

Army Forts, Camps, and Cantonments: Where Adapting to Peace, Preparing for War, And  
Responding to Crisis Meet.

Adapting to Peace. Preparing for War. Responding to Crisis. These three phrases separated by a period rather than by a semicolon represent large and significant tasks that historically our Army undertakes between wars. Each task is worthy of independent historical inquiry. Since the last century our first task, “adapting to peace,” was almost always synonymous with “draw down” or “reduction in force”. Our Army did those things after the Great War, the Second World War, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, the Cold War, and it is currently drawing down again in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan this time to its lowest strength since the Second World War mobilization. The lesson learned from those draw down experiences has always been the same: too much, too fast. The second task of “preparing for war” between those same conflicts was an event most often characterized by utilizing the equipment and depending on the doctrine from the previous war, “we are always preparing for the last war,” as the cliché goes. The only notable exception to the sad refrain about preparing for the last war might be our preparation for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It might be asked of that experience, however, if we were really that smart, or was Saddam Hussain really that dumb: my preference is for the former, but a case could be made for the latter. The third task “Responding to Crisis” short of a hot war was primarily a characteristic of the 1990s. Deployments in those years became prolific enough to inspire a doctrine that we called MOOTWA, Military Operations Other than War.<sup>1</sup> In the 1990s we became a power projection Army capable of executing expeditionary operations in response to a full spectrum of operations less than war

from peace keeping, peace enforcement, stability operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and assistance to other Federal Agencies.<sup>2</sup>

When these three phases are linked together by semicolons and then separated from the interrogatory, “An Unworkable Triad?” by a colon, the new sentence now suggests, and properly so given today’s security environment, that we consider the three tasks as almost simultaneous and interwoven. Is it possible then, or ‘workable’, as our symposium topic suggests, to do so? As historians can we provide some relevant precedents to help our commanders think this one through?

A useful Department of Defense model for exploring our topic is DOTES. The rarely used acronym stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training & Education, Equipment, and Support & Facilities. The first four categories provide rich material for the military historian. Topics such as Air Land Battle Doctrine, PENTOMIC Organization, the development of the National Training Centers, and certainly the equipment modernization program featuring the M-1 Abrams, M-2 Bradley, and the AH-64 Apache, are exquisitely rich historical examples loaded with lessons learned upon which we could profitably expand--and will do so in this symposium, I am sure. Last in this useful acronym is the lowly Support & Facilities, the wall flower of DOTES to whom I will give my attention in this brief presentation.

Facilities is a broad term. I intend to limit its meaning in this presentation to Army forts, camps, and cantonments. It is at these facilities where our Army traditionally has mobilized, trained, deployed, and returned to for demobilization. Since World War One our Army has repeated the cycle of adapt, prepare, respond between every major conflict, or to consider it on a time line, we repeated the cycle every five to twenty years between April 1917 and the present. Spread over time we can see the events within the cycle unfolded sequentially, manageably, and

can be analyzed as separate events. In our current environment, however, these tasks of adapt, prepare, and respond are compressed tightly in time: even to the point of overlapping at times.

The nature and functionality of our facilities at any given time does reflect the purpose of our Army, the nature of the relationship between our Army and the citizens of our nation, and even reveals much about the sociology within our Army. An examination of these factors about our facilities does provide a useful historical perspective. This perspective may help to answer the question of how or how not the triad of adapting to Peace; Preparing for War: Responding to Crisis, might be workable. Inclusive of the mobilization for World War One there have been seven cycles of adapt, prepare, and respond. These were:

World War One (1917-1918)

World War Two (1941-1945)

Cold War/Korea (1948-1964)

Vietnam (1965-1972)

VOLAR/Army of Excellence (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) (1973-1990)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWA) (1991-2001)

Post 9/11 GWOT (2001-present)

#### World War One:

The War Department and the Army did not stumble blindly into the mobilization for World War One. The concentration of the Regular Army and the integration of the Militia and the US Volunteer units with the Regulars for the Spanish-American War provided a model for the use of cantonments for the purpose of rapid expansion the force. The manpower/recruitment

shortages lessons learned of 1911-1916 from the actions along the Mexican border and the Punitive Expedition also provided important insights about the need for conscription and the necessity of balancing military manpower requirements with those needed to support the industrial workforce.

The personnel strength of the Regular Army in April 1917 was 133,111 officers and enlisted men. 80,446 National Guardsmen were in Federal Service for a total strength of 213,227. By Armistice Day 18 months later, the personnel strength was slightly over 3.6 million. In April 1917 existing Army camps, posts, and stations provided housing for 124,000. Before the Army could even begin to undertake a massive mobilization it would need to organize and construct shelter for 1.5 million men.

In a feat of construction management, the Cantonment Division of the Quartermaster General was ready to accommodate 1.5 million men in less than 6 months. A report to the Secretary of War was that the cantonments were at all times prepared to receive the conscripted soldiers faster than the Army could assimilate them.<sup>3</sup> This massive expansion was undertaken by a recruiting effort to fill out the Regular Army and a massive Selective Service effort to conscript men into the National Guard and National Army Divisions. 16 tent camps, mostly located in the south and southeast, were constructed for the National Guard Divisions. 16 wooden cantonments, spread throughout other regions were constructed for the National Army Divisions. Average cost per tent camp was 4.5 million dollars, and a cost of 12.5 million dollars for a wooden cantonment.

The camps and cantonments were extremely austere, functional, and temporary. Even something as simple as a request to paint the cantonments was rejected as not necessary by the Secretary of War. The nation was mobilized for a great moral crusade to “make the world safe

for democracy”, and Army was to “fight the war to end all wars.” The purpose of the camps and cantonments was to mobilize the conscripts, organize them into a unit, equip them, give them initial basic training, and then ship them off to the Theater of War for advanced training and commitment in the line. The austerity of the camps was accentuated by the harsh winter on 1917-18. Crowded conditions in tents and barracks, bad weather, coal heat, communal pit latrines, and austere mess halls contributed to the spread of diseases and misery that would not be forgotten 20 years later as the World War Two mobilization took place. As the first units shipped, newly forming units could take over. 80 Divisions were planned for: 43 Divisions were eventually sent overseas. As a last note about the World War One experience, there was no standing Army within the United States except for the brief mobilization before departure and the brief period between redeployment and demobilization. And the demobilization, adapting to peace, was swift and to the bone.



*Camp Wheeler, Georgia, 1917, US Army Photo.*

World War Two:

It was almost 22 years to the day when “the war to end all wars” ended and when Europe went back to war on 3 September 1939. The state of unpreparedness of the US Army does not need to be restated here. An important part of that story, however, is about the facilities that were constructed to house a rapidly expanding and modernizing Army.

The crux of the problem with an expansion and facilities plan in 1939 was that the whole mobilization process was dependent on the declaration of an M-Day (Mobilization Day): a declaration that would unleash the whole of the national resources for the effort and clearly mark the end of peace and the beginning of war. In the absence of a cataclysmic event that would justify such a declaration there were no plans for incremental steps. Nonetheless, the world situation continued to deteriorate, dangerously so, and a battle between those who were for preparedness and those who were for neutrality brewed. The M-Day plans on the shelf for facilities to support expansion were remarkably like those for World War One: the same type of austere and temporary camps and cantonments for rapid organizing of units and shipping them overseas for final training and commitment to combat.<sup>4</sup>

When the Phony War ended with the dramatic fall of France in June 1940 a period of incremental mobilization began. This was an ad hoc series of compromises of preparedness steps that were prudent in a world becoming more dangerous, but also politically tolerable in the face of a growing neutrality movement. These steps were significantly less than an M-Day mobilization. This period of incremental mobilization lasted for 18 months and was ended by the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7 1941, a cataclysmic event that proved worthy of a M-Day declaration.

The Fall of France caused President Roosevelt and preparedness advocates in Congress to take the first of the incremental mobilization steps. The President issued a “limited state of

emergency”, an Executive order that authorized an increase of 17,000 in the Regular Army and increased the National Guard strength by 100,000. He also asked Congress for funds to federalize the National Guard, 440,000 soldiers in all. Preparedness and neutrality advocates negotiated in Congress with a result that funds were allocated for federalization, but only for a one year, only for training, and with a prohibition that the National Guard could not be deployed outside the western hemisphere. Preparedness advocates in Congress were also successful in negotiating passage of the Selective Service Act, that same August 1940. This Act was profound because it authorized first large standing peacetime Army in our history. 400,000 were to be called up immediately, with another 700,000 within the year. Neutrality advocates leveraged this bill also and added the proviso that these citizen-army draftees could not be deployed outside the western hemisphere either, and most significantly for the facilities story, Congress spelled out specifics for the standards of the facilities these soldiers would occupy. Memories of the World War One camps were still fresh in the minds of fathers who did not wish the same for their sons. The new draftee Army would not live in the “tents and mess hall” environment of the World War One Army. “...Snug barracks, indoor toilets, showers, heating, insulation, and electric lights,” would be built and ready before the first of these new soldiers arrived.<sup>5</sup>


The issue of comfort for the soldiers of the citizen army was from the beginning of incremental mobilization an uncompromising public concern, but it rose to the level of presidential politics in the election of 1940. The Republican candidate, Wendell Willkie, made a campaign accusation that the camps would not be adequate or even ready for the troops as they came into service, to which President Roosevelt responded and promised, “I can give assurance to the mothers and fathers of America that each and every one of their boys in training will be well housed.” The president’s wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, served as co-chair of the influential

Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense (NDAC). The council addressed the aesthetic and moral aspects of the camp construction. It was by her influence that the new wood construction would be painted and not left bare; that chapels would not be merely utilitarian rectangles but would have a steeple and a church-like appearance reminiscent of home; and that wherever possible, the layout of the camp would have curved roads—curvilinear design, as it was called—to break the stark appearance of regimentation. The size and scope of these giant city-camps of 1941 were a far cry indeed from the austere “tent cities” envisioned by the 1939 PMP. In conveniences, functions and even in some ways in appearance, these camps were, in fact, small cities unto themselves, often even dwarfing neighboring civilian cities. In his Annual Report of 1941, Secretary of War Henry Stimson summed the accomplishment:

*A program of construction involving the construction of over 40 veritable cities qualified to receive a minimum of 10,000 to a maximum of 60,000 inhabitants and entertaining all the necessary utilities and conveniences including recreation buildings, theaters, service clubs, chapels, athletic areas, hospitals, bakeries, laundries and cold storage plants, was carried through on time and with a minimum of hardship on the troops.<sup>6</sup>*

By June 1941, the initial manpower goals of incremental mobilization were being met. A total of 1.6 million men had been drafted, mobilized and housed. Those favoring preparedness had pushed the country about as far as was politically possible. There came a significant political pushback from those who favored a policy of strict neutrality. Powerful and vocal organizations such as the America First movement and a very visible opposition to ROTC departments on college campuses highlighted the strength of popular discontent. Money became tighter. Although construction momentum came to an end about June 1941, planning now had to be done on a very constricted budget. Many in the Army saw an inevitable wartime personnel expansion of up to 8 million men and more city-camps to come. Though funds for construction and toleration for continued preparations had come to a trickle by June 1941, a great momentum of

experience and knowledge—military and civilian contractor alike—was prepared to surge forward if and when circumstances demanded.



*Six buildings completed the company group group—three barracks, a mess hall, a storehouse and a recreation building. Six company units are placed together to form a regiment group which include (in addition to the company buildings) headquarters administration buildings, infirmary, chapel, barracks for the headquarters company, regimental cold storage building, truck garage and fire house. Regimental groups are separate from each other by 250-ft. open strips as a fire break.*

### The Cold War:

There were great hopes for a new international order in the immediate aftermath of the Great Crusade of World War Two. Enemies crushed, the wartime Army of 8 million had demobilized down to strength of 1.3 million men and women. The giant city camps were used for demobilization. By 1947 most looked like ghost towns. The United Nations had been established. Peace and international cooperation seemed assured. Such, however, would not be the case. Between 1945 and 1948, a new political reality took hold: an ideological confrontation between the USSR and the USA that would persist for the next seventy years. It was called, from

its earliest days, the Cold War. The used and worn giant city camps would be repurposed as the facilities to support the Cold War Army.

One of the most profound effects of the Cold War was that it caused the nation to focus on defense as the most important government and national priority. So important was this purpose to defend the country from the threat of Soviet domination that some historians refer to the change in focus of the government as the establishment of a “national security state.” The National Defense Act of 1947 established new and powerful government agencies to accomplish this new purpose. Small parts of the bigger national security state were the many repurposed World War Two city camps that would become “national defense cities.”<sup>7</sup>

The Cold War required a new type of Army. The old model relied on a small, professional Regular Army that would serve as a nucleus for expanding a giant citizen army, if required. The Soviet and Communist threat in the Cold War was ever present and required an Army that was ever ready and ever vigilant. This larger, professional, full-time Army required a large cadre of officers and NCOs, and it required a draft to keep it manned. Selective Service was reestablished in 1948 and became a fact of life for all male citizens until the advent of the all-volunteer Army in 1974. The change in sociology was that this larger, full-time Army was not about to be a bachelor Army like that of World War II. The bachelor Army gave way to a married Army. The national defense city became home, therefore, to what has sometimes been referred to as the “national defense family”: Army husband, Army wife and Army children (often called “Army brats” but not in a pejorative sense), who each had their roles to play and sacrifices to make in the larger national and Army effort. Housing, schools, healthcare, family recreation, shopping, auto care, etc., became new and essential requirements to sustain this new full-time Army family. The giant bachelor cities of World War Two required a significant

upgrade to accommodate this new, full-time and professionalizing Army and the many families that were to become part of the new national defense cities.

As with the World War II Series 800 Plan of 1942, the Army developed a standard construction plan for the new and modern permanent troop barracks in 1949. The standard building plan was a three-story brick structure designed to provide orderly rooms, offices and day rooms on the first floor; house 225 soldiers on the second and third floors; and provide a company arms room and supply room in the basement level. Each had an attached company mess hall. The old six-building requirement for a company-size unit area in the Series 800 plan was reduced to one all-inclusive, permanent building in the new plan. The building looked like a hammer when seen from above, with the three stories of offices and living space making the appearance of the long handle of the hammer and the one-story mess hall perpendicular to the main building looking proportionally like the hammerhead. The proper name was Permanent Troop Housing and Supporting Facility; the nickname was hammerhead. The first construction of this design for the Army was at Fort Campbell. Construction began in June 1951.



New permanent cinder block construction troop housing nicknamed “hammerheads” for the hammer-like appearance as seen from above. The three-story troop building represented the handle, and the one-story mess hall on the end represented the hammer.

Installations struggled to build a sufficient stockpile of new troop housing to replace the Series 700/800 stockpile. Although most soldiers lived in the new troop buildings, there never seemed to be a sufficient amount of office, administrative, and storage space. A great reliance was placed on the old stock and much of it was repurposed. Though it is disappearing rapidly, some of it is still visible on our installations even today.

The need to provide family housing was immediate and acute. The truth of the matter was that after ten years of the Great Depression (1930–40) and four years of world war (1941–45), the entire nation faced a housing crisis. Young men and women who had faced the deprivation and separation of the war years were more than ready for what was to become the baby boom of the 1950s. The nation was in a scramble to solve the housing shortage, and so were the armed forces. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson recognized the magnitude of the problem as it

applied to attracting young men and women to the armed forces and defined it as a matter of national security:

*Rather than be separated from their families because of lack of Government quarters and scarcity of rental housing at their places of assignment, many of the service personnel have accepted disgraceful living conditions in shacks, trailer camps and overcrowded buildings, many at extortionate rents. It cannot be expected that competent individuals will long endure such conditions...There is nothing more vital or pressing in the interest of morale and the security of America than proper housing for our Armed Forces.<sup>8</sup>*



The first family government housing on post after World War II. Series 800 converted into four-plex apartments. The nickname for this temporary housing area was "Splinter Village."

Initially, much of the Series 700/800 stock was converted in four-plexus to provide a temporary solution. The longer view challenge of providing family housing was how to finance new construction and maintenance. Neither Congress nor the president was forthcoming with appropriated funds for solving the family housing crisis. It was too expensive a line item to add to the Defense Department budget. If not by an outright appropriation, then the solution was to attract private sector developers to finance, build, maintain and operate affordable rental housing on or near military installations. The scheme depended on private companies investing a large

amount of money in building a subdivision and then making their return and profit in the form of rents collected over time. Legislation to privatize this effort was sponsored first by Senator Kenneth Wherry, then by Senator Homer Capehart. The privatization program remained in effect until 1965. The Army took over the housing construction program until it was recently replaced by the current Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) programs of the early 2000s.



Junior enlisted Wherry Housing, 1956

### Vietnam:

There were many changes wrought to our nation, our culture and our Army by the turbulence of the Vietnam years. The decade from 1965 to 1975 is remembered as a time of cultural and sexual revolution, of civic and racial unrest and for the rise of an antiwar protest movement that often turned violent. The stress and strains and the debilitation to the Army and to Army families would take nearly a generation to heal.

The effect of the war effort and priorities had a negative effect on facilities Army wide, and an even deeper effect on installations that had been the home to divisions that had now

deployed to Vietnam. Army wide, the diversion of funds to fight the war meant less for continued efforts to upgrade facilities. Housing in particular languished. Where a greater effect was felt was on those installations that had been home to the divisions that had deployed to Vietnam.

When a division, brigade, or other unit left for Vietnam it completely cut ties with its home installation. There was no such thing as a stay-behind detachment or logistic sustainment. So complete was the severing of units from their former home stations that even the families of deployed soldiers were no longer authorized quarters.<sup>9</sup> Many of these installations were repurposed to the training base and housed basic training centers. In many cases great expense was taken to refurbish Series 700\800 barracks for basic training housing. Ranges and training facilities appropriate to basic training had to be built. Installations that had been the home town to stable Army families and soldiers attached to a historic division became utilitarian training centers for an unpopular war to large numbers of single, transient males.

The development of Army facilities to better support a professional Army stagnated during the Vietnam decade. Funds that would have addressed housing and family support needs were diverted during the course of the war. A returning Army came home to dilapidated facilities. Soldier housing, designed for the basic training experience, was inadequate. Ranges and training facilities built to support basic training would prove to be inadequate for the sophisticated rebuilding that the next generation Army would demand.

#### The All-Volunteer Army (VOLAR) and the Army of Excellence (AOE)

The nation recovered from the “crisis of confidence” brought about by the “distraction of the Vietnam decade,” and so, too, did the armed forces. In the case of the Army, its road to

recovery was guided by a remarkable group of senior leaders who developed an intellectual framework for reform called the Army of Excellence (AOE). Briefly, the AOE required the Army to change its fundamental character from that of a mass conscription citizens army of the World War II, Korea and Vietnam eras to a smaller Army made of volunteer, high-quality and long-serving professionals. High-technology weapons and command systems, professional education and sound doctrinal development were certainly part of the AOE transformation, but at the core of the ability to use high-tech equipment and to execute complex doctrine with great agility was the personnel component of quality soldiers and exceptional leaders.<sup>10</sup> Providing appropriate troop housing for unmarried enlisted soldiers of the emerging all-volunteer Army was a top priority also. Open-bay housing was appropriate for a conscripted Army but not for an all-volunteer Army. A first solution was the modification of existing hammerhead and temporary barracks housing to provide for four-man rooms for enlisted and private rooms with baths for NCOs living in the barracks. Soldiers were given greater autonomy to exercise their own taste in decorating and arranging their more private quarters. Young soldiers tended toward the fashionable trends of the day. Volcano lamps, black lights, pop icon posters and beads predominated. The news media delighted in highlighting the new all-volunteer Army as a kind of adjunct to the youth culture. Media attention gave the impression that the VOLAR program was nothing more than a misplaced acquiescence to the youth culture. It was a mistaken impression, and in time, the novelty wore off.<sup>11</sup>



VOLAR Soldiers Room, 1974

The validation of the VOLAR/AOE initiatives was the great victory in Operation Desert Storm. It was an amazing feat. It was all the more amazing because it was done on most installations with a deployment infrastructure that was essentially unimproved since the 1950s. Hundreds of vehicles and rolling stock were loaded on flat cars from concrete ramps that could accommodate no more than five train cars at a time. Diesel generators provided power for lights at night. Soldiers were fed from Vietnam-era marmite cans under canvas tents. In the case of one division once the trains arrived at the port, the equipment was transferred to ten reserve fleet Navy cargo ships that were so old that one of them, the *American Eagle*, had transported the division's equipment to Vietnam in 1967. Passenger holding areas for soldiers waiting air transport, staging yards for ISO container upload to flatbed commercial trucks, and facilities to support self-deployment of helicopters to ports of embarkation were antiquated and required updating. These upgrades would be essential as once again, the Army was to start a new transition that would be dependent on rapid and modern deployability.

## The 1990s and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWA)

In the background of the immediate concern of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the ongoing and then nearly complete collapse of the old Soviet Union. The Soviet military threat in Europe had been the focus of U.S. foreign policy and the threat that the AOE initiatives had worked to counter. The new international situation in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm caused a profound reassessment of the situation and moved the Army focus from reinforcing a forward deployed force in Europe to one that would be an expeditionary, power projection Army deployed from stateside installations against a variety of yet-to-be defined threats. Army doctrine writers struggled with a host of potential missions that were loosely grouped as Military Operations Other Than War, or MOOTW, pronounced *moot-wah*.

Deployments throughout the 1990s were many and varied. Most of these operations were smaller than a brigade task force and shorter than a year in duration. Many were scheduled training exercises to the National Training Center (NTC) or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). “Real World” deployments included such MOOTWA operations in the Sinai, Kosovo, the Southern Watch Area of Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Panama/Honduras. Disaster relief, counter-narcotics, border surveillance, and operations to support other domestic agencies kept the facility deployment infrastructure well-oiled and fine-tuned.

As the deployment infrastructure had been repaired, the pendulum swung back to issues effecting soldier quality of life. Housing had been a persistent challenge both for single soldiers and for Army families. Soldier barracks, unlike Family Housing, are constructed and maintained with Army dollars. The cost associated with barracks construction and maintenance competed with budget requirements for operations, readiness and training. It became apparent, however, by 1994 that priority was going to have to be given to correcting the problem of aging,

dysfunctional and inadequate soldier housing. A barracks modernization plan established a standard for soldier comfort and privacy. The standard was called 1+1. The standard was to provide for junior enlisted soldiers a module that provided for two private bedrooms with closets and a shared bathroom and service area. Junior NCOs in the grade of E5 and E6 would be authorized the entire module. The Army was successful in demonstrating the program to Congress, and in FY 2001, Congress added \$550 million to the defense budget for Quality of Life Enhancement. The program was extended through 2014. Funds continue to be provided for the modernization program.<sup>12</sup>

The answer to solving the Army family housing crisis was to be found in privatization, like that used in the 1950s. Several attempts were made in the 1980s by the Reagan administration to reinvigorate a privatization scheme, but they did not come to fruition. Fortunately, successive administrations were favorable to finding a solution. The Clinton administration program to “reinvent government” and the Bush program to outsource as many government functions as practicable better suited to the private sector kept the impetus for finding a private-sector solution alive. Privatization was a controversial idea. Those with severe reservations about turning the whole housing program over to private developers included congressmen, senior Army leaders and many garrison commanders. Several pilot programs were initiated on selected Army installations, and the results when measured by soldier and family satisfaction were more than just favorable. The program was a success. The essence of the program was to develop an installation plan for revitalized neighborhood communities as the old housing areas were renovated and the new housing areas were built. The concept that drove the neighborhood community theme was called by architects and city planners the “New Urbanism.” The concept of New Urbanism advocated for neighborhoods with diverse populations centered

on public spaces and community institutions that would be pedestrian friendly and consist of architecture and landscape that celebrated local history, climate, ecology, and practices.<sup>13</sup>



The New Urbanism, 2012

### Post 9/11 Global War On Terror

When the initial units deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom came home from in March 2004, were faced with two major projects. The first was to recover men, gear and equipment from a year of grueling combat in one of the world's harshest environments and to "reset," or make ready to do it again. The second task that all units faced was to undergo a reorganization called Army Transformation. Army Transformation was a modernization plan aiming to move the Army away from its Cold War, AOE, and divisional orientation to a newer organization structure made of modular brigade combat teams. The new structure was designed to provide for flexible, fully functional brigade combat teams of about three thousand soldiers. The concept was to enable the Army to conduct the continuous operations that the Global War on Terror was

going to demand. After 2004 a division headquarters could be deployed independent of its traditional subordinate brigades who would remain at “home station”, while a variety of “plug and play” Brigade Combat Teams” from different locations around the Army could be attached for a installations were in a state of flux. From 2004 to the present many installations faced the circumstance of half the division deployed at any one time while the other half was in a state of recovery and reset pending the next deployment already on the horizon. Brigades would return, and then other brigades would deploy. It is a stressful time for soldiers and families in which a routine of a one-year deployment is followed by a one-year recovery that is followed by the deployment cycle over again. The cycle has the familiar ring of “adapt to peace, prepare for war, respond to crisis, and in that context we ask, is it a workable triad?

### Conclusion

We have seen from this brief historical overview that there is a recurring process between wars and conflicts of adapting to peace, preparing for war, and responding to crisis. The process moved slowly and sequentially earlier in the century, but in the new circumstances of the Global War On Terror these events have been greatly compressed in time so as to become nearly simultaneous.

Using DOTES as a methodology; I have focused on the “S”. DOTES is spelled with an “S” and it stands for Support and Facilities. It is at our Facilities that we adapt, prepare, and respond. As we move towards our next transformation, whatever that might be, our facilities must be considered in the shaping of that transformation. Keeping our facilities in balance with the DOTES categories is essential if the Triad is to be workable. Keeping our facilities relevant is a matter of balance and proportion between people, place, and purpose. We expect our senior

leaders to make wise judgments in these matters. Knowing and appreciating the dynamics of the history and contribution of our facilities to accomplishing the mission can guide them as they balance priorities, make judgments and exercise their leadership concerning our facilities as we move forward.

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<sup>1</sup> The response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 and the Dominican Republic Intervention, 1965 would be notable exceptions.

<sup>2</sup> Bonn, Keith E., and Baker, Anthony, *Guide to Military Operations Other than War. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Stability and Support Operations, Domestic and International*, Also see Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. 16 June, 1995.

<sup>3</sup> Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization of the United States Army, 1775-1945*, Department of the Army Pam 20-212, June 1955, p 315

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p 574

<sup>5</sup> Kriv, Arlene, ed. *World War Two and the US Mobilization Program, A History of the 700 and 800 Series Cantonment Construction*. Legacy Management Program, Department of Defense, 1992. p 13

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, pp 34-39

<sup>7</sup> Stuart, Douglas, *Creating the National Security State: The Law that Transformed America*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 17

<sup>8</sup> "Historic Context for Capehart Wherry Housing", Abstract (accessed 2 August 2014), [achp.gov/army-capehartwherry.html](http://achp.gov/army-capehartwherry.html). Also see William C. Baldwin, "Four Housing Privatization Programs: A History of the Wherry, Capehart, Section 801 and Section 802 Housing Programs in the Army." U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, History office, 1996.

<sup>9</sup> The story of how the Army and the DOD handled family housing during Vietnam is a sad and little told tale. It is captured best by Donna Moreau, *Waiting Wives: The Story of Schilling Manor, Home Front to the Vietnam War*, New York, Atria Books, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> See Robert Scales, *Certain Victory*, United States Army in the Gulf War, 1993 and John Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army*. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, 1997

<sup>11</sup> For example, see *Life* "Bill Mauldin's Willie and Joe Look at the New Army." February 5, 1971

<sup>12</sup> "Army Barracks Master Plan Fiscal Year 2004, Office of the Chief of /staff for Installation Management, July 2004

<sup>13</sup> Matthew Godfy and Paul Sadin, "A History of the U.S. Army's Residential Communities Initiative, 1995-2010, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 2012