Reconnaissance aircraft sightings which promised to affect the ground tactical situation were reported by VHF communications to the Corps G-2. Some difficulty was encountered in maintaining radio contact between the reconnaissance aircraft and the Corps G-2. Corps G-2 Air is normally a considerable distance behind the front lines, usually located at the Corps FSCC or at Corps headquarters. The problem was particularly acute in the mountainous region in the eastern part of the front. The line-of-eight characteristics of VHF radio, as wall as the practice of locating Corps FSCCs and headquarters behind large hill masses, contributed substantially to this problem. Antenna remoting equipment has proved inadequate in Korea.

It was recommended that the VHF and UHF radio remoting equipment be improved to overcome the line-of-sight communications limitations caused by the terrain obstacles. The solution is sound, but unless the G-2 Air is at the FSCC and unless the pilot checks in, no amount of VHF or UHF will solve the problem. The most pressing problem between reconnaissance and communications with Corps G-2 Air was that many pilots did not check in with the FSCC when passing over the area.

The Army AGL Communications Center was located approximately five miles from the Air Force Headquarters and constituted a bottleneck in the transmission of immediate requests from the field commanders to the JOC.


The delivery problem is undoubtedly one of the most difficult deficiencies to correct in the over-all PI operations, in that travel


time of the photographs from the PI to the requesting unit is too great. All phases of PI have been shortened by finding better methods and newer innovations, but the greatest hindrance to date is still the delivery of photographs to the requesting unit. Photographs flown in the morning may be of value to a requesting unit only until that evening, in which case it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to help the requesting unit. Various circumstances such as weather, transportation, and limited facilities hindered the expedition of the photographs.

During the large-scale attacks in July 1953 and the Army-wide CPX held in December 1953, intelligence production was not delayed by the tendency to report too many details. PI reports were typewritten, listing each installation discovered on the photo and their co-ordinates with a description and type of activity noted.

An overlay, with a brief written summary of the defensive installations found on each photo mission was substituted for the typewritten report.


page created 10 January 2002

Return to the Table of Contents

Return to CMH Online