Endnotes for The Introduction

1 General Marshall had been ordered to Washingon to serve as Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division in July 1938, and in October 1938 became Deputy Chief of Staff. He was appointed Chief of Staff in September 1939.

2 The fullest account of peacetime military preparations is contained in Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950) (hereafter cited as Prewar Plans and Preparations). See also: (1) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953) (hereafter cited as Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942), Chs. I-IV; and (2) Maurice Matloff, "Prewar Military Plans and Preparations, 1939-41," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol, 79, No. 7 (July 1953)

3 John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York. The Viking Press, 1947), PP. 319-20.

4 For a discussion of American prewar strategic planning culminating in the evolution of the RAINBOW plans, see: (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Chs. I-III; (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. IV; (3) Stetson Conn and Bvron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959).

5 Interv, Dr. Sidney Mathews, Maj Roy Lamson, and Maj David Hamilton with Gen Marshall, 25 Jul 49, OCMH files.

6 The ARCADIA Conference is discussed at length in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. V. At the conference a fixed distinction between the terms "Joint" and "Combined" was adopted. Henceforth "Joint" applied to intersetvice affairs in the United Kingdom or the United States, and "Combined" to British-American collaboration.

7 Admiral Leahy had served as governor of Puerto Rico and ambassador to France after his retirement as Chief of Naval Operations in 1939. In 1942 the President appointed him Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Admiral King had become Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in December 1941 and in 1942 was also designated Chief of Naval Operations. General Arnold became Chief of the Air Corps in 1938, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) in 1940, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in 1942.

8 Field Marshal Dill had served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1940-41. In 1941 he became head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

9 For accounts of ABC Conference and ABC-1 see (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, ch. XII; and (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. III.

10 Chart, "Ultimate Requirements-Ground Forces," App II, Pt II, Sec 1, JB 355, ser 707.
The Victory Program is discussed in (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XI; (2) Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logisics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955), Ch. V. See also William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953) PP. 735-42.

11 For the initial Victory Program estimates, the newly established Air War Plans Division prepared a plan known as AWPD/1. This plan, calling for over 2,000,000 men and some 60,000 combat planes, contained the blueprint of AAF wartime expansion and embodied its strategic faith. In the opinion of the air planners, it was doubtful if a large-scale invasion of Europe could be launched before the spring of 1944. The invasion would coincide with the climax of the bombing offensive. The air planers went further and expressed the belief that if the air offensive were successful, a land offensive light not be necessary. Even though these views ere not entirely consistent with those of the War Department, General Marshall and the Army plan-is approved AWPD/1, which became the "bible" of air planners. (For a detailed discussion of WPD/1, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, Plans and Early Operations-January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948) (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF 1), 131-32, 146-17, 149-50, 594, 599-600.)

12 For an elaboration of the points that follow, including the evolution of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, the consequent Anglo-American debate, and the eventual decision to launch TORCH, See: (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Chs. VIII, XII and XIII; (2) Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (rev. ed.) (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950), Chs. XXIII and XXV; (3) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), Ch. XVII; (4) Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), Book I, Chs. 18 and 22, and Book II, Ch. 2; and (5) Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, Collins, 1952), Ch. V.

13 Secretary Stimson had been Secretary of War in 1911-13; Governor-General of the Philippines in 1927,-29; and Secretary of State in 1929-33. In July 1940 he again became Secretary of War.

14 Notations by Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.
General Eisenhower had served as assistant to the military adviser of the Philippine Islands from 1935 to 1940. In June 1941 he became chief of staff of the Third Army. He joined the War Plans Division of the War Department in December 1941 and became chief of that division in February 1942.

15 Notations by Eisenhower, 20 Apr 42 entry, Item OPD Hist Unit File. For the evolution of the Operations Division into General Marshall's global command post in World War II, see Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951) (hereafter cited as Cline, Washington Command Post).
Eisenhower had been promoted to the rank of major general on 27 March 1942.

16 After serving in the war Plans Division from 1936 to 1940, General Handy returned in 1941 and served as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group until he succeeded Eisenhower in June 1942 as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division.

17 For the effects of TORCH on postponing convoy sailings to the USSR along the northern route, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. XIV.

18 General Stilwell had commanded the III Corps in California in December 1941 and in early 1942 took part in the preliminary planning for a North African operation. In February 1942 he was appointed Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Chinese Theater of Operations, Burma and India. Stilwell was promoted to lieutenant general on 25 February 1942.

19 Figures based on: (1) USAF Statistical Digest, 1947, pp. 2-12; (2) STM-30, 1 Jan 48; and (3) OPD Weekly Status Map, 31 Dec 42. According to the STM-30 computation, total forces deployed in the war against Japan-including Alaska and CBIamounted to 464,868. Forces deployed against the European Axis Powers -including Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf Service Command - numbered 377,644.

20 For the impact of shipping and other logistical factors on Army planning and the constant struggle to match ends and means in 1942, see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43.

21 Stalin's position evidently represented a change of mind, since in September 1941 he had asked for twenty-five to thirty divisions to be sent from Great Britain to Archangel or through Iran to the southern front in the USSR. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 462-63.

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