route.

General Nudant stated that he would transmit the request for proper action.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

**Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation**

American Section  
No. 27

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December, 20, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Financial estimates: In a communication \* \* \* the Chairman of the German Commission requests a specific estimate of the expense of maintenance of the troops of occupation for each month and the total expenses for all the troops of occupation for each month, with special information as to whether the taking over of buildings and commodities are to be included.

It should be remarked that a special commission of economic experts is working out the details of cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation under the special direction of Marshal Foch. It has been stated unofficially that the basis of the estimate will be a per capita cost item for one soldier per month to be used as a multiplier for the number of troops included in each army of occupation. The details of the estimate hinge on the interpretation of the French word Entretien, which means maintenance or up-keep, and the special committee having charge of the matter will have to consider to what extent the regular and overhead charges are to be included in the upkeep of the troops of occupation.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

**Prisoners of War**

American Section  
No. 27

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 20, 1918.*

From: Chief, Amer. Sect., P. I. A. C.

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Condition of Prisoners of War: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has telegraphed the following to the Allied Commission at Spa:

I beg of you to address to the German Government an indignant protest in regard to the barbarous treatment inflicted on Allied prisoners in Eastern Germany, especially in the region of Danzig. To leave prisoners in this way without food and without care constitutes not only a violation of the Armistice conditions, but also an act of cruelty unworthy of a civilized nation. I take note of this new failure to fulfill agreement and of this new proof of German barbarity, and I reserve to myself the right to exercise all reprisals which I judge necessary.

To this, General v. Winterfeldt replied as follows:

I leave to the German Government the task of answering properly this note. I should like to mention merely as a proof of German barbarity a fact that for several weeks members of the Allied Commission have been in Berlin who were there very much better treated than the majority of the delivery committees that the Germans have sent into the evacuated areas, and that these representatives were given every facility to regulate the repatriation of prisoners of war. On account of the very large number of prisoners that had to be repatriated, it is well known to us that a number of misunderstandings had to arise. But we would like to call attention to the fact that in spite of the difficulties, several hundred thousand of prisoners of war have already been returned to their homes. In conclusion I may make known that according to information I received yesterday, sufficient shipping space has now been made ready for the transfer of prisoners from eastern Germany to Copenhagen.

To this, General Nudant retorted:

I make the point of not having put on the same basis the treatment accorded to the Allied Commission in Berlin and the treatment accorded to prisoners in Germany. This opinion in regard to the handling accorded to the Allied prisoners in Germany is shared by the entire French people, and is much worse now than it was some time ago; and it is against this general situation that we protest. The question is not raised that the German Armistice Commission has not done all that they could to reach the solution of this question. It is a fact that I am referring to a situation which I mentioned some eight days ago. I do not speak often, but when I do I refer to a specific instance. I hope that in the short time which remains for the repatriation of the last prisoners of the Allies, that the German Government will give more care, apply more authority and show more good will than has been shown up to this time.

The Chairman of the German Commission said in reply:

I do not want to prolong the discussion over this question, but I wish to establish this one point; that the German Government has in its possession a large number of documents that show the bad treatment accorded to the German prisoners in French camps. This information will be published to the world at its proper time at the peace conference.

General Nudant then stated:

I regret that you cannot go and see the condition in which your prisoners are here in France. They are in splendid health, and are not dying of hunger in the way our prisoners are on the roads of Germany.

General v. Winterfeldt then ended this acrimonious debate by stating that:

I would like to make this remark. If the German prisoners in France are better off than the Allied prisoners in Germany, it is because there is more food in France than there is in Germany.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Transfer and Repatriation of Prisoners***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 171 P. G. 2

*Spa, December 20, 1918.*

General Nudant

To: General v. Winterfeldt

I am instructed to inform you of the following telegram from Marshal Foch:

1. I received your telegram No. 143/P. G. 2, December 18. I approve the decision you reached in accord with General Dupont to hasten the repatriation of prisoners of war in eastern Germany. In any case it should be distinctly understood that the German Government is under obligation to feed prisoners as soon as they are in camps on the right side of the Rhine.

2. I have given orders to the Armies of the Allies to occupy the camps you enumerated in the first part of your telegram, and to make all measures necessary to gather together prisoners who are to come to these camps. Exception is made, however, for the camps of Lechfeld and Puchheim, too far distant from the armies of occupation, and the evacuation of which should be carried out through Switzerland under the same conditions as those at present for the camps of Bavaria, in which, after accord with the Ministry of War, will be sent commissions of control and inspection with sanitary personnel.

3. While awaiting their final repatriation, prisoners and recuperated soldiers will be evacuated at the first possible moment in the towns and camps of the Rhine region. I have given orders to the Armies of the Allies concerned not to hesitate to assure proper installation for prisoners and to requisition all public and private buildings necessary. Inform German delegates of the above decision.

4. For the comfort of the prisoners as well as to facilitate the delivery of the rolling stock by Germany, it is preferable that all transportation of prisoners in the interior of Germany be carried out by means of special trains, the materiel of which should not be included in that to be delivered by the Germans. However, not to delay the return of prisoners I admit that in cases of absolute necessity a part of this transportation be assured with the cars which should be delivered.

FOCH.

It is well understood that the camps of Friedrichsfeld, Wahn, Darmstadt, Rastatt, Limburg, Mannheim and Munster will be entirely under the command of the Armies of the Allies, and that the German personnel of these camps will remain on the spot continuing to work as in the past, and that the German Government will continue to supply them with food until they enter the Allied lines. On this last point an exception is made for the camp at Wahn, which is in the bridgehead of Cologne and where the food supply will be assured by the British army.

The German personnel maintained in the above-mentioned camps will only be held until the moment when its services may be dispensed with.

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**Bolshevik Advances in the Baltic**

American Section  
No. 27

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, December 20, 1918.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Russian Bolshevik troops: The Allied High Command has telegraphed, December 18, that the latest news from the Baltic Provinces indicates that the Bolshevik troops are marching on Reval and have met with small resistance. It is claimed that the Germans in Russia are favoring the invasion of the Bolsheviks into the Baltic Provinces by hindering the mobilization of the Esthonian troops, their transportation and their movement. Make energetic representation so that the German military authorities in the Baltic Provinces may receive orders to put an end to these violations.

To the above, General v. Winterfeldt, Chairman of the German Commission replied that he would forward the communication to the German High Command. He further stated that it is unfortunately true that the Bolshevik troops that are marching on Reval are meeting with but slight resistance. It was stated in a note to General Nudant a few days ago, that the condition of the troops in the Baltic Provinces was unfortunately very bad. Regarding the reproach that the German authorities are favoring the march of the Bolsheviks into the Baltic Provinces, an emphatic denial is entered.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1210: Memorandum

**Provisioning and Payment of Prisoners**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 2525

SPA, December 20, 1918.

General v. Winterfeldt

To: General Nudant

In answer to Note 101/P. G. 2 of Dec. 14, 1918

The reports concerning the lack of provisions which brought about very serious conditions in the prisoners' camps seem to be borne out by the facts. Of course, it is

understood that efforts commensurate with our powers are being taken to provision the prisoners of war, but we must call your attention again to the fact that the very difficult situation in regard to provisions in Germany cannot be without a certain influence upon the care of prisoners. As early as about four weeks ago the representative of the Ministry of War at the subcommission for prisoners called special attention to the fact that the entrance of provisions was unconditionally necessary for the interests of the prisoners of war.

That trains bearing food for prisoners and coming from Switzerland have been robbed is a lamentable fact that is due to the revolutionary conditions and the general famine. Everything is being done to avoid as far as possible in the future any such unhappy events. In connection with the conditions at the Giessen Camp a searching investigation has been ordered by the Hospital Department of the Prussian Ministry of War, to be carried out personally by the well-known Professor of Hygiene, Dr. Gartner of Jena. Everything will be done to get help, if it is necessary.

In connection with the orders given to provide due bills to the prisoners of war on account of the lack of coin all the necessary steps have been started to prevent counterfeits. In the future these due bills must bear the signature of the commander of the camp as well as the signature of the receiver, and in case the latter has run away, must bear the signature of the representative of the commission of assistance. The lists that have been drawn up of the distribution of these due bills will be transmitted as soon as possible.

The German Government has noted the demand of the French that six per cent interest should be paid upon these due bills, but protest must be made that when these prisoners come to collect on these due bills the German Government must pay them at the rate of 1.25 for one Mark. As a matter-of-fact, the prisoners of war have a right to demand receipt of the sum in marks. Therefore, according to the opinion of the German Government the due bills can be reckoned only by the rate of exchange current on the day they are presented.

v. WINTERFELDT.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 77: Letter

***Inspection of Trucks***

American Section

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 20, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Adv. GHQ, G-4, Treves

1. The following detailed information is furnished after a conference with the French Mission, today, when the latest rulings and interpretations of Marshal Foch of this subject were received.

(a) The places of delivery of the trucks to be taken over and inspected by the American army are Coblenz and Remagen, or other convenient points to be determined and arranged locally between the German representatives and the receiving committee.

(b) Prior to December 17 there were to have been delivered a total of 1,250 trucks at Ramagen or in that vicinity, and 850 at Coblenz or the vicinity thereof. These

were the instructions originally given on Nov. 25, and the date has now been extended to December 25.

(c) The responsibility for delivering these numbers of vehicles rests with the Germans, and daily reports of vehicles inspected and accepted and refused, together with the reason for refusal must be sent to the Armistice Commission so that at the expiration of the period permitted for deliveries, a statement be made to the Germans showing to what extent, if any, they have failed to comply with their instructions.

(d) There should not be less than 25 vehicles of any individual make; and after the total number called for has been delivered and the vehicles segregated into groups according to the makes, if there are any makes of which there are not 25, they must be replaced by the Germans with other makes of vehicles so that in no case will we have any lots of an individual design consisting of less than 25 vehicles.

(e) A modification has been made in the lists of spare parts to be required, to show in detail what parts will be delivered, and same will be sent you when completed and agreed to. The delivery date for these parts will be not later than February 16, i. e., one month after the extended days of the Armistice.

(f) Trucks which had been captured from the Allied Armies will not be acceptable because the Germans are not in any position to furnish spare parts for these vehicles.

(g) In making the inspections the best judgement of the acceptance committee should be used to insure that the vehicles are capable of running 3,000 kilometers.

(h) All the vehicles offered by the Germans, without regard to which army they are offered, will be inspected, and if one army receives more than the allotment made by Marshal Foch, a redistribution will be made, after the total of 5,000 has been received by all the armies.

In classifying the vehicles in the four categories as you are doing at present, these in the first category can be accepted, the spare parts to be furnished subsequently. Those in the second category will be permitted to be repaired by the Germans, who can send their personnel to the caserne at Coblenz or other convenient locations where these vehicles are at present to make these repairs. In order that the second category of vehicles will pass inspection the Germans may be permitted to use any of the parts or equipment from the vehicles of the third and fourth categories. The materiel remaining of the third and fourth categories can be taken away by the Germans, if the vehicles in these categories were actually offered for delivery, and not merely abandoned, because they could not be removed.

The automobile factories in the Rhine territory have been permitted to continue operations, for if the Germans wish to take any of the third category vehicles away for shop overhauls and repairs they may be permitted to do so. Permission to this effect was given to the Germans by Marshal Foch on December 4, but there is probably not now time for the Germans to avail themselves of this opportunity, as the deliveries must be completed as above stated, previous to December 25.

(i) These detailed instructions amplify the general instructions which have been issued by Marshal Foch to the several army hq.

(j) Arrangements for permitting the German personnel to come into our territory to make repairs will be made by the Third Army Hq. by arrangements with the German army whose personnel is assigned for the purpose.

(k) While the Germans have been assured that vehicles will be inspected and accepted with the utmost dispatch, the inspection should not be slighted and those with badly worn parts should be rejected until such parts have been replaced by German personnel.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Suppression of Possible Disorder in Luxemburg**

December 20, 1918.

Brigadier General Preston Brown

Advance General Headquarters

American E. F.

TREVES [Trier]

No. 2574 G-3. Following telegram sent this date to the Commanding General, American Second Army, repeated for your information: Number 2568 G-3. Information from Headquarters Allied Commander-in-Chief indicates certain amount of unrest among inhabitants of Luxemburg in the region of Echternach. While so far this unrest has been of a political nature and it is not desired to interfere at all in the politics of Luxemburg, the Allied Commander-in-Chief has received information which indicates there may possibly be a certain amount of disorder. It is desired that you take all necessary measures to suppress any disorder should such occur.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1211: Letter

**Internment of Mackensen's Army**

American Section  
No. 27

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, December 20, 1918.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Internment of Mackensen's Army: Marshal Foch has notified the German Commission that Marshal Mackensen was interned December 16 at Budapest on his railroad train, from which place he will be transferred to a chateau situated 20 kilometers from Budapest. He has given his word not to leave the chateau to which he has been assigned as a residence and he has permitted his troops to be disarmed and interned. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies requests the German Government, through the German Commission at Spa, to confirm Marshal von Mackensen's internment and the internment and disarmament of his troops.

General von Winterfeldt, Chairman of the German Commission, replied to the above that

while the note would be transmitted to the German High Command, the latter would insist that the internment of General von Mackensen and his army as herewith explained is not in accord with the Armistice agreement of November 11. The internment is rather the result of an agreement reached between the Allies and the Hungarian Government, an agreement reached prior to November 11 and therefore not affecting the Armistice agreement of that date, the provisions of which have priority. General von Mackensen submitted to forces over which he had no control, but the protest of the German High Command still holds good.

To this General Nudant replied that the German protest can still be made and will be transmitted to the Allied High Command. It is not denied that the Armistice agreement with Austria was included in the Armistice agreement of November 11; it is not a question here of legality but rather one of interpretation.

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C. D. RHODES,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: File 1035: Memo

***Interpretations of the Armistice Agreement***

American Section

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 21, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: General John J. Pershing, U. S. A.

1. Since the starting of the Armistice Agreement, the Allied High Command appears to have more or less exceeded the terms of the Armistice Agreement in the following particulars:

(a) Locomotives: Article VII of the Armistice Agreement prescribes that the German Government shall surrender five thousand locomotives in good working order with all the necessary spare parts and fittings.

Although the type of power of locomotives was not mentioned in the Armistice Agreement, Marshal Foch immediately directed that all the locomotives surrendered should be 950 tons or better, although the American expert on the subcommittee of the Armistice Commission argued that the Germans could not comply with the requirement and that a certain number of locomotives of lesser tonnage was desirable.

After nearly a month of wrangling with the German delegates, the recommendation of the American delegate (the superintendent of the Atlantic Coast Line in the United States) was in part adopted and the Allied High Command sanctioned the acceptance of a certain number of locomotives of 650 tons.

The compromise has therefore worked to the benefit of the former interpretation, although Marshal Foch's decision requires the surrender of the cream of German locomotives, and is therefore hardly a fair interpretation of the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

(b) Motor trucks: Article VII of the Armistice Agreement prescribes that: "Five thousand motor lorries, in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the Associated Powers."

In a note from Marshal Foch, the additional requirement was made that the trucks be turned over "With sufficient personnel, fuel and oil and spare parts to keep them in operation some little time." The words, "some little time" have been interpreted to mean

100 kilometers.

The chairman of the German Commission remonstrated against these requirements in the following language: The text of the agreement affords no support to this contention. Drivers cannot be furnished as they refuse to go. Means of compulsion according to law are not available to the German High Command. The demand is, moreover, as little justified as it would be in the case of field pieces or airplanes. The demand for fuel and oil sufficient for 100 km. is not in the agreement. If it were implied, the same demand would have been made in the case of airplanes. The German High Command cannot admit that the text of the agreement affords any justification for the demand that Germany should furnish additional reserve parts, etc., in sufficient quantity to enable the park to continue in operation for some time in the future.

The result has been that the Germans have ignored the additional requirement and have been turning in motor trucks according to the original terms of the Armistice. The Allied High Command, finding that it could not enforce the additional demands, noted above, have accepted the situation and are no longer insisting on the additional requirement.

(c) Evacuation of inhabitants: Article VII of the Armistice Agreement prescribes that: "In all the territory evacuated by the enemy, there shall be no evacuation of the inhabitants."

In spite of this prohibition, Marshal Foch has expelled from Alsace-Lorraine, across the Rhine, a large number of people among whom were: University professors, officials, schoolmen, merchants, in other words, persons of no military standing.

In remonstrance, the German High Command has stated: In connection, attention must be called to the fact that the apparently systematic expulsions seem to be carried out according to political aims. Such measures are intended and destined to prejudice the decisions of the peace compact, and therefore also in that way go far beyond the limits of the measures allowed by the terms of the Armistice.

The Germans also stated through their Chairman: The future of Alsace-Lorraine cannot be settled in the Armistice Commission, but can only be determined by a peace conference.

In a conversation on December 21 with General Nudant, Chairman of the Inter-allied Commission, the latter informed the American Commissioner that it was entirely true that Marshal Foch had expelled from Alsace-Lorraine, across the Rhine, over 15,000 Germans. But, he added, a distinction should be drawn between the word evacuated found in the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and the word expelled, which applies to the people sent across the Rhine.

There are about 200,000 Germans in Alsace-Lorraine and of this number a small proportion (15,000) were expelled by Marshal Foch immediately after the Armistice was signed, because they were undesirables who it was believed would undermine the rule of the Allies. Their expulsion was ordered as a police power of the occupying troops, in the same way that the United States would expel from her borders undesirable noncitizens of Japanese or Italian citizenship. It is true that many of these people were not criminals or charged with crime; many of them were highly educated professors or school teachers, but had compromised themselves in some way and it was thought best for the future welfare of Alsace-Lorraine that they should not be given opportunity for activities which might undermine the control of France.

(d) Demands for raw material: Marshal Foch in a formal note which is of record, directs that Germany should supply, from the right bank of the Rhine, thousands of tons of coke, coal, pure manganese, and pig iron, each month.

No justification whatever appeared for these demands except that provision of the Armistice Agreement which says: "Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be moved," the demands for the above raw material being supposedly a continuance of the raw material which Germany was sending across the Rhine before the territory west of the Rhine was occupied by the Allied troops.

When, on December 21, General Nudant, chairman of the Interallied Armistice

Commission was told by the American Commissioner that these demands appeared to him to be beyond the terms of the Armistice Agreement, General Nudant laughed and said: "That is exactly the contention that the Germans made. We needed these raw materials to keep up the industrial establishments within the occupied territory west of the Rhine, otherwise a large number of workmen, including 80,000 Germans in the Saar Valley, besides others in Alsace-Lorraine, would have been thrown out of work, the steel works closed down, and a serious situation created among our industrial establishments. When the demand was made of the Germans by a French colonel they simply said, 'If we give you these things, what are you going to give us in return?'"

The result has been that the Germans flatly decline to accede to these demands, and Marshal Foch yesterday ordered the assembly at Luxemburg on December 23 of an economic commission composed of a delegate from each of the Allied powers to meet the German delegates, all of them specialists on economic questions, to discuss and coordinate the economic laws of supply and demand on the opposite sides of the Rhine. It is then hoped that the problem will be solved.

It will thus be seen that by flatly refusing to accede to the demands of the Allied High Command, the Germans have evidently improved the situation for themselves; but this nevertheless does not affect the apparently unjust character of the original demands for the supply of raw materials, which the German Government claimed was needed for the maintenance of their own industrial establishments on the right bank of the Rhine.

2. RECAPITULATION:

(a) Locomotives: Original demands by Marshal Foch partially compromised at the instance of American Railway Representative.

(b) Motor trucks: Original demands of Marshal Foch neutralized by refusal or inability of Germans to comply with them.

(c) Evacuation of inhabitants: Justified by Marshal Foch as a police measure of expulsion and not of evacuation.

(d) Demands for raw material: Original demands of Marshal Foch neutralized by refusal of German Government to comply with them.

3. The foregoing cases are recorded because they have appeared objectionable in the eyes of Americans charged with applying the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and the demands are not such that a magnanimous and conquering army should make of a beaten foe. However, as in most of the cases cited, compromises have occurred, it is not recommended that formal protest be made to Marshal Foch unless further subversions of the Armistice Agreement made it possible for the American Government to be placed in an embarrassing position.

C. D. RHODES,  
Major General U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Memorandum

***Distribution of War Materiel Among Armies***

American Section

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 21, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR General Rhodes:

1. Paragraph III of Annex No. I to the Armistice Agreement of November 11, reads in part as follows:

This materiel will be delivered to each of the Armies of the Allies and of the

United States by each of the tactical groups of the German army in proportions which shall be fixed by the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission.

2. The matter of distribution was brought up informally by me with members of the Subcommittee on Materiel during the first meeting of this committee. It was agreed then that the distribution was foreseen by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement quoted above was impracticable because of the conditions under which the German army was retreating. The Germans had neither the time nor the facilities to place before each of the Armies of the Allies and the United States such materiel as might be determined upon by the Armistice Commission. Part of the materiel was abandoned and part regularly taken over by the retreating armies. It seemed then a question of getting the materiel from the Germans in any way possible. Hence the question of distribution was deferred and it was understood that this distribution would have to be made among the Allies after the materiel in question had been delivered by the Germans.

3. The matter was again taken up with the Allied members of the subcommittee today, December 21, but the French members of the committee declined to discuss the matter on the ground that an agreement as to the distribution of this materiel, or recommendation as to its distribution, is not in the province of the Armistice Commission, that it is a matter to be decided by the respective Governments concerned, that the Armies of these Governments were interested only in the guarding of the materiel. It was agreed that I should submit my views in writing.

4. These views are:

(a) The provisions of the Armistice Agreement, quoted above, by inference placed upon the Armistice Commission the duty of recommending, at least, for the approval of the army commanders concerned, the distribution of the materiel delivered up by the Germans as a result of the Armistice.

(b) This materiel was acquired by the Allied Armies and those of the United States a result of their activities in the field and must be considered as having come into their hands much in the same manner as if actually captured by them.

(c) The materiel captured previous to the signing of the Armistice is undoubtedly booty of war belonging to the armies capturing it. There can be no question of its distribution; that is, the Governments concerned will not convene a conference and endeavor to allocate it. The materiel taken after the signing of the Armistice is also booty of war, but taken under conditions that require an agreement as to distribution.

(d) Inasmuch as the material taken after the signing of the Armistice was delivered by the Germans in accordance with the force of circumstances under which they were retreating, and inasmuch as the more recent deliveries were made in accordance with their convenience, and all came into the hands of the armies that happened to be before the different German units, it seems necessary now to agree upon some equitable distribution of this materiel.

5. An equitable distribution of the war materiel taken after the signing of the Armistice would bring into consideration the number of troops of the various armies at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief, the material and financial support of the different Governments involved, and perhaps other conditions that might make a decision very complicated. But whether considered from these standpoints, or from the standpoint that there were four independent governments actually engaged on the west front, the proposition to divide the materiel in such a way that the United States shall receive 1/4 is considered both fair and modest.

6. Action as indicated in the accompanying memorandum is recommended.

SAMUEL G. SHARTLE,  
Colonel, General Staff.

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**Requisitioning of German Hospital for Cripples**

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 21, 1918.*

No. 230/12.18

President of the German Armistice Commission General v. Winterfeldt

To the President of the American Armistice Commission, General C. D. Rhodes

[Extract]

The Captain of the Rhine Provinces sends us word that in Coblenz a hospital Bruderhaus has been requisitioned by the American Third Army. By this requisitioning, the care of 6,000 war cripples who have lost arms or legs is extremely endangered.

It is urgently requested that the requisition be raised in order that the work of the apparatus for the care of these war cripples may be continued.

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v. WINTERFELDT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1257: Memorandum

**American Troops to be held in France**

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.

MEMORANDUM of a conversation between the Commander-in-Chief and Marshal Foch on December 23, 1918

1. This conversation was held at the request of Marshal Foch for the purpose of considering the number of American troops to be held in France, and other points raised in the Commander-in-Chief's letter of December 11.

2. Marshal Foch stated that a state of war still existed and that he thought that 25 American combat divisions should be retained until peace preliminaries were signed.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that in his opinion, which he believed Marshal Foch shared, a resumption of hostilities by the Germans was hardly to be considered possible.

Marshal Foch stated that he agreed that such a contingency was extremely unlikely but that it was essential to hold a considerable force ready for action in order that the Allies might be in a position to force the acceptance of such peace terms as they might dictate and that too rapid a withdrawal of American troops would be an encouragement to the Germans in any idea of resisting the terms dictated by the Allies.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that the American problem necessitated keeping our shipping capacity filled with returning soldiers; for January shipments only about 220,000 men were in sight, and that he must not only provide 300,000 for February shipments but

that we must establish and maintain a constant flow of troops toward the ports else sooner or later we would be unable to fill our ships. The Commander-in-Chief further stated that, as he had repeatedly informed the Marshal, it would be impossible in the immediate future to replace any considerable number of S. O. S. troops and that we must accordingly release combat troops to fill our shipping. The Commander-in-Chief stated that we should now reduce to 20 combat divisions and that he considered that from all points of view the maintenance of that number of divisions in France for the present was amply sufficient. The Commander-in-Chief also took care to explain that he did not mean that 20 divisions should be maintained indefinitely but that, on the contrary, it would be quite possible during February to decide on a still further reduction.

Marshal Foch stated that as the Allied Commander-in-Chief he had to report to the Allied Governments the number of divisions which he considered it indispensable to maintain, and that he was consulting all the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in an endeavor to cast up a balance. Marshal Foch stated that he had decided upon a total of 120 to 140 divisions, including the Italians.

The Commander-in-Chief called the Marshal's attention to the fact that American divisions were approximately double the strength of other divisions and that 20 American divisions would therefore be more than the quota which Americans would be called upon to furnish based upon a purely numerical ratio.

Finally, Marshal Foch proposed that we maintain 30 divisions in France until February 1, five of which should be in the Zone of the Armies, and that on March 1, we should have 20 divisions in the Zone of Armies and five ready to embark.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that he was willing to accept as a present plan the maintenance of 20 divisions in the Zone of the Armies until March 1, with 5 divisions at the ports ready to embark on that date, but that the restrictions as to the divisions to be in France on February 1, would result in an inelasticity which would seriously interfere with the flow of our troops toward the ports.

Marshal Foch and his Chief of Staff seemed unable to grasp the problem of embarkation, especially the necessity of an uninterrupted flow of troops through the port reservoirs, and it was necessary to explain this problem at some length.

Finally, it was agreed upon that we should so arrange our movements as to have 20 divisions in the Zone of the Armies on March 1, with 5 other divisions at or near the ports ready to embark. The Commander-in-Chief stated, however, that he desired it clearly understood that this agreement in no prejudiced decision for further reduction to be taken during the month of February. The Commander-in-Chief stated that he considered that a further reduction could be decided upon during the latter part of February, since it could reasonably be expected that the preliminaries of peace would be signed by the middle of February or that the situation would have at least cleared the way for such a decision. Marshal Foch agreed to this although he indicated by his conversation that he thought March 1 was the earliest date at which we could expect a decision on the preliminaries of peace.

Marshal Foch then stated that it would be necessary to occupy the Rhine provinces until such time as the indemnity imposed upon Germany had been met and asked how many divisions America would furnish for this occupation. The Commander-in-Chief replied that that was a question that might possibly be discussed at the Peace Conference and which must be settled by the American Government. The Commander-in-Chief stated that as far as his personal views were concerned he believed that every American soldier should be gotten out of Europe as soon as possible.

The Commander-in-Chief took up the question of the French Commandant d'Armes in Luxemburg and the situation of Luxemburg as a neutral state. The Commander-in-Chief stated that he could not accept that the Commandant d'Armes should give orders to American troops and that it appeared that the attitude of the French and Americans was not the same. Marshal Foch maintained that it was essentially the same but the Commander-in-Chief stated that he could not agree. The Commander-in-Chief stated that he was

perfectly willing either to take over the whole of Luxemburg or to take all American troops out of Luxemburg. After considerable discussion it was agreed that the Commander-in-Chief would send a Staff Officer to the Marshal's headquarters to study the entire question.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, G. S.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Note

***Payments for Maintenance of Armies of Occupation***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 23/F

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 21, 1918.*

From General Nudant, President P. I. A. C. to Marshal Foch

I have the honor to ask you to be good enough to communicate to the Allied Armies the attached note which points out to them the way they should go to work to procure marks necessary for them.

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Subcommittee on  
Finances

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 21, 1918.*

It seems that a French army has made a direct request to a branch of the Government Bank for a certain sum of marks to pay for requisitions. This method of procedure is contrary to the prescriptions in force. Requisitions must be paid by regular receipts.

As far as requests for marks are concerned for the payees, they should be sent by each Allied Army to its G. Q. G. The G. Q. G. will then send them by way of Marshal Foch to the Permanent International Armistice Commission. The latter will then do whatever is necessary through the medium of the German Armistice Commission to assure execution of these requests.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Note

***Shipments of Raw Materials***

[Contemporary Translation]

PARIS, *December 21, 1918.*

Answer to Note No. 469, of December 15, 1918, signed Von Haniel, and to the Memorandum Annex No. 766.\*

ARTICLE VI: 3d paragraph of the conditions of the Armistice stipulates: No measures of a general or official nature will be taken which might result in the depreciation of industrial establishments or the reduction of their personnel.

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\* Not found.

1. The discontinuance of shipments of coke and generally raw material and manufactured objects originating from nonoccupied Germany, necessary to the operations of the factories, is undeniably one of the measures considered in the said paragraph. The Armistice therefore, has been violated in this regard. The shipments should be renewed immediately.

2. All the stipulations of Article VI are relative to "The territories evacuated by the enemy." No reciprocity on the part of the Allies is implied; the claims based on the discontinuance of shipments from the left bank towards the right bank of the Rhine, are unfounded.

3. The Allied command does not consider, in any regard, the restoration of economic relations with nonoccupied Germany during the Armistice.

Germany is invited to make known the transports which are judged indispensable from the occupied regions towards the nonoccupied regions. It will be decreed in each particular case.

4. Reparation for damages is provided in Article XIX of the Armistice.

Preparatory measures for the restoration of objects stolen from factories should be taken immediately.

NUDANT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1192: Protocol

### ***Economic Protocol on Execution of Article VI***

[Contemporary Translation]

#### PROTOCOL\*

Relative to the execution of Article 6, 5th Paragraph, of the conditions of the Armistice

#### ARTICLE 1

1. The German Government will have delivered by the mines, factories and establishments of the right bank of the Rhine, the raw materials (coal, coke, etc.), which were normally furnished during the third quarter of 1918, to the countries on the left bank of the Rhine (Alsace, Lorraine, Saar, Luxemburg, Rhineland) and the country occupied on the right bank. To this effect the German Government will forward for January 1, 1919, to the Armistice Commission at Spa, the official tables of combustibles furnished and distributed to these countries during the third quarter of 1918.

#### ARTICLE 2

Supplies for Alsace, Lorraine, Saar and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

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\* [Editorial Note: The copy of an economic protocol reproduced above is unsigned and undated. However, a subsequent reference indicates that it was adopted at Luxemburg on December 25. See Par. 1, Report No. 67, of February 6.]

2. METALLURGIC COKES: The daily tonnage to be shipped from the right bank of the Rhine by rail, to Lorraine, and for a small part, by water to Strassburg, will be:

14,700 tons per calendar day, namely:  
441,000 tons per month.

3. VARIOUS COALS: The daily tonnage to be delivered by water to Strassburg, and Lauterburg docks, and by rail, will be:

4,000 tons per calendar day, namely:  
120,000 tons per month

4. In order to meet the urgent needs and while awaiting the arrival of the first boats, shipments will be made by rail up to 60,000 tons, in addition to the quantities which precede, coming from the stocks from Kehl, Carlsruhe, Mannheim. All provisions will be made so that these 60,000 tons will be immediately available and reserved.

5. MANGANESE ORE AND MARTIN OVEN SCORIA: While awaiting that measures should be taken by the French Government to supply manganese ore to the metallurgic factories of Lorraine and the region of the Saar, the German Government will continue to deliver to these factories, as it did during the third quarter of 1918, the necessary manganese ore and Martin oven scoria.

6. The total quantity to be delivered monthly will be calculated on the basis of 10,000 tons of pure manganese; so that for the products of 8% manganese, the total tonnage delivered monthly should be 125,000 tons.

7. SCRAP IRON: Germany will assure a monthly contingent of 20,000 tons of scrap iron per month to be furnished by the depots on the right bank of the Rhine.

8. FINISHED MATERIAL AND DIVERS MATERIAL: The German Government will have executed and delivered the orders for spare parts and machinery pieces which are addressed to it through the Comptoir des Chambres de Commerce [Agency of the French Chambers of Commerce], for the upkeep or the repairing of tools and factory material for factories which have machines of German manufacture, especially concerning:

Mining material  
Metallurgical factory material  
Electrical factory material  
Railroad material  
Special tools for factories, manufactures and divers operations.

9. Orders given before the Armistice will be executed and delivered in each case where the order is confirmed by the Comptoir [agency].

10. Refractory and ceramic products will enter into classes referred to in Article 20.

11. DIVERS CONDITIONS: Material furnished will be invoiced in marks, at the prices which were current during the third quarter of 1918.

12. The invoices will be established by the German Government in the name of the Comptoir des Chambres de Commerce of Alsace and Lorraine, acting in the name of the Services of the Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction. The amount will be carried, in the course of the day, to the credit of the German Government.

13. The shipments will be made in accordance with instructions given by the Comptoir. The latter having been charged with distributions by the French Government.

14. The shipments should begin without delay. While awaiting additional instructions from the Comptoir the shipments will be made on the same basis as those made during the third quarter of 1918.

15. The quantities will be the same as those furnished for same destinations during the third quarter of 1918.

16. All correspondence relative to those shipments, will be addressed to the Comptoir

des Chambres de Commerce of Alsace and Lorraine, with offices at Strassburg, east building of the former Ministry of the Interior.

### ARTICLE 3

17. SUPPLIES FOR SWITZERLAND, HOLLAND AND SWEDEN: The German Government, by agreement with Switzerland, is held to ship monthly 200,000 tons of coal to Switzerland. Of this tonnage about 40,000 came from the Saar and 15,000 lignite from the left bank of the Rhine. It is understood that the French Government will take over and assure the furnishing of 40,000 tons from the Saar and 15,000 tons of lignite, and the German Government will assure the shipment of the surplus from the mines on the right bank of the Rhine.

18. Similar measures with regard to Holland and Sweden will be taken and will be subject of a future protocol.

### ARTICLE 4

19. SUPPLIES FOR THE RHINELAND: Provisionally, the shipments will be made and liquidated under the same conditions as before the Armistice, under the control of the Interallied Command. Definite instructions will be issued later.

### ARTICLE 5

20. Additional protocols will settle the questions not treated in this protocol. Without awaiting their establishment, all measures will be taken to begin again immediately the shipment of material and especially the wood necessary for the operations of the mines.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 7: Letter

### ***Establishment of Customs Barriers***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLIES OF THE ARMIES,  
*December 21, 1918.*

No. 1989/CR

Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.)

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces  
in France.

I have the honor to call your attention to the immediate necessity of maintaining, or reestablishing effectively the customs barriers along the following frontiers:

Holland-Germany  
Belgium-Germany  
Belgium-Luxemburg  
France-Luxemburg

In the first place, maintenance of the blockade against Germany requires constant supervision of the traffic across the frontier line above-mentioned. In the second place,

as the duties to be collected by the German customs offices constitute a part of our guarantee, it is necessary to insure the collection of customs duties for traffic in both directions whose passage may be authorized with the exception of all supplies for the Allied Armies.

Finally, it is important to prevent the escape to neutral countries of securities and valuables, removed by the Germans, from French and Belgian territory which they occupied, as this constitutes a reduction of German wealth (particularly as to gold and foreign securities). The obligations undertaken by the financial delegates at Spa, will have no value, if we do not take measures to insure their execution.

It falls on the civil authorities to reestablish the customs barrier on the French and Belgian side, and the Minister of Finance advises that this barrier is in course of organization; on the other hand, control of the German customs rests with the Allied Armies, each in its own zone. In fact, according to the terms of the Armistice, the German officers are to remain at their posts, and to continue their duties under the supervision of Allied military authority.

There is occasion therefore:

1. To see to the maintenance of all German customs offices along the frontiers noted above. These offices can be established as mixed offices with the French or Belgian customs offices opposite them.

2. To arrange Allied military posts, to insure effective closing of the customs barrier. These posts will have the additional duty of preventing the entrance of marks and Bolshevik proclamations and literature.

Please be good enough to carry out the above measures in the zone occupied by your armies.

By order of the Major General:

WEYGAND.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188: Instructions

### ***Control of Neutral Zone***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 2d Bureau, G. S.  
No. 492/2

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 22, 1918.*

Corrected in G-2 (b) G. H. Q. to January 9, 1919

#### A. GENERAL PROVISIONS:

I. The exclusive purpose of the control to be exercised by the Allied Armies in neutral zone is to ensure that no measures be taken in this zone tending to the realization of military preparations whether of defensive or offensive order.

The exercise of this control should not result in obstruction to the life of the population nor in hindrance to the activity of the German authorities in neutral zone.

II. The German authorities are responsible for the maintenance of order in neutral zone.

To this effect they dispose of:

a. Regular police forces (police agents and gendarmes), limited to their numerical strength August 1, 1914.

b. Garrisons of the Service de Surete, of a total strength of 10 battalions and 10 squadrons, distributed according to the attached table.\*

III. Should the German authorities, in case of threatening or existing troubles, deem necessary the intervention of armed forces not included in the two categories above-mentioned, they shall advise the local Allied Commander interested as to the increase of forces anticipated. This increase may only be effected upon authorization of this local Allied authority.

B. MILITARY REGIME IN NEUTRAL ZONE:

I. The strength and distribution of the German garrisons of the Service de Surete are indicated on the attached table.\*

As regards the police forces, each commander of a German sector will inform the corresponding Allied Command, not later than 24 hours after this instruction has gone into effect, as to the strength and the location of these forces.

II. No changes will be made to the strength or the distribution of these forces (Garrisons de Surete and Police Forces) without previous authorization from the Allied Command interested. The commanders of the German sectors shall, in due time, notify the Allied commanders interested as to the relief of troops which they will order.

III. Russian prisoners must not be stationed in neutral zones.

IV. As the mission of the German troops in neutral zone is merely a police mission, they shall not carry on any military exercises or maneuvers whatsoever. It will be especially forbidden to them to practice shooting, even with blanks, to throw hand grenades, or to use any of the appliances of war.

V. No works shall be undertaken in neutral zone, which might be considered as contributing, even in an indirect manner, to the establishment of an offensive or defensive equipment in this zone, not excepting the work entrusted to civilian help. There shall be especially no building or breaking up of railroads. These are to remain unchanged in their present condition, even the narrow-gauge.

In the event a certain work should seem to be of urgent necessity, an authorization to execute it may be requested from the local Allied Command. Nothing shall be undertaken without the previous decision of the Allied Command.

VI. Hunting, under any forms, is forbidden in neutral zone. In the event it should become necessary to destroy harmful animals, no action shall be taken without previous authorization from the local Allied Command and observance of conditions stipulated by same.

There shall be no fireworks.

VII. The Allied Command interested, shall be notified, not later than 48 hours after the present instructions have gone into effect, of the existence in neutral zone of any kind of supplies which might be utilized for military purposes. The Allied Command has the right, if deemed useful, to order the removal of such supplies.

VIII. Visual signalling or the use of any of the other signalling processes is forbidden in neutral zone. This applies to soldiers as well as to civilians.

There will be no wireless station kept up or established in neutral zone without the authorization by the local French Command.

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\* [Editorial note: It is not believed necessary to reproduce the table of distribution of German garrisons.]

Military and civilian dovescotes are forbidden.

It is forbidden to airplanes to fly over neutral zone.

No work of camouflage shall be executed in neutral zone whether it be for practice or done by civilians.

C. THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL:

I. From the outset, the officers in charge of the control in order to accomplish their mission, shall call on the German officers commanding the police sectors or subsectors. Through the intermediary of these officers, they shall, when necessary, get in touch with all other authorities or with private people.

II. The commanders of the German police sectors or subsectors shall take up all matters directly with the local Allied commanders. The Allied Armies shall notify the commanders of police sectors or subsectors respectively as to the corresponding Allied local commands.

III. The officers charged with missions of control are to hold orders to that effect. These orders should be signed by the Allied Command which issued them. These officers may be accompanied by as much personnel of the troops as is deemed necessary for the accomplishment of their task. They must present themselves with a white flag. Upon presentation of their orders, the German military authority shall instruct the other authorities to ensure their admittance and to facilitate the accomplishment of their mission.

IV. Officers on mission may request from the German authorities all written certificates which they deem necessary. The party signing such certificates will be held personally responsible. Moreover, the officers on mission may exact the communication of certain documents as stated below.

V. The commander of each sector must keep a strict daily account of the personnel of all grades (Garnisons de Surete and Police Forces) in each garrison of his sector. This account is to be submitted to the Allied officers on mission upon their request. These officers may also request to see all ration returns, the lists of people drawing rations or other documents of the military administration.

VI. Soldiers on leave in neutral zone will be listed on a special list at the office of the mayor of the commune. On this list will be marked the soldier's rank and regiment, his class of mobilization and the duration of his stay.

VII. Demobilized German soldiers shall not be allowed to penetrate and establish their residence in neutral zone unless they resided there prior to August 1, 1914.

Each commune shall keep a list of the men who lived there when they were mobilized and another list of the demobilized soldiers residing in the commune, with indication of the date of their return and their class of mobilization.

VIII. The commander of each sector will inform in writing the corresponding Allied commander as to the number of civilian population in each locality of his sector. All increase in population over one percent will be made known immediately to the Allied military authority interested with the reason for this increase.

IX. In the case where one part of the commune should be situated in neutral zone and the headquarters of this commune should be outside of this zone, the officers on mission may convoke the civil or military authority, on which depends the commune, to some point in this commune which they will indicate in neutral zone.

F. FOCH.

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***Introduction of German Currency and Propaganda***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
No. 2086/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLIES OF THE ARMIES,  
*December 22, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieut. Chapin, American Mission (D. G. C. R. A.)

In order to prevent the introduction into France, of marks, paper money and other Germany monetary instruments, as well as Bolshevist tracts and proclamations, it is planned to establish, through the French authorities, a customs barrier along the whole new frontier of Alsace-Lorraine, by means of companies of customs men now in existence and of three others which are to be organized. At the same time, I am advised that the service on the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers is being reorganized in spite of great material difficulty.

I have the honor to draw your attention, the interest and urgency of taking on the part of the American army, similar measures in order to prevent the introduction of German monetary instruments and Bolshevist propaganda.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

BRAULT.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2A: Letter

***Proposed Division of German Trucks among Allies***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 2003/C. R.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 22, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France

It was decided at the Interallied Conference on November 14 that the 5,000 camions [motor trucks] which were to be delivered by Germany in compliance with the Armistice Agreement, should form an Interallied Transport Reserve, each army being charged with organizing a certain number of transport units of that reserve.

The British army notifies me that the organization of these units raises many

difficulties because of a shortage of personnel, and, therefore, asks that the German camions be divided between the Allies in a definite manner.

This being the case it seems to me that the pure and simple of the 5,000 camions should be contemplated.

This could be made pro rata based on the effective strength of each army Nov. 11, 1918, and I therefore propose the following division:

American army	1,250
Belgian army	300
British army	1,250
French army	2,200
	5,000 camions.

Will you be good enough to let me know your views on this division?

The necessary instructions for the assignment to the Allied Armies of the material delivered by the Germans will be sent you later in taking account of the reports of receipt which shall have reached me.

F. FOCH.

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HS Confidential File: Fldr. H-1: Minutes

### ***American Forces to Remain***

LUXEMBURG, *December 23, 1918.*

[Extract]

Present: Marshal Foch  
General Pershing  
General Weygand  
General Fox Conner  
Captain de Marenches acting as interpreter

I. Transportation of American Troops from France to the United States: General Pershing expressed his desire to discuss the question of the transportation of American troops from France to the United States. He indicated that the American people, the American Government, and he, General Pershing, were very anxious to see that question settled as soon as possible.

Marshal Foch replied that he wished, before the discussion started, to express once more his general views on the question.

\* \* \* \* \*

In his opinion, the share of the American Expeditionary Forces should be 25 combat divisions.

General Pershing replied that, as had been indicated in his letter of December 11, he considered that that number could, without any doubt, be cut down to 20.

\* \* \* \* \*

Preparations were made for a monthly transportation of from 250,000 to 300,000 men. The necessary shipping would be available. It was important to take advantage of that

shipping to its full capacity. He, therefore, considered that the preliminary movements of transportation towards the ports should start without delay.

Marshal Foch asked General Pershing to state in a definite form the reasons why he considered that the number under discussion should be cut down from 25 to 20.

General Pershing replied that there were two reasons:

1. Even if the movement of the 10 divisions (30 minus 20) was to start immediately, they would not be actually shipped before far into February. The railroad situation was such that 15 to 30 days would elapse between the time when the divisions got their orders and the time when they would actually be put aboard ships. It was necessary to take full advantage of the small capacity of the railroads by ensuring a regular flow of troops towards the ports.

2. If, towards mid-February, 20 divisions were still in the Zone of the Advance, 5 more would, according to all probabilities, still be in France, under transportation [either moving] by rail or awaiting shipment.

\* \* \* \* \*

A discussion then took place on the fact that the 220,000 men to be shipped in January were not all concentrated near the ports; some of them (tank service, engineers, etc.) were still in the Zone of the Advance. Therefore, their places on board the ships should have to be occupied by elements of combat divisions. In consequence the number of combat divisions in France towards January 31, would not be 30 complete divisions, but somewhat under that figure.

The conclusions were that there would be approximately:

(a) Up to February 1, 25 divisions in the Zone of the Advance, 5 in the Zone of the Ports or on their way to the ports.

(b) Up to March 1, 20 divisions in the Zone of the Advance, 5 in the Zone of the Ports, or on their way to the ports.

\* \* \* \* \*

II. Troops to be maintained in Germany after the Signing of Peace:

Marshal Foch pointed out that between the time when peace - the conditions of which he did not know - would be signed, and the time when its conditions should have been carried out, several years should probably elapse.

During that time, the occupation of the line of the Rhine should probably have to be maintained. He asked General Pershing if he had any ideas of the share, if any, of the A. E. F. in the above-mentioned occupation.

General Pershing replied that this was entirely a question of Government, which he had no authority whatsoever to answer. He would simply point out the fact, that, according to law, all members of the A. E. F. not belonging to the Regular Army must be discharged 4 months after signing of peace.

He also felt sure that a complete reorganization of the American army would, according to all probability, take place after the war. Purely as a personal opinion, he believed that all members of the A. E. F. ought to be sent back to the United States.

Marshal Foch made no comment, and the matter was dropped.

\* \* \* \* \*

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**Cash Payments for Requisitions Advocated**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
December 23, 1918.

MEMORANDUM for the Commanding General, Third Army

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

6. Considerations of Policy: \* \* \* The following considerations are peculiarly applicable under the present circumstances:

a. If payment is made in cash at a fair price, supplies will be forthcoming. If payment is made in paper with no agreement to redeem such paper supplies will inevitably cease.

b. If payment is made in cash good feeling is promoted between the Army of Occupation and the inhabitants with resultant elimination of irritation and maintenance of public order.

c. There is no agreement on the part of the German Government to take up and redeem requisition receipts issued by the American Army of Occupation and as a matter of historical fact no defeated government has ever redeemed such receipts. ("It is invariably put down as an inevitable hardship for which the government is under no obligations to make compensation. It is *damnum absque injuria*." Birkheimer M. G. and M. L. page 209). Inasmuch as the furnishing of supplies to an army of occupation under requisition is never taken into account in the matter of local taxation; if the Army of Occupation does not pay, the loss will fall on those who furnish the supplies, which is inequitable and unjust.

d. If the redemption of requisition receipts is left to the Government at Berlin, the Rhine Province will be placed in a dependent position which it is of the utmost importance to avoid. Religious differences and harsh treatment of this province for years have created a cleavage between it and the Prussian Government which it may be to the interest of the Allies to foster. If we leave the Rhine Province in a dependent position upon the German Government for adjustment of an obligation of millions of marks we in so far leave it at the mercy of Berlin.

e. In the hurry of requisitioning supplies, in many cases by inexperienced officers, many errors have been made by troops passing through the country. Unjustifiable demands have been made and in some cases enforced. Because of the indefensible position of Germany before the bar of international public opinion we must assume that for a generation her text writers and military men will seek to justify her acts by accentuating any errors or improper acts committed by the officers of the Allied Armies of Occupation. In order to remove this possibility, to adjust claims while the papers and the witnesses are on the ground and errors may be readily corrected, it is to the highest interest of the Army of Occupation that all of these requisitions be paid for in cash forthwith.

7. No Authority to the Contrary: So far as is known no text writer of authority justifies a payment for requisitions in paper if it is possible to pay in cash. Furthermore the reasons which might prompt a military commander under certain circumstances to

refuse to pay in cash - namely, the depletion of his own treasure chest - do not apply in this case inasmuch as the necessary cash is forthcoming immediately upon requisition to Berlin.

Respectfully,

I. L. HUNT,  
Colonel, Inf.,  
Officer in Charge,  
Civil Affairs.

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Advanced GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 77: Letter

**Conditions Imposed on Germans in Turning over Property**

G-4

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
December 23, 1918.

From: Advanced G. H. Q. (G-4)

To: C. G., Second Army, C. G., Third Army

1. The terms of the Armistice imposes the following conditions upon the German Government reference to turning over certain war materials.
2. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: 5,000 guns; 2,500 heavy and 2,500 field pieces; 30,000 machine guns; 3,000 minenwerfer; the above to be delivered in *situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note Annex 1.
3. 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 wagons (railroad cars) and 5,000 motor lorries in good working order, with all necessary repair parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated countries within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg.
4. It was originally intended that the Third Army be charged with the duty of receiving, classifying, inspecting, accounting for, storing and reporting on all war materials turned over or abandoned by the German armies in the sector of advance and sector of occupation of the American armies.
5. Since the line of advance of the Third Army, wherein most of the abandoned war materials are located, has been turned over to the jurisdiction of the Second Army, it has been decided that the war materials abandoned, or turned over by the German armies, as well as that remaining to be turned over, will be taken charge of by the respective American armies within their own areas.
6. This material is essentially divided into two classes:
  - (a) That class of material maintained in the Armistice which the German armies are obliged to surrender: i. e.

Guns (heavy guns  
(field guns

Machine guns  
Minenwerfer  
Aeroplanes  
Locomotives

R. R. cars  
Motor trucks

(b) That class of war material not required to be turned over but which was actually turned over or abandoned by the German armies.

7. Under that class itemized in Paragraph 6 (a) above, very accurate reports are required covering the following conditions:

- (a) Quantity.
- (b) Classification (to be made very carefully).
- (c) Condition
- (d) Date turned over (if abandoned that fact should be stated).
- (e) Place turned over or abandoned.
- (f) Place of storage.
- (g) Whether acceptable under the terms of the Armistice; if not state defects.
- (h) In the case of guns, installation in forts should be listed separately.

8. Under that class referred to in Paragraph 6 (b) the following information must be shown:

- (a) Quantity.
- (b) Condition (only for serviceable property to be reported).
- (c) Whether turned over or abandoned.
- (d) Place turned over or abandoned.
- (e) Place of storage.

9. (a) Army commanders will arrange with these headquarters for such additional technical experts as may be needed to take over, classify, inspect, account for, store and render official reports on all war materials turned over or abandoned by the German armies.

(b) The responsibility for taking over, classifying, etc., locomotives and railroad cars rests with an Interallied Railway Commission, which by the use of several sub-commissions are handling all details of this work direct with the Permanent International Armistice Commission at Spa, Belgium.

10. Reports on all war materials will be required as follows:

- (a) Separate reports will be rendered for each of the two general groups described in Paragraph 6 (a) and (b).
- (b) Daily reports in quadruplicate, carrying both classes, will be submitted to these headquarters showing quantities received each day. These reports will be numbered so as to be easily identified for reference.

11. Regarding the war materials already turned over or abandoned by the Germans, and which has been taken over and reported on by the C. G., 5th Division in his report to include "Abandoned Material - Report No. 9, December 14, 1918, and Armistice Material - Report No. 4, December 9, 1918." These reports are now being segregated in this office into the classifications enumerated in Paragraph 6 (a) and (b).

12. With reference to the ordnance material pertaining to that class of supplies enumerated in Paragraph 6 (a) above, and covered by the reports mentioned in the preceding paragraph, additional reports will be required embodying the information called for in Paragraph 7. or as much thereof as is practicable. These reports to be submitted to these headquarters in quadruplicate at the end of each week with a notation thereon to indicate that the material reported upon was previously carried by the reports mentioned in Paragraph 11 above.

13. Instructions will be given at a later date relative to the disposition of all materials of both classes. Such portion as the material of that class referred to in

Paragraph 6(b) as may be needed for military purposes may be used, a record of such issue and use to which applied being left at the headquarters of the army responsible for same.

By command of General Pershing:

PRESTON BROWN,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
A. C. of S. Advance G. H. Q.

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HS Confidential File: Fldr. H-1

### **Joint Occupation of Luxemburg**

LUXEMBURG, *December 23, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

III. Occupation of Luxemburg: General Pershing stated that he could not agree to the state of things that was going on in Luxemburg. Luxemburg was a neutral state. In spite of that fact, there was at Luxemburg, a city located in the American Zone of Occupation, a French Commandant d'Armes who was controlling the postal traffic, the circulation, etc.

Furthermore, American troops had been called upon to intervene in some local disturbances.

The American army had no business in intervening in local political conflicts. The regulations made by the Marshal raise up the question of the joint occupation of Luxemburg, a neutral country, by French and American forces.

Marshal Foch replied that he perfectly agreed to the fact that the Grand Duchy was a neutral country. We occupied it only for the reason that its neutrality had been violated at first by the Germans. It had formerly been the centre of the German espionage system. As Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, it was his duty, and he would fulfill it, to see that the safety of the Allied Armies was not imperiled by the activities of German agents. Therefore, he, after consultation with the Luxemburg authorities, who had raised no objections, and in accord with them, had established rules for the postal censorship, and the circulation of aliens in the territory of the Grand Duchy. As to the Commandant d'Armes of the City of Luxemburg, his authority did not extend outside the limits of the town.

The Americans were responsible for the police and traffic in their zone. He furthermore proposed that General Pershing should immediately send to his G. H. Q. an American officer fully acquainted with his views and with full power to propose, in his name, whatever changes in the present regime of occupation he thought advisable. The question should thus be taken up thoroughly and without delay.

General Pershing agreed to that, and said he would send the abovementioned officer as soon as possible.

(NOTE: After the General's departure, General Weygand asked Captain de Marenches to notify him of the arrival of the American officer referred to.)

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**Instructions for Closing the Luxemburg-German Frontier**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
December 23, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff

To: Commanding General, VII Corps

1. The army commander directs that you establish guard posts at the crossings of the German-Luxemburg frontier to control traffic across this frontier.

(a) Civilians desiring to cross from Luxemburg into Germany will apply for a passport to the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg who will transmit such passports to you for the granting and return of a circulation permit, should the facts warrant its issue.

No resident of Luxemburg will be granted passports to cross the Rhine.

(b) Residents of Germany within your area will similarly apply to you for passports which must receive the approval of the Commandant d'Armes de Luxemburg before issue.

Residents of the army territory west of the Rhine, not within your area, will be provided with necessary passes by army headquarters.

All circulation between the right bank of the Rhine and Luxemburg will be prohibited.

2. Guard posts should be established at the main railroads and road crossings of the Saar and Moselle Rivers and at other points should you find it necessary. These posts will be established and become operative at 6 h., December 27.

3. It is desired that you send an officer to confer with the French General, Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg, Headquarters City of Luxemburg, to arrange with him the necessary details connected with the crossing of the Luxemburg-German frontier by the civil population of the two countries.

MALIN CRAIG,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Note

**Forces to be Maintained**

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, G. S.  
No. 52 PCL

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
December 24, 1918.

[Extract]

The importance of the forces to be maintained by the Allied Armies in front of Germany is, first of all, dependent upon the situation of the Allied countries with reference to Germany.

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1. Duration of the Armistice: The Armistice is a suspension of hostilities; it may be terminated in two ways: By the signature of the preliminaries of peace, or by the resumption of hostilities. The most elementary prudence requires our remaining in condition to face the latter eventuality; it can not, therefore, be a question of disarming and, theoretically, the Allies should conserve intact their military power during the entire duration of the Armistice.

But as a matter of fact, it is necessary and sufficient that throughout the duration of the Armistice the Allied Armies be assured of a large superiority in combatants over the enemy. In effect this means that the more the enemy is reduced in strength the more it will be possible to relax the military effort of the Allies.

Now the military power of the enemy is being weakened:

1. By the execution of the clauses of the Armistice, which oblige the enemy to deliver to us war materiel and important territorial pledges which would permit us to foresee carrying the war, if it became necessary to resume hostilities, to the very heart of Germany.

2. By the demobilization, which has probably been imposed upon the enemy by his internal situation.

Progressively, with the execution of the clauses of the Armistice and with his demobilization, the enemy's power will still further decrease.

It follows, therefore, that if the state of the Armistice required, in the beginning, the integral maintenance of the Allied Armies under arms just as they were at the moment of ceasing fire, it is now permissible to look forward, as the duration of the Armistice is prolonged, to the realization of measures which, while not compromising the superiority which our armies must always preserve over the enemy, will at the same time permit the Allied countries to resume, within the time limits necessary, their economic existence. In the absence of suitable measures of this kind we should run the risk of developing discontent in the Allied countries and, still more grave, of being beaten upon the economic field after having obtained a victory upon the field of battle.

In application of the above principles: During the first period of the Armistice, from November 11, to December 17, 1918, the Allied Armies were not reduced in any way; at the beginning of the second period of the Armistice, which opened on December 17, the situation is as follows:

1. All the territorial clauses of the Armistice have been complied with.
2. A greater part of the military war materiel and naval materiel has been delivered.
3. A great number of Allied prisoners have been returned.
4. The German army is, in part, demobilized, it not yet being possible however to determine exactly the state of this demobilization: The armies in the field appear to be in a process of dissolution; the different troop units appear to have regained their garrisons or the localities in which they were organized.

As against this considerable reduction of the enemy's strength, it is true that the Allied Armies have, each one on its own account, begun to diminish their military power:

\* \* \* \* \*

The American army, according to the program under consideration must return 200,000 to 250,000 men and 5 divisions during the month of January and February. The American army counts, therefore, having on March 1, 20 combat divisions in the Zone of the Armies and 5 divisions moved toward the zone in which the troops are to be embarked.

It is not possible however, to continue indefinitely in this manner. It is necessary, in fact, for the period which may precede the signature of the preliminaries of peace: To fix the minimum forces to be maintained under arms by the Allies as a whole; to divide equally the burdens and advantages between the Allies; to prepare the transportation necessary for demobilization which, insofar as concerns railroads, will be a burden to be borne entirely by France.

The progressive reduction of the military power of the Allies must then be realized in accordance with a program for all the Allied Armies, drawn up by common accord by the Allied Governments upon propositions submitted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

These propositions are set forth below:

It is a question, first of all - stated above, of assuring to the Allied Armies throughout the Armistice a force very considerably superior to that of the enemy.

The material force of the German army cannot be exactly stated and can only be estimated.

It seems possible to assume:

1. That, within a short time, 4 classes at least - the 4 youngest classes - will be the only ones to remain under the colors; the effective strength of these classes would probably amount to about 500,000 rifles or a minimum of from 50 to 60 divisions.

2. That the different troop units have regained or are about to regain their garrisons.

The German army may then be considered as having the value of from 50 to 60 mobilized divisions; that is to say, in war effectives - but these divisions are not formed. Let us admit, in order that any error may be on the side of safety, that the enemy's force is equal to from 60 to 70 divisions.

By retaining in front of this German army a force of double its strength - that is, from 120 to 140 mobilized divisions, the Allied Armies will be assured of an indisputable superiority in numbers and will be in such a situation as to be capable of stopping any offensive tendencies on the part of the enemy.

\* \* \* \* \*

After study and taking into account the present forces of the several Allied Armies, this distribution of forces to be furnished by the several Allies appears suitably arranged as follows:

1. French army: 60 to 65 divisions of infantry.
2. British army: 35 to 40 divisions of infantry.
3. American army: 22 to 25 divisions of infantry.
4. Belgian army: 6 divisions of infantry, or a total of 123 to 136 divs.

\* \* \* \* \*

While maintaining under arms this indispensable minimum of the large units, the Allied Armies may now demobilize and repatriate a considerable proportion of their effectives by drawing upon units which may be broken up and upon armies, army services and army corps services.

The figures indicated above, therefore, satisfy the military interests which are held in common by all the Allies and satisfy as well the special interests of each one of the Allies.

It is upon these bases that the Allied Governments may come to an agreement.

We have already considered the reasons why the figures given must be considered as a minimum - from another point of view it should also be observed that the Entente must not go to the peace councils in a disarmed condition; the force of its armies will still be the best argument in imposing its will upon the enemy.

2. Period after the signature of the preliminaries of peace: The importance of the Allied forces to be maintained during this period will depend upon the conditions of peace. The importance of these forces cannot, therefore, be fixed before the conditions of peace are known.

But it is certain that considerable reparation will be exacted from Germany and that this reparation cannot be met until after the lapse of a considerable time; it is also

certain that the Allies must, as a guarantee, continue the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces.

The forces which appear to be necessary for the occupation of these countries, bridgeheads included, in front of an entirely demobilized Germany, may be estimated at about 32 divisions (of which 2 or 3 should be cavalry). These divisions could be furnished by the Allies as follows:

- The British army might furnish 13 to 15 divisions
- The American army might furnish 6 divisions
- The Belgian army might furnish 2 to 4 divisions
- The French army might furnish 15 to 20 divisions.

It is within these limits that it appears possible to call upon each one of the Allies for the necessary effort, taking into account considerations of all kinds which might operate to reduce or to increase the effort of each of the Allies.

Moreover, the number of divisions of infantry given above might be diminished if the military regime imposed upon Germany permits it, and the number of divisions might also be increased if the internal condition of Germany does not permit attaching much value to her signature.

We have the honor to request the several governments to be kind enough to inform us as to their observations on the propositions which have been formulated above.

F. FOCH.

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193-28.4: Fldr. C: Orders

### **Outpost Line**

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 779

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,  
*December 24, 1918.*

I. The outposts of the troops occupying the Coblenz Bridgehead will be established on the line fixed hereafter (100.000° map):

Wood east of GORGESHAUSEN (liaison with the American Third Army)---AULT---DIEZ (not farther than the eastern outskirts)---BIRLENBACH---TANNENKOPF Hill (2 km. northeast of SCHONBRORN)---SCHONBRORN---ALLENDORF---HOLZHAUSEN.

The zone edging the neutral zone between HOLZHAUSEN and the Rhine will be watched only by posts and patrols, the service of which will be directed by general commanding troops of Coblenz Bridgehead.

II. The dispositions prescribing the closing of the frontier and regulating the traffic inside the army zone have been settled by Note No. 2492/2, concerning the establishment of the blockade, completed by Notes No. 773 of December 21, 3001/2 of December 22, and 17975/2-S. R. of December 23.

III. The troops on duty at the outposts must know precisely the emplacement of the boundary poles and the circulation in the outposts area will be settled in order that they never go in any case in the neutral zone.

IV. The detailed distribution of outposts, with indication of emplacements occupied by the different posts, will be addressed to the general commanding the army as soon as it will have been settled by the General Commanding, I Cavalry Corps.

MANGIN.

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**Addition to Coblenz Bridgehead**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 2994

SPA, December 24, 1918.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the French Armistice Commission.

Answer to note 18.12 No. 111/G.

The German Government is in accord with the proposition to close the strip between the two bridges between Mayence and Coblenz. It is in accord also on the line Michelbach-Allendorf as the east limit. It desires, however, that places such as Eisighofen, Doersdorf and Bergshausen, which have good connections with the neutral zone, without disturbing the occupied region, should not be occupied. This request is in accord with the reasons for Note 111/G where the manner of contact with the bases for extending the bridgeheads for places named within reason does not exist. Details should be arranged on the spot.

The German Government requests in return for its concession that the suburbs of Frankfort be excluded from the bridgeheads. This is much desired in view of the travel of workmen back and forth.

In conclusion it is requested that exact maps of the three bridgeheads be supplied.

WINTERFELDT.

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Third Army Gen. File 380: Telegram

**River Police of the Rhine**

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,  
December 24, 1918.

C. G., Third Army

Please report circumstances connected with American employment of patrol boats on Rhine. By whom were these boats turned over to us? Who owns them? How were they obtained and what use is being made of them?

JAMES W. MCANDREW,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff.  
1624

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**Elections in the Rhenish Provinces**

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 2d Bureau, G. S.  
No. 534/2

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 24, 1918.*

In order to allow the Germans of the Rhenish Provinces occupied by the Allied Armies to proceed with the election to the National Assembly, the following facilities requested by the German Government shall be granted to the German authorities:

1. There are no restrictions to the sending by the regular administrative authorities of reports concerning the preparations for the election or concerning the election itself.
2. Freedom of the press and permissions to hold meetings shall be granted by the Allied Armies as far as consistent with the maintenance of order and with the attitude of the population towards the Allied Armies.
3. Permission to enter or to leave the occupied territories with destination to the interior of Germany may be granted to persons furnished by the regular German administrative authorities with an application for permit.

The above regulations do not apply to the territories of Alsace and Lorraine.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

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193-28.4: Bulletin

**Organization of Coblenz Bridgehead**

[Contemporary Translation]

G-3  
No. 2318

FRENCH I CAVALRY CORPS,  
*December 25, 1918.*

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: The organization of Coblenz Bridgehead (French zone) must answer to two purposes:

1. To cover the concentration of the forces coming from the left bank of the Rhine.
2. To create a starting base in case of an offensive movement in general direction of GIESSEN.

This organization must therefore be such as to give to the Allied troops the possibility to eventually resume the offensive, in the most satisfactory conditions, viz: To allow in due time to gather all means at their disposal on the eastern bank of the river, and to assure the ultimate outlet towards the east.

The troops of occupation must therefore hold as far ahead as possible (though remaining in the limits fixed by the Armistice) the most important points of ground,

crossroads, eastern outskirts of the woods, outlets of the valleys, etc. Besides, they must, in case the enemy would take the initiative and start himself the offensive before we could get together all our means on the eastern bank of the river, be able to oppose a resistance long enough to allow the second line troops to cross the river in the best possible conditions: Therefore organization of the ground (trenches and accessory defensive works), also disposition of troops in depth formation.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND: The organization of the eastern bank of the river by the troops of occupation will have to be worked out according to the above-mentioned general data.

These troops will therefore have to organize:

1. An outpost line which will be situated as far ahead as possible and as a whole be the periphery of a circle 30 kilometers in radius and having COBLENZ as a center. The elevated points of the ground, the most important crossroads, the towns, etc., will be the points.

2. A principal line of resistance prescribing all tactical advantages and allowing the deployment of the artillery under the best conditions.

3. A support line giving the same advantages as the principal line and located at a sufficient distance from the river in order that its crossing by the second line troops may go on without any difficulty.

4. A switch line.

5. A position of security.

NOTE: It is understood that the word line is not the proper word under the present circumstances, not more than it was during this war. Thus line of resistance must be understood as zone of resistance, and one must agree that the line is generally speaking the location of the most advanced points in the resistance zone.

III. OCCUPATION: The outposts line (zone) will be occupied and defended by a part of the occupation troops that can be fixed approximatively at 1/4 of its total strength including a great proportion of machine guns, the rest of the occupation troops being reserved for the eventual defense of the principal line of resistance which will have to be held at all cost.

The support line (2d line) will only be an emergency line which will be occupied eventually by reinforcement troops.

As a principle, the whole of the artillery will be assigned to the defense of the principal line of resistance.

IV. GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ALLIED TROOPS: The COBLENZ Bridgehead is occupied by American troops (northern part) and by French troops (southern part).

The distribution of American troops has been made according to the above-mentioned principles. In the French zone two infantry divisions will be assigned to the occupation of the sector: 48th Division and another division not yet designated.

V. DISTRIBUTION OF FRENCH TROOPS: Headquarters of I Cavalry Corps: BOPPARD.

1. Right bank of the Rhine: 48th Infantry Division Headquarters EMS (eventually reinforced by army artillery).

In charge of the zone of UNTERLAHN.

2 regiments side by side

1 regiment in reserve.

Nondesigned infantry division: Headquarters St-GOARSHAUSEN.

Zone: St-GOARSHAUSEN Circle.

Kept in reserve, ready either to reinforce the 48th Division or to cooperate on the right of this division.

The nondesignated infantry division will supply only the posts or police patrols on the general line: St-GOARSHAUSEN, BOLZHAUSEN (southeast limit of the neutral zone).

2. Left bank of the Rhine:

(	(	Kept on the left bank of the RHINE
( 1 F. A. Regt.	(	but ready to come and eventually re-
Corps	(	inforce the front of the 48th Div.
Arty.	(	
(	(	Positions and routes of march to be
( 1 Gp. 105	(	reconnoitered - crossing of the RHINE
	(	on boats of St-GOAR and at BOPPARD.

4th Cavalry Division - Headquarters SIMMERN.

In charge of the SIMMERN and ZELL Circles. The routes of march up to the RHINE and the means of crossing the RHINE to be reconnoitered and prepared.

3. Troops specially reserved for the watching of the RHINE and crossings:  
2 engineers cos. of the I Cav. Corps (Reinforced by the 2 engr.  
Company 92 (balloon co.) (cos. of the 2d Dismounted  
Company 5/17 (pontoon engineers) (Cavalry Division. Ultimately of the  
(nondesigned infantry division.)

The course of the RHINE in the zone of the I Cavalry Corps is divided into 3 sectors:

North sector from LAHNSTEIN to BOPPARD (inclusive)  
Central sector from SALZIG (inclusive) to OBER-WESEL  
South sector from OBER-WESEL to TRECHTINGHAUSEN

A unit is assigned to the watching of the river, guarding and maintaining the means of crossing in each sector.

VI. DEFENSE LINES - ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUNDS: In accordance with the principles of Par. II, the bridgehead of the south sector includes:

An outpost line  
A resistance line  
A second resistance line.

These lines are marked out on the ground:

Outpost lines (NIEDER-ERBACH---DIEZ---BIRLENBACH---SCHONBORN---  
by (KATZENELNBOGEN---BERNDROTH---GREBENROTH---ALGENROTH

Main line of (DAUBACH (liaison with the American Third Army)---  
resistance by (HIRSCHBERG---southern heights of DIEZ---wood east of  
(SCHONBORN---ALLENDORF---RECKENROTH---southern heights of  
(MICHELBAACH (liaison with the troops occupying  
(MAYENCE Bridgehead).

The part of this line situated between ALLENDORF at the AAR is included in the neutral zone, but there is no doubt that should we be attacked, there is no more neutral zone to be taken into consideration.

All necessary measures will therefore be foreseen to occupy as soon as possible that part of the ground.\*

2d line (ARZBACH (liaison with American Third Army)---WELSCHNEUDORF---  
(WINDEN---SINGHOFEN---HOLZHAUSEN-an-dem-HEIDE---  
(EGENROTH (liaison with the MAYENCE Bridgehead).

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\* It would even be of interest, circumstances permitting, to effectuate the complete junction between the two bridgeheads, by occupying the heights on the left bank of the EMS.

Besides will be foreseen a switch line established on the ridge going down from EBERTSHAUSEN through KORDORF and WEINAHR, a position of security using the open places and the outskirts of the woody area which is in the immediate vicinity of COBLENZ between RHINE and LAHN.

These various lines will be marked on the ground by means of pickets within the radius of 30 kilometers only.

Defensive works, studied and reconnoitered will be executed only where it will be possible to do so without damaging cultivated fields.

The studying and preparation of these defensive works will include all matters concerning the organization of a fortified position such as explained by regulations.

Posts of command

Liaisons

Artillery, etc.

#### VII. OCCUPATION OF THE POSITION:

A. The occupation of the outposts line and of the 1st line of resistance will be assumed by the 48th Infantry Division.

Troops will remain in their billets, but all units must know the emplacements they would have to occupy and their duty in case of alarm.

The outposts line alone will be permanently occupied.

The liaison with the American troops will be closely insured by mixed posts.

The 48th Infantry Division will have to insure by its own means the organization and the defense of the position (line of outposts 1st line) on the front limited at the northwest by the American area, and at the southeast by the general line RENDROTH [sic] - HOLZHAUSEN (these two places being included).

The outposts established by the not yet designated division at the border of the neutral area will temporarily establish their liaison with the 48th Division at HOLZHAUSEN.

According to these general indications the Commanding General, 48th Division, will establish:

1. The plan of distribution of troops in case of attack (emplacements, duties, et.).
2. A general plan of the works to be carried out (posts of command, observation posts, entanglements, trenches, etc.). The sketch of these works will be carried out on the grounds only after approval by the General Commanding the I Cavalry Corps.
3. A plan concerning the establishment of liaisons.
4. A plan of reinforcement of the artillery, admitting that his division will be reinforced by F. A. R. and two groups of short heavy guns.

B. The second line will be eventually occupied by reserved units (X Division) on the front running from the American area to St-GOARSHAUSEN.

The General Commanding the X Division will take the necessary steps (later on, after the arrival of the division) in order to study the organization and the occupation of this line by two regiments of his division, and his field artillery according to the general lines indicated for the 48th Division (1st Regiment of the division remaining in reserve in the region of BRAUBACH).

C. The positions of the artillery will be studied according to both considerations stated at the beginning of the present note.

The studies and preparations which will be made in consequence of this (organization of the firing, telephone system; posts of observation, posts of command, etc.) must allow:

1. To realize for every position of the bridgehead a disposition echeloned in depth in order to aid the defense in a suitable manner.
2. Or to carry out the quick deployment of a mass of artillery capable of supporting an offensive outlet beyond the radius of the bridgehead.

The Commanding Officer of the I Cavalry Corps will study the reinforcement of the artillery of the 48th Division, and the X Division by the regular artillery of the

I Cavalry Corps (without taking into consideration the regiment of corps artillery and the two heavy groups eventually forseen for the 48th Division).

This study will include the reconnoitering of the positions to be occupied, the routes to follow, etc. It will take place after understanding with the Generals commanding the 48th and X Divisions.

The plan will be submitted to the General Commanding the I Cavalry Corps for approval.

3. The General Commanding the 4th Cavalry Division will study the conditions of assembling of his cavalry division east of the RHINE either in the region of St-GOARSHAUSEN or in the LAHNSTEIN area (south of the LAHN River) in view of his eventual intervention on the plateau east of the RHINE.

This study will include the reconnoitering of the routes to be followed and of the crossings of the RHINE (ships being requisitioned at BOPPARD and St-GOAR). The bridge of COBLENZ being reserved for motor traffic, will not be used.

The General Commanding the I Cavalry Corps:

FERAUD,  
General.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

BOUCHERIE.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Note

***Commission to Negotiate on Article XIV***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 152/G  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
December 25, 1918.

From General Nudant to General von Winterfeldt

The German delegates of the special commission gathered at Luxemburg to discuss questions concerning application of Article VI of the Armistice convention as regards industrial plants in the occupied regions, declare that they are not qualified to negotiate on Article XIV, on the clause: Reparation des Dommages [Restoration of Damages].

On orders from Marshal Foch I am charged to ask the German commission to take the necessary steps for the appointing of such experts as are necessary to go to SPA to discuss this question with the Allies in the briefest possible delay.

They should be supplied with all necessary information in regard to materiels to be taken from mines or various exploitations in France and Belgium, its present location, etc.

Please indicate what date these experts may be expected at Spa.

NUDANT.

A copy has been transmitted to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, asking him to designate French and Belgian specialists to negotiate with the Germans.

NUDANT.

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**Lamorlaye Conference on Administration of Occupied Territories**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,  
December 26, 1918.

From: Liaison Officer, G-4

To: Chief of Staff, American E. F., G. H. Q.

1. There is enclosed a French copy of the minutes of the conference held at Lamorlaye on the 20th inst., on the subject of the administration of the occupied territories, together with translation of the same.

2. The Directeur General des Communications et des Ravitaillements aux Armees requests that, in view of the fact that the points decided at this conference are executory, such measures as may be necessary to carry them out, be taken by the American High Command. Should you have any objection to make, as to the matters at issue, the D. G. C. R. A. requests that you be good enough to notify them as soon as possible.

3. In accordance with instructions from Brigadier General Eltinge, we are forwarding a copy of the minutes direct to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs, Advance P. C. American E. F.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,  
1st Lt., General Staff.

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[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff

COMMANDER -IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
D. G. C. R. A.

INTERALLIED CONFERENCE

ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

2d Session - (December 20, 1918)

MINUTES

[Extract]

PRESENT

Staff of Marshal Foch:

Colonel Payot, D. G. C. R. A., President

Mr. Tirard, General Controleur de l'Administration des Territoires Occupes

Mr. Roussellier, General Controller

Lt. Colonel Lefort, Assistant to the D. T. M. A.

American Army:

Brigadier General Eltinge, G. H. Q.  
Colonel McCrea, D. G. T.  
Lieut. Colonel Elliott, C. I. C. F. C.  
Lieutenant Attwater, Navigation Commission.

Belgian Army:

Mr. Jacquart, Belgian, G. H. Q.  
Major Dumont, Navigation Commission

British Army

Brigadier General Wroughton, G. H. Q.  
Lieut. Colonel Whaley Cohen, G. H. Q.  
Lieut. Colonel Holland, G. H. Q.

French Army

Lieutenant Colonel Toutain, G. H. Q.

I. The meeting opened at 3 p. m.

Colonel Payot states that the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has organized with his staff (D. G. C. R. A.), and with a view to coordinate the measures to be taken by the different Allied Armies for the control of the German Administration of the Occupied Territories, a service whose duty it will be to draw up general instructions and to decide the question of a general nature in conformity with principles laid down by the Interallied Conference.

This service will function at Luxemburg, and will be composed of four sections, namely: Administrative, Financial, Economic, Judicial.

\* \* \* \* \*

II. The delegates of this conference ascertain:

1. That the different armies have found the German officials on duty.

2. That at each Allied G. H. Q., a service is functioning for the supervision of the German administration.

3. That the general directions have been received and have been applied. Lieutenant Colonel Toutain states that all the administrative districts situated outside of the former "Terre d'Empire" [Imperial territory] are attached to the Tenth and Eighth Armies for the purposes of administration.

III. Political Questions:

1. The delegates ascertain that no Allied Army has come in contact with the Soldiers'-Workmen's Committee. The representatives of the Allied Armies respond in the negative. Only the administrative authorities who were in authority on the day of the Armistice have been recognized.

2. The commission decides "to prohibit any electoral meeting, until such time as the Berlin Government officially opens the electoral period, and officially notifies the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, of this measure."

IV. Police:

1. Salute: Each of the Allied Armies has created a different rule regarding the salute due Allied officers by civilians.

The following was agreed upon:

Allied officers must be saluted by:

1. All police officials wearing uniform.

2. All railway agents wearing uniform.

3. The militarized agents wearing uniform (customs officials, firemen, etc.).

The salute is not obligatory for civilians.

2. The Press: In France, as well as in Germany, the press is at the present time compelled to submit to censorship before being printed.

The commission decides: "In the occupied territories, the press will be supervised, by an Allied censorship, in the towns where such can be organized; in all other places by German censorship, responsible to the Allied military authorities. All necessary disciplinary action (prohibition of the printing of a newspaper, court martial) will, if needed, be taken against the writers of articles considered dangerous to the public order."

3. Circulation of travelers through the lines of the outposts: It is decided "that the outposts can be passed by trains carrying labors indispensable for the functioning of the factories. These trains will be limited to a very few, and will be confined to a short haul. Daily inspections of these trains will be made to ascertain that the travelers have the regular identification cards, and that they do not carry large quantities of money, or valuable, nor dangerous tracts. Offenders will be severely punished."

V. Circulation on the Rhine:

1. It is indispensable to reestablish the circulation on the Rhine, and consequently, to authorize without distinction, the boats entering the ports on both banks of the river. Therefore, the commission decides to request the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to organize a military control over the port services of the right bank, to exercise which will perhaps require detachments of suitable technical troops.

2. When the armies have to ask for transportation on the waterway, or when they may be in need of floating material, they will have to apply to the interested navigation commission concerned, and must not negotiate directly with the German public or private administration.

VI. Blockade and Exceptions Thereto:

1. Mr. TIRARD reads the provisional instruction of December 12 (No. 1701/CR) relative to transit between the two banks of the Rhine.

He makes known to the commission the proposed functioning of the economic services, and the role attributed to their two principal organs, viz:

a. One interallied committee sitting at Paris, deciding the questions of principle and fixing the proportion.

b. One executive commission sitting with the staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and charged with the delivery of the permits.

Awaiting the formation of the Interallied Committee at Paris, the executive commission will make all the provisional decisions involved by the circumstances.

\* \* \* \* \*

This executive commission immediately holds its first meeting, adopts the provisional instructions of December 12, No. 1701/CR, with the following modification: The control of the traffic originally established on the line of the Rhine, is extended beyond the bridgeheads, and brought on a line with the outposts. Consequently, the bridgeheads will be submitted to the same rules as the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and will no longer be separated therefrom by any artificial barrier.

In consequence, all passenger and freight trains can pass the Rhine within the limits of the bridgeheads.

On the contrary, the rocade [lateral] line of the right bank of the Rhine, can only be utilized by trains specified in instructions of December 12, as being authorized to pass our lines.

2. In answer to a question put by the representative of the Belgian army, it is decided, that for the time being, traffic will be free between Holland and the occupied Rhine Provinces, on the condition that the customs duties should be enforced. The frontier between Holland and Germany remains open, the Belgian authorities exercising, however, a

supervision on this traffic, in order to be informed, as precisely as possible, regarding shipments made both ways, and to suggest later on any suitable measures to be taken.

VII. Telegraph and telephone communications: Colonel Payot requests the delegates of the French and the Allied Armies, to send him a memorandum, reporting as to the measures taken to regulate the use of telephone and telegraph in the occupied territories, in order to suggest a uniform regulation at the next meeting.

Meanwhile, it is understood, that official telegrams, necessary for the functioning of the railways, will be forwarded freely through the lines of the outposts.

VIII. Rate of exchange: The official rate of exchange will be uniform, and will be posted and brought to the knowledge of the troops, who will receive formal orders to the effect, that they will not be allowed to exchange their money with the trades people, but must apply to the office of the appointed disbursing officers.

IX. Luxemburg: General Eltinge, representative of the American army, who had been informed of the inconvenience resulting from the difference in regime between the American zone and the French zone, in the Grand Duchy, states that the American command is in receipt of the instructions of December 9, No. 1417/CR, that it has no objections to make, and that it will apply the said instructions in the zone occupied by the American army.

X. Financial Service: Representatives of the Financial Service will have to visit different points of the occupied territory, to make investigations as to the financial situation. They will receive an ordre de mission. The Allied Armies should, if necessary, give them their help.

XI. The next meeting of the conference will take place at Luxemburg, on January 9, at 3 p. m.

The meeting closed at 5:30 p. m.

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193-23: Fldr. 69: Order

### ***Inspection of Neutral Zone***

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Neuwied, December 26, 1918.*

From: Chief of Staff

To: Colonel Adna R. Chaffee, A. C. of S., G-3

1. Pursuant to instructions from the Third Army, you will proceed, accompanied by an interpreter, without delay by automobile to Westerburg to interview the German commander of the Neutral Zone opposite this corps front, as follows:

(a) You will inform him that officers accompanied by the personnel necessary for the accomplishment of the task will be sent into the neutral zone opposite this corps front for the purpose of exercising the necessary control over the policing of said neutral zone.

(b) The number of officers and men composing any one of these investigating parties, the number of parties, and the length of time which they will remain in the neutral zone for the accomplishment of their task will not be limited.

(c) They will enter the neutral zone without any notification being furnished the German military or civil authorities in advance.

(d) They will carry a white flag and will be provided with an order issued by these headquarters as their authority for the visit.

- (e) They will travel either by automobile, by horseback, or on foot.
  - (f) Orders must be given by the German military authorities so that they will be allowed to move about freely, upon presentation of their credentials.
  - (g) In the exercise of the above control the officer in charge of the mission will call upon the civil authorities and commanders of police sectors for any assistance that may be necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. German military authorities will give the necessary instructions to insure every facility being given for the above purpose.
2. You will make such other arrangements as may be necessary to insure the proper functioning of the above mission.

By command of Major General Hines:

CAMPBELL KING,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Note

***German Sales in Belgium***

[Contemporary Translation]

C. I. P. A.  
No. 157/G

*December 26, 1918.*

From General Nudant

To: General von Winterfeldt

I have addressed to the Allied High Command the following note:

It has been pointed out that the Germans before evacuating Belgium had sold to private individuals objects of all kinds, machines, utensils, motors, etc., as well as stocks of raw material which they foresaw they could not carry away. These objects of merchandise if they had been abandoned would have been considered as prizes of war.

The same thing may likewise have happened in other districts occupied by the German army.

The sales thus effected by the Germans after November 11 are illicit and one can see in them only a means of avoiding the consequences of the application of Art. 6, of the Armistice Agreement. There is, therefore, reason to take measures to find out the beneficiaries of these irregular sales, to cause them to turn over to the armies the objects illicitly bought and to have repaid by the Germans the sums which they have unduly received.

I request the German Commission to make known to me its observations upon this matter.

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### **Repatriation of American Troops**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 26, 1918.

My dear Marshal Foch:

With reference to your note of December 24 upon the subject of the forces to be maintained by the Allies in Germany, before communicating the contents of your note to my Government I believe it is necessary that we have a fair and clear understanding on the following points:

(1) It appears that due consideration is not given to the fact that the problem of repatriation of our troops and their demobilization is vastly different in the case of the United States from that of France and Great Britain.

We must transport our troops not only over long lines of railway in France, but also over more than 3,000 miles of ocean and at an average of probably 1,500 miles of railway in the United States. It is only after the completion of this entire journey that we can begin our demobilization. Even the most casual examination of our problem is sufficient to show that, with maximum use of all our available transportation at least fifteen months must elapse before we can complete our demobilization. It, therefore, seems imposing an undue share of the burden upon the United States to ask them to maintain in France 22 to 25 divisions until the preliminaries of peace are actually signed. If this is done it will mean that before the end of February our available transports will be idle because of lack of troops to fill them on their return voyage to the United States.

Another point to be considered is that where British and French soldiers have been able to obtain leave each four months under conditions which permitted them to visit their families this has not been possible in the case of the American soldiers. My Government has even forbidden the families of our soldiers from coming to France in order that all available transportation might be used for the transport of fighting men.

(2) While it appears that the French army is about to demobilize 1,200,000 men and the British army 500,000 to 600,000 men, we have available for shipment to the United States and demobilization at the present time, less than 250,000 men. If we repatriate five divisions during January, February and March, a total number available for repatriation will not be more than 400,000. We are not in the position of France and Great Britain to add to that number by drawing upon the units that may be broken up and upon army corps units, because, due to our response to the demand of the Allies during last spring and summer, we have never been able to bring up our services in army and corps units to their proper strength. We cannot, therefore, expect to add to the number of troops available for repatriation from such services and units until several of our divisions have been repatriated.

(3) In the allotment of forces to occupy German territory it is noticed that the French are to supply 60 to 65 divisions; the British army 35 to 40 divisions; the American army 22 to 25 divisions; and the Belgian army 6 divisions. In this allotment consideration does not seem to have been given to the fact that 22 to 25 American divisions are equivalent numerically to 44 to 50 British or French divisions. Considering the situation as set forth above this would be allotting an undue proportion to the American army.

With reference to that part of your note after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, it is noted that during the period of reparation it is requested that the American army be called upon to furnish six divisions (equivalent to 12 French or British divisions) to the Army of Occupation in Germany; of course the attitude of my Government on the question of reparation is one to be decided later but it seems only fair to call attention

to the inadvisability of maintaining such a comparatively small force of American troops in Europe, isolated as it would be, for an indeterminate period of time.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Note

**Wireless Communications**

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*December 26, 1918.*

No. 180/T

General Nudant

To: General v. Winterfeldt

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has decided that communication by wireless shall occur in the following way:

(1) The communication between the Allied High Command and the German High Command.

This communication will take place through the intervention of the Armistice Commission by the existing posts at Spa and a corresponding German post to be named.

(2) Direct communication between the Allied and German armies. A certain number of posts will be designated by the Allies, qualified to transmit and receive radios for the German armies, or coming from these armies. These posts will be as follows:

- 1 Belgian
- 1 British
- 1 American
- 2 French

5 German posts will be named to correspond with them.

It will be necessary to call together at Spa the proper representatives of the German Radio Service for the purpose of drawing up in conference with the Allied delegates the arrangements under which the above enumerated communications should operate.

The German delegates should be fully empowered to decide definitely all measures that are to be taken both from the point of view of the position of stations as from the point of view of the hours of work and technical matters, such as call signs, wave length and transmission.

I beg you to make known to me as soon as possible when the German delegates will be at Spa to take part in this conference.

NUDANT.

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**American-French Friction in Luxemburg**

*December 26, 1918.*

My dear Marshal Foch:

During our conference of December 23, it developed that our conceptions as to the status of Luxemburg were somewhat at variance.

This variance does not so much concern the neutral character of Luxemburg, which we both admit, but rather the character of the relations of the forces of occupation with the inhabitants and with the government of Luxemburg.

Thus, by your note of December 14, you charge the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg with carrying out the terms of your instructions of December 9, and you add that the army commanders of troops occupying Luxemburg would correspond "directly with the Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg for all matters within his competence." In the instruction of December 9, I find certain rules, especially those concerning meetings of inhabitants and the press, which impose restrictions the necessity of which I can not admit.

Dealing with a government situated as is that of Luxemburg is necessarily very delicate and I feel that it is being unnecessarily complicated by the fact that a part of the Grand Duchy is occupied by American troops while a part is occupied by French troops. The matter is further complicated by the appointment of a French Commandant d'Armes who must if he is to carry out your instructions exercise a certain authority, however, indirect, over American troops. In this connection you are doubtless aware of the tendency toward a certain friction between French and American lower staffs and between the troops. This tendency must sooner or later be aggravated by the present arrangements with reference to Luxemburg. I am taking every measure within my power to eliminate this tendency toward friction and I ask your cooperation.

It is my firm opinion that the divergent opinions as to our relations with the inhabitants and the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg can best be met by the withdrawal of all American troops, other than certain signal detachments and other services, from that country, reserving to us the necessary right of passage.

However, in accordance with our agreement I have directed two of my staff officers to seek an appointment with officers of your staff in order to discuss the entire question of Luxemburg.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, U. S. A.

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**Reception of Enemy War Material**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
December 27, 1918.

Copies to: Chief Ordnance Officer  
Chief Signal Officer  
Chief Motor Transport Officer

[Extract]

Condition to be fulfilled by German Government in turning over property in accordance with the terms of the Armistice.

1. The terms of the Armistice impose the following conditions upon the German Government reference to turning over certain war materials.

2. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment [Itemized list omitted here; previously printed herein] \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

4. It was originally intended that the Third Army be charged with the duty of receiving, classifying, inspecting, accounting for, storing and reporting on all war materials turned over or abandoned by the German armies in the sector of advance and sector of occupation of the American armies.

5. Since the line of advance of the Third Army, wherein most of the abandoned war materials are located, has been turned over to the jurisdiction of the Second Army, it has been decided that the war materials abandoned, or turned over by the German armies, as well as that remaining to be turned over, will be taken charge of by the respective American armies within their own areas.

\* \* \* \* \*

LESTER L. POLK,  
Captain, F. A.,

for

J. H. PERKINS,  
A. C. of S., G-4.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 59: Telegram

**German Materiel**

290

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
December 27, 1918.

C. G., HAEF

Retel this date the total number of trucks accepted up to 18 h., December 26; First class, accepted, 611. Total of other classes rejected, awaiting repairs, 637. None of these trucks are in use by the Third Army.

GRAHAM.  
3:15 p. m.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 4: Telegram

**Inspection of Aeroplanes Delivered by Germans**

(G-4)

ADVANCED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
December 27, 1918.

General C. D. Rhodes, American Section, Permanent International Armistice Commission,  
Spa, Belgium

Number A-166-G-4. Reference the 200 aeroplanes to be turned over to American army at Coblenz, 60 have already arrived by rail, loaded one plane per flat car. It is intended to inspect only one plane out of each twenty. Authority requested to hold railroad cars until planes are tested, then ship all planes to Romorantin for storage. No places available for unloading and storing planes in this area. Lieut. Colonel J. W. Elliott, American Member Interallied Railway Commission at Treves, suggests that the Interallied Commission for reception of locomotive rolling stock at Coblenz be instructed to inspect the railroad cars on which these aeroplanes are loaded with a view to accepting them as a part of the railroad cars to be turned over in accordance with the terms of Armistice, and that if accepted, these cars be permitted to proceed to Romorantin and upon discharging the aeroplanes, the railroad cars be then sent to such points as may be directed by the Interallied Railway Commission. Will hold all railroad cars delivering aeroplanes at Coblenz pending your reply.

L. D. GASSER,  
Lt. Col., G. S.,  
Representative of A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.

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***Assembly of Abandoned Enemy Materiel***

GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 16

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*December 27, 1918.*

1. Corps and division commanders will immediately cause an inspection of their area to be made for materiel abandoned by the German army. Such materiel as may be discovered will be assembled in such places as may be designated by corps and division commanders, and will be classified, stored, and inspected by the technical services of corps and divisions.

2. There will be submitted daily, a report to these headquarters, by telegraph or courier, giving the location of materiel discovered, the amount, and condition thereof.

3. Suitable guard will be placed over this materiel until such time as shipping instructions can be furnished by these headquarters.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,  
Chief of Staff.

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Third Army Gen. File 380: Telegram

***Purpose of Rhine River Police***

THIRD ARMY,  
*December 27, 1918.*

Commander-in-Chief

HAEF

Sgs one hundred twenty-four. Reference your telegram December 24 subject Rhine River patrol. American representative Interallied Inland Waterways Commission advised these headquarters that commission was preparing to establish police service on Rhine for purpose of preventing shipments of certain materials into Germany in contravention of terms of Armistice and for purpose of preventing contraband shipments of arms ammunition and other war material. He further advised that due to fact United States has no boats available it had been decided by the commission that British and French were to take over this police force on river within the area of the Third Army. It was deemed advisable if such police patrol was to be established within this area to control such police ourselves. The commission by its order 143 therefore assigned eight small launches to Third Army for this purpose. These boats were procured from the Germans and delivered to me by the commission. In addition to these small launches we have requisitioned one larger boat which is stationed in Coblenz as a supply boat for launches and in addition took over a German Government steamer previously used by German authorities for use of the Oberpresident. The river police has exactly the same object and is supplementary to the railway police maintained in accordance with instructions received through the Interallied Railway Commission. The operations of either railway police or river police alone would accomplish

no useful purpose and both are necessary. In general terms the railway and river police make certain that no supplies are cleared from the left banks of the Rhine for points on the right bank outside of bridgehead area. River police at regulating stations are established at either end of our area and examine papers of all through traffic to insure that such traffic has been properly cleared by other representatives of Interallied Inland Waterways Commission. Had I permitted police patrol of river in area of Third Army by Allied patrols certain complications could not have been prevented.

JOSEPH T. DICKMAN,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding, Third Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Memorandum

### ***American Policy on Control of Luxemburg***

*December 27, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM for General Weygand

1. The following is submitted in accordance with your request that the views of the American staff officers consulting with you be presented in concise form in writing.

2. First of all, as indicated in General Pershing's letter of December 26, it is very desirable that the whole of Luxemburg should be under the necessity of dealing with an occupying force of only one nationality at most. If forces of more than one nationality occupy Luxemburg it must inevitably result that divergent views of the troops of occupation must, whatever pains be taken to harmonize, lead to a treatment of the inhabitants which will differ somewhat with the army of occupation.

The truth of this statement has been illustrated by our experience in the Rhenish Provinces. A mixed commission of control can not alter this truth but may aggravate the results.

General Pershing has stated his willingness to withdraw his troops from Luxemburg, leaving only essential services and exercising only the right of passage. While the staff officers concerned have not heard General Pershing discuss the question we believe that he would also be willing to assume the responsibility for the whole of Luxemburg provided he were entirely free to determine all measures to be taken in that country.

3. Insofar as concerns the military service, America's distinct policy in the occupation of foreign territory is not only to leave every possible liberty to the inhabitants but also to avoid the publication of rules of conduct until the necessity of such publication is clearly and unmistakably indicated by overt acts.

It is useless to discuss the advisability of this policy since it is a national characteristic and any other policy is understood with the greatest difficulty by our soldiers. The delicate nature of our relations with Luxemburg makes it all the more important that we avoid even the appearance of interference by establishing rules of conduct for the inhabitants of that country in advance of the moment when such action is unmistakably indicated.

The greater part of Luxemburg is now occupied by American troops and no American admits that we are in any danger whatever from the Luxemburg people.

4. So much by way of indicating the American general attitude. Now for concrete measures. The only danger to be apprehended from Luxemburg relates to spies. It is not desirable to publish a decree against spies and therefore the American view is that no decree whatever need be published.

Spies and their work could be handled by three measures:

(a) By the Secret Service whose duty would be to locate any spies who may operate in Luxemburg and to bring each such individual before a military tribunal composed of officers of the army concerned.

(b) By restriction of the right of circulation of inhabitants of Luxemburg who may desire to pass the frontier of that country. Such restriction to be exercised, however, exclusively beyond the confines of Luxemburg. For example, insofar as concerns the American Zone this control would be exercised in two ways - first, for workmen and others penetrating only a few kilometers into Germany by means of local posts along the frontier-second, for persons wishing to make a more serious visit by a post or posts along the main routes of travel; as between Grevenmacher and Treves. Under this measure it would be incumbent upon individuals wishing to visit the forbidden zone to acquaint themselves with the regulations.

(c) All correspondence from Luxemburg to the American Zone of occupied territory could be sent if necessary to a designated town in such hostile territory.

5. With reference to the present decree it is believed that it is as mild as can be expected if a government of occupation is to be established on the European system. But since the people of Luxemburg cannot be regarded as our enemies or as in any way hostile to us, it is not believed that any government should be established over them until it is necessary for our security.

6. The propriety of the decree that has been proposed is neither increased nor diminished by the consent of the Government of Luxemburg. The decree is clearly not for the benefit of Luxemburg. The powers that issue it should assume the full and exclusive responsibility for it.

The American mind cannot conceive the necessity for this or any other decree at present.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

### ***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

American Section  
No. 29\*

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 27, 1918.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

#### I. Meeting of December 22, 1918

1. A note was transmitted to the Germans respecting the delivery of rolling stock by General Nudant who remarked "It was being delivered in very bad condition." The last paragraph presents the attitude of the Allied Headquarters with respect to the manner of delivering this rolling stock. It is as follows:

It is certain that unless energetic orders are given in order to modify the actual misdirection in the German railroad control, a considerable delay will take place

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\* [Report No. 28 was General Rhodes' last. Documents concerning his transfer from duty as Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C. have not been found.]

in the delivery of materiel, and in view of the fact that the responsibility of the German Government is only engaged, the application of the penalties foreseen appears from now on probable, without at the same time hindering the application of other measures which the delays, if too great, could involve on the part of the High Command.

General Winterfeldt replied to the effect that he agreed with General Nudant as to the facts and that the commission was doing everything to bring about orderly delivery, stating: "We are both likewise interested in finding out where this responsibility rests, and measures will be taken to that purpose."

\* \* \* \* \*

II. The regular meetings of the Permanent International Armistice Commission were suspended December 23, to December 26, inclusive. During this period the following notes of interest were exchanged:

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Several notes have been presented by the Germans bearing on the subject of communication between the right bank and the left bank of the Rhine, specifically with respect to postal communication, transport of food materiel and supplies for industrial purposes. These notes which are in the nature of more or less routine administrative matters are increasing in numbers and they show the tendency of the work of the Armistice Commission, that is, most of the purely military questions have been solved and questions pertaining to governmental affairs are becoming of more importance.

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S. G. SHARTLE,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
Acting Chief,  
American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1188

### ***German Demobilization Certificates***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 2d Bureau, G. S.  
No. 593/2

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*December 28, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces

The German Commission for the Armistice announces that the number of cases, where regular demobilization certificates (whether legalized or fortuitous) are not recognized by the Allied Armies of occupation, is constantly increasing.

All demobilized German soldiers should possess a certificate of demobilization the validity of which is left to the judgment of the Allied military authority. This certificate will serve as safe-conduct or authorization to reside in the occupied regions.

In case of doubt as to the validity of such demobilization certificates, it is recommended that the Allied military authority consult with the local civil or military authorities, to whom order has been issued to furnish all available information in such cases.

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

***Delivery of War Materiel***

American Section  
No. 30

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 28, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. From General Nudant to General v. Winterfeldt a note in which his attention is called to the fact that the delivery of materiel to the bridgeheads does not conform to Article IV. Modern guns should be delivered. This matter has been taken up in the sub-committee on materiel and precise instructions will be sent by telegraph to the different bridgeheads as to what constitutes modern guns. In these instructions certain calibers of ancient models will be excluded, and only guns with carriage recoil will be accepted.

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S. G. SHARTLE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

American Section  
No. 31

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 28, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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8. In regard to turning over the required number of locomotives and cars, the special committee giving attention to the carrying out of this part of the terms of the Armistice calls attention to the fact that cars and locomotives are being received at a very slow rate. For instance, on December 26 at Aix-la-Chapelle there were offered 64 locomotives, all of which were inspected, but only 38 were accepted. At the same point out of 2,289 cars offered only 1,547 were inspected, and of this number only 1,333 were accepted. On the same date at Metz out of 64 locomotives offered and inspected only 24 were accepted, and out of 484 cars offered and inspected only 365 were accepted. The total number of engines accepted to date is 750, and of cars 36,000. It was announced that the reception committee at Coblenz will commence to function today. The Germans in spite of their best efforts are not at all hopeful that the required numbers of locomotives and cars can be delivered in the 19 days remaining. They claimed that this is due largely to the very bad condition of the locomotives which have to be put through the shops before they are in condition for inspection, and also due to labor troubles. They stated, however, that every effort will be made to complete the deliveries in the specified time.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1187: Letter

***Future Employment of American Troops***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff  
No. 152/P. C. L.

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*P. C., December 28, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France

My dear General:

In reply to your letter of December 26, I have the honor to inform you that I have given great consideration to the remarks which you make with reference to my note of

December 24 and I request you in consequence to send me your propositions upon the number of American combat divisions to be maintained opposite Germany during the two periods indicated by my note of December 24, to wit:

1. During the Armistice, up to the moment of the signature of the preliminaries of peace.

2. After the signature of these preliminaries of peace, in the event that the treaties will continue the occupation of German territory during a certain period.

All of the Allied Governments having been presented with this question, I request you, at the same time, to be kind enough to communicate to your government my note of December 24.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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193-32.8: Fldr. B: Order

### ***Regulation of Rail Traffic in Bridgeheads***

General Staff  
No. 360  
ORDER

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALLIED ARMIES,  
INTERALLIED RAILWAY COMMISSION, RHINE PROVINCES,  
*Treves, December 28, 1918.*

No. 27

[Extract]

By order of high allied command, the traffic by rail from one side of the Rhine to the other, and in the bridgeheads will be regulated hereafter as follows:

I. The occupied territory within the bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence, are considered as being on left bank of Rhine, as far as railway traffic is concerned (passenger and freight).

The German blockade set by terms of Armistice on November 11 will be effective along the limits of bridgeheads or protracted by the Rhine.

II. Points of Passage: In general the Rhine cannot be crossed by rail:

(a) Outside of bridgeheads except at following points:

Duisburg (Bloch-Baerl)

Duesseldorf

Mannheim

Worms (exclusively under conditions mentioned in Para. V).

(b) Within the bridgeheads except at points authorized by P. I. A. C. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

VII. European time will be effective in the entire zone of the Interallied Railway Commission (bridgehead) commencing January 1, at 3 a. m.

VIII. The prescriptions of this order will be effective in their entirety on January 1, 1919, at 5 a. m.

These prescriptions annul all previous ones, and in particular the Orders Nos. 3, 16, 17 and 20.

They will be brought to the notice of the public by the railway directions.

GUITRY,  
President of Interallied Railway Commission of  
Rhine Provinces.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

### **Control of Neutral Zone**

American Section  
No. 30

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 28, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

10. Respecting the policing of the neutral zone the following exchange of comments is of interest:

GERMANS: From General Winterfeldt to General Nudant: No. 3682, December 26. The orders sent by Marshal Foch concerning the carrying out the policing of the neutral zone contained in part C Number VII the intensive limitation of the right of circulation in quite the same fashion as though it were being arranged for the occupied areas. This is contrary to the spirit of the neutral zone. In the neutral zone no German troops may be accepted except those that are left behind for police purposes. The control of this is conceded to the Allies, but on the control the life of the common people must be left completely free. The limitation of the free circulation of the people who are not due to bear arms limits the freedom of movements of those elements which are most important in the regular life of the common people, namely, the men who are at the age of bearing arms. During the progress of the war a number of changes in the population were naturally brought about. The occupation on the left bank of the Rhine will bring about still further shifts in the population. If everything is now to be brought back to the condition in which it was on August 30, 1914, this will bring extraordinary hardships to the occupied areas. The extension of these measures to the neutral zone is, however, not justified by the Armistice Agreement nor can it be based in view of the present circumstances in any way upon military necessities. The revocation of the measures in Article C of VII is therefore, requested.

ALLIES: When the regulations in regard to the neutral zone were drawn up, every consideration was given to the liberties of the civil population in that zone. Everything which in any way might have made the neutral zone lose its neutrality was omitted from these regulations, but precisely because this control was offered us it cannot be admitted outside of the effective control over the disorderly elements which might come into the

zone. It was provided that when the population should increase one-tenth above the figures provided in these figures, notification should be provided to the control. I do not see in this measure a hardship, but merely a simple measure of control.

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S. G. SHARTLE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

**Reinforcement of Neutral Zone Sector**

American Section  
No. 30

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 28, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

Subject: Report of Conditions

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. General Nudant transmits a telegram from Marshal Foch in which permission is given to the Germans authorizing the reinforcement of the sector of the Wesel by two new battalions for the purpose of keeping order.

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S. G. SHARTLE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Bolshevism: German Troops in Russia**

American Section  
No. 31

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, December 28, 1918.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

4. It had been brought to the attention of the Germans that under the provisions of Article XII of the Armistice Agreement in withdrawing troops from Russia the interior situation of those territories should be taken into consideration, and that in violation of these clauses not only had the German troops begun a movement of withdrawal without previous agreement and in disregard of the requirement of maintaining order in occupied territory, but it was also claimed that the German troops were fostering a spread of Bolshevism in the Baltic Provinces and in the Ukraine either by interfering with the mobilization and the acts of local Antibolshevik troops or by clandestinely aiding and abetting the elements of disorder and revolution. Also that by withdrawing they were failing to guard materiel and provisions. That they would be held responsible for any depredations which might be committed upon materiel and provisions thereby left unguarded as a result of the hasty withdrawal. The Germans offered the following explanation: That the conditions in eastern lands have for a long time been a matter of serious concern to the German High Command; that it was deeply interested in not evacuating this territory; and that they were interested in not allowing the peoples of these lands to be laid open to devastation by the Bolsheviks. They claimed that the German delegates before the signing of the Armistice requested that their troops be not withdrawn from this territory too soon. The Germans desired to again emphasize what has been transmitted in the note, namely: That even by using force it will not be possible to keep the German troops in these territories much longer. They also stated that if the peoples of these territories are not to be given over to the horrors of Bolshevism, the Allies must occupy themselves with this situation.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Prisoners of War**

American Section  
No. 32

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 29, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

5. In connection with prisoners of war; the committee having this matter specially in hand is taking up with the German authorities the question of furnishing lists of American prisoners who are sick and unable to travel giving full information as to condition, camp at which located, etc. It is also endeavoring to secure for the use of our Quarter-master Department lists of officers who have been held as prisoners with the amount of money paid to each, in order that the accounts of these officers may be settled when they are discharged from the service.

\* \* \* \* \*

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Transfer Camps for Prisoners**

[Contemporary Translation]

*December 29, 1918.*

DETAILS ARRANGED FOR FURTHER EVACUATION OF PRISONERS

The following is a translation of a communication of the Ministry of War at Berlin.

The Ministry of War at Berlin sends the following orders to the German army commands:

1. With consent of Marshal Foch the following camps in the neutral or occupied zone are destined for transfer camps of Entente prisoners of war: Friedrichsfeld, Wahn including the exercise grounds, Limburg, Darmstadt including the exercise grounds, Mannheim and Rastatt.

These camps are placed under the command of the armies opposite from which commands for these camps are to be sent. Insofar as they have not yet been turned over to the

Allies, the German commands will do so at once, at the same time appointing the plenipotentiaries of the inspection of Frankfort-on-the-Main mentioned in paragraph 3.

2. When these camps have been taken over by the opposing armies all transportation of prisoners to the west will go through these camps except for Friedrichsfeld (see below). For the purpose of having uniform movement of prisoners, the prison camp inspection of Frankfort-on-the-Main (telephone Hausa 9150) is appointed as a central office for the direction of prisoner transportation.

3. As plenipotentiaries for dealing with the demands of the Entente concerning all questions of transfer of prisoners, there are appointed Brigadier General von Studnitz, delegate Koch and Lieutenant Schneider of the Frankfort inspection. The Armistice Commission at Spa has been informed these plenipotentiaries deal directly with the Ministry of War on all questions concerning the movement of prisoners. They deal directly also with the Armistice Commission at Spa and with the transfer camps and with the camps of origin and with the opposing armies.

4. For the transfer to the west there is a question only of the corps districts of middle Germany, namely: The Guard Corps the III, IV, V, VI, VIII, XI, XVIII Corps, as well as a part of the X Corps, insofar as the prisoners from the X Corps are not transferred to the coast for transportation by sea, and likewise, their transfer by way of Friedrichsfeld through the Netherlands is placed under the prisoners inspection of Muenster; for the Italian prisoners of war from the above named corps districts are arranged for by transfer by way of Lechfeld through Switzerland.

5. The transfer of seriously ill and litter cases is to be carried out according to the special plan of the sanitary department.

6. The transfer from the camps of origin to the transfer camps is to be effected through Etra Berlin Group VI, which in turn receives instructions concerning the capacity of the camps from Frankfort prisoner inspection. To this end the inspections mentioned in paragraph IV will make known by wireless each Wednesday and Saturday, the status as of Tuesday and Friday respectively, giving the number of prisoners in each camp, separated by camps and by nationalities, including the prisoners that are still in working camps. The first report to be made December 28 to the Frankfort inspection. Russians and Rumanians are not to be included.

A similar message will be sent to the Ministry of War. The report in accordance with No. 10081/11, is limited for this inspection only to Russians and Rumanians. The inspections of the prisoners of war camps are responsible for absolute accuracy of numbers.

7. In order to be informed concerning the status of the transfer of prisoners of war each shipment is to be given with a statement of numbers of each nationality, and the camp of transfer for which the shipment is destined. This data to be wired to the Frankfort inspection and to the Minister of War. As soon as a camp or working camp has been entirely evacuated of any nationality this fact is to be also wired.

8. The feeding of prisoners of war in the transfer camps is undertaken by the Entente.

9. By appointment of the German general commands, German liaison commands will be sent. A superior German officer, staff officer or captain is also especially to be thus detailed. Besides a few officers thoroughly familiar with prison work enlisted personnel sufficient for the needs is also to be detailed to each camp. These liaison commands are not placed under the command of the opposing army, but they are under the command of the superior German officer who gives orders in harmony with the opposing commander. The superior German officer has the duty to keep German authorities informed concerning the coming of prisoner transports, and to this end will be accorded free use of the telephone and telegraph. He is, further, to be allowed free intercourse with the Armistice Commission at Spa at all times. The German officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men will wear uniform and be under arms just as the police troops of the neutral zone and shall enjoy the same rights as these.

10. All prison inspections except Muenster have received a copy. In order to unburden the army commands and to accelerate business, it is necessary to retain liaison already agreed upon between the Minister of War and the prison inspections, and between the general commands and the Minister of War. The general commands receive copies of all important matters. Entente prisoners of war are to be evacuated by January 15.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1234: Letter

***Repatriation of Alsace-Lorrainers***

[Contemporary Translation]

10915/G

*December 29, 1918.*

From: C-in-C, French Armies of the East

To: Chief of the F. M. M., attached to American Army

By letter of November 4, the Brigadier General, Deputy Chief of Staff, for Civil Affairs, Advance Headquarters, submitted to the French Command the question of the repatriation of several thousand Alsace-Lorrainers, now refugees in the region of Treves and who desire to return to their country.

Consulted on the possibility of an early repatriation, the Commissioners of the French Republic at Strassburg, Metz, and Colmar, gave me their assent.

However, they made several reservations:

1. The transition depots organized to receive the parties concerned, have only a very limited capacity despite the efforts made to increase the number.
2. A certain number of communes of the arrondissement of Chateau-Salins, which were situated very near the front, have suffered particularly and there should not be repatriations authorized, except in the localities which offer possibilities of habitation.

Under these conditions, it appears indispensable to assure the echelonment of the convoys and to notify in advance the Commissioner of the Republic concerned, of the number of persons repatriated who will be sent and the date of their arrival.

The French Mission attached to the American army should, therefore, proceed in the following manner to assure these repatriations:

1. Inform by telegram the Commissioner of the Republic concerned of the number of evacuated persons who desire to return to such and such a commune and are ready to leave.
2. Address the requests for means of transportation to the Commission des Chemins-de-Fer de Campagne des Pays Rhenans at Treves.
3. Notify, at the same time, the Commissioner of the Republic concerned and the C. G., Special Service, of the effectives sent on their way, the place of destination and the hour of arrival.

Please report the above to the Brigadier General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs and have instructions issued to assure the execution of the above measures.

G. TACQUET,  
Chef de Bataillon Adjoint.

French Military Mission  
No. 3843/CP

*December 31, 1918*

By Order: Chief of the 2d Bureau  
Illegible

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**Reception of Abandoned Enemy Materiel**

GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 19

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
December 29, 1918.

A commission for the reception of materiel abandoned by the German army in the area occupied by the United States Army is hereby appointed, consisting of the officers named below, who will meet at these headquarters at the call of the chairman:

Major Lewis Landes, Q. M. C.  
Major Ira B. Jaralemon, A. S.  
Major James W. Webb, Inf.  
Captain Lester L. Falk, F. A.  
Captain Harry E. Johnson, O. D.  
Captain D. L. Sutherland, Inf.  
2d Lieut. P. A. Davis, M. T. C.

This commission will prepare all reports necessary to be submitted to higher authority. They will be assisted by all services at these headquarters, and the departments concerned will be responsible for classifying, storing, inspecting, and accounting to the commission for such German materiel as they may receive.

The commission will prepare its reports in triplicate.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

**German Demobilization**

American Section  
No. 32

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, December 29, 1918.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3. From the Belgian Bulletin of Information it is learned that the organizations composed of Landsturm, Landwehr, and reserve men will be demobilized, and it is expected that this will be accomplished by January 15, 1919. It is also learned that men holding delays not belonging to the classes under arms upon proper application will be demobilized.

Also with reference to the men belonging to classes held under arms, those of the classes of 16 and 17 will not be called out for the present but will be granted new delays, and those of the classes of 18 and 19 will be incorporated at the expiration of the present delays.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-4, GHQ: Fldr. 4: Telegram

***Appointment of Subcommittee on Maintenance***

Received at 1 RS ED F        259 OB  
HAEF Dec. 29, 1918

Lt. L. H. Paul Chapin, American Liaison Officer, G-4, Etat-Major,  
Lamorlaye, Oise.

Number 9081 G-4. The following wire from Col. Gasser repeated for  
your information:

TREVES, Dec. 29. A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q., Chaumont, Number A 192 G-4.  
Reference your 8901 and 9022. Reference is made to letter from the Marshal, Commander-in-  
Chief, Dec. 11, No. 1535 C. R., signed WEYGAND, wherein the appointment of a subcommission  
is provided to study and supervise the ways and means in connection with the administra-  
tive and final questions covered by Article 9 of the Armistice. Maj. John A. Cutchins was  
appointed as a member of this subcommission. Unquestionably the subcommission in question  
will be the authority for dealing in these matters. I would suggest that the French High  
Command be urged to call a meeting of this subcommission as soon as possible in order that  
the methods which may be decided upon for determining what charges will be made for the  
occupation may be inaugurated as soon as possible. Copy of the letter in question will be  
forwarded with my report this date. Records of Maj. Cutchins detail to this subcommission  
are in your office.

GASSER.

Request that you take this matter up with French High Command and urge early meeting  
of subcommission.

8:22 a. m., 30th

GEORGE V. H. MOSELEY,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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**Delivery of Rolling Stock**

American Section  
No. 32

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 29, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

6. Information has been received from the Germans to the effect that cars at Coblenz upon which aeroplanes were delivered can be accepted as part of the total rolling stock to be delivered. They call attention to the fact that these were special cars and among the best which the Germans possessed. They also stated that positive instructions have been given to German inspectors passing upon rolling stock before presentation to the Allies that they would be held personally responsible if such rolling stock was refused. As a result these inspectors are sending to the shops all rolling stock which shows the slightest defect. As a consequence the shops were encumbered and could only turn out those cars requiring the lightest repairs. They further stated that due to the revolution, German workmen now work only 8 hours a day as compared with 11 hours formerly, and now they will not work on Sundays and holidays.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German troops in Poland**

American Section  
No. 32

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 29, 1918.*

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. The Allies brought to the attention of the Germans the fact that the German troops in the Ukraine had crossed Poland to Germany without having previously secured the approval of the Allied Governments, this in violation of Article XII of the Armistice Agreement of November 11. The attention of the German Government was called to the fact that if it is unable to maintain its troops in the Ukraine and is obliged to have them retreat across Poland, it must accept the conditions demanded by the Polish Government;

namely, disarmament of the German troops. If these terms are not accepted by the German Government the troops that enter Poland armed will incur the risk of being arrested and made prisoners of war, with the reservation of all measures which the Allies may take later in unity with Poland. The German reply to the above was that a note would be sent to the German High Command, but protest was made that this new demand is an additional increase in the severity of the conditions of the Armistice Agreement. In the agreement of November 11 there was nothing stated about the disarmament or the internment of German troops in Poland. It was claimed that the same process was being used in this case as in the case of General von Mackensen's army.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Letter

***Foch's Letter to Pershing on Modified Decree***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 2d Bureau, G. S.  
No. 625/2

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
P. C., *December 29, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commanding the Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces  
in France

My dear General,

The question of the circulation and police in the territory of the Grand Duchy very properly concerns you deeply, and we are in accord in considering that it is of capital interest that the same measures be adopted and applied by the different armies which may be located in this country.

Strictly military interests have obliged the Allies to penetrate the territory of the Grand Duchy, but these interests have not at all modified their intention of maintaining the principle of its neutrality. It appears to me essential, in order not to prejudice in any way the future destinies of this state, that, during the period of the Armistice, the American troops continue to include within the zone occupied by them a part of its territory.

You are sufficiently aware of the importance which I attach to having our points of view as completely as possible in accord to understand the care which I have taken in submitting to you a project of regulations which may be in harmony with the high conceptions of law of the American Government and of its army.

It is in this spirit that I have proceeded with the elaboration of the new text which I have the honor to transmit herewith, and the object of which is to render as clear, and at the same time as mild, as possible the rules which our common responsibility obliges us to take for the security of our armies.

I would be, moreover, disposed, if you consider it necessary, to still further soften and simplify these rules by omitting Articles 6 and 7 upon meetings in the street and other meetings, and Article 22 concerning the right of bringing individuals before military commissions, which, being only the application of an incontestable right of international law, may, without inconvenience, disappear from the text of the decree.

I have also taken pains to assure myself that the Grand Ducal Government was not opposed either to the principle or to the methods employed in the project of regulations, and I have obtained the formal guaranty of the Grand Ducal Government to this effect. The Chamber of Deputies will be presented at its next meeting with a proposal tending to enlarge, in order to apply the text of the decree, the jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace; and the information which has been given me permits to say to you that the legislative sanction will certainly not be refused to us.

In any event it is, in my opinion, indispensable that the rules relative to circulation be centralized and applied within Luxemburg itself. In Luxemburg the method of identification cards for foreigners is already in operation and was established by a decree of the Grand Ducal Government. This application within the territory of Luxemburg itself of the necessary rules is in the very interests of the inhabitants who will thus be assured of having applied to them uniform rules. A simple control of circulation without the frontiers of the Grand Duchy would present the grave inconvenience of being exercised by too many authorities, who, often unprovided with the necessary information would be likely not to apply the regulations in the same spirit.

I hope that these different considerations will permit you to agree with me in considering that it is indispensable to put into execution the project of the decree herewith. If this is not the case, however, I request you to be kind enough to inform me as to the measures which you propose be adopted.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Memorandum

***Interview on Proposed Decree for Luxemburg***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*December 29, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM for the Chief of Staff

Subject: Interview with General Weygand re proposed decree concerning

Luxemburg Affairs

1. Pursuant to your instructions General Bethel and I visited Luxemburg and conferred with General Weygand. This conference lasted three hours on December 27, and two and one-half hours on December 28. At times the conference was quite stormy.

2. General Bethel and I explained the American point of view as best we could.

I told General Weygand with all frankness that we did not wish to become involved in any political intrigues concerning Luxemburg. I also told him that there had recently appeared an increase of friction between Americans and French that should cause grave

concern to the higher staffs of both armies. I pointed out to him that this was the more important since there were so many Americans in France and I gave it as my opinion that our duty in preserving the harmonious relations between France and America made it essential that we eliminate all causes of friction insofar as possible. I said that the causes of friction appeared in part to be found in the divergent views as to the measures to be taken, and the treatment to be accorded the inhabitants, in occupied territory. I explained our policy and that our soldiers did not entertain the same feelings as the French.

General Weygand stated that he had observed the tendency to increased friction but that he did not consider it serious. He seemed to take the view that all that was necessary was an education of the American soldier to see the French idea. At one time General Weygand worked himself up to quite a frenzy in expounding his hatred for the Germans and seemed to fear that an effort might be made by Americans to modify that hatred. I explained to General Weygand that I understood the French point of view perfectly but that it was not the American, and that the American soldier had difficulty in understanding harsh treatment of civilians.

In any event, I reiterated, both our desire to avoid political complications and to avoid friction made it desirable to withdraw our troops and above all to have no mixed command.

3. General Weygand then expressed the desire to discuss the modified decree in detail. This was done and General Bethel and I point out in detail that even the modified decree interfered to some extent with the internal affairs of Luxemburg. We also expressed the view that all necessary precautions for the safety of our troops could be taken by the Secret Service and by measures taken outside the territory of Luxemburg.

The discussion dragged and General Weygand stated that we were dealing in the abstract. I replied that the concrete has already been stated in the Commander-in-Chief's letter of December 26, and that in order to avoid any appearance of being involved in the political future of Luxemburg and to avoid a mixed command we stood ready to withdraw our troops at once.

General Weygand maintained that Marshal Foch cared nothing for politics and finally lost his head and said that Marshal Foch did not even go to see M. Clemenceau but that General Pershing did. I closed this part of the conversation with sufficient politeness to remain in the room.

4. The modified form of the decree has been submitted for approval to the Luxemburg Government and is prepared for the signatures of the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Petain and Marshal Foch.

General Weygand asked if the approval of the Luxemburg Government would not remove our objections.

He was informed that it would not and that he himself must be aware that the Luxemburg Government must sign anything that the Allies asked.

General Weygand asked what the Commander-in-Chief's view would be if Marshal Foch issued the decree as an order. I replied that since General Bethel and I had been sent to the conference at Marshal Foch's request that I considered that it would be regrettable.

General Weygand asked a number of indirect questions and I led him on until he finally asked whether or not the Commander-in-Chief would obey the order if it was issued. I told him that I did not know. General Weygand asked what I would do and I told him.

General Weygand talked at some length concerning the necessity for maintaining the Allied Command; he had made similar remarks before causing General Bethel to remind him that the Commander-in-Chief was directly responsible to his Government.

Finally General Weygand asked me my views on the Allied Command. I replied that I had no objection to giving him my personal views, which were: It is necessary to preserve the Allied Command during the Armistice but each Commander-in-Chief must take an increasing number of matters to his Government for decision and the Allied Command must be more and more exercised by agreement.

5. On the evening of December 27, General Weygand asked General Bethel and myself to summarize our views which we did as shown in the attached memorandum. The contents of this memorandum were translated to General Weygand.

6. Finally General Weygand asked whether or not we thought the Commander-in-Chief would sign a still further modified decree. Seeing that further agreement was hopeless, I told him the best way to find out was to try. He stated that he would send the modified form with a letter. I suggested that the letter should explain why our troops could not be withdrawn and why the necessary precautions could not be taken from without Luxemburg.

7. The only reason I could get from General Weygand as to why we should not withdraw our troops was that such action would be interpreted as meaning that the Commander-in-Chief had broken with the Marshal.

I was unable to determine whether or not the insistence on issuing the decree was based on political considerations or was simply a reflection of the French minutiae in all affairs of the relations of inhabitants to the Government.

The French undoubtedly fear spies in Luxemburg but I cannot believe they fear the country.

One significant remark made by General Weygand was that the reigning house of Luxemburg was of German descent.

Before leaving we saw Marshal Foch. He said nothing of importance, merely repeating: "We are at war. We must safeguard all the armies. I am responsible. The soldiers must be educated to know what war means."

During the interview on December 27, a Frenchman in civilian clothing was present. He was introduced as a legal authority.

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Memorandum

***Impressions of Interview on Luxemburg Decree***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE,  
*December 30, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM For the Chief of Staff

Subject: Interview with General Weygand concerning proposed decree in Luxemburg.

1. The facts of the interview are set forth by General Conner. I shall state only my general impressions. Possibly you may infer from General Conner's report that the conference was stormier than it actually was. It was on the whole friendly but very unsatisfactory for the reason that there was no meeting of minds of the two sides. General Weygand's mind seemed to be closed to our suggestions and arguments.

2. Whenever the matter of withdrawal of American troops from Luxemburg was mentioned General Weygand changed the subject as quickly as possible, his only answer being that it would show that there had been a lack of accord between the Americans and the French. We

explained to him at length that the object of a separate and single control was to maintain the present friendly relations between the two armies, and that it was evident that a mixed control would not conduce to the preservation of harmonious relations. It was not apparent, however, that our efforts to convince General Weygand had any effect whatsoever.

3. We insisted that it was distasteful to American troops to exercise control over a neutral people in their own country, unless there was some clear necessity therefor, and that in principle we should not do so. General Weygand's only answer was, and the same was stated by Marshal Foch when we paid our respects to him, that this is a time of war and it is necessary to take means for the security of the armies. Of course it must be admitted that this answer is true in the abstract, but we denied its application to Luxemburg at present, and General Weygand did not attempt to show any present necessity.

4. I had never met General Weygand before. He is the first French officer with whom I have conferred that has not shown a sincere willingness to grasp the American view of things. Whether this is due to his personality or to some policy of the French towards Luxemburg I do not know. I tried throughout the conference to detect the real reason why the French wish to impose restrictions upon the people of Luxemburg, but I am in as much doubt as ever.

W. A. BETHEL,  
Brigadier General, Judge Advocate.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1237: Telephone Message

### ***Threatened Disorder in Luxemburg***

*December 29, 1918.*

General Preston Brown telephoned General Heintzelman from Treves at

12:15 h., December 29, 1918, as follows:

Agent at Echternach advises this morning that there may be trouble in Luxemburg this afternoon, and the French may make it a pretext to intervene.

General Brown said further:

That the Commander-in-Chief's policy in regard to Luxemburg is to keep out of any political affair. Let others attend to it if possible. The troops, however, are to maintain order in their area. This to be done in a perfectly impartial manner without taking sides and solely on the ground of securing the lines of communication.

At 13:05 h. the foregoing was dictated by General Heintzelman to Colonel Collins, Chief of Staff, VI Corps, and the following instructions were given:

General Bullard directs that you at once repeat to divisions, and have them on the alert. Investigate and report without delay.

STUART HEINTZELMAN,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, Second Army.

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**Modified Decree Controlling Inhabitants of Luxemburg**

[Contemporary Translation]

*December 29, 1918.*

DECREE  
REGULATING CIRCULATION AND POLICE  
MATTERS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE GRAND  
DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG

I. DECLARATION OF RESIDENCE

Article 1: The natives of Luxemburg are not required to make any declaration of residence.

Article 2: The identity card of foreigners required by the Grand Ducal Decree dated June 25, 1918 is obligatory for all foreigners who are citizens of enemy and neutral powers, whatever be the date of their arrival within the limits of the Grand Duchy. This identity book will be transmitted by the Communal Administration to the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg for visa. The refusal of the visa by the military authority will carry with it expulsion from the territory of Luxemburg. The same measures will be taken with reference to all foreigners who do not conform to the prescription of this article within a time limit of eight days from the official publication of the present decree.

For the execution of this article, and in general for the execution of the present decree, the General Commandant d'Armes will be assisted by a commission composed of representatives from the interested Allied Armies.

II. CIRCULATION

Article 3: In the interior of the Grand Duchy:

1. Circulation is free without any formality and by all means of transportation for Luxemburg citizens and the subjects of Allied Powers.

2. The citizens of enemy and neutral powers will not be allowed to circulate unless they are provided with the foreigner's identity book provided by the Grand Ducal Decree mentioned in the preceding article. This identity book must be presented on every demand of proper authority.

Article 4: To leave the Grand Duchy:

1. With France, Belgium or Lorraine as a destination the passports will be delivered by the Luxemburg Government and will be visaed by the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

2. With the countries on the left bank of the Rhine as a destination:  
a. Passports will be delivered as above for the citizens of Luxemburg and the citizens of Allied countries when the destinations are the administrative circles abutting on the frontier. Permanent cards with permission to pass may be delivered to laborers living within said circles.

b. Beyond the administrative circles abutting on the frontier for citizens of Luxemburg and citizens of Allied countries, and when the destination is the whole of the left bank of the Rhine for citizens of enemy countries and neutral countries, circulation will be authorized only in exceptional cases. Passports will be transmitted by the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg to the general commanding the interested army of occupation, who will grant the permission to circulate if he judges proper.

3. When the destination is the right bank of the Rhine: Circulation is forbidden except in case of special authority delivered on account of general interests or in grave cases by the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg with the approval of the general commanding the army of the zone through which the permission is to be effected.

Article 5: To enter the Grand Duchy:

1. Coming from France, Lorraine or from Belgium the necessary permission will be granted by the Bureaux of Circulation [travel control offices] of Paris or of Brussels, which will take action after consulting the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

2. In coming from the left bank of the Rhine:

a. The passports will be delivered for citizens of Luxemburg and citizens of Allied countries residing within the administrative circles abutting on the frontier by the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

b. For the citizens of Luxemburg and Allied nationalities residing beyond the administrative circle abutting on the frontier, and for the whole of the left bank of the Rhine for enemy and neutral subjects, circulation will be permitted only in exceptional cases. Requests for permission will be addressed to the general commanding the army of occupation of the particular zone who will act after consulting with the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

3. In coming from the right bank of the Rhine: Circulation is absolutely forbidden except by special authority in grave cases or of cases of general interest and then the authority is delivered by the General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg upon the recommendation of the general commanding the army within the zone through which the passage is to be effected.

### III. MEETINGS

Article 6: All meetings in the streets are forbidden.

Article 7: All meetings, any representation, any assembly of whatever nature must be preceded by notification as to the meeting made 48 hours in advance to the local military authority. The latter may forbid the meeting.

### IV. THE PRESS

Article 8: No newspaper, no book, no pamphlet, no poster, no placard, no drawing, no notice may be printed, published, or distributed without depositing a copy immediately upon its publication, said deposit to be with the local military authority.

Article 9: The distribution and the sale of newspapers published in unoccupied enemy territory and the distribution and sale of Russian newspapers are forbidden except by special authority.

Article 10: No one may exercise the profession of transporting or distributing newspapers, books, pamphlets, drawings, notices except individuals furnished with permission from the municipal authority visaed by the local military authority. This permission is revocable.

### V. PHOTOGRAPHY

Article 11: The carrying and the use of photographic apparatuses is authorized in the whole of the Grand Duchy without any restrictions.

### VI. CONTROL OF THE MAILS, TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES

Article 12: Letters and telegrams not leaving the Grand Duchy are not submitted to censorship.

Article 13: It is obligatory that all letters and telegrams for foreign countries or incoming from foreign countries pass through the hands of an Interallied Commission Censorship functioning at Luxemburg under the orders of the General, Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg.

Article 14: No restriction is placed upon local telephone communications.

Article 15: All telephone communications with foreign territory are forbidden.

#### VII. PIGEONS

Article 16: Owners of carrier pigeons must make, within 8 days after the official publication of the present decree, a declaration of their pigeon-lofts to the military authority and must transmit to that authority a descriptive inventory of carrier pigeons owned by them.

The pigeon lofts must remain open day and night.

No carrier pigeon must be kept in a cage or in any closed place.

The transportation of carrier pigeons is forbidden.

#### VIII. ARMS AND MUNITIONS

Article 17: Military arms and munitions will be deposited with the municipal authorities before January 1, 1919, at noon. These municipal authorities will be responsible for the arms and munitions so deposited to the local military authorities.

#### IX. LIQUOR SHOPS

Article 18: The sale or carrying and the drinking of absinthe are forbidden in accordance with the Grand Ducal Decree dated December 2, 1918.

The sale and the offering of alcohol, brandy of all sorts, strong liquors, etc., to all persons in the military service are formally forbidden. These prohibitions apply both to liquor dealers and to individuals.

The same prohibition applies to the sale of alcohol, brandies of all kinds, strong liquors, etc., to women and children.

The entrance to saloons, cafes and restaurants is forbidden to persons of all grades in the military service except during the following hours:

7 a. m. to 8:30 a. m.

10:30 a. m. to 1 p. m.

5 p. m. to 9 p. m.

#### X. PUNISHMENT

Article 20: No punishment may be inflicted without the decision of the proper tribunal of justice.

Article 21: The courts of the Grand Duchy will continue to decide cases of justice in accordance with the constitution and with the laws of the country.

Article 22: When the offenses are of such a nature as to affect the security of the armies or of the troops of occupation the accused may be brought before military commissions upon the demand of the official attached to said military mission or by competent military authority.

(Translators's note: By "official attached to Military Commission" is meant what, in our service, corresponds to Judge Advocate).

Article 23: Offenders to decree who are tried by military authorities will be subject to simple police punishment; but for grave offenses and in cases of repeated offenders, punishment may amount to 6 months in prison and 5,000 francs fine.

In agreement with the Grand Ducal Government, offenders will be brought before the police courts of the Grand Duchy, the jurisdiction of these police courts will be extended to this end.

Nothing in this is to be considered as reducing the legal authority of the provosts with the armies.

The General Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg may provisionally or indefinitely close offending establishments.

Article 24: The present decree, which is applicable throughout the territory of the Grand Duchy, will be effective as soon as published.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

**Circulation for German Elections**

American Section  
No. 33

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 30, 1918.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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3. The Germans announced that the elections for State Assemblies will take place very shortly, and they request on behalf of their Government that the same facilities be granted individuals desiring to vote as have or may be granted in the case of the elections for the German National Assembly. The election for the Constituent Assembly for the Republic of Hesse will take place on January 16, 1919. Information will be furnished later as to the date of other elections for State Assembly.

4. General Nudant announced that in response to a request made by the German Government information had been received that the regular German administrative authority that is empowered to request passes is the National Ministry of the Interior. It is recommended to the Allied Armies that they be generous in the matter of granting passes. These should be good until January 22, In order to avoid loss of time, it will be arranged to have passes visaed by the military authorities of the locality where the party leaves the train.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Prisoners of War***

American Section  
No. 33

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 30, 1918.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

8. Following the meeting of the commission this morning, General Haking, head of the British Commission, handed the undersigned a letter from General Ewart, the British officer in Berlin, who has charge of the evacuation of British prisoners of war. In this letter General Ewart stated that he considered that the Germans were making an honest effort to evacuate all Allied prisoners as promptly as possible; that in spite of their orders and all efforts, some men straggled away from the convoys, and, as a consequence, suffered for food and shelter. General Ewart also stated that the American Red Cross in Berlin was doing excellent work in assisting in the care of sick and wounded and the evacuation of prisoners. He also reported that available German shipping for repatriation of Allied prisoners of war could not be utilized owing to German shortage of locomotives and cars for conveying prisoners to ports. In view of the great desirability for the rapid repatriation of Allied prisoners, he recommended that the Germans should temporarily retain sufficient rolling stock to insure the transfer of as many prisoners to sea ports as there were ships available to transport them.

9. The Acting Chief of the American Section was requested by the head of the British Section to be present this afternoon at a conference of British officers on the subject of the repatriation of Allied prisoners, particularly the British. There were present not only General Haking, but General Ewart, the British officer in Berlin, and also General Bruce, the British officer from the Hague, also General Ayde, the British officer having charge at this point of the evacuation of British prisoners. During the discussion which followed, it appeared that the power of the German Government is very limited, but their willingness seems to be all that could be desired. If they could be certain that their orders were carried out, there would, undoubtedly, be no occasion for complaints. It appeared that the figures given in the recent report of the number of British prisoners still remaining in Germany was too large. General Ewart was able to state quite accurately the number still remaining, which he placed at 27,000. He also stated that there had been evacuated approximately 123,000. He feels that by January 5 or 6, all British prisoners, except the sick and stragglers, should be evacuated. General Ayde believes that that this date is too early and that it will be January 15 before all are out. It was stated that there would be found in Germany some British who would not want to be returned to England, such as deserters, who, if returned, would unquestionably be tried and shot. It was stated that in returning Russian officers and enlisted men a serious question arises, inasmuch as Russian officers sent back to Russia at this time are very likely to be killed by the Bolshevists. General Dupont is the French officer in Berlin looking after the repatriation of French prisoners. Major von Pabst, representative of the German

Ministry of War, reports that there are no more Americans in Germany, except those sick and wounded. This latter number is estimated at ninety, although he was not at all certain that many of these had not already been repatriated.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Note

***Delivery of Trucks***

[Contemporary Translation]

Subcommission  
on Transports

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

*December 30, 1918.*

No. 199/T

General Nudant

To: General von Winterfeldt

Attached hereto a statement showing the state of delivery of trucks at the final date of December 25.

I ask:

1. Whether we are agreed on the figures of this list which refers only to vehicles really accepted by this date by the Allied Armies.
2. What measures have been taken by the German Command to deliver the balance and how soon you expect to accomplish this delivery?

I will transmit this information to Marshal Foch for decision.

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TRUCKS RECEIVED BY THE ALLIED ARMIES

Up to December 25, inclusive

French army: 1,633 (114 light trucks are counted as 57 trucks in this total)

American army:	596
British army:	703
Belgian army:	140
Total	<u>3,072</u>

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**Provisioning Germany**

American Section  
No. 33

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 30, 1918.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. In response to a telegram of the 29th instant, Marshal Foch makes known that the question of provisioning Germany is at the present time being studied by a commission sitting in London. He adds that this commission will be informed of the decision arrived at in case it is called upon to have anything to do with the matter.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German Demobilization**

American Section  
No. 34

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 31, 1918.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Demobilization of the Germany army: General von Winterfeldt announced that the German demobilization is advancing materially in recent days. At present, on the western front, except for certain peace garrisons, there are about twenty German divisions still intact, but from these the oldest classes have been demobilized. He went on to say that the army commands and army group commands are now about all demobilized; that on the eastern front the internal zone will be entirely given over to the commanders of the peace garrisons. These conditions will be reached in Army Group A by January 2; in Army Group B by the 13th, and in Army Group C at about the same time, while in Army Group D only the XIV Army Corps is still a military organization. He states that the extensive demobilizations which have already taken place show that there can be no thought on the part of the Germans to reopen hostilities. In view of this fact, he suggests that further facilities

be granted for administration and intercommunication. It has been shown that the control by police troops in the neutral zone, the regulation of numerous local questions, such as passes, etc., have made necessary considerable intercourse between the commanders of the neutral zones and the Allies. These communications are carried on with very much greater facility, as has been shown by experience, if a German liaison officer is present at the office of the Allied Command. He, therefore, proposed that such liaison officer be established at all places where such arrangements can be made. This matter was taken up once before and is treated of in Report No. 19 of December 9. (See paragraph 8.)

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1257: Letter

***American Divisions To Be Maintained opposite Germany***

*December 31, 1918.*

From: The Chief of Staff

To: The Chief of Staff, Allied Armies

1. In the absence of General Pershing I have the honor to reply to the Marshal's note No. 152/P. C. L.
2. It is proposed that the number of American combat divisions to be maintained in the Zone of the Armies be fixed as follows:

On March 1, 1919: 20 divisions  
On April 1, 1919: 15 divisions  
On May 1, 1919: 10 divisions

On each of the dates indicated there would be approximately 5 additional divisions at or near the ports of embarkation.

3. In the unlikely event that Preliminaries of Peace have not been signed on May 1, it is proposed that 10 American divisions be maintained in the Zone of the Armies until such signature has been accomplished.

I may add that these 10 divisions, together with the necessary corps and army troops, would represent more than 300,000 combatants. The proposals outlined above would give us reasonable assurance of being able to comply with the instructions of the American Government to keep all available shipping employed in the repatriation of the American army.

The decision as to American forces to be maintained in Europe during the period of reparation is dependent upon the policy to be followed by the American Government and is not considered advisable to discuss this question at the present time.

4. I have cabled the substance of the Note (No. 152/P. C. L.) to Washington and have furnished complete copies of it to the proper American authorities in Europe.

J. W. McANDREW,  
Major General, General Staff.

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**Defensive Works in the Bridgeheads**

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff  
No. 161

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*December 31, 1918.*

Bulletin No. 7,282 of November 29 last, prescribed the organization of the bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence "avoiding all damage to private property.

This sentence should not be interpreted as a prohibition for the execution of defensive works, only as an invitation to avoid as far as possible doing any important and lasting damage.

In this viewpoint the placing in a state of defense of dwelling houses, enclosing walls, orchards and gardens is to be avoided, except in case of absolute necessity.

On the other hand, defensive works should be completed in the country.

All requisitions will be avoided.

The estimate of damages caused by defense works will be entrusted to committees in which the occupying military authority and the local administration will be represented, the latter being also warned that the Allied Governments decline any responsibility on the question of indemnification for damage.

There are joined hereto, as an indication, the instructions [not found] given on this subject by the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the East.

It would be advisable that similar instructions be given in the American and British armies charged with the bridgeheads of Coblenz and Cologne in order that the measures adopted by the various Allied Armies be as uniform as possible.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.  
By order Chief of Staff:

WEYGAND.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

**Prisoners of War**

American Section  
No. 34

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 31, 1918.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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10. Evacuation of Allied Prisoners: The latest report in regard to the evacuation of Allied prisoners shows that there were 160,000 French prisoners of war remaining in Germany on December 26.

General Dupont, the French representative in Berlin, has been assured that they will all be evacuated by January 15. In order to avoid disturbances, it is proposed to send an officer of each nationality concerned to the various prison camps for the purpose of maintaining discipline. Civilian doctors already mustered out will, where necessary, be reenlisted to look after the sick and wounded.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Letter

### ***Delivery of War Material***

American Section  
No. 34

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 31, 1918.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Delivery of heavy guns: General von Winterfeldt went on to state that yesterday he sent to General Nudant a note concerning the delivery of heavy guns and that he wished to add a few explanatory remarks, as follows:

It is well known that, according to the agreement, the Germans must deliver 2,500 heavy guns. In a recent order of Marshal Foch it was stated that a certain number of these guns could not be accepted because they were of ancient date. General Nudant stated to me recently that at some points we were delivering cannons that were too old, to which General von Winterfeldt replied that it would be foolish for the German subordinate officers to attempt to turn over cannons that were old and unserviceable, as such a policy would merely delay the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and it was well known that these guns would not be received.

General von Winterfeldt continued that when he made that statement he had in mind guns that were no longer useable and were possibly taken out of an arsenal or museum, but that many of the guns that were now being rejected as too old were some that were used with good results during the war. He added that the conditions of the Armistice are constantly being made more and more severe, which causes increased delay in carrying out the requirements.

General Nudant replied that old guns were being delivered, even speaking of some as pre-historic. He asks that they deliver guns that have been in active use and not those that had been spread around in dead sectors. He added that if the Germans had demobilized eighty divisions, as they claimed, it was not possible that they should have no guns available. He further stated that he had given orders that no more answers should be made to German notes on this subject. General von Winterfeldt replied that in accordance with the statements just made by General Nudant the work of the commission was made

considerably more difficult; that if the German representatives have no longer an opportunity to discuss the demands, there would be no occasion for their presence, that it would be sufficient to have a stenographer to take down the orders of Marshal Foch. General Nudant replied that the subject under discussion had been gone over during the last three weeks, adding that it was the authorities in the interior in Germany who were endeavoring to take advantage of the Allies, claiming that the members of the German Commission themselves had the same feeling in the matter, and yet were endeavoring to defend the authorities of the interior. General von Winterfeldt replied that he had never attempted to defend some of the acts of the authorities at home.

\* \* \* \* \*

11. Ammunition for machine guns: In the delivery of machine guns and the questions pertaining thereto as to their serviceability, the question has come up of furnishing ammunition for them. The Receiving Committee at Coblenz having raised this question, they have been informed that there is nothing in the decisions of the Armistice Commission requiring the Germans to furnish such ammunition.

12. Difficulty in getting train crews: Difficultly has been experienced in securing engine crews in Belgium on account of the bad treatment which the first crews received there, especially at Liege. The same crews returning from France stated that they had received very bad treatment, and also that, contrary to agreement, they had been employed at a lower grade of work, that is, engine drivers had been compelled to clean their engines. It was stated that there were many engines in the Saarbruecken territory which have been accepted, but there are no crews to man them.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1212: Note

### ***Provisioning Germany***

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 288

SPA, *December 31, 1918.*

Representative of the German Government

To: The President of the Interallied Armistice Commission

Reference Note 186/G

The German Government has commissioned me to inform you that the German Armistice Commission in Spa has authority to deal with the question of food supplies for Germans.

FREIHERR von LERSNER,

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***Evacuation of German Troops in the Ukraine***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 4416

ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, December 31, 1918.*

The President of the German Armistice Commission

To: The President of the French Armistice Commission, General Nudant

Information has been received about the situation in the Ukraine:

The railroad for the return of troops from Nikolajew is in the hands of revolutionary troops and strong Bolshevik bands, who have thoroughly disarmed and plundered a part of the transports which have already started. The further fate of these transports is completely unknown. The Bolshevik movement is believed to be growing. As a result the land route is completely closed for the garrison of Nikolajew and the troops of the Caucasus and of Constantinople. The only remaining way out is direct water transportation to Hamburg. The British commander in Sebastopol had already proposed the sending of German transport steamers to his Government. The division begs for immediate sending of steamers for a total of 25,000 men, with all necessary supplies to head off a catastrophe.

For troops in the region of the Black sea, SACK, Lieutenant General and Division Commander.

We have a similar radio message:

The increasing unrest of a Bolshevik character makes a trip home over land impossible for German troops of the Black Sea forces; this infatuation and the looseness of discipline are hastening dissolution. There is no more German protection of railroads in the whole Ukraine. Single convoys are disarmed and robbed and are facing the most desperate want in the Russian winter. The only solution to those who are left behind is removal by sea on shipboard. The danger is growing daily as we have to reckon with attacks from overwhelming forces and our own means of combat are weakened through the surrendering of weapons and munitions to the Entente; food and money are also running very short.

We therefore request a rapid concession of free use of the sea and information as to how the ships are to be made ready. It cannot be assumed that the Allies contemplate the complete destruction of the German troops which still remain in the Ukraine.

von WINTERFELDT.

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**Proposed Luxemburg Decree**

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 1, 1919.*

Memorandum for: The Chief of Staff

1. After studying Marshal Foch's proposals dated December 29, 1918, I believe that we must either accept the decree with the elimination of the articles concerning meetings and trials by military commissions or else seriously impair our relations with Marshal Foch's Headquarters.

I am of the opinion that we could so arrange as to avoid the Commandant d'Armes giving any orders direct to our troops.

While I am still of the opinion that the occupation of Luxemburg by our troops is filled with dangerous possibilities, I recommend, as the lesser of two evils, that we agree to the Decree eliminating the articles mentioned above and with the distinct understanding that the Commandant d'Armes make any request which concern our troops direct to these Headquarters.

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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**Belgian and French Political Aims**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*January 1, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander-in-Chief

Major Tinant of the Belgian Mission came in today, and, after finding out that it would be impossible for him to see you in person, told me what the object of his call was. He has been directed by his Government to get from us information which they are anxious to obtain at once. He is to ascertain whether or not you would have any objection to the Belgians sending some troops to occupy part of our Luxemburg Zone. This "some troops" that he referred to, I found out to be at the most a regiment. They make this request because Luxemburg, they understand, is in the American Zone and they wish to know our views on the subject of what would practically be a joint occupation before they take any further steps.

I pointed out to Major Tinant that the city of Luxemburg is in reality not in the American Zone. It is the Headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief and is to be garrisoned by French troops; that our occupation outside of the city is in accordance with the instructions of Marshal Foch; that any questions relative to the Belgian occupation of Luxemburg must be taken up with the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and that we could not, even

if we would, express any opinion as to the desirability or otherwise of Belgian troops occupying any part of the Grand Duchy. Any proposition looking to joint occupation would have to be taken up by the Belgian Government without any expression of opinion or recommendation on your part.

Major Tinant then said that while, of course, the city of LUXEMBURG is in reality Luxemburg, and they desire to have their troops stationed therein, they would be willing, if that were impossible, to have them stationed nearby the city. He then said he desired to speak very frankly with me and in all confidence. That the Belgians believed that Luxemburg---if left to decide her own fate---would become part of Belgium; that such a step seemed natural and in accordance with the past history and traditions of the people. The Belgians feel that the French are conducting a propaganda in Luxemburg that would have the opposite effect and that therefore the Belgians desire to send troops there for anti-French propaganda work. I told Major Tinant that was one of the reasons why it would be impossible for you to grant his request---that is, to express even a willingness, if not a desire, of having Belgian troops in Luxemburg; that American troops were not in Luxemburg for political purposes. We were there because in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief the tactical and strategical situation demanded it. I told him that he might see General Conner who would tell him, from the viewpoint of our Operations Section, why in itself joint occupation might not be desirable. He had a conference with General Conner, and the latter reported to me that Major Tinant had covered substantially the same ground he had with me. This has led to General Conner revising his first recommendation on the subject of the advisability of accepting Marshal Foch's revised Luxemburg Decree as the lesser of two evils. A memorandum on that subject is attached to the papers relative thereto.

Major Tinant before leaving requested that in view of his very frank conversation that it be held confidential and be not made use of in any way whereby its purport might come to the French Authorities.

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Memorandum

***Proposed Luxemburg Decree***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 1, 1919.*

Memorandum for: The Chief of Staff

1. This morning I gave you a memorandum the conclusion of which was that as the choice of the lesser of two evils we accept the Luxemburg Decree with certain modifications.

Since that time I have had an interview with Major Tinant, Chief of the Belgian Mission.

It appears that my conversation with Major Tinant was exactly along the same lines as that which you had with him except that Major Tinant may not have discussed with you the question of French journalists in Luxemburg. Major Tinant mentioned the fact that numerous French journalists, among others Maurice Barres, were conducting active propaganda work in Luxemburg.

Maurice Barres is an exceedingly talented French writer and is now contributing to the "Echo de Paris." I have read some of his recent articles and I have no doubt but that he is very much in favor of the annexation by France of Luxemburg and that his articles are intended to assist in that action.

I may add that the "Echo de Paris" is a very influential paper and is constantly read by Marshal Foch.

2. In view of my conversation with Tinant I now change my earlier recommendation and recommend that the situation be presented to the American Government with a plain statement of the fact that both France and Belgium appear to be intriguing for the possession of Luxemburg. The Commander-in-Chief in following his Government's instructions will, in my opinion, be in a much more satisfactory position than if he accepts the publication of the proposed Decree as a military necessity.

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Note

### ***Withdrawal of German Troops in the East***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 4262

*Spa, January 1, 1919.*

General v. Winterfeldt

TO General Nudant

Concerning the unheard of violations which the German troops in the east are said to have been subjected to, the German High Command states again the following:

(1) Articles XII and XIII of the Armistice Agreement originally called for an immediate withdrawal of German troops in the east. At the suggestion of the Germans, which was made in the interest of the Germans as well as of all the concerned, the wording was changed. Germany had not therewith undertaken the duty of keeping order in the east, but it simply retained the right to withdraw little by little.

(2) The Higher Command of the Allies evidently shared this view in the beginning, otherwise they would have objected that Germany send word concerning the beginning of the evacuation of the Crimea and requested the opening of the sea route by SEBASTOPOL in order to hasten this evacuation. \* \* \* There was at that time no question of a formal inquiry.

(3) The task which Germany voluntarily undertook in the east of preserving order was fulfilled so long as it was possible. A retreat was ordered when the German troops proved to be too weak and unfortunately also unreliable. The Allies were informed concerning this \* \* \*

(4) After it was agreed that the German troops should remain as long as possible in the east, it was to be expected that the Allies if they really cared to protect the smaller peoples in the east would not absolutely hinder the Germans from carrying out their task. However, this was actually the case. The Allies declared that they are in accord with the Polish Government, but they have not tried to hinder the Poles from cutting the railroads to Germany and thereby cutting off the source of supply of the German troops; or if the Germans were supposed to fight in the Ukraine, then they ought to have arms, munitions, and supplies. These should not have been taken away from them, as was the case for example in ODESSA. \* \* \*

By their own methods, thus, the Allies have rendered difficult the retaining of German troops in the occupied territories of the east, which they themselves desired.

(5) There is no doubt that the German High Command was justified in expecting that the troops which had remained in the east in accordance with the understanding of the Allies would naturally be permitted an honorable return with arms. The German High Command requested expressly a substantiation of this view, \* \* \* Nov. 29, 1918, as its view corresponds to the spirit of the Armistice conditions and to the sense of right and the military feeling in equal measure.

(6) Attention is further urgently invited to the fact that apparently the purposely degrading treatment of the German troops by the Allies would enormously increase the danger of Bolshevism for the eastern countries and not least for Poland, where Bolshevik ideas are widespread and encounter no opposition as they do in an old established state.

(7) Finally, it must be emphasized that the Germans who should be forced without arms to pass through a land which has been roused by enemy agitators, and which has no strong government at the time, would be exposed in the winter and without protection to acts of rapine and murder. Our experiences hitherto speak in no uncertain terms. It cannot be the purpose of the Allies to conjure up further horrors here.

(8) The German High Command therefore expects that in recognition of the reasons alleged above, some suitable solution for the return of the German troops from the east will be found.

v. WINTERFELDT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Note

### ***Evacuation of German Troops in Turkey***

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 304

*Spa, January 1, 1919.*

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chief of the British Mission

About the middle of November the German Government requested that the intended expulsion of Germans from Turkey, which was to occur based upon the Armistice Agreement with Turkey, be renounced. This request was transmitted to the High Council of War in Paris, but until now no answer has been returned from it.

But if in spite of this, this order is to be carried out in connection with the note of General Winterfeldt of December 27, I must call attention again with special emphasis to the fact that transportation across the Ukraine is impossible under present circumstances. On account of the severe weather and the lack of means of transportation, such a measure would constitute an extraordinary hardship. The constantly spreading unrest of the Bolsheviks in south Russia would constitute a great danger to the travellers.

The General Committee of the Red Cross of Berlin sent the following telegram on December 27, to the International Committee of the Red Cross at GENEVA:

"In Haider-Pascha near CONSTANTINOPLE about 10,000 German troops from Palestine and the Mesopotamia have been gathered together in order to be transported according to the Armistice Agreement. According to information received our enemies have transported recently a part of these troops via the Black Sea and the Ukraine, and have the intention of sending further convoys by the same route. For our troops who are unaccustomed to the

northern climate and whose clothing is intended for a warm climate transportation through Russia in winter time would be fraught with the greatest suffering and danger. The duration of the trip could not be reckoned. The provisioning would be extremely difficult. There would be no possibility of heating the freight cars that would have to be devoted to this purpose. In addition must be added the threatened dangers from the robber bands. If such conditions were true for military convoys, the transportation of civil persons along these routes would be entirely impossible. Women, children, and weak and old men would not be able to come out of the trip alive. The German Central Committee of the Red Cross begs the Central Committee at GENEVA, therefore, to use its influence with the Allied Governments to transport further convoys of German troops or civilians out of Turkey and Georgia not by way of the Ukraine but by way of the Mediterranean, and that the troops that are already gathered together in the Ukraine harbors be brought back as far as possible to CONSTANTINOPLE."

On behalf of the Government, I request a favorable reply as early as possible.

FREIHERR von LERSNER.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Note

***Authority of Marshal Foch Along the Rhine***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 206/T

*Spa, January 1, 1919.*

From General Nudant to General Winterfeldt

Annex II, Article I of the Armistice Agreement stipulates that all roads of communication up to the RHINE inclusive, or included in the right bank of the RHINE within the bridgeheads are under the complete and full authority of Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who has the right to take any measures he may deem necessary to assure the occupation and exploitation of them.

The control thus foreseen by the Armistice Agreement carries with it: (1) For the field committees on navigation instituted by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, the right to send or to set up on any of the parts and points of crossing of the right bank of the Rhine or of its tributaries, within the points that are contained within the bridgeheads, military commissions and police forces, whose duties it will be to control and to assure the carrying out of the instructions by the above-mentioned committees on navigation. (2) For the police force put at the disposition of the field committees on navigation the right to circulate on the Rhine its entire width between the east and west bank, to approach the east bank at any point whatsoever, to disembark there, and to take a position there close to the port of debarkation in order to assure the carrying out of their mission.

This right will be carried out especially in the ports and the points of debarkation here mentioned: Along the RHINE, KEHL, KARLSRUHE, LEOPOLDSHAFEN, RHEINAU, MANNHEIM, GERNSHEIM, LORSCH, LINZ, DUSSELDORF, group of DUISBURG, RUHRORT, AESUM, WALSUM, WESEL, EMMERICH.

Instructions have been given in accordance with the above by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to the field committees on navigation. I ask you to be kind enough to advise the German authorities commanding the police sectors of the Neutral Zone in order that any misunderstanding may be avoided.

NUDANT.

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**German Elections to be Facilitated**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 1, 1919.*

No. 35

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Arrangements for Coming Election: The Allies announced that Marshal Foch had stated that he wished to facilitate in every way possible arrangements for coming elections. This applies not only to the elections for the National Assembly set for January 19, but also for the elections for State assemblies which are to follow during the latter part of January.

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8. Acknowledging Efforts to Facilitate Elections: The Germans extended their thanks to Marshal Foch, through General Nudant, for his instructions that shall facilitate the elections, not only for the National Assembly, but also for those in the various States. General von Winterfeldt asked that these instructions be carefully executed, because he states that he has received a number of communications stating that assemblages in connection with the coming elections have been forbidden.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Forces to be Maintained against Germany during Armistice**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
January 1, 1919.

No. 2021-S

AGWAR  
WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

Paragraph 1. Have received a note from Marshal Foch which he asks be transmitted to American Government. Note is identical with others transmitted to French and British Governments and is preparatory to seeking agreement as to forces to be maintained by the several Nations during the Armistice and thereafter. Summary of important parts of the note is given in following paragraph.

Paragraph 2. During Armistice it is sufficient to maintain large superiority over enemy. But each Ally is diminishing force on its own account. Thus France is to demobilize 1,200,000 men by February 5, England is demobilizing between 500,000 and 600,000 and the American Army is planning to return divisions to the United States during January and February. This cannot continue and a program must be drawn up by Allied Governments upon proposals submitted by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. Force Germany retains under arms estimated at from 50 to 60 divisions and although the enemy's troops have for the most part been sent to garrisons it is assumed, to be on safe side, the Allies should be prepared to meet 60 to 70 German divisions. For this purpose 120 to 140 divisions appear sufficient "but this is a minimum force below which it is impossible to go as long as the preliminaries of peace have not been signed." Proposal made by note is that French Army maintain 60 to 65 divisions, British Army 35 to 40 divisions, American Army 22 to 25 divisions, and the Belgian Army 6 divisions. Statement is made that these figures satisfy the military interests which are held in common by all the Allies and satisfy as well the special interests of each one of the Allies. Also, underlined in the original, referring to the Entente "the force of its Armies will still be the best argument in imposing its will upon the enemy." Note continues that Allies must occupy the Rhenish Provinces as a guarantee after signature of peace and until reparation exacted has been met. Proposed that for this postwar occupation, British Army furnish 13 to 15 divisions, American Army 6, Belgian Army 2 to 4, French Army 15 to 20.

Paragraph 3. Upon receipt of note summarized above I ask Marshal Foch to consider fact that our problems of transportation before demobilization were much more difficult than those of the Allies. I also invited his attention to comparatively large demobilization program of France and England and explained why we must send divisions home or else soon interfere with troop shipments. Also pointed out to Marshal Foch that American divisions are double the size of any other divisions in Europe and that 22 to 25 American divisions are therefore equivalent to 44 to 50 French divisions. Under date of December 28, Marshal Foch says he has considered the points raised by me and asks for my proposals as to the number of divisions to be maintained by the United States. My reply to this latter note is in substance that from our point of view the number of troops maintained must be fixed by definite dates rather than by the indefinite period of the Armistice. On this basis I have proposed that we so adjust our withdrawal as to have in the zone of the armies 20 combat divisions on March 1, 15 on April 1, and 10 on May 1. I further propose that in the unexpected event that Preliminaries of Peace have not been signed by May 1, we continue to maintain 10 divisions in the zone of the armies until the date of signature. My proposals as to the number of divisions to be maintained by us are based upon the necessity of keeping

our available shipping employed. In making the necessary estimates I have assumed an average carrying capacity of 200,000 per month from January to May. After May 1 if above program be adopted, we will be able to continue shipments for a month or two with S. O. S. personnel and miscellaneous units even though shipment of divisions be discontinued on account of failure to sign Preliminaries of Peace. This eventuality is, however, I believe, exceedingly unlikely. It will be noted that my proposals consider only divisions in the zone of the armies; in addition to these there would, of course, be several divisions at or near the ports of embarkation on the dates indicated; I have pointed this out to Marshal Foch.

Paragraph 4. In my opinion it is unnecessary at this time to plan on the retention of 120 to 140 divisions until the signature of peace. The elimination of the German Navy, the surrender of a large part of Germany's materiel of war, the very serious crippling of her means of transportation, the food shortage, the internal difficulties of Germany, the reduction of her Army to an equivalent of probably not over 50 divisions and the dispersal of this personnel to their home garrisons all make it virtually impossible that she can resume hostilities. I recommend that we continue our program of sending troops home, and that to this end the proposals which I have made be approved.

Paragraph 5. In reply to Marshal Foch's question as to my recommendations as to the number of American divisions to be maintained in Europe during the period of reparation, I have informed him that this matter is wholly dependent upon a policy yet to be adopted by the United States and that I do not consider it advisable to discuss the question at the present time. I renew my previous recommendations that we take all our troops out of Europe at the earliest possible moment. Copies of the original and subsequent notes from and to Marshal Foch and of this cable have been furnished Mr. House and General Bliss.

J. J. PERSHING,  
General, U. S. A.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Note

***German Government Forbids Leaving Material to Bolshevists***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 4481

*Spa, January 1, 1919.*

From the German Chairman to General Nudant

The following information taken from the orders of the Highest Army Command [G. H. Q.] to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the East is transmitted as a counter to the incomprehensible and constantly recurring statements that Germany is favoring Bolshevists by means of giving over to them weapons and materials of war:

I request that by every means possible it may be made known that the German Government has forbidden most strenuously the leaving of weapons or materiel of war to the Bolshevists. The authorities of the Army commands, soldiers councils and troops who do not obey this command thereby make themselves responsible not only for the destruction of German articles of value but also personally responsible for the political results. Weapons and materiel of war that cannot be taken back must be given over to the provisional authorities that are concerned and in an orderly manner. I request that every guilty person who disobeys the command of the German Government either through cowardice or on account of any other reason be proceeded against by all possible measures, and that their names be made known publicly.

WINTERFELDT.

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**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 1, 1919.*

No. 35

FROM: Acting Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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16. Return of Allied Prisoners: In view of misgivings expressed by the British and American Commissioners yesterday, the Minister of War has sent out a strict order that prisoners of war shall be assembled from all working camps into the main camps by January 6. Provision is made for investigation in each camp and an accounting for prisoners by name, to assure that there will be no one left behind.

17. Return of German Prisoners: The German Commission gave notice of the return of 750 sick and wounded Germans from England, and it took occasion to thank the British Government. The American Government was likewise thanked for the return of 150 sanitary personnel from VIRTON and ARLON.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: 383.6: Fldr. 12: Letter

**Report on German Prison Camps**

INTERALLIED COMMISSION,  
ON THE REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR,  
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN COMMISSIONER,  
*Hotel Adlon, Berlin, January 2, 1919.*

FROM: 1st Lieut. F. K. Miller, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,

TO: Brigadier General Geo. H. Harries, U. S. A., American Commissioner, Interallied  
Commission on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War

1. It is difficult to realize without actual experience the conditions in the German

prisoner of war camps, but I will describe as accurately as memory will permit some of my experiences during my nine months' imprisonment.

2. I was taken prisoner at MORCHIES, north of CAMBRAI, at 5 p. m., March 23, 1918, and was sent to a German dressing station two miles back of the lines. Here I worked until 9 p. m., dressing some 50 wounded English. A German medical officer in his hut then offered me a cigarette and a drink of brandy, after which I joined walking transport. We marched steadily, with one halt of 3 1/2 hours, through CAMBRAI and MARQUION to DOUAI, arriving there at 4:30 the following afternoon. The men suffered considerably from cold, hunger and fatigue, sleeping in an open field on frost-covered ground during their short rest. At DOUAI we received our first food since capture, consisting of a slice of black bread and "ersatz" coffee. I remained at DOUAI two days, during which time I twice received hot soup and bread and then joined 500 other officers, marching with them to MARCHIENNES where we entrained for RASTATT Camp.

3. We arrived at RASTATT after a journey of 84 hours. During this time we got little or no sleep due to cold and the dirty, overcrowded, lice-infested condition of the cars. The cars were cattle trucks without seats or straw on floors, 40 officers being allotted to each one. We received no food for the first 40 hours and during the remaining time, hot soup twice. Upon arrival at RASTATT, we were given hot soup and a bath and assigned to barracks.

4. At RASTATT the daily food ration for officers was 1/7 loaf of bread in the morning and a thin watery vegetable soup, occasionally thickened with barley, at 11 a. m. and 5 p. m. Twice during my stay of three weeks we were given a small piece of German sausage; also some pickled beet root. This food ration was insufficient and the men were always ravenously hungry. I have seen officers carrying potato peelings away from the grounds outside the cookhouse and cooking them in their huts.

The barracks were furnished with roughly built double-deck wooden beds and insufficient bed clothing provided. Little or no fuel was obtainable for heating purposes. Camp canteens were very incomplete---no extra food, soap or toilet articles were to be had. In lieu of tobacco men smoked a poor quality of herb tea. Time passed slowly as no books or amusements of any sort were provided. The sanitation of the camp was reasonably good.

5. On leaving RASTATT we were provided with a half loaf of bread, 1/4 lb. of sausage and a small amount of cheese for our four-day trip to LANGENSALZA Camp. This trip was made under conditions similar to those on the trip from DOUAI to RASTATT. We received hot soup twice during the journey.

6. The camp at LANGENSALZA lies in a low, poorly drained and unhealthy location. The barracks were rough construction, set close together, very dirty, and infested with lice and fleas. The rooms were poorly heated. The beds were the usual double-decked wooden type and furnished with one blanket. The sanitation of the camp was very bad generally. The odor of a nearby pigsty permeated half the camp. The latrines were inadequate in number, poorly cared for and foul-smelling, due to lack of disinfectants. The sanitation of the lazaret was but little better.

After the signing of the Armistice, conditions became even worse. The barracks became overcrowded from surrounding kommandos---many men sleeping on the floors without blankets. Latrines, too, were used less than formerly. Due to relaxed discipline, the men would go no farther than the grounds outside the barracks doors, the grounds soon becoming in foul condition.

7. The German food ration for officers was reasonably good. If necessary one could exist on it alone. For the men existence was not possible on the German ration which consisted of 1/7 loaf of bread per day and a thin watery vegetable soup, in which I never saw meat or fats, twice daily. I estimate that in half the cases the soup was inedible and had to be thrown away. Existence was made possible by food supplies coming through the British, French, and American Red Cross station. A heavy percentage of individual Red Cross packages were thoroughly and systematically robbed by the Germans.

8. Much distress was caused among new prisoners by lack of proper clothing, underwear, and toilet articles. The men were invariably captured without overcoats or equipment of any sort and the only clothing furnished by the Germans were light cotton uniforms to hospital patients and heavy wooden shoes. Shoes were always in great demand, the men having lost theirs on the way to camp---taken in most instances by the Germans. The help committees could furnish only a small portion of the clothing needed and that to the most needy.

9. The hospital was very dirty, and unsanitary and infested with fleas and lice. Treatment of patients was very bad, the nursing being done by a small number of untrained soldiers. Bathing facilities were totally inadequate. Bed-ridden patients were never bathed; the bed clothing only changed upon arrival of new patients. The food was of poor quality and insufficient; special diet for dysentery and other serious cases almost unknown except when the Red Cross could supply medical comforts. Fully 90% of the drugs used were substitutes. Surgical dressing even in the worst septic cases was rarely done more than twice a week, paper dressings used exclusively. The operating room was small, unsanitary and poorly equipped. Ether was usually obtainable for anaesthesia, only minor and insignificant operations being performed without it. I understand, however, that before my arrival some major operations were performed without anaesthesia. There were sufficient Allied doctors present to care for the sick, but they were rendered helpless by lack of working material and were given little or no authority.

10. German discipline was very severe, the officers and men bullying and mistreating the prisoners on the slightest provocation. After signing the Armistice there was a noticeable change for the better.

11. Both from their appearance and stories, it was evident that the men working on kommandos received extremely bad treatment. They worked long hours on the most insufficient food and severest methods were used to punish slackness and inability to do extra hard work. In most cases they were permitted to report ill only after they could no longer stand at their work. I cite the following typical cases:

(1) I admitted a man from the salt mines to the hospital. He was covered with boils, weak, emaciated, and starved. He died two days later from tuberculosis.

(2) I also admitted a Frenchman from a nearby Kommando [German prison camp]. He was very thin and emaciated---a physical wreck with a temperature of 105. He had three or four old septic wounds and a number of boils as well as several bayonet wounds about the face and body. He told me that he had fallen down exhausted at his work and a German guard, furious because he could do no more, attacked him with bayonet and butt of rifle reducing him to unconsciousness. This man died the next day from the treatment received.

These are not isolated cases, but very good examples of the usual treatment on kommandos. Salt mine workers seemed to suffer the most severely, being obliged in many instances to work double shifts or 18 out of 24 hours on most insufficient food. They were predisposed to boils and tuberculosis.

12. About three months ago a transport of about 700 British and French, from behind the front lines where they had been working for several months, arrived in camp, after a terribly hard railroad journey, in a deplorable and totally indescribable condition. Many were so weak they could take no nourishment and some who took their first nourishment died immediately after. One man walking into the hospital dropped at my feet and died 15 minutes later. Thirty-four of the men died on the trip and some 20 more during the first 24 hours in camp. During the following eight or nine weeks, the deaths totalled about 300. Many of them contracted pneumonia on account of their reduced vitality. We are required to hold post-mortem examinations on all cases dying in the hospital and it is a conservative estimate to say 95% of the deaths in this transport were directly or indirectly of starvation. The bodies of the men were devoid of all fat and in most cases, the outline of the bones could be clearly seen. While on the post-mortem table, I spanned the largest part of one man's arm about the biceps muscle with my thumb and index

finger which overlapped to the first index joint. Even the German officers and personnel of the hospital seemed horrified and disgusted with the condition of the men. In one instance when 24 dead were piled on the floor of the post-mortem room, the German chief doctor came in and looked around. He seemed very much ashamed and humiliated, and turning to me remarked, "There, that is German kultur. That is what militarism does."

I was informed that in some instances the Germans used the following method to escape responsibility for the death of prisoners. A number of newly captured prisoners would immediately be put to work behind the lines on the hardest kind of work and with totally insufficient food. These prisoners were not permitted to write to relatives or communicate in any way with the Allies. Those who would survive this treatment, which often lasted for six months, were then sent to camps where they were permitted to send their first messages. A heavy percentage of the men, however, would die from starvation and ill treatment, but the Germans on being questioned, would deny having any record of their capture, and it would naturally be supposed they had been killed in action.

13. Many people believe that conditions in German prison camps are very much exaggerated but I believe I can safely say that not one-half the actual conditions will ever be known.

F. K. MILLER,  
1st Lieut., Medical Corps, U. S. A.

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1st Ind.

Hq. American Commissioner, Interallied Commission on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War,  
Berlin, Germany, January 3, 1919 - To Chief of Staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. Forwarded

Received  
Jan. 7, 1919.

GEO. H. HARRIES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 77: Letter

**War Material to be Allotted to Allied Powers**

*Spa, January 2, 1919.*

From: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

1. Herewith is transmitted a proposal by General Nudant, the head of the French Mission of the Interallied Armistice Commission in which is given a suggested proportion of the war materiel which shall be received by the Allied powers.
2. Please inform me whether or not this proposal is acceptable.
3. It will be noted that in the last paragraph General Nudant makes request that a statement of the amount of war materiel of all kinds received by our Armies be transmitted to Marshal Foch.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

No. 98/M.

From: General Nudant

To: Chief of American Mission

With a view to drawing up among the different Allied Armies the distribution of the materiel of war delivered by the enemy as a result of Article IV of the Armistice Agreement, I submit to you the following proposals and ask you to be good enough to make known to me your opinion on the subject.

1. It seems equitable that the proportion of materiel should be drawn up according to the respective strength of the Allies on the western front at the end of the operations.

The Marshal of France, Commander-In-Chief of the Allied Armies, is ready to adopt the following distribution which is in accord with this interpretation:

Americans	2/10
English	3/10
Belgian	1/10
French	4/10

2. The Allied Armies could immediately take over out of the German materiel 3/4 of the quantity due them, the last fourth being considered as a common total from which could be drawn the amounts necessary to complete later the definitive distribution, in the proportions that will have been determined.

If you approve of these proposals, I will transmit them to Marshal Foch.

In any case, I would be grateful to you to be kind enough to request your General Headquarters to send to Marshal Foch as soon as possible, a statement of the amount of war materiel of all kinds definitely received by your Armies.

NUDANT.

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Section 4, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 5, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

This matter has been taken up with G-1 and G-3 and it is recommended that the attached letter be sent to General Barnum.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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January 5, 1919.

386.32.93

Chief of Staff

Chief of American Section Permanent Armistice Commission

Distribution of materiel of war

Replying to your letter of the 2d inst., on this subject you are advised that the plan submitted by General Nudant for the distribution of the materiel of war delivered by the enemy, as a result of Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement is acceptable to the American authorities. In reference to the request contained in the last paragraph of General Nudant's letter, you are advised that copies of the lists of materiel of all kinds received by our Army are furnished Marshal Foch's Headquarters.

By direction:

J. A. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

**German Troops in Poland**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 2, 1919.*

No. 36

FROM: Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. The reported interference with Polish troops by German Commands:

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies telegraphs the following: 'January 1, number 136-0: Paragraph I: By means of telegram which General Depaise transmitted, the Polish Government announced that the German military forces in Lithuania and Poland are interfering with the local defensive organization against the Bolsheviks. Especially the German Command of KOVIA [KOVEL] is said to have prevented the transportation of troops which the Polish Government in agreement with Lithuania wants to send in the direction of WILNA against the Red troops.

(2) I ask the German High Command to immediately put an end to the measures mentioned above and to allow the Polish Government liberty to carry out the movement

of troops towards the east with a view to organizing a better Polish advance by road and by railroad.' The General, President of the German Armistice Commission is requested to make known the measures taken by the German High Command.

To the foregoing note the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission made the following remarks:

I shall ask the German High Command immediately for the necessary information, but it can be said now that the French authorities will undoubtedly be glad to know that the German Government is using its forces to oppose Bolshevism. According to information we have received, the Polish Government is said to have been using its forces for other purposes.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Letter

***Proposed Luxemburg Decree***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*January 2, 1919.*

FROM: Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

TO: Chief of Staff, Allied Armies

1. Reference to the letter of December 29 from Marshal Foch, commanding the Allied Armies, to General Pershing on the subject of a proposed decree regulating circulation and police matters in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, I desire to inform you that the matter is so deeply important that it has been forwarded to General Pershing for his personal consideration. I know he will give it that, and will send a reply to Marshal Foch within a very few days.

I trust that this will explain a very short delay in replying to the above letter.

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

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***Analysis of Proposed Luxemburg Decree***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS A. E. F.,  
JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE,  
*January 2, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM: For the Chief of Staff

1. You have referred to me, for immediate expression of views, a letter from Marshal Foch, with which there is received a copy of proposed decree, also two memoranda of January 1 on the same, by General Fox Conner. In his first memorandum General Conner recommends agreement to the proposed Decree, with certain modifications. In his second recommendation, made after a conference by him with Major Tinant of the Belgian Army, he recommends that the condition be reported to our Government at WASHINGTON in order to receive the Government's instructions in the premises. Although I had expressed approval to General Conner of his plan to have the matter submitted to our Government in the event of the impossibility of agreement between the two commands, I am convinced by a suggestion or two made by you to me this morning, and from further consideration of the matter that reference to our Government should not be resorted to. It should be an almost invariable rule here never to submit a question of policy to our Government when the Commander-in-Chief is legally competent to deal with it. It is impossible for the problems arising here to be understood in WASHINGTON as they are here, and the decision of the Government is liable to be most embarrassing.

2. I am pleased to see that General Foch expressly recognizes the principle of Luxemburg's neutrality, which was the basis of the C-in-C's proclamation to that country. This removes legal difficulties that might otherwise stand in the way of an accord, and must justify, in the eyes of the High Command, our policy towards Luxemburg as announced in that proclamation. Owing to the insistence of the High Command that we retain certain troops of occupation in the territory of Luxemburg, conditions are different from what the C-in-C's proclamation contemplated,---which was nothing more than an exercise of the right of passage through Luxemburg to reach the enemy territory. This change in conditions has not been brought about by any policy of the American Army, but the policy of the High Command, which, so long as such High Command exists, may reasonably exercise authority with reference to the distribution of troops. While I dislike the mixture or joinder of different nations in the matter of military occupation, and the exercise by our Army of any authority under rules prescribed by any other than American authority, I do not see that the people of Luxemburg are prejudiced or injured by the exercise of a joint authority over them any more than they would be by the exercise of a single authority, as, for example, by the French themselves.

3. It was proposed by General Weygand at the Conference a few days ago that the Decree be signed by both Marshal Foch and General Pershing. I do not think that General Pershing should sign any decree in which he does not fully believe and regard as necessary under the circumstances. If there is a decree published in Luxemburg, emanating from Allied authority, it should be issued in the name of General Foch alone.

4. It was also said by General Weygand that the Government of Luxemburg would expressly consent, and, as I remember, would even request the issuance of a decree if the same were thought advisable by the high military authority. I pointed out to him that Luxemburg was in a state of duress and that neither its consent nor request would affect the justification of a decree. This is true in principle, I think, though I must admit that in the minds of most men, and probably all taking a practical view of the situation,

a governmental expression of Luxemburg in favor of a decree would be a strong moral justification for its issue.

5. If then, some American troops remain in Luxemburg and assist in the enforcement of certain measures prescribed by General Foch for the purpose of the security of the Allied Armies, which do not substantially affect the liberties of well-disposed citizens of Luxemburg, and the Government of Luxemburg has, for its own good order and safety, expressed a desire that the same be done, I do not believe that practical objections to such a policy are so cogent that the same should be refused, if it is necessary for the maintenance of harmonious relations. The last sentence of the C-in-C's proclamation to the people of Luxemburg was as follows:

You are expected cheerfully to observe such rules as the American military commanders may find it necessary to make for the safety of their troops and your own protection.

This saving clause is a substantial justification for the exercise by the American military of reasonable regulations imposed by the High Command; though it would not, in my opinion, justify the C-in-C in prescribing rules which he does not consider necessary, as I have indicated in Paragraph 3 above.

6. In view of the immediate submission that I must make of this memo, I have not had time to study the proposed Decree. I note, however, that all Allies and all Allied territory are treated equally, which gives Belgium no ground of objection so far as the Decree itself is concerned. Neither is there any interference whatsoever in the circulation of the citizens of Luxemburg within that territory, and no more without than would be imposed upon them were the Decree not issued. There is a distinct advantage, as Marshal Foch points out, in regulating the circulation of the Luxemburg people beyond their territory by a decree published and exercised within the territory rather than without.

7. The willingness of Marshal Foch to strike out Articles 6, 7, and 22, removes the most serious objections to the substance of the Decree. Less serious objections I think might be made to some other parts, but there is not time for the consideration of those in this memo. I think, however, that in the event a favorable reply is sent to Marshal Foch, the other provisions of the Decree should receive joint consideration, at a conference, of those at these headquarters who have made a study of this subject.

8. Of course our troubles may not end by the mere publication of a decree whose terms are really harmless. The Decree must be enforced equally, and irrespectively of the political interests of the different nations that may be involved. If it should be proposed later to publish a further decree, harsher in terms than appear necessary, or if it be attempted to employ the American Army to enforce the Decree unequally, or in the interests of particular nations, it will be time for the American Army to assert its responsibility to its own Government only.

9. If the Decree be issued by Marshall Foch at the request of the Government of Luxemburg, I think it most appropriate that there be an introductory clause, making a statement to that effect; such as:

Whereas, the Government of Luxemburg has, for the promotion of good order in its territory and the security of its neutrality, requested that the following rules be published and enforced, etc., etc.

10. On the whole I think that the C-in-C may consent to the retention of American troops within the territory of Luxemburg, the same to assist in the enforcement of a properly modified decree, issued by General Foch at the request of the people of Luxemburg, without serious inconsistency, with his former proclamation of the neutral and friendly relations which exist between the United States and Luxemburg.

W. A. BETHEL,  
Brigadier General, Judge Advocate.

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### **Delivery of Rolling Stock**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 5454/1109

*Spa, January 2, 1919.*

From General Winterfeldt to General Nudant

According to the conditions of execution of Annex 2 of the Armistice Agreement of December 17, 4,400 locomotives and 80,000 cars are to be brought from Germany within one month and delivered over to the Allies. This is a very considerable number of locomotives and especially of cars added to the previously accepted amount of materiel abandoned in Belgium and France. In accepting these obligations, it was thought also that only rolling stock would be requested of such capacity as was in fact in general use on the German railroads, in other words, that the Allies would take into consideration in their demands the conditions that have been called into being on the German railways by the war, and that in this connection the requirement that the material would have to be in good condition would obtain. This assumption has proven to be incorrect: On the contrary, in the examination of the rolling stock such severe demands are laid down that only a very inadequate percentage of the available rolling stock would be satisfactory as it is. The rolling stock, therefore, had to be put in good order for the delivery. All the locomotives and almost all of the cars have to be examined and especially put into good order before they can be brought before the Committee on examination with any possibility of being accepted. The available workshops, however, are not able to meet rapidly enough these demands made upon them, and all efforts to increase the capacity of the output, for example, the increase in personnel of more than 30 per cent has remained almost entirely in vain as the result of the decreased capacity of the individual workers resulting from the circumstances of the revolution in Germany. Special difficulties are caused by the dissimilarity of the requirements of individual reception committees which have brought it about that at the same time in different delivery places an entirely different percentage of offered locomotives and cars have been accepted. The demands in regard to the condition of rolling material have not been established uniformly and free of all possibility of doubt in spite of the several attempts that we have made, especially the attempts made in connection with the negotiations at TREVES. Even within the more recent days the basic demands have been so considerably increased by the reception committees, that the choice and repair of rolling stock has been again delayed. For example, the METZ-SAARBRUCKEN Committee has refused further cars without side-boards in spite of the joint agreement of the Subcommittee on Transportation to accept them.

In addition to the time consuming work of bringing the rolling stock into suitable condition, the extraordinary demands in the way of traffic which are required by the requirements of the reception committees lay especial burden upon the German railways. Several thousand of cars are brought forward in vain. Several hundred are transported under perfectly aimless purposes because new demands of some subcommittees prohibits their reception. For the largest part these cars may be examined upon the tracks of the railway system separated into classes and led to the workshops. The cars and locomotives that have not been accepted fill the entire region and make especially difficult the advance of new materiel. Congestion results therefrom which causes its effect to be felt far into the inner regions of Germany. This congestion leads to a break in the use of locomotives for economic pursuits which completely exhausts the resources in locomotives which have been in any case considerably weakened and thereby the entire railway traffic is lamed.

From the previous representations it is evident that the German authorities are doing everything possible to abide by the agreements that they have undertaken, but that obstacles have arisen that lie entirely outside of their realm of influence. In order to

put to one side any doubts that may still remain as to the loyalty of the measures that have been undertaken and the correctness of the description of the circumstances that at present obtain on the German railways, the attempt is made again to have railway experts sent to Germany. At the same time express attention is called to the fact that in spite of all attempts and the most earnest endeavors of the German authorities to do what is humanly possible, the rapidly approaching end of the period given for the delivery of the railway materiel will make that delivery impossible, if the Allies persist from now on they fail to pay attention to the condition of the German means of transportation as they have been evoked by the war.

The request is further added hereto that the reception committees be at once directed to essentially lighten their demands as to the capacities of the rolling stock that is delivered to them.

WINTERFELDT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 3, 1919.*

No. 37

FROM: Acting Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.,

[Extract]

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4. Delivery of Locomotives and Cars: The Committee in charge of the receipt of materiel states that as near as their figures can be checked the number of locomotives received to date is one thousand and the number of cars about fifty thousand.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German Railroads Exempted from Requisition**

No. 2

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
January 3, 1919.

SUBJECT: Prohibiting Interference with the Operation of German Railways

The Interallied Railway Commission reports that certain local commanders and supply officers are interfering with the operation of the German railways in this area. This interference arises through the arbitrary stopping of trains, requisitioning of railway facilities and requisitioning of coal, oil, and other railway supplies. The Interallied Railway Commission reports that this action has seriously interfered with the efficient operation of the railroads, upon the successful operation of which depends the efficient supply of our forces.

It is, therefore, ordered that all railway facilities and railway supplies actually in possession of German authorities, within the Third Army area, are exempted from requisition without prior authority of Headquarters Third Army. Authority for such requisition will ordinarily only be given after consultation with and approval by the American representative of the Interallied Railway Commission.

The American representatives of the Interallied Railway Commission alone have authority to interfere with the operation of the German railways within the Third Army area. These railways are being operated by German personnel in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. Local commanders will not interfere with these operations unless so directed by these headquarters, or unless a purely emergent military situation demands such action. In this latter case, a full report will be immediately telegraphed to these headquarters.

Nothing contained in the foregoing instructions will be construed as affecting in any way the operation of the railway blockade of Germany now being enforced by the C. G., III Corps.

By command of Major General DICKMAN:

W. A. HAVERFIELD,  
Adjutant General.

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193-23, Fldr. 69: Telegram

**Control of Neutral Zone**

January 3, 1919.

From (USK) Spa Belgium

To Commanding General, Third Army, Coblenz

Number 209. Reference your letter December 31 relating control of Neutral Zone, is not full authority given your paragraph three, four, five, instructions for control of Neutral Zone from Marshal Foch December 22. Will furnish these instructions if not supplied.

BARNUM

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***Economic Conference at Luxemburg***

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF ARMY,  
*January 3, 1919.*

Marshal FOCH, C-in-C. Allied Armies.

No. 2808/CR to Cs-in-C.            American Forces  
   Belgian Forces  
   British Forces  
   French Forces

1. My attention has been drawn by the British command to difficulties under which the industrial establishments of the district of COLOGNE are situated, difficulties due to the necessity of assuring the supply of the requisite raw materials to these establishments and an outlet for their products. Similar difficulties exist in the other occupied areas.

One cannot contemplate the complete unrestricted restoration of commercial relations between the occupied territories and the rest of Germany, such as the German Government is endeavoring to obtain.

In fact the Allies are concerned on the one hand in preventing the cessation of work in the factories, and on the other in utilizing the produce of these factories to the best advantage of the Allies, especially having in view the restoration of the devastated country.

The solution of the question arising out of the necessity of distribution of raw material (of which there is a general shortage) the creation of outlets towards the Allies, and the exportation of surplus products into unoccupied Germany and neutral countries, necessitates the formation at my hq. (Luxemburg) of an Interallied Economic Committee \* \* \*

I will be obliged if you will nominate a technical officer from your staff to be placed on this Committee. He should be at Luxemburg (Hotel de COLOGNE) at 15 hours on January 12 to take part in the first meeting at which the details of the organization will be studied.

II. Until this organization commences to function, exceptional permits (called derogations) for the exportation of manufactured goods into unoccupied Germany can be provisionally granted.

These derogations will depend on the stocks of manufactured goods according to the limits of daily output, upon the declaration of the manufacturers that the level will be maintained.

The derogations will be granted on the recommendations of the territorial commander [local Allied commander], who will submit the requests to the Derogations Committee at TREVES.

\* \* \* \* \*

Commerical postal and telegraphic correspondence will be authorized for these commercial operations as well as the despatch of funds for their payment.

Your attention is drawn to the necessity of establishing the above organization as soon as possible.

FOCH.

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**Sea Travel by Germans**

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 324

*Spa, January 3, 1919.*

The German Representative

To Chairman of Allied Armistice Commission

Quite recently, the German Government has repeatedly received requests for information as to when and under what circumstances trips by sea can be undertaken, especially to South America.

On behalf of the German Government, I would be grateful for a definite statement that no difficulties would be henceforth put in the way of German Government employees in the matter of travel by neutral ships.

v. HANIEL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213

**Prisoners of War**

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, Belgium, January 3, 1919.*

PRISONERS OF WAR COMMITTEE, JANUARY 3, 1919.

[Extract]

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Then follows a statement by the War Office of BERLIN concerning repatriations up to December 30:

REPATRIATIONS UP TO DECEMBER 30.	French		English		Belgian		Portu- guese		Ameri- cans	
	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men
via SAABRUCKEN METZ	682	79,072	446	15,002	41	961	1	26		437
Across RHINE to STRASSBURG		12,398		1,530		160			1	35
via HOLLAND	3	82,300	1,565	47,000	1	8,400	399	3,510		123

REPATRIATIONS UP TO DECEMBER 30.	French		English		Belgian		Portu- guese		Ameri- cans	
	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men
via AIX-la- CHAPELLE to LIEGE		10,071		1,936		21				
via SWITZERLAND	1,381	38,662	1,585	4,721	19	341	2	45	221	2,418
Interned in SWITZERLAND	269	5,634	84	2,017	38	809				
Left behind re- treating armies	647	82,098	310	39,000	10	850		2,030	3	221
via Baltic and North Sea	700	1,706	3,253	21,386				17	8	67
Transferred to con- centration camps, WAHN, LIMBURG, etc.	2	15,100		25		333		1		75
			<b>ITALIANS</b>			<b>Serbians</b>			<b>Japanese</b>	
			<b>Off.</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Off.</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Off.</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Off.</b>	<b>Men</b>
via SAARBRUCKEN-METZ				8,055		406				
Across RHINE to STRASS- BURG				2,565						
via HOLLAND				7,320		843		15		
via AIX-la-CHAPELLE to LIEGE				3,741						
via SWITZERLAND		1,295		14,175					100	
Interned in SWITZERLAND Left behind retreating armies				44,300		8		700		
via Baltic and North Sea				95						
Transferred to concen- tration camps, WAHN, LIM- BURG, etc.				12					6	

**Russian Officer Prisoners**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 279/PG2

*Spa, January 3, 1919.*

General Nudant

To Marshal Foch, Luxemburg and Bacon Staff, Senlis

General Dupont as the interpreter of the unanimous feeling of the Chiefs of the Allied Missions at BERLIN, begs me to send forward to you the following request.

According to reports of the Swiss Committee of the Red Cross, Russian repatriated officer prisoners are immediately shot or forced to join the Bolshevist Armies. The same is true of all soldiers.

It is not desirable to prevent the repatriation of Russian prisoners, although constituting a daily reinforcement of 5,000 men to these Armies, it seems purely on the basis of humanity that a formal prohibition of the repatriation of officers ought to be given immediately.

I beg you to let me know your decision on this subject.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 4, 1919.*

No. 38

FROM: Acting Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War: The Allies submitted a note to the effect that although the evacuation of Allied prisoners is going on rapidly, they have not yet had full assurance that there are not prisoners of war remaining in isolated parts of Germany. It is quite possible that many prisoners were not listed and that these may be held back, involuntarily or not, in the interior of the country. There may be others who attempted to regain the Allied lines on their own account before the Armistice was signed and who now remain in places of shelter, possibly not knowing of the Armistice.

In the same note the Allies informed the Germans that public opinion in the Allied countries demands that it be determined beyond question that there are no living men remaining as prisoners, other than those now in prison camps and being evacuated.

The Germans were informed that a search should be made for all such prisoners; that it should be based upon the lists which the prisoners of war camps and army commands will furnish certified as exact by the heads of the service concerned. All facilities will be

given to the neutral and Allied delegates to carry on the necessary search in camps, commands, mines, factories, and hospitals of Germany. On their side the German military authorities must inform their people through the press and through postal notices that they must on pain of immediate punishment call attention to the existence of any Allies who remain in Germany.

The German prisoners of war at present in the hands of the Allies will be in case of necessity, a guarantee of compliance with the foregoing.

The President of the German Mission is requested to make known as soon as possible the views of the German Government in regard to the above.

2. Concerning French Prisoners who have been Condemned in Germany: The Germans were informed that the French Government attaches the very highest importance to their being furnished in the shortest time possible with a list of names, certified as correct, of all French prisoners who have been condemned in Germany, with a statement of the places where they are interned and the date of their repatriation. It is further requested that they furnish twice a month a list of the numbers of sick and wounded that are not capable of being evacuated that have remained in the quarantine hospitals or with the German sanitary units.

The Germans were informed that the foregoing arrangements will have to be carried out for prisoners of war of all Allied Nations.

\* \* \* \* \*

8. Request for Permission to send German Chaplains and Red Cross Workers to German Prison Camps in Allied territory: The Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners reports that the Germans have submitted a request for permission to send German chaplains, Red Cross workers, and, if possible, sanitary personnel to prison camps in Allied territory where Germans are still held. The question remains under consideration.

The Committee reports that the British are returning seven hundred and fifty wounded German prisoners.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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193-23: Fldr. 69: Telegram

### **Control of Neutral Zone**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*January 4, 1919.*

American Representative Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission, SPA, Belgium

G-3 Number 2. Reference your two nought nine, paragraphs three, four, and five instructions for control of Neutral Zone from Marshal Foch are considered to give authority desired by these headquarters. The authority is not so understood by the commander of the German forces occupying the Neutral Zone and it is requested that the matter be adjusted through the German representative of the Armistice Commission.

DICKMAN.

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**Occupation of Ports on Right Bank of Rhine**

[Contemporary Translation]

German Armistice Commission

*Spa, January 4, 1919.*

No. 4832

The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission, General Nudant

In Answer to Note No. 206/T of January 1, 1919.

Even though according to Annex Note 2, Art. I of the Armistice Agreement, navigation on the RHINE is subject to the complete control and authority of the High Command of the Allies, nevertheless there can not be induced from that right any justification of the military occupation of the ports of the right bank of the RHINE. The policing can be carried out by the occupation of the left bank as well as the guarding of the river itself.

That this point of view was shared likewise until now by the side of the Allies is evident from the text of Paragraph 3 of Note 64/G of December 7, 1918, according to which the activity of the policing troops for materiel that was to cross the river was to extend only to the left bank exclusively.

Note 206/T, however, speaks of police troops that are to make secure and supervise the carrying out of orders in the ports of the right bank of the RHINE. In order to avoid misunderstanding I request a clear explanation of how it is conceived that this should be carried out in detail, so that the German authorities can be informed. According to the German conception the only thing that can be done is to send commissioners insofar as the supervision of traffic by boat requires such commissioners, while as far as the land areas of the ports are concerned, which of course fall in the Neutral Zone, Germany, according to the terms of the Agreement, must undertake the supervision of the policing.

v. WINTERFELDT.

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***Materiel Delivered Under the Armistice***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*January 4, 1919.*

FROM: Commanding General, Third Army

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Advance G. H. Q., Treves

1. Enclosed communication is forwarded to you for your information. The original of this letter was handed to the Chairman of the German Delivering Commission, consisting of the following members, this date:

Major Teulelenthal, G. S., Chairman  
Major Kahl, Artillery  
Captain von Sybels, G. S.  
Captain von Schuckmann, Foot Guards  
Captain Crantz, Flying Forces.

J. T. DICKMAN,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding.

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FROM: United States Receiving Commission, Coblenz Bridgehead

TO: German Delivering Commission, Coblenz Bridgehead

1. The International Armistice Commission has specified that all materiel to be delivered by the German Government to the Allies must be in good condition, and that "in good condition" means "in condition for immediate use with all the accessories and spare parts necessary for fire or flight."

2. The United States Receiving Commission at the Coblenz Bridgehead has decided that the German aeroplane Roland D-VI-b No. 6141 was wrecked during a test flight on January 1, 1919, prior to its delivery to the United States Army. This Commission therefore requires that you deliver one aeroplane in place of said aeroplane, on or before January 10, 1919.

3. This Commission advises you that there have been received at the Coblenz Bridgehead, one hundred fifty-two cannon. Eighty-two of these cannon are rejected and will not be accepted by this Commission under the terms of the Armistice. Eighty cannon consist of 15-centimeter howitzers, Model 1896; of 15-centimeter guns without recoil systems; and of 12-centimeter guns, Model 1879. Two of the 21-centimeter howitzers have had premature explosions in the bore and are not accepted. The remainder, amounting to seventy guns, have been inspected, and their acceptance is at this time doubtful, pending the completion of their equipment. You are therefore at present required to deliver eighty-two other cannon in good condition in accordance with the terms of the Armistice and the decisions of the Permanent International Armistice Commission at SPA, and it is expected that the same will arrive at this bridgehead not later than January 10, 1919.

4. Twelve hundred heavy Maxim machine guns have been received; the shortages on this group consist of twelve hundred cartridge belts with boxes, and twelve hundred sets of asbestos packing. You are required to deliver said shortages on such guns, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, at this bridgehead on or before January 10, 1919.

5. Thirteen hundred light Maxim machine guns have been received; the shortages on this group consist of one thousand light Maxim mounts, nine hundred eighty muzzle attachments, and thirteen hundred belt reels, cartridge belts, and carrying straps. You are required to deliver said shortages on such guns, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, at this bridgehead on or before January 10, 1919.

United States Receiving Commission:

LEWIS LANDES,  
Major, Q. M. C., U. S. A.,  
Chairman.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 192: Memorandum

***Method of Requisition in Occupied Territory***

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 5, 1919.*

Administration of Rhine Territory

No. 2699/CR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant Chapin, Chief of the American Mission with the  
D. G. C. R. A.

I have the honor to inform you that the German representative at the International Permanent Armistice Commission has sent me a request that requisitions by our troops in occupied territory should not be made through the communes but through the "Associations de Cercles Communaux" which were, during the war, in charge of questions of public supply.

In spite of the principles by which armies of occupation make their requisitions in accordance with their own laws, cases may, nevertheless, arise where the regulations followed by such Army, may lead to difficulties of application as a result of difference in administrative organization between the occupied country and the occupying nation. In such cases there is reason, in the interest of both the requisitioning authorities and those furnishing supplies, to adapt the regulations of the occupying Army in the most rational way possible to the country upon which requisitions are made. It does not, therefore, seem to me in any way impossible to accede to the request of the German Government on conditions that the "Associations de Cercles Communaux" mentioned in the request, present satisfactory guarantees and their operation can be conducted under the same conditions as that of the municipalities.

Consequently, it will fall to the American command to give all necessary instructions that the "Associations" be substituted for the municipalities whenever this is practical.

CH. PAYOT,  
Director General of Army,  
Communications and Supply Service.

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***Desirability of Unhampered Inspection of Neutral Zone***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 5, 1919.*

From: Chief

To: Chairman, Permanent Interallied Armistice  
Commission

1. In compliance with the written instructions \* \* \* from the bridgehead corps commander, an American staff officer proceeded to WESTERBURG to confer with Major General Schutze, commander of the German forces occupying the Neutral Zone. Upon presentation of his instructions, this officer was informed by the German commander that his present orders did not contemplate the entrance into the Neutral Zone of American officers and enlisted men without previous notice to the German command as to the time of entry, strength of the visiting party, and an approximation of the time to be spent in the zone; i. e., objection was made to Paragraphs B and C of letter of instructions \* \* \*.

2. Under Clause IA, "Instructions relative to the control of the Neutral Zone" Allied commanders are charged with supervision or control of the Neutral Zone. The German police garrison is the instrument of this control. As a measure of military security, as well as to insure proper compliance with police regulations, some system of personal inspection by allied officers must be followed. This necessity is anticipated in Clauses II-C and III-C. The mechanism of this inspection is open to interpretation as evidenced by the opposition of Major General Schutze to Paragraphs B and C of the \* \* \* instructions, given to the American staff officer.

3. It is desirable that the Allied commanders have the right of unhampered inspection in the Neutral Zone. The value of the information obtained by inspection in the Neutral Zone will be considerably lessened if special arrangements must be made with the German zone commander in each individual case. It would seem that an arrangement with the German zone commander, giving certain specified Allied personnel unrestricted right of inspection, is fully in accord with Clause I-C.

4. This matter is presented to the Chairman of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission for consideration with view to making recommendation to the Allied Commander-in-Chief for a decision, the latter to be transmitted to the German High Command for compliance.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Liaison between Allied and German Zone Commanders**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. II03/CH  
4017/OI  
3II

CIPHERED TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JANUARY 5, AT 9:30

FROM: Bacon Headquarters

TO: French Mission (for General Pershing)

1. The settlement of the numerous questions which come up in the Neutral Zone make necessary the constant dealing of the German commands of that region with the Allied commands.

2. This indispensable liaison will be insured in each sector of the Neutral Zone by Allied officers detailed by the Allied commands of the corresponding zone.

3. General de Winterfeldt has been informed by General Nudant that he must advise the German commands of the Neutral Zone of this measure.

I request you to take such steps, as far as you are concerned, for the designation of the Liaison officers mentioned in Paragraph 2, and for the organization of their liaison service with the German commands of the corresponding sectors.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Note

**Return of Industrial Material**

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, January 5, 1919.*

No. 217/G

From: General Nudant to General Winterfeldt.

Under orders from Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, I have the honor to communicate the following to you.

On December 24, 1918, at the conference at LUXEMBURG, the German Committee on Industrial Affairs under the Presidency of Minister Mueller, declared that it was not empowered to treat the question of restoration of industrial material of all kinds that was lacking in the regions that had been occupied by the troops of the Central Empires. At the request of the German Commission the affair was laid on the table.

In the Note Number 152-G of December 25, 1918, General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C., asked General Winterfeldt to appoint competent experts to meet with the French and Belgian delegates.

French and Belgian representatives arrived at SPA on January 1, and on January 3, they met the German representatives under the Presidency of Minister Goppert.

I note the following statements of the German Commission:

(a) The German Government, in order to show its good will, is ready to give back in their present condition such of the machines requisitioned by the various German departments in France and in Belgium that may be returned without any difficulty.

(b) Among these machines are those that have not yet been sold, a list of which the German Government will hand over as speedily as possible.

(c) The German Government will replace by equivalent machines such machines as cannot be restored.

(d) The German Government will make all possible efforts to buy back the machines that have been sold and to restore them to the French and Belgian Governments.

(e) The German Government will offer to complete the number of machines not delivered by carrying out the preceding paragraphs, the machines freed in war industries whether used or not, and the machines that can be obtained by ordering them from private industries, and this without delay.

(f) The German Government is ready to draw up a contract assuring the fulfillment of these various points.

But these different points form only a part of the question. The Allied point of view carries with it, in fact, the entire restoration in kind or in equivalent value the material lacking in the districts which have been invaded by the troops of the Central Empires.

In a note dated January 5 the German Commission declares that the above requirements go beyond its powers.

As a result I ask General von Winterfeldt to cause the German Government to take the indispensable measures to give the German delegates within forty eight hours the necessary powers. They must be empowered to treat the questions under discussion in their entire extent.

The Allied Governments attach supreme importance to the solution of this affair. If before the coming January 12, an agreement has not been reached between the French and Belgian delegates on the one hand, the German representatives on the other, the point of view of the French and Belgian Governments will be imposed in its entirety upon the German Government when the Armistice is extended.

NUDANT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

### ***French Propaganda in Rhineland***

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 351

*Spa, January 5, 1919.*

The German Representative

To the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission

As representative of the German Government I have the honor to transmit the following note:

In execution of the Armistice Agreement of Nov. 11, 1918, the French Armies have occupied parts of the Prussian Rhine province of HESSE, of the PALATINATE, and of ALSACE-LORRAINE, after the German troops had withdrawn within the time agreed upon. From the first day of occupation the French Government has taken a peculiar attitude towards

ALSACE-LORRAINE. It has not remained within the points of its right to occupy the evacuated territory in a military way and to take such measures as are indicated by military necessity and the interests of the troops of occupation, but it has begun a political campaign of extermination of the whole RHINE territory against everything which is German, which thinks German, and which feels German. Without in any way being empowered to do so by the Armistice Agreement, the French Government has removed judges and administrative officials of the territory and has retained only those German officials at their posts who are deemed indispensable. It has furthermore carried out the expulsion of numerous inhabitants and stood idly by when shameful scenes took place at their departure in STRASSBURG, as well as in COLMAR, MULHAUSEN and other places. It is evident that systematic expulsions of large masses of people are being carried out as in one town alone on the frontier of BADEN, KEHL, more than 800 expelled persons have passed through in the last fourteen days, and, on one single day, 119 persons. The French Government has furthermore imprisoned a number of citizens of ALSACE-LORRAINE, even on the ground of hostile acts which took place before the signing of the Armistice Agreement. By these acts, against which the German Government has repeatedly protested in vain, the French Government has violated the clear text of Article VI of the Armistice Agreement and the specific assurances given by Prime Minister CLEMENCEAU by wireless on November 17.

Furthermore, reliable information is at hand to the effect that the French Government has taken up the fight against everything German in the schools of ALSACE-LORRAINE as well. The German teachers in the University of STRASSBURG have been displaced, and in the common schools, even in territory which is purely German from a language point of view, instruction exclusively in French has been made obligatory on the widest scale. The French Government has further not hesitated to invade the inner church organization of the people of ALSACE-LORRAINE, inasmuch as it unhesitatingly deposed the President of the Consistory of the Church of the AUGSBURG Confession in STRASSBURG and brought him to the frontier. More recently still, according to definite information present in our hands, the French Government has sought to remove every non-French element from the large industrial undertakings of the country, and puts in French managers and removed German managers; we even have information that it intends to proceed to the enforced liquidation of German works. Finally, the French Government is attempting to enlarge the boundaries of ALSACE-LORRAINE, as since the beginning of the occupation it has fixed upon a northern frontier for the territory which is arbitrary and new and which must awaken the impression that parts of the Prussian Rhine Province, especially the basin of the SAAR, belonged to ALSACE-LORRAINE. These territories have never been parts of ALSACE-LORRAINE. The formal protest of the German Government of November 21, 1918, against this determination of boundaries has so far been completely ignored. On the eastern boundary of the territory the French Government seems to wish to violate the clear frontier established in written agreement, as its troops of occupation at the RHINE crossings have not simply gone to the channel of the river, but have pushed forward to the eastern bank of the RHINE.

None of these measures can be justified in any way either by the Armistice Agreement or by military necessity in the face of a defenseless country which desires only to conclude peace. These measures only become clear if the French Government has the intention to make French as soon and as thoroughly as possible the population of ALSACE-LORRAINE, which is overwhelmingly German, and to increase the coveted territory as far as possible by the addition of valuable frontier districts which do not belong to it. The French Government seem even to take the point of view that the separation of ALSACE-LORRAINE from Germany is an accomplished fact. This appears from the Note, No. 156/G, of December 26, of General Nudant, in which, by direction of Marshal Foch and the Prime Minister, a raising of the present postal ban between ALSACE-LORRAINE and the rest of Germany is refused on the ground that "correspondence between France and Germany is absolutely forbidden." Furthermore, this point of view is expressed in the official refusal of the French Government to allow elections for the German National Assembly in ALSACE-LORRAINE. \* \* \* It is irreconcilable with the Armistice Agreement that the French

Government should, without any military necessity, deprive the population of an occupied territory of Germany of the exercise of its political rights.

The German Government affirms most solemnly that the settlement of the ALSACE-LORRAINE question is to take place in the Peace Conference, and solemnly protests against the present French procedure.

v. HANIEL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

***Alleged German Aid to Bolshevists***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 5, 1919.*

No. 39

FROM: Acting Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

4. Germans aiding Bolshevism in Russia: On the part of the Allies, General Haking, head of the British Mission, submitted the following:

(1) I have received instruction from H. M. Government to make strong protest concerning the aid afforded by Germans to Bolshevist troops invading Esthonia.

(2) In many cases retreating Germans have torn up the railway lines, telephone, etc., thereby assisting Bolshevists.

(3) The German General von Kathen, Commanding in the RIGA district, is reported to be in direct negotiations with BOLSHEVISTS.

(4) H. M. Government demands the German Government will cease forthwith to assist BOLSHEVISTS invading Esthonia and other Baltic territories and that the Germans will carry out faithfully the letter and spirit of Clause 12 of the Armistice.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Delivery of Trucks**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 5, 1919.*

No. 39

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

7. Auto Trucks Turned Over by Germans: The Germans submitted a report showing that the following auto trucks had been turned over by them:

To the French Army	1,749 1/2
To the English Army	776
To the American Army	779
To the Belgian Army	140
	<hr/>
Total	3,444 1/2

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**German Demobilization**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 5, 1919.*

No. 39

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

2. State of Demobilization of German Army: The Allies announced that Marshal Foch had telegraphed the following note, dated January 3:

The information which General von Winterfeldt has furnished concerning the carrying out of the terms of demobilization concerns only the western front; it does not give any accurate information as to the number of classes actually sent back to their homes, nor the size of the effective demobilization, nor the names and numbers of the units dissolved. The question of accurate information about the entire situation of the German Army is indispensable to us in order to understand the real intentions of the German Government. At the time when the prolongation of the German Armistice Agreement is going to come into discussion, it is necessary for the Allies to know the manner in which demobilization is being carried out on both fronts. As a consequence, I ask General von Winterfeldt to obtain in the shortest time possible additional information for the western front, and complete information about the eastern front.

I recognize that the regulation of numerous questions which arise in the neutral zone renders necessary constant contact between the German and Allied Armies. However, I cannot admit for this purpose the presence of German officers with the Allied commands in the occupied territories. The liaison that is desired can, therefore, be assured in each sector of the Neutral Zone by Allied officers attached to this particular Mission by the High Command of the corresponding sector. Please advise General von Winterfeldt of this and beg him to notify the commands of the sectors of the Neutral Zone. I, on my part, will notify the Generals of this arrangement. The President of the German Armistice Commission is requested to give the above information as soon as possible.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 383.6: Letter

***American Prisoners of War Located***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*January 5, 1919.*

FROM: Commanding General, Third Army

TO: Commander in Chief (G-1), H. A. E. F.

1. Captain A. H. Noyes, who is a member of the Red Cross, sent by this army into Germany for the purpose of locating American prisoners of war, has just returned to these headquarters and makes following report on the general situation, viz:-

Red Cross unit in charge of Captain A. H. Noyes and Lieut. W. K. Wood left COBLENZ on December 24, and proceeded to LIMBURG and from there to WESTERBURG, at which point we were advised that German General in command of the Fourth Neutral Zone was to be found. Through the German General in command of the Fourth Neutral Zone, we made request of the German War Office for information relative to American Wounded and sick prisoners in German lazarettos or prison camps. Information was

given us that Americans were to be found at RASTATT and we proceeded, carrying orders from the General in command of the Fourth Neutral Zone to the General in command of the 18th Neutral Zone at FRANKFORT and in turn carried orders from FRANKFORT to the General in command of the 14th Neutral Zone at DARMSTADT. We proceeded to RASTATT and found about thirty Americans, from various units, captured during several months and had been congregated at this point, having been brought from numerous prison camps and were being evacuated to STRASSBURG, the work being in charge of Captain Ceresole, a Swiss officer, working in connection with the American Red Cross. This officer had covered practically every prison camp in Germany, had information through the German War Office of American captives in Germany and had been evacuating the American boys to STRASSBURG on orders from G. H. Q.

There was but one isolated case reported to us, of an American boy at WITTEN, on the RUHR, and investigation gave us the man's name as Virpitch, 139th Infantry, enlisted from FRANKLIN, MO. This man had his right leg amputated above the knee and was not in condition to be moved at the present time.

The work has been handled by the American Red Cross, in connection with Captain Ceresole and has been well and thoroughly done. Practically every American still in German territory is listed and known to this man and all American soldiers returning from captivity have been reported direct to G. H. Q.

2. Captain Noyes and Lieutenant Wood deserve credit for the manner in which they have carried on this important work.

J. T. DICKMAN,  
Major General,  
Commanding.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

***Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium January 5, 1919.*

No. 39

FROM: Acting Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Return of German Prisoners of War: The Germans called attention to the fact that the British have sent across the RHINE into Germany some of the severely wounded German prisoners of war who were in their possession. They requested the other Allies to do the same, but attention was called to the fact that the meeting of January 4, the French declined to accede to this request, on the ground that the rolling stock available at that

time was not sufficient. The Germans continued to urge that such return of prisoners be made on the ground of humanity.

To the above, General Nudant, speaking for the French replied, as follows:

If we have not yet sent back the German wounded, it is because we have not the means to do it. When you have returned our prisoners we will have the necessary rolling stock. Therefore, the whole matter is based upon the speed with which you return our prisoners to us. It would be very strange if we were to return your prisoners before you had returned ours.

\* \* \* \* \*

9. American Prisoners in Germany: A personal letter from General Harries in BERLIN states that our men are practically all out of Germany, but that every day or so one, two, or three show up in unexpected places. We are now combing the country to be sure and get them all.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Note

### ***Return of German Sanitary Personnel***

[Contemporary Translation]

GERMAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
SUBCOMMISSION FOR PRISONERS OF WAR,  
*Spa, January 11, 1919.*

No. 271/12.18.U/Wako 3760

General Winterfeldt

To General Nudant

The American G. H. Q. has to our gratification allowed the release of sanitary personnel which fell into their hands in consequence of the retreat of the German Army.

The Subcommission for Prisoners of War received assurance that the GENEVA Convention would not be set aside by the Armistice Agreement, and that sanitary personnel is not considered as prisoners of war.

A large part of the sanitary personnel in the hands of the Allies is no longer necessary for the care of German sick and wounded prisoners. On the other hand they are urgently needed in Germany.

A part of the German hospital trains are not being used on account of lack of sanitary personnel, of the Entente is being used for these trains. The transportation of Allied sick and wounded to the corps concentration camps increases the necessity for this personnel.

Hence it is requested that the dispensable sanitary personnel in the hands of the Allies be returned at once.

The execution of this measure will benefit the Allied prisoners. To this end it is proposed:

(1) That the sanitary personnel left behind in the occupied territory be returned immediately upon the dissolution of the lazarettos which they tended.

(2) And that later the sanitary personnel captured before the retreat be relieved insofar as they are not needed for care of German sick and wounded.

(3) That the retention of German sanitary personnel who, on account of court investigations, are serving sentence be discontinued.

(4) That the sanitary personnel be forwarded to the Allied collecting camps on the return trip of trains bearing Allied prisoners from these camps, in order to be repatriated from the collecting camps by trains bearing prisoners of war from Germany into these collecting camps; and partly on the return trip of ships bearing Allied prisoners of war from German ports to Allied ports.

v. WINTERFELDT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

**Status of American Prisoners**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 6, 1919.*

No. 40

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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7. Revised Report as to the Status of American Prisoners: The subcommittee of the Mission handling the question of repatriation of American prisoners of war secured from the Germans the following revised statement of the status of American prisoners of war in Germany on November 11, 1918:

CORPS		OFFICERS	MEN
Guard	Corps	-	9
I	Corps	2	2
II	"	2	7
III	"	6	31
IV	"	-	37
V	"	3	13
VI	"	1	2
VII	"	-	136
VIII	"	5	233
IX	"	-	97
XI	"	7	64
XII	"	-	7
XIII	"	-	39
XIV	"	211	2,317
XV	"	2	14
XVI	"	4	30
XVII	"	3	40
XVIII	"	1	175
XIX	"	1	6
XX	"	-	4
XXI	"	-	13
I Bav.	Corps	-	10
III Bav.	Corps	-	16
TOTAL		248	3,302

Of the foregoing all have been repatriated except the following:

REMAINING IN GERMANY		
Officers:	XI Corps	1
	XVII Corps	2
	Total	3
Enlisted men:	I Corps	2
	VI Corps	2
	XI "	2
	XIII "	14
	XVII "	20
	XX "	4
Total		44

I am sending a copy of the foregoing list to General Harries in BERLIN, with the request that he make every effort to secure the repatriation of the three officers and forty-four enlisted men shown to be still in the hands of the Germans.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

***German Requisitioning in Baltic Provinces***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 6, 1919.*

No. 40

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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3. British protest against the continuation of requisitions in the Baltic Provinces: General Haking, head of the British Section, submitted the following note of protest:

(1) I am instructed to lodge a strong protest before the German Armistice Commission against the persistent violation by the Germans of Clause 14 of the Armistice Convention.

(2) Information has been received that Winning, the Chief German Political Agent in the Baltic Provinces, continues to requisition on the plea that Germany's imperative need does not allow of leaving behind raw materials.

(3) Will you please demand of the German Government the immediate cessation of requisitioning of foodstuffs and raw materials in the Baltic Provinces formerly belonging to the Russian Empire.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Maintenance Expense**

[Contemporary Translation]

*January 6, 1919.*

[Extract]

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ARMISTICE (ARTICLE 9)

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF JANUARY 6, 1919

\* \* \* \* \*

As the result of an exchange of views in which all the members of the Subcommittee participated the following decisions were arrived at:

(1) That the expression "expense of maintenance" should be understood in its widest and most complete signification.

(2) That it would be advisable to draw up for each Army a detailed list of the expenses to be included under expense of maintenance. The comparison of these lists, account being taken of the inherent differences in the organization of each Army, would cover any omissions or double charges. Finally after the different items of the lists thus compared having once been determined, there would be nothing more to do than to complete these lists by adding the amount for each class of expenses.

It was decided that the French Mission would at the meeting of January 7, present a projected detailed list which would serve as a basis of discussion. In the same order of ideas and for the same purpose the representative of the U. S. Army called attention to the advantage there would be in having the French Mission propose as soon as possible a written general definition for expenses of maintenance.

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**Maintenance Expense**

*January 7, 1919.*

[Extract]

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ARMISTICE (ARTICLE 9)

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF JANUARY 7, 1919

THE MEETING OPENED AT 11:05

\* \* \* \* \*

General Ronneaux announced that according to the desire expressed by the Allied representatives at the meeting of the preceding day, the French Mission had prepared a projected detailed list of the expenses to be entered under expenses of maintenance.

This projected list was not offered, of course, as a model but simply as an example. As a result, therefore, the different suggestions that might be presented by the Allied delegates would be very welcome. Likewise it was not to be forgotten that as a result of the differing administrative organizations of the various Allied Armies, the items of expenses of the French might not be identical with the items in the expenses of the other Allied Armies.

General Ronneaux then gave a few succinct explanations of the manner in which the detailed lists submitted by the French Mission had been determined in which the expenses had been grouped in two great classes. On the one hand individual expenses that could be calculated per officer, per man, and per animal, and on the other hand collective expenses that could be determined only for the total number of troops.

In the course of the examination of the proposed list of expenses, General Wingfield declared in his opinion, (a) there should be included under the item pay not only the pay properly speaking, but also all allotments (indemnities, allowances and commutations of various kinds, etc.) due to the personnel without any exception, and (b) that under the item of expenses of maintenance there should be included all the expenses resulting to the providing of consumable articles of every kind necessary for the Armies of the Allies, including such expenses as adhered to the transportation of the said articles to the place of consumption.

The opinion thus expressed brought no objection from any member of the Subcommittee.

A rather long discussion followed next between the British and Belgian representatives with regard to the easiest method of calculating the expenses of transportation by railway: Whether a total expense for complete transportation as suggested by the Belgian delegate or an itemized calculation by articles transported as suggested by the British delegate. General Ronneaux stepped in and stated that the method of calculation could not be determined in advance and could be chosen freely by each individual Allied Army according to its organization and according to the statistical information which was already in its possession.

The U. S. Army representatives asked that all or at least a part of the expenses caused by the lines of communication, including the expenses of upkeep of organizations situated at the bases be added to the expenses to be paid by the German Government. The representatives of the British Army declared themselves in agreement with this proposition inasmuch as it is in part due to the occupation that the lines of occupation have to be maintained.

General Ronneaux remarked, that it would doubtless be difficult to admit that the maintenance of troops stationed outside of the zone of occupation be a burden upon the German Government, but that in any case the question would need further attentive study.

Moreover, it was important to remember that if the lines of communication are maintained, it is not as a result of the 9th Article of the Armistice Agreement, but because of the state of war which continued to exist in spite of the Armistice Agreement.

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**Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 7, 1919.*

No. 41

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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13. Expenses of the Allied Armies of Occupation: The Committee recently appointed to consider the question of the expenses of the Allied Armies of Occupation, report that as a result of their meeting this morning there seems to be a general agreement that expenses should be figured under the three following heads:

1st, - Pay and allowances of all officers, enlisted men and civilians, other than Germans.

2d, - Cost of all consumable articles, which is to include the cost of transportation, handling and administration.

3d, - Wear and tear on materials including replacement. The foregoing was but an informal agreement. It was believed that better results would be obtained by treating of the subject in a general way rather than attempting to specify in detail just what items should come under each heading.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Coal and Coke**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 7, 1919.*

No. 41

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Failure of the Germans to Furnish Coal and Coke: General Nudant informed the Germans that all the great blast furnaces still at work in the Province of LORRAINE, especially the factories of WENDAHL (sic) will be inactive tomorrow on account of receiving neither coal nor coke which was to have been furnished by Germany. The situation is serious since it carries with it the throwing out of work of a large number of men. "I beg you to protest with all insistence to the German delegates and to call upon them to furnish coal and coke at once to the factories on the left bank of the RHINE. You will let me know immediately the results obtained. Instructions have been given the railroad committees so that all necessary cars will be furnished to transport this coal." He called the attention of the German delegates to the fact that this is a failure on their part to carry out the Armistice Agreement, and that he held in reserve all measures that will have to be taken to assure the making good of all damages that may be caused.

Minister von Haniel then announced that in compliance with General Nudant's wishes he had telegraphed it immediately to BERLIN in the most energetic form possible. He also announced that the National Commissioner for the Disposition of Coal had given orders immediately that coal and coke should be delivered at once. He stated that he had not yet received a reply from BERLIN; that he presumed the delay was caused by the unrest and street troubles occurring in BERLIN. He further announced that this morning he had tried to get telephonic communications on this subject but that they were broken. That he would follow the matter up during the day.

General Nudant replied that no coal had been received since December 5, that it was very strange that if the Coal Commissioner gave orders on December 24, that no coal or coke should have been received up to January 6. He called attention to the fact that in the regions from which this coal must come, that there had been no unrest; that up to seven o'clock last night communications with BERLIN were still open, and it seemed very strange that no steps had been taken to correct this matter.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Requisitioning of Property in Alsace-Lorraine**

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, January 7, 1919.*

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission.

According to information received, the French Government has ordered the requisitioning of the property of all subjects of the German Nation living in ALSACE-LORRAINE who are not of ALSACE-LORRAINE birth. The purpose of this requisitioning is said to be the security for the demands that France will make on Germany.

As this information has naturally awakened the greatest unrest in the circles concerned, I request on behalf of the German Government information as to whether these reports are based upon a true condition of affairs.

Further, I will be grateful for information as to whether and when a possibility will be offered expelled people of ALSACE-LORRAINE to get into direct communication concerning their material interests.

v. HANIEL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1213: Letter

**Delivery of Rolling Stock**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 7, 1919.*

No. 41

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

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12. Receipt of Locomotives and Cars: The Committee on Receipt of Locomotives and Cars submitted a report showing the number of locomotives and cars that were submitted for inspection at each of the reception points. This report shows that the total received up to January 5, was---locomotives 1,790, cars 59,482. The attention of the Germans was called to the fact that many locomotives are idle on account of the failure of the Germans to provide crews. To which the Germans replied that although they had done everything possible to secure protection for such personnel, that they had been badly treated in many instances. He read an article from a French newspaper in which a train accident was

alleged to be a German felony and due to viciousness of the German personnel.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 5: Telegram

***Creation of Interallied Economic Committee***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 8, 1919.*

To: Chief of Staff, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Number 157-4. With view to establishing between the Allies a common policy of civil economic administration in occupied territory, Marshal Foch has addressed a letter to General Pershing creating an Interallied Economic Committee, which will be given large powers to determine its own organization and action. This letter requests that an officer be detailed to represent American Army on this Committee. This Committee will meet at 15 h., January 12, at Marshal Foch's Headquarters in Hotel de Cologne, LUXEMBURG. Delegate from Allied Headquarters and chairman will be Engineer General Mangas. This Committee will consider: 1, distribution of raw material; 2, distribution of manufactured products; 3, export permits; 4, general supervision of production. If desirable Interallied Economic Committee will include representatives of Interallied Field Railway and Field Navigation Commissions. Interallied Economic Commission will be responsible for execution of policy of the Interallied Governmental Committee which is now being discussed by representatives of Allied Governments at PARIS. Copies of this message forwarded G-4, G. H. Q., and Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs, Advance G. H. Q.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,  
1st Lt., General Staff.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 5: Instruction

***Constitution of Interallied Economic Committee***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 2809/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 8, 1919.*

1. An Interallied Economic Committee is established under the authority of the Marshal, C-in-C, Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.), General Control of the Territories, with the following powers:

- (a) Distribution of the raw material in general.
- (b) Distribution of manufactured goods.
- (c) Authorization of derogations for exportations.
- (d) To watch production and collect general information.

2. This Committee is constituted on the following lines:

One delegate of the Marshal, C-in-C of the Allied Armies (Engineer General Mangas) President

One delegate of the General, C-in-C, American Forces

One delegate of the C-in-C, Belgian Forces

One delegate of the C-in-C, French Forces

One delegate of the C-in-C, British Forces

To this Economic Committee when necessary will be added assistant delegates of the Interallied Commission of the Field Railways and Navigation.

3. This Committee will constitute under the authority of the military commander of the interested area *Sous-Commission Interalliee de District* in connection with the Interallied Field Railway Subcommission.

The district subcommissions will have technical delegates in the manufacturing centers.

4. The powers of the "Derogations Committee" at TREVES, which is actually working will be transferred to the Interallied Economic Committee. The attached appendix shows the whole of the Interallied Economic Commission in the occupied area as it will function after the creation of the Economic Committee.

FOCH.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 8, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX GIVING THE INTERALLIED ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

No. 2810

1. Interallied Government Committee at PARIS. Settles questions of principle and the economical policy of the Allies.

The constitution of this Committee is at the present time under consideration by the different governments.

2. Interallied Economic Committee under the authority of the Marshal, C-in-C, Allied Armies.

(a) Carries out the directions given by the above Government Committee. Provisional and urgent measures.

(b) Division of raw material and goods.

Derogations for exportation.

Watches the production.

General information.

3. Economic District Subcommission under the authority of the commanders of Armies of the occupied areas technically under the control of the Interallied Economic Committee.

4. Interallied Commission for Field Railways will send delegates to the Interallied Economic Committee.

5. Interallied Navigation Commission will send delegates to the Interallied Economic Committee.

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**Notes on Formation of Allied Economic Committee**

ADVANCE SECTION, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 8, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM for Chief of Staff:

1. Principal points to the conference at LAMORLAYE, January 5, were as follows:

First, concerning distribution of products from east of the RHINE in the country west of the RHINE and the reverse. The French proposed a primary committee to regulate this. The first question raised was where such a committee would sit, it being stated that the German corresponding organizations were at COLOGNE and COBLENZ. The French asked which place the Americans would prefer to which General Smith and I replied that we would prefer to go to COLOGNE. The British stated that they would prefer to have it go to COBLENZ. There was much discussion on this subject and eventually it was wished on us and it goes to COBLENZ. General Smith stated that he did not believe in this committee anyway, that it had no functions, that we were overrun with numerous committees which acted as an aid to an organ which could take part of the commanding officer's authority away from him and yet could exercise no authority of their own. He stated that we already had too many committees and hoped that no more would be formed. This discussion finally led us to the functions of this committee and as to whether it should be formed or not. It was eventually decided that it should be formed and at COBLENZ.

The French then asked how many American officers of technical experience we could furnish for service on the committee so that we would have officers in all German industrial plants west of the RHINE. General Smith replied that we would furnish all that we needed in the American zone and that we wanted it distinctly understood that those we furnished would be used in the American zone, and that no others would be. This was most unsatisfactory to the French who insisted that this interallied committee should have placed at its disposal a number of officers of each of the Allied forces and that the committee should then distribute these throughout all the occupied territory as the committee saw fit: Putting both French and British officers into the industrial plants in American territory and American officers into the plants of British and French territory. General Smith and I stated that this would not be satisfactory to the American forces, that we would furnish the necessary men to supervise within our own district but that we did not want our men to be distributed all over, and that we did not want to have those of the other nationalities put within our territory. The discussion was long; sometimes rather violent. The subject was finally dropped without a decision, with the understanding that it would be brought up in the form of a written document.

During this discussion I stated that the action of all of these numerous interallied committees was not authoritative until confirmed by the respective headquarters, no matter what the subject considered. This provoked more or less discussion, the British agreeing with me and the French trying to hold that any one of these numerous committees when passing on an action, that such action was binding. I finally said that the French themselves did not observe this rule as they had frequently disavowed the action of committees. They called on me to state instances which I said was entirely unnecessary, but as they insisted rather violently that I state instances, I did state two. Then they said that it was the Marshal's orders, as if that settled the question. However, it was made plain to them that the actions of all these numerous committees would not be considered final unless they had been confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief.

They then brought up the question of the formation of an interallied finance committee. General Smith reiterated his objection to these numerous committees, stating that it was entirely unnecessary, and that he proposed that it not be formed. After considerable discussion it was stated that this proposition would be submitted to the various commanders-in-chief in writing. General Smith then proposed paying cash for requisitions in all places in the occupied territory, instead of giving I. O. U.'s. The French stated that they would forward this proposition to Marshal Foch, with their approval. The British said that they were doubtful of the expediency. The Belgians objected violently to paying cash. It was explained to them that this cash was German money, that the Germans would have to put up in advance and that the Belgians would have to expend not one cent of their own money - the object being to see that the individuals were paid and that the loss came on the German Government. The Belgians still objected. The question will be submitted to Marshal Foch and will probably be brought up at a later sitting.

From the way things are running at the headquarters at LAMORLAYE and from statements of Lieutenant Chapin and also from my own observations I am satisfied that the headquarters there has practically nothing to do with Marshal Foch. It is purely a political affair run by civilian politicians who give orders in Marshal Foch's name. Lieutenant Chapin who is stationed there all the time told me definitely that he knew that certain orders were written by one of these civilians and issued in the name of Marshal Foch.

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LeROY ELTINGE,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1199: Order

### ***Cooperation with French in Reconstruction***

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*France, January 8, 1919.*

FROM: Commanding General, Second Army

TO: Commanding Generals, VI and XI Corps, 5th, 7th, 28th, 33d, 35th 79th, and 88th  
Divs. and Commanding Officers, Army Troops, Second Army

1. The French Government is engaged in creating an organization for the reconstruction of liberated regions in France. The general plan under which this organization will operate is outlined in note attached herewith from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated January 3, 1919.

2. The Army commander desires that the Second Army will cooperate to the fullest extent with the French in this matter, to foresee difficulties and to provide for their avoidance and, in general, to render to the French authorities all assistance within its power. In order to accomplish this hearty cooperation and to avoid any possibility of friction, and so that subordinate commanders may have early warning of their duties and responsibilities in this connection, the following outline of the Army commander's views and his interpretation of the extent to which it is possible to cooperate under the plan, as laid down in the accompanying note, is published for the information of those concerned:

(a) Cooperation with the French in preparation for this work will commence at once, notwithstanding the fact that the organization will not begin its actual labors until January 15.

(b) In each corps and division affected, an experienced officer - preferably the A. C. of S., G-1, - will be designated, by name, and will be placed in charge of carrying out the details of this cooperation under the direct supervision of his commanding general.

(c) In view of the fact that in each canton there will be 150 workmen for whom quarters in villages will be necessary, local commanding officers will make recommendations for such redistribution of their troops as will assure that number of billets remaining available for the French troops and, in addition, they will be prepared to provide accommodations for the returning French civil population. The redistribution of troops throughout the liberated regions will be supervised by the corps and division commanders concerned and by commanders of Army troops, who will, if necessary, make application to these headquarters for necessary increases in billeting areas to provide for this spreading out. Every village occupied by American troops in the area under consideration should have accommodations available for the purposes indicated above.

Inasmuch as the French policy of reconstruction is to begin rebuilding those towns in the devastated regions which are at present least destroyed, it is evident that it will be necessary for commanding officers to provide the necessary space in such towns and villages in the first instance. It is also apparent that it is towns of this nature, that is, partially destroyed, which will first be reoccupied by the returning civil inhabitants.

Division and corps staff officers charged with cooperation with the French in this matter, as well as the local commanders concerned, will without delay call upon the French authorities and make known to them the general tenor of these instructions, and will arrange to cooperate with them. It is essential that a close, personal touch shall be maintained between the American and French authorities in order to provide for the smooth and efficient conduct of this great undertaking.

(d) No restrictions will be placed by commanding officers upon the entry of French workmen or German prisoners under their charge into the cantons, where they will undertake their work. They will be permitted to bring in the necessary material, machinery, tools, etc., required for the accomplishment of their work. The use of German material now guarded by American troops may be used after obtaining authority from these headquarters. Applications therefore will state the exact articles, amounts and condition thereof.

(e) Cooperation with the French in regard to furnishing necessary transportation for supplies and material for workmen over railroads used by the Second Army will be arranged for by G-4, Second Army, who will assist in this matter to the limit of the capacity of his rail transportation after providing for the indispensable American supply for which he is responsible. The 60-centimeter railroad, both American and French, will be left in place, repaired insofar as means will permit, and kept in condition for use in this project.

(f) In regard to the use of motor transportation for this work, the policy of the Army commander is one of liberality consistent with the great demands already made on this means of transportation. Motor trucks will be furnished whenever available, after providing for the necessary work of supply and salvage now being performed. Motor trucks will not be permanently assigned to the work of reconstruction but it is desired to honor requests for motor trucks for specific tasks at times when the trucks are available.

(g) Attention is invited to General Orders No. 242, Section V, 1918, G. H. Q., American E. F., which prohibits further destruction or demolition of any buildings, installations or utilities, no matter what their present condition may be, in the devastated regions. Violations of this prohibition will be severely dealt with.

(h) At a later date orders will issue changing the western boundary of the American zone to coincide with certain French departmental boundaries. At such time commanding officers will provide, without further instructions, for guarding any American supplies which it will be necessary to leave in the areas to be vacated by the Second Army it will not be possible to remove. A report of guard detachments left for this purpose will be made direct to G-3, Second Army, at the proper time.

(i) Copy of map showing the location of cantons within the area of the Second Army will be furnished as soon as completed.

(j) Col. David L. Stone, G. S., A. C. of S., G-1, Second Army, is designated as in charge of cooperation in reconstruction of the liberated regions described above, insofar as it affects the area occupied by the Second Army. All correspondence on this subject will be addressed to the Commanding General, Second Army, Attention G-1.

By command of Lieutenant General Bullard:

STUART HEINTZELMAN,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

### **German Prisoners**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 82/1.19.U/Wako 5358

*Spa, January 8, 1919.*

General Winterfeldt to General Nudant

Among those upon whom the Armistice conditions fall heaviest are the German prisoners of war and civil prisoners.

Whereas the prisoners of war and civil prisoners of the Entente immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice were able to return to their homes, the fate of German prisoners of war and civil prisoners is for the present veiled in obscurity. The arrangement of their repatriation is put off until the conclusion of a preliminary peace. Since for the present it is not known how long this period of time will be, it appears to be an urgent law of humanity to mitigate the fate of these innocent victims of the war as far as possible in the meantime.

It is reminded that immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice extensive liberties were granted to the Entente prisoners of war up to the time that they could be repatriated. I, therefore, beg the consideration of the following measures in favor of the German prisoners of war and civil prisoners:

(1) Considerable alleviation of postal regulations; abrogation of the rule that letters must lie ten days before forwarding; a disuse of the Bureau de Renseignement for letters emanating from and destined for the occupied zone; disuse or alleviation of the censorship. In the present circumstances the circuitous route through neutral countries for prisoners' letters might be avoided. It is, therefore, requested that the letters be delivered directly across the RHINE via some border post office which may be designated, perhaps ELBERFELD. A similar alleviation has to our gratification been made for letters destined to the left of the RHINE.

(2) Payment of prisoners of war according to the scale of wages for free workmen in the country concerned, and either in full payment when the prisoners are unable to secure their own rations, or by furnishing rations and the full payment of the remaining amount due.

(3) The greatest freedom for neutral commissions to visit German prisoners of war in all camps in the Allied countries and in the former zone of the Army. Similar permission for German Red Cross Delegates, German medical personnel, "Sisters" [nurses], and chaplains is desired. In reference to the last request special attention is called to the good effect brought about by the visit of General Dupont and the gentlemen of the Allied Commission to German prison camps, which was emphasized by the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission. I request that these proposals be brought as quickly as possible to the attention of the Allied Governments and to that of the United States and that these measures be recommended.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
 PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 9, 1919.*

No. 43

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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9. Prisoners of war remaining in Germany on January 5, 1919: The Germans submitted the following list of Allied prisoners of war remaining in Germany on January 5, 1919:

	OFFICERS	MEN
French	808	69,620
English	6	4,773
Belgian	457	11,756
Italians	14	26,831
Portuguese	--	816
Serbian	--	12,432
American	--	17
	-----	-----
	*1,285	*126,245

\* These do not include the sick and wounded.

The Chairman of the Committee on Prisoners of War states that the seventeen American prisoners shown above is not intended to include such as may be sick in hospitals or stragglers or who may have left the prison camps.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
 Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
 Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 14: Telegram

**Red Cross Financially Prepared to Aid Russian Prisoners**

Received at G. H. Q., A. E. F.

NR 4 US 101 OB

Spa, Belgium, Jan. 9 FLD 1300

Chief of Staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Number 242. Following telegram received this date repeated: "P 61. Can you get in touch with Hoover? Secretary Meyemburg of International Red Cross at BERNE informs me that his organization is financially prepared to fatten German rations of Russian prisoners of war, but does not know where to get necessary food supplied. Any information which will enable me to bring buyer and seller together will be appreciated. The Russians are suffering greatly and money is of no use to them. Signed Harries."

BARNUM. 2:12 p. m.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

**German Liaison Officers not Permitted**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 9, 1919.*

No. 43

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

3. Request for German Liaison Officers: The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, informs the German High Command that no German liaison officers will be permitted with the Allied commands in the occupied zone. Liaison will be maintained by Allied officers being attached to the German commands opposite.

The foregoing is the approval by Marshal Foch of the recommendation made by General Nudant and referred to in my report of January 5.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Delivery of German Trucks**

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 2871/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
January 9, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant Chapin, Chief of the American Mission with the D. G. C. R. A.

In order to follow the execution of the Armistice Convention, it is necessary that the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, receive each day exact information upon the delivery of German camions to each Army.

I shall, therefore, be obliged if you will be good enough to inform me daily before 20 hours, the total number of camions received by your Army from Nov. 11 until the evening of the preceding day. (sic)

This question is particularly important at this time when the Armistice is about to be renewed.

Ch. PAYOT.

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AFG-OCCA.;Fldr. XX: Telegram

**Economic Conference at Luxemburg**

RECEIVED AT

18A K99 OB

G. H. Q., A. E. F., Chaumont, Jan. 9, 1919---3:15 p. m.

General H. A. Smith

Adv. F. G. Q., Treves

Reference telegram recd. today from Chapin stating Marshal Foch is creating Interallied Economic Committee which will meet at his Headquarters Hotel de Cologne, Luxemburg, at 15 h., January 12, copy of which telegram was furnished you by Chapin, the Commander-in-Chief directs that you and Eltinge both attend the conference and that you ascertain what the scope and intentions really are inasmuch as its objects stated in telegram appear to be very indefinite get in communication with Eltinge and give him these instructions. Acknowledge receipt.

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

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**Removal of Industrial Machinery**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 9, 1919.*

No. 43

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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11. Visit to Factories in LIEGE: The undersigned made a visit to the city of LIEGE on January 8 for the purpose of visiting factories which have been destroyed or robbed of their machinery by the Germans. This visit was made after an appointment with a gentleman of large manufacturing interests in LIEGE who accompanied me to these factories and arranged for a thorough inspection of them.

Accompanying this report is one set of photographs [not available] showing in some cases conditions prior to destruction, but mostly conditions after the Germans had left.

That part of the plant shown in each picture is marked on the back.

Following the inspection of these blast furnaces, we visited one of the large steel mills of LIEGE and were escorted through the works by the proprietor. The destruction here was not so great, but the machinery of this vast plant has almost all of it been removed. The proprietor stated that not to exceed two per cent of the machinery remained.

This plant formerly employed seven thousand men and covered many acres of ground. Some parts of the plant have been destroyed by the removal of the roof and the steel frame work supporting it.

The management now has a few men at work cleaning up the place and preparing to reestablish it as fast as opportunity will permit.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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***Return of Industrial Machinery***

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I.

No. 843

*Spa, January 9, 1919.*

Representative of the German Government

To Chairman of Allied Armistice Commission

In the negotiations between the United States and the German Government which preceded the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, the Allied Governments declared on November 5, with the consent of President Wilson, that the "Occupied areas must not only be evacuated and freed, but also restored" and "that Germany must repay all the damages that her attacks by land, by water and by air had caused the civilian peoples, of the Allies, and their property".

President Wilson declared himself expressly in agreement with this statement. The German Government has decided to carry out sincerely the regulation for the reparation of damages, which has already been determined exhaustively in preparation, for the coming peace compact. And so there is complete agreement between the German Government and the demand of the note of Marshal Foch of January 5 insofar as that note demands the "immediate return in nature or in satisfactory substitute of equal worth" of the entire materiel that had been carried away by Germany from the occupied areas and is therefore lacking; but the final complete regulation of the details of this question may hold over for the Peace Agreement for the conclusion of which the German Government has repeatedly made urgent demand. Therefore the German Government is not in a position to meet the desired demands in carrying out the conditions of the Armistice Agreement and thereby prejudice the Peace Agreement. However, the German Government declares itself ready, as was expressly stated in the proposition of January 4, to put at the disposal of the French and Belgian delegates immediately all of the machinery that came from the occupied areas that can be given back without further trouble, likewise to put at their disposal immediately that machinery that has been sold to German war industries and which can be brought back by agreement with the present owners, and finally to arrange agreements with the Belgian and French delegates concerning the time limit and the quantities in which machinery is to be delivered as a substitute for that requisitioned in the occupied territories.

The preparatory work for the return of this machinery is already started. As soon as the French and Belgian delegates have reached a conclusion as to the list and classification of deliveries of the individual types of machines the restitution can begin. As far as the delivery of substitute materiel is concerned, the German Government cannot enter into binding conclusions until the conclusion of peace, and only then under the conditions that the necessary materiel for the provisioning of the German people and the reconstruction of German economic life will be omitted from the required deliveries.

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***Germans Traveling by Sea; German Coasting Vessels***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 9, 1919.*

No. 43

FROM: Acting Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Status of German Subjects Met With on the High Seas: Marshal Foch informs the German High Command that the question of Germans travelling on the high seas has been turned over for consideration to the Naval Section of the Armistice Commission; meanwhile the French Admiralty has decided that in conformance with the requirements of Article 26 of the Armistice, German subjects that are met on the high seas will be arrested as they were before the Armistice went into effect.

5. Use of German steamers to carry food stuffs between German ports: General Haking, head of the British Section of the Armistice Commission, informed the Germans that he had received a reply to their request forwarded by the German delegate of the Prisoners of War Subcommittee in which the latter desire to use German coasting vessels for the movement of prisoners of war and to carry foodstuffs to them.

General Haking stated that the commissioners of the British Admiralty had decided that such vessels could not be used for the purpose requested as it would be in contravention to Article 6 of the Armistice.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Passes for German Elections***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 233/G

*Spa, January 9, 1919.*

General Nudant, President of the Permanent International Armistice Commission

To General von Winterfeldt, President of the German Armistice Commission

The following instructions have been given by the General commanding the Group of French Armies of Occupation in the RHINE territory in regard to German elections:

1. Entry into the RHINE Countries:

(a) For the elections to the National Constituent Assembly---Requests for passes that emanate from the German national officers of the interior will be the only ones allowed.

(b) For the Elections for the Individual States of Germany---passes will be delivered upon the request of the Ministers of the Interior of the Individual States regularly in office on November 11, 1918, or who have in the normal course of events succeeded the Minister of Interior who was in that office on that date.

2. Exit from the Rhine Countries [Territories]: There will be allowed as well for the elections to the Constituent Assembly as for the elections for the Individual States, all the requests drawn up by the high German administrative authorities of the occupied countries who are regularly in office. These authorities will be responsible for the announcements that are made, and must transmit with the announcements all the requests that they receive.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 107: Minutes

***Agreement by Subcommittee on Maintenance***

[Contemporary Translation]

*Spa, January 9, 1919.*

UNDERCOMMISSION OF THE ARMISTICE 9th ARTICLE

MEETING OF JANUARY 9, 1919

Following four preparatory conferences held on January 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1919, the members of the Interallied Under commission charged with preparing the application of the clauses of the 9th Article of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, have unanimously admitted that the meaning to be attributed to the 2d paragraph of the said article was to be the following:

All through the duration of the present Armistice, which involves war occupation, the maintenance expenses for troops of occupation of the Rhine territories must be understood to mean all the expenses imposed to the Allied Governments by the daily life of the occupying troops, as well as those involved by their obligation to constantly maintain these troops to their fixed effective force, and in condition which would allow them at any time to resist any attack or to immediately resume the hostilities.

Resulting from this definition the maintenance expenses must include not only those relating to feeding the personnel and animals, the lodging and quartering of same, but also the expenses occasioned by the payment and its accessories, the wages and salary, the billeting, the heat and light, clothing, equipment and harnessing, armament and rolling stock, the air service, the attendance of sick and wounded, the veterinary and remount service, the transportation service of any nature (by rail, sea or river, motor trucks, etc.) the service of communications and correspondence,---and in general, the expenses of all the administrative and technical services, the operation of which is necessary to the instruction of the troops and to the maintenance of their effective and military force.

The members of the Interallied Undercommission of the 9th Article being in complete accord, have deemed useful, at the time of undertaking a detailed study of the question, to sign the present document destined to precise the charges of the German Government and to avoid divergences of interpretation and useless discussions.

Made at SPA on January 9, 1919.

The delegate for the American  
Army:

John A. Cutchins,  
Major G. S., Am. E. F.

The delegates for the British Army:  
Hon. M. A. Wingfield, Brig. Gen.  
H. R. Satow, Major

The delegate for the  
Belgian Army, Hamelrycke,  
Intendant 2d Classe.

For the French Army:  
Guiot S/Intendant  
Chauzac.

RONNEAUX,  
The General, President.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1214: Note

### ***Circulation and Communications in Occupied Zones***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. A. A. I. 384

*Spa, January 10, 1919.*

Representative of German Government

To Chief of British Armistice Mission

The German authorities in the Government districts of COLOGNE and AIX-la-CHAPELLE are complaining about the exaggerated limitations of communications by telephone and telegraph. Only the most urgent official, professional and commercial conversations are allowed. The smaller connecting lines have been placed entirely out of use.

At St-VITH, smallpox broke out and the District Councillor could not get in communication with the doctors of the district. Upon a request being submitted by the President of the Government to the British Government at COLOGNE, communication was immediately allowed. But in the meantime so much time had been lost that the disease had spread very far. It is desirable that complete freedom of communication by telephone be allowed within the occupied area.

Communication by telegraph has been limited in the same way as communication by telephone and in addition has been subjected to censor. Telegrams are accepted only at 25 telegraph stations. They must first be sent to the authorities of the community and after

that to the censor, thereby great delay occurs. It is desired that the limitations on communication by telegraph within the occupied areas be removed.

The British military authorities have the intention to subject postal communications to the same limitations in the same manner as the telephone and telegraph, and subject all letters to censor. These measures, which are not caused in any way by the behavior of the people, are extremely severe and irritating. They will affect to an extreme degree all of the official economic communication inside of the occupied areas. It is desired that no limitation of censor be imposed upon the postal communications in the occupied areas.

The circulation between the towns of the occupied areas is now so far improved that circulation is allowed inside of a community without any special pass. But on the contrary, circulation between towns is allowed only upon presentation of a pass, but the obtaining of a pass is accompanied by such difficulties and unpleasantnesses that it is almost made impossible. It is desired that complete freedom be allowed for all circulation of individuals within the areas occupied by the enemy Armies.

I am requested by the German Government to request that satisfaction be given to these justifiable desires of the authorities of the Rhine Provinces.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1287-C: Letter

***Report on Internal Germany***

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE,  
*Paris, January 10, 1919.*

Joseph C. Grew, Esquire,

Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Extract]

Sir:

I have the honor to submit herewith the following report of a journey to Germany, covering the period from December 27, 1918, to January 5, 1919.

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II. General Attitude of the German People: Taken as a whole, the Germans fully realize that they have lost the war and that the situation which faces them is one of extreme difficulty. The general sentiment is of utter depression, and apathy and inertia are everywhere noticeable. At the same time, the old habits of order and discipline have not been superseded, except in isolated instances, and the outward life of the people, as observed in the streets, theatres, restaurants, etc., is not changed. While crime is said to be on the increase, the mass of the people is well-behaved and orderly, and even on such occasions as New Year's Eve, no evidence of riotous behavior of any kind was observed.

Among the people at large, any return to military activity is looked upon with the utmost aversion, and the returning soldiers are almost all only anxious to go back to their families and to take up civil occupations.

The places of entertainment are all crowded and there is an evident desire to forget

the war and its consequences as soon as possible. The effort is, however, hardly successful, and little real gaiety is seen anywhere. The streets are alive until late at night.

III. Analysis of Present Political Situation: The following is a rough outline of the composition of the more important parties. These are, however, changing from day to day, and any analysis, to be correct, needs constant revision.

1. Majority Socialist Party: This is now in control of the Government, and maintains its hold through disposing of the best party organization and by its homogeneity. The leaders, though generally without experience in administering Government affairs, are practical common sense men of moderate ideas. While they have not abandoned their views of an ultimate social reorganization of the State, in accordance with the ideas of Karl Marx and other Socialist writers, they see the necessity of postponing the full realization of these views until order has been entirely restored. They also appreciate the necessity of working together with the members of the new Democratic Party and other moderates in order to stabilize the Government.

Besides the lack of governmental experience, the chief handicap of the party has hitherto been its great disinclination to extreme measures against the fanatical groups involving bloodshed. A deliberate attempt has been made to avoid a clash at any cost before the elections, but it now seems that this will have to be abandoned, and the appointment of a strong man, Noske, about a fortnight ago, to take charge of the military situation is a sign that a determined effort will be made to keep the Anarchists under control.

The Cabinet now includes five Socialist members: Ebert, Scheidemann, Noske, Wissel and Landsberg.

Of these, Ebert, the head of the Government is universally respected, and has a strong hold, both inside and outside his Party. He makes an impression of great honesty and sincerity, but it may be questioned whether his ability is adequate to cope with the intensely difficult situation, and whether his forcefulness is sufficient to control the disorderly element outside of his Party. He is a self-made man, the son of a tailor, and was himself brought up to the saddler's trade. He has acquired considerable education, and expresses himself with clearness and even eloquence.

Scheidemann, also a man of humble origin, who began life as a printer's apprentice, has more brilliant gifts than Ebert, but is less free from self-effacement, and unlimited political ambitions are attributed to him.

Noske is a man of little education, but has a very strong personality, and his chances of controlling the parties of disorder are good. His success at KIEL, which led to his present appointment, is evidence of his power and willingness to use an iron fist.

Wissel is Minister of Education, but neither he nor Landsberg, the remaining Socialist member of the Government, is especially prominent at present.

To sum up the strength and weakness of the Government, it may be affirmed with some certainty that it is gaining rather than losing. The resignation of the Independent Socialists has given it a freer hand. Its elements of strength are:

- (a) Close touch with and control of the masses.
- (b) A constructive program and political initiative.
- (c) Its moderation and willingness to cooperate with moderate men of other parties.

The elements of weakness are as follows:

- (a) The inexperience of the leading party members in actual government, their previous activity having been confined to party and parliamentary work.
- (b) The fact that the prominent members have now no time for public propaganda.
- (c) The disinclination of the Government to shed blood, at least before the elections, if it can be possibly avoided.
- (d) The lack of a real military organization at the present moment, and the necessity of creating a national army.

In addition, in BAVARIA, the Party is handicapped by an Independent Socialist, Eisner, being nominally in control as Prime Minister. Here the man best fitted to head the Government is undoubtedly Auer, a man of obscure origin, but who appears to be possessed of constructive ideas, and of energy to carry them out, and who has the respect of all moderate parties.

2. Independent or Minority Socialists: This Party, at the present moment, is in a state of disorganization. While it is far more radical than the Majority Socialists in its insistence on the immediate institution of far-reaching Socialist measures, it has for the most part shrunk from cooperating with the Spartacus adherents. The result is that it has been losing in influence, the Right Wing of the Party joining the Majority Socialists, while some of the Extremists have been won over to Liebnrecht. The leaders of the Party are Hoffman, Barth, Dittmann, Cohn, and Ledebour.

3. Spartacus or Bolshevistic Groups: These comprise several different factions, such as the followers of Liebnrecht, the Anarchists, and the Communists, who may properly be considered together, as the aims of all appear the same, and as they are all closely allied to Russian Bolshevism. The movement is led by radical fanatics, who are, with few exceptions, foreigners or Jews. It is composed of:

(a) Professional and theoretical agitators.

(b) Laborers who have hitherto received extravagant wages for their work in war industries (schwerasbeiter).

(c) Young uneducated soldiers.

(d) Fanatical women such as take part in all revolutions.

The strength of the Party lies in:

(a) The serious food and economic situation, resulting in hunger, disease and unemployment.

(b) A nervous collapse, due in the first place to defeat, and in the second to under-nutrition.

(c) The old agitation of labor against capital, strengthened by the collapse of the Capitalistic Regime.

(d) The entire freedom from scruples of any kind on the part of the leaders and their willingness to go to all extremes.

(e) The fact that the Party has obtained, in a large measure, the control of arms and munitions, including especially machine guns.

(f) The fact that they are in control of large sums of money obtained principally from Russian sources.

(g) The fact that the leaders are not in the Government, and therefore free to agitate on the outside.

The weakness of the Party appears to be due to the following considerations:

(a) The people whom they wish especially to control, i. e., the mass of the populace, are not particularly amenable to their influence. The German proletariat are far better educated, much less easily led and much more attached to order and discipline than the Russians.

(b) The widespread knowledge of the true state of affairs in Russia.

(c) The fact that the Party has no well defined and constructive programme, but is in its essence destructive.

(d) The lack of distinguished leaders.

4. German Democratic Party: This consists of a conglomeration of the liberal elements of several parties, and includes the former Progressive Party and the Left Wing of the National Liberal and Centre Parties. Their aim is to establish a permanent republic on democratic lines, excluding however, the social reorganization to which the Majority Socialists are committed. Their ideal is a revival of the Republic of 1848, under the black, red and gold flag. Their tendency is antimilitaristic, and they derive their strength from the middle classes and from men of moderate incomes who wish an

orderly and moderate government, without marked social changes. They will be willing to join the Majority Socialists in a coalition government, should the latter not have an absolute majority. The weakness of the Party lies in the fact that it is composed of heterogeneous elements and includes among its prominent men a number of professors and other theorists. Among the leaders and founders of the Party are Theodor Wolff, Naumann (known as the Chief Exponent of the Mittel-Europa scheme), Dr. Dernburg, Professor Delbrueck, Max Warburg, Prince Max of BADEN, and others.

While forecasts of the election are unreliable, it seems certain that the Party will poll a large vote and will be a strong factor in framing the new constitution.

5. German People's Party, or Christian People's Party: This consists of the Right Wing of the former Centre Party and includes the Clerical Party, which is especially strong in Bavaria, and which is fighting the separation of the church and state. The Party is bourgeois, republican and not markedly reactionary, but is more opposed to all Socialistic measures than the Democratic Party.

6. German National Popular Party: Comprises the former Conservatives and the Right Wing of the National Liberals. The leaders are Stresemann and Heydebrand. This Party is also professedly republican, but its tendency is distinctly reactionary, and should the Liberals be unable to form a stable government, it may be looked on to make an attempt to revive the monarchy in one form or another.

In some sections, especially in Bavaria, some of the old parties have maintained organizations and will put tickets into the field, but as far as can be ascertained, they will not form an important factor.

### III. Attitude of Social Classes:

1. The Junkers have retired entirely into the background, owing to the results of the war. The landowners, owing to their advocacy of the war to the last extremity and to their success in obtaining food supplies, are the most unpopular class in the community and no serious attempts are being made by them to influence public opinion. They are under such obloquy that they will not be able to assert themselves, if at all, for a long time to come. The same thing may be said of the large manufacturers and of the war profiteers, as well as of the officers of the Ludendorff regime, who have been eager to fight to the last. Their voices are not heard, and their newspapers have had to change their tone.

2. The intellectuals, including professors and others, have to a large extent joined the Major Socialist Party. Some are in the democratic ranks. They are not a strong influence at the present moment, due to their theoretic rather than practical views and their failure to agree on questions of policy.

3. The bankers and important merchants are extremely pessimistic and apathetic. They consider the financial condition of Germany almost beyond redemption and afraid of losing all they have.

4. The minor officials, small employees and tradesmen are proletarianized, orderly and in favor of a liberal and stable government, but are politically quite untrained.

5. The laboring classes are mainly reasonable and inclined to support the Majority Socialists. A serious danger exists, however, that by hunger, cold and lack of employment, they will come under the control of the radical revolutionaries.

IV. Attitude towards the Allies and the United States: The most conspicuous feature of all conversations which I had with all classes was the somewhat over-friendly disposition towards America and Americans. This is undoubtedly partly due to self-interest, but is also largely owing to the former close ties with America, to social, economic and financial intercourse which existed before the war, and to the large population of German extraction in the United States; also to an appreciation of the fact that America has no selfish ends to serve and to the hope that she may be induced to plead the German cause with her Allies. The result is that there is a strong wish to take up relations again with the United States at the same point where they were before the war, and the hope is cherished that the events of the war will be overlooked and condoned and that by the help

of America, Germany will be enabled to rehabilitate herself. It is perhaps needless to add that I was careful to give no encouragement to this desire for a policy of forgiving and forgetting.

It was suggested to me that the real advantages could be obtained for America if she consented to become the friend of the German people. One of the leading German financiers went so far as to explain that the nations predestined to bring order into Russia were evidently Germany and America; that America could not accomplish the task alone, and Germany had hitherto failed because of her lack of experience in dealing with the Russian people and her preoccupation with the war in other quarters, and that America would also fail if she acted alone because she would not understand the conditions in Russia, but Germany had now gained the necessary experience and together the two Governments could organize the whole country and develop its resources.

An attempt will also be made on the part of the financiers to obtain a loan for Germany.

Anxiety is expressed as to whether, after the war, there will be a market for German goods in America, and I was asked on several occasions whether a boycott would be put in force for a considerable time after the war.

As regards the Peace Conditions, it is hoped in Germany that America will prevent the infliction of terms so severe as to cripple the economic and commercial life of the country, which is stated to be necessary for the existence of the German people. Bitter complaints are heard on all sides on account of the alleged harshness of the terms of the Armistice, and the point most frequently brought up is that the forced giving up of rolling stock has practically stopped the transport of coal to many districts and has necessitated the closing of factories and unemployment of thousands of workmen. The occupation of the RUHR district and the possible loss of the SILESIA coal mines is also an especial source of anxiety. At MUNICH all factories were closed down for a period of ten days, up to January 1, owing to the coal shortage.

A further cause of complaint was the alleged embargo against allowing passage of goods from the right to the left bank of the RHINE, in other words, from the occupied to the unoccupied district, and vice versa. It was claimed that the consequence would be to prevent the important industries, such as textile concerns, from receiving supplies which would enable them to continue business.

Great emphasis was laid, by almost all persons with whom I talked, on the necessity of obtaining an immediate supply of raw materials, and it was even claimed by one or two that the supply of raw materials was more important for the rehabilitation of Germany than the food supply.

The invariable argument used by all persons with whom I came in contact was that the Bolshevik danger was real and pressing, and was constantly fed by the lack of food and by the unemployment due to stoppage of raw materials; that Bolshevism would spread all over Germany and infallibly from thence to the neighboring countries, and would ultimately affect the whole world; that it was in the power of the Entente to check the movement by energetic relief measures and by giving the German people a chance to rehabilitate themselves; that this could only be done by affording them the necessary help and by failing to demand huge indemnities and crushing conditions with which it would be impossible to comply.

From many quarters it was insistently urged that the Entente should issue a formal and specific declaration substantially to the following effect: that it would under no circumstances conclude peace except with a responsible and stable government, elected by the will of the people, and that it would not be able to furnish food and other supplies to the people of Germany unless such a government, capable of providing the required guarantees, could be established. Such a declaration would in their opinion have the greatest possible strengthening effect on the forces of law and order.

I was asked repeatedly by persons connected with the Government whether Count Bernstorff would be an acceptable person to represent Germany at the peace negotiations.

While I disclaimed giving anything but a personal opinion, I intimated that it would be, in my opinion, a great mistake, as in popular estimation, Count Bernstorff was held to have been the responsible head of the whole propaganda and espionage system in America and was emphatically an object of suspicion to the people at large. It seems probable that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau would be the principal delegate, if his health which is said to be delicate, would permit. Dr. Solf was also mentioned, as was Dr. Rathenau. Mr. Warburg expects to be the financial representative of the German Government. Besides this, it is undoubtedly planned to bring over a number of experts. It is assumed that elaborate peace negotiations between Germany and Entente will take place, in the course of which Germany will be allowed to explain her position at length, and it is hoped her views regarding the fourteen points of the President and the League of Nations will be sustained.

V. Possible developments. Constructive plans: It is believed, that while in the extremely confused state of affairs an accurate forecast is difficult, the moderate element will ultimately remain in the ascendant. No doubt serious trouble with the Anarchists is bound to take place, and very likely before the election at some time or other a serious clash is inevitable. It is, however, hardly possible that with the great majority of the German people opposed to them the Anarchist people can do more than obtain momentary triumphs. The Government both in Prussia and Bavaria is adopting a more resolute attitude, and it is not conceived that the elections can be prevented. With the National Assembly behind them, the present Government, with or without the support of additional members of other Parties, especially the German Democrats, should succeed in organizing a permanent government upon a republican basis.

What form of organization will eventually be established is now the subject of discussion, and in BERLIN a number of competent men are working at the task of framing a constitution. Of these, the most prominent is Professor Preuss, Minister of the Interior. The scheme favored by him is a confederation of states modelled on the American system with parliaments and a president or governor in each, and a central government with a president of strictly limited powers analogous to those of the French or Swiss President, together with a ministry responsible to a central parliament. Bodies akin to our Senate and Congress are proposed. Prussia would have its controlling influence weakened by being divided into four or five large states, and the Capital would be removed from BERLIN to some more central point, such as WIEMAR, ERFURT, or FRANKFORT.

The south Germans appear to be in general accord with this plan, and at the instigation of Minister Auer, it was proposed to hold a convention for the purpose, before the elections, of determining on forms of constitutions for the whole of Germany. Two or three delegates from each state were to have been sent to this convention. The scheme did not go through, owing to the opposition of Eisner and the apparent lack of interest of the Government at BERLIN in the proposal.

The danger of a monarchist reaction is, according to the concensus of opinion, remote. The general sentiment against the Hohenzollern dynasty is exceedingly strong, and there is a feeling that the latter has shown itself unworthy. In especial the former Emperor is an object even of contempt, due to the fact that in popular estimation his flight has branded him as a personal coward.

Whatever action may hereafter be taken in favor of a monarchy will therefore probably confine itself to an attempt to establish a constitutional form of government like England or Italy, under a non-Hohenzollern prince, possibly chosen from among the south Germans. Such elements as are likely to favor Monarchism are, first, the agrarians, secondly, the Catholic Church. These are, however, only marking time at present. Against any such reaction is, in the first place, the growth of Socialism, which will foster closer relations with the proletariat in republican governments; second, the disorganization of the Army, which is exhausted by fighting and wishes to shed no blood in furtherance of a monarchical form of government.

It seems probable that no monarchical government will have any chance of success for many years to come, unless;

(a) An undue extent of bona fide German territory or disputed territory is occupied by the Allies or by subject nationalities.

(b) The terms of peace are so harsh as in substance to reduce the German people to a state of slavery.

(c) A violent and arbitrary separation of Church and State lends fuel to the Catholic forces, which at present are in a state of inanition. This contingency applies in especial to Bavaria.

VI. Economic, Financial and Food Situation: In view of the fact that, as is understood, a commission will shortly visit Germany, including a number of specialists, in order to thoroughly investigate the economic and food situation, I made no especial effort to make a study of conditions of this nature. Some general impressions which I obtained in the course of conversation may be of use in order to furnish a rough outline.

The financial burdens which Germany will have to bear were described by bankers and others with whom I talked as well nigh hopeless. The country is practically bankrupt, and unless commerce can be restored, will be unable to meet the interest on the war loans, in addition to severe indemnities which may be imposed. The well-to-do are gloomily anticipating being shorn of all they have. By the latest tax proposals, the war profiteers are to be taxed out of 80% of their war gains. The large estates are to be divided up. The bankers are expecting to become insolvent, as security for their loans has vanished, and merchants complain that they cannot collect debts.

War industries have come to a standstill, and owing to the lack of raw materials the factories cannot be retransformed so as to take up their prewar activities. The seaports are centres of unrest on account of the large number of unemployed, and in HAMBURG alone, it is estimated that 40,000 persons are out of work. At the same time, the rate of wages remains high and ordinary laborers are demanding and receiving 7,200 marks a year, amounting at prewar rates to \$1,800 annually, and at the present value of German currency to be about \$900. In Bavaria and other places, the unemployed are being supported by the State, at a rate in some instances of 20 marks a day.

The purchasing power of the mark has about been cut in two. As an example, the taxicab drivers are demanding and receiving twice the registered fare. At the same time, the salaries of petty officials, railroad employees, teachers, etc., have seldom been increased, and the result is that these classes are suffering severely.

I only had opportunity to judge of the food situation in MUNICH and BERLIN. It is evident, however, that there is no danger of actual starvation for a number of months to come. The estimates vary from March 1 to June 15 as the period at which all stocks would be exhausted. It is probable that the last date is substantially correct. At the same time, the undernutrition is everywhere evident. Especially in BERLIN, but also in MUNICH, the people on the streets show marked signs of insufficient nutrition. The children have an anemic and delicate appearance compared with two years ago, and the older people also show signs of emaciation and lack of strength.

I was informed by one of the food experts that while it had been possible during the war to furnish 1,200 calories to each person, this now had to be reduced to 800 or 900. The normal allowance is, I am told, 3,000. The most evident need is fats of all kinds, the butter and margarine ratio being only 70 grammes per week. The bread is very poor and meat ration, 1/2 lb. per week, including bones, insufficient. The potato crop, according to personal statements which were made me, was much worse than has been admitted in the papers.

The system of food distribution has almost completely broken down and the result has been that the rich are often able to obtain sufficient supplies by paying exorbitant prices and by underhand methods of all kinds, which are now employed without hesitation. In some quarters of BERLIN even money cannot buy adequate rations. In the country stocks

which had been successfully concealed during the war are now being brought forth and sold at high prices. The incentive to this is partly the fear that a Bolshevist government may succeed in confiscating all food supplies and also to the expectation that when stocks are exhausted there will be help from outside.

The infant mortality is said to be terrible, and in general I was told that 800 more deaths occur daily throughout Germany than was the case before the war. Deaths were not directly due to starvation, but to wasting diseases caused by malnutrition. I was informed that cases of hunger oedema have been diagnosed by competent medical men as a result of living on full rations allowed by the Government.

VII. Recommendations: I venture to make the following suggestions:

(1) A commission of competent observers familiar with the German language should be organized and should proceed to Germany without delay, unless a condition of actual civil war arises within the next few days, in which case such a commission would probably attain no useful results. The members of this commission should be distributed throughout Germany. The points where it would seem advisable to place observers appear to be BERLIN, which would naturally be the centre of the organization and where the strongest force should be maintained; MUNICH; LEIPSIK or DRESDEN, probably the former; HAMBURG, FRANKFORT and BRESLAU. Such distribution should, however, be elastic and subject to change. The staff distributed outside of BERLIN should report there by telegram or mail, and cipher communication, which will be allowed by the German Government, should be arranged from there to PARIS. Great care should be taken of course, that only persons of good judgment and considerable experience shall be sent in. Persistent endeavors will be made to convert observers to German views, and objectivity and impartiality are absolute prerequisites. In this connection attention is called to the great undesirability of allowing the entry into Germany at present of American newspaper reporters, some of whom have already in several cases obtained interviews with German public men.

(2) A further commission to study the economic and food situation should also be sent immediately. Whether this could not be advantageously combined with the political commission is a question seriously to be considered. In this connection the question suggests itself whether preliminary arrangements for consignments of fats should not be undertaken at once.

(3) The coal situation should be made the subject of an immediate investigation, with the view of alleviating the very serious conditions which undoubtedly obtain in Bavaria and elsewhere at the present moment.

(4) I advise that an official statement of the kind above indicated relative to non-negotiation except with stable government elected by the will of the people and non-supply of food stuffs and other commodities except to a government capable of giving the necessary guarantees, be issued at the earliest moment possible. In view of the coming elections, the present moment seems especially indicated for such a statement.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

ELLIS LORING DRESEL.

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**Armistice Prolongation**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 10, 1919.*

No. 44

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Negotiations for Prolongation of the Armistice: The Germans announced that negotiations for the prolongation of the Armistice Agreement may take place on the morning of January 15, at TREVES.

They state that on this occasion it is assumed as understood that the representatives and the entire suite will be given personal liberty during their stay at TREVES, and also that they will be permitted the free use of the telegraph, telephone, and radio. They announce that the same representatives will be there as formerly.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Letter

**Summary of Trucks Delivered up to January 9**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,  
*January 10, 1919.*

Liaison Officer, G-4

Director General of Communication and Supply of the Armies

Motor Trucks Delivered under the Armistice.

1. I have the honor to inform you that the following deliveries of trucks took place on January 9, 1919. Seven 1st class trucks were delivered and accepted, no others

being presented. The trucks accepted on this date represent three from 2d class and four from 3d class, repaired and made suitable.

2. The totals for all classes are brought to the following figures by the operations stated above:

1st Class, i. e., inspected and accepted under the Armistice	825
2d Class, i. e., in need of light repairs	306
3d Class, i. e., in need of heavy repairs	242
4th Class, i. e., rejected	52
TOTAL	<u>1,425</u>

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,  
1st Lt., General Staff.

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193-28.3: Letter

### ***Abandoned Material***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*January 10, 1919.*

No. 8

From: Chief of Staff, Third Army

To: All Corps and Division Commanders and C. O., U. S. Troops,  
Coblenz, Germany

1. The Commanding General directs that you have the following order published for the guidance of the civilian population of the districts of Germany occupied by the American forces under your command:

a. Paragraph VI of the Armistice, signed November 11, 1918, is in part as follows:

Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact; so, also, military stores, food, munitions and equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

b. Pursuant to the above provisions of the Armistice all military stores, food, munitions and equipment which belonged to the German Army upon November 11, 1918, the day of the signing of the Armistice, and which had not been removed from the zone of the American Army of Occupation during the period of time fixed by the Armistice for evacuation, are hereby declared forfeited under the terms of the Armistice, to the American Army of Occupation.

c. Considerable quantities of material of the kind set forth in Paragraph a and especially clothing, leather, iron, blankets, motor trucks, etc., were abandoned by the German Army prior to its evacuation or sold by it to individuals and cities after the Armistice went into effect. All such sales are hereby declared null and void. The title to all such property so abandoned or sold vests in the United States.

d. All individuals, corporations and municipalities having possession or custody of any property described in Paragraphs a and b are hereby directed to turn over the same to the nearest military commander or to the burgomaster, on or before noon of January 20, 1919.

e. Any property described in Paragraphs a and b of this order in the possession of any individual, corporation or municipality after noon on January 20, 1919, will be seized by the American Army and the owner and holder thereof brought to trial forthwith before a military court for violation of this order.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Assembly Camps for Sick and Wounded Prisoners***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 10, 1919.*

No. 44

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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13. Concentration Camps for Allied Sick and Wounded: The Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners of War gives the following as the list of concentration camps of the various army districts to be used for assembling Allied sick and wounded:

Guard Corps		TEMPLEHOFERFELD
I	"	HEILSBURG
II	"	STETTIN, STARGARD
III	"	FRANKFORT-on-the-ODER
IV	"	STENDAL, QUEDLINBURG, MERSEBURG
V	"	SAGAN
VI	"	OPPELN
VII	"	MUNSTER
IX	"	GUSTROW, PARCHIM
X	"	MUNSTER-LAGER, HAMELN
XI	"	GOTTINGEN
XII	"	BAUTZEN
XVII	"	CZERSK
XVIII	"	GIESSEN
XIX	"	ZWICKAU
XX	"	PREUSSISCH-Holland
1st Bav.	"	LECHFELD, AUGSBURG

2d " "  
3d " "  
Wurtemberg (XVIII Corps)

WURZBURG  
not determined  
HEILBRONN, LUDWIGSBURG,  
CANNSTATT, WEISSENAU

It further reports that there has been collected in WURTEMBERG 135 transferrable and 17 nontransferrable sick and wounded. Among the latter are two Americans.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Russian Prisoners***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 11, 1919.*

No. 45

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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10. Russian Prisoners of War in Germany: General Nudant sent to General Dupont, in BERLIN, the following telegram:

You will receive at once instructions from Marshal Foch concerning attitude toward Russian prisoners of war, especially officers. You may for the present intercede in their favor with the German Government. You are authorized to put at their disposal from the present time any rations you can dispose of.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**American Prisoners of War**

*January 11, 1919.*

American Representative, Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission,  
Spa, Belgium

No. 5049 G-1. Reference our 4690 G-1, what progress has been made in securing from German Government names of all American prisoners of war who have been condemned to death, imprisonment, prison or punishment of any character, with place where punishment was inflicted and date of liberation? Also a complete list of all American citizens who have died in captivity. You are requested also to make every effort to secure the return to the Effects Depot, Base Section No. 1, A. E. F., of all personal effects of Americans who have died or been killed and buried behind the German lines.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Treves: Fldr. 77: Letter

**Disposition of Miscellaneous German War Material**

Section 4, G. S.

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 11, 1919.*

C-in-C

C. G., Second Army,  
Third Army,

Disposition of German War Material not covered by the terms of the Armistice

1. All war material abandoned or turned over by the German Army in the sector where the American Armies originally advanced or operated since November 11, 1918, becomes the property of the United States, with the possible exception of the following:

(a) Cannon, minenwerfer, trench mortars, machine guns, airplanes, locomotives, railroad cars, and motor trucks if serviceable, will be credited to Germany against the total amount of similar war materials, which under the terms of the Armistice the German Armies must turn over to the United States or the Allied Armies.

(b) Or if unserviceable, due to lack of spare parts, and the Germany Army supplies the missing parts, credit will still be given.

(c) In case such credit is given, the materials in question go into the general pool to be allocated between the United States and the Allied Governments.

(d) If unserviceable, and not repaired by the Germans, it remains the property of the United States.

2. All of the war material in question represents various degrees of serviceability as well as utility.

3. As to condition:
  - (a) Serviceable.
  - (b) Barely serviceable, but not worth the labor involved in collecting, cleaning, storing and shipping.
  - (c) Unserviceable.
  - (d) Too dangerous to move.
4. As to utility:
  - (a) That class of property which is useful for civil as well as for war purposes.
  - (b) That class which can be used only for war purposes and could be utilized by the Allied Armies as well as that of the enemy.
  - (c) That class which can be used for war purposes by the hostile Armies.
5. Condition to be considered in selecting war materials:
  - (a) Its actual value as to present and future use.
  - (b) Its value for purpose of investigation, research and experiments.
  - (c) Its historical value (ultimate distribution to museums, municipalities, etc.).
6. You will appoint a board of officers to consist of one each from the G-4 Section, G. S., Quartermaster Corps, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, Engineer Corps, Air Service, Motor Transport Corps and Salvage Corps to determine the serviceability and disposition of all war materials turned over or abandoned by the German Armies in your sector, which does not belong to the general pool of war materials, which the German Armies are required to turn over in accordance with terms of the Armistice.
7. The board will be guided by the principles set forth in this letter.
8. In case of materials which are found to be unserviceable, the board is authorized to have such material destroyed at once.
9. In case of ammunition and explosives not needed for the purposes outlined in Paragraph 6 above, destruction is also authorized.
10. Members of the board are authorized to communicate direct with the chiefs of their respective services with a view of determining the most suitable storage points for assembling materials pertaining to their respective departments for shipment to the United States.
11. The Commanding Generals, Second and Third Armies, will designate storage points for that class of material in their respective areas, which can be utilized by our forces.
12. (a) Reports will be submitted to the representatives of the A. C. of S., G-4, at Advance G. H. Q., showing disposition of all material.
  - (b) In connection you are advised that where any part of a sector is turned over to an Allied Army, the German war material located therein will also be transferred, receipts for same showing unit valuation being obtained and forwarded with reports.
  - (c) These reports will be made up separately to show material pertaining to each service department, and will be prepared in quintuplicate and disposed of as follows:
    - 2 copies to the representative of the A. C. of S., G-4, Adv. G. H. Q.
    - 2 copies to the chief of the supply department concerned.
    - 1 copy retained by the board.
  - (d) Reports will be submitted on Saturday of each week, all to carry forward the balance previously reported by the board.
  - (e) Every effort will be made by the board to properly account for all materials previously reported by authorized agencies, other than the board--i.e., in the Second Army by the 5th Division; in the Third Army by the salvage officer.
13. An Interallied Railway Commission for the reception of locomotives and railroad cars and handling all matters pertaining to receipts, inspection and disposition of this class of material, and the board will therefore have no jurisdiction, except to cooperate with the Commission in assisting them to locate all abandoned material of this character, both serviceable and unserviceable.

14. It must be understood that the board has no jurisdiction over that class of war material covered by the Armistice and which is acceptable under the terms of the Armistice, or which may be acceptable by the Germans supplying the necessary missing parts or making actual repairs. It is only when the Germans have either refused to make these repairs or supply missing parts, or, are unable to do so that the board will assume jurisdiction.

15. In this connection, particular attention is invited to the large quantity of abandoned cannon, machine guns, minenwerfer and trench mortars in the Second Army area, which have been reported by the 5th Division, but does not show condition as to serviceability. It is desired that everything possible be done to expedite reports on this particular material, listing missing parts which render the material unserviceable, in order that this may be reported to the Permanent International Armistice Commission at SPA, and Germany given an opportunity to place same in a serviceable condition. This report to be furnished the representative of the A. C. of S., G-4, Advance G. H. Q., in triplicate.

By order of the C-in-C.:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Treves: Fldr. 77: Memorandum

***Airplanes Accepted under Armistice Terms***

Section 4, G. S.

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 12, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.

1. General Patrick, Chief Air Service, called at this office on Jan. 10 and stated that he was very desirous of beginning shipment of certain types of German airplanes as soon as possible, and requested me to ascertain what quantity of the airplanes turned over or abandoned by the Germans which are acceptable under the terms of the Armistice, in possession of the American Army, could be shipped to the U. S.

2. In my Report No. 2 on Armistice material, two copies of which were submitted to you with my Daily Report No. 17, the following detailed number airplanes have been indicated by Major Marsh, representing the Air Service, as acceptable under the terms of the Armistice:

In that section of the report from Nov. 11 to Dec. 8, inclusive---a total of 104 planes;

In that section from Dec. 9 to Jan. 9, inclusive---199 planes a total of 303 planes.

Some of these have already been shipped to ROMORANTIN; others are being prepared for shipment.

3. Major Marsh, who delivered my report No. 2 to the French G. H. Q. at LUXEMBURG, had a conference with the French, who stated that there was no reason why the American Army should not dispose of at least 75% of each type of the planes in their possession as they saw fit; the remaining 25% to be retained for such exchange as may be desired between the representatives of the different Armies.

Assuming that about 1,700 planes have been turned over or abandoned by the Germans, which can be credited to them under the terms of the Armistice, there will be still due the U. S. a few planes when the final division is made on the basis of the French receiving 40%, the British 30%, the U. S. 20%, and the Belgians 10%.

4. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Chief of Air Service be advised that such shipments of airplanes as may be desired may be started to the U. S., up to and including 75% of all types now in possession of the American Army.

L. D. GASSER,  
Lt. Col., G. S.,  
Representative of A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.,  
Advance G. H. Q., A. E. F.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Delivery of Rolling Stock through Poland***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 11, 1919.*

No. 45

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Interference with German Railways in East Prussia: The Germans transmitted a note to the Allies calling their attention to their Note Number 1265 of January 7, to which they desire to add the following:

According to information received from the Railway Directorate of POSEN the Polish Civil Consulate has notified the Armistice Commission in SPA of the stoppage of delivery of railway materiel and rolling stock from the Prussian Province of POSEN.

Until the receipt of an answer the Poles are not allowing any further transfer of railway stock or materiel from the Province of POSEN. The delivery of rolling stock that is intended for the Allies from the Eastern District of Germany is thereby made exceedingly difficult, and to some extent, entirely impossible. These conditions have been further greatly increased within the last few days on account of the revolutionary disorders in BERLIN, as a result of which the traffic in the realm of the Railway Directorate that is there present has been for the most part entirely stopped.

That part of the district is especially concerned in which the railway lines from the sea empty, thereby the traffic of these railways as well as telegraph and telephone communication with the Eastern Railway Directorates is made extraordinarily difficult (meaning not very clear).

The unrest in BERLIN has had the effect that the delivery of materiel necessary for the traffic to the Allies is further rendered difficult on account of the fact

that the amount of work done in the factories has fallen to the least possible amount, by means of which the repairs necessary for the locomotives and the cars that are to be turned over to the Allies out of this district has been essentially limited. Also, the delivery of rolling stock that is already repaired from the district of the Berlin Railway Directorate has been likewise rendered more difficult by the stopping of the traffic and to a considerable extent entirely hindered.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3 GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Note

### ***Internal Germany***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 11, 1919.*

#### NOTES ON CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER von HANIEL:

In a conversation with Minister von Haniel, this morning, after the regular session of the Commission, he stated that conditions in BERLIN are still very unsettled, that the Spartacus Group had secured possession of the police headquarters, that they were barricading themselves, and that they had plenty of food to enable them to hold out for some time.

When asked if the military government did not have forces at its disposal upon which it could depend, he stated that this was a very uncertain question. Troops were brought into BERLIN that were thought to be loyal, but as soon as they arrived the Bolsheviks got among them and persuaded them not to fire on the people, so that the reliability of troops very soon becomes questionable. He stated that the government had regained possession of the Federal Mint, but learned that the Spartacus Group had carried off about 150,000,000 marks during the time that they were in possession. He also stated that other large centers, such as MUNICH, STUTTGART, and DUSSELDORF were also having local disturbances.

When asked about the coming national elections, he stated that it was to be hoped that this would be held on the 19th, as planned, but that the Spartacus Group was trying to have it put off. If held as planned it would probably be several weeks before the electors could come together and it would then be necessary for them to devote much time to drawing up a Constitution for the New Germany.

Following this, other elections would have to be held in such manner as might be provided for in the Constitution, following which a permanent parliament could be drawn together.

It will be seen at once that it will require many months before this program can be carried out. He further stated that it was greatly to be hoped that the Allies could give Germany assistance in the way of food supplies, as this would tend to stabilize conditions. Until such is done he did not see how Germany would be able to meet her financial obligations to the Allies.

Workmen are demanding such exorbitant wages and doing so little work that many commercial concerns are either obliged to suspend operations or go to the wall.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3 GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Return of Industrial Machinery***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 11, 1919.*

No. 45

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Restitution of Property Removed from France and Belgium: General Nudant called the attention of General von Winterfeldt to the fact that on January 5, he made known to the German Government the point of view of the Allies regarding the restitution of materiel removed by the Central Powers from northern France, Belgium, Alsace, Lorraine, and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

General Nudant called the attention of the Germans to the fact that the note of the German Government presented on January 9 (No. 843) in no respect modifies the point of view of the Allies, to which they added the following:

(1) The demands of the Allies are directed not only to machines, but include all materiel lacking in the above mentioned regions.

(2) The Allies demand immediate restitution not only of the materiel which the German Government has not already disposed of, but also of the materiel still existing, no matter in whose hands it may be, and whether or not the possessor of it approves its restitution.

(3) All materiel which no longer exists should be replaced by its equivalent in the measure in which the Allies demand.

(4) It is not for the Allies to supply a list of the materiel for which they have need. They need all the objects of which the German Government has deprived them. The Germans supplied a list of all the objects which they are able to give ALSACE in conformity with the note of the Subcommittee on Industrial Questions, Franco-Belgian on January 9. The Allies reserve for themselves the order in which these objects should be reshipped.

(5) The reservation made relates to the feeding of the German civilian population, and the reconstitution of economic life in Germany cannot be taken into consideration at this time where the fundamental question is discussed in the present note.

(6) It is understood that on the question of the prolongation of the Armistice at TREVES, January 15, the actions of the Allies reserves to themselves the right to maintain the point of view presented here and to consider by what means they may decide as proper.

4. Information from Secretary Erzberger in Regard to Return of Machines: Secretary Erzberger has sent information by telegraph that all preparations for carrying out the wishes expressed by the Chairman of the French Subcommittee for the giving over of machines and materiel (session January 9) have been fulfilled.

1. This comprises the arranging of places on the right bank of the RHINE for the collecting of objects to be returned.

2. Information has been requested as to places where machines which have not been sold are available to the Government.

3. In the appointment of a manufacturer as commissioner.

4. The organization of dispatch units.

5. For the delivery and reception of machines and materiel.

6. Any further classification of machines to be delivered in three categories and information over these categories.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Armistice Prolongation***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 11, 1919.*

No. 45

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Prolongation of the Armistice: General Nudant informed General von Winterfeldt that Marshal Foch had telegraphed, under date of January 11, that the conference for the prolongation of the Armistice will be held on the morning of January 15, at TREVES. He will make known as soon as he arrives the exact hour of the meeting.

The German plenipotentiaries are requested to be kind enough to limit the number of persons who accompany them to a dozen, in order that complete personal liberty which they desire may be granted without inconvenience. They will have full liberty to telegraph, telephone, and correspond by cipher.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Note

***British-American Cooperation***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 11, 1919.*

NOTES ON CONVERSATION WITH THE HEAD OF THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE ARMISTICE

COMMISSION:

[Extract]

After the regular meeting of the Commission this morning the undersigned accompanied General Haking to his quarters where the former was shown a letter that General Haking had sent to his Government.

In this he suggested the possibility of the Allies having to occupy other cities in Germany, of course, BERLIN being the most important as being the seat of government.

In this document he discussed the condition as to which of the Allies could best carry out such a mission. He called attention particularly to the ill advisability of using French troops inasmuch as the natural antipathy between the French and Germans would not get the best results; that if French troops were to occupy more German territory than they are doing at present it should be contiguous to that which they are now occupying, and if any cities were to be occupied not contiguous, they should be those as near as possible to the present territory now occupied by the French.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Provisioning Germany**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 12, 1919.*

No. 46

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Provisioning of Germany: Minister von Haniel, on behalf of the German Government, announced that it was the intention of his Government to create a special commission to negotiate with the Entente and the United States concerning the provisioning of Germany. He stated that the German Armistice Commission in SPA has full power to receive communications concerning the beginning of this work. He called attention again to the great need of speedily bringing provisions to Germany. This necessity is based not only on the grounds of humanity, but also on political grounds. Continuing, he stated that until now the German Government has been able to maintain the provisioning of the German people in a fairly satisfactory manner, but this has only been possible by means of making great demands on the stores of provisions that were intended to have lasted until the next harvest. The Government was forced to take this action in order to stop further unrest and prevent revolution, but the provisions on hand will very soon be exhausted. If famine is added to the present unrest the German Government and all those devoted to order will have to find recourse in Bolshevism.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Coal for Switzerland**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 12, 1919.*

No. 46

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Coal Furnished Switzerland from German Areas: Minister von Haniel presented a note in which he stated that information had reached Germany that the Allies had undertaken to furnish Switzerland, monthly, with sixty thousand tons of coal from the SAAR Valley, and fifteen thousand tons of brown coal from the left bank of the RHINE, with the understanding that payment for this coal would be made in PARIS.

He called the attention of the Allies to the fact that the districts from which this coal was to be taken remained now, as well as before the Armistice, under German control. The Allies can have no right to represent these areas with a foreign power, and can therefore, make no contracts concerning articles produced in these areas. Still less are they justified in having payments under such contracts executed in PARIS. He claimed that this action is entirely contrary to the spirit and text of the Armistice. He, therefore, claimed that German representatives in this area should be recognized. He requested that any negotiations now under way be broken off at once and that any agreements that have been made be revoked.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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***Conference on Economic Questions***

*Luxemburg, January 12, 1919.*

[Extract]

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The first question raised was whether there was agreement on the principle of having an economic and financial committee. Brigadier General H. A. Smith, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Advance G. H. Q., stated that we would agree to the formation of such a committee, but wanted it distinctly understood that this committee was to issue no orders, and that the orders, if issued, would not be obeyed; the committee was to be advisory only, and to suggest distribution of products, provided: 1st. Goods sent to France and Belgium must be paid for in cash; 2d. That the American commander would furnish all information concerning his district through his own agents, and that he would not allow any except his own agents in his territory. To this the British and French agreed.

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General Smith proposed that commerce be free between the different Allied zones. The British and French expressed tentative agreement, but said it would be formally taken up on January 20. The Belgians objected violently on the ground that it would be allowing German trade to grow too rapidly to the detriment of Belgian industry which is not yet free to compete for its old trade in German territory.

It was noted that both the British and French had civilian political representatives on this committee. The French representative of the Ministry of Finance, a Monsieur Tirard, did all the talking for the French. The British politicians said absolutely nothing, merely conferring on all questions with the British officer, who then acted as spokesman.

The British insisted on a free selling market for German factories, etc., in all of the occupied territory, with preference for export to France and Belgium if they desire to purchase, prices to be fixed by this committee on a fair and equitable basis with relation to the prices that could be obtained elsewhere; purchases to be paid for in cash. All agreed. We were then asked to name our representative on this permanent committee, and on statement from Lieutenant Chapin that the Chief of Staff had informed him that Captain Jackson would be the man, we named Captain Jackson.

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The French asked if we would agree to force trade secrets from the German manufacturers. The British said no. The Belgians urged that we do so in retaliation because the Germans had forced trade secrets from the Belgian manufacturers. I stated that the American Army had orders under no circumstances to use force for obtaining trade secrets for material, other than material of war. The French said that we had already asked for liaison officers to pick up secrets with their committees. Finally, the discussion narrowed down as to whether we should visit factories and find out what we could without forcing the Germans to show their methods. In other words, could they, under the guise of sending inspectors to inspect goods purchased, permit such inspectors to steal secrets when practicable without using pressure to do so. It was agreed that no objection would be made to this. The French then proposed that officers visiting territories of this kind on inspection trips of goods be furnished automobiles by the garrison in whose zone they were inspecting, it being stated that if they brought their own automobiles they were without

spare parts, unable to repair, etc., and asked that this rule be general throughout the occupied territory. We stated that the American Army would comply with this desire, unless the number of officers became so great as to make an undue tax on our available motor transport.

The question of the station of the Permanent Economic Committee was then brought up, and it was agreed to change the decision to keep this Committee at COBLENZ so as to locate the committee at LUXEMBURG instead.

The British brought up the question of the distribution of food in the occupied territory, the point at issue being, largely, whether flour ground in the Belgian zone and formerly distributed to the whole Rhineland might still be distributed in the same manner as it had under German rule. The Belgians rather prefer to seize all the flour ground in the mills in their territory, but did not make violent objection.

It was finally agreed to have a special committee meet at COBLENZ where the representatives were to settle this particular question by agreement.

The French asked if a method of sending money in and out of unoccupied Germany by authorizing existing German banks to correspond with bank in occupied territory would be satisfactory. British and Americans agreed. Belgians said nothing. It was finally agreed that a complete project for sending money in and out of occupied Germany should be presented at the meeting in PARIS on January 20. The meeting then adjourned.

LEROY ELTINGE,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Telegram

***Action of French Commandant in Luxemburg***

*Treves, January 12, 1919--5:31 p. m.*

Commanding General, Second Army

A 315. At request of Grand Ducal Government of Luxemburg composed of Reuter Ministry and Clerical Chamber and Deputies General Latour commanding French troops has placed armed guards in Chamber of Deputies and government buildings also policing streets. Latour has further established a telegraphic and postal censorship at the disposal of constituted authorities thus cutting off communication between the committee of public safety and PARIS population calm but incensed at action of French general. Disorders appear unlikely but action of French general tends to strengthen position of Grand Duchess and Clerical Party. Republicans protesting against calling in of foreign troops by constituted authorities grounds of violation of neutrality also violation of constitution by establishment of unconstitutional censorship control.

PRESTON BROWN,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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**American Troops to be Withdrawn**

January 12, 1919.

My dear Marshal Foch:

I have very carefully studied your letter of December 29, 1918, and the proposed decree concerning Luxemburg.

Upon entering Luxemburg I published a proclamation to the people of Luxemburg assuring them that we entered Luxemburg solely on account of military necessities, that we respected their neutrality, and that we would not interfere in any way in their internal affairs. Since our entry the people have been absolutely tranquil and have not only not interfered with American troops but have assisted them in every way.

Under the actual circumstances I have, therefore, been unable to conclude that it is necessary at this time to publish any further decrees concerning Luxemburg. In view of the divergent opinions held by you and myself and on account of the peculiarly delicate status of Luxemburg I have consulted the President of the United States on the entire question of our relations with the Grand Duchy.

The President considers that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to publish any further decree to the people of Luxemburg. He agrees with me that the Army of the United States is threatened with no danger from Luxemburg. If, therefore, you should consider it indispensable to publish a further decree concerning Luxemburg the President would deem it most advisable, in the interests of all concerned, that all American combat troops be withdrawn from the Grand Duchy.

I trust that you will find it possible to suspend the publication of your proposed decree. But if you deem it indispensable to publish the proposed decree I must request that you make such decisions as to the troops to replace American units as will enable me to withdraw all American combat troops from the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg at the earliest practicable date. It will only be necessary to leave a very few men of the Signal Corps, and similar services, and to give American troops the right of passage.

I infer from your letter of December 29, as well as from reports from the officers of my staff who conferred with your chief of staff on the subject, that you are of the opinion that the withdrawal of American troops is likely to be misinterpreted. I can see no reason why such a result should occur; any more than in the case of the change of boundary which excluded all of LORRAINE from the American zone in order to avoid difficulties resulting from differences in points of view.

However, if you consider that the withdrawal of the two American divisions now in Luxemburg to training areas in the American zone in France is likely to be followed by unfortunate comment, I suggest that these two division might be moved forward into the occupied region of Germany. If this were done and the American troops were replaced by a few French detachments, which would be ample for the purpose, drawn from troops now in or around Luxemburg, there could be no possible danger of improper inferences being drawn.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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**Reports from Advance G. H. Q. on Luxemburg Situation**

Second Section, G. S.

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,  
January 12, 1919.

MEMO: Chief of Staff, Hq. Second Army

FROM: A. C. of S., G-2

1. Now receiving daily confidential reports from Advance G. H. Q. at TREVES. Following are some of the extracts pertaining to Luxemburg situation:

It is reported that when the Luxemburg Ministers recently waited upon the Grand Duchess to ask her abdication, she did not at first understand what they wanted, but when Monsieur Collard bluntly told her, she fainted. Upon her revival, she said, "If the people wish it, it must be done."

It is reported that the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg stated in a recent conversation that she would like to go to America.

It is reported that the Luxemburgers are displeased with the difficulty that they find in getting passports from the American military authorities in TREVES to allow them to return home, and that they feel that this matter might be simplified by having a reputable Luxemburg Attache at TREVES.

Reports from Luxemburg indicate that preparations have been made for the departure of the Grand Duchess within the next five days. She will leave at night by motor, accompanied by French, for HOHENBURG, in Upper Bavaria, where the family estates are located.

It is reported that the meeting of the Luxemburg Assembly on Thursday afternoon, January 9, broke up in disorder, all the clerical members leaving in a body. A provisional government or committee of public safety has been formed consisting of eight members; two Liberals; two Democrats, and four Socialists, and it is expected that a manifesto will be issued shortly. The soldiers at the CASERNE [barracks] declared a Republic and large crowds marched to the Palace singing the Marseillaise. There was no disorder, and the Grand Duchess still remains.

It is further reported that although the city of Luxemburg is predominately pro-French, the people were displeased at being required to disperse by the French General in command, who is said to have clerical sympathies. The Liberals are noncommittal concerning a Republic for fear that it might hinder union with the Belgian Constitutional Monarchy.

It is reported that some feeling has been roused in Belgium owing to French propaganda in Luxemburg, but that contrary to the opinion reported as prevailing in Luxemburg, it is strongly believed in BRUSSELS that Luxemburg desires to join Belgium.

2. Pertinent extracts are being furnished to VI Corps.

C. F. THOMPSON,  
Lt. Col., G. S.

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***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 12, 1919.*

No. 46

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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10. Receipts of Locomotives and Cars: The Committee on Receipt of Locomotives and Cars reports that up to January 10, the total number of locomotives accepted from the Germans is 2,153; and of cars 68,431.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214:

***Delay in Delivery of Rolling Stock***

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako  
No. 6170/1377

*Spa, January 13, 1919.*

General von Winterfeldt

To General Nudant

Summary of Document Presented by The Chairman of The German Commission Explaining Reasons for Delay in Delivery of Rolling Stock as Provided by The Terms of The Armistice with Subsequent Demands.

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1. Despite the heavy demands, the German Government has done everything in its power to fulfill the demands. Where it has failed, it has been due to unfortunate circumstances and not to ill intent.

Following are the reasons for the shortage:

(a) Difficulties in collecting the rolling stock. Rolling stock taken from northern France and Belgium was assembled in large quantities beyond the RHINE and part returned to Belgium shortly after the Armistice. Much of this, however, was not in state of repair acceptable to the Armistice Commission. A large quantity of miscellaneous rolling stock was also collected only to be rejected for the same reason. This was especially serious in regard to locomotives, owing to the added demands made. The demobilization of troops hindered the collecting of cars together in places, the troops, from want of discipline, hindered service. The occupation of bridgeheads and cutting off of all communication across the RHINE was a serious hindrance to the delivery.

(b) The high demands as to state of repair of rolling stock:

Locomotives: A shortage in labor, in spare parts and in certain metals made it impossible to bring all of the locomotives surrendered to the required standard. This made it impossible to supply locomotives of the power demanded within the time limit; none the less, the Railroad Administration sacrificed home needs to realize as far as possible the demands. Private firms were called in to help with the repairs. New demands, such as that relative to fireboxes, increased the difficulties.

Cars: Many of the same reasons apply to cars. Demands were made which involved finishings of materiels no longer available in Germany. There were difficulties in fitting out captured rolling stock with German spare parts. Furthermore, receiving committees were uneven in their demands. Finally, the 8-hour day was a serious handicap to completing repairs in the time delay given.

(c) Difficulties in Delivery: Modifications in the numbers to be delivered at certain points made it difficult to make necessary provisions. Furthermore, it was discovered that some of the stations could not receive the quantity of rolling stock demanded.

(d) Difficulties with Personnel: Owing to reports of bad treatment of German personnel, there was great difficulty in recruiting the necessary crews for trains to Belgium and France.

(e) Difficulties Due to Political and Military Conditions: The difficulties on the eastern frontiers have cut off the quantity of rolling stock.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

### **Postal Restrictions**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 13, 1919.*

No. 47

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Postal Service in the Palatinate: General Nudant handed to General von Winterfeldt a note replying to one from the representative of the German Government in regard to the postal arrangement between the Bavarian Palatinate and ALSACE-LORRAINE:

By the note of January 9, 1919, No. 135, the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the

Armies of the Allies, declared that the Palatinate would undergo the same postal service as is prescribed by the French Army for all the territory occupied by it and which have been applied since January 1. That is to say: 1. Private correspondence, the shipping of packages and bundles by post is forbidden. 2. Authorization, under control, of industrial and commercial correspondence, and the shipping of samples without value.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Disorder in the Ukraine; Bolshevism***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 13, 1919.*

No. 47

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Conditions in the Ukraine: The Germans presented further evidence of the conditions existing in the Ukraine in the form of a telegram they had just received from Vice Admiral Hopman.

This telegram reads as follows:

The British Admiral Calthorpe and the French Admiral Legrey have recognized a renewed request of ours for transportation by water and will send the request on to their Governments. Bolshevism and general chaos are increasing daily in the Ukraine. Transportation overland is entirely out of the question. In case the German troops here do not receive the assurance immediately that they will receive transportation by sea their position will become untenable, and the demands of the Entente to keep order in NICHOLIEW [NIKOLAJEW] will become impossible.

7. Relations of German Troops towards Bolshevism: General von Winterfeldt in presenting the following note stated that he felt that it was important to bring this to the attention of the Commission in view of the meeting at TREVES, which will begin on the 15th for the continuance of the Armistice.

The Allied High Command has handed over a series of notes, the leading sense of which constantly repeats itself in a statement that the Germans are supporting Bolshevism. This appeared the last time, as far as the Ukraine was concerned, in a note of January 11. No. 6127. As far as the northwest of Russia is concerned, I

have in behalf of the German High Command the following statements to make that seem to be all embracing. The conception of the Allies that the Germans are supporting Bolshevism has been constantly opposed, especially in the following notes. (Here followed a reference to a series of ten notes, giving number and dates.) In spite of this, today, as before, in official and unofficial statements, false statements are spread about concerning our so-called friendliness for the Bolsheviks. It is regrettable, however, that no answer is given to such notes as Nos. 2040, 5247 and 5389.

The question is discussed for the sole purpose of clearing up the matter, insofar as the explanation can be carried out on the part of Germany without individual details being given, while we are supposed to be guilty, we claim to be blameless. The behavior of the Allies is completely incomprehensible. In the meantime the Bolsheviks have made essential progress. Now the boundaries of East Prussia are threatened and its distributing point at SOLLKAU (sic) in Courland is already in the hands of the Bolsheviks. Support given to the Government of the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania and Poland, by Germany was not able to hold up the evil. (See notes Nos. 3224 and 4831.) Neither was the presence of the British fleet in RIGA of avail. The British had to leave RIGA just as the Germans had to. Troops from Latvia have gone over to the enemy. The Poles who received weapons from us have fled from VILNA. In revenge, the Poles are now turning their principal forces to the west against German territory without the Allied Governments coming to the rescue. The events in north-western Russia were to be foreseen. They were announced to the Allies in time. (For example, in Note No. 2073 of December 10, and Note No. 1931 of December 11.)

The Allies did not undertake to carry out any of the proposed measures. (No. 1931 - No. 3224.) So it is not proper that the responsibility for the course of events, which are undesirable alike for the entire civilized world, should be put upon the shoulders of Germany, or even that mention should be made of the violation of the conditions of the Armistice.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Note

**German Demobilization**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 6153

*Spa, Belgium, January 13, 1919.*

From: General von Winterfeldt

To: General Nudant

The German High Command states that the duty does not devolve upon it to give information about the conditions of demobilizing, but in view of the fact that the purposes of the Germans still remain suspected, and even official authorities---for example, the British

Government on January 8---spread false statements about the German Army, the German High Command finds it is obliged to give out the following information:

1. In the west

There were:

On November 11---188 complete divisions

On December 16--- 46 complete divisions--- In addition 77 were returning.

On January 1st--- 19 complete divisions--- In addition 38 were on the return march.

On January 6--- 5 complete divisions--- In addition 32 were on the march for home.

2. In the east (exclusive of Rumania and Macedonia)

There were:

On November 11, in Finland--- 1 division in Russia, Ukraine and Poland---25 divisions (3 cavalry) all of them weak in effectives and of less combat power than the Landwehr divisions on the western front.

On January 1, in Finland---No more German troops in Russian and Poland---18 divisions.

Of the troops that have returned, a small part could voluntarily enlist for the protection of the border (about 2,000 men for the 6 eastern boundary general commands). All other troops had to be demobilized as the troops could no longer be held.

For the fighting in Russia, only a few volunteer battalions could be formed out of the troops of the eastern Army. Of the western Army nothing could be used over except a very weak part for the protection of the western boundary \* \* \*

3. In General:

(a) As early as November notice was given that all detachments should be demobilized as soon as they reached their peace garrisons, and that detachments that had been formed during the war should be demobilized immediately after they arrived at their replacement depots (except the troops protecting the western border as above). Only the Classes 96-99 were to remain as peace detachments.

(b) In December the demobilization of the Classes 96 and 97 took place. It will be ended by January 31.

(c) Except for the Classes 98 and 99, which can be estimated at about 200,000 men at the present time, there are in addition about 100,000 men in the service of the Army, partly in the east, partly as volunteers, and partly because they are out of work.

In addition the present circumstances in Germany show there is a large number of people who are wearing uniforms without being soldiers. The reason for this, for the main part, is the lack of civilian clothes.

4. Conclusions:

It is thus evident that as complete demobilization of the Army has been carried out as was possible under the circumstances. That the official order for general demobilization was not made public until January 4, was due to technical reasons of administration.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 77-A-144: Telegram

**Delivery of German Planes**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
January 13, 1919--4:35 p. m.

Received at : 21 Z AH S 167 OB

Lt. Col. Gasser, A. C. of S., G-4, Treves

(Attention Lt. Keller)

No. 171. Have received for one hundred ten German planes at TREVES Airdrome from Major Joralemon. Third Army will continue to furnish guard until your 2d Park Squadron arrives. Some of these planes were assigned by General Mitchell to squadrons and some have been crashed. All remaining in Zepp shed should be shipped to ROMORANTIN as rapidly as possible. In shipping TREVES material and that at VILLERS-les-CHEVRES and other airdromes also ship any spare parts such as extra propellers, aerial bombs, searchlights, field landing lights and any other material you believe to be of interest to the Air Service keeping complete records of what is shipped. Shipments should be well convoyed. Officer in charge of convoy should deliver planes to Commanding Officer, Air Service Production Center No. 2, ROMORANTIN, France, and should obtain receipt for them. Marsh.

MITCHELL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

**Rates of Exchange in Delivery of War Materiel**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, Belgium, January 13, 1919.

No. 47

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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9. Rates of Exchange of Materiel: At an informal meeting of the Allied members of the Committee on materiel it was agreed to propose the following rates of exchange of materiel: 100 machine guns, or six aeroplanes, for one heavy cannon.

The Germans having delivered some 2,000 machine guns and a few aeroplanes in excess of requirements, it is believed to be in the interest of all to make the exchange as shown above.

As yet this matter has only taken the form of a proposition, but has not been formally submitted to the Commission, and of course, has not received the approval of the Allied High Command.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 13, 1919.*

No. 47

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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11. Meeting at the British Headquarters for Further Considering the Repatriation of Prisoners of War: General Haking, Head of the British Section of the Armistice Commission, asked the undersigned again to be present at a meeting which was to be held at his headquarters for further considering the repatriation of prisoners of war.

At the previous meeting held about two weeks ago it was agreed that there should be this second meeting on January 13. There were present from the British forces, besides General Haking, General Ewart, the British Representative in BERLIN; General Bruce, the British Representative at The HAGUE; and, a general officer representing the British advance G. H. Q., with various assistants.

As American prisoners have practically all been repatriated, this meeting had no special interest to the undersigned but for the purpose of securing information. I was glad to be present. From the discussion which followed it appears that the British prisoners of war are practically all out of Germany. Those remaining are the stragglers, the sick and the wounded who are now being collected and moved out by hospital trains.

The Italian prisoners are being repatriated very largely with the French.

General Harries, of the American Army, now in BERLIN, is supervising the return of the Serbians.

On January 11, a Rumanian Mission arrived in BERLIN for the purpose of supervising the return of their prisoners.

It was reported that Major von Pabst, of the German Mission here at SPA, stated that all prisoners of war would be out of Germany by January 15, except about 12,000 Serbians. This was considered very optimistic, and will probably not prove correct.

General Dupont the French representative in BERLIN, was known to have stated that he thought that the French will all be out by January 15, and that in a week more all

Italians will be out. Many Italians are being returned through Holland and from ports on the Baltic, using French and British ships.

It was reported that the Germans planned to collect the Russian prisoners of war into about twenty large camps and hold them for the present. It was stated that the German plans for mobilizing the Army placed the subject of prisoners of war under the German Red Cross, the headquarters of this organization being in FRANKFORT. The German War Office in BERLIN have only very general information on this subject.

The British are bringing out all prisoners of war, regardless of whether they wish to come or not. Some will prove to be deserters and are wanted for military discipline, and in any case all should return to England to close their military status. If they have married German women, or have other German interests, they may then return to Germany.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Resolution

### ***Prisoners of War***

[Contemporary Translation]

*January 14, 1919.*

I send herewith the text of a resolution passed on January 13, by the Allied and Associated Governments, which you will kindly communicate to General Dupont.

You will inform him that upon request of the French Government the delegated officers of the Allied Nations will be kept constantly advised by their respective Governments concerning the constitution and powers of that Commission. General Dupont will receive from me a copy of instructions drawn up to this end by the French Government. \* \* \* With a view to hastening the work of this Commission, General Dupont will take the initiative, calling and organizing the first meeting, in the course of which the members of the Commission will themselves choose their President and will proceed to a preliminary study of the questions to be treated.

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The Allied and Associated Governments in meeting on January 13 passed the following resolution:

Officers delegated into Germany by the Allied and Associated powers to regulate the affairs of the prisoners of war of the Entente Armies assisted by representatives of the aid societies of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy will constitute a Commission charged with the regulation of Russian prisoners in Germany. This Commission which shall sit at BERLIN shall be empowered to treat directly with the German Government in accordance with instructions from the Allied Governments all questions relative to Russian Prisoners.

It shall receive from Germany all facilities for circulation necessary for the regulation of the conditions of existence and provisioning of these prisoners.

The Allied Governments reserve the right to order the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war to such regions as shall appear suitable to them.

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January 14, 1919.

I

With a view to assuring the organization, that measures be taken to safeguard the existence of Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany, the Allied and Associated Governments have decided to establish to this end a regular commission in BERLIN, composed, first, of military delegates of these powers charged with the repatriation of Entente prisoners of war. Second, of a representative of the aid societies of each of these powers.

II

Role of Commission: The role of this commission consists of, first, providing for betterment of the material and moral situation of Russian prisoners, and, second, of assuring their final repatriation.

1

Betterment of Moral and Material Situation of the Prisoners: This betterment shall be effected by immediate measures which shall assure the feeding of the prisoners, furnishing necessary care for the sick, and ameliorate their housing conditions.

A first part of the provisions to be furnished by the Entente to Germany shall be reserved for them. In the meantime Germany will be required to provide further needs in victuals, clothing, etc., give to the sick the treatment they need, to arrange the prison camps in a sanitary way.

The Allied regulations of the distribution of food and regulation of hygienic conditions and of installations will be organized without delay.

11

Repatriation of Prisoners: This can be considered only with caution on account of the transportation question and on account of the evacuation of the Serbians, Greeks, Rumanians actually in operation which must be ended first, and on account of the interior conditions of Russia, and on account of the disposition of the prisoners themselves.

It is, therefore, the operation and execution of which requires time and which will only be prepared for at present.

By reason of the dangers which it entails, repatriation directly to the east will be discontinued. The only regions towards which the transportation of prisoners may be prepared for are, therefore, Poland and southern Russia (we may limit ourselves for the present to sending into these regions those not suspected of Bolshevism and capable of reinforcing the parties faithful to our cause).

The organization of two currents of repatriation thus provided for requires the primary sifting of the prisoners and their arrangement into camps placed along the transportation lines to be utilized.

111

Functioning of the Commission: The Commission of Control is placed under the Armistice Commission at SPA, and it will function under the Presidency of one of its military members who shall be designated at the election at the time of the first meeting.

The President and, by delegation, the members of the Commission of Control, or its representatives, shall be empowered to orientate and coordinate the actions of the Red Cross societies and all various aid societies. Secondly, to notify in the name of the

Entente the German services interested of all instructions relative to the arrangement of the camps and to the transportation of food and of groups of prisoners and repatriation.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Memorandum

***Distribution and Transfer of War Material***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff, 1st Section  
2d Bureau

CHIEF COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 14, 1919.*

No. /2

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, in agreement with the Allied delegates at SPA, fixes as follows the proportions of German war material to be assigned to each Allied Army.

Belgian Army	1/10
American Army	2/10
British Army	3/10
French Army	4/10

The attached tables indicate the distribution of airplanes, field guns, machine guns, and minenwerfer.

The delivery of heavy guns by the Germans is not finished, so these guns will be distributed later.

**Distribution of Airplanes:** The total of planes classed as good being 1,787 instead of 1,700, which figure was called for by the Armistice Convention, 87 planes in good order will be returned to the Germans.

The return will be done by the British Army which will determine the types of planes which it wishes to return.

The remaining 1,700 planes will be distributed according to the table attached hereto.

It seemed useless to distribute the planes classed as bad, as this materiel does not seem capable of rendering any service.

**Distribution of Field Guns and Minenwerfer:** For these weapons it has been impossible to take account of the classes indicated by the Allied Armies, as the classification was made according to a variety of methods and as some are not yet classified.

As a result, the total quantity of materiel received has alone been considered for each category, and it has been assumed that the proportion of good and bad materiel in each lot must be about the same.

**Field Guns:** Each Allied Army having received the total number of guns larger than that to which it was entitled, no distribution has been made.

Each Allied Army will therefore keep the lot of guns which it has.

**Machine Guns:** In the same way as for field guns, and for the same reason, no distribution has been made between the Allied Armies.

Nevertheless, as 3,188 machine guns are to be returned to the Germans according to the convention which prolonged the Armistice on December 13\* these machine guns will be

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\* Materiel in good order which was omitted on the lists of December 9, or which was found after December 9.

returned by the Allied Armies which have large numbers in excess of their normal amount, according to the table attached.

Minenwerfer: As the American Army received a number of minenwerfer very much smaller than it was entitled to, it is arranged that this Army will receive 200 minenwerfer from the British Army, which alone has an excess.

It seemed useless to direct a more exact distribution in view of the slight value of materiel of this class.

The British Army will also return to the Germans 23 minenwerfer\*.

It is requested that the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, if they see no objections, kindly give instructions for the execution of the arrangements above indicated.

FOCH.

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MINENWERFER						
	DUE		RECEIVED		Total	Deficit or Excess
	Good	Bad	Not Classed			
Belgian	300	50	243	-	293	-7
American	600	-	-	389	389	-211
British	900	1,400	193	381	2,014	[+] 1,114
French	1,200	807	246	63	1,116	-84
	3,000	2,297	682	833	3,812	

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\* Materiel in good order which was omitted on the lists of December 9, or which was found after December 9.

**FIELD ARTILLERY AND  
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY**

ARMY	Due	RECEIVED			
		Good	Bad	Not Classified	Total
Belgian	250	11	705		716
American	500	13 *		717 #	730
British	750	372	354	292	1,018
French (and Sixth Army)	1,000	658	463	37	1,158
	2,500	1,054	1,522	1,046	3,622

\* Counted in 72 heavy guns turned over at COBLENZ  
# 685 per Col. Gasser's lists.

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**MACHINE GUNS**

	Due	Received or found			To be returned to the Germans
		Good	Bad	Total	
Belgian	2,500	1,591	2,180	3,771	
American	5,000	12,793 *		12,793	2,188
		(not classed)			
British	7,500	8,502	1,003	9,505	500
French	10,000	11,231	3,168	14,399	500
	25,000			40,468	3,188

\* Corrected per Col. Gasser's list  
2,500 good  
7,793 not classified  
10,293 Total

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## AIRPLANES

Army	Due	Received or found			Excess or deficit (planes only)		Distribution of excess
		Good	Bad	Total	Excess	Deficit	
Belgian	170	73	412	485		97	
American	340	303	54 *	357 *		37	
British	510	644	79	723	134		(a)
French	680	767	423	1,190	87		(b)
	1,700	1,787	968	2,755	221	134	

(a) (47 to the Belgian Army)  
 87 returned to Germans  
 134

\* per Col. Gasser's list  
 46 Bad  
 347 Total.

(b) 50 to Belgian Army  
 37 to American Army  
 87

-The 87 planes to be returned by British Army will be of such types as the British Army shall decide.

-The American Army having received no bombardment planes, the 37 planes which the French Army passes over to it must include 5 bombardment planes of each model.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Letter

### **Police of Rhine River in American Sector**

*January 14, 1919.*

My dear Marshal Foch:

The matter of the river police of the Rhine has just been brought to my attention. It appears that some time ago the Interallied Waterways Commission decided to divide the naval patrol of the RHINE between the French and the British; unfortunately this decision was not brought to my attention at the time.

Immediately upon reaching the RHINE my Third Army took the necessary steps to provide for the proper police of that river. To this end the necessary boats were secured and armed. These boats are manned by picked crews drawn from the Marine Brigade and are more than able to handle all matters of the police of the RHINE within the American zone. Under these circumstances there seems to be no necessity for the constant patrolling of the RHINE by either French or British boats within the limits of the American zone.

It is of course necessary that patrol boats of adjoining sectors should have overlapping rounds; moreover, it will frequently be necessary for boats from the British zone, for example, to make extended patrols into the American sector. But it seems to me extremely desirable from all points of view that the responsibility for patrolling that

part of the RHINE within the American zone should be definitely fixed upon the American command. May I not ask, then, that you give such instructions as will clear up any misunderstandings on this point and as will place the responsibility for the patrol of the RHINE within the American zone entirely and exclusively upon the American command?

I take this opportunity to suggest that it might avoid much misunderstanding were the commissions hereafter appointed as limited as possible in numbers and were the principle adopted that all important agreements of the various commissions must be submitted to all the interested headquarters for confirmation before the moment of executing such agreements.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

To Marshal Ferdinand Foch,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Allied Armies.

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AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-661: Minutes

***Meeting of Interallied Economic Committee***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
Administration of the Rhine Territory

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 15, 1919.*

Interallied Economic Committee

DISPOSITIONS TAKEN AT THE MEETING  
OF JAN. 12 AT LUXEMBURG

The Interallied Economic Committee whose composition, functions and powers have been determined by my letter of Jan. 8, 1919, No. 2808/CR, have met at LUXEMBURG on Jan. 12 and taken following dispositions:

The district subcommissions previously provided will be replaced by economic sections, placed under the authority of the military command of the territory.

I. Composition of the Economic Sections:

These sections will be formed by:

1. The economic offices or services already created by the Armies.
2. Delegates of my staff and incidentally of the staffs of Allied Armies.
3. Delegates of system subcommissions of the field railroads and of the Navigation Commission.

II. Functions and Powers of the Economic Sections: The economic sections are charged with establishing the general documentation and particularly that necessary to the Economic Committee for the distribution of raw materials and manufactured products.

Until further order the Interallied Economic Committee intrusts the economic section with the power of granting authorization to export to nonoccupied German territories,

under the conditions fixed by the instruction herein. The authorization to export to ALSACE-LORRAINE and the Allied and neutral countries will be, till further notice, transmitted by the sections with mention of their reasons therefor to the Economic Committee who will decide.

The subcommissions will give the Interallied Committee weekly accounts of the granted authorizations to export.

III. Supervision of Production, Receipts of Products, Documentation: Officers of the Allied Armies will be detailed to the various areas by the Interallied Committee to supervise the fabrication and to audit the accounts of receipts. These officers will be placed under the orders of the corresponding economic section who will provide them with all facilities to effect their duties.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 4: Memorandum

***Armistice Groups Listed***

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 16, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR Lt. L. H. Paul Chapin, Cav., G-4 Liaison Officer, American Mission, Etat-Major, Lamorlaye

1. With reference to your memorandum of December 31, 1918, we are returning the three charts forwarded by you showing commissions created by the Armistice. Enclosed also are revised lists showing the status as understood by this section at present. The principal revision is in the commission appointed at the request of Marshal Foch for determining the cost of the occupation of German territory. This is the Commission on Finance and Administration.

2. There have also been certain changes in American personnel.

3. Kindly inform this section of changes which may come to your notice from time to time.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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PERMANENT ARMISTICE COMMISSION

(C. I. P. A. [P. I. A. C.] at SPA)

Americans  
Maj. Gen. Charles D. Rhodes  
Brig. Gen. Malvern-Hill Barnum  
Col. Samuel G. Shartle, G. S.  
Col. V. R. C. King, Engrs.  
Lt. Col. Louis A. Craig, F. A.  
Major Henry Loy, Q. M. C.  
Major David A. Reed, F. A.  
Capt. J. K. Fornance, F. A.  
Capt. R. E. S. Williamson, Cav.  
Capt. Sanford Griffith, I. C.  
Capt. Colman D. Frank, Inf.  
Capt. Francis W. Bradley, I. C.  
Capt. William C. White, M. C.  
1st Lt. Frederick Wulsin, Inf.  
1st Lt. Samuel Powel Griffiths, F. A.  
2d Lt. Sidney E. Hopkins, S. C.

Belgian  
General Major Delobbe

British  
Lt. Gen. Haking  
Brig. Gen. Green  
Lt. Col. Addison  
Capt. Baring Gould

French  
General Nudant  
General Giraud  
Colonel Charet  
Lt. Col. Demain  
Cdt. Sisteron  
Cdt. Courtillet  
S. Int. Burdin

German  
General von Winterfeldt  
Colonel von Muller  
Commandant von Boetticher

SUBCOMMISSION ON TRANSPORTS [P. I. A. C. at SPA]  
[Listing of names omitted]

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SUBCOMMISSION OF PRISONERS OF WAR [P. I. A. C. at SPA]  
[Listing of names omitted]

\*\*\*\*\*

COMMISSION ON MATERIEL [P. I. A. C. at SPA]  
[Listing of names omitted]

\*\*\*\*\*

COMMISSION ON MOTOR TRANSPORT [P. I. A. C. at SPA]  
[Listing of names omitted]

\* \* \* \* \*

Remarks: To receive 5,000 trucks from Germans.

COMMISSION ON FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION [P. I. A. C. at SPA]  
[Listing of names omitted]

\* \* \* \* \*

Remarks: To execute the Armistice clause imposing on Germany the payment of expenses of occupation.

INTERALLIED COMMISSION TO RECEIVE RAILWAY MATERIALS [P. I. A. C. at SPA]  
[Listing of names omitted]

\* \* \* \* \*

Remarks: Subcommission at METZ  
Subcommission at BRUSSELS

To receive 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars under stipulations of the Armistice.

RAILROADS

INTERALLIED RAILROAD COMMISSION (C. I. C. F. C.) at TREVES [TRIER]  
[Listing of names omitted]

\* \* \* \* \*

Remarks: Exploitation of railroads of Luxemburg and Rhineland.

Subcommissions at:

COLOGNE (American, Belgian, British, French)

MAYENCE (American, French)

LUDWIGSHAFEN (French)

SAARBRUCKEN (American, French)

LUXEMBURG (American, French)

COMMISSION FOR ALSACE-LORRAINE RAILROADS

(C. C. F. C. A. L.)

HEADQUARTERS at STRASSBURG  
[Listing of names omitted]

\* \* \* \* \*

Remarks: Exploitation [operation] on railroads of ALSACE-LORRAINE

Subcommissions at:

METZ  
MULHOUSE [MULHAUSEN]

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF BELGIAN RAILROADS

HEADQUARTERS at BRUSSELS

(C. I. C. F. CALAIS)  
[Listing of names omitted]

\*\*\*\*\*

Remarks: Exploitation [operation] of the Belgian Railroad System.

COMMISSION FOR ARDENNES RAILROADS

[Listing of names omitted]

\*\*\*\*\*

EASTERN RAILROAD COMMISSION\*

(C. R. E.)

[Listing of names omitted]

\*\*\*\*\*

Remarks: Exploitation [operation] of the [French] Eastern [Est] Railroad System

NORTHERN MILITARY COMMISSION\*\*

(C. R. N.)

[Listing of names omitted]

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Remarks: Exploitation [operation] of the [French] Northern Nord Railroad System

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\* Military Railway Commission for the French "Reseau de l'Est"

\*\* Military Railway Commission for the French "Reseau du Nord"

NAVIGATION

COMMISSION ON NAVIGATION OF INTERALLIED COUNTRIES

HEADQUARTERS at COLOGNE  
[Listing of names omitted]

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Remarks: To control navigation on the RHINE between the frontiers of ALSACE-LORRAINE and Holland, on the MOSELIE and SAAR from the frontiers of ALSACE-LORRAINE to its [their ?] confluence.

COMMISSION ON NAVIGATION IN ALSACE-LORRAINE

HEADQUARTERS at STRASSBURG  
[Listing of names omitted]

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Remarks: Exploitation [operation] of navigable streams [inland waterways] of ALSACE-LORRAINE and control of navigation on the RHINE in ALSACE-LORRAINE.

COMMISSION ON NAVIGATION IN BELGIUM

HEADQUARTERS at BRUSSELS  
[Listing of names omitted]

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Remarks: Exploitation of navigable streams [inland waterways] of Belgium.

INTERALLIED ROAD [HIGHWAY] COMMISSION

[Listing of names omitted]

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1193: Agreement

**Second Armistice Prolongation**

[Contemporary Translation]

CONVENTION

Signed at TREVES on January 16, 1919, for  
the Prolongation of the Armistice with Germany

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, Admiral Wemyss being replaced by Admiral Browning, provided with the powers by virtue of which the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, was signed, concluded the following additional conventions:

- I. The Armistice of November 11, 1918, prolonged until January 17, 1919, by the

Convention of December 13, 1918, is prolonged again for one month, that is, until February 17, 1919, at 5 a. m.

This prolongation of one month will be extended until the conclusion of the Peace Preliminaries, under the reservation of the approval of the Allied Governments.

II. The execution of the clauses of the Convention of November 11, 1918 incompletely realized will be pursued and achieved during the prolongation of the Armistice, under the detailed conditions fixed by the Permanent International Armistice Commission, in accordance with the instructions of the Allied High Command.

III. The German Government will furnish in place of the railroad material, supplementary to 500 Locomotives and 19,000 Cars, fixed in application of the Tables Annexes 1 and 2 of the Protocol of SPA of December 17, the following agricultural machines and implements:

- 400 Steam Plowing Groups, complete with two engines and appropriate plows
- 6,500 Seeders
- 6,500 Manure Spreaders
- 6,500 Plows
- 6,500 Brabant Plows
- 12,500 Harrows
- 6,500 Scarifiers
- 2,500 Steel Rollers
- 2,500 Croskill Rollers
- 2,500 Mowers
- 2,500 Reapers
- 3,000 Reaper-Binder Machines

or equivalent apparatus, with interchangeability admitted between the different kinds of apparatus after examination made by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. This material, new or in good condition, should have all accessories for each instrument and the lots of spare-parts necessary for eighteen months use.

The German Armistice Commission will furnish before January 23, to the Allied Armistice Commission, the list of that which can be delivered up to March 1, and which should be, in principle, equal to one-third of the whole. The International Armistice Commission will fix, before January 23, the delays of later delivery and which should not be extended over June 1.

IV. The officers delegated in Germany by the Allied and Associated Powers to regulate the evacuation of prisoners of war of Armies of the Entente, assisted by the representatives of aid societies from the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy, will constitute a commission in charge of the control of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

This commission, whose seat will be at BERLIN, will have the power to treat directly with the German Government, in accordance with the instructions of the Allied Governments, all questions relative to Russian prisoners of war.

It will receive from the German Government all facilities of circulation necessary to control the conditions of existence and feeding of these prisoners. The Allied Governments reserve to themselves the right to regulate the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war to such and such a region which appears to them most convenient.

V. Naval Clauses:

Article XXII of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, is completed as follows:

In order to assure the execution of this Clause, the following should be required of the German Authorities:

All the submarines which can go out to sea, or be towed, should be delivered immediately, or begin the voyage to the Allied Ports. These ships should include the submarine cruisers, the mine-layers, relief ships and docks for submarines.

The submarines which cannot be delivered should be completely destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of Allied commissioners.

The construction of submarines must cease immediately and the submarines now under construction must be either destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of Allied commissioners.

Article XXIII of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, is completed as follows:

In order to assure the execution of this Clause, the German Commission should furnish to the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, a list of all the service vessels constructed or under construction (already launched or on the ways) giving the anticipated dates of completion.

Article XXX of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, is completed as follows:

In order to assure the execution of this Clause, the Allied High Command notifies the German High Command that it should make immediately all possible provisions to deliver into the Allied Ports, the Allied commercial vessels which are still in German Ports.

VI. Restoration of Material Removed from Belgian and French Territory:

1. The restoration of material removed from French and Belgian territory being indispensable to the operation of the factories, the following measures will be executed:

2. The machines, parts of machines, objects of industrial or agricultural implements, various accessories of all kinds, and in a general manner, all agricultural and industrial objects removed from the territories which were occupied by the German Armies on the Occidental front, under any pretext whatever, by the German military or civil authorities, or by German individuals, will be held at the disposition of the Allies to be reshipped to their places of origin, if the French and Belgian Governments so desire.

These objects will be subjected to no new changes or any damages.

3. To prepare for this restoration, the German Government will send immediately to the Armistice Commission all official or individual accounts relative to these objects, all sale contracts, renting or others, all correspondence relative thereto, all declarations or useful information on their existence, origin, transformation, present location, and the place of deposit of these objects.

4. The delegates of the French and Belgian Governments will proceed in Germany to searches and examinations on the premises of objects reported on, if that appears necessary.

5. The reshipment will be effected in accordance with special instructions which will be given by the French or Belgian authorities, in accordance with their decisions.

6. In particular, there will be declared, in view of immediate restoration, the depots of all kinds in parks, on rail, on boats or in factories, of transmission belts, electric motors, or parts of motors, accessories, etc., removed from France and Belgium.

7. The information given in Paragraphs 3 and 6, should begin to arrive within a delay of eight days, beginning January 20, 1919, and should be entirely furnished before April 1, 1919.

VII. The Allied High Command reserves to itself the right to occupy whenever it may deem it advisable, as an additional guarantee, the sector of the PLACE de [Fortress of] STRASSBURG, constituted by the forts on the right bank of the RHINE, with a belt of terrain of five to ten kilometers in front of these forts; \* \* \*

This occupation will be the object of an advance notice of six days from the Allied High Command. No destruction of material or buildings should be made.

The outlines of the Neutral Zone of 10 kilometers will be, in consequence, brought forward.

VIII. To assure the supply of food to Germany and the balance of Europe, the German Government will take all necessary measures to place, during the Armistice, all the German

Commercial Fleet under control and under the direction of the Allied Powers and the United States, assisted by a German Delegate.

This agreement does not in any way prejudice the final disposition of these ships. The Allies and the United States can, if they deem it necessary, make a total or partial replacement of the crews. The officers and crews who are thus released, will be repatriated to Germany.

For the utilization of these ships, an appropriate remuneration will be attributed, which will be fixed by the Allied Governments.

All the details and the exceptions to be determined for the various categories of ships, will be settled by a special convention which should be concluded immediately.

TREVES, January 16, 1919.

F. FOCH,  
BROWNING.

ERZBERGER,  
A. OBERNDORFF,  
von WINTERFELDT,  
VANSELOW.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214

### ***German Requests for Trade Relations***

[Contemporary Translation]

*January 17, 1919.*

#### ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCY OF THE OCCUPIED AND UNOCCUPIED REGIONS

The following is the summary of a series of studies presented by the German Armistice Commission showing in a number of products the importance of trade relations across the RHINE:

In the note of December 24, 1918, the representatives of the Allied Governments informed us that the High Command of the Allies had not the intention of systematically preventing commerce between the occupied and unoccupied regions of Germany. Indeed regulations were being studied with a view to establishing a basis for exchanges between the two regions in accord with the requirements of the Allies, and to go into effect during the Armistice. In the final sitting in LUXEMBURG the German trade delegation was requested to give precisions on demands and projects and it was stated that the question of a free list would shortly be studied.

In this spirit several propositions dealing with trade relations between the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany were made. Possibility for further extensions were taken into consideration. In this an accord was reached for trade in coal, coke, minette, manganese, and scrap iron. The question of circulation of essential foodstuffs was left out of consideration because it was closely related with the question of foodstuffs from abroad and the settling of this question should not anticipate subsequent negotiations. It may be noted in general in regard to these propositions that handling of essential raw materials and manufactured goods is to be centralized commercially. This control must be maintained when it does not relate to local trade in either the occupied or unoccupied regions. It is essential for the trade centers that the trade regulations operative in Germany maintain their full effectiveness in the occupied regions. Their maintenance is

precaution that the occupied region not suffer. No fixed limit should be set to trade between the occupied and the unoccupied regions. For a series of goods enumerated in the attached list, which will not be placed under trade control, and which have no military significance, it is proposed that they be left unrestricted on the market; wares are in general included in the free list the trade in which had been settled for specific industries after special steps were taken.

The industries studied in detail are the following: Textiles; chemicals; and artificial fertilizers; cellulose and paper; rubber, rosin, turpentine, etc.; gelatine; lime; iron and steel and machines; copper, brass, tin; and leather and shoes.

Textile industry: To secure necessary war materials commerce between both banks of the RHINE is necessary. The commerce in paper and thread should be free. The quantity of raw materials distributed is determined by a central board.

The silk factories on the left bank require the markets of the right for their output. This is especially urgent in view of the large stocks on hand which after peace will drop in price.

Cotton: It is requested that no difficulty be made in delivery in cotton to the left bank of the RHINE. The consumption of the manufactured goods in Germany is controlled by a war bureau. Freedom of trade across the RHINE is requested. The same privileges are requested for wool.

Chemical Products and Fertilizers: In these products it is difficult to fix a scale of exchange owing to the fluctuations of the moment. The same request is made for freedom of shipments.

Cellulose and Paper: The raw materials manufactured on the left bank come largely from the right. On the other hand the manufactured goods are largely consumed on the right where fully fifty percent of the goods comes from the left bank. The paper factories on the right bank are dependent upon the SAAR coal and brown coal from the left RHINE.

Rubber: The left bank of the RHINE has an urgent need of rubber flexible tubing and joining bands. Freedom of trade is requested. The Rubber Bureau will be maintained to assure equal distribution of the products. Much of the rosin, turpentine, shellac, etc., are manufactured in large quantities in the region of COLOGNE. The left bank depends upon the right for much of the raw materials.

Gelatine: The left RHINE produces twenty-three per cent of the total. The finer grades of glues, etc., are very largely made on the right bank. An exchange in goods is carried on between both groups of factories.

Lime: The left bank is dependent on the right for a large part of its lime. The production has diminished sharply the last year. In view of the wide use made of this product, its circulation should not be restricted.

Iron and Steel: The manufacturing of the unoccupied regions is directly dependent on the various grades of iron and steel extracted from regions of LUXEMBURG, COLOGNE, and the SAAR district. Large quantities of materials ordered by factories on the right bank are held up on the left bank. Unless delivered, the shortage of materials will be a hindrance to the railroad works. In 1913, 400,000 tons of iron and steel was sent each month from the left to the right bank. In machines most of the shipments were from the right to the left bank.

#### Minor Metals:

Aluminum: The largest aluminum works are on the left bank of the RHINE. Tin was also shipped from the left to the right bank.

Zinc: The left bank exchanges iron for silesian zinc. It is noted that the organization of the mineral control in Germany is very complete and is organized so that during demobilization the supply of the left RHINE will not be inferior to that of the right RHINE region.

Leather and Shoes: The production of shoes on the left bank exceeds the demand. The unoccupied region is dependent on the left bank for some five million pairs. At present the right bank should receive the surplus of 1,500,000 pairs per year from the

left. Certain kinds of shoes are also made in the occupied regions which are not made elsewhere. The left bank, however, is not in a position to meet its own needs owing to the fact that factories on the left bank are not organized for preparing certain kinds of leather. The strict control exercised by the Central Bureau for leather and shoes should be maintained on the left as well as on the right bank.

Oil, Fat, and Soap: The blockade forced Germany early in the war to organize an elaborate system of oil and fat control. An extensive development is being made of substitutes. Were any region to be taken out of the system it would involve serious consequences to the remainder of Germany. The shortage in foodstuffs accentuates this. The fat industries are concentrated on the lower RHINE. Oleomargarine for the most part comes from there. Its making, however, involves the use of substances which come from all parts of Germany. Unless free exchange be maintained between these factories a reduction of output will follow which will have serious consequences.

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AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-B-192: Memorandum

***Meetings of Committee on Finance, Economics, and Industry***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
January 17, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1. Three meetings of a main Interallied Committee on the above subjects have been held. The first meeting was called by order of Marshal Foch, and the call indicated very indefinitely the subjects to be considered. At this meeting, three French civilians appeared as members of Marshal Foch's delegation. These civilians, at the first meeting, acted as though subordinate to General Payot, who was Marshal Foch's military representative. At the second meeting, these same French civil officials were present as was one civil representative each for Great Britain and Belgium. At this meeting, the French civil officials absolutely dominated, and I am reliably informed that at Marshal Foch's Headquarters they issue orders on civil, industrial, financial and political matters in the Marshal's name, and without his knowledge.

At the third meeting, the same general character of representation prevailed, but the French adopted a less arrogant tone and tried to attain the same ends by less direct methods.

From the conditions outlined above, it is evident that the French Political Government is attempting to use the authority of Marshal Foch as Allied Commander-in-Chief to force measures that are purely economical or political and that have no real military bearing. In general, the measures proposed are intended to place France in absolute control of all financial, industrial, and economic life in all occupied territory, and to permit her to use this control solely for the benefit of Frenchmen.

At first, the method employed was to use the power of the Chairman of the Committee, appointed by Marshal Foch's order, and his representative, to force agreement with all proposals. These proposals were brought to the meeting in dossiers by the French representatives and no one else could find out in advance what would be proposed.

Later, the proposals were not forced but disguised to such an extent in language and apparent import that it was almost impossible to avoid them. Yet the least important looking and most reasonable sounding proposals can be seen, on analysis, to lead directly toward obtaining the end in view, which is to use the name of the Allied Armies to forward French political, financial, and economic ends. As an example, the American delegates

refused to agree to using a system of force to obtain German trade secrets. Then a proposal letter came up that French and Belgian buyers be allowed to inspect goods before acceptance from the factory. Agreed. Later, it developed that these inspectors would be French experts who would seek to obtain trade secrets by stealth while theoretically inspecting goods. No protest registered.

Still later, on the ground of inability to repair or obtain spare parts for automobiles of European makes, it was asked that such inspectors be permitted to use American automobiles in the American zone. The American delegates could not well refuse this request, yet it is evident that an inspector coming in an official American car, and by permission of American authorities, can use this fact to make it appear that the power of the American Army is behind his demands.

Conclusion - Due to force of circumstances, the American Army is being used to forward French political ends.

This is bound to continue as long as Marshal Foch is recognized as Allied Commander-in-Chief and can put a personal delegation on every interallied committee and appoint its chairman.

To dissolve the Allied Command will be a great inconvenience, but will not be dangerous in a military sense.

Recommendation - That the advisability of withdrawing American troops from Marshal Foch's orders be seriously considered.

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1236: Memorandum

### ***Reported Political Activity***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, January 17, 1919.*

General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, today gave official denial to the story printed in the New York Times "that the American Army, on its entry into Luxemburg, suppressed a movement then in progress and directed against the existing Government." The story is entirely without foundation in fact. Immediately upon the entry of our troops into Luxemburg, a proclamation was issued by the Commander-in-Chief, and widely published, fully setting forth the reasons for the entry of our troops and assuring the people that our Army would in no way interfere with the internal affairs of Luxemburg. The entire spirit of this proclamation was carried out by our Army during its stay in the Grand Duchy.

[Unsigned]

[Editorial Note: This is apparently the substance of a statement released to the press by G. H. Q., A. E. F.]

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**Proposed Luxemburg Decree**

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
No. 657

SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND,  
G. Q. G. A., January 17, 1919.

FROM: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

TO: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

My dear General:

In your letter of January 12, you advised me that it seemed impossible for you to accept the proposed Decree which I had sent you on December 29, and which settled the whole regulation of the supervision to be exercised in Luxemburg. Taking into account the opinion expressed by President Wilson, and in order to avoid any difference in our views, I withdraw this proposal.

But it is necessary, as you will see, that certain measures dealing with the territory of Luxemburg should be uniformly applied by the military authorities of the Allies participating in the occupation of the country.

Take, for example, the circulation of inhabitants living near the frontier. Farmers and workers, to go to their fields or to their factories, children to go to school, doctors and midwives to visit the sick, often have to cross the frontier several times a day. At the present time they are all equally prevented from doing so, and I daily receive requests from the Luxemburg Government regarding them.

Other questions, which have already arisen, such as the repatriation of citizens of Luxemburg at present in Germany, interest the American, as well as the French, command.

In the interests of the population of Luxemburg, these questions should be quickly solved. With this double end in view, I propose that these questions should be regulated, in each individual case by agreement between the American General charged with territorial questions in LUXEMBURG and General de Latour, Commandant d'Armes at Luxemburg.

It would only be in important questions of principle that these general officers would refer to the higher authority which governs them.

If this proposal meets with your approval, I would be grateful if you would be good enough to let me know as soon as possible the name of the American General with whom General de Latour will enter into relations.

In the meantime, and in view of its urgent nature, I ask you to be good enough to let me know if you have any objection in principle to make to the attached Decree regarding circulation in the zone of the frontier.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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**Circulation of Luxemburg Inhabitants**

[Contemporary Translation]

*January 17, 1919.*

The closing of the frontiers between Luxemburg and the RHINE countries on the one hand, and between Luxemburg and the Allied countries on the other (a closing which was brought about as much by the interest of the Allied Armies and Nations as of the Grand Duchy itself), has involved as a consequence the enactment of provisions of general order governing circulation.

Experience has shown it to be necessary to supplement the general rules at present in force by detailed provisions regarding circulation of people living along the frontiers.

The following measures will accordingly go into effect beginning January.

1. People living along the frontiers of Luxemburg may circulate in the bordering circles between Luxemburg and the RHINE countries, and in the bordering Belgian and French communes, upon the mere presentation of a card of identity given by the Burgomaster of the commune in which the interested person is domiciled.

2. Belgian and French people living along the frontiers (frontier inhabitants of LORRAINE included) may circulate in the frontier communes of Luxemburg upon the mere presentation of a card of identity given by the Belgian Burgomaster or the French Mayor of the commune in which the interested person is domiciled.

3. Inhabitants of the RHINE countries living along their frontiers may circulate in the frontier communes of Luxemburg or of LORRAINE, upon the presentation of a card of identity bearing their photograph signed by the Burgomaster of their place of residence and countersigned by the nearest local military command (Cantonment Commander or Commandant d'Armes).

Persons committing infractions of these provisions will be turned over to the Luxemburg courts of law.

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**Lamorlaye Conference of January 18, 1919**

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL MOSELEY AND GENERAL PAYOT, LAMORLAYE,  
JANUARY 18, 1919

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Supply of Locomotives and Cars to the American Army: General Moseley brought up the point that the locomotives which had been delivered to the American Army by the Germans under the Armistice were all light machines and that we were getting more of this class than we actually needed as our trains are all too heavy for the type of engine which had been turned over. He suggested that we turn back to the French a certain number of these machines in exchange for cars as there was a general shortage of cars for us to make our necessary movements both from the front and from the bases. General Payot called Lt. Col. Lefort in conference on this point, who stated it was not possible to turn over any more cars to the American Army, the reason being that all cars received under the Armistice were being turned into the general pool and used pro rata in proportion to the needs of

each Army. Both Gen. Payot and Col. Lefort asked for specific instances where we had not been able to make desired movements owing to shortage of rolling stock, but General Moseley stated that he was only speaking in a general way and looking forward to the time when we would have to make movements at the rate of 10,000 men per day to the ports of embarkation. Upon being asked by General Moseley whether the French were actually absorbing all the locomotives which they had in use, Col. Lefort replied in the affirmative and stated it would materially help the situation if we could see our way clear to turn over some more locomotives to the general pool. General Moseley agreed to look into this matter with a view to satisfying the request and also agreed to find out more definitely whether we had actually received sufficient locomotives from the Germans for our present needs.

\* \* \* \* \*

Request for Tank Cars by American Member of Armistice Commission: General Payot stated that a request had been received through the American Member of the Armistice Commission for the delivery to the Americans of 200 tank cars out of the 1,000 coming from the Germans. He could not understand this as the Americans had been the ones who supplied the French with tank cars and he believed we had sufficient for our needs. General Moseley and Col. Kilpatrick were of the same opinion and General Moseley agreed to investigate the matter and notify General Payot.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Delivery of Rolling Stock and Trucks***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 18, 1919.*

No. 49

FROM: Acting Chief  
TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.  
SUBJECT: Report of Conditions

[Extract]

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5. Report of Committee on Transportation: The Committee on Transportation reported that up to date 4,100 auto trucks had been delivered to the Allies, leaving a balance of 900 still due. The Germans claimed that they would be able to deliver these within the next two or three days. Of the 5,000 trucks to be delivered, 1,250 are to be assigned to American Army. It has been agreed that if Germany had not completed the deliveries of railroad rolling stock by January 17, a penalty of 500 engines and 15,000 cars to the

Allied Armies and 46 cars for the railroads of ALSACE-LORRAINE should be added to the number to be turned over.

At the renewal of the Armistice at TREVES on January 15, it was agreed to change this penalty from rolling stock to agricultural implements in order to assist in the rehabilitation of the devastated regions of Belgium and France. The details of this agreement have not as yet been received.

The total deliveries of engines and cars to date is, as follows:

Locomotives	2,945
Cars	83,749
For ALSACE and LORRAINE	
cars	10,570

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1214: Letter

***Polish Troops in Posen***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 18, 1919.*

No. 49

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Germans Protest against Polish Troops taking Possession of Posen: The Germans stated that the Polish General Bowlormuszki has gone from WARSAW to POSEN in order to take command of all Polish troops there. The German Government enters a protest against sending this General and Polish troops into the Province of POSEN, claiming that it is a violation of German territory; they, therefore, most energetically protest against it. They claim that at the time of the Polish elections it was stated that the eastern frontier of the German Empire from August 14, 1914, would be maintained as it has been until the peace conference should determine a new frontier. The German Government has sent a similar note to the Polish Government.

They also make the point that these Polish questions do not relate to the Armistice Commission. They claim that the Poles are taking advantage of the Armistice to create a situation which shall have the appearance of an accomplished fact. They are occupying extensive areas which form a part of the German Empire.

The first question to be settled is whether or not these regions are inhabited by a majority of Poles or of Germans. They request that the Governments of the Allies and the

Allied High Command use their influence over the Poles to induce them to return to their former boundaries as recognized by the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments, who approved of Poland being an independent state.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

***Payment of Marks by Germans***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, March 22, 1919.*

No. 108

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

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2. Payment of Fourth Installment of 100,000,000 Marks by the Germans: Referring to my Secret Report No. 106, of March 20, in Paragraph 9, attention was called to a request made by the Germans to be allowed to pay the fourth installment of the above sum at the same time the third installment was paid.

General Nudant presented a reply to that request today, informing them that such payment could be made, the money to be sent to ROTTERDAM.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**American Prisoners Not Judicially Punished**

*Spa, Belgium, Mar. 1, 1919--6 p. m.*

Asst. Chief Staff, G-1, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

No. 626. Following telegram from Harries, BERLIN, repeated:  
"No. P-562. Ref. your No. 5049 G-1. The German War Office has notified me that it has completed an examination of the lists of Allied prisoners who were judicially tried and has thereby ascertained that no American prisoner of war was ever judicially punished while in German hands."

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

**Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, March 1, 1919.*

No. 88

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Construction to be Placed upon the Word Entretien:

General Barnum sent to General Nudant, the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, the following letter: "I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the American Armies to inform the Armistice Commission that he is not prepared at present and without further consideration to adopt the construction placed upon the word Entretien in the Armistice, by the Interallied Command, but that he will give notification of his views a little later."

This letter was not read at the meeting of the Mission as, of course it is not desired to give any information to the Germans of any differences of view held by the different Allies on this question.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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**Provisioning Germany**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, March 1, 1919.*

No. 88

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. French Mission to be sent to Berlin: General Nudant notified the Chief of the German Armistice Section that in accordance with the instructions received by Marshal Foch, the French Government has decided to send a mission to Berlin for the purpose of getting information with a view to eventually provisioning Germany. This Mission is entrusted to Mr. Haguerrin, accompanied by four or five collaborators, who will go to BERLIN by way of Switzerland. General Nudant requested that the German Government be notified.

Later in the morning General Von Hammerstein protested against this method of procedure, stating that if Germany had been informed that it had been decided to send a Mission, the question should then have been asked as to whether such a Mission would be welcome by Germany.

To this protest General Nudant stated that he considered that they must recognize in this Note the manner of expression of a soldier and not that of a diplomat. This was quite a happy form of reply to make and was accepted by General von Hammerstein without further remark.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Section.

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***Germans Traveling by Sea***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 18, 1919.*

No. 49

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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8. Travel of German Subjects by Sea: In answer to the note of the Germans dated January 3, the Chairman of the Allied Armistice Commission informed the Germans that he had received word that the Naval Armistice Commission does not grant authority for German subjects to cross the seas.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 18, 1919.*

No. 49

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Handling of Russian Prisoners of War:

General Nudant handed to General Von Winterfeldt a note stating that he had been directed to communicate to him the following:

The Governments of the Allies and those associated with them united

January 13, 1919, have adopted the following resolutions: The officers delegated in Germany by the Allies and Associated Powers to control the evacuation of prisoners of war of the armies of the Allies, assisted by the representatives of the aid associations of United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy will form a commission charged with the control of Russian prisoners of war in Germany. The commission, of which the central office will be in BERLIN, will be qualified to negotiate directly with the German Government in regard to all questions relating to Russian prisoners of war. It will receive from the German Government all the facilities for travel necessary to control the conditions of living and feeding of these prisoners. The Governments of the Allies reserve for themselves the right of ordering the repatriation of prisoners of war to such places as may seem to them the most desirable.

2. Serbian, Rumanian, and Russian prisoners sent to the western front:

General Nudant stated that he had just received a telegram in regard to the following:

In the last four or five days the German Government has been sending trains of prisoners, Serbians, Rumanians, and even Russians to the river RHINE. We have quite decided not to accept them. I ask, therefore, that General Von Winterfeldt take steps in the matter, as certainly has General Dupont in BERLIN. I ask, therefore, that they be sent in the direction that has been indicated, and especially that they be not sent to France, which is not the road to Russia. As regards the sending of the Russian prisoners, it is either a mistake or a tactical move and we will not permit either the one or the other.

To the foregoing General von Winterfeldt called upon Major von Pabst, Chairman of the German Prisoners of War Committee, to make reply, which he did, as follows:

As regards transportation of Russian prisoners of war to the RHINE, if such is the case, it is contrary to the instructions which have been given by the Ministry of War in BERLIN. The same may be said in regard to the transportation of Rumanians. In regard to them, there are Rumanian officers negotiating at the present time in BERLIN.

As regards the Serbian prisoners, it was understood in a subcommission that no difficulty would be raised in regard to the transportation of small numbers of Serbian prisoners. As compared to the total number of prisoners which have been transported by way of the RHINE, the number of Serbians sent there is relatively small.

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6. Report of Committee on Prisoners of War: The Committee on Prisoners of War reports that the repatriation of all Allied prisoners is completed except for one French officer and 693 men. Of these one officer and five men remain in Germany in the service of the French Mission; 628 are in work camps in the district of Germany occupied by the Poles. 60 do not wish to return to France, having taken out naturalization papers.

Reports show that the grand total of French prisoners repatriated to date is 487,651. Of the British, there are practically none left, and of the Belgians, only about 60.

According to information received from the Ministry of War there were on January 9, in GORLITZ, 399 Greek Officers and 500 enlisted men, all others having deserted.

7. Report from General Dupont at BERLIN:

General Nudant received the following telegram from General Dupont:

I received official assurances that there were in Germany on the first of December last, neither prisons nor fortresses nor camps nor any other place in which officers or soldiers of the Entente were kept hidden or from which they were forbidden to give news of themselves. Since the first of December no prisoner has been kept in hiding.

Since the Armistice no Allied subject has been kept in prison, either for trial or punishment.

Information concerning insane will be furnished at an early date.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 383.6: Fldr. 6: Letter

***Effects of deceased Prisoners of War***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 18, 1919.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F. (G-1)

1. Referring to your Telegram No. 5049 G-1, Jan. 12, 1919, last sentence, German authorities state that all effects of prisoners of war who have died in captivity from any causes whatever are forwarded to the Nachlass-Stelle, Zentral-Nachweise-Buro, Ministry of War, BERLIN, in order to be forwarded from that office through diplomatic channels to the country concerned.

2. It is suggested this matter be taken up with General Harries at BERLIN.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Note

***Circulation of Alsace-Lorraine Inhabitants***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 301/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 19, 1919.*

From General Nudant to General von Winterfeldt

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army made the following ruling on January 13, No. 19689:

All persons except demobilized men who left ALSACE-LORRAINE before the occupation and who, being domiciled there, desire to go to ALSACE-LORRAINE either to put their affairs in

order, to remove their families or their property, or have any other reason must address individual requests, with cause, to the Armistice Commission. The requests will be transmitted by the Armistice Commission to the Commissioner of the Republic of the district where the individual concerned lives. The Commissioners of the Republic will come to a decision and will inform the Armies concerned and the Armistice Commission directly. Execution will belong only to the Armies, which will allow only people designated by the Commission to enter ALSACE-LORRAINE.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Note

### ***Condition of German Trans-Oceanic Steamers***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 294/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 19, 1919.*

From General Nudant to General von Winterfeldt

The French Minister of War telegraphed the following on January 18; for Ship Captain Vanselow, member of the German Commission, from the navigation delegates of the Associated Governments:

With reference to the agreement made on the 17th instant for turning over the German ships, you undertook:

1. To take all necessary steps immediately to insure the ability of the German ships to sail.
2. To obtain complete information on the present condition of all German ships, information to be transmitted to us.
3. To study the reasons which you wish to submit to us for the exemption of certain ships, such as coast trading vessels in the Baltic.

It was also agreed that your delegates would meet ours at an early date to deal with the questions which are still in suspense, and which are similar to those mentioned in the last paragraph of the article of the Armistice.

You are requested to furnish at once to the Interallied Armistice Commission of SPA a complete list of all German trans-oceanic steamers, passenger and freight, which are now in the German ports in a good condition so that they can be immediately utilized. We also need very detailed information on the condition of other ships of trans-oceanic type and the date at which each of them will be ready to sail. You are also requested to send the other information of the sort mentioned above as soon as possible, and as you receive it. The first part of this information must be furnished early enough in SPA to reach PARIS by January 25.

We will then arrange at once for a new meeting with your delegates at SPA.

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***Return of Luxemburg Inhabitants***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 300/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 19, 1919.*

General Nudant to General von Winterfeldt

The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies writes on January 17 in Note 895/2, as follows:

In answer to Communication No. A. A. I. No. 396, Wako, the German Armistice Commission should be informed that in principle the return of all Luxemburgers to their country who make the request is allowed, and will be put in practice in agreement with the Government of the Grand Duchy.

Insofar as the application of the rule is concerned, all that is necessary is to send a list of the names of the people to be repatriated to the General Commanding the Armies of LUXEMBURG; the latter authority will use the aforesaid list to draw up the safe-conducts and send them to the people interested, after having come to an agreement with the Government of the Grand Duchy.

For the purpose of simplifying the process, the safe-conducts can be sent to the representative of the German Government at the P. I. A. C., to be sent on by him to the commanders.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Note

***German Request for Interpretation of Armistice Clauses***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 6833

*Spa, January 19, 1919.*

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission, Gen. Nudant

Reliable information from COLOGNE has it that the command of the British Second Army has declared as confiscated all former property of the Army which in the period between November 11, 1918, to the entry of the British troops was sold by the German Services to the civilian population. Similar information comes from various parts of the occupied area.

The German military command has throughout the entire war come to the aid of the suffering and needy population, especially among the working classes with clothing, equipment, washing, linen, tools, and, above all, foodstuffs which were sold with a view of checking promptly increased distrust. Such a situation existed within the German army when its large numbers were forced to draw back through the occupied areas. Art. 6, Par. 3, of the Armistice has no sentence which concerns the selling of military property. There is, therefore, an opening in the agreement and protest must be raised against interpreting such an opening to Germany's disadvantage.

In 1771 [1870-1871 is obviously intended], the Germans as victors agreed to interpret any want of clearness to the advantage of the French.

I am referring especially to Art. 7, of the Armistice concluded October 27, 1870 at METZ. It comprises: Any article about which there is doubt will always be interpreted in favor of the French Army. Signed at the Chateau FRASCATY, October 27, 1870 (signed also Jarras and von Stiehle.

In that Art. 6, Par. 3 openly comprises such a want of clearness, I ask the High Command of the Allies and the various commands of the Armies of the Allies to reconsider the measure and to remand the already executed requests. The measures in question have caused considerable agitation among the people they affect.

My Note of January 4, Number 3962, will be further discussed.

von WINTERFELDT.

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HS Confidential File: Fldr. H-1: Minutes

### ***Conference on Joint Occupation of Luxemburg***

*Paris, January 20, 1919.*

Notes on conference held in PARIS, 4 Bis Boulevard des Invalides, between  
Marshal Foch and General Pershing.

[Extract]

Also present were General Weygand, Colonel Boyd and Captain de Marenches. Title.

The only subject taken up in that conference was the question of joint occupation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg by American and French troops.

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General Pershing stated that in his opinion the establishment of an agreement between a French general and an American general would involve a question of principle.

As he had often mentioned it to the Marshal, Luxemburg was considered by the American Government as an independent, neutral state, having the right to administer its own people. Furthermore, he did not agree to have the French Commandant d'Armes of Luxemburg control a part of the American zone; the American zone ought to be entirely controlled by the Americans, or not exist at all. Should the Marshal's suggestion of a Franco-American committee be adopted, the result would be that, as experience had often shown, French influence would predominate in that committee.

Marshal Foch replied that he did not see that any question of principle was involved. It was, in his mind, only a question of individual matters being arranged by agreement between a representative of the French Army and a representative of the American Army. The question, he thought, was not one of great importance. He suggested that the scheme he advocated be given a fair trial, and if experience showed that it did not work, other steps could be taken.

General Pershing said that he must persist in his point of view that the division of territory of the Grand Duchy into two zones created a situation which was very unsatisfactory; that it was very desirable that the territory of the Grand Duchy be included in one zone.

The city of LUXEMBURG being situated in the American zone, he did not at all agree to the presence and activities of a French Commandant d'Armes in that city.

He, therefore, always believed that the best solution was a complete withdrawal of all American combat troops from the territory of the Grand Duchy; that the two American divisions presently billeted in Luxemburg ought to be moved either forward into German territory, or backwards.

Marshal Foch replied that to move these two American divisions into German territory would mean an increase in the number of troops whose billeting was to be paid for by Germany, according to the conditions of the Armistice. To move them backwards would be difficult on account of the fact that they would have to be placed in a zone presently occupied by French divisions.

Furthermore, the question of the total withdrawal of American troops from the territory of the Grand Duchy was, in his opinion, a very serious one. It would tend to spread out the belief that the French authorities were carrying out in the Grand Duchy activities in which the Americans refused to have any part.

General Pershing replied that in fact that opinion was one which many people held.

Marshal Foch and General Weygand stated that they wished to enter the strongest protest against that assumption. The division of the Grand Duchy into two zones was, they indicated, the result of military necessities. At the time when the Armistice was declared, its conditions were, of course, not yet carried out. The Allied Armies had to be moved toward the RHINE in constant readiness to resume fighting. They were, therefore, given zones of advance which corresponded to that situation. It happened that the line of demarcation between the French and the American zones of advance went through the territory of the Grand Duchy, which had, therefore, been accordingly divided into two zones - a French zone in the north and an American zone in the south.

General Pershing said that this did not show why a French commandant d'Armes should have control of a part of the American zone.

Marshal Foch replied that he had been compelled to locate his G. H. Q. in the city of LUXEMBURG on account of its geographical situation in the center of the zones of the rear of the Allied Armies. He had considered it necessary to have a French regiment billeted in the town to form the guard of his G. H. Q. That French regiment had to be moved from time to time according to the movements of the division to which it belonged. To avoid, therefore, that the military rules concerning circulation should be changed each time, he had appointed a permanent Commandant d'Armes at LUXEMBURG.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

### ***German Deliveries***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 20, 1919.*

No. 51

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Supply of Coal to Switzerland:

General Nudant, in replying to General von Winterfeldt's note, Number 916, of January 12, in regard to sending coal to Switzerland from the valley of the SAAR to the left bank

of the RHINE, read the following as the decision of Marshal Foch in this matter:

In the execution of the clauses of the Armistice the Commander of the Allies has the right to control the administration of the occupied regions. On the other hand, the German Government cannot ignore that it belongs to the French Government to guarantee Switzerland the supply of coal from the SAAR and of lignite from the left bank of the RHINE. This clause forming part of the protocol of LUXEMBURG was signed by the representatives of the German Government. The German protest which is hardly admissible in its present form, calls for no other reply.

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3. Deliveries of Coal: General Nudant called the attention of the Germans to the fact that it was agreed in the negotiations in LUXEMBURG that they were to deliver something like fifteen thousand tons of coal per day. In this connection he stated that in eighteen days, deliveries did not reach eighteen thousand tons, adding that this condition should be promptly remedied.

To this, the representative of the German Government, Minister von Haniel, made the following reply:

General Nudant will have understood from the newspaper reports that in the valley of the RUHR, where the coal is dug from which the coke is produced, there is the greatest disorganization. The local soldiers and workmen councils have taken upon themselves the distribution of coal and the working of the mines. The rest of Germany that is not occupied by the Allied troops is suffering as much as the Allied part of Germany from this circumstance. The German Government has not succeeded in becoming master of this situation which is in large measure to be attributed to Bolshevism. If it has, therefore, up to this time not been able to satisfy the obligation into which it entered at LUXEMBURG, it is because it is face to face with a superior power. I assume that General Nudant will receive details of the situation from Major Aaron of Essen.

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13. German Money to be sent to BRUSSELS: Minister von Haniel, on behalf of the German Government, requested that in answer to a note of January 14 from the Belgian representative that the Belgian Financial Commission be informed that on the 20th of this month at least, six hundred million marks will be sent to BRUSSELS for the National Bank by the Government Bank of BERLIN.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Telephone Communications**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 21, 1919.*

No. 52

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Telephone communications between the occupied and unoccupied regions: General Nudant replied to a note from General von Winterfeldt in regard to telegraph and telephone communications between the occupied and unoccupied regions that the answer which is always made to these questions is that the commanders of the Armies of Occupation have received instructions to handle these questions. They give the necessary authority according as they see fit and in accordance with instructions which they receive.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Payment of American Officer Prisoners**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 20, 1919.*

No. 51

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Payment of American Officers: The Chief of the American Section of the Armistice Commission submitted to the Germans a request that they obtain from the German authorities

as promptly as possible an accounting of money paid to officers of the United States Army while prisoners of war in Germany.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, PIAC.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Repatriation of German Prisoners***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 21, 1919.*

No. 52

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Return of German prisoners of war:

It is interesting to note the activity of Major von Pabst, the Chairman of the German Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners of War. He has presented to the American representative of that Committee a note stating that during the discussion of TREVES on January 15 and 16, Secretary of State Erzberger requested Marshal Foch now that the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war has been finished, to bring about at once the repatriation of all German prisoners of war and interned civilians. Marshal Foch stated on the sixteenth, that he was ready to discuss the question and called upon Secretary of State Erzberger to summarize his desires in a letter, which he would at once answer. Secretary of State Erzberger's letter was as follows:

Marshal, the stipulations of the Armistice Agreement concerning repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and in turn civilians have been carried out. The present lengthening of the Armistice Agreement treats the question of the return of Russian prisoners of war. Also the repatriation of Serbian, Rumanian, and Greek prisoners of war is under way. In a short period of time Germany has released all prisoners of war and civilians in turn.

So far as German prisoners of war are concerned, it was stipulated in the Armistice Agreement of the eleventh of November that their return should be regulated upon the conclusion of the preliminary peace. Since that time, eight weeks have passed. The conclusion of the preliminary peace is still uncertain at this time. The moment, however, has come when also the German prisoners of war and civilians must be brought back to their homes. This is the desire of our people by the innumerable relatives and dependents whose uneasy state of mind in the meanwhile is aggravated to the point of despair, and further by the prisoners of war and in turn the civilians themselves, whose hopeless condition must lead to complete spiritual break-down.

I, therefore, make to you, Marshal, the most urgent plea to bring your influence to bear with the Allied Governments so that as soon as possible, and indeed before the beginning of the negotiations concerning preliminary peace, all German prisoners of war, and in turn civilians in the hands of the Allies may be released and sent home at once. Especially urgent is my plea for the sick and severely wounded prisoners and for the prisoners who have been in imprisonment for longer than eighteen months, as well as all interned civilians.

Marshal Foch answered the same day as follows:

Mr. Secretary of State, I understand the interest which Germany has in the repatriation of the prisoners at present in the hands of the Allied Governments. I intend to transmit your request and to support it with the Allied Governments in particular for the prompt repatriation of the most interested classes.

While it would not be advisable to question the accuracy of the foregoing, it is interesting to note that as yet the French representative on this Committee has no advices which confirm the accuracy of the letters given above.

As the latter part of Paragraph 10 of the Armistice Conditions of November eleventh states that the return of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the Peace preliminaries, I have directed the American representative on this Committee not to allow himself to be drawn into any discussion of the question of the earlier return of these prisoners.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.,

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Committee for Return of Agricultural Implements***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 21, 1919.*

No. 52

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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8. Committee to Handle Agricultural Implements to be Turned Over to the Allies: In as much as Paragraph 3 of the Convention of January 16, 1919, for extending the terms of the Armistice provides for the return of a large quantity of agricultural implements and machines, a committee is now being formed in the different Allied Sections of the Armistice Commission for the purpose of handling the details of this work. Special officers to act on this committee, representing the Germans and French, are here. I have asked for no

special officer to represent the American Section of the Armistice Commission for the reason that the new disbursing officer, having had a course in agriculture at Cornell University, seems well qualified to represent our Section. I have, therefore, designated him to act on this Committee.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

### **German Elections**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 21, 1919.*

From: Sanford Griffith, Captain Corps of Int.

To: General Malvern-Hill Barnum, Acting Chief

[Extract]

1. Nature of the Election: The election is for members of the National Constitutional Assembly to determine the Constitution and assume the power of Government in Germany. The Assembly will meet the early part of February, probably not in BERLIN, but possibly in ERFURT. It is based on universal suffrage of all citizens of twenty years and over. The suffrage is single, direct, and secret. The vote was for the list of candidates approved by each Party in each electoral district, and not for individual candidates. The places in the Assembly will be proportioned among the Parties relative to their strength as determined by the election. One seat is apportioned to each 150,000 inhabitants.

The election took place Sunday, January 19, the polls being open from 9 a. m. to 12 noon, and from 1 to 8 p. m. I visited a series of polls: One in EUPEN, two in AIX-la-CHAPELLE, and some ten or twelve in COLOGNE. After some further detail on the mechanism in the polling at all these places, I note the conditions peculiar to each of them.

2. The Mechanism of the Election: It was agreed at the Armistice Commission that facilities - right to hold meetings and to publish party propaganda in the newspapers and on billboards - would be accorded the occupied regions for the election. Some ten days prior to the election the parties organized a series of meetings and started a newspaper campaign. Since the occupation the people had lost contact with the general situation. North German papers have not come through, the local papers have been closely censored, and meetings were not allowed. The Rhinelanders, accustomed to rigid control, accepted this restraint stolidly and with apparent indifference. When the campaign was opened, however, they promptly awakened to political questions. All meetings in COLOGNE and AIX-la-CHAPELLE were crowded. It was sometimes necessary to go hours in advance for seats. In the French sector it was necessary to have a specific authorization for each meeting. Local plain clothes police were present to maintain order. Censorship was maintained over the press, and it may be said for both the French and British sectors that the political information published was of an incomplete nature.

The people, however, do not seem to have taken any particular notice of this fact.

At the polls on the day of the election there were no troops of occupation present, order being maintained either by the German plain clothes men or by the local police. I chatted with two of these agents at AIX-la-CHAPELLE who informed me that there had been no difficulties of any sort other than at a meeting of the Spartacus Party where it was proposed to form a parade after the meeting. As all street gatherings are forbidden, the meeting was broken up by the local police and by French troops.

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The two unpopular parties were the Conservatives - who now call themselves "The German National Peoples Party" - and the Minority Socialists. I told one of the ward-healers, wearing an iron cross decoration and there for the old Conservative Party, that he would not get my vote. He was a trifle embarrassed by the laughter of the others, and hastened to explain that he was representing the Party "to earn his living, and not from any profound conviction." There were several down-and-out women wearing placards at one or two of the polls in some of the crowded districts, who also appeared to be there to earn their living. On the whole, however, the Party heeleders were serious, respectable people, school teachers, shopkeepers, and the like.

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3. Political Opinions: In AIX-la-CHAPELLE I talked with two members of the Minority Socialists Party (U. S. P. D.). They complained that they were misunderstood in the Rhineland, and seemed more bitter against their own Government and command than against the Army of Occupation. Of the latter they complained that their political campaign had been a failure owing to the fact that their meeting was broken up and they could not distribute circulars on the streets. They have no newspaper and cannot afford extensive bill-posting. They declared that Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were killed with the connivance of the Government. They dammed militarism in general, more particularly their own. They were surprised that the Allies now are not in sympathy with them, in view of the fact that "the Independents alone fought the machine the Allies said they were fighting throughout the entire war."

A poster of theirs in the same vein reads "We as no other Party were obliged to bleed during four and one-half years of war. We saw our Party reduced and leaves forbidden. Capitalists are still crushing us and the profiteers have the power. If you propose to stop that, vote Independent Socialist and no other party."

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The Catholic Center according to one of the ward-healers, a theological student and ex-machine gunner, declares that the immediate concerns of his Party are to fight Bolshevism and Socialism. "Within reason we are ready to go to almost any length to prevent secularization and the removal of religious instruction from the schools. For this reason they favor a Catholic Rhineland state which, united, could form a part of a loose German confederation." He admitted that they are negotiating with the French and said many are in favor of reaching an agreement with the enemy if they cannot realize their aspirations within.

This opinion, however, was not shared by Germans of the other parties present. The chief concern of all at present seems to be to establish a system, and reach an accord which will permit them to receive foodstuffs from America. They repeated insistently that their potato ration has been reduced to four pounds per week, and they they are really

suffering from hunger. Most of them were open in denouncing Bolshevism and no protest was made by others present when one or two declared "better enemy occupation than Bolshevism."

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Transportation of Food***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 21, 1919.*

No. 52

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Supplying Food to Poland: Marshal Foch telegraphed under date of January 20 that the Interallied Council of Food Supply proposes to send the necessary foodstuffs into Poland by way of DANZIG.

In accordance with the terms of Article 16 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, request was made of the Chief of the German Section of the Interallied Armistice Commission to ask the German Government to assure the daily transportation of three thousand tons of foodstuffs from DANZIG to the Polish frontier. They were informed that the German Government should insure absolute protection for these shipments, the supervision over which will be exercised by delegations from the Allies.

To the foregoing, General Von Winterfeldt replied as follows:

I shall send this note on, but I should like now to express my doubts as to whether it will be actually possible to transport these foodstuffs according to the measures here suggested. The way in which the Poles are behaving has been discussed here frequently. I do not know how the German Government will take upon itself the responsibility of transporting these foodstuffs. In any case it will be necessary for the Allied High Command and the delegates of the Allies to use their influence upon the Poles not to make difficult the carrying out of these suggestions [to prevent interference with the execution of these measures].

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Maintenance of Armies of Occupation**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 21, 1919.*

No. 52

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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7. Meeting of the Finance Committee: Officers from the different Allied countries reported here about two weeks ago and gave consideration to the question of cost of maintenance of the Armies of Occupation.

This Committee after holding several preliminary meetings and determining the lines along which it should work, took a recess in order to enable the different members to secure the necessary data with which to continue their work.

The members of the Committee are now coming together again, and when the necessary data has been received by all, the meetings of this Committee will be resumed.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Treves: Fldr. 417: Telegram

**Alleged Violation of Armistice Terms**

THIRD ARMY, AEF,  
*January 21, 1919--2:12 p. m.*

TREVES

C. A. 7. Orders have heretofore been issued by the headquarters that all German property not removed from the area of American occupied territory during the time specified in the Armistice must be turned in not later than January 20. Evidence of wholesale attempts on the part of the German military authorities to violate the terms of the Armistice in this respect have been discovered. They are exerting every effort to prevent compliance with its terms. It is very vital that we insist upon a strict compliance with our orders; therefore no deviations from the terms of the order have been permitted. Request that G. H. Q., officer in charge of civil affairs in occupied territory, and the American

representative at SPA be advised by wire that protests will probably be received from high German sources in this matter and request that no action be taken thereon without first referring matter to these headquarters for our information and recommendation.

JOSEPH T. DICKMAN,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding Third Army.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 430: Letter

### ***Enemy Material***

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
*Coblenz, January 22, 1919.*

FROM: Enemy War Materials Board

TO: C-in-C, Advance G. H. Q.

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in communication from G. H. Q. dated January 11, 1919, this Board was appointed by G. O. 7, these headquarters January 19, 1919, for the purpose of determining "the servicability and disposition of all war materials turned over or abandoned by the German Armies in the sector of the Third Army, not belonging to the general pool of war materials to be turned over under the terms of the Armistice by the German Armies; and to destroy at once such material, including ammunition, as is found to be unserviceable or not needed."

2. Certain contingencies have already arisen, with which it is believed that this Board should be explicitly empowered to deal, as hereinafter set forth.

3. There are large quantities of certain material in the area of the Third Army which is apparently of no value in the military service, nor as salvage. Although same is within the category of booty of war, it is of such character as not to be worth transporting for the use of the civilian population of Allied countries, although undoubtedly of value to the local population of Germany.

4. A considerable part of such material was sold by the German Army to municipalities and civilians, or by municipalities to civilians, in this area, subsequent to November 11, 1918, and is now in their hands.

5. For example, 23,000 pairs of shoes were sold by the city of COBLENZ to a loyal civilian. Same have paper tops and wooden soles, and are obviously valueless unless to the local population. Other examples are: dog-drawn carts, paper harness, pots, kettles, etc. The destruction of such property would be an economic waste, and yet it is not of value to the United States.

6. This Board therefore recommends that it be granted in substance, authority as follows: Enemy W. M. Bd. to C-in-C, Adv. G.H.Q., Jan. 22, 1919.

To sell at public or private sale as it may deem advisable, such enemy material above referred to as it shall decide to be of no value to the United States and of no military assistance to the enemy: further, to confirm sales heretofore made by German municipalities to civilians of material falling within this category, requiring the proceeds of any and all such sales to be delivered to this Board and by it deposited to the credit of the United States with a disbursing quartermaster.

7. This Board would further recommend that it be authorized to make reports at such intervals as it deems advisable, instead of submitting a weekly report, and to submit a final report at the termination of its duties.

Enemy War Materials Board.

LEWIS LANDES,  
Major, Q. M. C., Chairman.

CHARLETON S. COOKE,  
Capt. Inf., Secretary.

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1st Ind.

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*January 24, 1919.*

Representative A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q., Jan. 24, 1919

TO: A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.

1. During a recent trip of COBLENZ, I inspected the quantity of the class of property referred to in this communication, which, while serviceable, is entirely unsuited to our service. Some of this material is widely scattered, in the possession of numerous merchants who purchased the same from the German Armies after the Armistice was signed.

2. In addition there is a considerable quantity of material which is unserviceable, not worth the labor and expense of salvage, but of some economic value to the local inhabitants. In this category are included motor trucks out of which all engines and spare parts have been removed and with nothing but the chasis and part of the body remaining.

3. It is thought that the best way to handle this material is to dispose of it by sale to the German population in the area occupied by the American Army. It is not believed that this can be considered as trading with the enemy and it is not thought than any objection can be raised to this method of disposing of this class of property, when it can be shown that the sale will not in any way augment the military strength of Germany.

4. In view of the above, it is recommended that the following letter of instructions be issued to the Commanding Generals of the Second and Third Armies:

5. With reference to letter from this office dated January 11, 1919, on the Subject of "Disposition of German War Material not Covered by the Terms of the Armistice," the following additional instructions are issued.

6. Investigation has shown, particularly in the Third Army Area, that there is a large quantity of new, serviceable, or unserviceable, material which is not of value to the American Army and which in the light of recent events cannot be considered as an asset of the military power of Germany if disposed of to the merchants in the occupied area, but the destruction of the same would be an economic waste. This material may be classified as follows:

(a) Such manufactured articles which, due to lack of raw materials were manufactured from substitute materials of inferior quality (such as shoes with wooden soles and paper uppers, paper harness, etc.).

(b) Manufactured material other than the above which is of value to the inhabitants of the occupied area only (such as dog-carts, etc.).

(c) Manufactured material of use in all countries, on which nothing could be realized from its sale in other than the occupied area due to cost involved in collecting and shipping elsewhere (such as pots, kettles, other cooking utensils, etc.).

(d) Unserviceable material not worth salvaging: this to include all classes of material excepting arms and ammunition.

(e) Animals which have no military value and which, due to old age or infirmity, can never become of military value.

7. Where the Board in charge of this work classified property as coming under the description enumerated in Paragraph 6 above, special proceedings covering the case will be prepared by the Board, wherein this property will be definitely classified as booty of war, under one of the appropriate headings mentioned in Paragraph 6 above, and recommendations will be made by the Board that the property in question be submitted to an inspector for his action with a view to sale at auction to the highest bidder. The action of the inspector, approved by the commanding general of the area wherein the property is located, will be considered as final.

8. Any funds accruing by this method will be deposited to the credit of the United States with the nearest disbursing officer, accompanied by a copy of the Board's proceedings, action of the inspector, and records of sale at auction, so as to show the exact source from which the money in question was received.

9. The disposition of the property in question will be shown on the final report to be submitted by the Board, which will also be accompanied by proceedings of the Board, the inspector's action, and copy of the record of sale.

10. Paragraph 12 (a) of letter from the C-in-C to the C. G., Second Army and C. G., Third Army, dated January 11, 1919, mentioned above is amended as follows:

When all property pertaining to this class of war material has been disposed of, the Board will render a final report covering same to the Representative of A. C. of S., Advance G. H. Q., showing disposition of all material. No other reports will be required.

L. D. GASSER,  
Lt. Col., G. S.,  
Representative A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.,  
Advance G. H. Q., A. E. F.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Note

### ***Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1187

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 22, 1919.*

From: The Representative of the German Government

To: The Chairman of the P. I. A. C., General Nudant

The Government bank at COBLENZ sends information by telephone that according to information received from the Americans, 60,000,000 marks are to be paid over on January 25, 1919, for the maintenance of the troops of occupation. Nothing is known of this matter, either at the P. I. A. C. or at the Government bank in BERLIN.

In connection with Note No. 3757 of the Wako of December 24, 1918, the request is made for explanation.

von HANIEL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Delivery of Trucks**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 22, 1919.*

No. 53

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Delivery of Auto Trucks: General Nudant called the attention of the Germans to the fact that in their Note Number 4603 of January 3, they agreed to complete the delivery of five thousand auto trucks by January 20. They repeated this promise on January 12 in their Note Number 6227, presented in the discussion at TREVES, stating that the delivery may still be expected to be completed by January 20.

In view of these statements, no penalty was imposed.

General Nudant calls their attention to the fact that the following trucks have been delivered:

To the	Belgian Army	140
" "	American "	926
" "	British "	1,060
" "	French "	2,113
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,239</b>

The Germans have announced that they will deliver 220 trucks between now and the end of this month.

Their attention was called to the fact that they had failed to comply with their formal promises.

The President of the German Section of the Armistice Commission replied that a larger number of trucks had been presented than was required and that the failure to have completed their obligations was due to unexpected reasons which have been discussed in the subcommittee handling this matter.

The President of the Allied Commission replied that there was too much discussion of all manner of details and not enough was accomplished.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Prisoners of War**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 285

*Spa, Belgium, January 22, 1919.*

From: General von Winterfeldt to General Barnum

Request list of all American prisoners who have been sentenced to imprisonment or other punishment and list of prisoners who have died in captivity was thoroughly discussed with Captain Bradley on January 13, (see minutes Paragraph 4, quoted below):

Captain Bradley asked on December 22, for list of all prisoners of war who had been sentenced to any kind of punishment during their imprisonment, together with a statement of the places of the punishment and the day they were liberated. At the same time he requested a list of all American prisoners of war and civil prisoners who had died in prisons. Doctor Brockelmann states the lists are being prepared. The Minister of War sends the following information:

Foreign Office has regularly been receiving since the beginning of war monthly lists of all prisoners of war and civil prisoners who have died in captivity, these to be forwarded to the enemy Governments. From the prison inspections and camps, there have been demanded lists of all who have died in captivity. These lists will be sent to the Armistice Commission immediately upon arrival.

With regard to those undergoing punishment, it was explained that all prisoners of war undergoing punishment as well as other prisoners of war had been repatriated so that the lists have only a historic value. In spite of this, the Minister of War was busy with drawing up lists of all Allied prisoners of war who had undergone sentence during their imprisonment. It was expressly mentioned that the drawing up of such a list would require a very long time since the personnel necessary for it is partly lacking and partly replaced by new and inexperienced workers. A definite time within which the lists can be delivered can, therefore, not be stated.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Ten-Hour Working Day in French Zone**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 22, 1919.*

No. 53

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Number of Hours to Constitute a Day's Labor: Minister von Haniel called attention to the fact that the French High Command in its management of the railways of occupied

areas has ordered as effective from January 20 a ten hour working day. He claims that an eight hour work-day was adopted throughout Germany even before the occupation of the left bank of the RHINE by the Allied Armies, and that the working classes regarded the eight hour day as one of the essential accomplishments which the revolution has brought to them. He protested against the setting aside in the occupied area of this eight hour day and the substitution therefor of the ten hour day and requested that these requirements be revoked.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Repatriation of German Prisoners**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 22, 1919.*

No. 53

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Return of German Prisoners of War: The head of the German Section of the Commission brought up in verbal remarks the question of the return of German prisoners of war.

His remarks were, as follows:

I would like to call the attention of General Nudant and the heads of the other Missions to the extreme seriousness and importance of the question treated. The gentlemen know with what vigor they themselves insisted on the return of their prisoners of war. They will understand without difficulty that the German Government and the Armistice Commission will show no less zeal for the return of their prisoners.

Inasmuch as the repatriation of the Allied prisoners has been accomplished with the exception of a few separate cases, it is hard to understand why the question of the return of German prisoners should be constantly procrastinated.

In Germany the anxiety and worry concerning the fate of the German prisoners has reached its height. Most fantastic reports are spread about them and it is impossible to quell them. I would be grateful to General Nudant if he will give me an answer as soon as possible to this question which concerns the interests of several hundred thousand people.

To the foregoing, General Nudant made the following reply:

I will inform you tomorrow of the point of view which the Generals of the Allies and myself have in this matter. In advance, I may say that the two

points of this note will be brought to the immediate attention of the High Command of the Armies of the Allies.

This may be handled under two headings: First: The repatriation in general of German prisoners of war; and, Second: The repatriation of wounded and sick who are no longer fit for military service.

As regards the second category, I will seek a solution in accordance with my proposition of January 5.

As regards the main question, the repatriation of German prisoners in general, it would be more far-sighted to conclude that the solution of this question will only be reached on the conclusion of the preliminaries of Peace.

This is only a personal point of view, but I think it would be prudent not to let German opinion start off with the idea that this is a question, the solution of which will be taken up within the next few days.

In conclusion, I will transmit to you tomorrow a note which will have been drawn up after discussion with the Generals at the heads of the Missions of the Allies, - a note which will be transmitted to Marshal Foch.

Following the meeting when this conversation took place, the undersigned spoke to General von Winterfeldt with a view to learning more specifically on what ground he based the request that German prisoners should be returned. He stated that it was on the ground of humanity, as well as for the reasons stated in his remarks given above.

General Nudant requested the Chiefs of each of the Allied Missions to meet him at 6 p. m. for the purpose of discussing this question. At this meeting the views of each Chief were requested and there was a unanimous expression of opinion that there was no ground on which to recommend to Marshal Foch that such action should be taken. As mentioned in my report of yesterday, the last part of Paragraph 10 of the Armistice of November 11 states that the return of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the Peace Conference. At this meeting General Nudant read Marshal Foch's report on the effort made by Secretary Erzberger at TREVES to induce him to approve of the return of German prisoners. In my report of yesterday I questioned the accuracy of the report of this interview as given in a letter from the Germans. From the letter which General Nudant has, it seems that all that Marshal Foch assented to was that he would give consideration to the return of the sick and wounded, the very young, and the very old prisoners of war. It is, therefore, evident that the report of this interview as given by Secretary Erzberger was decidedly misleading. Within the last few days there has developed a manifest effort in propaganda to have German prisoners of war returned. With this matter treated as specifically as it is in the Armistice, I see no reason for any discussion of it whatever before this Commission.

There appears to be two reasons why the German prisoners should not be returned in the near future: First, there has already been demobilized in Germany probably a million or more men, most of whom are now idle, and sending another seven hundred fifty thousand Germans into the country would only be to increase the number of idle and therefore increase the number of persons who will have to be fed, whereas, in France, the conditions are reversed. The French Army has not demobilized and there is, therefore, a shortage of labor, consequently the German prisoners can be readily employed. The second reason may well be placed under the requirements of the Armistice known as *reparations des dommages*.

The German prisoners of war are being held in France and Belgium to work out this reparation to such extent as the Peace Conference shall determine.

If the people of Germany are in such a state of mental agony over the failure to have their husbands, brothers, and sweethearts returned as is claimed by General von Winterfeldt, it is a small part of the price which the German Nation must pay for having brought on this war.

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6. Organization of a Commission to Care for Prisoners of War Remaining in Germany and to Repatriate them at such Time as shall be Decided upon: \* \* \* a copy of instructions received from Marshal Foch by the head of the French Section of the P. I. A. C.

From the last section of this memorandum it appears that this Commission is placed under the Armistice Commission at SPA. With a view to encouraging this work and to a full understanding between the representatives of the different Allies here at SPA and our representatives who have been working in BERLIN, General Ewert, the British representative in BERLIN, and General Harries arrived at SPA on the afternoon of January 21. I have been conferring with General Harries in this matter, and we have conferred with General Haking and General Ewert.

The work of this Commission seems now to be directing itself almost entirely to the care of Russian prisoners remaining in Germany, as the repatriation of all others is nearing completion, practically all having left, except about twenty thousand Serbians and about forty thousand Rumanians.

General Harries will keep me informed of the work which is accomplished by them, which will be covered in my reports from time to time.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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183-28.2: Memorandum

### ***Reconnaissance of Neutral Zone***

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,  
*January 23, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR G-3

1. In compliance with instructions from the Chief of Staff, January 22, I called on the German commander of the Neutral Zone at WESTERBURG about 12:15 h., today. I was received by the Chief of Staff, Major Osius, who informed me that they understood from instructions received from Marshal Foch that advance notice was to be given them in case we entered the Neutral Zone. They seemed to object to our entering the zone without giving them advance notice. I stated my business and no objection was offered to furnishing me any of the information. The Chief of Staff informed me that the only troops opposite us in the Neutral Zone are less than 150 dragoons and 2 commissioned officers in WESTERBURG and one battalion of infantry in HACHENBERG, a statement of which had already been given to the representative from this office who had arrived at HACHENBURG about two hours previous.

2. The Chief of Staff stated positively that there was no target practice or maneuvering, nor was there any artillery within the Neutral Zone. He also stated that all military weapons had been removed from the possession of inhabitants of the Neutral Zone and no form of hunting was allowed.

We observed about two minenwerfer and 13 or 14 trucks in WESTERBURG. The Chief of Staff stated that this material was either material rejected by the Allies or was held on hand in case it were necessary to replace any that would be rejected.

3. With reference to the policing of the Neutral Zone I was informed that it was being taken care of by the municipal police officials and that there had been no disturbance or hostilities. In case of any disorder, the commander, after obtaining permission from the Third Army, would send a patrol or troops to the scene of disorder.

4. At the request of the Chief of Staff the interview was in German in order that another staff officer could understand the subjects discussed. Lieutenant Schlesinger acted as interpreter.

5. Route: The following route was covered: HUNDSANGEN---HADAMAR---DORCHHEIM---LANGENDERNBACH---GEMUNDEN---WESTERBURG---LANGENHAHN---WOLFERLINGEN. Condition of roads very good. Road from HADAMAR to LANGENDERNBACH suitable for double column. Trains were observed operating on the railroad in the ELBE Valley

6. Topography: Bridges observed across the ELBE and tributaries were of stone arch and can carry heavy traffic. The valley from HADAMAR to WESTERBURG is practically all under cultivation and of open terrain. Heights south and west of WILSENROTH is one of the important positions which, with MOLSBERG heights, dominate the valley and have plain view of the main road running north from HADAMAR as far as LANGENDERNBACH. The next important heights east of the ELBE River consist of two main hills on a line between IRMTRAUT and OBER-WEYER, both wooded.

7. Inhabitants: We conversed with inhabitants at HADAMAR and DORCHHEIM, also at MUHLBACH. They were very friendly and claim everything is orderly in the sector. They state they have observed no troops of any kind since the Armies retreated. They seem generally to be in good spirits.

A. E. AHRENDTS,  
Lt. Colonel, U. S. A.,  
G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Return of Industrial Machinery***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 23, 1919.*

No. 54

FROM: Acting Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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9. Restitution of Materials taken from French and Belgian Territories: A committee of the Interallied Armistice Commission has been organized to supervise the execution of the requirements of Part VI of the Convention of January 15 extending the terms of the Armistice. The French delegate on this committee is M. Lefevre; the German delegate is M. Guggenheim. There are also British, American, and Belgian delegates selected from among the officers present with their respective Armistice missions.

This Committee held sessions yesterday at 11 a. m. and 5 p. m. M. Lefevre stated frankly that they proposed to give the fullest possible interpretation to the provisions of Article VI of the Convention referred to above. His demands were positive and made in a form which left no doubt that unless the Germans conceded every essential point, the Allies would take more direct measures to see that they were fulfilled. In the two meetings held

yesterday, the principal questions considered were: First, the extent of the powers of the delegates present and, second, the methods and scope of work necessary to carry out the terms of the Convention.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Letter

**Luxemburg Agreement**

*Paris, January 23, 1919.*

Marshal Ferdinand Foch,

Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies

My dear Marshal Foch:

After most careful consideration, I am unable to concur in the proposals, with reference to Luxemburg, which you make in your letter of January 17. You will recall that from the beginning of our discussions on this matter, I have insisted not only upon the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Luxemburg, but also upon the prime necessity of avoiding any dual control insofar as concerns the American relations with the people of Grand Duchy.

Although your present proposals might be construed as looking to the benefit of the Luxemburg people, I find that these proposals still maintain the elements both of a dual control over American troops and of interference with the internal affairs of Luxemburg. I must, therefore, adhere to my repeated suggestion that the only satisfactory solution of this perplexing question is the withdrawal of American combat troops from the Grand Duchy.

If I correctly understand your position, your principal objection to the withdrawal of American troops is found in your belief that such withdrawal would be likely to be misinterpreted.

I believe that the withdrawal may very readily be accomplished without such result. Under the present plans for returning troops to the United States, the 32d and 42d Divisions, both of which are now on the RHINE and are among the divisions longest in France, will embark at a comparatively early date. These divisions might readily be sent down the RHINE to a port of embarkation. In any event, it would be perfectly natural that these two divisions should, upon their departure, be replaced by the two American divisions now in Luxemburg.

Although I believe such cases are not numerous, I see no objection to consultations, in any case of civil rights which affects both Luxemburg and that part of Germany occupied by American troops, between such officers of your staff as you may designate and General H. A. Smith, in charge of civil affairs in the American occupied zone.

In order that there be no misunderstanding, I think I should add that I do not recognize the French Commandant d'Armes of LUXEMBURG as being either directly or indirectly interested in the American zone.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

**Repatriation of German Prisoners**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 23, 1919.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. German Prisoners of War:

General Nudant then read a note giving the reply to General V. Winterfeldt's request of yesterday for the return of German prisoners of war. It was as follows:

In order to inform you the point of view of the Chiefs of the Allied Sections of the Armistice Commission in reply to Note No. 275 of January 22, in regard to repatriation of prisoners of war and German civilians, the question of finding out whether or not the work has been begun for the repatriation of these prisoners seems to them all to be one of a governmental nature. In view of this fact they will not inform their individual governments. However, they will ask of them a list giving the total numbers of German prisoners of war and these will be communicated to you as soon as they are received.

On the other hand, the Chiefs of the Allied Sections of the International Armistice Commission will transmit with indication of their approval your request in regard to the repatriation shortly of German prisoners of war who are seriously wounded and sick.

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It will be noted that in his last sentence, quoted above, General Nudant states that the second part of the question which relates to the seriously wounded and sick will be settled in a favorable manner. In making this statement, it can only be assumed that he has information from Marshal Foch which warrants it. Referring to General Nudant's reply about the return of prisoners, a separate letter has been sent to the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., asking that the number of German prisoners held by the American forces be furnished this Mission. It is believed that General Nudant's statement that the Chiefs of the Allied Sections of the International Armistice Commission will transmit their approval of his request for the seriously sick and wounded, is all the action that is called for from me to comply with the statement made by him to the Germans.

In my report of yesterday, I stated that I believed that such action should be taken on the ground of humanity. General Nudant informed me that he did not believe there were over 6,000 or 7,000 of these men now held by the Allies.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Repatriation of Alsace-Lorraine Inhabitants**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 23, 1919.*

No. 54

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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8. Demobilization of Alsace-Lorrainers:

The Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners of War reports that Marshal Foch has sent to General Dupont the following telegram:

You are charged with regulating German Government repatriation of the Alsace-Lorrainers who have been demobilized. These Alsace-Lorrainers will be sent as far as possible by complete train loads to the camps of HAGENAU, METZ, STRASSBURG, SCHLESTADT; SARRLOUIS. It would be desirable that each camp should receive only 1,500 Alsace-Lorrainers each 48 hours. Request information as soon as possible concerning measures taken or considered for execution. The greatest diligence will be exacted of the German Government.

The Committee report goes on to say that the repatriation of Alsace-Lorrainers, which according to Paragraph 3 of the Armistice Convention was to have been terminated by November 16, 1918, continues to be the subject of abnormal delay for which the German authorities could give no valid excuse. In spite of the representations that have been made through the Allied Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners, and in spite of the assurances which have been given that these people would be immediately liberated, these have remained a dead-letter and news coming now shows that Alsace-Lorrainers are still retained in Germany either by force or by intimidation.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Repatriation of German Sanitary Personnel**

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,

No. 3492/CR

January 24, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, D. G. C. R. A.

To General Nudant, President of the International Permanent Armistice Commission at Spa

Replying to Communication 2146/CIPA of January 12, 1919:

1. Orders will be given that the German sanitary personnel remaining in occupied territory shall be set at liberty by the Allies upon discontinuance of the hospitals where it is employed or a transfer to [of] such hospitals of [to] the Allies.

2. It is understood that German sanitary personnel, made prisoner before the retreat, will be released insofar as its services are no longer necessary with German sick and wounded; an exception is made, however, in the case of physicians from Alsace-Lorraine, who will be kept in their country of origin.

3. It is impossible to exempt German sanitary personnel from judicial inquiries, or the execution of penalties which may be justified by acts contrary to military regulations which they have rendered themselves liable. The Geneva convention specifies only that sick personnel shall not be treated as prisoners of war.

4. Such sanitary personnel may be either sent back in empty trains to the concentration camps for Allied prisoners, to be transported to Germany later in empty German trains, or transported to German ports in ships returning there empty after having repatriated allied prisoners of war.

By order of:

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

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**Prisoners of War**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 24, 1919.*

No. 55

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Return of Greek and Serbian Prisoners: It is reported from a reliable source that the Minister of War in BERLIN told the Greek General charged with the repatriation of Greek prisoners that this work as well as that of repatriation of Serbian prisoners would depend on the response made by Marshal Foch to the request of the German Government for a delay in the delivery of cars estimated to be necessary to accomplish this work. It was further claimed that the German Government was to reduce the number of Russian prisoners being repatriated in order to secure the cars necessary for the Greek and Serbian prisoners; whereas, the number of cars used for Russian prisoners continued the same.

The Armistice Commission was requested to take up this matter with the German authorities.

The matter was placed before General von Winterfeldt for further report.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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***Free Passage for Polish Troops***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 24, 1919.*

No. 55

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Movements of Polish Troops:

Marshal Foch telegraphs under date of January 23, No. 768-0 as follows:

The Polish Government informs us that General Falkenhayn, with whom it had entered into relations in order to secure free passage by way of GRANDO [GRODNO?] for Polish troops who were advancing against the Bolshevists, refuses catagorically to grant this request. The Polish Government has referred this matter to the German Government at BERLIN, whom it has invited to give reply before the morning of January 26.

This communication confirms the report of the protest previously made in regard to the attitude of the German military authorities in the regions evacuated by the troops in the east of Poland. It is therefore clear that the German Government opposed in no manner the advance of the Bolshevik forces.

I request that you again intervene and in the most energetic manner with the German delegation to secure complete and immediate satisfaction of the Polish Government in regard to the transportation towards the east of units which may form a barrier against the Bolshevik advance. To the foregoing, General von Winterfeldt made the following reply:

I shall immediately transmit this note to the German High Command. I have nothing to add to the numerous communications and expressions that I have already given concerning the attitude of the German Government towards the Bolshevists and the conditions among the Poles.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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### **Strength of Armies Opposite Germany**

#### SALIENT POINTS IN CONFERENCE OF SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

January 24, 1919

The conference was opened by Mr. Clemenceau, who announced that the question to be considered was one raised by Mr. Lloyd George as to the strength of the Armies to be maintained opposite Germany until the conclusion of the Preliminaries of Peace. Mr. Clemenceau announced that he would hear Marshal Foch on this question.

Marshal Foch presented a written paper, which he read to the Conference. \* \* \*

Marshal Foch stated that he had originally asked 120 to 140 divisions as the Allied force; that the Germans now had 37 divisions on the western front and 15 on the eastern front - a total effective strength of 400,000. In view of this, the original request for 120 to 140 divisions could now be reduced to 100 Allied divisions on the western front. Marshal Foch proposed 46 French divisions, 18 British divisions, 15 American divisions, and 6 Belgian divisions as being the force which should be maintained in the Zone of the Armies.

In reply to a question asked by Mr. Clemenceau, General Weygand announced that the strength in combatants of these forces would be 800 to 900,000 French, 350,000 British, 450,000 Americans, 120,000 Belgians.

Mr. Lloyd George discussed the question of the number of German divisions available, and asked why the Germans kept such an army. He proposed that at the renewal of the Armistice, the Germans be told that they must demobilize; that the Allies should fix the number of divisions that the Germans might maintain. Mr. Lloyd George thought that the Germans would welcome such a decision on the part of the Allies. He also pointed out that in the strength stated by General Weygand, divisions only were considered, while as a matter of fact the forces to be maintained by the Allies would be very considerable in excess of the strength stated.

Marshal Foch stated that terms requiring demobilization could be put into the Armistice, but that there would be difficulty in enforcing a real demobilization by Germany. Marshal Foch recalled the history of Napoleon's conditions limiting the strength of the Prussian forces after the battle of JENA.

The President of the United States stated that there was no question but that there was a great lack of control of German troops by German officers, and thought that we should consider that a complete demobilization on the part of Germany would induce an increase in idleness unless Germany could be restored to peacetime conditions through the importation of raw materials, etc. The President thought that sooner or later we must trust the Germans to keep their promises; that the real solution of this question, as of many others was to be found in an early peace; that the state of mind of the peoples of Central Europe was a very real danger and one which no army could obviate. The President stated that Bolshevism must be forestalled; that in presenting these thoughts for consideration, he had not formulated from them a definite conclusion.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he agreed with the idea that it was essential to have an early peace. However, Great Britain's position required that she face the question of the troops to be maintained in Continental Europe at once; that he doubted whether or not Great Britain could contribute the 18 divisions she was called upon to furnish.

Mr. Lloyd George further said that France and America were interested in this; because if England could not furnish the quota she was called upon to furnish, either the total forces to be maintained by the Allies must be reduced or that France and America must make good the deficit in British troops. Mr. Lloyd George stated that there were very great difficulties with the men in the British Army. He went on to say that it

seemed to him that the German Army could be reduced through the insertion of clauses in the Armistice and that an effective control over Germany as a military power could be introduced by the regulation of food and arms.

General Bliss stated that the question was more or less academic insofar as America was concerned. Since our problem was one of transportation, and that it would probably be next summer before we could be able to reduce our forces in Europe below that which we were asked to contribute.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that the position of Germany was such that she could not resume military operations on any considerable scale. Germany has demobilized, and she certainly has not more than a million men under the colors. There is nothing in the present conditions to cause any alarm, and it appears perfectly possible for each nation to continue its demobilization in accordance with the national policy without the necessity for any very strict limitations upon the rate of demobilization. The German Army was either in idleness or in its barracks, and is not a body of troops which is well in hand and capable of being utilized on a large scale. Other guarantees that Germany will not resume military operations against the Allies are found in the state of her food supply; the fact that her ports are open and fully exposed to British and other navies; the fact that the Allies occupy a large part of the German territory; the Allies control absolutely the RHINE and all commerce on that stream; that a large part of the German armament has been surrendered or abandoned. Moreover, since the German ports and coasts are open, all of the large German rivers, as well as the RHINE, are open to Allied operations. Therefore, for all these reasons it does not appear that the question of regulation minutely the demobilization of the several countries is at all a pressing question. Insofar as concerns the American forces, the number which the Marshal proposes that the United States should have available on April 1, corresponds very closely with the number which would remain in France after utilizing the transportation, which will probably be available for returning American troops.

Sir Douglas Haig stated that he had no fresh arguments to add, but that in his opinion Germany could cause considerable trouble, and he thought that the Governments should maintain the number of divisions asked for by Marshal Foch unless certain guarantees in the way of control of factories, etc., could be secured.

Sir Henry Wilson stated that, in his opinion, the Germans should be called upon for demobilization, and until such time as Germany had completely demobilized, we should be very careful, as he thought that Germany might possibly reopen the war.

Sir Henry Wilson also stated that Great Britain was called upon to contribute large contingents in various parts of the world.

Mr. Lloyd George touched upon the possibility of destroying machinery, etc., in the Krupp factories.

General Diaz stated that Italy had demobilized 13 divisions, and 38 divisions remained under arms. Stated that Italy was ready to act in concert with the Allies. He also said that Austria was forming volunteer cadres of divisions and that this might be a potential danger.

General Diaz said that it was evident that the Allies could not remain on a war footing indefinitely, and that he advocated the control of raw materials, factories, etc.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that all large part of the raw materials was in the hands of the Allies or under their control, and that factories were of no value unless raw materials were available.

The President of the United States stated that he was not at all alarmed about Germany resuming the war; that Germany was beaten; that the people wanted peace, as did the peoples of the entire world. Stated that the supply of food and raw material to Germany was essential, and that without such supply she was helpless; said that much more danger to Europe was to be anticipated from the Bolshevik movement than from anything that Germany might do.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that it was reported that German troops are selling their

arms; that it might be that they were selling these arms to the Bolsheviks. He stated that the British Army had become less efficient; that the condition of the British Army was a very serious one, and it was very doubtful as to the number of troops which Great Britain could maintain under arms; that he saw no remedy other than the disarmament of Germany.

Mr. Loucher stated that the German manufacture of munitions of war depended essentially on the region of ESSEN; that if ESSEN was controlled and a considerable amount of the remaining German artillery taken under the control of the Allies, it would be impossible for Germany to resume operations.

Mr. Loucher stated that machine guns should also be taken under the control of the Allies, since they were a very important part of their equipment.

It was finally decided to announce that a committee, composed of Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Loucher, Marshal Foch, General Bliss and General Diaz would meet to discuss ways and means for securing the demobilization of the German forces and such control of German factories, etc., as would forbid the possibility of Germany resuming operations.

Marshal Foch then stated that he would like to consider the question of demobilization with the Allied Commanders and ascertain from them the rate of demobilization of each Army in order that he might know exactly what to expect.

Mr. Churchill stated that a loyal army was much more necessary than mere numbers. He continued on this statement at some length, and clearly indicated that the questions of discipline in the British Army was causing the greatest concern to the British authorities.

Mr. Orlando asked whether demobilization included the minor powers, and stated that any plan of demobilization should include all the powers.

It was finally agreed that the Allied Commanders-in-Chief should meet Marshal Foch at 4 bis Boulevard des Invalides on Sunday, January 26, at 10 a. m.

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HS Secret Docs: Vol. H-1: Memo.

### ***Strength of Allied Armies to be Maintained during Peace Negotiations***

TRANSLATION of note submitted to the Supreme War Council January 24, 1919, by Marshal Foch:

According to the programs of demobilization or of returning troops home, which the different Allied Governments appear to determine upon, each one upon its own account, there will be available March 31, upon the French-Belgian Theater of Operations the following forces:

French Armies	46 Infantry Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions
British Armies	18 Infantry Divisions 2 Cavalry Divisions.
American Army (and five others in the ports of embarkation.)	15 Infantry Divisions
Belgian Army	6 Infantry Divisions

or a total of from 85 to 90 Infantry Divisions and 8 Cavalry Divisions.

In a note of December 24, No. 52, P. G. L., the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies indicated as necessary the maintenance under arms facing Germany until the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace of a total of 120 to 140 Allied divisions.

Since this date the German demobilization has continued, According to the information given January 13, by General Von Winterfeldt at SPA, and January 15, by Mr. Ersberger at TREVES, the German forces still included in the first 2 weeks of January the following organized large units:

37 divisions on the western front,  
15 to 18 divisions upon the eastern front,

or a total of 52 to 55 divisions.

According to the same sources of information, the German effectives with the colors comprised at the same date the two classes of 1898 and 1899, amounting to about 200,000 men per class, or a total of 400,000 men, as well as several hundred thousand men who were retained in the service, either as volunteers or on account of lack of work. According to this information, it may be assumed that the present effectives of the German Armies amount to from six to 700,000 men. The exactness of this information not being capable of verification, it is desirable, taking into account the source of the information, to consider the figures given above as a minimum.

Taking all of this into consideration, the figure of from 120 to 140 Allied divisions given on December 24, as the force which should be maintained opposite Germany, may be reduced to 100.

Under those conditions, the figure of 80 to 90 Allied divisions indicated at the beginning of this note appears to be an extreme minimum below which it would be perilous to fall so long as the Preliminaries of Peace have not been signed. Moreover, these figures of from 80 to 90 divisions could not be admitted except under the express condition that these units be maintained at a strength and in a state of organization which would permit them to resume active operations without any delay.

So long as the Preliminaries of Peace have not been signed it is not possible then to continue further the programs of demobilization, nor is it possible to allow the number of divisions maintained to fall below the figures which are indicated above.

Otherwise, it would not be the victorious Armies which presented themselves before beaten German troops; it would not be Armies capable of resuming the struggle if peace should not be signed. We would have Armies in the process of demobilization or of departure, in great part demobilized, which would be available on our side as well as on the German side, perhaps; that is to say, it would be military feebleness on either side.

Finally, under these conditions, the discussion of peace would be taken up with equal conditions with reference to the military situation and how under this condition could we talk of reparation, of immediate indemnities; how would we be able to impose anything upon the enemy?

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Memorandum

### ***Clothing of Demobilized Germans***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 7148

*Spa, January 24, 1919.*

From: General von Winterfeldt

To: General Barnum

The Commander of the Headquarters of the American Troops of Occupation of the community of SAARBURG, of the district of TREVES, gave the following order toward the end of

December, 1918, published as No. 20 of the orders for the supervision of civilian affairs:

All German soldiers, who have returned to the occupied areas, must lay off their uniforms within 24 hours. Neither trousers nor coats may be worn. Likewise, these may not be altered by a tailor.

Recently also orders were given forbidding the wearing of military shoes or puttees.

Based upon these orders the Mayor of ORSCHOLZ was recently arrested and condemned by the court of SAARBURG to pay a fine of 200 marks because he did not cause to be arrested and brought before the Commander of SAARBURG for judgment, a man who appeared in his office in a uniform that had been altered by a tailor.

On account of the present great lack of materials for civil costumes, the soldiers at the time of their demobilization have received by order military clothes for the purpose of having them remodelled for civilian uses, and orders have been given them to complete their civilian costumes with parts of their uniform.

It is therefore requested, that in view of these difficulties the demobilized soldiers be allowed to use their military clothing equipment, just as it is allowed by the troops of occupation of the other nations.

von WINTERFELDT.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 103: Memo

### ***Censorship in Occupied Rhine Countries***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 24, 1919.*

#### A-----PRINCIPLES

I. Censoring of Publications Published in Occupied Rhine Countries: Is effected by each Allied Army in its zone.

Any publication authorized by an Allied Army will be allowed to be circulated freely in the occupied Rhine Provinces and be sent beyond their limits and to any destination.

II. Censoring of Enemy Publications Sent Over from Nonoccupied Germany: Each Army will set up a list of the newspapers and periodicals whose field circulation it deems suitable to allow. This list will be forwarded to the Interallied Economic Committee at LUXEMBURG, who will set up the definitive list of the authorized newspapers and periodicals, by amalgamating the list of the various Armies.

The list fixed up will be communicated to all Armies.

The importation of tracts, pamphlets, books, etc., is prohibited except if authorized by the Interallied Economic Committee of LUXEMBOURG, who will have the power to fix, in their general classes, the authorized works.

III. Censoring of Allied and Neutral Publications: The importation into the Rhine Provinces of any Allied or neutral publication is free, under the condition that interdiction will not have been requested from the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies by one of the Allied Governments or high commands.

The decision of the Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies will be made known to the high commands who will notify it to the Postal Control Commissions within their respective zones.

## B-----FUNCTIONING OF THE CENSORSHIP

### I. Censoring of Publications Published in the Rhine Countries:

(a) **Printing:** No newspaper (political, economic, financial, etc., ) no book, no pamphlet, no bill, no poster, no drawing, no photograph, no note can be printed, published or distributed, no cinematographic film can be published or sold without an authorization of the military authority, excepting catalogues, pricelists, circulars or letters necessary for commercial or manufacturing business.

As soon as printed, all publications of this kind must be turned over to the military authority. They can be published or distributed but with the authorization of this military authority who has the power to exact any suppression or alteration it may deem necessary. So much has been disposed for cinematographic films, which cannot be sold or projected without having first been presented to the military authority.

Shall be forbidden all written or printed papers, all films that will spread false news, or be of a nature to disturb the good order, and to endanger the troops of occupation, that will fail in the respect owed, and in occupied countries, to the Allied Government and Armies.

In case of any infringement of the orders concerning the censorship, the sanctions may be:

1. Temporary or definite interdiction for the papers or periodicals. Temporary or definite seizure for every other publication.

2. Imprisonment:

Fine (inflicted upon the newspaper ) or the town authorities held ) responsible.)	Under the conditions provided by Art. 28 of decision annexed to Memorandum No. 562/CR. of Nov. 15.
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Arrestment before a courtmartial )

One of the penalties of the second class can be incurred together with one of the sanctions of the first.

The publishers of newspapers and periodicals shall declare at fixed dates to the military authority the numbers of their sold and unsold copies, and insert freely when ordered by the military authority any communication emanating from same authority.

(b) **Sale:** Only persons holding a written authorization of the military authority will be allowed to sell, hawk or distribute in public or private places, newspapers, books, pamphlets, drawings, accounts. This authorization may be revoked at any time.

(c) **Censoring:** The authorizations provided by above Par. I and II are given and the effecting of the censoring is entrusted to the local military authorities.

It is advised to decentralize freely this service.

For instance: In each Kreis, the censorship will be entrusted to the officer in charge of controlling the administration of this Kreis for all publications that come out in this Kreis or usually circulate only within its limits.

The same regulation will be available for the Bezirk or the province, with the supervision of the efficiency of the censoring work in the subordinated echelons of the control of the administration.

The officers in charge of controlling the administration will have power to interdict or seize provisionally all newspapers, publication or printed papers within the limits of the power granted to them by the generals commanding the Armies.

To inflict fines or prison penalties to the offenders, they will use the power granted to them by their Army commanders.

Only the Army commanders or officers with authority therefor will have the power to interdict or seize definitely all newspapers, printed papers, publications, etc.

In order to facilitate this service, the German authorities may be charged to insure under their own responsibility the whole or part of the censoring control under the supervision of the Allied officers entrusted with the control of their administrations.

II. Censoring of Enemy Publications coming from Nonoccupied Germany:

(a) See A Par. II.

(b) Duties of the Postal Control Commissions: Each Postal Control Commission will allow to enter all publications carried on the lists of authorized publications, which it will keep up-to-date, and all those bearing the stamp of the Interallied Economic Committee of LUXEMBURG, as well as all catalogues, price lists, circulars or letters, printed matter necessary for commercial and manufacturing business.

III. Censoring of Publications coming from Allied (including ALSACE-LORRAINE) and Neutral Countries: All printed papers coming from ALSACE-LORRAINE, Luxemburg and all Allied or neutral countries will be entered freely and without any declaration into the occupied enemy territories, with the condition that their interdiction has not been requested from the Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies will be communicated to the Allied high commands. These will forward it for application to postal control commissions of their respective areas. The Interallied Economic Committee will besides be empowered to interdict such publication gotten out in a neutral country as it would esteem dangerous for the morale of the troops or population.

IV. Exportation from Occupied Enemy Territories of Publications from any Source: The exportation of these publications will be free as they will have been controlled by the military authority.

V. Press Articles Written in the Rhine Provinces for Allied or Neutral Publications: These articles will be submitted to the military censorship, an office of which will exist with every Army or G. H. Q. (Intelligence Service). In each Allied country, the censorship will be warned to allow only the articles with the stamp of Allied G. H. Q.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Note

***Allied Forces to be Maintained and German Demobilization***

[Contemporary Translation]

TRANSLATION of note submitted to the Supreme War Council  
January 24, 1919, by Marshal Foch.

According to the programs of demobilization or of returning troops home, which the different Allied Governments appear to determine upon, each one upon its own account, there will be available March 31, upon the French-Belgian theater of operations the following forces:

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American Army in the ports of embarkation).	15 Infantry Divisions (and five others
Belgian Army	6 Infantry Divisions, or a total of from 85 to 90 Infantry Divisions, and 8 Cavalry Divisions.

In a note of December 24, No. 52, P. C. L., The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, indicated as necessary the maintenance under arms facing Germany until the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace of a total of 120 to 140 Allied divisions.

Since this date the German demobilization has continued. According to the information given January 13, by General von Winterfeldt at SPA, and January 15, by Mr. Erzberger at

TREVES, the German forces still include in the first 2 weeks of January the following organized large units:

37 Divisions on the western front,  
15 to 18 Divisions upon the eastern front, or a total of 52 to 55

Divisions.

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Otherwise, it would not be the victorious Armies which presented themselves before beaten German troops; it would not be Armies capable of resuming the struggle if peace should not be signed. We would have Armies in the process of demobilization or of departure, in great part demobilized, which would be available on our side as well as on the German side, perhaps; that is to say, it would be military feebleness on either side.

Finally, under these conditions, the discussion of peace would be taken up with equal conditions with reference to the military situation and how under this condition could we talk of reparation, of immediate indemnities; how would we be able to impose anything upon the enemy?

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Memorandum

### ***Disapproval of Supreme War Council Committee Proposals***

MEMORANDUM [Written by General Tasker H. Bliss following the Supreme War Council Committee meeting of January 24, 1919.]

The report of the Committee is based on the assumption that any reduction in the effective strength of the Allied Army of Occupation calls for:

1. The fixing of the strength of the German Army.
2. The surrender of all war materials in Germany not required by the German Army whose size is thus regulated.
3. The control of all factories, shops, building yards, engaged in the manufacture of war material.

Under (1) the strength recommended for the German Army is 25 divisions of infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, it being assumed that these divisions are sufficient for the garrisoning of the frontiers and the maintenance of order in the interior. The infantry and cavalry

divisions would be organized and armed as at present. The total arms needed for this force is given as:

Heavy guns	1,000
Field guns	1,575
Machine guns	3,825
Automatic rifles	4,500
Rifles	412,000

Under (2) it is proposed that Germany turn over to the Allies everything in excess of the war material listed in the above paragraph. Subtracting the above amounts from the material listed in the report of the Subcommittee, it would appear that the following would be turned over to the Allies:

Heavy guns	1,500
Field guns	6,425
Machine guns	41,675
Rifles	838,000

In addition to the above the report calls for the surrender of all war material in the interior of Germany both in proof and in course of manufacture, including all stocks of asphyxiating gas and gas masks. The amount of this material is unknown, but it is believed to be considerable in amount.

Under (3) it is proposed that the Allies maintain in Germany technical experts and officers who will control the factories, workshops, and building yards engaged in the making of the war material discussed above.

It is proposed in the new Armistice terms (Paragraph 9) "in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing proposals or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them, the Allies will proceed to the military occupation of the WESTPHALIAN Basin on the right bank of the RHINE."

The paragraph quoted above (Paragraph 9) negatives in a large degree the idea that the Allies by negotiation reach an agreement with Germany in regard to the above demands.

Previous to the negotiation of the original armistice with Germany my position was that Germany should be required to demobilize completely except such forces as were needed for the maintenance of order and to surrender her arms. These terms were at the time considered too harsh, and milder terms were offered Germany which she accepted in the original Armistice Conditions. I do not find it consistent with my sense of right to go beyond the terms of the original Armistice Agreement except as a penalty for Germany's wilful failure to comply with these conditions. To my mind to proceed now to a military occupation of the WESTPHALIAN Basin on the right bank of the RHINE in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing new proposals would be on the part of the Allies and the United States a breaking of the Armistice Agreement. If it did not lead to a resumption of hostilities the Allies could be readily accused of violating their own agreement and justly so. If it led to the grave consequence of the resumption of the war due to this act the responsibility would belong to the Allied Governments and the Government of the United States.

I regret that I find myself unable to agree on the report of this Committee to the Supreme War Council recommending the addition of clauses to the original Armistice Agreement which are based on the threat of forcible occupation of further German territory unless our proposals are agreed to.

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**Available German Divisions**

SALIENT POINTS IN CONFERENCE OF SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

January 24, 1919.

[Extract]

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Mr. Lloyd George discussed the question of the number of German divisions available, and asked why the Germans kept such an army. He proposed that at the renewal of the Armistice, the Germans be told that they must demobilize; that the Allies should fix the number of divisions that the Germans might maintain. Mr. Lloyd George thought that the Germans would welcome such a decision on the part of the Allies. He also pointed out that in the strength stated by General Weygand, divisions only were considered, while as a matter of fact the forces to be maintained by the Allies would be very considerably in excess of the strength stated.

Marshal Foch stated that terms requiring demobilization could be put into the Armistice, but that there would be difficulty in enforcing a real demobilization by Germany. Marshal Foch recalled the history of Napoleon's conditions limiting the strength of the Prussian forces after the battle of JENA.

The President of the United States stated that there was no question but that there was a great lack of control of German troops by German officers, and thought that we should consider that a complete demobilization on the part of Germany would induce an increase in idleness unless Germany could be restored to peace-time conditions through the importation of raw materials, etc. The President thought that sooner or later we must trust the Germans to keep their promises; that the real solution of this question, as of many others, was to be found in an early peace; that the state of mind of the peoples of Central Europe was a very real danger and one which no army could obviate. The President stated that Bolshevism must be forestalled; that in presenting these thoughts for consideration, he had not formulated from them a definite conclusion.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Commander-in-Chief stated that the position of Germany was such that she could not resume military operations on any considerable scale. Germany has demobilized, and she certainly has not more than a million men under the colors. There is nothing in the present conditions to cause any alarm, and it appears perfectly possible for each Nation to continue its demobilization in accordance with the national policy without the necessity for any very strict limitations upon the rate of demobilization. The German Army was either in idleness or in its barracks, and is not a body of troops which is well in hand and capable of being utilized on a large scale. Other guarantees that Germany will not resume military operations against the Allies are found in the state of her food supply; the fact that her ports are open and fully exposed to British and other Navies; the fact that the Allies occupy a large part of the German territory; the Allies control absolutely the RHINE and all commerce on that stream; that a large part of the German armament has been surrendered or abandoned. Moreover, since the German ports and coasts are open, all of the large German rivers, as well as the RHINE, are open to Allied operations. Therefore, for all these reasons it does not appear that the question of regulating minutely the demobilization of the several countries is at all a pressing question. Insofar as concerns the American forces, the number which the Marshal proposes that the United States should have available on April 1 corresponds very closely with the number which would remain in

France after utilizing the transportation which will probably be available for returning American troops.

\*\*\*\*\*

General Diaz said that it was evident that the Allies could not remain on a war footing indefinitely, and that he advocated the control of raw materials, factories, etc.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that a large part of the raw materials was in the hands of the Allies or under their control, and that factories were of no value unless raw materials were available.

The President of the United States stated that he was not at all alarmed about Germany resuming the war; that Germany was beaten; that the people wanted peace, as did the peoples of the entire world. Stated that the supply of food and raw material to Germany was essential, and that without such supply she was helpless; said that much more danger to Europe was to be anticipated from the Bolshevik movement than from anything that Germany might do.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that it was reported that German troops are selling their arms; that it might be that they were selling these arms to the Bolsheviks. He stated that the British Army had become less efficient; that the condition of the British Army was a very serious one, and it was very doubtful as to the number of troops which Great Britain could maintain under arms; that he saw no remedy other than the disarmament of Germany.

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It was finally decided to announce that a committee, composed of Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Loucheur, Marshal Foch, General Bliss and General Diaz would meet to discuss ways and means for securing the demobilization of the German forces and such control of German factories, etc., as would forbid the possibility of Germany resuming operations.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Report

### ***German Army Strength***

[Contemporary Translation]

REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
AT THE MEETING OF JANUARY 24, 1919. (Morning)

[Extract]

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Assembled on January 27, February 2 and 5.

1. There is some uncertainty regarding the strength of the existing German Army, and the resources in war material of all kinds at its disposal, but both are still considerable.

2. There is similar uncertainty regarding the war material and stocks of munitions in the interior of Germany, both in proof and in course of manufacture, also regarding the

means of production of such materials, but these stocks and the means of production also are certainly still considerable in quantity.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Committee therefore considers that the Allied Governments should fix definitely the number of troops and the amount of war material of certain categories to be left in the hands of the German Armies, which it proposes should be reduced to a strength of 25 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions, and recommends that all material in excess should be handed over.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Committee, therefore, calls attention to the fact that a form of guarantee less comprehensive, but sufficiently efficacious, provided that the delivery of existing material has taken place, could be found in the establishment of absolute control by military occupation of the area extending to the east of the RHINE for an average depth of about 50 kilometers from COLOGNE to 15 kilometers to the north of DUISBURG, in such a way as to embrace ESSEN and the principal Krupp establishments, the greater part of the Rhenish-Westphalian coal fields and the metallic industries which depend on these. A map has been sent to Marshal Foch showing this zone.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Resignation of von Winterfeldt***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 24, 1919.*

No. 55

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Notice to the Germans of Enforcement of Penalty Provided in Article 7, Armistice Convention of January 16:

General Nudant read the following telegram from Marshal Foch, dated January 23, Number 769.

Inform General von Winterfeldt of the following: "The High Command of the Allies informs the German High Command by the application of Art. 7 of the Armistice Convention of January 16, it is taking steps to occupy the sector to the east of STRASSBURG, - that is to say, the fortress and adjacent regions within the conditions fixed by the above-mentioned Article. The required notification of six days in regard to this occupation will date from January 23, eighteen o'clock.

To this, General von Winterfeldt replied as follows:

In a private conversation recently with General Nudant, I made known to him that in the occupation of this bridgehead I would see a lack of confidence in the Armistice Commission. That on the day when I should learn of that decision I would have to ask that I be relieved from my post. That moment has now arrived and I shall at once take the necessary steps.

General Nudant then remarked:

I know none of the reasons which have determined the Marshal to take the steps which he had made. But I am almost certain that these steps in no way relate to the work of the Commission. Without taking the liberty to appreciate the steps which General von Winterfeldt is taking, I can personally say that I will regret this decision because I recognize the complete courtesy on his part in the negotiations which have taken place between us.

A telegram was sent to G. H. Q. reporting the fact that General von Winterfeldt had asked the German High Command for his relief.

According to the talk by some of the German officers in the corridors of the Hotel,\* after the morning session, General von Winterfeldt had been assured that this penalty would not be imposed unless it was found necessary. This talk also was to the effect that the Allies (the French) had not lived up to their agreements in as much as the penalty was imposed without there being any apparent cause.

With a view to understanding more perfectly the conditions surrounding General von Winterfeldt's resignation, the undersigned saw him at his Hotel and learned that he had been given no assurances whatever that this penalty would not be imposed without it was found necessary.

He stated that he had talked to General Nudant in this matter and expressed the hope that this clause would not be imposed unless necessary, but he did not even know whether General Nudant had repeated his remarks to Marshal Foch or not.

Determining this fact definitely as I did, showed that the talk of German officers of lesser rank was either more propaganda, or was due to misinformation on their part.

A special report has been forwarded showing General von Winterfeldt's exact position in this matter.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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\* Hotel Britannique at Spa,  
Headquarters for the German Armistice Commission.

**German Opinion**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 24, 1919.*

No. 55

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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7. German Viewpoint of Province of Armistice Commission: The German viewpoint of the functions of the Permanent International Armistice Commission is that it is a place for agreements; whereas, my understanding is that it is simply a place for arranging details for the compliance with agreements already entered into.

As the Armistice as originally drawn and as extended on two occasions is quite general in its terms, there arise many questions as to details.

The Germans frequently bring up questions which involve a distinct divergence from the Armistice conditions as laid down. One instance of this being their urgent request for the return of German prisoners.

It is readily understood that their arguments and discussions on such points are for the purpose of getting what they can, or saving what they can. At the same time it is readily understood that conditions in Germany have changed greatly since November 11, when the first Armistice Agreement was entered into. They base most of their claims for consideration in the failure to comply strictly with prescribed conditions to the impossibility of doing so owing to the revolution.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Return of Industrial Machinery**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 24, 1919.*

No. 55

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Return of Materiel taken from France and Belgium: The Committee handling this subject reports that it has been arranged that the German Minister of the Interior is to issue a decree requiring all those having machines taken from France and Belgium to declare them.

It has been arranged that two delegates of the Allies will sit permanently in BERLIN to look after these matters.

Representatives of the French and Belgian Governments are to have full freedom to travel in Germany for the purpose of locating and inspecting machines.

The French representatives on this Committee proposed that there be a meeting in FRANKFORT in five or six days for the purpose of completing arrangements in regard to the return of machinery.

I directed the American representative on this Committee to protest against the transfer of the work of the Committee to FRANKFORT as it would not be convenient for him to attend the meetings at that city. Upon his representation the Committee decided to continue their sessions at SPA.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 192: Memo

**Payment for Requisitioned Supplies**

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 3494/CR

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 24, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Chapin, Chief of the American Mission, D. G. C. R. A.

I have the honor to advise that the representatives of the Allied Armies at the

Interallied Conference on the Administration of Occupied Territories decided unanimously at the meeting held January 21 at LAMORLAYE:

1. That all requisitions made in occupied territory for the account of the Allies should be paid directly by the German Government.
2. That the German Government should render each month a statement of expenses thus paid for these requisitions and should remit in support of this statement papers proving the supplies furnished.

I beg you to be good enough to bring these instructions to the knowledge of the American High Command informing them at the same time that Marshal Foch has placed the Permanent Armistice Commission of SPA in charge of settling the question under this condition with the German representatives.

PAYOT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Demobilized German Personnel in Mayence***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 25, 1919.*

No. 56

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Residence of Demobilized Men in Neutral Zone:

The Germans presented a note stating that the following information had reached them:

1. According to the orders of the commanders of the French troops of occupation, all of the active military persons have been expelled from the stronghold of MAYENCE.
2. The order that in the Neutral Zone only the demobilized military persons could remain who were there before the war is said to have been applied also to the employees of the official offices of RASTATT. As only about ten out of every ninety employees are able to remain, the activity of three thousand workers would be entirely cut off. Apart from the extraordinarily great material damage, there would be the greatest danger of a large number of workmen being without work and without bread. It is determined by both the Armistice Agreement, Article 5, Paragraph 2, and by the note of the P. I. A. C., No. 30-G of November 28, Paragraph 3, that the employees who are necessary for the continuation of the military administration may remain in the Rhineland without any attention being paid to their military obligations. It is

requested therefore that the commanders concerned be given the necessary orders.

To the foregoing General Nudant replied that he had already transmitted a favorable report on a similar question. The solution to the above will, therefore, depend upon the answer which he received to this other question.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Memorandum

***Demobilized Germans in Neutral Zone***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau

SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND GENERAL STAFF,  
*January 25, 1919.*

Confirmation of telegram sent to French Mission, Chaumont, for General Pershing.

No. 807

It has been reported to me that military authorities of the Allies have warned demobilized Germans who did not live in the Neutral Zone before August 1, 1914, to leave this zone before January 26, in compliance with Article 7 Chapter C of Note 492/2 of December 22, on the exercise of control in the Neutral Zone.

By analogy with the provisions of Notes 703 of January 19, and 780 of January 23, and of Telegram 784 of January 24, I give Commanders of the Armies of occupation the necessary powers to authorize insofar as it may seem to them to be justified by the economic needs of the country, the continued stay in the Neutral Zone of demobilized Germans satisfying the conditions referred to above.

By order of the Major General:

GEORGES.

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**Payment of Cost of Occupation by Germany**

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
January 25, 1919.

Received at 28 a. m. 400 O. B.

Col. L. D. Gasser,

A. C. of S., G-4, Advance G. Hq., Treves.

Number 774, G-4. Following telegram from SPA, quoted for suitable action:

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, G. H. Q., A. E. F. The following questions have been asked by the precedence officer of the Subcommittee on Article IX Armistice Agreement:

1. In what term (specie, banknotes, securities, etc.), does your Government want the expenses of maintenance of the troops of occupation in the Rhine Country paid by the German Government?
2. Is it suitable to determine a minimum portion of specie or national securities for these payments?
3. In what proportion can the specie or money of Allied Nations or that of neutral nations to be accepted?
4. Where should the payments be made and who will receipt for them to the German Government?
5. Is it proper to prepare for a verification of the moneys paid and what time should be allowed for this verification?
6. What is the rate of interest to be claimed from the German Government for payments which are not entirely settled on the first dates agreed upon?

While all of the above questions may not be policies according to the terms of the recent letter of instructions, I would yet prefer authoritative definite answers to each question from the Chief of Staff. If any of the above questions are not considered questions of policy, would prefer that I be given general instructions in reference to them and be left to conform our plans to those of the Allies. Immediate answers to the above queries are especially desired.

Please expedite information as to when various echelons of American troops crossed German frontier; brigades or divisions may be considered echelons. Also request information as to authorized maximum strength of American Army of Occupation, including officers and men, also civilian employees, and animals.

CUTCHINS

1. Take up without delay the above questions as to money matters and furnish categorical answers to the six questions.
2. If not possible to furnish such answers indicate policy in respect of each question. Furnish data in detail for last part of telegram.

MOSELEY

7:16 p. m.

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**Delivery of Rolling Stock**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, January 25, 1919.

No. 56

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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8. Receipt of Locomotives and Cars: The Committee having in charge the receipt of locomotives and cars from the Germans reports that the total accepted up to January 22 is as follows:

Locomotives	3,287
Cars	102,436
For Alsace-Lorraine:	
Cars	11,020

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2A: Memorandum

**Delivery of Spare Parts**

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff  
D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 3556/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
January 25, 1919.

MEMORANDUM for Lieutenant Chapin, Chief of The American Mission with the D. G. C. R. A.

The Germans have delivered to the Allies a large number of trucks of the following makes, Opel, Arbens, and Mannesmann-Mulag, whose factories are at MAYENCE, COLOGNE, and AIX-la-CHAPELLE.

To allow them to deliver the lots of spare parts intended for these trucks the Germans request that the *Inspection Generale du Service Automobile* at BERLIN be authorized:

1. To communicate directly by letter and telegram with these factories.

2. To send representatives there to obtain information upon present output and the necessity of sending there certain raw materials from Germany as well as for settling certain details.

3. To ship raw materials from Germany to these factories.

4. To ship finished spare parts to MAYENCE.

I think it wise to grant the authority requested under one, three, and four above, and to refuse the authority requested under number two, making exception by granting this authority in particular instances.

I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to ask your general staff to state its opinion on this subject and to give me its reply as soon as possible.

Ch. PAYOT,

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Allied Decision on Ten-Hour Working Day***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 25, 1919.*

No. 56

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Hours of Work for Railroad Employees: In response to a request made by the Germans, contained in their Letter No. 563 of January 22, the Allies notified the Germans that the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army, had decided that it is absolutely necessary that the employees of the railways in the Rhenish territories keep the ten-hour work day. However to give this personnel a recompense in return for the measures taken, he would authorize the personnel to get from the Allied Armies of Occupation the necessary provisions to give them sufficient food.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German Merchant Marine**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 25, 1919.*

No. 56

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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9. German Ships, Passenger and Freight, at Present in German Waters in Good Condition and Ready for Immediate Use: \* \* \* list of vessels following giving gross net tonnage. The Germans in submitting this list state that only those ships are mentioned in the list which have a carrying capacity of over four thousand tons and will be ready by the first of February. Inasmuch as inquiries which had been directed by the Government to ship companies could not in every case be answered promptly, a supplementary list will be submitted shortly giving additional vessels. They also state that transports that are now being used for the repatriation of prisoners of war and which at the present time are en-route between Germany and Allied ports are not included in this list. They further state that readiness to sail is dependent upon the condition of the coal market and the question of obtaining crews. Therefore delays may arise before these vessels can put to sea. There is also the possibility of strikes or transportation troubles.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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## LIST

of the German sea-going vessels, passenger and  
freight steamers, at present in German harbors,  
in good condition, ready for immediate use:

*January 24, 1919.*

NAME OF SHIP	SHIP'S OWNER	GROSS TONNAGE	NET TONNAGE
Kronenfels	Hansa	12,325	8,135
Schwarzenfels	"	12,500	8,325
Weissenfels	"	12,500	8,319
Altenfels	"	11,350	7,470
Crostaffels	"	7,579	4,939
Falkenfels	"	12,480	8,322
Greiffenfels	"	9,042	5,852
Kybfels	"	7,701	5,049
Solfels	"	9,113	5,821
Sonnenfels	"	9,042	5,848
Arensburg	"	6,470	4,257
Aschenburg	"	10,170	6,394
Rudelsburg	"	10,180	6,173
Wolfsburg	"	10,180	6,185
Treuenfels	"	11,200	7,471
Gerfried	Globus	9,790	5,280
Hebe	"	4,450	3,035
Prinz Ludwig	N. D. L.	8,490	9,687
Heilbronn	"	11,200	8,000
Augsburg	"	11,200	8,112
Dessau	"	11,000	6,719
Remscheid	"	11,200	8,039
Waldeck	"	10,900	6,582
Meiningen	"	10,900	6,738
Altenburg	"	10,950	6,742
Genua	Sloman Jr.	4,970	2,911
Malaga	"	4,970	2,911
Brocida	"	4,670	3,001
Alexandra Woermann	Woermann-Linie	4,725	3,828
Eduard	"	7,350	5,642
Waregga	"	6,000	3,820
Warundi	"	6,050	3,821
Silesia	Kunstmann	5,234	3,338
Hollandia	"	5,120	3,133
Raimund	Reland-Linie	10,830	6,783
Java	D. A. D. G.	12,090	7,676
Mannheim	"	9,770	5,878
Rendsburg	"	7,970	4,639
Heluan	Kosmus	8,550	7,246
Reda	"	8,600	7,265
Kagera	D. O. A. L.	9,080	5,618
Revume	"	9,080	5,618
Altmark	Hapag	8,202	4,427

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**LIST  
(Continued)**

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NAME OF SHIP	SHIP'S OWNER	GROSS TONNAGE	NET TONNAGE
Aragenia	Hapag	7,738	5,124
Belgravia	"	10,338	6,648
Brisgavia	"	10,668	6,550
Liberia	"	5,669	3,669
Nordmark	"	9,042	5,106
Slavonia	"	6,685	4,514
Swakopmund	"	7,315	5,631
Windhuk	"	7,498	6,344
Kribi	"	6,553	3,800
Pionier	F. Laeiss	4,865	3,602

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Letter

***Luxemburg to be American Zone Throughout***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff  
3d Bureau

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*January 25, 1919.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France.

My dear General:

In reply to your letter of January 23, and in the presence of the difficulties which you find in adopting the system which I had proposed to you for an understanding between our officers to regulate those questions which could be solved by a common agreement, I have the honor of informing you that:

The French XXI Army Corps is about to evacuate the region of Luxemburg which it was occupying, to return to French territory in its region of origin. Consequently, the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg will become an American zone throughout and will pass under American control.

Being unable to find, for the moment, a more suitable headquarters than LUXEMBURG in which to exercise my command, as you admitted in the course of our interviews, I must maintain it there and retain French troops to assure its guarding and service. Therefore, I intend to remain at present at LUXEMBURG where the commander of the French Troops will assure the service of the garrison.

These new arrangements will result in the suppression of the function of the Commandant d'Armes now held by General de la Tour, and it is, of course, understood that you may have in the city the staffs and departments which you deem necessary to regulate questions

concerning the occupation of the Grand Duchy, in accordance with your instructions and in agreement with the Luxemburg Government.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Letter

***Pershing Agrees with New Plan***

*Paris, January 26, 1919.*

Marshal Ferdinand Foch,  
Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies

My dear Marshal Foch:

I have received your letter of January 25, informing me of your decision to withdraw the troops of the French XXI Army Corps which are now in Luxemburg and to include the whole of the Grand Duchy within the American zone.

This arrangement is satisfactory to me, and I shall make the necessary dispositions with delay.

I agree with you regarding the advantageous location of LUXEMBURG for your headquarters, and I appreciate the necessity for your retaining French troops necessary for the guard and service of your headquarters in the city of LUXEMBURG. My troops will be instructed accordingly.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, United States Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Memorandum

***Political Conditions in Luxemburg***

*January 25 - 27, 1919.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

Talking with country people in the north of Luxemburg, I found no desire to sample republican institutions and on the contrary a real attachment to the House of Nassau. \* \* \*

The opposition to a change to a republic at this time is due in part to the propaganda by the clergy for maintenance of the Duchy. They fear an increase in favor of the Socialists and the spread of anti-clericalism. Such a change at this time, according to the Conservative Party would have unsettled stable government and have been a stepping stone to assimilation by France. Further, they argue, the country is too small for elections to be more than a farce. The House, has now, in fact the control over affairs, and it functions at each election without unsettling the country.

The Socialists and Liberals inclined toward republican institutions are also disinclined to raise the issue at present. They fear, too, that the change might weaken Luxemburg's claim to sovereignty before the Peace Conference.

\* \* \* \* \*

The significant fact in Luxemburg opinion is the growing desire of all parties to maintain the political independence of the country and to avoid all steps which might compromise this. The Luxemburgers enjoy being courted by both sides - Belgium and France. When the French Commanding General gave a ball with French pastry and chocolate (notoriously an irresistible argument in the occupied zone) the Belgians replied by giving a concert. The French permit the Luxemburgers to import from PARIS, while the Belgians have opened the Belgian Relief to them paying the loss on difference in exchange.

The essential difference in the two propagandas is that the Belgians announce that they propose to annex Luxemburg, while the French more discreet, have given no official indication of their intentions.

The arguments raised by the Belgians in favor of annexation are numerous. Racially and geographically Luxemburg may be regarded as a logical extension of Belgium. Both are very Catholic countries. The schools of LOUVAIN and LIEGE have been much in favor in Luxemburg. Economically there are serious arguments. ANTWERP is the logical seaport for Luxemburg. Belgium has a surplus of coal while Luxemburg has a surplus of iron. The burdens from taxation will not be as heavy in Belgium as in France.

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I note a decided change in Luxemburg opinion as regards the French since November. At the moment of occupation, it may be said without exaggeration that half of the townspeople looked favorably on annexation to France. On a second visit in the early part of this month the idea had lost rather than gained ground. At present I have met none who admit positively that they favor annexation to France. Several who were ardently French now qualify their enthusiasm by saying that they regard an economic accord as essential, but that Luxemburg should maintain full political autonomy. Conservative circles are vigorously opposed to joining France. They admit the necessity of economic union, but many prefer that this be with Belgium or with both France and Belgium. Mayor of PRUM, Clairvoux, a prominent Conservative has just written a pamphlet entitled *The Tunisification of Luxemburg*. He explained his point of view to me. In Luxemburg Clerical circles there is criticism of French methods of colonizing Alsace-Lorraine. They are of the opinion that the German Catholic Clergy has been too harshly treated and see a danger to the Church in Luxemburg by the French steps to accomplish the separation of Church and State in Alsace.

A part of the clergy in Luxemburg is carrying on a vigorous anti-French propaganda which is masked either by ardent support of the Grand Duchess or by adhesion to the Belgian solution. The Conservatives, which include the farming classes generally, that is to say 3/5 of the population, see also in Republicanism an open door to French annexation.

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SANFORD GRIFFITH,  
Captain, Corps of Interpreters.

Editorial Note: [This report is based largely on the opinions of the investigating officer, which may have been at variance with actual conditions. It is reproduced in part as indicative of the somewhat confused political situation which existed in Luxemburg.]

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**Resignation of von Winterfeldt**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 25, 1919.*

No. 56

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Opening of Meeting: At the opening of the session of the Armistice Commission this morning it was noted that General von Winterfeldt did not preside for the Germans, Colonel von Meuller taking the chair in his place.

After the meeting was over, the undersigned asked Colonel von Meuller if General von Winterfeldt was ill, to which he replied in the negative, and later stated that he was awaiting reply to his request to be relieved from further duty with the Commission.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Prisoners of War; Terms of Second Prolongation**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 25, 1919.*

No. 56

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Handling of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany:

Colonel von Meuller presented the following note, in regard to the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war as provided for in Article 4 of the TREVES convention of January 16: 7987. At the negotiations for the prolongation of the Armistice in TREVES

on January 16, 1919, an Annex to Article 10 of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, was taken up, in which the Allied Governments were given the right to place a Commission in BERLIN that would occupy itself with the care of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany. The Allied Governments reserved for themselves the right to regulate the point of destination of their transports in the matter of repatriating Russian prisoners of war according to whether this or another neighborhood would seem most advantageous to them. The Chairman of the Commission above mentioned, General Ewart, has now made the demand that the transportation of Russians to their homes be stopped completely until further orders.

Against this decision the following must be mentioned with emphasis: The present system of transportation of Russians was prepared for and made known when the conditions for the prolongation of the Armistice were prepared and included the time up to February 2. The Russian prisoners of war who are concerned had already been notified of their coming transportation. According to the present information, and in connection with the present unrest, heavy revolt could be expected, which would have serious results, not only for the security of the German people, but for the general political conditions in the interior of Germany. The German Government must therefore decline to allow itself to be forced to such measures that are all the less well founded, as the repatriation by way of PINSK is being accomplished without any trouble and is going along in orderly fashion. General Ewart has been well informed of the present situation. I request that this declaration be transmitted to the High Command of the Allied Armies with the greatest speed and that orders be given us that General Ewart may receive instructions not to oppose the present plan until the second of February. Further measures will be taken in communication with General Ewart. It is of course well understood that it is in the interest of Germany to avoid anything that could strengthen the Bolshevik front in Russia.

To the foregoing, General Nudant made the following reply:

The note states very well what it means, but it does not make mention of why there is emphasis laid on transporting the Russians to Russia in spite of the assurance given by the Ministry of War. The repatriation was made in spite of assurances he gave that they would not be made, but I do not insist upon this point. The important question is the following, and it is indeed masqued by this note. It is a question of transporting to their homes the Serbian, Greek, and Rumanian prisoners. For the repatriation of these prisoners the Germans have no order, but it has got orders to transport Russians to Russia by the fifty thousands and by the hundred thousands in order to strengthen the Bolshevik front and in order to give Russian officers over to destruction. This is the full question brought to the full light of day, and that is why in the text of the prolongation of the Armistice in January the Allies deemed it wise to put in a clause that gave them the right to enter into discussion of the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war. So far as we are concerned, we propose to transport home the Greeks, Serbians, and Rumanians and to ask the German Government to do what it could in this matter. That is the whole question. Instructions have been given to General Dupont at BERLIN to handle the question to this effect. I will follow them with energy. I have transmitted to the Allied High Command the request made for the freeing of 800 cars for the transportation of Greeks, Rumanians, and Serbians. I doubt, according to information we have received from BERLIN, whether this proposition of mine will receive a favorable reply. Therefore, it would be wise not to count upon it. And it would be wise that in the circles of Ministry of War at BERLIN that they stop working against the articles of the Armistice Agreement

and that they begin to busy themselves with the work of repatriating Greeks, Serbians, and Rumanians. In addition to that I may state that we are very well informed of the situation.

In connection with the foregoing, attention is invited to Colonel von Meuller's remarks above, where he says, "The German Government must, therefore, decline to allow itself to be forced to such measures."

This remark shows again the German frame of mind, or at least the line of contention in case they themselves do not believe in it, - namely, that the Armistice Commission is a place for remolding the terms of the Armistice. Paragraph 4 of the TREVES convention of January 16 is very explicit in the authority it gives to the Allies in regard to Russian prisoners remaining in Germany, and it is difficult to see how the Acting Chairman of the German Armistice Commission can place himself on record as saying that the German Government cannot allow itself to be forced to such measures, when they have but a few days ago signed a written document wherein they agreed to these very measures.

4. Comments: When General Harries was here a few days ago the question was arranged with General Nudant that he would request the Allied Commander to grant authority to the Germans to retain for two weeks 800 cars for the purpose of repatriating Serbian, Greek, and Rumanian prisoners of war remaining in Germany.

I know that General Harries wished to have these prisoners repatriated as promptly as possible, and, therefore, recommended that the authority to use these eight hundred cars be granted.

In order to accomplish this, I recommend that the Commanding General of G. H. Q. communicate with the Allied Commander in order to insure that this action shall be taken. What General Nudant says is manifestly true, - namely, that if the Germans would stop repatriating Russian prisoners, they would have the necessary cars with which to repatriate Serbian, Greek, and Rumanian prisoners.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Russian Prisoners**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 27, 1919.*

No. 57

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Return of Russian Prisoners of War: The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission stated that in the session of January 25 the Chairman of the Allied Armistice Commission made such vigorous protests against the return of Russian prisoners of war that he felt called upon to make further explanation in regard to this matter:

The German authorities in returning Russian prisoners are accused of assisting the spread of Bolshevism and in being accomplices to the assassination of large numbers of Russian officers. In the first place, I must recall the position taken by the Governments of the Allies in regard to the Russian prisoners. The Russian prisoners working in regions near the western front to the numbers of several hundred thousands were rejected by the Armies of the Allies. 120,000 Russian prisoners in the Neutral Zone on the left bank of the RHINE were not permitted to remain there. Furthermore, it was demanded that the camps in the Neutral Zone be relieved of all Russian prisoners. The result was that these Russian prisoners were obliged to join the hasty retreat of the German forces. This was an excessive hardship for these prisoners in view of the fact that they were neither equipped nor in physical condition for such a withdrawal. All requests with a view to securing permission to transport prisoners, first, by way of the RHINE and then by Sea were rejected. It was only some time later that this transportation was permitted by way of the BALTIC. It was none the less stated in the Subcommittee for the Handling of Prisoners that the German Government would be held responsible for taking all necessary steps for the repatriation of Russian prisoners. The German Government found itself in an increasingly difficult position owing to the fact that these Russian prisoners were being concentrated in the central part of Germany. An extreme discontent broke out among them because they realized that no steps were being taken for their transportation, and secondly, because no measures were being taken to feed them. The only way out of this difficulty was to increase the transportation of these prisoners to the east and more particularly, to the railhead of PINSK. The German Government was obliged to take these measures with a view to keeping Bolshevism out of the country. The repatriation of Rumanians and Serbs was in no way interfered with nor was that of the prisoners of the Allies. The fact that Serbian, Rumanian, and Greek prisoners could not be repatriated to the extent desired, was due to the fact that rolling stock in Hungary was in bad condition and in view of the fact that the Allies had taken over the control of boats on the DANUBE. The proof that the transportation of Allied prisoners, - that their return was not hindered, is found in the fact that fully 800,000 prisoners were returned to their homes

in a period of seven weeks despite the fact that communications were difficult. I am of the opinion that the German authorities can regard this accomplishment with complete satisfaction. It is possible that the sending back of Russian prisoners of war resulted in their enlisting within the ranks of the Bolsheviks. That Russian officers were victims of the Bolsheviks is extremely regrettable to the Germans. Over thirteen hundred officers and five hundred noncoms received hospitality in Germany, while General Nudant refused to permit them to be transported by way of the RHINE. Bolshevism in the eyes of the German Government is the enemy of all civilization. However, the possibility for Germany to become a bulwark has been weakened owing to the increased hardship due to the conditions of the Armistice and the still maintained blockade. Measures should be taken by the Allies to maintain unity of front against the Russian Bolshevik danger. Forbidding transportation of Russian prisoners of war excepting those of Polish nationality which may increase the strength of the Polish front, has endangered the inner situation in Germany and in this its power of resistance against the red waves from the east, about the dangerous nature of which there is no longer any doubt among the countries of the Allies.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Notes

### ***Strength of Armies of Occupation***

*Paris, January 26, 1919.*

[Extract]

Marshal Foch, Marshal Haig, General Pershing and Diaz.

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Marshal Foch stated that the object of the Conference was to obtain definite figures concerning the strength of the Armies of Occupation to be maintained on the western front.

Field Marshal Haig stated that Marshal Foch could rely on ten big and well organized British infantry divisions, plus two cavalry divisions for the duration of a year.

As everybody knew, demobilization of the British Army had been under way for sometime and several classes of men have been sent home. However, two days ago the British Government decided to stop the movement and start the organization of an army of over one million men for all the Empire (Palestine, etc., included). The situation has been for sometime pretty difficult due to the fact that there existed no more a volunteer army but the difficulty has been overcome by that decision. He repeated that the British Expeditionary Forces on the western front should consist of ten infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions; these units to have a very high character of organization and discipline.

In reply to a question from General Weygand, Marshal Haig stated (1), that the divisions from the Dominions were progressively broken up; therefore, after March 31 they should not be held any more in account; (2), that the infantry divisions to be maintained on the Western front would consist of three brigades and be much stronger than the present existing divisions.

General Pershing asked what would be the total strength of those British Divisions. Marshal Haig replied 272,000 combatant troops.

General Pershing asked what would be the strength of the troops of the line of communication.

Marshal Haig replied about 60,000.

Marshal Foch, taking up the question of the A. E. F., said that he understood that by March 31 the Americans should have 15 divisions in the Zone of the Armies and five in the Zone of Embarkation.

General Pershing replied that this was correct.

Marshal Foch then took up the question of the French forces.

General Weygand said that by March 31 the French forces would consist of 61 infantry divisions, each division having 4 regiments.

Marshal Haig asked what would be their total strength.

General Weygand replied that on April 10 - that is, at the time when France would have completed the demobilization of all the territorial classes and of all the classes of reserve but two, the French Army would still have 2,257,000 men. Out of that total, 1,250,000 would be in the Zone of the Armies on the western front, the remainder being in Salonica, Palestine, North Africa, etc.

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Marshal Foch then suggested that the Chiefs of Staff present at the Conference would immediately hold another conference in which they should definitely establish the basis of the calculation of the numbers of combatants and noncombatants in the Allied Armies. The Commanders-in-Chief, he stated, were especially interested in the number of fighting units; the Governments, for obvious reasons, were mainly interested not by the number of existing units but by the number of citizens remaining with their colors.

Marshal Foch's proposal was unanimously agreed to, and the Conference then adjourned.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Minutes

### ***Strength of A. E. F.***

#### NOTES ON CONFERENCE HELD AT PARIS

January 26, 1919.

[Extract]

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General Fox Conner replying to a question from General Weygand, said that by March 31 the total strength of the A. E. F. would be 1,380,000; probably even slightly above 1,400,000, according to the shipping situation. This would give an approximate total of 680,000 combatant troops.

On May 1, ten divisions would be in the Zone of the Advance and five in the Zone of the Ports.

General Weygand asked what the situation would be after May, supposing that peace was not signed by that date.

General Conner stated that as far as the American Army was concerned, the question was mainly one of shipping. The general idea was to send the American troops home as fast as the shipping on hand made it possible. The plan was to ship combat troops during the months

of January, February, March, and April. Due to the length of the line of communication, it was not possible to ship at the same time combatant troops and other elements, material, etc. Therefore, in May and in June it was probable that the existing shipping would be used for other transportation than that of combatant troops; that it was probable that up to the end of June there would still be in France about ten divisions. He wished to state that this would be true only if arrangements could not be made for the shipping of American troops through ROTTERDAM. Should these arrangements be made, troops could then be shipped on the RHINE, sent to ROTTERDAM and then to America without being put again on land. On the contrary, if this was not possible and if American troops were to be sent for shipment to the French ports, it was necessary to count that one month should elapse between the time of their arrival at the center of embarkation and the time when they would actually be on board the ships.

General Weygand asked what would be the strength of the American divisions of the Army of Occupation.

General Conner replied that their strength would be from 25,000 to 30,000 according to the number of men temporarily absent from their units.

The Conference then adjourned.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1257: Letter

### ***Troops to be Maintained Opposite Germany***

*January 26, 1919.*

My dear General Bliss:

The following notes based upon statements of the several Allied Commanders-in-Chief at the Conference held this morning may be of interest to you.

The British plan is to reduce their forces on the western front to 10 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions. They hope to accomplish this reduction by March 31, and state that they are prepared to maintain this force for one year. The divisions are all to be strong divisions and the combatant strength of the force to be retained was stated at 212,000 in round numbers. In addition there will be some 60,000 British troops on the lines of communication and about 280,000 men temporarily maintained for cleaning up.

The French plan of demobilization will result in 2,257,000 men remaining with the colors on April 10. This figure includes all French soldiers whether in distant theatres of war, the Colonies, or the interior of France. The strength of the French Armies of the North and Northeast on April 10, will be 1,350,000. As reorganized the French Army will include 46 divisions of infantry of 4 regiments each and 6 divisions of cavalry.

The American plan of demobilization is dependent upon the available shipping. Under present prospects of available tonnage there will be 15 American divisions in the Zone of the Armies on April 1, and 10 on May 1. In addition there will be approximately 5 divisions in the ports of embarkation on each of the dates mentioned. On April 1, there will be approximately 1,260,000 American soldiers in Europe. The fact that available tonnage is the governing factor in the return of American troops was clearly brought out at the Conference.

Italy will have 31 divisions in Italy and Dalmatia, 3 in Albania, 1 in the Balkans and 2 in France, or returning to Italy, on April 1. In addition Italy has 4 cavalry divisions. Italy now has a total of 1,540,000 soldiers in Italy of whom 1,020,000 are classed as combatants. A total of 400,000 additional men are to be demobilized by

April 1, of whom 220,000 are now in Italy. The Italian Army in Italy will therefore number 1,320,000 on April 1.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, U. S. A.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Delivery of Rolling Stock**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, January 27, 1919.

No. 57

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Committee on Receipt of Locomotives and Cars:

The Committee on Rolling Stock reports the numbers of locomotives and cars being presented and accepted from day to day:

DATE	PLACE	LOCOMOTIVES		CARS	
January		Presented-Accepted		Presented-Accepted	
23	METZ	49	23	1,727	1,567
24	"	59	23	1,431	869
25	"	56	35	1,512	1,229
23	ALSACE-LORRAINE	—	—	111	92
24	" "	—	—	114	48
25	" "	—	—	53	43
	BRUSSELS				
23	( From Germany )	17	13	1,296	1,013
24	( " " )	15	12	675	275
25	( " " )	12	10	344	286
23	( In Brussels )	—	21	55	52
24	( " " )	—	0	53	43
25	( " " )	—	0	710	609

TOTALS ON JANUARY 25: (Subject to slight corrections due to errors in transmissions.)

Accepted

Locomotives	3,424
Cars	108,379
Alsace-Lorraine Cars	11,203

Postal Cars for American Army: Major v. Boetticher announced that of the 17 postal cars asked for by Colonel King, 3 have been accepted at FRANKFORT and the remainder will be presented within the next few days.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Return of Private Securities; Delivery of Agricultural Implements***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 27, 1919.*

No. 57

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Return of Valuables and Securities Belonging to Subjects of Alsace-Lorraine: Minister von Haniel on behalf of the German Government submitted the following note: The French Minister of Finance has expressed a desire that the German Government send a plenipotentiary to SPA to meet a representative of the French Government in accordance with the agreement of the Finance Commission at TRIER in regard to the return by the Germans of valuables belonging to subjects of the Allies taken from the occupied territory and also in regard to the return of securities which were in their possession. The German Government finds itself obliged to make the following observations: The French Government after the conclusion of the Finance Commission in TREVES, issued a decree sequestering the private property of Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, Germans who were not of Alsace-Lorraine origin. It is evident that the Germans whose property has been sequestered in this way will suffer considerably. This decree involves the open violation of Art. VI, Par. 1, of the Armistice Convention, in accordance with which the private property of inhabitants from the evacuated German territory will suffer no damage. The German Government took the obligation in the financial convention at TRIER to open negotiations in regard to sequestration measures in the occupied territory. These, however, cannot be opened as long as the French Government continues to take steps contrary to

the terms of the Armistice. The German Government must, therefore, ask that the above mentioned French decree which sequesters German property be withdrawn, and that in this respect the state of affairs again be established so that in accord with agreement reached by the financial commission at TRIER, negotiations may be carried out. As soon as this request has been granted, a delegate will promptly be sent to SPA, with full powers for negotiating the above mentioned questions. To the foregoing General Nudant made the following reply:

If I have understood clearly, the German Government refuses to send a delegate to enter into negotiations in regard to the return of securities taken from the occupied regions, and they raise a condition in regard to fulfilling this request which relates to a decree issued in Alsace-Lorraine. The question is an important one and a very serious one. I ask, therefore, Minister von Haniel, if this is the point of view of the German Government?

To this Minister von Haniel replied:

I have no other instructions than those which were included in the Note which I have just transmitted.

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7. First Meeting of Committee on Delivery of Agricultural Implements:

Paragraph III of the TREVES Convention of January 16 provides that in lieu of the 500 locomotives and 19,000 cars which were to be delivered in excess of the original numbers agreed upon, that the German Government would furnish a large number of different kinds of agricultural implements. The Committee having this matter in charge held its first meeting this morning. In the discussion which followed it was apparent that these implements were to be turned over to the Allies for the use of France and Belgium.

As the locomotives and cars mentioned above would have been divided on a pro rata basis between all of the Allies, the question at once came up as to how Allies other than France and Belgium were to get their pro rata share from the agricultural implements. While the United States and Great Britain will probably not want the implements, they are at least entitled to a money credit for their pro rata share. This matter has been submitted to G. H. Q. in a separate communication.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**United States Share of Agricultural Implements**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 27, 1919.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

1. In accordance with the terms of Par. 3 of the TREVES Convention of January 16, 1919, the Germans are required to turn over to the Allies a large number of agricultural implements in lieu of 500 locomotives and 19,000 cars.

2. It is quite manifest that these agricultural implements are to go to the French and Belgians to meet their immediate needs, and it seems highly improbable that the United States will want any portion of them. Had the locomotives and cars been delivered, the United States would have taken its pro rata share. The fact that the implements are substituted is, of course, no grounds for depriving the United States of its proper share of booty to be turned over by the Germans. While the implements themselves are not desired, it is believed that their money value should be credited to the United States.

3 The Committee to handle the delivery of these agricultural implements has begun its sessions, and in order that they may understand exactly the lines on which they are to work, information is requested as to the following:

- (1) Are any of the implements themselves to be turned over to the United States?  
and,  
(2) If not, is the United States to be given credit for their money value?

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Resignation of von Winterfeldt**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 27, 1919.*

No. 57

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. The Opening: General Winterfeldt was again absent from the meeting of the

Armistice Commission, his place being taken by Colonel von Mueller. I learned that General von Winterfeldt had gone to CASSEL (German G. H. Q.), but did not learn the purpose of his visit nor when he was likely to return. Colonel von Mueller spoke of acting in his absence. I, therefore, presume that General von Winterfeldt has not yet been relieved as Chairman of the German Armistice Commission.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Memorandum

**Conditions in the German Army**

2d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
January 27, 1919.

Memorandum to A. C. of S. G-3, G. H. Q.

With reference to my memorandum to you of January 24, 1919, on the subject of the German Army, your attention is invited to the important statement attached hereto. The statement was made by a man sent by General von Groener to our Advance G. H. Q.

D. E. NOLAN,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
A. C. of S. G-2.

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Statement of Freiherr von Eltz to Colonel A. L. Conger at Advanced General Headquarters, Treves, Germany, January 25, 1919, regarding Conditions in the German Army

Conditions in the German Army are very bad! The demobilization of all troops on the western front was completed on January 15, as per program. But in many instances the troops refused to go home, and would not leave the barracks; at the same time they will not work, nor perform any military service.

Q. How about the reorganization of two Army Corps of Volunteers?

A. The organization is practically completed, but the difficulty is that we do not know how far we can trust them or if we can trust them at all. As an example; One of our crack regiments of the German Army, the 76th (?), recruited from BREMEN, entered BREMEN commanded by a Major riding at the head of it. He had been with it during the four years of war; he had been wounded six times and had received our highest decoration (Pour le Merite). In a few moment's time the regiment ceased to exist, men had given their arms

away to the Spartacists who had surrounded them and they had joined the Spartacists.

In the east we do not really know what the state of our demobilization is, because everything is at sixes and sevens. Our troops there are no longer responding to orders but have been running away in dribbles followed by the Bolsheviks, and we do not know where they are or how many of them are left.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Food for Poland via Danzig***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION  
*Spa, January 27, 1919..*

No. 57

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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9. Food Supplies for Poland:

Minister von Haniel submitted on behalf of the German Government a telegram received from WARSAW by the Commander of the German forces in DANZIG. This telegram was sent by Colonel William R. Groves, U. S. A., Minister [Administrator?] of American supplies relief mission for Poland, and is as follows:

Within two or three days time I am leaving WARSAW by way of LAVA [M'LAWA] to DANZIG in a special car, with a view to organizing the shipment of supplies to be made for the Polish population. This is provided by Paragraph 16 of the terms of the Armistice. I demand that the German railroad officials receive instructions to attach my car to the first train going to DANZIG upon my arrival at the German frontier and that all the naval, railroad, and other authorities in the port of DANZIG receive orders to help in the preparations for unloading the ships and for sending these cargoes by R. R. or by the Vistula to the Polish frontier. I will be accompanied by three or four officers of the American Army and four or five civilians, employees of the Polish Government. The presence of the latter are indispensable to me for facilitating my work. I expect a telegraphic reply acknowledging this dispatch and the assurance that all the measures have been taken in accord with the above instructions.

Minister von Haniel acting upon instructions from the German Government, requested information whether Colonel Groves is operating on the instructions and in accordance with the American Armistice Commission. If such is the case, he requested that the principle be established and be maintained that all questions of detail concerning the work of the Commission be handled by the Armistice Commission at SPA. In this case it would not be in form for Colonel Groves to give direct orders to the Commanding General in DANZIG.

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Minister von Haniel added: "I state that the German Government in principle is ready to permit the sending of food supplies towards Polish territory. It must, however, be observed that in view of the bad condition of the railroads and the great shortage in rolling stock the shipment of food supplies to the German-Polish border will be hindered. The German Government must have complete assurance that the rolling stock turned over for the shipment of food supplies will be returned. I reserve the privilege of making further communications in this matter."

On account of the unfriendly conditions existing between the Poles and Germans in the vicinity of DANZIG, and the suggestion offered by Minister von Haniel that great care would have to be exercised to insure the return of locomotives and cars sent into Poland, it is very likely that the Germans will lend themselves more readily to the transportation of these food supplies if the necessary rolling stock is furnished by Poland. Then when it is returned the Germans would not be concerned with the loss of any of the rolling stock.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1238: Memorandum

### ***Relations with Luxemburg Government***

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 28, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR Colonel Birnie

SUBJECT: Luxemburg

1. Herewith is a folder on the Luxemburg affair.
2. You will see from the General's letter of January 23, Marshal Foch's letter of January 25, and the General's letter of January 26, that the matter is arranged for the French to get out of Luxemburg except for Marshal Foch's guard in the city, and for the whole of Luxemburg to be turned over as an American zone.
3. In conversation with the General after the Chief of Staff left PARIS, the General indicated that he thought that a suitable officer should be sent to the city of LUXEMBURG to establish relations with the Luxemburg Government, this officer to be under General Smith whose jurisdiction should be extended to include civil matters in LUXEMBURG. One particular point is the matter of relaxing the rules as to the crossing of the frontier between Luxemburg and the occupied portion of Germany by individuals living near the frontier. It will also be necessary to get in touch, through the French Mission, with Marshal Petain's Headquarters so as to ascertain when the French troops evacuate the northwestern portion of Luxemburg, and after getting this information it will be necessary to send a certain number of troops from either the 5th or 33d Division into the principal towns evacuated by the French. I believe eventually some American troops should be stationed in the city of LUXEMBURG, but, as I understand the General's views, we should go slowly in the matter of sending troops into the city.
4. I think you had better take this entire matter up with the Chief of Staff tomorrow morning. He will, of course, have to select the officer to go into the city of

LUXEMBURG for the purpose of establishing relations, under General Smith, with the Luxemburg Government; and either he or Eltinge will have to inform General Smith of all details in connection with the Luxemburg problem.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

***Relations of German Troops in the Ukraine with Bolshevists***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 28, 1919.*

No. 58

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. German Troops in the Ukraine:

Minister von Haniel, on behalf of the German Government, presented a note to the Allied Armistice Commission, as follows:

Without the consent and against the will of the German High Command it appears that Soldiers' Councils in the I Army Corps in the eastern Ukraine have made an agreement with the Bolshevists regarding the evacuation. This regrettable incident not only endangers discipline in the German Army, but it also strengthens the Bolshevists. It is due to the attitude of the Allies towards the German troops in the Ukraine, especially to the delays in handling Inter-allied questions.

The dangers of a separate agreement have been frequently pointed out. They alone are, therefore, responsible for the large part of the blame for the reinforcement of Bolshevism which has occurred owing to this agreement.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Maintenance**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 28, 1919.*

No. 58

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Requests Made by the Allies: General Nudant informed the Germans that the representative of the Armies of the Allies in the Interallied Administrative Conference for the occupied territories in the Session of January 21, decided unanimously that all requisitions made for the Allies in the regions occupied will be directly paid by the German Government. That the German Government should present each month a list of the expenditures which have been made on these requisitions, substantiated by receipts at approximately the same time.

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6. Cost of Armies of Occupation: Minister von Haniel brought to the attention of the Commission the fact that the representative for the German Government to discuss the cost of the Armies of Occupation had arrived at SPA. He stated that his Government was anxious to secure prompt information in regard to its obligations in this matter.

Reference has been made to this subject from time to time in my reports, calling attention to the fact that Major Cutchins, representing G-4, at G. H. Q. is here and is at work as the American representative on the Committee handling this subject. Papers which he must have from S. O. S. TOURS have not arrived, although they have been expected for several days. Until they come, our representative on this Commission can do practically nothing.

The Allied representatives have been working together on this matter, and when they have arrived at conclusions satisfactory to all, it is proposed to inform the German representative. Prior to that time, it is not the intention to consult the German representative, as the question of the expense of maintaining each Army is not one to be argued with the Germans, but simply to be determined by each Army and the information then conveyed to them.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier, General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**German Prisoners Held by American Army**

1st Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
28 January 1919.

Commander-in-Chief, G-1

Acting Chief, American Section, Permanent International  
Armistice Commission, Spa, Belgium

REPORT OF NUMBER OF GERMAN PRISONERS HELD BY AMERICAN ARMY

1. Replying to your inquiry of January 23, the number of enemy prisoners of war recorded as being in our custody at present, is 840 officers and 48,751 men. These figures include a certain number of Austro-Hungarians, Rumanians, Poles, etc., but these constitute a very small percentage of the total.

2. The above figures are subject to some revision because of unavoidable errors in the records, due to sick and wounded prisoners having been scattered through a number of hospitals and also due to the fact that in some operations prisoners captured by the Americans were turned over to the French for temporary custody.

3. Any substantial change in the figures which may result from the present rechecking of the records will be communicated to you.

By order of the C-in-C.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Serbian, Rumanian, and Greek Prisoners**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, January 29, 1919.

No. 59

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Return of Serbian, Rumanian, and Greek Prisoners: The question of securing eight hundred cars require by General Harries for the return of Serbian, Rumanian, and Greek

prisoners was taken up by telephone with the French Mission to ascertain if any reply had yet been received to the formal request made for these cars.

The reply was that no answer had yet been received, but that General Harries could be informed that he could go ahead with this movement, getting such German cars as he was able to.

As the Germans have ceased the repatriation of Russian prisoners, the French consider that the cars thereby made available will meet this requirement, and, consequently, did not hesitate to say that General Harries should proceed, as stated above, without waiting for a formal reply from Marshal Foch. These instructions have been communicated to General Harries by telegram.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 197M: Letter

### ***Requisition for German Funds***

4th Section, G. S.  
Refer to: File No. 197-M

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 29, 1919.*

From: A. C. of S, Advance G. H. Q.

To: C. G., Third Army

1. The representative, of the A. C. of S. G-4, G. H. Q. has been sent to Advance G. H. Q. for the purpose of coordinating the handling of all Armistice Material and war material turned over or abandoned by the Germans, as well as all financial matters coming under the IX Article of the Armistice Agreement; therefore, all German funds required in the future will be requisitioned through the representative, A. C. of S., G-4, at Advance G. H. Q.

2. In this connection, this office has been advised by the American member on the Interallied Committee of Finance and Administration, that it has been brought to the attention of that Committee, that the American authorities have made requisitions for German money on the Germans direct. It is also understood, that requisitions for funds have been made direct to G-4, G. H. Q.

3. These instructions are therefore issued in order to simplify the method of requisition for German funds and insure their prompt receipt.

By command of General Pershing:

W. H. DUKES,  
Adjutant General.

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**Expenses of Maintaining Troops of Occupation**

[Contemporary Translation]

D. G. C. R. A.  
No. 3727/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*January 29, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant Chapln, Chief of the American Mission with the D. G. C. R. A.

In order to determine the expenses of maintaining the troops of occupation, which falls on Germany (Article 9 of the Armistice Convention), the Subcommittee in charge of this valuation at the Permanent International Armistice Commission at SPA, requests immediate information as to the approximate strength in men and horses of the different Armies for each day after beginning of occupation until the date when the maximum effective of occupation was reached.

I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to ask the American High Command to forward this information direct to the delegate of your Army at [on] the Subcommittee at SPA.

CH. PAYOT,

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation**

No. 59

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 29, 1919.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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8. Proceedings of Committee on Entretien: The Subcommittee on Administration and Financial Questions arising under Article IX of the Armistice Agreement will meet tomorrow for the purpose of delivering to the German representatives, who meet the Commission for the first time, the definition of the word Entretien, heretofore agreed upon. It is then proposed that on the first or second of February a second meeting with the German delegates will be held, at which time will be delivered a statement of the tables of organization strength of the Army of Occupation, together with the cost per capita of the maintenance of one officer, one man, and one horse, as estimated by the Service of Supply.

The figures and statement necessary to determine these costs arrived today in time to be presented by the American representative at the next meeting of the Subcommittee.

The embarrassment caused by the failure of these papers to arrive (due to the fact that they were sent by way of BRUSSELS, instead of by way of CHAUMONT and TREVES) has fortunately been relieved, and the representative on the Subcommittee is now clothed with complete authority to settle all questions which have so far arisen or are likely to arise in the immediate future, and he further has in his possession very complete figures and the calculations upon which they are based, sufficient to enable him to intelligently work out any problems which may hereafter arise.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**Reconstruction of Railroads**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 29, 1919.*

No. 59

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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7. Reconstruction of Railroads in France and Belgium: The Committee on Transportation has proposed that the reconstruction of the railroad lines each side of the front as it stood on November 11, 1918, shall be left for the consideration of the Peace Conference; that signal materiel and maintenance of way, which has been left in place by Germany, shall be utilized by the Allies for the purpose of making temporary repairs of the lines at such points as have been destroyed by the Germans; that the question of reconstruction of the railroad shops of France and Belgium shall be taken up at once on account of their immediate importance.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Financial Arrangements**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 29, 1919.*

No. 59

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Application of Paragraph 6 of the Armistice Convention: The Committee having in charge the carrying out of the financial agreements entered into in the TREVES Convention of December 13, 1918, found that Article 6 of the original Armistice Agreement had to be considered.

The Belgian and French delegates came to a perfect understanding that the requirements of Paragraph 6 Armistice Agreement, imposed certain conditions on the Germans, but was not binding on the Allies.

Having been informed of this interpretation by the American representative on this Committee, I sent word to them that I considered that this Article, as well as all others, was just as binding upon the Allies as upon the Germans.

Later on I was awaited upon by General de Celles, the French Chairman of this Committee, a French civilian, and a Belgian civilian, who endeavored to convince me that the provisions of Paragraph 6 were not intended to apply to the Allies, but were put in the Armistice for the purpose of fixing conditions with which the Germans must comply.

The first three provisions of this Article are just as applicable to the Allies as furnishing a guarantee for Germans remaining in Alsace and Lorraine as they are to the Germans in furnishing guarantees to French and Belgians in territory which the former evacuated.

There is no question but what the Allies should conform to all requirements of the Armistice just as fully and faithfully as is required of Germans. Otherwise the Armistice Agreement is liable soon to degenerate into a mere scrap of paper.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Estimated Strength of German Army**

*Paris, January 29, 1919.*

FIRST MEETING OF  
MILITARY EXPERT SUBCOMMITTEE ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

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General Weygand stated that the object of the meeting was to attempt to estimate the strength of the German Army in personnel and material, and asked General Thwaites for any information he had on the subject.

General Thwaites stated that the following figures represented an estimate made for November 11:

Rifles	2,500,000
Machine guns	125,000
Trench mortars	7,000
Field guns	20,000
Heavy guns	10,500
Aeroplanes	4,000

After deducting surrendered material and subtracting 50% of the remainder on account of material left on the road and unserviceable, we arrive at the following figures:

Rifles	1,250,000
Machine guns	50,000
Trench mortars	2,000
Field guns	8,750
Heavy guns	4,000
Aeroplanes	1,150

General Thwaites considered that Germany should be compelled to hand over the above quantity during the Armistice. It should also be borne in mind that in the terms of the Armistice, nothing had been said about restoring captured Allied guns, the number of which was, of course, in the possession of the Allied Governments. No rifles had been surrendered, and the British had tried to estimate the number of rifles and machine guns remaining in depots in Germany. General Thwaites hoped to have this estimate tomorrow and it might be profitable to strike an average from the information obtained from British, French, and American sources.

General Weygand said that the French figures were smaller on the whole:

Machine guns	75,000
Trench mortars	7,000
Field guns	12,000 to 15,000
Heavy guns	10,000
Aeroplanes	4,000

General Weygand considered the British demands quite clear and asked General Nolan for American estimates.

General Nolan said that the American estimate showed about 3,000 heavy guns and about 12,000 field guns, but no deduction had been made for wastage. As regards aeroplanes, it was estimated that on November 11 there were 2,968 and that of these 633 remained now.

There were no reliable data as regards machine guns. General Nolan stated that he could not express an opinion as to whether the Germans should be compelled to hand over the material it was estimated was still in their possession.

General Weygand said that he, too, at the moment could not express an opinion on these proposals which, of course, involved a complete change in the terms of the Armistice, and which was a question of policy which could not be settled by military experts alone.

General Thwaites considered that the delivery of this material should be made a condition of peace; the German Army would thus be dislocated for a certain number of years.

General Weygand remarked that the position was as follows: The Allied Governments wished to demobilize their Armies as rapidly as possible, but are faced with the impracticability of doing so so long as Germany possesses fighting power. It is imperative that if the Allies demobilize their Armies, Germany must also disarm.

General Thwaites said that the real question is what sized Army German is to be allowed to keep until the end of the Armistice. Having determined the strength, we must demand a return of arms over and above those that were necessary for the equipment of that strength.

General Weygand thought that we should first estimate what strength in personnel and material Germany has now, and then on February 18 on the renewal of the Armistice, demand the surrender of a certain amount of additional material as a condition of such renewal. He hoped to be in a position, either tomorrow or the day after, to give the estimates made at the French General Headquarters but would suggest a second meeting further to discuss the matter.

General Nolan stated that General Bliss considered that the Committee should estimate:

- i. The amount of material remaining;
- ii. The amount of material to be surrendered;
- iii. Probable strength of German forces remaining and general information concerning their demobilization.

General Weygand remarked that as regards question (iii), we had two sources of information, the French and German. Both Erzberger at TREVES and Winterfeldt at SPA had stated that on January 6, on the western front, there were five divisions in being and thirty-two divisions retreating to their place of demobilization, a total of thirty-seven in all. On the eastern front in Russia and Poland, there were eighteen divisions. As regards effectives, according to Winterfeldt there were under arms the '98 and '99 Classes, 200,000 men in each Class, making 400,000 in all. In addition there were volunteers and other men remaining with the Colors, making a total of from 600,000 to 700,000 men.

General Thwaites remarked that it was probably very difficult for the Germans themselves to estimate the present strength of their forces as their military system was in a state of chaos. He thought that General Winterfeldt had merely made a calculation in the same way as we had done, and his estimate was probably of not much value.

General Nolan said that on January 24, a message had been intercepted from the army corps headquarters at COBLENZ in which it was stated that in compliance with a Government order dated January 11, the '98 Class would be released forthwith, but the '99 Class would remain in the Army for the present. General Nolan considered that it was very likely that there were 200,000 men in either Class as considerable numbers have probably deserted.

General Weygand said that the cases of the western and eastern fronts differed greatly. On the western front the German Army was beaten and in disorder, but on the eastern front was an Army probably very much better disciplined with its headquarters east of BERLIN. He would be glad to circulate a paper compiled on the 21st instant dealing with estimates of German strength.

General Thwaites considered that it was best first to determine how many divisions the Associated Powers were to maintain during the Armistice; secondly, how many divisions the Germans should be allowed to keep under arms; and thirdly, calculated from information obtained from French, British and American sources, the amount of war material at present in German possession. Any war material over and above that required for the

equipment of the number of German divisions allowed should be handed over to the Allies.

General Weygand concurred, but thought perhaps that it would be very difficult to compel the Germans to hand over all the remaining material as it was probably very much scattered. (General Weygand left the room to consult Marshal Foch.)

Marshal Foch returned with General Weygand and expressed his opinion that it was advisable for the Committee to meet again to compare the various estimates.

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Second Army Gen.: File 386 A-C: Letter

***Ownership of Abandoned Enemy War Material***

[Contemporary Translation]

*January 29, 1919.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies

To: Marshal Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army

I understand that there have been difficulties between American and French authorities regarding the taking over by the French XI Corps of materiel left by the Germans in area which so far was American but is at present occupied by the French XI Corps.

According to decisions contained in convention drawn for Armistice (see my Telegram No. 3578/CR of Jan. 25) war materiel left by enemy becomes property of any Allied Army when marching forward occupies that ground first.

This applies more specially to materiel now being taken over by the XI Corps, but which is the property of American Army.

I beg to draw attention of General Commanding XI Corps to these facts.

By order of the Marshal:

WEYGAND,  
Major General.

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**Execution of Financial Convention**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 30, 1919.*

No. 60

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Execution of Paragraphs II and IV of the Financial Convention at TREVES, dated December 13, 1918.

The Committee looking after the execution of this financial convention held a meeting this morning. It was the unanimous view of the Allies that the question of sequestrations in Alsace-Lorraine is not within the scope of the Finance Subcommittee; further, that it has nothing whatever to do with the application of Articles II and IV of the Convention of TREVES. The Germans having agreed in the Convention of TREVES to meet as soon as possible with Allied delegates, and discuss measures for carrying out the aforesaid convention, they must meet Allied delegates for that purpose or be guilty of bad faith. They were therefore called upon to refer back to BERLIN for power to discuss Articles II and IV of the TREVES Convention exclusive of any reference to sequestrations in Alsace-Lorraine, and were informed that a refusal to do so would be referred by the Allied representatives to their Government as a very serious breach of good faith on their part.

The Financial Convention of TREVES on December 13, 1918, having been entered into after the original Armistice Convention is binding in all its details without recourse to the Armistice Convention itself; therefore the Germans have no ground whatever on which to stand in refusing to carry out the provisions of this agreement because they are not in accordance with any construction that they may place upon certain articles of the Armistice Convention. The Allied viewpoint as expressed above is therefore believed to be perfectly sound.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Request for Funds**

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS,  
*January 30, 1919.*

MEMO FOR: G-4, Hq. Third Army

1. The initial error in this matter appears to have been committed when the Germans were told for what purpose we wished the money. It is no affair of theirs for what purpose we spend it.

2. The suggested reply which your office has prepared will not, in my estimation, procure the results desired. It will merely give the Germans a further chance for argument. There is something to be said in favor of the German viewpoint that the operation of a bureau of exchange is not in itself a proper charge for maintaining the Army of Occupation, but it is not necessary to put the demand upon this ground at all. What we are doing is merely making a demand for part payment for pay of troops (as you suggest in your reply), using this for the purpose of maintaining our bureaus of exchange; the amount thus obtained to be credited on account.

3. I think the following would more accurately explain our position:

Number Reference your Number three nine. Requisition for thirty million marks is only partial payment on account of pay of Army of Occupation. The fact that this money may be used for bureaus of exchange in no wise affects the principle involved. The amounts which are demanded as partial payments on account represent but a very small part of the cost of maintenance of the Army of Occupation. It is requested that you make strong representations to the German representatives that we consider their protest in this matter a mere quibble and ask that you demand immediate compliance with our requisition for funds.

DICKMAN.

Respectfully,

J. L. HUNT,  
Colonel, Infantry, Officer,  
in Charge, Civil Affairs.

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**German Arrangements for Payment of Prisoners**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 434-119. U/Wako 8085  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, January 30, 1919.

General Winterfeldt to General Nudant

**ANSWER CONCERNING THE PAYMENT OF ALLIED  
PRISONERS OF WAR.**

The Ministry of War has called for lists of the Entente prisoners of war from the prison camps with the following requirements:

The drawing up of the lists is to be hastened with all means available so that the demand of the Allies may be met as soon as possible.

The lists are to be sent from the prison camps to the Intendantur. The Intendanturen after listing them and adding up the sum totals will turn them all over together to the General-Kriegeskasse, and will hand in at the same time a list of the sum totals. The following lists are to be considered:

- (a) A list of the amounts due to prisoners that have escaped.
- (b) A list of the due bills given to prisoners upon their release.
- (c) A list of the amounts due to prisoners to whom no due bill was given.
- (d) For each nationality a separate list is to be made.

The lists are to be drawn up in triplicate and must contain rank, name, unit, prison number and amount due in case of each prisonment.

Amounts which the prisoners are still due in the prison camps are not to be deducted from the total sum, but are to be deducted from the amount due to the prisoner in question.

The lists are to be provided with certificates of correctness by the commandant of the camp, and insofar as possible also by the Auxiliary Committee of the camp concerned.

Insofar as such certificate on the part of the Auxiliary Committee is no longer possible an explanatory remark is to be entered.

All officials of the Kommando are again called upon to cooperate in the rapid drawing up and sending in of the lists that are still lacking to the Intendanturen. All lists must have reached BERLIN at the latest by February 1, 1919.

Several camps have already announced that on account of the extraordinary large amount of writing they will not be able to finish by February 1.

We must, therefore, count upon some delay in the arrival of the lists. The measures taken as indicated, likewise meet the note of General Delobbe of January 20, as well as Point No. 1, of the French Communication No. 61-P. G. 1.

(Illegible.)

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**Situation of Russian Prisoners**

489

HOTEL ADLON, BERLIN.  
*January 31, via Paris February 2.*

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1, H. A. E. F.

No. P-151. The situation with respect to Russian prisoner control is rapidly becoming desperate. German slackness and a thoroughly efficient force of Bolshevik agents, provided with ample funds, have obtained to bring Russian prisoners to the verge of revolt. German commandants of prison camps have generally lost control and the inhabitants of some cities adjacent to camps are, not unreasonably, fearful of outbreaks. The primary remedies are food and efficient camp administration. Both Major Silvester and Lieutenant Bryan are showing the Germans how camps ought to be handled. Pending the arrival of sufficient food supplies for the 700,000 Russians, we must proceed to organize. Attention is, therefore, invited to the letter referred to in my Telegram No. P-138.

General Ewart, President of the Commission on Russian Prisoners, has (after conference with all of us) determined to put that plan into operation and has called upon the British War Office for personnel to staff proportion of camps - to be furnished with all the speed the dangerous exigency demands. I request the assignment of personnel for 20 camps; the details being set forth in the letter referred to. Immediately after being informed that the officers and soldiers requested will be furnished I will wire list of camps to which each administrative unit is to proceed. Instructions to each camp commander will be furnished when he reaches his destination. Each unit takes with it rations for 30 days.

Under the terms of the amended Armistice the Entente has become responsible for Russian prisoners. The Bolshevik apostles realize that as soon as we control the camps and provide food their opportunities to cause uprisings of prisoners will cease, so they are now working at highest possible pressure to upset the Entente plans. If we do not perform most promptly there is likely to be a disastrous explosion. Am sending this message out of Germany by courier who will put it on wire at some point in France. Please keep me advised.

G. H. HARRIES,  
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,  
Chief, American Military Mission, Berlin.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 197: Memorandum

**Financial Arrangements**

4th Sec., G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*January 31, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Gasser, Representative G-4, Advance G. H. Q., Treves.

1. Having reference to your memorandum of January 23, on above subject, you are advised that action thereon will be suspended pending receipt of definite instructions from the Treasury officials as to method of handling funds requisitioned from the German Government

touched upon in Paragraph 6 of your proposed letter of instructions to be issued to the Board.

2. In the meantime, it is recommended that Paragraphs 4 and 5 of that letter be revised in the interest of clearness. For example, Paragraph 4 specifies that reimbursement will be made to the United States on account of the expenditures for transportation of all classes. Paragraph 5 includes an item payment for transportation for which reimbursement will not be made to the United States. There is accordingly an over-lay or connection between the two paragraphs which will have to be more fully elucidated.

3. In conclusion the exact duties of this board, if appointed, will have to perform is not clear. The handling of funds will devolve upon the disbursing officer and studies are now being made as to the cost of maintaining officers and soldiers in this territory. These when completed will furnish a guide to the disbursing officer and under these circumstances the Board will have very little or nothing to do. Will it not be possible for the disbursing officer with competent assistants under his immediate direction to handle all these questions more expeditiously than can be done by a board of which there are a great number already at work in connection with the German Armistice and questions growing out of that Armistice.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Report

### ***French Control Over German Industry***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 31, 1919.*

#### ANNEX TO REPORTS ON MEETINGS OF THE SUBCOMMISSION ON THE RESTITUTION OF MACHINERY.

In view of the fact that M. Lefevre is Chairman of this Subcommittee and is directing the service of return of machinery taken from northern France and Belgium, it may be of interest to note his point of view on some of the present economic problems.

It will be recalled that it was he who attempted to put through the blanket interpretation of the clause *reparation des dommages*, [repatriation for damages] which would have affiliated Germany economically to France.

He would establish a direct control over German economic life, and more specifically German industry. Needless to say he would reserve the prominent place in this for France. He disapproves certain aspects of the present policy of hindering German industrial activity. He would give the Germans raw materials and facilitate communications, but always with the view to making their output more productive to the profit of the Allies.

He also is a partisan of draining Germany of materials insofar as it is possible for the reconstruction of northern France and Belgium. He would maintain labor battalions numbering three or four thousand Germans. These would be taken first from among the prisoners or war, to be rotated with laborers who would be sent to replace them from Germany.

He has not the least hesitation in advocating such a program, declaring frankly that he regards it as the only way for France to save herself from economic disaster. He then outlined in broad terms the part which the Allies should have in this reconstruction of France. He fears that public opinion in America does not realize that "America's obligations should not be over with the fighting, but should be predominant in the necessary rebuilding of destroyed regions. America should do for an extensive region south of DUNKIRK what she has already done for some of the ports, that is to say, take over the improving of ports, building of lines of communication, factories, reconstruction, etc. This work should be done by American labor along American methods." He goes even further, declaring that America could do a generous act in cancelling France's debt there. He fears however, that we are too idealistic and that our policy at the peace negotiations will be such a one as to reestablish her economic life on the scale with her new political position.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,  
Captain, Corps of Int.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Note

**War Material Abandoned or Sold by German Army**

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

No. 83/F

*Spa, January 31, 1919.*

Subcommittee on Finance

From General Nudant to the President of the German Armistice Commission: In regard to the German notes No. 6-3962 of January 4, and 6833, of January 19.

The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies has sent the following instructions to the Allied Army: "According to Paragraph 6, of the Armistice Agreement the equipment, the provisions, and the materiel of a military nature which the German Armies were unable to carry off with them in the course of their withdrawal, had to be delivered over to the Armies of Occupation.

As a result, any sale or any cessions under whatsoever title it may have taken place of materiel of military nature made by the German military authorities after November 11, 1918, is considered by the Allied Command as null and void.

The person handling will be notified without delay that the objects which he holds are the property of the Army of Occupation by virtue of the Agreement of November 11. Whether the objects have been bought by him from the German authorities or whether he has simply taken possession of them taking advantage of the retreat, the procedure will be just exactly the same.

The commander of the Armies, after advising with the economic section, will determine whether the materiel should be taken over purely and simply from the present holder or whether it is proper to authorize the latter to acquire the property in a regular manner by means of the payment of the fixed sale price.

In the latter case the present holder of the property will be given the opportunity to pay the fixed sum immediately or to give up the objects which have come into his possession in an irregular manner.

NUDANT.

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**Delivery of Agricultural Implements**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 31, 1919.*

No. 61

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Movement of Raw Materiel across the Rhine: Minister von Haniel, on behalf of the German Government, called attention to a note which he had submitted relating to the exchange across the RHINE of raw materiel and partially manufactured materiel destined for the manufacture of agricultural machinery. He stated that unless this authority was granted, it would be impossible for Germany to deliver the agricultural machinery agreed upon in Article 3 of the TREVES Convention of January 16, 1919.

In reply, General Nudant stated that the importance of this question did not escape him and that he had called the attention of his Government to the importance of authorizing this. He stated that he was willing to continue to urge the approval of it as he thought that more than likely the authority would be granted.

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8. Delivery of Agricultural Implements as Called for by Paragraph 3 of the Treves Convention of January 16, 1919: The Committee having in charge the execution of the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the TREVES Convention of January 16, 1919, has arranged many of the details under which the agricultural implements specified are to be delivered.

This agreement was signed by the German, French, and Belgian delegates, but I directed the American delegate not to sign it in view of the fact that one of the paragraphs enumerated over ten thousand implements which were not to be delivered until after the first of June.

Paragraph 3 of the TREVES Convention specifies that deliveries shall not be prolonged beyond the first of June, and for this Committee to enter into an agreement contrary to the terms of the TREVES Convention would be manifestly improper. That Convention was concluded by the German and Allied representatives and no member of this Commission has any authority to modify its conditions.

The British member of this Committee also declined to sign the agreement, but I have no doubt that with the French and Belgians agreeing, the details of delivery will commence in accordance with this protocol.

When June first arrives and all deliveries have not been completed, it will then be a question as to what penalties should be inflicted or an arrangement arrived at for concluding this paragraph of the TREVES Convention of January 16.

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7. Financial Agreement of December 13:

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Paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Agreement are giving rise to a good deal of discussion in the Committee charged with the execution of this Agreement. It places certain obligations upon the Germans without giving corresponding guarantees to them.

They have been demanding some reciprocal consideration based on this Convention, but like others of their claims, it seems to have no foundation.

Paragraph 2 of this Agreement will, undoubtedly, affect few, if any, Americans. Under Paragraph 4, Americans doing business, or having property in Germany at the outbreak of the war, which property has been confiscated, may be very much interested in the execution of this Convention.

I have no knowledge whatever of the extent to which American property in Germany has been confiscated during the war, but if it amounted to a very considerable sum, it seems as though it would be very desirable to have an American representative on this Committee, who is fully conversant with such matters and can safeguard our interests.

There is no one present with this Mission at present competent to look after any complicated affairs of this kind.

The greatest safeguard that I see to American interests is that the Belgians have four members on this Committee and the French three, all of whom are men of high standing in legal matters and matters of finance. It may work out that the French and Belgians in guarding their interests will also guard the interests of the Americans.

It seems quite probable that the large financial interests of Americans who were doing business in Germany at the outbreak of the war and who have suffered confiscation of large amounts of property will have their interests safeguarded by the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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C-in-C Report File: Fldr. 410: Memorandum

***Food Situation in American Occupied Zone***

ADVANCED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH CIVIL AFFAIRS,  
*Trier, January 31, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR General Smith:

[Extract]

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10. Conclusions: The preliminary survey of the food conditions made by this office appears to warrant the following conclusions:

- (a) An inadequate food production in Germany during the war.
- (b) A complicated and intricate system of governmental food distribution and control.
- (c) A breakdown of this system following the revolution and the Allied occupation of German territory.
- (d) Inadequate food allowances per person during the war with amounts gradually diminishing.
- (e) An unbalanced dietary with protein and fats relatively, as well as absolutely, greatly diminished.
- (f) Very considerable stocks of food on hand or available in the territory occupied by American troops; these would furnish the population with the bulk and the most important portion of the present food allowances provided it could be equally distributed. (This statement is made on the fact that the German estimates show that the available supply of potatoes will last on an average of 26 1/2 weeks and flour 21 weeks; these two articles constitute together nearly seven-eighths of the weight of the present ration and about four-fifths of its caloric value.)
- (g) Detrimental effects of reduced and unbalanced diet shown in vital statistics, most noticeable in the very young, in the sick, and in old people
- (h) Nursing women, children, and the sick are most in need of food.

11. Recommendations:

- (a) That steps be taken to increase the dietary of nursing women, children, and the sick by the addition of wheat, flour, rice, condensed milk and butter or margarine.
- (b) That the United States Government be prepared to issue to the general population wheat flour (preferably whole wheat), meat (preferably pork), bacon or margarine and rice.

12. The evidence at hand indicates undernourishment of babies and young children. Nursing mothers are not properly nourished and their babies do not gain weight as they should. Bottle-fed babies cannot be properly fed on account of the lack of milk. Children are undernourished mainly by reason of the lack of fats and milk. In regard to the sick, one of the most important considerations is a proper diet. There is ample evidence that sick are dying or that convalescence is greatly lengthened on account of lack of nourishing and easily digestible diet. White bread, rice, milk, and some easily digested fats are essential.

13. With regard to the general population there is no doubt that the middle class and poorer people who cannot afford to pay exorbitant prices for food are undernourished and in many cases resistance is thereby lowered so that they become more susceptible to disease. As it is manifestly impossible to secure a perfectly even distribution of all the food available in the American area, it is almost certain that some of the essential articles of diet in the ration allowance will before the next harvest become exhausted in certain localities, such as the industrial centers, and that it will be impracticable, perhaps impossible, to supply such districts from German food stocks. It is, therefore, believed that our Government should have on hand the necessary supplies to make good these deficiencies and should be able to control the distribution. It is probable that the first serious cry for food will be for bread. The present dietary is deficient in protein and fat. These deficiencies would be made up by wheat which is rich in protein and by pork which in addition to protein is rich in fat. Potatoes will probably be demanded in certain localities as this vegetable is even more of a staple than bread. Rice is an excellent substitute for potatoes. In addition, bacon or margarine might be economically issued to replace the deficient fat. Canned beef or canned salmon would form valuable additions to the present dietary and if on hand in excess might be used to advantage.

14. It is understood that the Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province has received word from BERLIN that no more food supplies could be counted on from outside that province. If this is true, it would seem to be a wise policy to bring pressure to bear on the present

German Government by telling them plainly that unless they exert every possible influence toward the alleviation of the food situation in the occupied areas, the Allied Governments will hesitate to offer any assistance whatever.

HENRY A. SHAW,  
Colonel, Medical Corps,  
Chief Sanitary Officer.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1215: Letter

**German Troops in Southern Russia**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, January 31, 1919.*

No. 61

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Repatriation of German Troops in Southern Russia: Colonel von Mueller brought to the attention of the Commission the fact that they are receiving telegrams from the Black Sea Region saying that the health of German troops is bad, and urging that these troops be removed by sea at once.

At this point, Colonel von Mueller announced that he had just received a telegram to the effect that the French Commander in ODESSA had left word authorizing the transportation of these troops and had communicated same to Admiral Hauptman.

Colonel von Meuller asked for confirmation of this information.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Critical Food Situation in Poland**

654 OB

*Paris, January 31, 1919.*

General Andrews,

U. S. Army, G-1, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

January 31, 8 p. m., in respect to your telegram in regard to Colonel Grove. In order to get the whole story in front of you I will report that on January 20 the Supreme Food Council telegraphed General Foch as follows: "We have just heard the report of Dr. Kellogg who has completed a mission in Poland on behalf of Mr. Hoover. It is clear from his statements that the food situation in Poland is most critical and that immediate supplies are necessary if the present Government is to be able to withstand the Bolsheviki. The Allied Supreme Council of Supply and Relief is ready to send the necessary cargoes to DANZIG at once. Article 16 of the Armistice with Germany gives the Allies the right of access to Poland by DANZIG for purpose of sending supplies to Poland. We request you to ask at once by wireless that Germany should take steps to assure the transport of three thousand tons of foodstuff daily by rail from DANZIG to Polish frontiers. The German Government must assure the protection of these supplies and should the supplies delivered in Poland prove to have been tampered with there shall be a corresponding reduction in the future supplies for Germany. The transport of the supplies shall be carried out under the control of Allied representatives of the Council and we request you to keep us informed by telegram." On January 28 we received from General Foch the following message: "German reply to Telegram Number 3564 C. R. 1st: The German Government is disposed in principle to permit the passage of provisions destined to the Polish Congress but on account of the bad condition of the railways and the great lack of rolling stock, transportation to the German-Polish frontier cannot be assured without meeting with inconvenience and delay. Second: Germany asks the assurance that the material furnished for the transportation of these provisions be returned to her immediately. Third: The German Commission reserves the right to make further remarks on this subject." I telegraphed Colonel Grove, who is head of the Food Mission in Poland, these arrangements and instructed him he could expect certain cargoes of foodstuffs in DANZIG within the next five or ten days and that I would be glad if he would get into communication with the German railway and port authorities and make the necessary detailed arrangements for the transportation of the food from DANZIG to the Polish frontier. Knowing Colonel Grove, I have no doubt he is simply giving effect to these instructions and have no doubt that the Germans will raise every detailed difficulty they can in regarding this transmission of food from DANZIG to WARSAW, as is evidenced by their desire for Colonel Grove to communicate with them via the Commission at SPA. Such an arrangement would be hopeless as it is a question of discharging ships, securing warehouses and wharf accommodation, loading railway cars, and securing their dispatch and delivery to the Polish frontier. If such communication is to be made through SPA it would involve an enormity of detail whereas if the Germans were willing to cooperate with Colonel Grove it would certainly save them and us a great deal of difficulty. My view is that they should be at once instructed that Colonel Grove is our representative in food transmission to WARSAW and anyone with whom he associates himself as assistants are our representatives and that the Germans should loyally cooperate with this group in securing the results demanded by General Foch. It would seem to me any failure on their part is a violation of their undertaking under the Armistice.

HOOVER.

American Mission - 11:45 p. m.

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**German Garrison Authorized**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, January 31, 1919.*

No. 61

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. German Troops In Bridgehead of Strassburg: In response to notes from the Germans, Marshal Foch has decided to authorize the maintenance of two German battalions in OFFENBURG; this was the former peacetime garrison. It also has been decided to leave the towns of ACHERN and OBERKIRCH outside the Neutral Zone. An engineering battalion has been stationed there. Marshal Foch made it very clear that the limits of this garrison should not exceed those given above, and report was called for as to their effective strength.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**American Inspections in Neutral Zone**

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*February 1, 1919.*

No. 383/G

From General Nudant

To the President of the German Armistice Commission

My attention has been called by the General commanding the American Third Army that police control exercised in the Neutral Zone without previous notification of the German police commanders in the sectors and subsectors has given rise to remarks by German officers there.

The instructions of Marshal Foch, C-in-C of the Armies of the Allies relative to police control in the Neutral Zone specify in Part C, Par. 1, that in principle the officers charged with this control should address themselves to the German police commanders

in the sectors and subsectors and through them should enter into relations, if there is occasion for it, with other authorities or with private parties.

These instructions do not involve the necessity for the authorities charged with missions of police control to notify the commanders of sectors or subsectors in advance. Any military measure which relates to either defensive or offensive preparations should be taken unexpectedly.

I request you to be good enough to notify this to the commanders in the sectors and subsectors (of German police) and to call the attention of the German Government to Part V, Paragraph VII, of the same instructions to the effect that all supplies susceptible in any way to military utilization in the Neutral Zone should be called to the attention of the Allied Command concerned before January 3. Stocks which are not declared or which are left on the spot contrary to orders from the Allied Command run the risk of confiscation.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Note

### ***German Prisoners***

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 8841

*February 1, 1919.*

The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the Allied Commission

It was stated by the American representative at the Subcommittee for Prisoners of War January 1 that the return of German doctors and medical personnel who remained behind is being arranged for by the American High Command.

Their return has not yet taken place.

I request that a list be drawn up giving their names and where they are at present in that this will be of some slight satisfaction to their very anxious families.

I will be grateful in the interest of those concerned for haste in the matter.

von MUELLER.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 930: Memo

### ***Enemy Material***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE,

*February 1, 1919.*

MEMO: For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

1. By letter of the Commander-in-Chief (A. C. of S., G-4), January 11, 1919, on the subject of, "Disposition of German war material not covered by the terms of the Armistice", the Commanding Generals of the Second and Third Armies were directed to appoint a

board of officers to determine the serviceability and disposition of war materials turned over or abandoned by the German Armies which the latter were not required to turn over in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. In that letter it is stated that all war materials, except cannon, minenwerfer, trench mortars, machine guns, aeroplanes, locomotives, railroad cars, and motor trucks, abandoned or turned over by the German Army in the sector where the American Armies have advanced or operated since November 11, 1918, become the property of the United States. The board provided is authorized to have all ammunition and explosives, and such materials as are found to be unserviceable, destroyed at once. Pursuant to these directions the Commanding General, Third Army, appointed an Enemy War Materials Board directing it to destroy at once such material, including ammunition, as is found to be unserviceable or not needed.

The Enemy War Materials Board, Third Army, reports that there are large quantities of material in that area of no value in the military service nor as salvage, which, though not worth transportation for the use of the civil population of Allied countries, is of value to the local population of Germany. Mention is made of shoes with paper tops and wooden soles, of dog drawn carts, paper harness, pots, kettles, etc. The Board states that this property is not of value to the United States and of no military assistance to the enemy, but that its destruction would be an economic waste. The Board asks authority to sell such enemy material as last described to the civil population of the occupied territory, covering the proceeds to the credit of the United States with a disbursing quartermaster. It is pointed out that a considerable part of such material was sold by the German Army, subsequent to the Armistice, to municipalities and civilians in whose hands it now remains. The Board asks authority to confirm such sales, requiring the proceeds thereof to be turned to the United States.

The request of the Enemy War Materials Board is approved by the Representative, A. C. of S., G-4, Advance G. H. Q., who states that the property referred to is entirely unsuited to our service, if not of value to the American Army, and that the proposed sale of it will not in any way augment the military strength of Germany.

You request my opinion upon the legality of such sales under instructions received from the United States, and also as to the method of sale proposed by the Representative, A. C. of S., G-4, in his 1st Indorsement of January 24, 1919.

2. The question is a difficult and far reaching one. It opens up the whole field of our legal position with respect to the property of the enemy state in our hands under the existing conditions. Throughout this war we have endeavored scrupulously to observe our trusty obligations, particularly the rules of warfare laid down in The Hague Convention, without reference to breaches thereof on the part of the enemy. Article XXIII (g) of The Hague reglement reads:

In addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions, it is specifically forbidden - (g) to destroy or seize the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. This provision was not inadvertent or unconsidered. It was retained both in the Convention of 1899 and that of 1907, after considerable debate, for the very reason that it applied to all kinds of property, including the war munitions and material of the enemy state. "The subject of Article XXIII (g)," says Spaight, "is one of the greatest difficulties in the whole of international law." (War Rights on Land, P. 111). The difficulty consists in the application of the rule, in determining when destruction or seizure is "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." Under conditions of actual combat the question never arises, since all enemy property captured or abandoned on the battlefield is so obviously within the rule that title to it passes to the capturing Army which may either destroy or use it at will. In situations such as we have at present, however, we must apply the test of military necessity in determining our right to seize and, *a fortiori*, to destroy the property including war munitions and material of the enemy government. Hall, the recognized English authority states the rule to be:

That property can be appropriated of which immediate use can be made for

warlike operations by the belligerent seizing it or which, if it reaches his enemy, would strengthen the latter either directly or indirectly, but that on the other hand property not so capable of immediate or direct use or so capable of strengthening the enemy is unsusceptible of appropriation.

In the instant case the Enemy War Materials Board and the representative, A. C. of S., G-4, insist that the property they refer to is of no use whatever to us and could be of no material assistance to the enemy. It is for these reasons that authority for the proposed sale of the property is sought; yet these reasons negate our rights of appropriation of the property and consequently our right of destroying or otherwise disposing of it. The notable instance of the sale by the Germans in 1870 of a large quantity of oak timber belonging to the French Government is quite in point. This timber, not having been entirely removed by the purchasers at the conclusion of peace, the French courts, when they resumed jurisdiction of the Departments of the MEUSE and the MEURTH where the timber was located, promptly annulled the sale on the ground that the German Government had exceeded its authority in appropriating property not useful in its own military service or advantageous to its enemy. In this position the German Government itself acquiesced as a corrected exposition of the international rule.

3. Article LIII of The Hague reglement is as follows:

Article LIII. An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the state depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and generally, all movable property belonging to the state which may be used for military operations.

All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depot of arms, and, generally all kinds of ammunition of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

This language is not ambiguous. It means that an army of occupation is entitled to take possession of the materials of war and supplies belonging to the enemy state if such property is susceptible of use for military operations, either by the occupying Army of the enemy; and property so appropriated may either be used by the occupying Army in its own operations or held to prevent its falling into the hands of, and being used by, the enemy. It is equally clear, however, that property, not susceptible of a military use by either belligerent, though belonging to the enemy government and at one time forming a part of the supplies of his Army, cannot lawfully be appropriated much less destroyed or sold and the proceeds pocketed by the occupying state. In plainer words we are entitled to take only what we can use or what the enemy could use; what we do take we must either use ourselves or keep for restoration upon the conclusion of peace. We cannot go further. To dispose of such property by sale is illegitimate and destruction of it would be justified only as an extreme measure imperiously demanded to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. I think it may be said, however, that the destruction of stores of ammunition, and possibly of arms also, may always be considered a military necessity.

4. Waiving for the moment all other considerations, it should be observed that if we are to exercise a right of ownership over enemy property in the hands, it can only be upon the theory that it was taken from the enemy by our arms. By the 70th Article of War Congress has enacted that:

All public property taken from the enemy is the property of the United States and shall be secured for the service of the United States, etc.

In principle, to dispose of property of the United States requires congressional action and I am not aware that Congress has ever delegated the authority for the sale of property of this particular kind which it has expressly declared to be the property of the United States. The provision of the Army Appropriation Act of July 9, 1918, concerning the sale of war supplies, evidently did not contemplate granting authority for the sale of property

captured or taken from the enemy. This is quite manifest from the provision that the proceeds of the sales authorized by the act shall be deposited to the credit of the appropriation out of which was paid the cost of the government of the property thus sold.

5. What has been said above proceeds from the conventional rules and general principles of international law and presupposes that the question is unaffected by any special agreement, such as the Armistice. The directions and order constituting the Enemy War Materials Board contemplate that such Board is to deal only with enemy property not included in the terms of the Armistice Agreement. It is said that there are war materials and munitions in our hands, abandoned or turned over to us by the enemy, "not belonging to the general pool of war materials to be turned over under the terms of the Armistice by the German Armies." I cannot escape the belief that a mistaken notion of the legal effect of the Armistice Agreement lies at the root of this whole matter. I cannot conceive that there should be war materials turned over to our Army of Occupation, or abandoned by the enemy in his retreat from our sector, which are not covered by the express terms of the Armistice Agreement. Article IV of the Armistice Convention provides for the delivery, by the German Armies, of guns, machine guns, trench mortar, and airplanes. Section VII provides for a similar delivery of locomotives, railroad cars, and trucks. In addition to these provisions, however, Section VI contains the following comprehensive paragraph:

Sec. VI. All military installations of whatever nature will be handed over intact: likewise all military supplies, foodstuffs, munitions, equipments, which shall not have been taken away within the time limit set for the evacuation.

This language is so broad as to include all of the property mentioned and referred to in the communication from the Enemy War Materials Board. It is broad enough to include every sort of munitions and material which the enemy could possibly have turned over or abandoned to our Army. The language of Section VI is the same as that of Section IV and VII, viz., that the property described will be "handed over" or "delivered." The word used in the French original is the same in all instances (*livrees*). In none of the provisions is it stated to whom the delivery will be made but the Agreement itself recites that it is made by the enemy and "the Commander-in-Chief, of the Allied Armies, acting in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers." Whatever the limitations of The Hague Convention or the rules of international law may be, here is an express agreement by the owner state to turn over all of the munitions and war materials it may leave behind in the occupied territory; but it is an agreement to turn that property over to the Allies. The Allied and Associated Powers, acting through the Allied Command, may, therefore, lawfully make any disposition of this property that is deemed wise, freed from the restraints and restrictions, external and internal, which would prevent the same action independent of the Armistice Agreement, by the United States alone.

6. I am confirmed in my opinion that there is no subject matter upon which the existing Enemy War Materials Board can legally act and that title to the property referred to in their communication rests in the Allied and Associated Powers jointly, rather than in the United States, by the fact that there has just been received at these headquarters a cablegram from the War Department, No. 2581 R. January 30, 1919, in reply to an inquiry concerning the status of enemy property captured in battle, which states the view that the 79th Article of War has not intended to assert an exclusive right of the United States. The cable concludes:

Title to captured war materials is considered to vest in Allies jointly.

You are authorized to confer with the Allies and dispose of this property in accordance with mutual agreement.

There is a decided advantage in considering all material in our hands the property of the Allies. First, the right of possession and disposition of it, denied by the Hague Convention, is justified by the Armistice Convention when asserted by the Allies; and second the Allies will be able to make such disposition of it as they please, which, as pointed out in Paragraph 4, it would be very [difficult for the American military authorities to

do upon their own account without additional congressional action].

7. I have no difficulty in answering your special inquiries. In my opinion there is no legal authority to make the sales proposed in the communication from the Enemy War Materials Board; and it is, therefore, unnecessary for me to express an opinion upon the method of sale proposed by the representative, A. C. of S., G-4.

8. If the Armistice Agreement be construed to cover enemy munitions and material in the occupied territory, as its plain terms import, then the property sold by the German Government to municipalities and civilians fall likewise under Allied authority. The obligation of the Armistice Convention was to "hand over intact" all such property as was not taken away within the time allowed for withdrawal. The Allied Command may, therefore, proceed to take possession of this property or confirm its sale and demand the proceeds - matters which could very properly be made the subject of representations to the enemy government through the Armistice Commission. But there is no authority in the United States Army to confirm such sales or to demand the proceeds thereof.

9. In view of the legal situation outlined herein, I recommend as follows:

1. That the directions contained in the letter of G-4, of January 11, 1919, be withdrawn or modified.

2. That G. O. No. 7, Headquarters Second Army, January 19, 1919, establishing the Enemy War Materials Board be modified so as to revoke the part thereof which orders the destruction of material other than ammunition.

3. That the entire subject be reported to the Permanent Armistice Commission, the title of the Allies to the property recognized, and orders for the disposition of the property obtained from the Allied Command. I see no objection to the Enemy War Materials Board continuing in existence for the purpose of determining the serviceability and recommending the disposition of material and otherwise [acting] as an agent of the Allied Command in the discharge of any function that may be confided to them by that authority.

W. W. BETHEL,  
Brigadier General, Judge Advocate.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1239: Order

***Second Army to Occupy French Zone***

*February 1, 1919.*

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

To: Commanding General, Second Army

1. Under an agreement reached with the Allied Commander-in-Chief the French will evacuate that portion of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg now occupied by them, and the entire Grand Duchy will come within the American Zone, the present zone of the Second Army being extended to include that part of the Grand Duchy now occupied by the French.

2. It is understood that the French XXI Corps began its movement from the Grand Duchy on January 26 and that this movement should be completed February 6. You will make such dispositions as may be necessary upon the withdrawal of the French to occupy that portion of the Grand Duchy evacuated by them.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief will reserve for the present the city of Luxemburg for his headquarters, and for the garrisoning of the necessary troops to insure its guard and service. It may be desirable later to station some American troops in the city of Luxemburg, but so long as that city continues to be occupied by French troops no American troops should be sent there.

3. Civil administration within the Grand Duchy will be under Brigadier General H. A. Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs in the Occupied Territory.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***German Personnel in Turkey and Southern Russia***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 1, 1919.*

No. 62

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Repatriation of German Subjects interned in Turkey: In response to several representations which have been made by the Germans within the last month, General Nudant read this morning a decision of Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, bearing on the repatriation of German subjects interned in Turkey and the German troops in southern Russia. He stated that the Allied Governments had decided to carry out this repatriation, the conditions to be announced later. He added that transportation by sea has already begun.

Colonel von Mueller asked if the Germans should put additional boats at the disposal of the Allies for this movement, stating that if so a little time would be required in order to get them ready. General Nudant was unable to make any reply to this latter question at the time.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Transportation of Food to Poland**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 1, 1919.*

No. 62

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[[Extract]

\*\*\*\*\*

3. Food supplies for Poland.

General Nudant announced that Marshal Foch had telegraphed that the German Government is taking measures to allow shipments of food to Poland. Rolling stock supplied by the German Government for the shipment of these supplies was to be immediately returned.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Note

**Communication of German Dioceses with the Holy See**

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. 714

*Spa, February 1, 1919.*

From the Representative of the German Government to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.  
The Dioceses of the occupied area of Germany are completely cut off from communication with the Holy See. Up to now this communication had been carried on by the Nuncio in MUNICH, but now, however, the Nuncio is not in a position to send letters to the individual Dioceses nor to receive orders from the individual Bishops. As a result, all of the very important documents that come from ROME and should be delivered, cannot be forwarded.

On behalf of the German Government, I request that orders be given so that and end will be immediately put to this untenable position and that the administration of the Dioceses and of the Nuncio will be allowed to communicate by letter and telegram unhindered.

The letters of both the Dioceses and the Nuncio are easily recognizable by the stamp on the outside.

I would be grateful for an early reply.

von LERSNER.

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**German Decree on Declaration of Machinery**

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 827

*Berlin, February 1, 1919.*

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the  
Chairman of the Permanent International Armistice Commission.

Reference to Note 407 G

1. Whoever on January 31, 1919, has in his possession or custody industrial or agricultural machinery of any kind, accessories or spare parts: boilers, iron wares (rolling-beds), converters, ovens, etc., threshing machines, agricultural implements and reapers, which was requisitioned in Belgium or France and shipped to Germany is under immediate obligation at latest by February 20 to indicate this possession to the Government Indemnification Commission, 34 Victoria Street. The Government Indemnification Commission will give fuller details as to the way and contents of the information to be given. Objects which should be declared which are being shipped should be declared immediately upon receipt. Any further information as to ownership, possessor or control should be transmitted directly to the Government Indemnification Commission.

2. The Government Indemnification Commission will be empowered to give notice of further information required in accord with the "Declaration Obligation" of July 12, 1917 (Reichgesetzblatt, page 604).

3. The owner, possessor, and user are under obligation to keep in their possession or under their control the objects which they should declare.

4. The Government Bureau of Appraisement is given the power to transfer, upon orders, to one of the persons to be named the ownership of the articles mentioned in paragraph 1, in case they are not given up freely upon request upon payment of the value of the property. The order can be communicated to the owner or be made known through official announcements. The owner is obliged to give up the objects that are taken from him, especially he is obligated to transfer them or to send them according to the measures prescribed in the more detailed orders of the Government Bureau of Appraisements. The Government Bureau of Appraisements is to pay the owner on taking over, a price proportionate to the expenses that he has been under in acquiring the property. If there can be no agreement reached as to the price, the price of taking over will be finally established by the Government Court of Adjustments for Affairs of War. The reservation remains that lines of action to be followed in the establishment of the price of taking over are to be determined.

5. The prescriptions of the regulation concerning the effect of war measures upon the financial burdens of property; mortgages, debts on the property or debts against the income, promulgated on April 11, 1918 (Government Laws, page 183) are in force without any count being taken as to whether the business from which the installations are removed is stopped or not.

6. Whoever does not produce the lists required in paragraph 1, or who does not produce them in the required time, or who of his own knowledge gives wrong or incomplete indications, or whoever opposes the obligations of paragraph 3 and paragraph 4, will be punished either by imprisonment up to one year or with the payment of money up to 10,000 marks or both. Also the objects that are concerned in the discussion may be taken up without any count being taken as to whether they belong to the wrong-doer or not.

7. The regulations are binding from the date of announcement.

THE GOVERNMENT,  
Ebert, Scheidemann.  
State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Preuss.

FREIHERR von LERSNER.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***Delivery of Agricultural Implements***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 1, 1919.*

No. 62

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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11. Agreement in regard to delivery of agricultural implements.

Referring to Par. 8 of my report of yesterday, No. 61, attention is invited to a letter of General Haking, Chief of the British Armistice Mission, to General Nudant. In this letter he states that the British representative also did not sign the proposed agreement in regard to the delivery of agricultural implements. Also that according to his view, the committee having this matter in charge was not qualified to sign such an agreement as was proposed. He adds, "The Germans say they cannot deliver the material laid down (called for), it is therefore the business of the German delegates to represent this through General Nudant."

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Shipment of Sugar from Right Bank of Rhine**

[Contemporary Translation]

Number 380-G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*February 1, 1919.*

From General Nudant to The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies announces the following, dated January 27, No. 458-ATR: "The shipment of 45,000 tons of raw sugar from the right bank of the RHINE to the refineries of the left bank, which was determined upon for the last three months of 1918, and the month of January, 1919, must take place at once.

"I beg you to be good enough to make known to me with all possible speed whether the orders to this effect have been given by the German Government and when the entire delivery will have taken place.

"In return, the reexport to the right bank of the RHINE of sixty-seven per cent of the refined sugar will be authorized."

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AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-682: Memorandum

**Equity in Locomotives and Cars**

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*February 1, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Agricultural implements to be delivered by the Germans.

1. Reference is had to a secret special report of January 27, 1919, from the Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C., asking for instructions as to the acceptance by the U. S. of its proportionate share of certain agricultural implements to be delivered by the Germans in lieu of 500 locomotives and 19,000 cars. This matter was referred to this section for recommendation.

2. As suggested, Major Kountse of the War Trade Board in PARIS, was consulted and his reply is as follows:

Reference your Telegram Number 849 G-4 supplementing my telegram of yesterday. From information available here in PAIRS it appears that the substitution of agricultural implements for railway cars and locomotives which covered by Armistice Convention of January 16 was not discussed by the Supreme War Council. It has been suggested that the equity that United States had in locomotives and cars might be satisfied out of deliveries already made by the Germans to the French Military authorities and that this matter be taken up for settlement by the American delegate on the Permanent International Commission for the Armistice at SPA with the French delegate on this commission.

KOUNTSE.

3. In view of his statement a letter of instructions as per copy herewith has been prepared for the signature of the Chief of Staff.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-682: Letter

**Agricultural Implements**

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
February 1, 1919.

C-in-C

Chief, American Section, Permanent International Armistice Commission

Agricultural implements to be delivered by the Germans

1. In reply to your secret, special report of January 27, 1919, on above subject, you are advised as follows:

The U. S. does not waive its equity in any class of materiel to be turned over to the Allies by the Germans under the terms of the Armistice or under any extension, modification, or convention pursuant thereto.

However, the U. S. can make no direct use of the agricultural implements and if it accepts its pro rata share of these will be under the necessity of disposing of them. The French and the Belgians, on the other hand, are in position to make use of these implements, while at the same time the U. S. can use to advantage, locomotives, and cars.

You are, therefore, directed to take up this matter with the French and Belgian delegates, either or both nations at your discretion, with a view to satisfying out of deliveries of locomotives and cars to these nations, our equity in the 500 locomotives and the 19,000 cars, for which agricultural implements are to be accepted by the Allied high command.

This will have the advantage of delivering to the U. S., war materiels in kind and will involve no immediate consideration of their money value, leaving to the U. S. the ultimate disposition of this railway rolling stock in connection with other railway rolling stock received from the Germans or acquired from the United States.

LEROY ELTINGE,  
Chief of Staff.

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1st Ind.

Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C., SPA, Belgium, February 10, 1919

To Commander-in-Chief, American E. F. - Returned.

1. This matter has been submitted to Marshal Foch. Reply received through General Nudant is that the question will be decided by the Allied Council of Defense.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

***Transportation of Food to Poland***

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. Nr. 721

*Spa, February 1, 1919.*

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the Permanent International Armistice Commission

In the main session of the Armistice Commission, SPA, January 21, 1919, General Nudant transmitted a note in reference to food shipments to Poland. It demands that the German Government assume the daily shipment of at least 3,000 tons of foodstuffs from DANZIG to the Polish border. Even before this note was transmitted, a representative of the Polish Ministry opened negotiations with the Railroad Direction in DANZIG in reference to the same subject. Although receiving the requests of the Polish Government, the Railroad Direction of DANZIG rejected them as outside of its scope. Afterwards was taken into consideration a daily shipment of at least 300 tons, possible 500, provision cars to be delivered by American ships coming to DANZIG and from there to the border station of ILLWO to be sent over from there to Poland. The Prussian Railroad Service was to supply the means of transportation. The Prussian Minister of Public Works transmitted this proposition to the Polish Minister of Commerce, at the same time the Minister of Public Works stated that in view of the transportation difficulties now predominating, due in the first place to shortage in rolling stock and then to want of coal, the transportation could only be undertaken where the required locomotives and cars could be supplied.

In view of the difficulties in carrying out the proposition, attention must be called to the technical impossibility of unloading daily more than 1,000 to 1,500 tons from ships to cars, in view of the organization of the harbor of DANZIG and of its outer port, NEUFAHRWASSER (docks, warehouses, cranes, etc.), and in view of the present labor conditions. Even to reach this figure special provisions have to be taken, which have already been begun.

The further unloading of 3,000 tons daily would involve an unloading at the same time of some 10 ships. This exceeds the capacity of the port in that DANZIG as a Baltic port has only a part of its space accessible to deep-bottomed Trans-Atlantic ships. At the same time that I call the above facts to the attention of the Allied Governments I am at the same time charged to inform them that the German Government is not in a position to admit without further conditions the transportation demands of the Allies. The transportation involves a quantity of rolling stock and coal, which in view of the present extreme shortage in rolling stock cannot be undertaken.

The German Government proposes that the Allied Governments agree that the number of locomotives and cars forming a part of those which should be delivered by the German Railroad at a given date be excepted as necessary for the Polish shipments until concluding them.

It may be remarked in this connection the Poles as especially regards locomotives are not in a position to do so. Should the shipping not be undertaken by the Poles in ILLWO, the German Government in consideration of the prolonged Polish assaults on German rolling stock, especially through the withholding of rolling stock, must make the further condition that the Polish Government send an equal number of locomotives and cars to Germany as enter their territory. With reference to the extremely critical coal situation in Germany, the German Government expresses the hope that the Allied Governments will take into consideration and permit the possibility of making shipments by water, especially the steamship service from the north seaport and from STETTIN to Baltic ports. The German Govern-

ment takes it for granted that the shipping costs, including the unloading expenses from the ship to train, will be guaranteed by the Allies on the scale of the present tariff. In the above-mentioned note General Nudant made the demand that the German Government guarantee the complete protection of those shipments. Naturally, the German Government will take the necessary measures to guarantee the shipments all possible military protection. I am, however, charged to inform the Allied Governments that the President of the Provinces of West Prussia has expressed the fear that the population will take a hostile attitude in event of such shipments to Poland and cannot be restrained. The German Government requests, therefore, that the Allied Governments see whether or not it be possible to begin shipping of foodstuffs to the German population, especially of DANZIG, at the same time that shipments are being made to the Poles.

v HANIEL.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

**Return of Industrial Machinery**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 2, 1919.*

No. 63

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Return of Machinery taken from France and Belgium:

The Committee looking after the return of machinery taken from France and Belgium have had several meetings recently.

The French and Belgian representatives on this Committee seem to have been very practical business men or manufacturers who had definite ideas of what should be done. They have, therefore been able to draft conditions which the Germans must meet, and as a consequence good progress has been made by this Committee.

Among the other regulations which they have adopted in one to the effect that the German Government will receive from the French or Belgian Governments forms to be filled in showing the exact location or materiel to be returned. These forms should begin to reach the Central Bureau fifteen days later, and reports from all parts of Germany should be in within six weeks. These will then be classified and instructions will be given in detail as to the methods of collecting, shipping and turning over this materiel.

The meetings of the Committee handling this matter will continue here at SPA, as announced in a previous report of mine, but the Central Bureau, which will have in charge all the details of the execution, will be at FRANKFORT. This will be quite an extensive organization and must have adequate facilities.

The French and Belgian delegates will make inspections throughout Germany for the purpose of determining if all machinery which should be returned has been reported. All expenses for such work of inspection, collection, shipment, etc., will be borne by the

Germans. It is expected that this machinery will begin to come in by the end of February.

The German Government is to issue a decree fixing the maximum penalty of one year's imprisonment and a fine of ten thousand marks on any person having such machinery and failing to report it.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***Payment to American Third Army***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 1, 1919.*

No. 62

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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4. Payment of Thirty Million Marks by the Germans.

General Barnum on behalf of the United States presented the following note to the Germans:

"Referring to letter from this office of January 25, in which, under the provisions of Article IX of the Armistice Agreement, the German Government was called upon to turn over to the American Third Army, 30,000 marks, to be deposited with the Reichsbank in COBLENZ, your reply, dated January 27, is unsatisfactory and asks for further information.

"The call for 30,000,000 marks was definite and specific, even stating the denominations in which this amount would be paid. The question of establishing a Bureau of Exchange was purely a local one and should not have been taken as a cause for delaying the payment.

"The Commanding General, Third Army, in a telegram of January 31, again requests that this money be paid. It is hoped that the facts given above will prove all that is necessary and that this money will be deposited without further question or delay."

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Estimates of German Military Resources**

[Contemporary Translation]

ANNEX 1.

General Weygand's Report

NOTES

On the Estimates of Resources in Men and Material in the German Army on February 1, 1919

General Thwaites, of the British Army

Brigadier General Dennis E. Nolan, Asst. Chief of Staff G-2

General Weygand, of the French Army, having assembled the actual resources in men and material in the German Army during conferences held on January 29, February 1, compared papers produced on this subject by the British, American, and French Armies.

Having examined together the information from various sources in their possession, and having estimated the respective value of each of them, these general officers are in agreement on the average figures which it is useful to adopt to estimate the military forces of Germany at the present time.

These figures are as follows (the accuracy of these estimates should be taken with reserve):

(1) Personnel serving with the colors of the German Army at the end of January: From 600,000 to 700,000 (at least).

(2) Various war material existing with the fighting troops (exclusive of material in depots, factories and arsenals):

(a) Machine Guns of all types: 50,000 (a minimum).

(b) Field Guns (including antiaircraft guns): 8,000

(c) Heavy Guns (including super-heavy artillery): 2,5000 of which nearly all is good modern material.

(d) Trench Mortars: The estimates vary between 4,000 (the figure furnished by the British Army) and 6,000 (the figure furnished by the American and French Armies).

(e) Rifles: 1,300,000 for the fighting line troops (according to British and American information), 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 (for the total existing at the front, in the interior and in arsenals).

(f) Aviation: It is very difficult to estimate the value of aviation material remaining in the hands of the Germans. The squadrons stationed on the different fronts at the time of the Armistice contained about 3,000 machines (not including those in Army parks and on lines of communication, nor those of the fleet), but on account of the intensity of production, and of the necessity for frequently replacing service aeroplanes, this number only represents a fraction of the machines existing in Germany (just as in France there were from 10,000 to 12,000 aeroplanes for 3,000 in service).

It follows that, although Germany has surrendered a large part of the machines belonging to squadrons at the front, she may have made up since then her air force; we do not know the number and the position of the aircraft factories which have continued to function since November 11.

The naval aircraft (estimated by the British as amounting to 450 machines); is still intact; and so are the dirigibles. Nearly all the engines are produced at 3 factories namely, the Benz, the Mercedes, and the Maybach.

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In the above estimates no account has been taken of the material taken from the Allied Armies on the western front during the whole war, nor of the considerable quantity of Russian material which remains in German hands, which would constitute an important augmentation of these estimates.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 2, 1919.*

No. 63

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Deliveries of Rolling Stock:

The Committee on rolling stock reports that up to January 30, there had been accepted 3,724 locomotives and 115,197 cars.

Although not provided for in the original Armistice Agreement, from information obtained here it appears that there are to be delivered in ALSACE and LORRAINE 19,021 cars. Of this number 12,122 have so far been delivered.

Of the motor trucks to be delivered, the American Army was to receive 1,250. Up to January 31 they had received 1,094.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Information on German Prisoners Requested**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 2, 1919.*

No. 63

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. German Prisoners in Hands of Americans:

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It will be noted, first, that the American representative on the subcommittee for the return of prisoners of war stated that the American High Command would arrange for the return of German doctors and medical personnel who remained behind. Information should reach this office as to what action is being taken along these lines in order that reply may be made to the German note. If it is the intention to hold this medical personnel to care for German prisoners, information to that effect should be forwarded.

In regard to the second part of his request, viz., that names of German prisoners of war and where they are held would be satisfactory to their families, it is suggested inasmuch as there are about fifty thousand of these prisoners, it would be a considerable task to make a list. It is understood that prisoners are given the privilege of communicating with their relatives, and by this method much more complete satisfaction can be given their families.

If such is to be the policy of the American High Command, I request that I be so informed.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Control of Prison Camps**

No. 178

*Spa, Belgium, February 2, 1919.*

Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

Number 404. Following request received by phone from General Harries in BERLIN: "Americans will assume control of twenty Russian prisoner camps."

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Memorandum

**Limburg Camp for Repatriation of Alsace-Lorrainers**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 8520

*Spa, February 3, 1919.*

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To General Nudant

The French Tenth Army has issued the following command:

The General Staff at Mayence telegraphs:

The following measures are in force for the repatriation of demobilized Alsace-Lorrainers.

I. Special sentinels will be posted at the crossings of the advance posts and in fact there will be one sentinel on the railway lines and one on the streets which are likely to be used as points of entry. The duties of these sentinels will be to send the demobilized Alsace-Lorrainers to the LIMBURG Camp.

II. This camp (4,500 capacity) will serve as the concentration camp for the demobilized men and will be in force after the morning of the 19th. It will continue to be equipped with the same personnel and materiel as formerly.

III. Orders concerning the notification of arrivals and measures concerning the repatriation of these demobilized men will follow later.

In the agreement of the Armistice Commission concerning the taking over of the LIMBURG prisoners of war camp by the French, it was expressly emphasized that the camp was to be evacuated immediately after the repatriation of French prisoners of war. This camp has never been authorized by the German High Command as concentration camp for demobilized Alsace-Lorrainers.

Neither the French Tenth Army nor Marshal Foch have the right to make arrangements for a camp that is on German soil without the consent of the German

High Command. Communications of this kind given in the form of orders must be refused.

It is requested that the LIMBURG Camp be evacuated at once. The establishment of a special concentration camp for Alsace-Lorrainers is not regarded as necessary by the Germans.

von MULLER.

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AFG: File 144-A-2: Fldr. 31: Letter

***Maintenance of the Blockade***

[Contemporary Translation]

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*February 3, 1919.*

No. 3919/CR

Marshal Foch Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs

DIRECTION OF THE BLOCKADE

I have the honor to advise you that I am in entire accord with the conclusions in your letter on the subject of the blockade in Germany.

The strict maintenance of the rules of the blockade is important from the military standpoint.

As a matter of fact, when the Allied Armies are reduced to such a point as to make any important military operation difficult, the blockade, the severity of which could be increased or diminished according to circumstances, would remain the best and most rapid means of obtaining respect for the Armistice Agreement and in a general way to impose our wishes on Germany.

FOCH.

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AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-682: Letter

***Substitution of Rolling Stock for Agricultural Implements***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 3, 1919.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Chief, French Mission

1. It is desired that an understanding be reached as to the manner of satisfying the

claims of the United States for a portion of the agricultural equipment to be supplied to the Allies under Clause III, Treves Agreement of January 16, 1919. For obvious reasons the United States can make no direct use of its share of agricultural equipment. On the other hand, an arrangement by which locomotives and cars are substituted for the former would be entirely acceptable to my Government.

2. I would appreciate your views on this subject.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-753: Memorandum

***Meeting of Interallied Economic Committee***

ADVANCED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Treves, February 3, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, A. E. F.

Subject: Notes on Conference and Meeting, Interallied Economic  
Committee held February 1, 1919, at Luxemburg.

[Extract]

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The first matter presented was the Instructions No. 2 \* \* \* relating to commercial and official inspections, General Maugus presenting and explaining the same. The first paragraph was explained as meaning that no inspections would be permitted without mutual agreement between the manufacturer and inspectors. All agreed. Paragraph 2, Instructions 2, was discussed at length and General Clive's position was that he did not want these official instructions published or made public in any manner. All agreed. General Clive explained that it was desirable and he was encouraging visits by his officers to the factories where mustard gas and chemicals of like character are being made as the information derived therefrom was regarded as a military secret and very valuable. Major Aron, French coal expert, then presented with a very long and elaborate explanation his scheme for control of the distribution of coal in the occupied territory---General Clive very much interested and taking part in the discussion. It seemed to be the opinion that it was very essential that the coal industry be controlled. General Clive stated that he had recently ascertained that coal was going up the RHINE and then back into Germany. He said

that a coal committee had been organized, sitting at COLOGNE, the British representative on this committee being Major Piggott, and the French, Major Aron, and a Herr Kruse, German, head of the Brown Coal Control Distributing Bureau. It is proposed to have this committee sit regularly every week or 10 days at COLOGNE. General Clive strongly recommends that the Americans immediately appoint a member. This member's presence in COLOGNE only being necessary at the time of formal meetings as at other times Colonel Coleman, U. S. A., could keep in touch sufficiently well to permit of the committee functioning at all times. M. Tirard stated that in order to have better control over the industrial situation, the hours of labor should be regulated. General Clive said that he did not wish to interfere in the regulations of the hours of labor except insofar as military necessity dictates. The American representatives expressed no opinion on this point, as the matter was only up for discussion and not decision, although I did indicate to General Clive personally and informally that I thought our position was that we did not object in principle to the proposed rule on 8 hours with the reservation, that it may not be possible to apply the same to public utilities due to the necessities of the Army of Occupation or other military necessities. The next subject discussed was the question of not recognizing in the occupied territory, laws made in BERLIN unless they are approved by the respective Allied commanders. M. Tirard stated that he could not state his government's position until he had received an answer to a letter he had written on this subject. General Clive stated that he had issued orders to the effect that no laws be recognized in his zone without British approval. Major Joy stated that we did not know what the position of our Government would be on this important matter. The next subject was the question of removal of censorship on registered mail. General Clive stated that they were observing the principles of censorship, although the practical application of the same was not what would be termed strict. The French, Belgian, and British agreed on the proposition of continuing censorship along the lines already established. General Clive stated that he found it valuable in the way of furnishing at times valuable information. General Clive said that in the matter of parcel post it was important from his standpoint to limit each package to 4 kilos. Discussion of food control then ensued and it was the sense of the meeting that it was a most difficult proposition to control and should not be taken up by this committee, at this time. The view was expressed that the Germans will pinch the occupied territory in the matter of food with a view to saving for the unoccupied territory thinking the Allies will get together and take care of this problem and supply food to the inhabitants if the situation becomes acute. Mr. Tirard and his financial representative and General Clive had quite a long discussion over the question of the control of private and public funds, the French idea being that an Allied representative should be placed in every public and private concern with a view to keeping a very close tab on everything transpiring. General Clive's view was that this should not be done and stated that as far as he was concerned he could not undertake to furnish representatives for this purpose, but it was agreed that the bankers and banks should be supervised but not controlled and that public funds including budgets, taxes, etc., should be carefully scrutinized and followed. No decision. After discussion it was agreed that economic sections should handle imports and exports when approved as a class in principle without further reference to the Interallied Economic Committee. M. Tirard stated that it was the purpose of the French and Belgians to organize a committee to buy and sell products in the occupied territory and their respective countries. The French expressed the view that all goods originating in the occupied territory should be marked "made in occupied territory," before shipment, while General Clive thought it possible for these goods to be marked afterwards in the territory where sold. No decision.

M. D. CHAPMAN,  
Captain, Marine Corps.

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**Allied Commission to Poland and German Poland**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 3, 1919.*

No. 64

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. The Commission to Poland:

General Nudant announced that the Ministry of War telegraphed under date of February 2 that Marshal Foch informs the German military authorities that the Associated Powers are sending a Commission to Poland which has full power to reduce disorder there as far as possible. To this end the Commission has received instructions to insist that the Polish authorities abstain completely from using force against the German troops. Marshal Foch transmits to the German authorities in German Poland an order from the Associated Powers to abstain hereafter from all participation in public life, awaiting the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference.

In reply to this note Colonel von Meuller stated that this was a question that from its very nature the German Government will have something further to say in reply. He added, that the present necessities of the Government require an urgent decision on their part for, according to information that has come, the most disgraceful murders of German subjects have occurred. He called the attention of the Allies to the fact that the measures which the Germans are now taking on the eastern front are at the same time measures to oppose Bolshevism.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Armistice Commission Subcommittees Outlined**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 3, 1919.*

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Summary of Committees at Present Working under Armistice Commission:

There are at present seven committees working under the Armistice Commission in addition to the work being carried on by General Harries at BERLIN in caring for Russian prisoners of war remaining in Germany. The designations of these committees and the work that they are engaged in here is as follows:

(a) Committee on Receipt of Materiel, which includes cannon, machine guns, aeroplanes, etc.

This committee has about completed its work as most of the materiel called for by the Armistice has been received.

(b) Committee on Rolling Stock: This committee, as its name signifies, has in charge the receipt of locomotives, cars, and automobiles which are to be turned over by the Germans. In my report of yesterday I gave the figures showing how this work is progressing. It seems probable that full deliveries will not be completed before the end of February.

(c) Prisoners of War: This committee has about completed its labors, as practically all prisoners of war, except the Russians and a few Serbians, Rumanians, and Greeks have been repatriated. A personal letter from General Harries states that he is now engaged in repatriating the Serbians, Rumanians, and Greeks, and that this will probably be completed in a week or ten days.

(d) Return of Machinery to France and Belgium: This committee has charge of the work of collecting information as to machinery to be returned, and the collecting, shipping and inspecting of this machinery.

(e) Committee on Agricultural Implements: This committee has recently taken up its work, and an agreement has been suggested and discussed covering the manner in which the agricultural implements specified in Paragraph 3 of the Treves Convention of January 16 shall be handled.

(f) Committee on Entretien, or Upkeep of Armies of Occupation: The American representative on this committee has collected all the data necessary for his use, and information concerning the upkeep of the Allied Armies has been turned over to the German representatives, although no exact figures giving totals of cost of Allied Armies have been given them.

(g) Finance Committee: This committee is engaged in arranging for carrying out the details of the finance agreement entered into at Treves on December 13.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Payment of Requisitions**

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
February 4, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant Chapin, Liaison Officer, G-4, Etat-Major, Lamorlaye

1. We are in receipt of two letters from the French through your office on the question of methods of payment for supplies requisitioned by our forces in occupied territories. The method followed so far by our Army has been that of paying such requisitions from treasury funds, later withdrawing the total amounts of these requisitions paid from the supply of marks requisitioned from the German Government.

2. The latest instructions received from D. G. C. R. A. (No. 3494/CR) are that each individual requisition be paid directly by German Government. This is in conflict with an earlier note of Dec. 28, 1918 (No. 2303/CR). Copies of these two notes are as follows:  
No. 2303/CR Allied G. H. Q., Dec. 28, 1918.

NOTE  
for Lieut. Chapin  
Chief of American Mission,  
D. G. C. R. A.

In reply to the question which you have addressed to me, I have the honor to inform you that so far military organizations have not been forbidden to make purchases in occupied territory. Such purchases must without fail be paid for in German money withdrawing the amounts necessary from the supply of marks delivered by Germany.

By order, D. G. C. R. A.

BRAULT,  
Chief of Staff.

No. 3494/CR

Allied G. H. Q., Jan. 24, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieut. Chapin, Chief of the American Mission, D. G. C. R. A.

I have the honor to advise that the representatives of the Allied Armies at the Interallied Conference on the administration of occupied territories decided unanimously at the meeting held on Jan. 21, at LAMORLAYE:

1. That all requisitions made in occupied territory for the account of the Allies should be paid directly by the German Government.
2. That the German Government should render each month a statement of expenses thus paid for these requisitions and should remit in support of this statement papers proving the supplies furnished

I beg you to be good enough to bring these instructions to the knowledge of the American High Command informing them at the same time that Marshal Foch has placed the Permanent Armistice Commission of SPA in charge of settling the question under these conditions with the German representatives.

D. G. C. R. A.

3. As the latest instruction received (No. 3494/CR) does not conform in policy outlined in the previous instruction; is not in accord with the policy pursued by the United States in the past; and is not believed to either facilitate the payment of requisitions, relieve our responsibility in this respect or reduce at all the work which would be required if the American Army assumes the responsibility of tabulating, vouchering and paying for all requisitions from lump sums advanced by the Germans, we would prefer to continue the present method.

4. The method now in vogue is decidedly simpler and quicker than it would be, were we to become involved in continuous bickering with the German authorities over their payment of numerous small requisitions.

5. While this matter has been under consideration a letter from the Commanding General, Third Army, on the general subject of expenses has been received which concurs in the viewpoint expressed above. A quotation of paragraph three of his letter follows: "The Commanding General, Third Army, urges that all outstanding obligations of the American Army of Occupation be met before the Army leaves the occupied territory, and suggests that the interest of the American Government would be best served if requisitions were paid for in cash from the Treasury of the United States, rather than have the Army evacuate the territory leaving behind outstanding vouchers or bonds."

6. Accordingly, it is desired that strong recommendations be made to General Payot to enable us to continue the present method of payment which we find works very well.

7. Kindly advise by wire as soon as some decision is reached.

GEO VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***Provisioning Poland***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 4, 1919.*

No. 65

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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2. American Food Supply for Poland:

General Barnum, in behalf of the American Section, presented the following note:

I am instructed by American General Headquarters to inform you that Colonel Grove is the direct representative of Mr. Hoover, and head of the Food Commission for the Relief of Poland, and that he is acting under Clause XVI of the Armistice Agreement. It is essential to the success of this project that the local German authorities extend a loyal and prompt cooperation and assistance to Colonel Grove in making the detailed arrangements for food supplies.

Germany will receive direct benefit in a more stable Poland,--- a buffer between Germany and Russian disorders.

For obvious reasons any opposition to this plan or failure to cooperate on the part of the German authorities, will react unfavorably when the question of food supply of Germany is taken up.

It is requested that the Chief of the German Mission transmit the contents of this note to his Government without delay.

Before the close of the session Baron von Leichner, representing the German Government, made the following remarks in regard to this note:

I have here before me the note of General Barnum and I shall not fail to send it immediately to my Government, but I allow myself to say that I am very much disappointed by the contents of the note. The American note does not touch at all the kernel of the note of January 26. We protest, first, against the fact that an American officer gave orders to a German Army corps. I am sure that the American High Command does not approve of this method of action.

The second, we ask especially that the Chairman of the American Delegation give us in writing a statement that the activity of the Polish Government would be limited exclusively to organizing the expedition of food supply to the limits of Poland, and that it abstain from any political activity, direct or indirect. The failure to give a declaration so requested by Germany could only have unpleasant results in that it would make the work of Colonel Grove more difficult, which would be contrary to the wishes of America, Germany, or Poland. Moreover, in the note of January 26 it is expressly stated in writing that we would make the entrance of the Poles dependent upon this statement. So I would like to direct a request once again to General Barnum to give us this declaration in writing.

In response to these remarks, General Barnum stated that he would make further reply to the German note at a later date.

After the session closed I spoke to Baron von Leichner in regard to this matter. He assured me that they had no fear whatever but that the American representatives would be perfectly free from mixing in political questions, but inasmuch as Colonel Grove had announced that he would employ four or five Polish representatives to assist him, they were considerably exercised as to what activity these latter might undertake when they had an opportunity to mix with the Poles of DANZIG.

He showed me a telegram that he had just received, giving the name of one of these men. He seemed to know him, considering him a political agitator.

I sent a telegram (No. 414) to G. H. Q. this morning bearing on this subject. Baron von Leichner states that the German Government would be perfectly willing to cooperate in the movement of food to Poland, but there were two things which had disturbed them. The first, being the orders which had been given by Colonel Grove to the German Army commander in DANZIG, and the second, the fear of political agitation on the part of the Polish Staff which Colonel Grove was employing.

The first of these points was covered in their letter of January 26, and was covered in my report of January 27.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section P. I. A. C.

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***Transfer of American Installations to the French***

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*February 4, 1919.*

No. 3936/CR

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant Chapin, Chief of the American Mission with the D. G. C. R. A.

Among the numerous installations belonging to the American Army it may be possible to utilize a certain number as fast as they are vacated by the American Army as shelters for the population of the devastated regions.

I have the honor to ask you to be good enough to request the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in France, if he shares this opinion and to give orders that such installations should not be torn down or destroyed before the question of their use by the homeless population is considered. The American military authorities can, whenever an installation becomes available, give notice to the civilian service (prefet or sous-prefet) and ask them if they are disposed to take it over.

I shall be obliged if you will inform me what reception the General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, gives to this suggestion and the measures which he takes pursuant thereto.

Ch. PAYOT,  
Director General of Communications and  
Supplies of the Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***Commission for Repatriation of Russian Prisoners***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 4, 1919.*

No. 65

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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7. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners:

This work which is being carried on by an Allied Commission in BERLIN is under the jurisdiction of the P. I. A. C. at SPA.

General Ewart, the British representative, was made Chairman of the Allied Commission in BERLIN, and as such, has been sending telegrams to General Haking, the British representative here. The latter has transmitted a number of these to General Nudant, the Chairman of the P. I. A. C. General Haking has directed General Ewart in the future to forward all his dispatches direct to General Nudant.

General Harries, American representative on this Commission has transmitted a few communications through this office which have been in turn forwarded to G. H. Q. However, in accordance with the foregoing, it is to be expected that most of this work will go from the Chairman of the BERLIN Commission direct to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C., and thence to Marshal Foch.

So far as is known here, this method of procedure is perfectly satisfactory. The foregoing is reported merely that G. H. Q. may understand just how the work of the Commission for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war is being handled.

There can be no doubt but what to properly care for 700,000 Russian prisoners under the complex arrangements now in force is going to be very difficult and the success of the plan seems extremely doubtful. Certainly, every effort should be put forth that is possible to produce a working machine with the least possible delay. Most recommendations as to action to be taken must naturally come from General Harries. To this end the request from him for personnel to administer twenty of these camps should be given urgent attention.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

### ***Repatriation of German Prisoners***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 5, 1919.*

No. 66

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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#### 3. Return of German Prisoners of War:

General von Hammerstein made an effort to secure the consideration of the return of prisoners of war by stating that there had arrived from BERLIN two German gentlemen who belong to a society that is not of a political nature, but is supported by the Government. This society is a popular league for the support of civil and military persons who are Germans. It already has a membership of about ten million. General von Hammerstein requested General Nudant to give his approval to these gentlemen attending a meeting of the

Committee on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War. He proposed that a meeting of that committee be held at four o'clock this afternoon for this purpose.

General Nudant replied that he did not understand what these gentlemen desired. To which General von Hammerstein replied:

These gentlemen wish to present the position of the German people in the hope that it will assist the repatriation of German prisoners of war.

To which General Nudant replied:

The Committee for Prisoners of War has neither the power to receive nor to express an opinion on this subject. A committee is an organ for study, preparation, and execution. Consequently, I see neither the possibility nor the utility in bringing these gentlemen in contact with the Committee. If these gentlemen have desires to express, it seems to me that the way is open through the German Armistice Commission. However, I do not admit that they come in contact with the Committee on Prisoners of War. This would result in a confusion of powers and qualification which cannot be admitted here. I am naturally ready to receive any communications which you wish to make to me. General von Hammerstein replied:

I regret very much the statement of General Nudant. These gentlemen wish to bring to the knowledge of the members of the Allied Commission the importance that the repatriation of the German prisoners of war has for the German people who take an enormous interest in it. The purpose of their visit is one entirely of giving information.

General Nudant added that:

German desires have very frequently been communicated. The question is very well known. I frequently have had occasion to make communications in this matter. I have made clear the point of view of the Allies to the German Armistice Commission. This point of view is not changed. The question of repatriation of German prisoners relates to the Treaty of Peace, and will be settled by the Treaty of Peace.

General von Hammerstein replied:

General Nudant emphasizes merely the point of view of right. We are in hopes that the point of view of humanity will be met with cordially by the Allied members.

The discussion was closed by General Nudant with the following remark:

I cannot make reply in view of the fact that I am not concerned in the question. I repeat, however, that I am ready to transmit a new request on the part of the Allies if you are so inclined to make it.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Return of Industrial Machinery**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 5, 1919.*

No. 66

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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6. Return of French and Belgian Machinery:

This committee on the return of machinery taken from France and Belgium considers that it has completed its work. The French and Belgian delegates on this committee are leaving SPA with a view to organizing the bureau at FRANKFORT which is to handle the details of this work. It is probable that there will be no more meetings of this committee.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Provisioning Poland**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 5, 1919.*

No. 66

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Food for Poland:

Following the meeting the undersigned had a conversation with Baron von Loersner, stating to him that I had requested my Government to make further reply to his note of January 26, in regard to sending food to Poland. I hold him that I was certain that

Colonel Grove in charge of this work would use every precaution to see that those Poles whom he employed did not engage in political agitation.

He then showed me a telegram which he had just received calling attention to the difficulty of supplying coal for this purpose. In this telegram the German Government requested that one of three methods be employed:

- (1) That the blockade be raised at DANZIG and that coal be sent from England.
- (2) That coal be sent to DANZIG from the WESTPHALIAN coal mines.
- (3) That coal be sent to DANZIG from the SILESIAN mines.

In regard to the latter he considered it very doubtful if trains carrying coal would be allowed to pass through POSEN as the unrest there is very great. In regard to the second proposition he doubted very much if coal could be sent from WESTPHALIA as the Government is unable to control the output of these mines on account of the very great unrest among the miners there. He therefore strongly urged that the first of these methods be adopted.

I told him that that was a matter which would have to be arranged by Colonel Grove, if necessary acting through Mr. Hoover, of the American Food Commission.

It seems certain that Colonel Grove must be in telegraphic communication with Mr. Hoover, and that the latter can readily communicate with representatives of all Governments. It, therefore, seems as though it would delay these matters to attempt to handle them through the Armistice Commission. Of course, any questions of this nature which the Germans present will be transmitted in order that it may reach the proper authorities.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***General von Hammerstein Succeeds General von Winterfeldt***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 5, 1919.*

No. 66

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. The opening:

This morning General von Winterfeldt appeared with his successor, General Freiherr von Hammerstein. The latter was formally presented to the Chiefs of the Allied Sections, and when the morning session of the Commission began he took his place as the Chairman of the German Mission.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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**Committee Work**

Section 4, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
February 5, 1919.

[Extract]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Hayes, G-4, Representative, Advance G. H. Q.

\*\*\* it is requested that you \*\*\* furnish this office, as soon as practicable, with a complete list of the personnel of each such committee so created, which is at present operating and functioning in occupied territory together with proper designations and, if possible, information as to just where their sessions are held.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

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1st Ind.

Representative A. C. of S., G-4 (G. H. Q.) Advance G. H. Q., Feb. 6, 1919

To A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.

1. The following boards of commissions [all lists of personnel omitted], other than those under the jurisdiction of the Permanent International Armistice Commission, are functioning in relation to conditions growing out of the Armistice:

THIRD ARMY

(a) U. S. RECEIVING COMMISSION.  (Headquarters, COBLENZ)	Appointed by C. G., Third Army pursuant to telegraphic instructions from G. H. Q., Dec. 21, for the purpose of receiving materiel from the German Delivering Commission. This commission is sometimes referred to as the Board for the Reception of Armistice Materiel.
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(b) ENEMY WAR MATERIALS BOARD.  (Headquarters, COBLENZ)	Appointed by the C. G., Third Army, pursuant to letter from the C-in-C., dated Jan. 11, 1919, for the purpose of recommending disposition of all enemy war materials turned over or abandoned, not covered by the Armistice Agreement.
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(c) Working under the Third Army Enemy War Materials Board, is a subcommittee for the carrying on of its work in the Advance G. H. Q. area *** (Headquarters, TREVES)	
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SECOND ARMY

- (d) ENEMY WAR MATERIALS BOARD. Appointed by the C. G., Second Army, pursuant to letter from the C-in-C., dated Jan. 11, 1919, for the purpose of recommending disposition of all enemy war materials turned over or abandoned, not covered by the Armistice Agreement.
- (Headquarters, TOUL)

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(e) There is also functioning in the area of the Second Army an ordnance detachment commanded by Col. J. C. Nicholls, which under the supervision of the Chief Ordnance Officer, Second Army, is inspecting all enemy ordnance material in the area of the Second Army, for the purpose of determining its acceptability under the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

The present headquarters of this detachment are at JARNY, France.

(f) In addition to the above there is, of course, the Interallied Railway Commission, on which Col. J. C. Elliot is the American representative, which operates independently of this office and has for its function the determination of policy of the management of the railways in the occupied Rhine Lands [territories] and the waterways of the MOSELLE and RHINE.

The office of this commission is at TREVES.

CASEY HAYES,  
Lt. Col., F. A.,  
Representative A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q.,  
Advance G. H. Q.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216:

**Censorship**

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 405/G PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, February 5, 1919.*

General Nudant to the President of the German Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies states February 2, No. 616, in regard to measures taken for organizing the censorship of books, tracts, pamphlets, etc.:

1. "In accord with the measures taken by the Interallied Conference in PARIS, January 21, it has been decided that the bringing in of pamphlets, tracts, books, newspapers and periodicals other than those authorized by the Armies of the Allies will be permitted under the following conditions:
2. "Five copies of each of the publications which it is requested to bring in should be sent to the Interallied Censorship Control at LUXEMBURG (Censorship Section).\*

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\* Note [in pencil]: This Par. 2 was not agreed to at the Conference in question and the appointment of an Interallied Censorship Council was specifically repudiated there. In view of the terms of Par. 1, which allows Commanders of Army of Occupation all necessary liberty this is really immaterial, but shows French method of doing business.

3. "Works actually being used in the different kinds of instructions may be introduced without previous authorization. New editions should be submitted for censorship. However, if the use of certain books or manuals is considered as threatening the security of the Army or as wanting in respect to their Governments, these publications may be forbidden and the books confiscated."

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***Armistice Prolongation***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, Belgium, February 6, 1919.*

No. 67

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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3. Extension of Armistice:

General von Hammerstein presented the following notes for the purpose of determining what action is to be taken in regard to the extension of the Armistice:

According to Par. 1 of the Agreement of 16/1/19 'the prolongation of the Armistice will be extended, subject to the consent of the Allies, to the conclusion of the peace preliminaries.'

I request a definite statement as to whether this can be depended upon. If not, it is requested that the beginning of the renewed negotiations start not later than February 12, as it is in the interest of both sides, that sufficient time be at our disposal for the necessary conferences. In addition, account must be taken of the fact that during the sittings of the National Assembly at WEIMAR, it will take a lot more time to get answers from the German Government than if all the Government authorities were in BERLIN.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.  
Acting Chief, American Section.

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**Report on Luxemburg From Advance G. H. Q.**

February 6, 1919.

Memorandum for A. C. of S. G-3

[Extract]

Following extract of daily report from Advance General Headquarters (dated February 5, 1919) is referred to you for report:

5. Luxemburg: Information has been received from the VI Corps that the French 109th Regiment ordered to leave LUXEMBURG on February 6, is now to be replaced by another French regiment on the same date. It had previously been announced to the public of LUXEMBURG, and also through the Liaison Officer sent to advance G. H. Q. (reported in daily letter of February 3), that all French troops would be withdrawn from the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg except the necessary guard and personnel connected with Marshal Foch's Headquarters.

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LeROY ELTINGE,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 15: Memorandum

**Russian Prisoner of War Camps**

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
February 6, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR A. C. of S., G-4

1. Instructions have been issued to assemble at the regional replacement depot at TOUL 20 detachments, each detachment to consist of 4 officers and 25 enlisted men, for duty at the Russian prisoner of war camps in Germany. 10 of these detachments are to be forwarded from TOUL to COBLENZ, and from that point to designated locations in Germany. The other 10 detachments are to be held at the regional replacement depot at TOUL until further orders.

2. Upon arrival at COBLENZ, each detachment is to be supplied with rations for a period of 30 days.

3. It is requested that necessary action be taken to expedite this movement in every possible way.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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**Payment of German Sanitary Personnel**

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
February 6, 1919.

From: C-in-C., G-1

To: American Representative, Permanent International Armistice  
Commission, SPA, Belgium

1. Upon receipt of your Telegram No. 417, the following was sent to the C. G.,  
Third Army:

Number 5505 G-1. It is the opinion of the Armistice Commission that  
sanitary personnel left behind by the Germans after November 11 should be  
paid in accordance with GENEVA Convention. You are authorized to pay this  
personnel accordingly. This applies only to Army personnel and not members  
of volunteer aid societies.

2. None of the sanitary personnel left behind by the Germans in their withdrawal,  
and who have already been repatriated were paid by the American Army. It is too late for  
this to be done, but in view of the fact that all expenses of the Army of occupation are  
to be borne by the German Government, this resolves itself into a question of accounting  
only.

3. Will you please acquaint the German delegates with the situation outlined above.

By order of the C-in-C.:

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

**Raw Materials for Agricultural Implements**

No. 67

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
Spa, Belgium, February 6, 1919.

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Manufacture of Agricultural Machinery:

In regard to the manufacture of agricultural machinery, Marshal Foch States:

(1) Raw material and manufactured goods necessary for the construction

of agricultural machinery may be sent from the left bank to the right bank of the RHINE.

(2) SAAR coal, the necessity of which has not been approved, should be taken from the quantity delivered in accord with the protocol of LUXEMBURG of December 25.

(3) The bringing into Germany from the left bank of the RHINE of raw materials and manufactured goods is authorized on requests addressed to the Interallied Economic Committee, in LUXEMBURG.

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7. Progress made by Finance Committee: The Committee having in hand the carrying out of the details of the Finance Agreement of TREVES, December 13, has been having frequent meetings, as reported by me on January 31, Secret 61, Par. 7.

There was serious disagreement in regard to the interpretation to be placed upon Article IV of this agreement. The Allies, with the French largely in the lead, finally decided not to propose further consideration of this Article, and so recommended to Marshal Foch, who has now directed them to drop further consideration of it for the present, the intention being to provide in the next extension of the Armistice the exact conditions which they will require the Germans to carry out. The latter seem to have become aware of the proposed plan of action and are now desirous of discussing Paragraph 4, but under present instructions from Marshal Foch this will not be done.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

***Delivery of Rolling Stock***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa. Belgium, February 6, 1919.*

No. 67

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

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5. Receipt of Rolling Stock:

The Committee on Transportation reports as follows in regard to rolling stock that has been received to date:

Locomotives	3,861
Cars	118,698

For ALSACE and LORRAINE:

Cars 11,213

From the foregoing it will be seen that the rolling stock is not coming in very fast. However, I have been informed that it is coming to a point where it is impossible to secure crews for locomotives, and consequently the speed with which the remaining locomotives are being turned over is not a matter of great importance.

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MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

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Third Army: Gen. File 100: Fldr. 20: Telegram

***Funds Furnished by German Government***

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*February 6, 1919--14:35 h.*

To Commanding General, Third Army COBLENZ, Germany

Number 430. German Mission states thirty million marks requested have been deposited in Reichbank in COBLENZ.

BARNUM.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 107: Memorandum

***Cost of Maintaining Army of Occupation***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,  
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,  
*Spa, February 6, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM: A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q., American E. F.

1. Enclosed are:

A statement of cost to United States of maintaining Army of Occupation in Germany.

This statement is under two heads:

1st. Composition and strength of the Army of Occupation.

2d. Cost of maintenance.

(a) Statement showing the daily average unit cost to the United States of maintenance of Army of Occupation in Germany.

(b) Daily average cost for maintenance of 1,000 men---By department.

(c) Items which cannot be computed as above.

2. Attention is invited to the method of computing the strength of the Army of Occupation, which is to consider each organization as having with it its maximum Table of Organization strength, but not to consider any organization which though normally constituting Army or corps troops, is not represented with the Army of Occupation. The strength figures for these calculations were furnished by the G-1 Section, Third Army, and show a grand total of 287,975 officers, field clerks, nurses and enlisted men. The cost per officer, per field clerk, per nurse, per enlisted man and per horse as shown on the attached statement, is practically the statement of the Q. M. costs with medical cost of maintenance and horse equipment, etc., furnished by the Ordnance Department, included. This statement taken together with the statement of daily average unit cost per 1,000 will give a correct per capita basis which when multiplied by the grand total as determined, will give the daily cost per officer, field clerk, nurse, man, and horse, which is to be paid by the Germans.

3. The Commission was unanimous in considering the maximum Table of Organization strength of the organizations represented at present with the Army of Occupation, as the proper basis. In the occupation of France by the Germans in 1871 they adopted a flat number for the Army and that number was paid for regardless of whether that number was actually present for duty or not. Then too, any question of averages was thought to entail a great deal of unnecessary trouble and leave subject to argument certain things which should be so far as possible made definite and final at the start.

4. There is also enclosed a note, dated SPA, February 5, 1919, submitted by the Chairman of the German Subcommittee, calling attention to the German interpretation of the work maintenance and quoting in support of his contention articles of The Hague Convention and of the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Peace, etc.

5. Marshal Foch has summoned General Ronneaux, President of the Commission, to PARIS for a conference and has asked him to bring with him tabulations showing the daily costs of each army and the strength upon which these calculations is to be based. Until his return therefore the Commission will have practically nothing to do.

6. If it is intended that I be overruled in the matter of fixing the strength of our Army, I would like to ask that I be notified of such intention immediately in order that adjustment may be made and the remaining members of the Commission notified before a bill is submitted to the Germans. If my action in this respect is approved it might be well to have brought to the attention of every other representative on any other committee which might be called upon to furnish figures to the Germans, that the method adopted by this Subcommittee would prevail

7. It might be interesting to know that the British Government has held that the financial questions growing out of the IX Clause of the Armistice are not subjects for military action, and they have asked to be notified ten days in advance of the date of the meeting at which this phase of the question be discussed, in order that Treasury representatives may be present. In this connection, if the recommendation of Colonel Gasser for the establishment of a board of officers to consider rules and regulations for handling the money to be derived from the application of this article is not approved, I should like to be advised of that fact and would then ask that an arrangement be made whereby I could consult further with our own Treasury authorities in anticipation of the meeting which will take place with the British representatives.

JOHN A. CATCHINS,  
Major, General Staff,  
American Member, Subcommittee of  
Administrative and Financial Questions  
under Article IX of  
Armistice Agreement.

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