Oral History Interview
DSIT AE 072

Interview Conducted 10 March 1991 at the 6th Light Armored Division Headquarters near As Salman, Iraq

Interviewer: MAJ Dennis Levin (Commander, 130th Military History Detachment)

NOTE: Interview was conducted entirely in English.

MAJ LEVIN: [This is an Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM interview tape]. This is the 10th of March, [1991] and this is Major Dennis Levin [Commander, 130th Military History Detachment]. I am interviewing ...

CAPT JOHNSON: I am Captain Johnson, Michael Johnson, and my service number is **-***-*****. I am the S-2 of the French Tank Battalion, the 4th Dragoon Regiment.

MAJ LEVIN: The 4th Dragoons were located on the far eastern flank of the operation. Can you describe the movement of the 4th Dragoons up the escarpment on G-1?

CAPT JOHNSON: We went on the escarpment G-1 and we went through the border at about 1500 [hours], le control, and we just positioned the different units ready to ... on the departure line, and spent the night. And we went in the ... we departed at about 0545 in the morning from just five clicks [kilometers] from the border and they attack to [Objective] ROCHAMBEAU first.

MAJ LEVIN: What is the primary weapon system of the 4th Dragoons?

CAPT JOHNSON: It's main battle tank?

MAJ LEVIN: Yes.

CAPT JOHNSON: Of course, AMX-30, and we have 44 of them. And the main armament is a 105[mm] gun with coax[ial] ... 20mm coax, and also a machine gun.

MAJ LEVIN: Was there any problem for the AMX-30 in moving across this terrain?

CAPT JOHNSON: No problem. We heard of no problem and we have 44 tanks at the beginning. Two days later and 170 kilometers later, 44 tanks.

MAJ LEVIN: Very good.

CAPT JOHNSON: Very good.

MAJ LEVIN: Can you describe ... was there any opposition at all in the first phase of the assault?

CAPT JOHNSON: The first day when the first phase of the assault, there was first a position on ROCHAMBEAU. On the border, nothing. It was not our task, it was not the task of the regiment. The passing for border was the task of, for us [the 6th (French) Light Armored Division], the task of the 3d RIMa [3d Regiment of Marine Infantry]. So we just went, and the first opposition was to be found on ROCHAMBEAU--exactly at the place where the intelligence reported that there was some enemy positions.

MAJ LEVIN: What did you encounter?

CAPT JOHNSON: Infantry. Infantry and ... well, we make at first the choice to turn the position. This is the ROCHAMBEAU mark, and we chose to turn the position not to take along MSR [Main Supply Route] TEXAS but take it by the right flank (eastern), and take a new departure line about 90 degrees against the enemy lines.

MAJ LEVIN: What effect did that have?

CAPT JOHNSON: Very good, because at first it was about 11:00, the end of the ... well, 11:00. And the 3d RIMa

had [a] problem with one company which was located five clicks from the eastern defensive position. And so we take position on the departure line and then we had a big artillery support, fire support on the position, on all the enemy position.

MAJ LEVIN: What did the artillery consist of? Was it only 155s [155mm howitzers] or were there MLRS launches [M-270 Multiple Launch Rocket System] on those positions?

CAPT JOHNSON: Well, I think it was mainly 155. MLRS was before that, but if I remember well, we didn't hear MLRS this morning. And also we had Mixon's support from aviation, the ATAB [aerial target acquisition battery]. We are a ... we had with us a forward air controller, an American [Air Force] forward air controller.

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: And when we took place on this departure line, there was a line of bunkers facing us just one click from the departure line. And we have a little problem because our shells, while [they] are terrific, but [are] probably not enough for the bunkers which were not exactly in front of us, which were not well-seen from our position.

So we called the commanding officer of the battalion, called the forward air controller, the American forward air controller, say, "Okay, I have a problem now. What can you do for us?" And, well, a half an hour later there was two A-10 who were bombing all these bunkers very, very good. And so we had artillery support very good, A-10 support. And then it was about 12:15, the 44 tanks attacked. And they were not in front of the enemy position but just on the ... for them, the left flank.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes.

CAPT JOHNSON: And that was probably a surprise for them. And there were only infantrymen facing us, and they heard the rumble of the tracks, I think, for them for psychologically different reason, but that was a little too much for them after the bombing, after the artillery pounding and so on.

MAJ LEVIN: And then the tanks are behind?

CAPT JOHNSON: And then the tanks just behind them and on the trenches.

MAJ LEVIN: Oh, yes. How close were they on the trenches?

CAPT JOHNSON: Well, the nearest company was just on the front line. The two were about one click each from the ... behind the front line.

MAJ LEVIN: Was the ... ? Now, how did the attack take place? Were they on-line moving laterally across the enemy, or to the enemy's rear?

CAPT JOHNSON: I'll show you the detail. See, this is the front line.

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: And we have all three companies attacking.

MAJ LEVIN: On-line.

CAPT JOHNSON: On-line.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay.

CAPT JOHNSON: The first one being ... having its tracks just on the enemy trenches.

MAJ LEVIN: I see. So the southernmost or the left end of your line was on the enemy trenches?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yes.

MAJ LEVIN: And then you had ...

CAPT JOHNSON: ... two others.

MAJ LEVIN: Two others.

CAPT JOHNSON: And when the first company which was on the enemy trenches seems to be ... to have some problems in front of him, well, he just stopped, fixed the enemy, and wait for the second company, which was right on his right, to bypass and attack from the rear. And, well, it would make that about two or three times, and no problem.

MAJ LEVIN: So they did have a little opposition from the trenches?

CAPT JOHNSON: They have little opposition and in fact, we have ... well, these are the rounds which were fired the first day. Forty-four high explosive anti-tanks [main gun rounds] against the bunkers; 88 explosives, anti-personnel; and also a lot of rounds of the 20 millimeter coax.

MAJ LEVIN: I see.

CAPT JOHNSON: So they were rather convincing.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes.

CAPT JOHNSON: A lot of enemy soldiers went out ... just went out of the trenches with hands up and surrendered.

MAJ LEVIN: Was there evidence that--other than the fact that the enemy surrendered right away--was there evidence of the effectiveness of that fire on their positions? Were there many wounded, were there many killed?

CAPT JOHNSON: No. Rather little. In fact, they fired on the enemy positions, but most of the hits were on the ground, on the trenches, on the bunkers. But the soldiers were ... the Iraqi soldiers were already outside because they very well understand that if they remain in the bunkers, they would be killed in the bunkers.

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: And this unit, this brigade didn't have a lot of fighting spirit, I think. So this day in two hours we made about 550 prisoners. The one[s] we can count and disarm, but there was plenty of others which were just left behind us for the infantry which was following us.

MAJ LEVIN: Which infantry was following you?

CAPT JOHNSON: 3d RIMa and also the 2d [Brigade] of [the] 82d [Airborne Division] was called to take care of the prisoners because we were just overwhelmed by prisoners.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes. Did the 3d RIMa gather any of them up? Did the 3d RIMa clean up on the prisoners? Did they take prisoners into custody?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yes. In fact, they cleaned up the terrain much following days ... but ... than we did because they had much more people on the ground [i.e., personnel who could be dismounted].

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: We, our regiment, have only tanks and one infantry platoon per company.

MAJ LEVIN: Oh, so you don't have enough to go through the bunker complexes or anything?

CAPT JOHNSON: No, we cannot. We cannot take care of all bunkers and all of the soldiers.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay.

CAPT JOHNSON: The tanks made the main effort.

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: Go through the position and leave all the lighter resistance or the care of the prisoners to infantry.

MAJ LEVIN: All right. Once you got through that complex, that put you very close to MSR Texas?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yes. At the end of the day we were on ... in the nearby of MSR Texas, and we took a third battalion away. I'm looking for the schedule. Yeah. We attack through ... about noon, this [Iraqi] battalion first, then this one. Then we turn about 60 degrees right and we took the third one with also an [Iraqi] artillery battalion.

MAJ LEVIN: And that ... now, that battalion that you took ...

CAPT JOHNSON: ... at the end of the day ...

MAJ LEVIN: ... at the end of the day?

CAPT JOHNSON: These between 1200/1215 and 1530.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. So that's a more northern position. It's the 2d [Battalion] of the 842d [Brigade, 45th Infantry Division]?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: And it straddles MSR TEXAS?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. We were on the eastern side of MSR TEXAS. We never went west of MSR TEXAS, and we just stopped for the night just before that position. In fact, we didn't know there were just there and there was a big sand wind [shamal] ...

MAJ LEVIN: Yes.

CAPT JOHNSON: ... falling just before night. So we stopped. We were preparing for refueling and taking more ammunition and ... .

MAJ LEVIN: Were you in view of that position? Except for the sandstorm, would you have been in view of those positions when you stopped?

CAPT JOHNSON: We didn't have direct view on this position because probably of the sandstorm. And we just saw ... demanded of soldiers more coming with their hands up at night--just before night. We took one colonel there and the half of his staff just before night.

MAJ LEVIN: I see.

CAPT JOHNSON: At about 1700. And we spent the night there ready to attack for the next morning, on the morning of the 25th [February].

MAJ LEVIN: Who came up the west side?

CAPT JOHNSON: The west side was the 2d [Brigade] of the 82d.

MAJ LEVIN: And they went through the western portion of that battalion, 2d of the 82d?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: And they also ... did they encounter the 3d and ... the 1st and 3d [Battalions] of the 842d [Brigade]?

CAPT JOHNSON: I don't know exactly what happened on the western part.

MAJ LEVIN: All right. Were they in line with you for the attack in the morning?

CAPT JOHNSON: No. For the attack in the morning, we attacked from the departure line ...

MAJ LEVIN: No, I mean the following morning when you kicked off against these people.

CAPT JOHNSON: Oh, yes. No ... .

MAJ LEVIN: The 2d of the 82d, was it abreast of you on the west when you attacked or were they back further?

CAPT JOHNSON: I don't remember problems of coordination with the 2d of 82d. I think they was on the rear. Yes, I think yes, because I saw on a position after that, the commanding officer of the 2d of 82d, Colonel [Ronald F.] Rokosz ...

MAJ LEVIN: Rokosz, yes.

CAPT JOHNSON: ... which was coming after us. And I think it was in the second echelon.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay.

CAPT JOHNSON: And so we went on the right side of MSR TEXAS for the next morning, running up along MSR TEXAS. And first, of course, just at the beginning of--at dawn--we took one artillery position with one D-30 [122mm Soviet-designed howitzer] company [i.e., battery] just at the beginning of the attack. It was probably the 642d Battalion, Artillery Battalion, very shortly.

MAJ LEVIN: And how many guns did they have?

CAPT JOHNSON: Six D-30. Six D-30 just at ... .

MAJ LEVIN: Did you ever receive any fire from that battalion?

CAPT JOHNSON: Not from this one. I think that ... I remember that in the morning of the 25[th], the TOC (tactical operations center) was fired at when we were moving, and I saw some tracks and the shells of D-30 falling about 400 to 500 meters from us, but not very accurate. We were just moving, and so ... and we have liaison officer, an artillery liaison team ...

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: ... and he called for counter-battery immediately, of course.

MAJ LEVIN: I know he got it.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. When he saw the rounds coming down, he said, "Oh, we are shot at," and called for counter-battery and they came.

MAJ LEVIN: Yeah. I was next to our batteries when they opened up on them. I know you got counter-battery fire.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah? Very good. Well, we appreciate it very much.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. Was it likely that it came from this battalion, the 951st, or the company?

CAPT JOHNSON: I don't know.

MAJ LEVIN: You don't know.

CAPT JOHNSON: I cannot tell you exactly, but I think I know exactly which battery it was. It was probably not, as the artillery officers said, the M-46 [122mm Soviet-designed howitzer], but it was probably D-30. I'm not an expert in shells, artillery shells.

After that, we went along MSR TEXAS and that was quite a different combat.

MAJ LEVIN: Going up TEXAS from there?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. The first day it was on fixed positions and infantry which were dug into trenches and foxholes. And the next day, well, first we didn't have so good intelligence and we didn't knew exactly what was ... where was the enemy as we knew it on ROCHAMBEAU. But we knew the strength of the enemy, so we were waiting to encounter a tank company. And it happened on the northern part of Shabah and there in about fifteen minutes, one of our units, one tank company just blow off one Iraqi tank company on T-55 [older Soviet-designed medium tank mounting a 105mm main gun] in about fifteen minutes, and destroyed eight tanks out of fifteen which were there.

But on the fifteen [tanks], some of them were previously destroyed by the airplane and one or two of ... one of them was destroyed by our [Gazelle] helicopter with a HOT missile [antitank air-to-ground missile]. I found the tank. It was hit by the HOT. And some of them were destroyed by the aviation.

MAJ LEVIN: So they really didn't have anything left by the time you swept through? I mean, once you destroyed those eight tanks, they really ... there wasn't very much left there.

CAPT JOHNSON: On the same positions when we destroyed the eight tanks, there was one company to one battalion, I don't ... I cannot say exactly the strength ... of infantry. And, well, the figure is in ... .

The tanks was trying to move, because one time more we attack not in the direction they were waiting us, but on the side. And it's very surprising--not surprising, but characteristic--when I went on the battlefield some day later and I saw some tanks which were facing south and which tried to move out of their position, dug-in position with berms and so on, just to face another direction, the one we were coming on them.

But it failed, and we took very good advantage of the range of our guns against them because we have a T-55 that has an estimation of 1,200 meters to kill an AMX-30. And for us to kill a T-55, 2,000 meters. So most of them were shot at from 2,500 meters to 2,000 meters.

MAJ LEVIN: And they were hit?

CAPT JOHNSON: And they were hit with APDS [armor penetrator discarding sabot antitank rounds] and also HEAT [high explosive antitank rounds]. But afterwards, the tanks went through the position and there were still infantry in the trenches, in the foxholes, and these guys really were wanting to fight because they shot at the tanks while the tanks went through the position. And the tanks had to enter with 20 millimeter coax against the fox holes which were ...

MAJ LEVIN: They get a lot of RPGs and ...

CAPT JOHNSON: Yes. I found a position on this location which was very, very impressive. It was in a slope.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay.

CAPT JOHNSON: And there was foxholes, but [designed] for RPGs. [It was a] long one with special features to take up the ammunition and so on; all around [coverage] with about ... in a circle in about 500 meters round. And while they didn't show the enemy, just at the last moment when the tanks were coming right on them; but there they can shot at the tank and the tank, of course, hadn't seen anything before he was shot at by two, three or four RPG at each time. And there were plenty of ammunition there.

And some of these foxholes were very cleverly done. I saw one which was with big stones ... made with stones and dug in the ground, and a lot of big stones were also spread all around the foxhole just to seem already hit by the round, the gun round or something.

MAJ LEVIN: So it looked like the position had already been hit?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yes, but it wasn't. In fact, I went into the foxhole. It was neat and very, very fine.

MAJ LEVIN: Were you able to assess the effect of your tank rounds against their foxholes?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yes. Most of them were destroyed when they were covered, and the one which were in open air, nothing enormous, but sufficient to make it --

MAJ LEVIN: Unlivable.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: Yeah.

CAPT JOHNSON: And on this position that was characteristic. All the weapons we found with the infantry platoon which was with each company, each tank company, all the weapons they found were destroyed. All the AK-47 were destroyed.

MAJ LEVIN: So they made an effort to deny us?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, just to destroy their weapons before they surrendered. It was not the same thing the day before.

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: The day before, we found in the foxhole all the AK-47 and RPG we wanted. There, not.

MAJ LEVIN: It was a better unit.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, quite different unit, I think.

MAJ LEVIN: And they did fire RPGs at the tanks?

CAPT JOHNSON: They tried, but too long range. They were hit a long time before they were at the right range to fire. With an RPG on a moving target, you cannot fire more than 100 to 200 meters.

MAJ LEVIN: That's right.

CAPT JOHNSON: And I think that's something really courageous to use an RPG against a tank at 200 to 100 meters.

MAJ LEVIN: You'd better hit it.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. You have no choice. And, well, we went through this position and at the end of the day, we were on Target [Objective] WHITE nearby, but on the hills up on ... facing the south and western part of the village of As Salman. And there one of our units found about 30 trucks and destroyed about 15 of them and also some Toyota and UAZ-469 [Soviet-designed trucks], mainly trucks, logistic and so on. And for us it was, in fact, the end of the battle.

We found in the ... just before night three position of ZPU-4 machine gun of 40.5 millimeter--14.5 millimeter--just in the nearby of our position. But there were nobody inside.

MAJ LEVIN: Yeah. I've seen those guns and it looked like they were abandoned.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. But I have seen two of these positions and I was ... I have been impressed because they are ... in fact, there are a lot of ammunition. I count on one gun, one four-barrel gun, 16,000 rounds ready to be used already in the box.

MAJ LEVIN: And the crews load those by hand. The crews load those boxes by hand.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: Everything is loose rounds and belts and they have to ...

CAPT JOHNSON: No, no, all the ... they were already in belts.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes, I know.

CAPT JOHNSON: The 16,000 rounds were already in belts, ready to be used. And there was plenty of others which was to be ... which were to be put into belts and into boxes to be ready. And each gun had eight replacement barrels.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes, I noticed that.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, two boxes of four brand new barrels. And also lots of replacement parts. Well, there was no lack of replacement parts.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes. They had all their tools there too.

CAPT JOHNSON: Tools and everything. And in all the foxholes there was some food and some water and so on.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes. These positions further back seemed to be, I thought, better prepared and better supplied than the forward positions.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. But in the forward positions, we found also a lot of rounds.

MAJ LEVIN: Oh, yes, there was ammunition.

CAPT JOHNSON: And most of them, there was some food, mainly rice, but sometimes some other things. And yesterday I went on the battlefield another time and I found the place where the medics [were], and there was a lot of medicine and medical supplies, very plenty of them. It was not as bad a situation as we thought before, in fact.

MAJ LEVIN: Well, we had a lot of information from deserters that they were poorly equipped and poorly supplied.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, but I think the deserters want, in fact, to excuse themselves to be deserters.

MAJ LEVIN: Make an excuse. Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: And so they said, "We are in poor condition, we are in poor condition," but just to absolve themselves of what they did.

MAJ LEVIN: Yeah. I noticed from my own observations on some of these positions that there was new clothing, a lot of new clothing still in boxes ...

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: ... that had not been issued. And I noticed also that they had protective masks that looked brand new.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: Some of them looked like they had just come out of the box, they weren't even dusty.

CAPT JOHNSON: Brand new, yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: That first day.

CAPT JOHNSON: Protective masks and sometimes boots and gloves and also ...

MAJ LEVIN: ... a cape ...

CAPT JOHNSON: ... a cape, yeah. Not a very good one, but ...

MAJ LEVIN: ... just plastic.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, plastic. It was the old one we have from ten years before.

MAJ LEVIN: Did you see much evidence of Jordanian munitions?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, a lot. On the position, [the] anti-tank position I told you, most of the official ammunition were issued by Jordan Ministry of Defense--markings and all. And I have a lot of photographs of these munitions.

MAJ LEVIN: Good. We've been ... .

CAPT JOHNSON: And brand new.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes.

CAPT JOHNSON: Not from a long time.

MAJ LEVIN: Yes, I noticed that. They were in very good condition and they were new.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: We've been trying to locate something that gives a definitive date of shipment on those.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: Once you got to Objective WHITE, did you find something different from what you had anticipated in terms of enemy strength?

CAPT JOHNSON: No, ...

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. Your regiment?

CAPT JOHNSON: My regiment was not greatly involved around As Salman. We just stopped south and west of As Salman on the hills which are surrounding As Salman. We never went to the airport and never went to the village before the 3d RIMa went back.

MAJ LEVIN: So the 3d RIMa actually moved into the village?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. Around the village, we were just ready to support the 3d RIMa by fire from the hills all around there.

MAJ LEVIN: And I understand the town was pretty well deserted.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah. As far as I know, there were 13 people, civilians, in the village, not more, and four or five soldiers.

MAJ LEVIN: I noticed in As Salman itself ... I don't know if you have any knowledge of this, but in As Salman itself there were two fortress-like buildings.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: One was very much like a prison.

CAPT JOHNSON: You speak of the prison which on the hill?

MAJ LEVIN: No. No, there's one in the village.

CAPT JOHNSON: In the village?

MAJ LEVIN: Yeah. It had a wall around it with barbed-wire on top.

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah, yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: I don't know if it was a prison or not.

CAPT JOHNSON: I don't know.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. The fortress on the hill is actually a prison?

CAPT JOHNSON: Well, it has been conceived as a prison, certainly, because it's very characteristic of a prison.

MAJ LEVIN: Yeah.

CAPT JOHNSON: But I don't know if it was used as a prison when we went there.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. After taking Objective WHITE, where did the 4th Dragoons--where did they go?

CAPT JOHNSON: Near the big fort, the big prison.

MAJ LEVIN: Up on the hill?

CAPT JOHNSON: Way up on the hill, and we are still there.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. I understand that the 2d Brigade of the 82d made an eastern move to block the eastern approaches to As Salman?

CAPT JOHNSON: Yeah.

MAJ LEVIN: One battalion went with, I guess, 3rd RIMa. Do you know which battalion that was?

CAPT JOHNSON: No.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. Do you know at what point they were released and did they have to cross any French lines in order to make their movement?

CAPT JOHNSON: No. We didn't talk the coordination problem. Well, the first night we spent at the south of As Salman just on the hills, then the day later the battle was ended ...

MAJ LEVIN: Right.

CAPT JOHNSON: .. and we just went through As Salman, not knowing who was exactly where and so on, just passing through As Salman and going up the hill. But we didn't have contact with the 2d of 82d. And in fact in the morning of the 26th, all our liaison team: the FAC [forward air controller], for artillery (FIST [fire support team]), and the liaison officer of 2d of 82d just leave the battalion and went with the 2d of 82d. On the morning of the 26th. After that it was the end of the contact with the 2d of 82d.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay. The 4th Dragoons were never used in support of the assault on the airfield itself?

CAPT JOHNSON: No.

MAJ LEVIN: Okay, very good. Is there anything that you would like to add that I may not have covered in some of the questions?

CAPT JOHNSON: No.

MAJ LEVIN: All right. I thank you for your time and for your help. Very much.