COMMUNICATIONS ZONE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST PERSONNEL
The principal concern of OB operations in KCOMZ was the enemy guerrilla forces which operated-from mountain strongholds within the Communications Zone. Also of concern were enemy forces in the forward areas. KCOMZ was charged with the logistical support of Eighth Army's efforts in the battle zone. The Communications Zone's area of responsibility adjoined the-rear boundary of Eighth Army. Consequently, it was determined that OB data on enemy forces in the battle zone as compiled by Eighth Army would be maintained by KCOMZ. It was recognized early that OB data on each of the above-cited enemy forces must be maintained and correlated with the over-all intelligence operation; e.g., enemy guerrilla activities within the Communications Zone conceivably and frequently were influenced by enemy activities in the battle zone.
Personnel assigned to OB duties were thoroughly trained in the 0B aspects of enemy forces within and without the Korean Communications Zone, with special emphasis on the interrelationship of the two as it affected the KCOMZ mission. Subsequently, close supervision was given particularly to that portion of the periodic intelligence reports which outlined guerrilla capabilities to insure proper consideration of these capabilities with respect to enemy operation in the battle zone.
School-trained intelligence personnel further qualified by on-the-job 0B training have proved effective in meeting KCOMZ requirements. In a G-2 section of limited size with varied intelligence requirements it is necessary that OB personnel be qualified in other phases of intelligence work.
The over-all logistical mission of KCOMZ did not require a considerable amount of rapid photo interpretation. The need for photo interpreters was therefore too infrequent to justify provisions for PI spaces in the KCOMZ TD. However, it was still necessary to provide for this service when the need arose.
In co-ordination with Eighth Army, a procedure wee established wherein aerial photo requests originating in KCOMZ were forwarded to Eighth Army for action. On those occasions when it could be determined that photo interpretation of the prints was advisable, the aerial photo mission was accompanied by a request for an interpretation of the prints. This latter request outlined the specific information which was desired through photo interpretation. The procedure outlined in this paragraph proved effective. PI requests forwarded by KCOMZ were, without exception, fully processed and expeditiously returned to Eighth Arty.
Attendant to the activation of KCOMZ a considerable number of intelligence requirements were imposed by Headquarters AFFE in the form of Essential Elements of Information. It was therefore necessary that KCOMZ not only determine the apportionment of the intelligence requirements upon its collection agencies (subordinate commands and
supporting intelligence agencies), but also to establish a priority system on each EEI to emphasize the need for certain types of information over other types.
Collection and confiscation of captured documents were a command responsibility; therefore, appropriate collection procedures were established and promulgated. The preponderance of captured and confiscated documents processed by KCOMZ were of bandit origin; however, POWs were another Source. An SOP was prepared which contained detailed
instructions for the collection, handling, and processing of documents.
During a period of over a year, this procedure proved to be a practical and positive measure very adaptable to the KCOMZ intelligence mission. In actual practice, intelligence derived through captured documents was given rapid and complete dissemination.
Concurrent with the activation of KCOMZ a technical intelligence detachment was attached to the Command with the primary mission of examining, processing and disposing of captured and abandoned enemy materiel (CEM). However, this technical intelligence detachment was of insufficient strength to handle physically, in addition to its other responsibilities, the collection of all CEM in the Communications Zone. KCOMZ, in accordance with theater policy, fixed responsibility for prompt report of CEM upon each subordinate command. Reports were forwarded through intelligence channels to the Technical Intelligence Co-ordinator (TIC) G-2 Section, KCOMZ. The appropriate technical service in KCOMZ was then notified of the location and quantity of CEM by the TIC. The technical intelligence service co-ordinated with G-4, KCOMZ evacuated the CEM to the designated collecting points.
Bandit and guerrilla forces normally disposed themselves in approximately thirteen separate areas within the Communications Zone. These forces occupied remote mountain strongholds and/or areas from which they periodically emerged for brief periods to raid, loot, capture, and kill. Identity and strength of their raiding parties was difficult in view of the fact that they generally wore nondescript native garb and utilized hit-and-run tactics. Hence, infiltration into their target areas was relatively simple. During the excitement of the looting and the killing that followed, it was often difficult to differentiate between the raider and his victims. The raiders scattered and deployed from the target area at the conclusion of each
mission. Consequently, a rough estimate of the strength and identity of raiding parties was only an approach to accurate assessment. Another complexity was the hesitance of local natives, including victims, to admit knowledge of any information pertaining to the guerrillas and bandits; their fear of reprisal was often greater than their sense of duty.
Close liaison was established with those special security units of the ROK National Police and ROKA who were charged with the responsibility of eliminating bandit and guerrilla forces. The commanders of these security units were advised to stress to their personnel the necessity for capturing prisoners rather than accomplishing one-hundred percent kills as was frequently the case during the earlier stages of anti-guerrilla operations. Subsequent captures conclusively proved to the anti-guerrilla forces the value of information, including OB, which was obtainable from captured personnel. This information, evaluated with intelligence from other sources (e.g., KMAG, CIC), produced reasonably accurate OB data. While not entirely complete, the OB information obtained utilizing the above method was within economy of force limitations, sufficient to meet intelligence requirements.
CO-ORDINATION AND LIAISON
In order for KCOMZ to provide the maximum effective intelligence coverage it was essential that G-2 co-ordination and liaison be established with adjacent as well as subordinate commands. In some cases adjacent commands overlapped geographically with KCOMZ, e.g., KMAG, KCAC, Fifth Air Force, and ROKA. In addition to continued co-ordination with Eighth Army, other agencies frequently co-ordinated with were the US Embassy, US Army Attache, CCRAFE, UNCREG, and UNCMAC.
As frequently as feasible the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, KCOMZ or his representative visited the intelligence officers of adjacent commands. The proximity of Hq KMAG, Hq ROKA, Fifth Air Force Rear, and the US Army Attache, all located in Taegu, considerably facilitated close liaison. Regional commanders of the 704th CIC Detachment (operationally under G-2, KCOMZ) were directed to effect liaison with various intelligence echelons within the KCOMZ area including OSI, ROK NP, and ROK CIC. Because of frequent efforts to curtail UNC intelligence efforts, and its tendency to guard jealously sovereign privileges, intelligence co-ordination and liaison with ROK agencies was in many cases handicapped. Within security limitations, on-the-spot telephone co-ordination was continually utilized. As appropriate, and particularly in the case of G-2, Eighth Army, pertinent spot and recurring intelligence reports, communicated to higher headquarters were mutually exchanged through information copy distribution on messages, e.g., Daily SITREP and daily reply to special AFFE EEI. Intelligence publications, reports, etc., were exchanged with all interested agencies.
In a relatively small G-2 Section, covering a large geographical area with the intelligence complexities of Korea, it is essential to operate on an SOP basis with a well-organized group of highly qualified officers and enlisted men. Developed methods of co-ordination and liaison proved very adequate but could have been more effective had the G-2 section, KCOMZ been organized under a larger T/D.
page created 10 January 2002
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