ARMY-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
ORDER Of BATTLE
During active operations in Korea there were often areas or units in North Korea which were not reported to the Army OB Branch for long periods of time. In order for Eighth Army to maintain a current and accurate record of the enemy situation, definite intelligence information on those areas or units was required.
In order to maintain a complete, current, and accurate description of enemy strength and capabilities, it is necessary that information be obtained at periodic intervals concerning enemy forward, immediate reserve, and rear arena. Information from these arena meat be obtained with sufficient frequency to detect movement of enemy troops and to reveal concentrations of supply and support units. The mutual co-operation of collection agencies and Order of Battle personnel on an informal basis should facilitate the maintenance of an accurate portrayal of enemy strength and equipment.
The various forces composing the Eighth Army brought together a heterogeneous collection of languages and customs; many times these factors caused delays in information required by higher headquarters. Failure to report unfavorable information because of face saving and failure to realize the importance of passing on information to higher headquarters were principal difficulties.
Indoctrination and training courses were instituted to imbue the Allies with the importance of submitting timely and accurate information as well as to promote a better understanding among those who comprised the UNC forces. Informal staff visits were made to
lower echelons during periods when action was slow in order to learn their problem and to encourage and assist subordinate units. Liaison teams were dispatched to lower echelons during periods of activity to assist in the timely and accurate reporting of information.
Numerous measures have been taken to overcome the language and customs barrier and to promote a better appreciation of timely intelligence on the part of ROK forces; ROK intelligence training was checked and helpful advice and assistance was rendered ROK intelligence personnel. The Eighth Army Weekly Intelligence Summary was translated into the Korean language, effecting a better exchange of information between US and ROK forces. ROK G-2 personnel were oriented and briefed on the functions of the various branches of Eighth Army G-2. Army G-2 rendered valuable assistance to the ROK personnel in establishing the G-2 organizational structure of the ROK Field Army.
EVALUATION OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
Covert agents in many cases were unable to penetrate the security screen of the CCF installations during the period 1 November 1952 to 27 July 1953. Causes included racial differences, the language barrier, and tightened security measures. As a result, full information on enemy Order of Battle and of enemy troop movements could not be obtained.
Continuous training of covert agents was emphasized, as well as improvement in operational procedures, reaction of mass-type operations, and a continued careful selection and training of operational-type personnel. During the last phase of operations in Korea, continued emphasis on the production of tactical information of immediate importance wee the mission of all covert agencies of the Eighth Army. The effect of centralized control over covert agencies and close
co-ordination and liaison between these agencies and Eighth Army was reflected in the increased volume and worth of intelligence information received. Increased scope of operation continued to build up a clearer picture of the tactical situation confronting UNC forces in Korea.
page created 10 January 2002
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