CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
a. In any future operation similar to the Korean hostilities, steps should be taken as early as possible to insure procurement and proper utilization of linguist personnel. me final solution to the problem is long-range in nature and involves policies and decisions that lie beyond the jurisdiction of any single theater command. Steps should be taken not only to train an adequate number of linguists to meet the needs or any area wherein US military operations are probable, but to train these linguists in military terminology. There appears to be a tendency for the selection of personnel for language training to be based on such factors as racial origin without regard for the individual's basic knowledge of English. In this connection a large number of linguists were ineffective despite their fluency in Chinese or Korean. This was particularly true in the case of many Americans of Oriental parentage who had learned a smattering of two languages in their homes but had not progressed much beyond a childhood vocabulary in either. Unfortunately, higher general aptitude test scores do not necessarily reflect language ability or even ability to work well in English. An adequate knowledge of English should be as important a consideration in the selection of candidates for linguist training as racial or national background. Language qualifications should not be a criteria for intelligence duties. Assignment procedures should be corrected to insure the linguistic requirements of non-intelligence agencies are met.
b. Although intelligence schools are able to provide students with many of the necessary intelligence techniques, local conditions must be learned while actually on the job. Because Or rotation policy, on-the-job orientation must be given rapidly if personnel
are to attain maximum efficiency in time to be of value to the command. All enlisted linguist and order-of-battle personnel should have the following qualifications:
(1) Clearance for access to at least CONFIDENTIAL information at time of reporting for duty.
(2) Familiarity with military terminology.
(3) Translation and/or interrogation ability.
(4) Aptitude Area score of at least 100.
(5) Have completed basic course in general military intelligence.
c. The mission and T/O of ground liaison teams should be reviewed to determine what will constitute an adequate organizational structure based on Air Force organization and Army requirements. All ground liaison personnel should be required to attend a complete course of instruction in air-ground operations.
d. In the event hostilities are resumed, the capture of POWs should be stressed as a tactical requirement of all units in combat. Complete and thorough indoctrination should be given troops on the importance of getting POWs back to the echelons where all the information that the POW may have can be obtained through thorough interrogation. More patrols should be dispatched with the specific mission of capturing POWs, and the Psychological Warfare effort to encourage defection of enemy troops should be fully exploited. The Army Intelligence Officer should be given the opportunity, when necessary, to interrogate POWs as soon after capture as possible to determine the extent of their intelligence potential.
e. During a period of non-hostility, training to indoctrinate troops should be continuous. This program should be conducted to include visual and sound demonstrations and the use of enemy materiel.
f. (1) Frequent and detailed coverage is necessary to expedite identification of troop activity and equipment. Photographic reconnaissance aircraft for both day and night photography should be equipped with cameras which will provide 1/5000 scale coverage for an extended period of time, and which will permit maximum advantage to be taken of the altitude, speed, and range of the aircraft. These cameras should have a greater focal length, a greater recycling speed, and a greater film Capacity than those used during the Korean conflict, and they should have air adjustable mounts allowing increase or decrease Of camera angle for oblique work.
(2) The methods used in PI work in Korea were essentially those of World War II. The increasing demand for photo maps by PI personnel at all command levels created considerable duplication of effort which was extremely difficult to avoid. Each combat unit in any future operation will need appropriate photographic coverage; however, the number of personnel and the time required in providing PI must be reduced. Improved methods in the application of aerial photography to obtain military intelligence are needed; photographic interpretation is an essential tool in warfare. Studies should be made to include both technical and tactical fields, with the purpose of reducing the cost drastically without a corresponding reduction in quality.
g. Great stress should be placed upon proper collection and relaying of bomb-damage information because of its importance to the close air support operations. Ground and air observation on such targets should be used more extensively to help alleviate deficiencies. A satisfactory medium for securing information of front-line activities is the artillery forward observer communications system to the FSCC. From the FSCC at division and corps headquarters, the information can be forwarded to the information
section at JCC. This section would then disseminate the information to the tactical air bases, adjacent army units as required, and G-2 and G-3 Air. Recommended changes to the bomb line could be handled in the same manner. Recommended solution is sound; however, it must be remembered that many parts of the battle area in Korea were bombarded with such regularity that it became impossible to assess damage either visually or photographically. In normal cases, the target must be photographed as soon as possible after the strike.
a. An aggressive implementation of current counterintelligence directives to all echelons, emphasizing the close accountability of all restrictees, alleviated to a marked degree the possibility of such individual transfer without notification to a higher command. A command-wide report directed by AFFE required the lower commanders to set up a system of accounting for such restrictees every two months. The effectiveness of this plan was checked by IG and G-2 inspections to insure compliance. All personnel should be required to submit PHSs and finger-print cards upon entering the service and these forms should be filed at the G-2 Central Records Facility. All officers and first three grades of NCO class should be cleared for access to at least CONFIDENTIAL information before they are declared POR qualified.
b. Proper classification of information was not always made; a great number of documents were overclassified. Officers authorized to classify information should be thoroughly informed of the classification criteria as outlined in existing directives.
c. The handling by lower echelons of all cases involving the transfer of personnel restricted to non-sensitive duties must be expedited. Lateral dissemination of this personnel information by agencies outside the theater is essential in similar situations.
page created 10 January 2002
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