Endnotes for Chapter XV
1 The composite conference was usually referred to by the code name SEXTANT, although SEXTANT properly referred only to the meetings at Cairo. EUREKA was the code name given to the interim meetings at Tehran.
2 Ltr, Barker, Deputy COSSAC, for Handy, 17 Nov 43, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5.
3 The general background Of SEXTANT, including the oft-told stories of security leaks and the narrow escape during the voyage to Cairo of the USS Iowa from a torpedo accidentally discharged by one of the accompanying U.S. escort vessels, is briefly recounted in the published memoirs and biographies of a number of the principal American participants: (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 766-70; (2) Leahy, I Was There, pp, 193-99; (3) King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 499-502; (4) Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 453-59. For negotiations on the location of the conference, see also Hull, Memoirs, II, 1292-96, 1303, 1306, 1311. For preparations on the British side, see Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 300-33.
4 General Roberts had succeeded Wedemeyer as chief Army planner on 11 September 1943. Roberts had been promoted to brigadier general on 6 November 1943.
5 (1) A brief summary of Army and joint staff preparations for SEXTANT is contained in Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 226-28. (2) To help brief General Handy for the Cairo conference, the Operations Division gathered a variety of data relating to plans, command, operations, deployment, and logistics. These were assembled in one book, an abbreviated version of books prepared by OPD for earlier conferences. See OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6. (3) For the detailed story of Army staff preparations for Cairo, see especially: ABC 337 (18 Oct 43), 1-A; ABC 337 (7 Dec 43); Item 12a, Exec 5; and Item 15, Exec 5.
6 See PP. 311-12, above. 
7 Min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43. Marshall's argument for flexibility and adaptability in order to attain his major strategic objectives was not a new characteristic. He bad revealed these same qualities earlier in the year in advocating an earlier date for HUSKY and in recommending AVALANCHE. See Ch. VII, above.
8 Min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43. Admiral Leahy was more pessimistic and voiced his fear that it would take more than a year after Germany's defeat to subdue the Japanese. The JCS official appreciation of the European situation, submitted several days later at Cairo to the British, contained no estimate of the date of possible German collapse. It predicted that Germany, still possessing formidable strength, would fight hard as long as hope for a negotiated peace existed. See CCS 300/3, 18 Nov 43, title: Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944-Europe. 
9 (1) JCS 581, 9 Nov 43, title: Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan 1944. (2) JCS 581 / 1, 16 Nov 43, same title. (3) Min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43. (4) Min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43.
10 (1) Min, mtg President and JCS, 15 Nov 43. This meeting, as well as that of the 19th, was held aboard USS Iowa, with the President, Harry Hopkins, Generals Marshall and Arnold, Admirals Leahy and King, and Rear Adm. Wilson Brown, Naval Aide to the President, present. (2) JCS 558, 1 Nov 43, title: United Nations Strategy in the Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean Region. (3) JCS 558/ 1, 5 Nov 43, same title.
11 For the staff shipboard discussions on command in advance of the meeting with the President, see min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43.
12 (1) Memo, Handy for CofS, 4 Nov 43, sub: Formation of Two French Brigades for Operations in West Pacific, with JCS 547 in ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), (2) Memo, Donnelly, Secy JPS, for Bieri, Gen Hansell, Gen Roberts, Capt Doyle, USN, 7 Nov 43, sub: The Distribution of French Ground and Air Forces in the Various Theaters of Operations and the Rearmament of French Air and Naval Forces, with JCS 561 in ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43). (3) Memo, Col G. A. Lincoln for Gen Hull, 21 NOV 43, same sub, with JCS 547 in ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43).
13 Min, mtg President and JCS, 15 Nov 43. 
14 For background discussions of the staff, see especially: (1) min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43; (2) min, 125th mtg JCS, 18 Nov 43; and (3) min, 126th mtg JCS, 19 Nov 43. Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion that follows is based on min, mtg President and JCS, 19 Nov 43. What is apparently a preliminary informal version of the formal recorded minutes is contained in Item 11, Exec 2. A partial record of the minutes is also filed with CCS 320 in ABC 384 NW Europe (20 Aug 43), 1-A.
15 On 23 November General Marshall submitted the requested statistics to the President. These carried forward the breakdown of U.S. versus British deployment from the current point (22 November 1943) to 1 July 1944. In general they showed the projected steady increase in total strength of American forces deployed overseas-for all branches while those of the British forces overseas would remain, except for a slight increase in Navy personnel, almost constant during the period. At the second plenary session at Cairo the President read out the figures. See: (1) memo, CofS for President, 23 Nov 43, no sub, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5; and (2) min, 2d plenary mtg, SEXTANT, 24 Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Book. For the statistical breakdown see App. A.
16 For the background papers on RANKIN and for staff discussions on that operation on board the Iowa, see especially: (1) JCS 577, 8 Nov 43, title: Europe-wide "RANKIN"; (2) JPS 321, 10 Nov 43, same title; (3) JCS 577/1, 16 Nov 43, same title; (4) JCS y77/2, 17 Nov 43, same title: (5) min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43; and (6) min, 125th mtg JCS, 18 Nov 43.  
17  The map is filed in item 11, Exec 2. At the conclusion of the meeting the map was handed to General Marshall who in turn gave it to General Handy the same day.
18 Memo, T. T. H. [Handy], 19 Nov 43, sub: RANKIN, Item 11, Exec 2. This is General Handy's record of the information given him by General Marshall on 19 November after the meeting of the JCS with the President. The existing record of the minutes of the conference is somewhat confusing on the question of the occupation of Berlin. It contains the puzzling statement, attributed to the President, "The United States should have Berlin." This, of course, may have been garbled in notation. 
19 Min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43.
20 Leahy, I Was There, p. 198.
21 Min, 126th mtg JAS, 19 Nov 43.
22 There was little explicit discussion of specific Pacific operations in the staff meetings with the President on board ship. Since the Pacific was viewed as an area of primary American responsibility, differences over specific undertakings were not likely to emerge in forthcoming discussions with the Allies, on which the President's interest was then focused.
23 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 770. (2) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 197.
24 (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 196. (2) King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 504.

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