LTC Walter F. Kilgore
Commander
2d Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery

Interview Conducted 21 March 1991 at Logistical Base CHARLIE, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia

Interviewer: MAJ Robert B. Honec, III (116th Military History Detachment)

Oral History Interview DSIT AE 079

MAJ HONEC: This is an Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM interview. My name is MAJ Robert B. Honec of the 116th Military History Detachment. I'm here today, the 21st of March, 1991, at the south end of Log[istical] Base CHARLIE with Task Force 2-1, [the XVIII Airborne Corps] Air Defense Artillery task force.

And, for the record, sir, could you state your full name, rank, Social Security Number, unit of assignment and duty position, please?

LTC KILGORE: LTC Walter F. Kilgore, the task force commander for Task Force 2-1, Air Defense Artillery. Social Security Number, ***-**-****.

MAJ HONEC: Okay, sir, thank you. Getting into your organization, the Task Force 2-1 is a composite task force put together to answer the air defense needs for this particular operation, or operations, if you will. Could you explain for the record, please, how Task Force 2-1 was organized, the reason behind it, and go into that?

LTC KILGORE: Okay. Normally back in the CONUS [Continental United States] at Fort Bliss, [Texas], we are a HAWK [Homing-All-The-Way-Killer] -pure battalion. In order to support the task for deploying to Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, we were asked to develop a task force organization which consisted of our normal three HAWK batteries, our headquarters battery, and our ordnance company. Added to that to make up the task force was three Patriot firing batteries and a support slice to support that.

MAJ HONEC: That's perfect. Okay. Relative now, coming over, starting with deployment, how was this task force utilized in Phase I, the DESERT SHIELD portion of this operation? Would you elaborate on that, please?

LTC KILGORE: Yes. The way we developed our scenario and maneuvered out into the Operation DESERT SHIELD was we took and deployed from north to south: a Patriot fire unit up at FOB [Forward Operating Base] BASTOGNE along with two HAWK firing platoons with them; and then in the center sector, in the 24th [Infantry] Division, a Patriot battery and two HAWK firing platoons; and then down to the south a Patriot battery in the 1st Cav[alry] Division ... or 1st Cav Regiment ... or [correction,] the 1st Cav Division along with two Patriot firing platoons in that area.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Were you initially to engage aircraft only, or did you have the missile capability? And if you can elaborate which elements had missile capability for the record?

LTC KILGORE: No. By having the Patriot within the task force we were able to do a dual role; both the HAWK in an air defense, air ... to shoot down aircraft only. The Patriot were there both for tactical ballistic missile and for air-breathing threat aircraft role.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Is there ... I understand that the HAWK and the Patriot will have the capability to engage missiles--the Patriot does now. The HAWK ... did ... was only relegated to that air defense role against aircraft. Could you elaborate the reason why that was ... you know, why in this theater that was so?

LTC KILGORE: Patriot was designated primarily, as the primary role for tactical ballistic missiles [TBM] due to the SCUD missile threat from Iraq, both the ... of course, having the Patriot battalions in Riyadh and in [Ad] Dammam, and then the Task Force 2-1 out in the Corps sector providing the TBM for the primary assets, i.e., the Log Bases in 24th, Log Bases at FOB BASTOGNE, and also the DISCOM [division support command] over in 1st Cav sector.

Currently the HAWK does not have tactical ballistic missile engagement capability. There is a software upgrade and hardware that would give it that capability. But the Army has not decided as of this date whether to incorporate the TBM capability into the HAWK system.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great. During this time has any of your batteries in Phase I or Phase II, Phase III, have they engaged the SCUDs and if so, what was the kill rate on that? The Patriot batteries.

LTC KILGORE: In the Corps sector there were no TBM's fired within the Corps sector, so therefore Patriot missiles were not ... did not engage any SCUDs.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great. Okay. Now, let's move back to ... hold on for a second.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Let's go on to the ... how was deployment of the units, the structure of that for DESERT STORM, sir? Go ahead.

LTC KILGORE: Okay. The task force convoyed over 700 kilometers from the old sector under DESERT SHIELD up to DESERT STORM. Within that we took the same concept, or similar concept as far as deploying a Patriot and two HAWK platoons together. We took a HAWK and two Patriots [actually, a Patriot and two HAWK platoons] down around Rafha where the Corps Main [Command Post] was; a Patriot and two HAWK firing platoons at Log Base CHARLIE; and a Patriot and two HAWK platoons to the east, around the [24th Infantry] Division Tac[tical Command Post] and other Log Bases down to the east.

On order, when the Corps was to maneuver forward, we were initially going to take the HAWK firing batteries forward first. We had one firing battery in Iraq when the war ended.

MAJ HONEC: G+4 or 5?

LTC KILGORE: At G plus ...

MAJ HONEC: Okay. That's all right. Go ahead.

LTC KILGORE: The other two HAWK batteries were scheduled to move into there within the next 24 hours when the war ended. At that point we were going to control the HAWKs initially with a TSQ-73. The Patriots were going to stay back with the Log Bases initially, controlled with the ICC, the Information Coordination Central. At some point then we were to bring the Patriot fire units forward and start leap-frogging forward following the Corps maneuver units as they maneuvered forward. At that point EAC [echelons above corps] assets were ... Patriot and HAWK were to come out, break from KKMC [King Khalid Military City] and to guard the Log Bases at that point.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Now, was this ... as I understand it, the only elements that were deployed into Iraq was one HAWK element, a HAWK battery, rather. Is that correct, sir?

LTC KILGORE: We had two HAWK firing platoons, the equivalent of one HAWK firing battery, deployed into Iraq up into the French sector along with the command and control. One significant point I'd like to make, as far as the command and control, we deployed what we called ASIT, air-to-surface interface terminal, which interfaced with the AWACS [airborne warning and command system], both voice and data as far as command and controlling. At no time were they out there in the autonomous role.

MAJ HONEC: Great. Okay. So AWACS ... communication between AWACS and your batteries was primarily ... was a primary means of identifying threat targets, was it not, sir?

LTC KILGORE: That's correct. When the fire unit was in Iraq they communicated directly with the AWACS. The other fire units that were back and to the rear, we communicated via satellite back to KKMC where the Air Force CRC was located and they down-telled data to us as far as the tracks from the AWACS so that the fire units would not have to be radiating at any time, other than the Patriot fire units which radiated all the time in the TBM role.

MAJ HONEC: Radiation meaning radar? There was a consideration that enemy could distance ... could home in on you?

LTC KILGORE: Yes. By transmitting a radar emission, sending off radar frequencies that you would send out and receive back signals from that. In this case, the AWACS was providing the air picture for us.

MAJ HONEC: Great. Okay. Is there any other tactical considerations or any special DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD considerations that you had to plan into your operations because of the harshness of this environment, because of the obvious effects it has on the operation of all your equipment, that perhaps you could further elaborate on?

LTC KILGORE: I'd like to elaborate on several things. One, being a HAWK-pure battalion back at Fort Bliss, we were not able to interoperate with the Patriots on a large scale basis. Fortunately right before we came over here they accelerated a software bill called Post-Deployment Bill No. 3, in the Patriot control center, the Information Coordination Central, the ICC, which enabled the ICC to control both HAWK fire units and Patriot, both voice and data, and therefore make a composite task force.

Other things that had to be added to us was communications equipment. Due to the vast size and all, we had to have additional, what they call, communications relay groups added to the task force. At the very end we had six communications relay groups assigned to us because at that point we were communicating both voice and data over a 175-kilometer distance.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. As I understand it, this is an extension of the distance that's ... required this equipment in normal textbook operation, what's the maximum that you should be considering in all conditions or just desert flat conditions for communications links? Communications links ... go ahead.

LTC KILGORE: Of course, the links themselves are geared to the curvature of the earth. In the desert environment the most that you can get out of a CRG is around 40 kilometers due to the curvature of the earth. We thought we would get more over here, the terrain being flat, but that did not happen.

MAJ HONEC: Great. Okay. Is there any other changes to your basic operations that you feel that you had to have? Before we go into going through the various support elements, the transportation and that sort of nature, anything else, sir?

LTC KILGORE: No.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Very good. Let's go on then to regular ground communications. Start that off at first. Did you have enough communications out here to float program emission? At what point ... delineating between SHIELD and STORM did you always have enough telephones, enough radios, enough tactical satellite [TAC SAT] capability to accomplish your mission, or were there perhaps some changes that you can see that you need to improve your mission capability perhaps, TO&E changes, or personnel changes?

LTC KILGORE: Of course when we first came over, we had attached to us a TAC SAT satellite to communicate back to the CRC, an Air Force CRC. That was okay during periods when the task force was composite and all together. As I mentioned earlier, during DESERT STORM when we were first moving into Iraq, the plan was to take and move the HAWK fire units to the north first and leave the Patriots back, meaning that you could ... due to the vast distances, you could only use the TAC SAT in one location. So we requested and got approved an additional Tropo[spheric] asset to stay back with the Patriots, had that in place, and were going to move the tactical satellite north with the HAWKs initially, get set up there and then bring the other Patriots up at that point.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Continuing on with the communications theme, did you have mobile subscriber equipment [MSE] assets and, if so, how did they perform for you in your role?

LTC KILGORE: Okay. We did not have MSE equipment assigned to us. Since we were in the French sector we had two French liaison officers assigned to the battery up there, of which they personally did have an MSE, which we communicated with a battery, went through their switchboard.

MAJ HONEC: Ah, good. Okay. Great. Is there any other communications issues that you can think of right now that perhaps we should be ... do you have enough communications personnel? Do you have enough ... is the equipment adequate?

LTC KILGORE: Yes.

MAJ HONEC: Okay.

LTC KILGORE: Yes. Right before we came over we got plussed up as far as communications assigned to the HAWK unit and to the Patriot slice.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Moving to transportation and the trucks. Would you describe in your operation how you needed transportation to move from place to place here? Long haul transportation and I see a number of CUCVs [M-1008-series Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles] out there an some Japanese vehicles. Could you elaborate on how that helped you accomplish your mission in SHIELD and STORM? Long haul first, sir.

LTC KILGORE: In addressing the long-haul requirements, we being an air defense unit, had to rely on the area support concept as far as additional assets to move us from point A to point B. That's especially true with the HAWK missiles where the cans themselves weight 2,100 pounds apiece so you have to go to the Corps or the COSCOM [1st Support Command (Corps)] to get additional assets.

Many times it was thought that, you know, we were the equivalent of divisions and could move our own, and that's just not so. That goes right along with all of the other support that has to go with a non-divisional unit ... that you have to rely on the area support concept. Many times divisions were reluctant to give you that support because they knew they had to support their own division, so you had to really go out and dig to the Corps COSCOM units on the area support to find support of all classes. And that made it difficult at times.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Was there any particular class that you critically needed that were in short supply? In what phases were they and did they ever clear up? Class I, Class II, Class III, Class IV ... .

LTC KILGORE: In addressing what classes were short, as I discussed earlier, the way the fire units were deployed in clusters from north to south, it depended on, as far as support, on what areas that those units were in. In some units, divisions, sectors, support was very well, much provided and others it was a lot of growing pain in getting it established and getting the divisional/non-divisional atmosphere ironed out.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. All right. Who supported you in the transportation role? Was that the 7th Transportation [Battalion] up here in Log Base CHARLIE? 230th Transportation Company?

LTC KILGORE: Through the Corps MMC.

MAJ HONEC: Through the Corps MMC. Great. Okay. How about in transportation, maintenance-wise in transportation, did you have enough Class IX parts? Or did you experience any shortages?

LTC KILGORE: In addressing the question of maintenance for repair parts, of course, being a task force when we got the Patriot units attached to us, they came to us with no ASL [Authorized Stockage List], because the ASL was in Riyadh with the Patriot battalion. The three firing batteries were located back there. So we had to immediately requisition the Patriot ASL slice to support the Patriot units, otherwise, it was on a task from outside the task force to other fire units and rely primarily on their PLLs [prescribed load lists] during that. We did get that ASL in along with the transportation to support carrying it.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Any other transportation ... oh, talking about now ground transportation and the use of both military vehicles and civilian vehicles, what help to your mission accomplishment were both the vehicles you had and what sort of, if any, maintenance anomalies did you experience in operating those vehicles? I'm talking specifically about the CUCV and the Japanese-supplied commercial vehicles, sir.

LTC KILGORE: Okay. As far as the reliability of a CUCV, it was less than desirable, especially in this environment. The HMMWV [M-998-series High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle], I thought, stood up very well, especially with the rocky ground and the soft sand that we had to go over. Many times, you know, they just got stuck in the soft sand, especially your deuce and a halfs [2.5-ton trucks] where you had numerous problems with transfers, transmissions, due to the soft sand, clutches, things of that nature that were impacted by the terrain itself.

We did get supplemented with three Japanese vehicles that provided transportation. Those were a great help when making mail runs because at certain times it was 300, 400 miles distance between us and our brigade element where we had to go to various meetings or get other support. Those provided great benefit rather than having tactical vehicles on the road for that distance.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Were there any maintenance considerations with these commercial vehicles? Also, were they leased or were they an outright gift from the Japanese government? Do you know?

LTC KILGORE: We had a combination of three donated Japanese vehicles that were assigned to us on our property book, and then we had two rental vehicles that I had in my S-4 section. As far as maintenance on those, we did local purchases on filters, things of that nature, and did our own maintenance on them.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Transportation, communications. Any other issues that perhaps you can call to mind on those two issues now. When you were convoying, how did you communicate with the convoys? Was there any problems in that coming up?

LTC KILGORE: Communications during the convoys was primarily your normal FM [frequency-modulated] and, in certain cases, AM [amplitude-modulated] on long distances, which, you know, we did not have any problems with.

MAJ HONEC: [AN]/PRC-46s were used or ...

LTC KILGORE: PRC-46s, -47s.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Let's move on to the engineer support which was so important in the Log Base CHARLIE area for using the Class IV to build berms and protectives and to establish security. So could you elaborate on the engineer supports that you got and perhaps a little bit more on what units were supported and, you know, go into some detail on that?

LTC KILGORE: We initially went into the Corps with a request that berms be put around the various air defense sites both for ground defense and other protection, from bomblets and all. We were unsuccessful in that due to the vast demands on all the engineer units, building MSRs [main supply routes] and other types of support. We did get some engineer support primarily through the good-old-boy network of "Can you help us?" type things. We got better support after the publicity of the Patriots knocking down SCUDs and all. More units were readily willing to support in the good old-boy-network.

MAJ HONEC: Great. Good point, sir. Okay. Any other perhaps ... engineer or any other issues that perhaps have come up that we haven't covered that you'd like to read into the record?

LTC KILGORE: Fortunately my Patriot unit--correction--my HAWK units each had their own scoop-loader so those things were of great benefit in building berms and bunkers where we didn't have other engineer support. I cross-leveled with the Patriot units and many times those scoop-loaders were building berms for the Patriot sites.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. These scoop-loaders are a standard TO&E item, sir?

LTC KILGORE: That's correct.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Going to the maintenance, would you describe the ordnance ... the maintenance element that you had that's part of your task force and how they were divided up? I don't believe that we've talked about that. What I'm interested in is the ordnance and the regular maintenance component that you had, or ... well, okay, elaborate on the structure of your maintenance company, sir?

LTC KILGORE: Okay. Normally my ordnance company, my 34th Ordnance [Company], has all the support to support the battalion, i.e., both for the HAWK direct support, communications repair, engineer repair as far as generators and automotive. When I got the Patriot units attached to me I did get a slice from their ordnance company organic to their battalion to come with the Patriot units.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. And these were the 34th Ordnance Company?

LTC KILGORE: Yep. The slice I got from the Patriot units was a slice from the 516th Ordnance Company and also an intermediate support element for DS/GS [direct support/general support] from the 13th Ordnance Company.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great. Okay. Moving on to personnel issues, or to actually operations, personnel operations in the desert, I'd like to focus in on perhaps some issues that were raised by navigation in the desert and go ahead and elaborate on that, sir.

LTC KILGORE: Yeah. Coming from Fort Bliss we were used to operating in the desert both for the environment of snakes and scorpions, and the heat and the water impacts. One thing, though, that did impact us was navigation. When you're going across flat desert and you have no mountain ridges or no identifiable terrain features on a map, it's hard to determine other than just looking at the odometer there and a compass, saying where you are and how far you've gone and pinpointing where you are on a map, especially with the maps the way they were over in Saudi Arabia and Iraq in that they didn't have a whole lot of identifiable features. There were no ... you know, maybe one or two roads.

One thing we did get added to us for this was the GPS [Global Positioning System] devices that interface with the satellites so that you could get an eight-digit coordinate of exactly where you are within just a matter of minutes and identify where you are and where you wanted to go. Otherwise it would have been very difficult.

MAJ HONEC: How many were issued to you?

LTC KILGORE: I had eleven assigned to me.

MAJ HONEC: And where were they deployed?

LTC KILGORE: Basically I put one with each fire unit along with a few in the headquarters.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Could you elaborate a little bit more on the problems that perhaps ... you all were experienced in desert navigation, but there was a 10th Mountain [Division] infantry unit that was assigned to you or attached to you. Could you talk a little bit about their problems that they ran into?

LTC KILGORE: Okay. I had four platoons of infantry assigned to me. I took those up and broke them out with the various fire units of the air defense sites along with the headquarters and the ordnance company to protect them--primarily ground defense and security. They, of course, coming from the 10th Mountain, were not very acclimated to the desert. They did have to ... fortunately it was during the winter months and the heat didn't ... and things got over before they ... but I'm sure they would have had some problems had it come in the hot summer months, not being used to it. They, of course, did have to get used to working in desert environments both for navigation and acclimation.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great. Mainly distance judging? There was distances that you could see ... you could see further than what you thought you could travel in a day, is that right, sir?

LTC KILGORE: That's correct.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Any other considerations ... before we go on to ... we could cover lessons learned. Okay. If you could sum up perhaps some of the key lessons learned that you have here, sir? Go ahead.

LTC KILGORE: It's hard to figure out where to start and end on lessons learned. Everything from your advance party composition of ... making sure you've got the [S]-4 and the other representatives out there in front, the [S]-3, to make sure you get coordination made up front to make things happen before big numbers of people, because by the time the task force was task organized and we finished up at the end we were 1,200 people strong.

MAJ HONEC: All the equipment ... did you have all the equipment, sir?

LTC KILGORE: No. We got a lot of it pushed on us right before we left Fort Bliss and we continued to get new equipment as we were in the theater, trucks, communications gear, etc.

Several other lessons learned. Land deconfliction. As I mentioned earlier, as far as area support and relying on external units for a lot of your class of support, the same went along with the land deconfliction. We air defenders needed certain key terrain for both ... so that the radars and sites could see and give the correct coverage for the maneuver units. Many times that was in conflict with the maneuver units and therefore we had to ... we initially coordinated with the division headquarters in thinking that that was the best place to coordinate and it varied division to division. Some divisions were very cooperative, welcomed us with open arms, and said, "Yes, you can have this land." Others, it was a tooth and nail fight of getting terrain where we wanted it and caused many, many problems.

MAJ HONEC: Was it just division-wide, sir, or was it also the Saudi government ... the need to interface with ...

LTC KILGORE: It was a combination both with divisions and with the Saudi government. Of course, the divisions were continually interfacing with the Saudis because you couldn't be within X number of kilometers of a certain road. You couldn't get close to certain towns, etc.

Other lessons learned is, of course, the issues we had in being an air defense unit it was working with the Air Force. When we first came into the theater there were no well-defined rules of engagement, SOEs, and command and control guidance between the Army and the Air Force. That continually developed as we were in theater, but it's one that has to be continually worked and if at all possible, well defined before you go into a theater.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Good point. SCUD launch procedure?

LTC KILGORE: Another piece of the task force that I did not mention earlier, normally as a HAWK-pure, we have sixteen, or correction, fourteen Stinger teams organically assigned to us. I had those and we had deployed them around the HAWK fire units and the headquarters. The Patriot units do not have dedicated Stinger teams so what we did, we took and trained up non-dedicated Stinger gunners, certified those Stinger gunners, receipted Stinger missiles for them so that they would have that SHORAD [short-range air defense] protection around their sites also.

MAJ HONEC: This was in Saudi Arabia, sir?

LTC KILGORE: That's correct. The training and the acquisition of the missiles was done in Saudi Arabia.

MAJ HONEC: Did you have enough simulators to do this or how did you train the Stinger gunners?

LTC KILGORE: We trained them with ... there were training devices for the Stingers and you can go through all the commands, aircraft rec[ognition], making sure that they understand what aircraft to engage because you do not want to put a Stinger in the hands of an untrained gunner that doesn't recognize aircraft. A lot of it is you're relying on that individual.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great. Go ahead.

LTC KILGORE: A few more lessons learned, the electric power plant for the Patriot units, it's two 150KWs [kilowatts] mounted on a five-ton truck. Those 150KW turbine generators were less than desirable as far as reliability. I had multiple problems with them of which was recognized theater-wide.

One big plus in the communications side was the RATT [radio-teletype] reliability. That ... those ... we had two RATT's within the task force and those--R-A-T-T--and their reliability ... AM communications, teletype, was very, very, very good.

MAJ HONEC: Okay.

LTC KILGORE: In addressing the problem with the electric power plant, 150KW turbine generators, I attribute that to several things. One, the question of whether the reliability of those things were as good as they were supposed to be when they were even fielded. When the Patriot units were first fielded to Germany they shortly thereafter went to a commercial power source so they did not run the 150KWs that extensively. Of course over here in this Saudi Arabian theater we ran them 24 hours a day for almost six months continuous. Whether the dust in the desert had that much impact on them ... may have had some. I do know one thing that did cause problems with them was the fuel problems over here. If we did not burn strict diesel in them they had the lubricant to make sure that the fuel was lubricating the engines and all. We had problems, i.e., if you tried to run those on Jet A-1, which is a drier fuel, less lubricant, you had bigtime problems and it burned up the 150KW turbines quickly.

MAJ HONEC: Good point. Good point. I'm glad that ...

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Continuing with the lessons learned. I understand that there are some other things here. Go ahead.

LTC KILGORE: Other things that we had assigned to us to assist in the air defense mission, we had one, a Title A setup that was added to us that enabled, in case the AWACS [to] CRC shot was dropped, that we could immediately turn the Title A on and have an external A picture from the AWACS directly here on ... within the task force.

Another device that we had was what they call TIBS,

T-I-B-S, Tactical Integrating Broadcasting System, which interfaced ... which is a down-link from the RIVET JOINT aircraft, that gives you information of aircraft and other sources of intelligence within Iraq--communications, etc.--that was very beneficial both intel[ligence]-wise and in SCUD missile attacks, and also as far as what aircraft were flying when.

MAJ HONEC: Did you have any problems with radar, with any of the radar picture being false, getting false echoes on it because of this desert environment?

LTC KILGORE: Let me address another lesson learned as far as some of the training that was beneficial to us before we came over here. One, there was ... we did two ROVING SANDS, JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed] exercises, both in ... two years previous to coming over here, one in May of last year, which was of big benefit to us. It's an exercise with the Air Force, the Navy and the Army, specifically 11th Brigade, which we had their targets flying against us. All the different types of aircraft; the AWACS flying and receiving information from it. So it was a similar environment that we had when we deployed over here.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. The timeliness of that. Okay. Those two exercises were pretty well a ... very well placed considering in August we started DESERT SHIELD. Had you not been able to get that training, it would have ... how would it have affected your mission, your overall mission? Hone in on a little bit about the important aspects of the training you got just before you came over here. It was in July, wasn't it, sir?

LTC KILGORE: May. Being a contingency FORSCOM [US Army Forces Command] unit, of course, we did a lot of field time. The exercises I mentioned, the ROVING SAND exercises, were a big benefit prior to coming over here both for conditioning for the desert, but also the interoperability with the Air Force and the AWACS and getting used to operating like that rather than trying to do it in an immature theater where you've got enough growing pains to screw with just getting operational, getting into theater, and like that. So that paid big dividends to us.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Any other lessons learned that you would like to talk about? Okay. Could you elaborate on all the rest of the air defense assets in VII Corps and the others for a little bit?

LTC KILGORE: Yes. Let me identify total assets ... air defense assets that were within theater. We had two Patriot battalions that were located back in echelons above corps, one a six-battery battalion that was located in Dammam area for primary tactical ballistic missile defense. Another half battalion, 3/43 [3d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery], which was located in Riyadh; a three-battery defense. Up in KKMC then we had 2/43 [2d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery] which was a four-battery Patriot battalion for TBM defense. Then assigned to VII Corps was a task force (heavy) also, similar to the one in XVIII [Airborne] Corps, 8/43, which had four Patriot batteries along with two HAWK batteries assigned to it. Of course and then in XVIII Corps was Task Force 2-1, which was a three HAWK batteries and three Patriot batteries.

Backing up one, also at KKMC was the ... a 2/52 [2d Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery] HAWK battalion: echelons above Corps for the KKMC area also.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great.

MAJ HONEC: Okay, each division ... go ahead, sir.

LTC KILGORE: Another air defense asset within the theater was, of course, each maneuver division had their own organic gun/Stinger battalion attached to them, or assigned to them.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Good. Let's talk about the command and control issue aspect of this particular mission that you all had. Elaborate on the brigade, 11th A[ir] D[efense] A[rtillery] Brigade, and what was your relationship with them?

LTC KILGORE: Okay. Of course, back at Fort Bliss we are assigned to 11th ADA Brigade. Coming into theater, the brigade's primary mission was echelon above Corps. By that I'm meaning the control of the Patriot units for tactical ballistic missile defense both for Dammam and Riyadh area. As things progressed the task force then was assigned a mission of providing air defense and TBM for the XVIII Corps.

When you start getting a brigade headquarters with multiple missions of echelons above Corps that are directed toward the ARCENT [US Army Central Command] level and then trying to do Corps missions, there is a tendency to be a conflict of interests and also just time to do both missions. I believe that each Corps needs to be assigned its own brigade headquarters along to provide the air defense like it should be.

Realizing in this theater we did have air superiority primarily due to the weaknesses of the Iraqi air force and the superiority of the US Air Force, but if that had been another case we might have been hurt because of that.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great. Let's ... any other issues we haven't discussed? We can go on to retrograde operations? Okay. This is March 21st. In retrograde how are you going to pull back the units? I understand that yesterday was clearance for ... to bring the units out of Iraq with transition over to the VII Corps. Could you give a commander's perspective as to the issues now faced in retrograde operations and elaborate on that, sir?

LTC KILGORE: Yeah. Concerning the retrograding, of course, let me go back one. I forgot to highlight that, of course, the HAWK battery that did go into Iraq went into Iraq at H-Hour plus 30, so it was one of the first units that went into Iraq, right behind the French and the 82d Airborne. So we did have air defense up in Iraq shortly after the ground war had started.

Now, as far as the retrograde, on the 20th of March we were allowed to bring the units back out of Iraq. We've now brought them back into a tactical assembly areas. Missions now are to: recan the HAWK missiles, put them ... get them ready to ship back out; get the Patriot missiles ready to be shipped back out; acquire lift assets--S&P [stake and platform] trucks--to move those to the ASP's; lift assets to move additional equipment to the port; and then schedule convoys and get to the port; go through the agriculture inspections, customs inspections and get ready to load things; equipment on ships and schedule people to redeploy back to the United States.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. There's a question ... when you first came over you came in through the port of [Ad] Dammam, sir, and now is there ... is this definitely a port that you're going to be leaving out of that's been recognized?

LTC KILGORE: That's correct. When we first came over our ships came into the port of Dammam. Currently it appears that we will ... all units that are going back to the Texas area will go out of the port of Al Jubayl.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. What problems is that going to cause?

LTC KILGORE: Currently it's going to ... the initial plan was that we would go back out of [Ad] Dammam. Brigade then set up all the support assets, the rear assembly areas and the facilities to prep their equipment at that location. Now that it looks like we're going to change to Al Jubayl, that means there will have to be a shift in direction of moving the assets up to that location and establish a support to make that happen.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Who's going to establish the support, sir, for you?

LTC KILGORE: The port's already established, but the support for the life support, the cleaning of the vehicles, type things, will have to come out of brigade and within the battalion.

MAJ HONEC: Okay. Great. Any other issues that perhaps we haven't called?

Okay. This concludes this portion of the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM interviews.

Thank you very much, sir.